RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON

SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

2014-09-23 | A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

Per Curiam:
FACTS:

In the middle of 2013, the “pork barrel scam” controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country. Some
government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged
mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. Among the said personalities who allegedly
transacted with Mrs. Napoles was the incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong.

The Kevlar Case:

 Based on the testimonies of Benhur Luy, Marina Sula and Aries Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the
charges against the respondent, as follows:
o Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
o Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal;
o Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her acquittal;
o Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (11) checks, each amounting to
P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she
deposited in her personal account
o Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles
 Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of
the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the
said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that
he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any
social event hosted by her.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

 Respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were
instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth. In fact, their answers to the undersigned's
probing questions were consistent with their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-
examination, they did not waver or falter. It was found that the two whistle blowers are credible witnesses and their
story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses and therefore found
unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.
 Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function. It is not
misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member
of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports
Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.
 Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges must
ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Justice Gregory Ong is guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty and impropriety, thus violating the
New Code of the Judicial Conduct.

COURT’S RULING:

 The Court ADOPTED the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been defined as "out of all
measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.
 The Court agree with Investigating Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during
the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes
GROSS MISCONDUCT notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of
the said judgment.
 Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official
duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. A judge who extorts money from a party-
litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct and the Court has condemned such act in
the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.
  The evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both
Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal
in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
 Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, the Court found credible
evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the
circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the
public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two
occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles.
 Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was GROSSLY IMPROPER
and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1,
2004.

 A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes
this appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.
 Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and
impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "Propriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge."

 In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge.
Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for
acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's
association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially
involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less
than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. The Court cannot, by any
stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.
 The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint
was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of DISHONESTY, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
 Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray."Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

AMRTJ-15-2405: Ascano vs Jacinto

Date: 12 January 2015
Ponente: Sereno, CJ

Facts: Petitioners accused respondent Judge of having acted with bias and partiality in favor of Mayor Villarosa for having
disallowed 500 witness from the courtroom and for having ordered the lifting of a TRO in favor of the mayor.
Petitioners claimed that during the hearings, respondent “argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused and admonished
petitioners without basis or justification.” They further claimed that respondent judge asked complainants “confusing and
misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the
cause of their adversary.”

Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire community of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is identified with the causes, friends, and allies of the latter. Thus,
complainants filed the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of Judicial
Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

Issues: (1) Whether or not acts of the respondent judge constituted violations of RA 3019; (2) Whether or not respondent
judge violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling: (1) Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and partiality. Mere suspicion
that a judge is partial is not enough. Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality. The
circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited “manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence” in the discharge of his judicial functions, as required by Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued
the Order lifting the TRO.
This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from the mere fact that he did
not allow the “more than 500 members” who accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the courtroom. As
indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this huge group could have
been accommodated inside.

(2) As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’
witness. Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which reads:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges
shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, viz:It is reprehensible for a judge to
humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all
times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control.
The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.This Court likewise
finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

TOPIC: ERRORS COMMITTED BY A JUDGE IN THE EXERCISE OF ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS CANNOT BE

CORRECTED THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS BUT SHOULD BE ASSAILED INSTEAD THROUGH
JUDICIAL REMEDIES

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.

JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.

FACTS: The complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of
the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave
Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period
and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as
rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation
receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law
firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11,
2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila)
and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for
SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the
respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise
of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that
she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge and
presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and, at the same time, as her
financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCP’s
expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion
to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIB’s
witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent
denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his
every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking
for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court’s power to approve the
rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor and made comments
and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement in the case.

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the respondent
committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and
posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with
her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a
brassiere.

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the
complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not supported by
evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in nature,
hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a
judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared
Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account
contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.

ISSUE:

WON respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. 3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA PROBLEM
AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

RULING:

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on the
respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of
the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary
hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless
about.

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors
correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge
where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in
the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead
through judicial remedies.24

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were
grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s
predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare
allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus
conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and
partiality must fail.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption,
dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare
accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed32
and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is
FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further
acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

TOPIC: IMMORALITY AND IMPROPER USE BY A JUDGE OF THE HALL OF JUSTICE

DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO

vs.

JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17

FACTS: Complainant alleged in her complaint that respondent: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly his chamber, as his
residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his staff, especially by a former Utility Worker of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of the same station, Dyndee Nuñez (Nuñez); (c) used the court process server, Benjamin Pepito
(Pepito), as his personal driver; (d) delegated his work load tohis legal researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape (Atty. Mape), because
he could no longer attend to the same due to his many vices; (e) committed gross ignorance of the law when, in one criminal
case that he handled, he proceeded to trial and allowed the private complainant to testify in open court even if the accused
was not assisted by counsel, and furthermore, extorted money from the accused in the amount of P200,000.00; (f) asked for
gasoline, personal allowance, and other benefits from the local government; and (g) failed to decide cases within the
prescribed 90-day period because he was waiting for litigants to offer him monetary consideration.

In response to the OCA’s 1st Indorsement4 dated February 13, 2009 directing him to comment on the complaint, respondent
submitted an undated comment denying all accusations against him. In particular, respondent maintained that he: (a) could
not be residing at the Hall of Justice as he was already renting a vacant house near the same during his tenure as judge of
the RTC; (b) had no mistress, explaining that the woman that often goes inside his office was his caterer who brought him
food; (c) merely requested to hitchhike with Pepito from Palompon to Ormoc City and viceversa on Mondays and Fridays
since the latter synchronized his process serving to litigants and lawyers of Ormoc City on such days; (d) personally
prepared his decisions as Atty. Mape only assisted him with legal research; (e) indeed allowed trial to proceed without the
accused being assisted by counsel in that criminal case pointed out by the complainant, but only because the accused
violated the three (3)-day rule of filing postponements and failed to inform the adverse party of such intention, and that he
never extorted money from the accused; and (f) never asked for gasoline allowance, but nevertheless affirmed that he, like
all other local officials, received allowances from the local government. Further, respondent averred that as of January 9,
2009, he had already been separated from service due to compulsory retirement.

The Investigating Justice of the OCA found respondent guilty of violating the prohibition on not using the hall of justice as
residence and guilty of immorality. He was then fined 40,000.

ISSUE: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular
No. 3-92 inrelation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.

HELD: YES.

SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for functions related to the
administration of justice and for no other purpose. Similar thereto, Section 3, PartI of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for
similar restrictions regarding the use of the Halls of Justice, to wit:

Sec. 3. USE OF [Halls of Justice] HOJ. Sec. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public
Attorneys, Probation and ParoleOfficers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of Deeds, including their support personnel.

Sec. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall not be used for residential, i.e., dwelling or
sleeping, or commercial purposes.

Sec. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar beverage, shall not be allowed in the HOJ.20(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as
his residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both the Investigating Justice and the OCA, respondent’s
defense that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is
possible that a person could be renting one place while actually and physically residing in another.

Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of Immorality.1âwphi1 Immorality has been
defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions
of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Celso L. Mantua of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 is found
GUILTY of Immorality and violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC. Accordingly, he is
hereby meted the penalty of a FINE in the amount of P40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted from the retirement
benefits due him.

THE CONDUCT OF A JUDGE MUST BE FREE OF A WHIFF OF IMPROPRIETY NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO
HIS PERFORMANCE OF HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES, BUT ALSO TO HIS BEHAVIOR OUTSIDE HIS SALA AND AS A
PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 February 4, 2015

JILL M. TORMIS vs. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES

Facts: Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review. She
averred that in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis),then
Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage
scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge,
corrupt, and ignorant of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one session,
Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis),son of Judge Tormis,
stating that he was a "court-noted addict.

She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her
about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and
transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis" (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was
suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release
of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who
reviewed the findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

In his Comment, Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases,
some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis;
that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis,
but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by
the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility. that there was nothing wrong in discussing
the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some were
even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the
executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, butshe resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his discussions in
class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother

Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the filing of the
present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere because she
could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent
discussions in class of her mother’s administrative cases

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a
"drug addict."
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder, dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss the marriage scams
in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal publications,
and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report,1 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations
by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record then. Considering the
gravity and the sensitive natureof the charges, a full-blown investigation should be conducted by the CA.

On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the
Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the records.11

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy.

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined
that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project
Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in
class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6
which stated that "Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but
in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary."16

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct
unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized
under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less thanP1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Issue: W/N Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct of unbecoming a judge

Held: Yes.

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty. Misconduct is defined as a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official
duties. Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge
Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as "misconduct." They are simply not related to the discharge
of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave
misconduct.

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and
penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances is admonition.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial Conduct provides: CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall
judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. The rationale for the rule was spelled is that courts
and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice
or sympathies. Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the
Court only on April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue
influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in
contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in
his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormisas a corrupt and
ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times.
Canon 4 instructs:

CANON 4 PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a
way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself,
the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint. Heshould choose his words and exercise more caution and control inexpressing himself. In other words, a judge
should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-
mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be
temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.26

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to use temperate
and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as
properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated
his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified
his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without
limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedomof expression, Judge Paredes should
uphold the good image of the Judiciary ofwhich he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks
in his discussions and should have been more circumspect inhis language. Beinga judge, he is expected to act with greater
circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of
a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary.1âwphi1Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. (Emphases supplied)

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not
a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior
outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in
private life should be above suspicion.

Atty. Melvin D.C. MANE vs Judge Medel Arnaldo B. BELEN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Calamba City

Carpio Morales, J.
By letter-complaint dated 19 May 2006 received by the Office of the Court Administrator, Atty. Mane charged Judge Belen of
“DEMEANING, HUMILIATING, AND BERATING” him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003-
C, “Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al” in which he was counsel for the plaintiff. To prove his claim, the
complainant cited the remarks by respondent in the course of the proceedings conducted on February 27, 2006 as
transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. De Guzman. The idea of the statement by the Court that was rendered demeaning,
humiliating, and berating according
to the complainant is that Judge Belen belittled the Manuel Quezon University graduate Atty. Mane because he did not
graduate from University of the Philippines. Therefore, he cannot equate himself to the judge. Complainant further claimed
that the entire proceedings were ‘duly recorded in a tape recorder’ by stenographer De Guzman and despite his motion (filed
on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the motion remained unacted
as of the date he filed the present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however, attached a copy of the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on February 27, 2006. Regarding on the complaint filed in compliance with the 1st Indorsement
dated May 31, 2006 of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an “Urgent Motion to
Inhibit”. Paragraph 3 of which was malicious and a direct assault to the integrity and dignity of the Court and of the Presiding
Judge” as it “succinctly implied that he issued the order dated 27 September 2005 for a consideration other than the merits
of the case.
On the unacted motion to furnish the complainant with a copy of the ‘unedited’ taped recording,
respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and 3 of the motion which to him, implied that the trial court was “illegally, unethically and
unlawfully engaged in ‘editing’ the transcript of records to favor a party litigant against the interest of complainant’s client.
Respondent, on the account of the two motions, ordered the complainant why he should not be cited for contempt
September 4, 2006 – complainant withdrew his complaint stating that it was a mere result of his impulsiveness November 7,
2007 – OCA evaluated the withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative complaint. The Court
should not be deprived of its authority to discipline court officials and personnel. Thus, the complainant’s withdrawal of the
instant complaint will not bar the continuity of the instant administrative proceeding against respondent Judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statements and actions made by the respondent judge during the subject February 27,
2006 hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
Ruling: YES it does.

Respondent did not deny the happening of the incident in the complaint.Respondent judge’s insulting statements which tend
to question complainant’s capability and credibility
stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated from UP Law School is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable.
A judge’s official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties, should be free from the appearance of
impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be temperate in his language. A judge should always
observe courtesy and civility. In addressing counsel, litigants and witnesses, the judge should avoid controversial tone or a
tone that creates animosity. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free to insult lawyers
and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is mark of culture and
good breeding.

Respondent opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a
judge. OCA recommended that the judge be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct with a
warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct – Judge
should be courteous and civil for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language during the hearing of a
case. Nor should he be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment. He may utilize his
opportunities to criticize and correct unprofessional conduct attorneys, brought to his attention but he may not do so in an
insulting manner.
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule – (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not
exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of
reprimand.
Anonymous v. Judge Achas
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013
JUDGE IMMORALITY

Facts: The Court received an anonymous letter-complaint alleging immorality and conduct unbecoming of a judge against
Judge Rio C. Achas. The letter calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge Achas and alleges that: (1) it
is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives
beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he
comes to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary consideration;
and (6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling. Judge Achas denied all the charges but admitted that he was married and
only separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having
inherited such from his forefathers.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Achas was immoral?

Held: Yes. Even if he was separated de factor from his legal wife for 26 years, the fact remains that he is still legally married
to his wife. It is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife. Such
is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary. For going out in public with a woman not his
wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by the Canon 2 and 4 (Integrity and Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for Philippine Judiciary

HON. JULIETA DECENA vs. JUDGE NILO MALANYAON, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669, 4/14/2004

FACTS: A session was conducted wherein revocation of two previous resolutions granting authority to operate a cockpit in
the locale was being deliberated. Respondent, whose nephew-in-law was one of the cockpit operators, heckled and
interrupted the session by hurling various accusatory remarks and insults (such as “lies, they are lies”, “Lies! Can you do that
even if they are lies? Even if you are being deceived?”) at the council members. Municipal officials later filed a joint affidavit-
complaint for Respondent’s dismissal and disbarment. Respondent admitted his presence during the council session, but
contended that he was not drunk and that he was there merely in his private capacity as a taxpayer.
RULING: Respondent FINED P20,000 for conduct unbecoming of a judge in violation ofCanon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule
2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; with STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or a similar act or omission
in the future will be dealt with more severely. His actuations constitute palpable violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
that, “a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities (Canon 2)”, “a judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01)”; “a judge
shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office
shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge(Rule 2.03)”.
Respondent needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not terminate at the end of the day when he takes off his
judicial robes. Even when garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority and moral
ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala.
A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Indeed, the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 2 in particular, mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities, as well as behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Thus,
the Court has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaon’s suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a taxpayer or
ordinary citizen and not as that of a judge. In fact, his utterances were not made under a cloak of anonymity, for the
members of the council, as well as some of the people in the gallery knew very well that he was a judge. It is highly
probable that his invectives took on a greater imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a judge, with all the
authority attendant to the office.