Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I.

Gil Muñoz) 1

Formal and Dialectical Logic (The Form of Presentation)

Preface: 1) Contradistintion between D.L. and F.L. (formal, mathematical, symbolic and logistic)
2) This is elaborated with the aim of developing a research program 3) He will only deal with
predicate calculus not with: relational, propositional, and conjunctual.

I) Types of propositions: formal and dialectical

I.1)Here we will examine formal and dialectical Propositions, before the machinery of formal
and dialectical logic may begin to operate it will be in need of what we will call basic
prelogical material (the way we informally talk to one another). So, what would basic pre-
logical material would look like?

Basic pre-logical material may be found in expressions such as “it rains: bad weather”, “Plato
reasons (engages in rational thought: the Spanish reads: Platon razona), Socrates dialogued
(enter into dialogue in the following manner) in the simplest of manners”

I.2) Material that has been adapted, that is ready to be worked upon the machinery of
formal and dialectical logic, to dialectical and formal logic can be found in expressions such
as: A)“Plato is rational”, B)“Socrates is dialoguer” (in Spanish “Socrates es (is) dialogador”
(the verb is nounified in Spanish: to if you engage in “dialogue” you may be not only
someone that enters in dialogue, but a “dialoguer”) C)”It is humid today” (Hoy (today) es (is)
dia (day) humedo (humid)

D)”Plato is humanly rational” (Platon es (is) humanante (in a humane manner) rational”
(when he reasons he does so the way a particular mammal known as woman/men do)

E)Socrates is constantly simple-like dialogador (dialoguer). In Spanish “Socrates es (is)

constantemente (constantly: a new adjective, a new determination added to what follows)
sencillo (simple-like) dialogador (a person that engages in dialogue. I looked on google
translator, but it simply returns, its machinery, :dialogue. You cannot noun-nify the verb in
English sometimes)

(Notice how we begin with simple examples and begin to add adjetives, qualities,
determinations to the subject, on the way to become more contrete in a way. So from Plato
is rational to he is not only rational but rational in a very specific way: we add another
feature, dimension to something that was empty etc)

F)Today is an exceptionally hot day (Spanish: Hoy (today) es (is) dia (day) excepcionalmente
(exceptionally) caliente (hot)
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 2

G)”Plato is a philosopher” (Spanish: Platon es (is) filosofo (philosopher)). Now he will add
determinations to the right side. So, we get “Platon es (is) filosofo (philosopher) griego
(greek). In English: “Platon is a greek philosopher” (Plato is greekly philolosopher, or, the
Spanish example “Platon es (is) grecamente (greekly, or, in a uniquely greek manner)
filosofo (philosopher), “Plato is an original (type of: innovative) philosopher” (Platon es (is)
filosofo (philosopher) original (original), Even more examples: “Plato is originalmente
(mainly a) filosofo (philosopher), or, Platon es (is) filosofo (philosopher) a su manner (in his
own way: like Sinatra). So “Plato is a philosopher in his own (unique) way”

I.3) He claims that the material upon which the machinery of formal and dialectical logic
may be considered to be in a “pre-logical” state because it is a type of, or, set of linguistics
elements that are in a state of mish-mash, bloque (block)

(imagine grabbing pieces of plastiline of different textures and colors and mixing them
together until you get a kinda block: not as pristine or sanitized as the way it could be if it
undergoes a process of sculpting (the metaphor for the machinery of logic): with fine sharp
instruments of work made out of metal, and all the instruments with which someone who
works with sculpture has at his or her disposal. That is the image he is going after with
“block” or “bloque”)

When we say “block” what we mean is that said material has not been put through the
machinery of logic: it is not analyzed, neither is it organized according to the categorical
“prism” (another way of saying machinery) of: 1) subject (expressly (explicitly put,
manifested “s”. The subject in grammar: “s”), 2)predicate (expressly (explicitly put,
manifested), “p”. The regular predicate is designated by a variable “p”, 3) expressed or
explicit stated “union” this operation of union between subject and predicate is explicitly
stated, and becomes operative through the usage of the verb “to be: ´is´ (es) ”.

He them claims that when we say things in everyday life like “Platon reasons” (is engage in
reason. You may substitute for “Plato thinks”. In spanish “Platon razona”), “Socrates
dialogaba” (Socrates was engaged in dialogue, or, Socrates was speaking, or, discursing(?))
you can see that there is not a clear demarcated line of separation between what it is that
one is to count, clearly delineate within the block on information as presented to us in a pre-
logical state, as the subject of the statement, and what the predicate of the statement is in
terms of it being the predicate and not being meshed in with something else. He says that
pre-logical material was called by Aristotle a type of material that is in a molten state
(fundido). Its meanings, and signifieds (significados (meanings, signifieds are fundidos)
meshed together in in a molten mess one with the other. It is a unity of things that has not
been individuated between subject and predicate in a clear manner. Think of the molten
mess of the big-bang, and how after it exploited elements individuated clearly into Galaxies,
Suns, planets, observing clear way of relating: gravity dependant upon mass etc, and other
laws of the universe. Each law articulated/working with one another, but clearly
individuated into, for, example, the three laws of Newton.
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 3

Now once we know what a “fundido” (molten block of linguistic expression) is we can
compare it to expression that are the output of our formal and dialogical machinery. So,
instead of molten messes that lack clarity as to where is the subject situated and where is
the predicate situated (in a explicit manner of course: that it may be revealed in the
sentence itself unlike “Plato thinks”, or “Platon razona”) our machinery delivers onto us
ecpressions like “A es (is) B” the latter type of expressions, the output of our machinery of
refining the molten raw linguistic material, is called “un (a) compuesto (composite)” in
formal logic “a compound statement”.

Here, in our output, everything acquires a clear, well formed, individuated shape. And this is
so since each thing (cada (each) thing (cosa)) by “thing” he means each “significado” (meaning, or,
signified, each element: subject and predicate) in found to occupy its proper place. This is
followed by the following expression in Spanish (lugar (place), categoria (category), function
de sujeto (function of the subject, function of the predicates, of vinculos (links): As es (is) Bp
(s = subject, and p = predicate)

I.4) The Material of F.L. and D.L. is artificial vis-a-vi the meaning that is encountered in its
fundido (unabstracted, all meshed in, neutral, or natural state). Moroever the artificial state in
which the previous molten state finds itself now lends itself to technical manipulation (you can
operate with it as with numbers I guess) (in Spanish (uso (usage) tecnico (technical). Technical
manipulation, or, being able to operate with them with our machinery of production of outputs
will display the feature of eficiencia (efficiency) especializada (specialized) and since out artificial
output will display this characteristic in it then it will be mas (more) potente (potent) and segura
(secure: in its accuracy) that the normal every day application of language may offer us.

“As es (is) Bp” can be then said to be an artifact – just as: a prism, lever, thermometer, ruler,
clock, car, cannals, matches…Their properties and the way they are presented to us as an output
of a process of work by a machinery are not natural; but they are real nevertheless. He wants to
lllustrate this point with the symbolism of cybernetic (computer) theory

Input (black box) Output

Raw Material S ( ), P( ),
Plato thinks “Plato is thinking”
( ) is ( )

Ex from computational theory

Assigning functional Roles.
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 4

Note: Inducto or Inductor: a substance that promotes an equilibrium reaction by reacting with
one of the substances produced.

(Inducto(r):) Logical Machinery (transformador logico) Output (Educto)

Plato philosophizes

Socrates dialogues S( ) P( ) (As es (is) Bp)

Teeteto calculates

Its cold ( ) es ( )

I.5) We will from now on turn our attention towards to the material that has been approprietly,
or, properly prepared for formal, and dialectical logic.

The form “As es (is) Bp “ may be found in two particular modes (may be found in two states. He
uses “states” as in “matter may be in solid or liquid states” = H20). The first modality is that of
indicated union

(“union indicada”: that is to say the verb “is” explicitly states the union between the subject
(now explicitly defined) and the predicate. It forms a statement, or, kind of minimal logical
statement out of which compound statement may be made)

The second modality in which we may encounter it is that of “verified union”. Ex: 1+2 the sum of
each numbers is held in a cryogenic state of “indicated” it has yet to be activated into a result.
So, it is an “indicated union” or “union indicada”. When we write “3” the union is verified. The
statement has shifted onto a state of “verified union”.

Another example: In (a+b) (a-b) = a2 – b2 once we replace a = 2, or, a for the number “2” and do
the same with “b”. So, “b” = 1 and proceed to carry out, set into motion (my italics: remember
Hegel is always hinting at the movements, motion of the dialectic) the set of indicated
operations (the sums and subsctrations) we get as a result 3 = 3. The fomula then finds itself in a
state of “verified union”.

It is verified in two senses: 1) One of the things that is explicitly manifested, stated, expressed is
the equality between the terms. He claims that the way this is explicated manifested has to be
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 5

given the name of “verified union” de (of) forma (form, type) externa (external): 3 = 3. The point
here I am guessing is that before we reached our 3 = 3 output we were inhabiting a state of
“indicated union” a static prior to any type or organized set of operations upon the material. It is
external to the empty implicit internal, and abstract form of an indicated set of operations. An
out put is the result, the fruits, exteriorized for us to see. Before this we had no idea what the
results where going to be: it was all implicit and internal and indicated, but I had to put the
machine of set of organized operations into motion to see what I would get on the other side. I
could not compute all those things in my head at the speed of light, immediately, without
blinking. It at least takes the minimal amount of time that it takes for the operations to take
place before I know. Before I see what lies at the other end. You can think of an even more
difficult equation and will have the same feeling of “I will only know the answer after I work
through all the set of operations before then I have no idea”.

2)What was also carried out was to fundir (to assemble together into a tight unit: a block. More
literally to melt together, blend together) into a block (a unit: a concrete unit he emphasizes)
the plularity of elements and relations (a,b, +, -, *, =) of the formula we were given. The block
(concrete unit) we obtain is “3 = 3”

(Sidenote: Does he not also mean “3 is 3” an identity has been formed between subject and
predicate)

Now a feature that is worth pointing out is that we cannot make our way back from “3 = 3 “ to
the original formula that gaves us this result

(tons of formulas may give you 3 = 3. You can come up in your heads with all the different ways
in which you could arrive to said result. Interesting no? It is its output, but you may not trace
back its roots in a sense. The rootlessness of Hegel´s approach kinda begins to announce itself in
this example. Which one is the root: the set of infinite possible functions or operations that is to
say no root)

In the formula “A es (is) B”, the union established by the verb to be in “is” to be redundant is:
indicated. Not one operation has yet to be carried out. So the type of unit that is brought forth
by the verb “is” once again, redundancy, is merely indicated, but not realized (no hecha (hecha =
made)

The point, clearly, is to verify it by making use of the machinery of F.L. (formal logic) and D.L.
(dialectical logic) without returning said unit to its original pre-logical molten-mesh state.

One has to admit that one of the ways to verify the union that is indicated by the “is” between
the subject and predicate, will carried out in the form of a hypothesis we will have about how
the connection is made
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 6

(You may have to go to the work of linguists to see what they have been able to empirically
verify about it. There is a thing called “binding theory” that is supposed to explain how all the
elements in a sentence are woven together, what mathematico-logico operations our minds
carry out, to bring forth verified units of meaning. But much of it is classified. I watched a 9 part
introduction to linguistics by a guy named Noam Chomsky in Catalonia Spain where he tried to
give arguments for a naturalistic approach to the study of language. It was attended by Phd´s in
linguistics, philosophers of language, computer scientists, mathematicians etc. But not a single
one of them asked the question: “Well, we now know that the approach by Quine, Dummett
and others is erroneous. Now show us how your theory has been empirically verified. Not a
single one asked the question: “What is the generative function that creates meaning.?” Or at
least the sections that have been verified empirically. In another talk about linguistics he
explained that he has to sell his work to private corporations, and the military. So this is
classified or private property. So, we do not know exactly, and the books one is offered that deal
with linguistics are probably 10yrs behind what is actually understood about this generative
function. Since this lies outside the reach of Bacca he says his explanation about the operations
that are carried out are only a hypothesis)

Ok back to Bacca,

“A es (is) a (B)” Ex: “Man is humanly rational” in Spanish “El Hombre (man) es (is) humanamente
(specifically human, humanly, in a very human way unlike other animals) racional (rational).
Another example he brings forth is: “El hombre (man) es (is) humanamente (humanly) vidente

(translates to “seer”, but it simply means that a person who is “vidente” is a person that is not
blind, but posseses the faculty of seeing. A person that sees. In this instance the verb “to see”
cannot be noun-nified. Or at least I forget what options there are in English for it. I know that
you noun-nify verbs like “run” = runner, jump = jumper (track and field), etc)

Platon (Plato) es (is) platonicamente (platonically) filosofo (philosopher). A good translation

would be “Plato is a platonically type/kind of philosopher”. Aristoteles es (is) a su manera (in his
own way) a philosopher. Circumference is in its own way a curve (circunferencia es a su manera
curva)

In each of the examples above the union between the subject (A) and the predicate (B) is
verified (queda hecha) through the advervial form, or, adjectival form of a ( ).

Other ways to verify that which is only being indicated (not yet operated upon material) by (may
we call it the operation of identity “is”? or not. I really do not know) by “is” could be:

1) A is c (B), 2) A is d [c (B)], 3) A is e {d[c(B)]}…;

Example of 1) would be: El hombre (man) es (is) vivientemente (vividly) racional (rational).

An example for 2) is El Hombre (man) es (is) sensitively (vividly) rational.

Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 7

An example for 3) Plato is an idealist, subtle y primero (first among many: first), or, Plato is the
first subtle idealist philosopher….; “2 is much less than 2100”, “The longitude of a body is spatio-
temporal, or, temporally-spatial)

𝜶−𝒗𝒕
α´´ = 𝟐
√𝟏− 𝒗𝟐
𝒄

“La duracion real (the real length of time) es (is) espacialmente (spatially) temporal (temporal)

𝒗
𝒕− 𝟐 𝒙
𝒄
T´(the real length of time) = (is) 𝟐
(spatio-temporal)
√𝟏− 𝒗
𝒄

Another example:“Velocidad es primera derivada de espacio en function de Tiempo” English:

“Velocity is first derivative of space as a function of time” written in formal logic:

V is e {d [c[b(t)]] I did not draw all the arrows from the proposition to the logical formula but
you get the sense of it.

Another example:

Lv = Lo (yum) (1/√ 1 – (v2/c2))

AS is a (Bp))

e {.}, d {.} , c {.}… are to be considered “predicate of predicates, or functions of other functions,
or operation of operations” not unlike if we were to have a, a(x),[a(x)]2, log(a(x))2 etc

Finally, quisi-final form (forma semi-final)

A is a {….e{d[e(B)]}}, “Plato is platonically the first subtle…(a number of adjetives, predicates you
could add: a ton) philosopher”; “2 is the first, and only-par-prime number….”
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 8

II Contraposicion (comparing) of Formal (f.l.) and Dialectical Logic (D.L.)

Let us enumerate and develop the characteristics of formal logic (F.L.) and dialectical logic (D.L.)
from the point of view of I (formal and dialectical propositions above)

(II.1) Formal Logic accepts as characteristic, as typical the form “As is Bo” 1) What we aim to say
with this is that in F.L. the union that is to be realized by the verb “is” remains in a state of
simply being “indicated” it has yet to be activated to produce a new logico-liguistic unit or
meaning. It is not verified.2) The forms/propositions “A is c(B)”, “A is d[c(B)}” are to be treated
in the same manner as “A is B” as they relate to truth values of: true, false, and the possible set
the operations that one may perform upon them. We will deal with this matter shortly. 3) The
proposition “A is A”, or “As is Ap” are to be understood as propositions that will go under the
heading of “simple union” (union simple) (the identity of A with itself even though A occupies in
the second proposition both places: that of subject and that of predicate). It is to be understood,
then, that they will go under the heading of “simple unions” and not “double union”
(potenciada, enhanced in potency type of union), and they will fail to go under said heading,
because in F.L. “A” as a subject will not affect “A” when it occupies the position of predicate.
They will not relate, connect, or produce in a combustion of productivity something else. They
are separated and will not affect each other.

Now when it comes to: A is a(B), or, “As is a(B)p “ we may say of them that their union is
double,or, double unions. 1) What follows is sort of dense, but I hope you will get it if not ask
me. He says: 1) The same, as it regards only itself, serves its role of subject and predicate (one is
to notice that subject and predicate are not the same thing, or, serve the same function) and
2)The A in the proposition does affect the predicate, and “A” in turn affects itself (transforms
itself)

(it has the property of self-reflexivity: see carnedes in youtube (logic) for a visual and good
description of self-reflexivity: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPIWJ1tOM-E)

It transforms itself so it may have an effect upon, or, “affect the predicate”

Phrases such as: “Man is humanly man”, or, “Man is inhumanly man” , “´Plato is sometimes
inconsequential (inconsistent) with himself in his platonic idealist positions”, “Plato is
antiplatonically Plato”, “Plato is simply consequent with himself” (in his philosophical positions),
or, Plato is platonically Plato (Platon es platonicamente Platon)….”The (proletarian) man is (and
seems to be) inhumanly man”, … The latter phrases are all variations, of thousands of possible
variations, that are expressions of the proposition/form “A is a(B)”, “A is a[c( B)]…”

We may now say:

(II. 1.1) That formal logic is characterized by 1) its acceptance of “A is B” as its basic form, or
tipical form, or basic unit. 2) Its preteritation
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 9

(the mode in which it adds predicates to predicates: remember the thing about predicates of
predicates, or functions of functions, or operation of operations above: this very same reminder
retroactively, further, dermining, that is to say, adding more, to our orginal exposition of the
idea of predicate of predicates) of the types of units: “A is c(B)”; 3) It is also characterized for its
preference of “A is A” as the formula of propositional identity (my translation of: formula de (of)
proposicion (proposition) identica (identical))

Meanwhile dialectical logic

(simplifying a bit, but what is simplified away from: complexity is gained in efficiency at
transmitting the message. Such is Garcia Bacca´s bet. He says so explicitly. I will attach a pdf of
the Spanish version of this article)

Will be characterized for 1) accepting as its main unit, or, tipical proposition “A is (a)B” 2) Within
dialectical logic the propositions “A is c(B)”, “A is d[c(b)]” as irreducible to each other and
irreducible to 1)

(I guess you may remember his example of 3 = 3 and how you could not trace your way back
once the whole set of operations was done. I think this is what he aims at. You have produced
something new (remember: affecting the predicate and itself) that although related is different
to its origins: Like kids are relatable to their parents but not reducible to them)

3) A is (A) are to be understood as the appropriate form propositions of identity are to take
(doubly: remember the issue of potency, and doubly above. Again notice how the
explanation keeps on adding, as in predicates, to the initial elaboration of the point he is
reminding us of. Not only is he explaining, but showing, in the way it is edited, how the
logic works. The way he keeps on adding predicates, more complexity, as we departed
from zero. The way Hegel does in Phenomenology)

He then says that the phrase “the identity is potenciable” (prone to express its potency, or,
inherently capable of being potent in what it will produce: the complexity of the predicates the
subject will acquire through a generative dialectic) in dialectical logic, but not so in formal logic,
has a specific set of connotations and modes of being formulated or specifically defined.

Let us warn you in advance that – briefly as we will develop in V.3 below – that A is A is in a
logically or formal sense either true or false. 1 (V), 1(F), furthermore it can be really (I think he
means empirically) true r(V) or really (empirically, and in a bad way also: remember Hegel on
always aiming for what we cannot reach, or, meaning the opposite of what we want to say) false
r(F). “Man is Man” (“El hombre es hombre”) is always, in a formal sense, true; however “man is
humanly man” (man in very human in his behavior that defines the subject man. This man is
humane such is its predicate) can be either really true, only applicable to certain people, mental
states they inhabit, historical epochs (or future ones) and it can also be really false: in other
cases be them either individual cases or not, in cases where man in being inhumanly man,
inhumane man (hombre inhumano)…; but it is always the case that we may say of “man is man”
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 10

that it is a formal truth. “Meter is Meter” (Mile is Mile) “Metro es Metro” are always formally
true, however it can be the case that they may be really false. That is to say it can be the case
that such statements are really false if they are engaged in motion (in the finite real world: if
they belong to our social temporal world: relativity. Meaning Einstein) (in Spanish: si se halla en
movimiento). Relativity according to the formula

𝑽𝟐
1 = 10 √𝟏 − 𝑪𝟐
… (the square root should only cover the numerator not the denominator “c”
squared)

𝑽𝟐
1 = 10 √𝟏 − 𝑪𝟐

As is a (B)

Let us now proceed in V.3 to detect the importance that the distinctions we made above have in
regards to the truth tables (Wittgenstein)

II.1.2) Formal Logic is characterized for being abstract. Dilectical logic is to be understood as
concrete. Once again each one of them are unto themselves

(“cada una son lo suyo”: each one operates in its proper terrain in a legitimate manner I think is
what he is aiming at, but at the same time I am aiming at what he is aiming and will, according
to Hegel, miss some crucial aspect of what he means by necessity. Using possible errors as
examples that illustrate the Phenomenologies´ reach. Ohh, I should not have say reach. Ughhhh.
He does have the advantage of being rootless: unlike us)

So, according tp II 1.1 (notice how he will further add determinations, and predicates to
something he had yet to add complexity to) in the proposition “A es B”, A does not affect B

(it is not expressed, or, articulated as saying: “A” affects “B”, or, “B” affects “A”: no self-
reflecivity of a variety that would lead to producing something new: remember the logic of
families and kids above)

As it regards B it is the same for this predicate whether “A” is A1, A2 , or An….; to state it in a
more rigorous manner “A” is a variable with respect to “B” – a variable within a context yet to
be determined or specifided given a set of conditions that ought not to concerns us now. We will
then write instead of
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 11

Translation of what is above “Instead of …..or, simply”

To say that”B” is abstract is to say that it is not affected by the number, and changes
(substitutions) of the set of possible subjects. And the same goes with regards to the relation
that “A” holds to”B”. To be abstract is to say that the term designated as such is indifferent (to
its own: predicates) actualizations (realizaciones translated as realizations by google, but that is
not what is meant)

Since what we say about what abstraction means is the case we must realize that “abstract” is a
relation and not a property of “x” entity. B is abstract with regards to A (A 1, A2, A3…), if it is true
that the same case holds, regardless, for “A1 is B”, “A2 is B”; A1, A2, A3… each “A” is different from
each other, but “B” is indifferent to such differences (unaffected at a real level). Such
indifference defines that which is abstract and its extent (he uses “the degree to which”…rather
than extent)

The formula “A is a(B)” is, by concrete comparison

(contraposicion concreta is what he uses instead of concrete comparison: google contraposition

in English and you will get interesting results other than comparison. You will get things like
“contraposition”, in English, I am uncertain about Spanish, also means, or, mainly means:
conversion of a proposition from all A is B to all not-B is not-A.)

The phrase in Spanish is a little weird, or, difficult for me at least “La formula(proposition) “A es
a (B)” is (that is you can say that “it is” or “it exists in the manner that it does”) por (by)
contraposicion concreta. B is affected by A, and A as it regards its position of an entity that
affects B, and affected by B transforms itself into “a”. If A includes within itself, for whatever
reason, - A1, A2, A3…- the proposition

(la (the) formula (formula: he calls them or prefers to call them. I guess is to try to establish an
identity between the propositions and the mathematical formulas he was using in the examples
above)

A is a (B) would yield: A1 is a1 (B)

A2 is a2 (B)…we have here concrete propositions between themselves, linked by their capacity to
affect B.
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 12

III. Contraposition (comparison plus: see definition above imitating the editing retroactivization
style) of the typical postulates of Formal and Dialectical Logic

Let us remind ourselves that the greek word equivalent to postulate is , whose
meaning is not only limited to “petition, or, exigency (an imperative demand: a must), but it also

means “to ask for”, “to demand” to be able (para poder) to determine ,

or, to be able to construct (build) . Let us further remind ourselves – and this is not
usually given a proper amount of attention (unknown is his word choice) – that Euclides
classifies theorems under two possible types: those which must be proven (to be the case)

and those theorems which have to be built (constructed)

The first five “theorems” (he likes postulates better?) of his book I are of the kind that must be
constructed. Postulate, then, is reserved for “basic rule” that will enable a proof, or, will enable
us to build. (In Spanish: para construer, o, para demostrar). Clearly a number of theorems fit to
build will be used to build other theorems, and those that will be built, or, generated will bear
the characteristic for having the capacity to construct/build given that they have been built
themselves, or, have been exposed to the process of having been built.

(genetically related, or relate, or, having a shared essence with that which is built it)

Theorem: T1------ T2----T3

We will compare (contrapondremos) formal logic and dialectical logic according to the decisive
and primary criteria, or, criteria of a primary character. Formal logic makes use of (emplea: puts
to use) demonstrative type postulates; dialectical logic attaches to itself constructive postulates,
or, postulates that will enable the conctruction of further theorems (note: and with it
complexity etc). Let us now enumerate with a brief explanation.

In Dialectical Logic

(III.1) Any (toda) proposition has to undergo the process of concretization (tiene que ser
concretada)
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 13

(III.2) Toda (every, any possible “x”) operation has to be verified.

(III.3) The set of propositions and operations has to be totalized, or, undergo a process of
totalization.

(III.4) The “Todo”

(“the everything”, “the all” meaning the set that contains all the elements)

of all the elements is different – positively, originally, although related (connexo, conexamente)
– from all its elements (of said meta-set). This might mean that it is a set that does not contain
itself as a member of itself.

Therefore giving us the emergence of totality.

To put it in simpler terms: the set that contains “n” elements is different, although related, to all
the elements it contains.

We, then, may proceed to add the postulate of “exigency” todos (every single one,
all) de los Todos (pluralizing All, in a vulgar vein: All-sesses) (all of the meta-sets is what he is
going for). So, to clarify all of the meta-sets have to aggregate and integrate themselves until
forming another meta-meta set: a set that contains all the meta-sets.

And of course this meta-set of all meta-sets will be an original, and new although related (not
different to the extreme where there is such a rupture that it returns to the indifference of
formal logic) to its sub-sets: the meta-sets it contains. This will be the final set out of which you
may no longer continue to build other theorems (In Spanish: …y final del conjunto de todos
ellos)

We may also re-formulate what we have just stated above in the following manner

(notice that Hegel in the Phenomenology does return to the same object of study or under
scrutiny to observe a different angle of it, a different dimension of it: after length, he returns to
the object ot examine the width of the same object etc and on and on like that)

(III 1.1) (my notes: variation on theme I) Each proposition must be exposed to the step, or, set of
steps that will lead it to be concretized.

(III. 1.2) (variation theme 2) that each operation (set of operational steps) passes from simply
being indicated, or, shown to being verified.

(III.1.3) (variation theme 3) that the set of propositions under consideration and the set of
operations that accompany them may be exposed, or, submitted to the step of aggregated
(consolidated into) into an All (meta set), and as we continue this process over and over we may
reach the final meta-meta set – orininally, and positively new, although still related – of all the
processes and elments that make up, or, form part of II: 1,2, 3.
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 14

(III. 1 2 3 4) The registerable absence, the noticeable absence of the systematic application of
the four exigencies just mentioned is that which characterizes formal logic.

IV Some exemplary cases.

“es” = “is” below (I copy pasted it out of laziness. Also I am tired)

IV.1) they are examples of

propositions in formal logic (F.L. in Spanish L.F.)

The ones above this phrase (notice the relation of self-reflexivity at work: this very same phrase:
the object being itself) are characteristic propositions found in dialectical logic. Now the issue
about the set of necessary conditions that we will be in need of applying in the case of the union
(organized, arreanged)

In order to avoid non-sense as an output will be something outside the scope of the present
essay.

The examples brought forth from I. are useful to illustrate in a provisional and plausible manner
the case we are attemting to demonstrate for our readers.

IV.2) The operation that leads to what we know as “identification” is to be found in “A is B”….,

and even still in , but even though this is so they remain in a state of
simply being merely indicated, not of having been fulfilled in concretization. In the expression

We find that “A” – the subject – firm, unmoved, unassimilated, unaffected. Using classic
dialectical terminology: such a type of proposition – already dialectic given that its predicate has
undergone the process of concretization – has its subject still inhabiting a state of substance, or,
the subject remains substance in itself. What we want to do is to transform substance into
subject, in a type of substance that is affected

(my comment: enters temporality? Recall that Hegelian philosopher Eduardo Vasquez pointed
out that dialectical logic preceded the linearity of cause and effect. It could be a misreading, or,
misassociation of mine)
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 15

Affected, and transformed by the predicates (effects becoming causes, feedbacking upon the
original cause, and cause in turns dialectically changes into its opposite: effect). Such a
description may be symbolized by

All that expression is to be considered a single term

(Yeah, if you go to carnedes.org in youtube you will see, he deals with formal propositional logic,
but you will see that that whole thing above is considered a unit called a compound statement)

The identity “demanded” (recall what he mentioned above about exigency and demand),
insisted upon, has finally been verified. Furthermore any identity that remains in the state we
have designated as: simply “indicated” leaves the subject untouched, that is to say, in a state of
substance. To ask ourselves if apart from being “a closed flat centered curve” – or to put it in
more technical, although not as literary way: centered (flatly) [closed] Curve) – If we were to say
that there is some kind of entity such as a Circumference

(I guess this relates to the sum of its parts issue. Whether the set is to be considered a separted
unit apart from the elements and the operations upon the elements that yield in this example
the circumference)

As some sort of substrate that posseses some extra (algo mas), that remains unaffected by all
that preceeded it, is the equivalence to admit that there are such things as substances

(remember this is a very subtle point: substance is supposed to be what Dolar said Hegel said
about the zero level universality: empty noise. He seems to contradict, but I do not think he is.
What there is is a void ,a “not”, like: 5-1= 4-1= 3-1= 2-1 =1 -1= 0 (void) a there is no substance as
positivity that we may call substance. Zero is no positive substance. It is like a “Whoooosh” of
something that vanished and you cannot longer see: that is “zero”. It is like saying infinity is an
individuated thing. Mathematician Rudy Rucker in an interview in BBC 4 radio with Melvin Bragg
(can download for free) refered to it as “a process” it is either there on ir “philosophy talk” in I-
tunes a podcast on philosophy and related matters from California)

Returning: substrate, or, models that may never undergo the dialectic of
transformation: untransformable subjects – to agree that there are things in themselves (yeah,
he is being really severe about the issue of “nothingness” how you must address it. It seems
extreme, but I believe adequately, finitely, materialistic)
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 16

Leaving apart what said consideration may have about ontology, or, metaphysics, let us resolve:
dialectical logic demands (postulates) III. 1, 2,. The symbolism we have used makes disappear,
does away with, the independence (of the in itself) of the “subject” of the proposition that
belongs to formal logic. In formal logic the subject and predicate are still at the service, and
acting according to, or at the service of the function of eide (idea in greek? It means form, type,
essence, or, species: https://www.dictionary.com/browse/eide) of Plato, or, aristotelic

substances

IV.3) In formal logic we find that the operator of negation (not = -) remains, as we have
observed before, in a state of simply being merely indicated. “Two is even”, “Not (Two is even)”
or “Two is not even”; “not [not (two is even)]” are the typical way in which things are articulated
in formal logic. Expressions such as “man is inhumanly man”, “D is blind” (same set: at yum.
Disregard this), “D is not-sighted”, “It is not the case that D is sighted”, or the affirmations “man
is man”, “man is humanly man”… all of each treated in the same manner according to the
formula/principle “A is B” or “not (A is B)”… The negation or affirmation are in a state of simply
being merely indicated, never verified (activated mechanism of computation towards
verification) they are: extrinsic.

In the example “C is blind” the negation has been made/accomplished, in the most of original,
and intrinsic of manners y it really C will not passed from being blind to being sighted unless a
miracle takes place (same set: at Uni. “In the Know” (“guff-waff)) – a mirable carried out by God,
or, science itself (same set: couplet. “In the know” spatio-temporal concrete coordinates of “is”
or existence logico-real (V)), but such miracles cannot be carried out by formal logic´s “not-
blind”, not (not-blind), that is to say to add to the “not” another “not” (por un “no” al “no”)

In the issue of “blind” the negation has been made/realized in an intrinsic manner, of a truly
original manner, en inhuman – be it individual, society, or, social, economic, and religious
system

(Note to self: connect this to the truly existing caricature of “bad-humor-social-relations-at-best”

social relations (Ecrits: Kant avec Sade), and connect with the current levels of exlpotiation in
economics (another caricature- excess- that does not exist) or the wiping out of an entire sub-
continent (the middle east: another non-existent, because black-a-minati caricature. The bosses
they serve and to whom they sell derivatives are caricatures, but they are not when their bosses
cash in on said derivatives over and over etc)

The negation , “not-human” has been exposed to the process of intrinsicalization in the most of
original y revulsive manner that is to say: in a revolutionary way (same set: aspirations?
Detecting something missing at “x”?).

The intrinsic negation of such negation, already intrinsic, will yield (it may, and can yield) an
original kind of sublimation (una superacion original) (Aufghebung) , something to which we
may describe as a miracle (new affirmation, miraculous)- of God, or the current state of
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 17

technique, or of History. The logical expression – the language – of the state inhabited by such
things could be: (L.F. = formal logic) (L.D. = dialectical logic), en = in, the bar above it = not.

are as original (new) and positivily distinct as “It is not the case that C is sighted”
and “C is blind”; just as “The soul is not-mortal”, “The soul is immortal” (Cf. Kant regarding

indefinite judgment) etc. instead of “two negation affirm and affirm the same intial
entity (preceeding the process of the operations of negations. That is to say the subject has not
been affected after said process as if standing outside motion, change, and time. This is in F.L.)

“ here P is a new proposition. It is the transubstantiation of the initial “p”

through the dialectical process of “the negation of the negation”, but it is not simply “the
negation of the negation” it is a “negations of the negation intrinsicalized”. “Man is Man”, “Man
is inhumanly man”, “Man inhumanly man” yields , because of unit sustained conexively
(connected) (that is my probably bad translation of “por unidad conexa, equivalente) is
equivalent to “Man is socially/sociably(?) man” (El hombre es socialmente hombre) this is our
(P). That there may be a domain of properties and things for which it is the case that

- As in the domain of arithmetics – does not eliminate the need of a dialectical logic

for other fields: biology, sociology, economics… in which are each

real of an original and appropriate manner for each displayed in the latter set of
operations.

(IV.4) In mathematics the axioms of Hankel are the case (same set: unhorni at l.v. = true r(V))
a+b = c, a*b = d – apart from a + b = b + a…(same set: at 180edout after unhorni. Further
violence redirected upon own episteme: ready to swing” at unhorni). In 1 + 9 = 10, 5 *2 = 10, 2 *
5 = 10
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 18

(Note to self. Please have an appreciation for the x,y,z,q of “in the know” bad (a)-im. The level
of, only grasped by math, numerical density (friction towards violence) of the set of
concentrated collective-l-attention upon an “x”, in order to reduce it to as x--zero as the Sarah
Woman (no caricature) as that very same “x” occupies a level of the biological minimum. The
ratio of as “x”-0 : caricature + violence (v) -- infinity (positive) the idea is to find the
mechanism (dialectical) to turn the limit into negative infinity for any moment “x” that may
apply: noumena-tec. Let vassal enter it whenever the situation may arise. It is ok)

The set of operations above have been verified and have yielded a result for us. A result of an
irreversible variety (I do not know how to translate the way he qualifies “irreversible variety”
the phrase in Spanish is: “por no biunivoco”. I am tired)

The same goes for (a+b) (a-b) = (a2 – b2), a = 2, b =1, we get 3 = 3….(reminding you of the
example above about how from that “3” so original you cannot devolve, regress in a motion of
incestuality towards the beginning. All you do if you attempt to do this is to head towards, what
the Greeks called, the mathematical “apeiron” formless type of infinity. Beckett re-wrote the
same thing in a line that I will never forget: “the mind-ghost forsaken, sunk into its kaos”. I will
never forget it, because I wish I had written it. It is that good of a line. It is like being surrounded
by s.k.´s 24/7 or the herramientas of its voluntdad “x” = zero at T1. Just having a good ol´ hacking
away a-la Kantian 120 days. See Kant avec Sade Ecrit, Lacan)

A useful link to the symbols (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols)

The unions found in are not simplifiable, or, verifiable. In

are not equivalent to (a+b) (a-b) = a2 – b2, let a = 2, b =1, and we

get 3 = 3. The logical operators &, or… are not “verifiable” all they do is remain in a merely
indicated state. The attempt at union is not realizable, not possible, The “is” (whose role is to
combine the units into a combustion that will generate something new like the “P” above) goes
not move beyond being merely indicated.

In the expression . “r” is totally unrelated to “p” or “q”. This situation may be
seen more clearly in the prediate calculus (he calls it “calculo expresso de predicados:
manifested? Explicit? It is an adjective he believes it to be important, but I clearly skipped it) Just
pay attention to the logical formula not the phrase. es = is.

Simplifying the formula found above we get: the fomal syllogism

Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 19

A is B and

B is C therefore, or, then

A is C

In A is C we no longer know what was the middle term that was used (remember the 3 = 3
example given at the beginning) A is C is not a conclusion that may be characterized for being
dialectical. The syllogism if formal logic did away with, without preserving it for Aufghebung, the
middle term. That is to say: the union of each premise through “and” or “&”, and that of
subjects and predicates has not been verified.

(Comment: I do recommened carnedes.org. if you want to clarify things. Very short, accurate,
and accessible about formal logic. Propositional logic deals with compound statements (macro-
view) predicate formal logic deals with subjects and predicates)

Would it be, perhaps, a dialectical type of syllogism the following:

(y= and, or, &) (luego = therefore)

“Man is humanly sighted and the humanly sighted is sightedly conscious” therefore “Man is
humanly sightedly conscious”. In this manner thanks to, or, in virtue of (III. 1, 2). But it ows
more to what is demanded by the dialectical step III.2, the “is” of this conclusion remains yet to
be verified. And it has yet to be verified because we have yet to apply III.3 – the step towards
totalization. Once we assemble the set of predicates that apply to man, and submit its
expressions to III. 1, 2, 3, the subject vanishes due to the process of its sublimated reabsorption
(Aufghebung) – substance.

We reach the form:

(III. 1, ,2, 3) let us designate this expression by

Ta (Totality with respect to A)

Each substance, once it reaches the point of having undergone the process of becoming fully a
subject , becomes center of all of its properties (predicates), or, the set of these properties is in a
centered way (organized through, or, by a specific center; agglomerated around a center of
gravity as it were) which implies es serse el ellas y ser ellas el (the subject becomes its
predicates, and its predicates become the subject) by way of, or, according to the state of the All
(the meta-set that contains all of the elements) The “All” is the one that is in itself.
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 20

By virtue of III.4, Ta, Tb , Tc …..(T = Todo = All = Meta-set) (Todos (All) special in themselves,
“man”, “sun”, “2”, “rosal”(same set: at too easy), solar system, greek culture, roman religion,
feudal economy…) (that is to say: Late capitalism. A wink from Bacca) Now each of those
mentioned have to integrate towards, into, in The All (meta-set) – the step we have come to
know as Totalitity. Such a step towards totality can depart from y pass through , or, travel
through a plural, reduced – in a gradual and most ordinary of ways – a growing unity; moreover
it is always the case that the All-sesses (every possible meta-set), be they either of a transitory,
or, mediatory nature, are distinct, different from, although connected, and related to, their
subsets (let us define the latter, or, denominate the latter: its sums the result thereof)

We will say then that dialectical logic is procedural; a succession that is ordered (or capable of
being ordered) in a number of sets that will move towards agglomerating themselves in The All
(the meta-meta-set, or, meta-set of subsets that are All-sesses)

V)Some important warnings

(V.1) Because of the nature of the way it is structurally organized (“por su plan structural”)
dialectical logic looks like 1) arithmetic, and not algebra. Propositions: p, q, Logical operators:
“or”, “&”, are the equivalent to indeterminate constants (like an “x” that is yet to be assigned a
number): a, b, c…; the set of operations that are in a state of being indicated

Are the equivalent of: +, -, / (división), * (multiplication) all of the things we just mentioned is
just the first step of what constitutes dialectical logic, and here it coincides with formal logic.
Dialectical logic fits within itself explicit propositions

Do not mind the Spanish just concentrate on the logical and mathematical operations. It is just
saying that the explicit propositions “A is B”…. are the equivalent of: 1, ,2 ,3...pi, e….; up to this
point dialectical and formal logic go together hand in hand. Morover in dialectical logic allows
room for a set of complex operations, explicitly displayed (explicitamente planteadas) such as:

Es = is (my apologies if my repeating this insults your intelligence, but the text although helpful
can be prove to be slightly dense) equivalents = equivalents a = to

2)Furthermore, before anything else, dialectical logic fits within itself every calculation that
involves “as ´x´-0” (he means here infinitesimal calculus:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZLC0egL6pc) Remarkably easy to digest.

Calculus of : derivatives, integrals…converging or diverging series….dialectical logic applies to,

because of its 4 step program “approaching the limit” – coordinated in a progredient manner
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 21

Progredient: progredient. Adjective. (comparative more progredient, superlative most

progredient) (medicine) progressive (course of illness)

Stepping towards the step towards concretization (III.1), verification (III.2), totalization (III.3),
and to the fourth “The All” step (III.4). The All, towards which everything that preceeded it tends
to gravitate towards (retroactive signification is an example: subject + verb+ adjective are all
meta sets that include subsets: (Pierce,John, Dewey, Lisa, Marlene, Juanita) verb (reads, walks,
studies, eats), adjective (fast, slowly, eagerly, distinctively, calmly…) , is equivalent to the
“Universe of Thought” (Boole: “The Algebra of Thought”: his book on logic), but all this happens
within a set of internal operations, a mode of organizing itself internally – and not in a “block”
(see above) that implies totality, or, a block of totality.

Formal logic - above all in its modern form: symbolic, mathematical….is a look alike, or, it
resembles, structurally (isomorphically?) to the algebra of elementary operations.

(V.2) In Boolean logic you not only consider, or, take into consideration each set in itself. Rather
it is always considered, keeping in mind, in its relation, and connection to its complementary (or
negative) as this complementary relates to the set Total (The ALL set, the Meta-set)- universe of
though. If the rectangle that I am about to show you symbolizes said universe – such All - such
meta-set of meta-sets, T(0)

The rectangle above then may be considered to be a determinate set (a set with predicates or
concrete), at the beginning, that is to say at time = zero. So, a determinate set at the beginning
(temporally) in itself – its number of elements - , in relation to an other, example – if it may fit
within itself the following operations: sums, substractions, cut (division: cutting the rectangle in
half, or, dividing it by 2)…between each other – yet we will always have to make explicit its
complementary with regards to T (tn) (all = Todo):

Such that in Boole´s algebraic logic such final demand is reduced to demand merely indicated.
This is a different matter that will not be developed further in this article.

In dialectical logic there is no presupposition of (T= Todo = All) T(t) as something already made,
and finally constructed to the last detail, perfectly and definitively. T (t n) presents itself as a
project that is to be realized, or, yet to be realized. And this will happen as it moves through
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 22

each of the four steps in orderly fashion, or, (any other set of steps he seems to imply by what
follows) – or as it moves through history (historical time)…

(V.3) Given that the All of “n” elements is something positive, new, and original with regards to
the simple agglomeration (set) of operations and elements (whose generative, and operative
assembling motion) brought it about nothing will fit within said process, but retroactive
rationality.

(My comment: You read rationality into the process after all the elements have come together
in an output. You get to see the output and readback, I think they call this nowadays reverse
engineering,)

That gives a logic, a reason, order, or unifying order of that which preceeded the appearance of
the output, but this does not mean that it sets in stone, once and for all, all that is to appear

(it does not afford you 100% predictive powers. Uncertainty arises. In Keynesian economics they
experience this phenomenon of “Uncertainty” as a (central and defining characteristic of market
economies) featureless feature not ameanable to mathematical scrutiny. Keynes himself,
recognized as a main contributor to the theory of probability in mathematics, said that there are
situations where your predictive power goes down to zero, or, absolute uncertainty)

- Were you to have said capacity to predict at said level it would amount to a
rejection of novelty (implicit mortality of things also. The dimension of the finite, or,
mortal) scientific discoveries, inventions, of a technical character, economical
character or social character….So, what we are left with is nothing more than a set
of conditions, or, necessary, but not sufficient causes of everything that will follow.

But once what we define as “that which is to follow” reaches its destination point in actuality
provides us with sufficient reason of everything that came before it (sufficient, but finite in its
potentiality. Sufficient for what preceeded it not what will follow it and on like that)

Dialectical logic is not deterministic, or, rationalist (racionalista), but it is not also irrational. If a
is a cause (condition) it will only need (Cn) of b, b will be assembled together out of two
components: b´, or that which is in b (can be detected in it) as an effect of a. The second
component will be “that which may be considered to be original to b, or, emerges from b as
output”

An ordinal (this is a way to measure types of infinities: cardinals, ordinals etc) disposition of
novelties , upon a necessary base – such based perfectly rational in character. Where novelty is
nowhere to be found – let us presuppose in: geometry, algebra, formal logic, or physics…. – the
set (system) of necessary conditions is sufficient for the following – things we will come to know
as: effects, and theorems. In dialectical logic necessity (annulled, or, annihilated) is the place
where the emergence of novelty may take place (liberty, invention (creativity), spontaneity) –
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 23

and therefore, belonging to a temporal sequence (taking place within it I believe), with a very
real, and appropriate sense of meaning (“con (with) sentido (meaning) real propio (proper to
itself, and its time I guess”) all of it for real History, or, actual History.

V.4) Truth tables in formal and dialectical logic. “man is living” is a truthful proposition- let us
admit as much. Moroever, “Man is living consciously”, “Man is seipsiconcientemente
(Selbsbewusstein, self-conscious) living” or “living applying the faculty of self-awareness” the
latter my-less-than-a-bet guess are all propositions really true (remember really above)

meaning of prefix ipsi: a Latin prefix meaning “apart,” “asunder,” “away,” “utterly,” or having a
privative, negative, or reversing force (see de-, un-2); used freely, especially with these latter
senses, as an English formative: disability; disaffirm; disbar; disbelief; discontent; dishearten;
dislike; disown.

They are really true because they make explicit how the man is being, or, in which way is he
being a “living creature” a “seeing creature”, “a listening creature”, “a creature that feels in a
particular way”…. This may be contrasted with the pure, and simple creature we refer to as
“animal”.

At the same time “man is man” is logically true, but “man (notice that what follows are kinda
subsets: be it, individual, or collective; a specific mode of economic life, such a economic class of
people, or, social class) is (it is being (“esta siendo”) inhumanly man”, “man (individual, or
collective) is being (esta siendo) humanly man” (being man in a humanly manner: like the
humane society for animals: a way to really concretely relate to them etc. It gives us a set of
practices, or, threshold against which to measure other activities)

The latter set of propositions just elaborated are propositions whose falsehood, or, truth may be
really false, or, really true. Really true r(V(erdad) = True) or really false r(F), while retaining the
property of logically true. 1 (V), the proposition “man is man”, “man is not man” the latter being
logically false., 1 (F), but even so, it can be the case that said falsehood may be really true (it can
be concretely the case that it is true)- “proletarian man is inhumanly man” (el hombre proletario
es inumanamente hombre), or, “the proletarian man is not (being a) humanly man”; but besides
1 (F) it can be the case that it may be r(F); “the social man is not man” (el hombre social no es
hombre) “the social man is not (being a) humanly (sort of) man”. The same may be said of
“Meter is Meter”, “mass is mass”: they are logically true, but they could either be really false, or,
true according to the system of reference we may be using at the moment, as well as features,
and characteristics as they are specified by the theory of relativity.

The following truth table may be read as it is for dialectical logic

Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 24

(V = verdad = true), (F = falsa = false), r = really, concretely, empirically true or empirically false.

The truth table above for dialectical logic may be reduced to its simple terms in formal logic in
the following manner

In one of them, dialectical logic, it will be the case that 1) What type of transformations, or,
redifinitions may be fit for introduction into the table of operations of classical formal logic, will
not be a part of this paper. It will be sufficient with simply indicating it. In formal logic
(Wittgenstein) it is the case that

In dialectical logic it could be the case that the following truth tables may be considered as valid.
Let us designate with π a dialectical proposition:
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 25

[π], is the explicit position of the relations between logical values – 1(V), 1(F) – and dialectical
values – r(V= T), r(F). Such position – designated by i: (indicated, indication) y by “&” (logical
operator: indicator of union) includes the position of complex contradiction (of both types

logical truth, and empirical (real) truth): and complex affirmation (of

both varieties: logical and real (empirical)); . In the column III

we are presented with an acceptable (programmatic) solution, or, result, condensed in a
particular norm: the predominance of the real (empirical) reinforced against (the limits of?)
formal logic. The axiom or juridical norm maior pars trahit secum minorem could be here
readapted by saying: “the real r(T, F) does away with the formally logical” 1 (F: T) (Kant).
Entering somewhat into contradiction with the syllogistic logical precept:

Peiorem sequitur semper conclusion pattern. For the logician of classical logic that which is real
must submit itself to that which is ideal – then 1 (T) & r(F), reduced (he uses refered to) to the
same proposition it ought to yield (1(T); 1(F) & r(T), will yield 1(F). That which belongs to formal
logic is indifferent to that which is really (existing, existence and temporality see his relativity
reference) and that which is real will never be able to contradict what holds inside formal logic.
The domain of that which is real has already constituted itself, since the beginning, obeying, and
because it obeys the principle of (no) contradiction, and that of perfect rationality (omne ens est
rerum). In dialectical logic what is preponderant is the domain of that which is real. That which
is empirically real is totally indifferent to that whose main characteristics are defined by formal
logic (the limits of human thought as they are organized by formal logic: see Aristotles)
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 26

Let us risk a dialectical truth table for the operation of negation (intrinsicated)

With regards to the negation of negation, intrinsicalized both of them, of a dialectical

proposition (π), what we obtained is a redoubled proposition, or, truthfully, really, empirically
reinforced [r2(V)], we also have redoubled and empirically, really, truthfully reinforcedly false
[r2(F)], but always as it relates to the initial proposition – such as “consciously being man” or “to
be a man consciously” these are original, positive, and appropriate reinforcements of “being
man”; that goes for consciously as well as socially both are the result of having (once?) been
unconsciously and unsociable (may it be: individually, in groups, sectarially, classically…)

is different, appropriately, positively, and originally of however is not

reinforcement of “p”; it is a form of repetition (a kinda loop) aiming after a useless return to the
same (actually think of Freud´s death-drive. It kinda sounds like it)

(V.5) One is to establish a precise step (regular way ) to move from dialectical to formal logic
such that it may result in a “case” (same set: too easy: Zeno´s pistol at x = loaded) that may
qualify as one of the cases that may be said to belong to dialectical logic, in virtue of the
specified step III.3, 4. In such a way we move from a complex number a + bi to a real one such
that b = c; or of

Or it may be the case that we may do with leaving all the operations indicated : affirmation,

negation, What we encouter here then is a logic with a style characteristic of

pure algebra, which contains the following set of formulas
Formal and Dialectical Logic by David G. Bacca (translated: Gonzalo I. Gil Muñoz) 27

All this perfectly legitimate, since it is dependant upon a decision (same set) (option) pre-logical
(dream logic terrain? Unconscious choice? To what infinitesimal extent and x,q,y,z?) and
metalogical, such that it would bring with itself the outcome of installing (poner) as an axiom:
“two points determine a straight line, and only one, and the same line in its totality” (how
exhaustive does totality =?), or intall the following so that it may be the case that

That it may be the case that in a particularly specified domain of objects formal logic applies
(Aristotelian, or, Boolean) will be a matter of fact. To extend them to every, or other domains,
will be a matter of enterprise (question the empresa: same set densification at self-mastery, or,
loading towards or, as x--infinity (positive)) a proyect, decisions followed or made after trial
and error (truth or falsehood of the enterprise (practice) at hand, truth or falsehood of
transcendental style: God sig)