LEGAL ETHICS

I. Preliminary Topics
Concept of Legal Ethics
Terms commonly used in Legal Ethics
Reference, Legal Ethics, Pineda, 2009 ed.
Practice of Law
Case : Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner opposed the nomination of Respondent Christian Monsod as chairman of the COMELEC alleging that
the latter does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
pursuant to Section 1, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

Held: It is ruled in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava that the “practice of law” is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of
law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.

Based on the forgoing, the petitioner’s contention on the respondent’s qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years is incorrect. Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor satisfy
the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman which is to be engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. Therefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Law Student Practice Rule, Rule 138-A, Rules of Court

Persons who cannot Practice Law in the Philippines
Appearance of Non-Lawyers
Attorneys and Admission to the Bar, Rule 138, Rules of Court
Case : In re Petition to Sign Roll of Atty., Medado, Sept. 24, 2013

FACTS:

Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC.
He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced
the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice.
He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably
just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his MCLE compliances
to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken
belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in
the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law. Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing
upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case,
said action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more
than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he
appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and
companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction. A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty
likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also
made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of
law.
Graduates of Foreign Schools
Readmission to the Philippines Bar
In re Petition, Torres, Aug. 25, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner seeks judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
In Ting-Dumali v. Torres, the Court meted the supreme penalty of disbarment on Torres for committing gross misconduct
and violating Canons 1 and 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility.
His petition was denied since Torres failed to provide substantial proof that he reformed himself, especially considering
the absence of showing that he had reconciled or attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law, the original complainant in
the disbarment case against him; nor was it demonstrated that he was remorseful over the fraudulent acts he had
committed against her. Despite the foregoing, Torres filed the instant petition, again seeking judicial clemency from the
Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
Issue:
Whether petitioner can be reinstated
Held:
No. The principle which should hold true for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that judicial clemency, as an act of
mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Thus,
the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and
promise are indispensable.
In support of the instant petition for reinstatement, Torres merely rehashed all the several testimonials and endorsements
which he had already attached to his previous petitions, in addition to another endorsement, this time coming from the
incumbent Secretary of Justice, stating that Torres "is a person of good moral character and a law abiding citizen”.In this
regard, it is noteworthy to point out that since the promulgation of the Court's August 25, 2015 Resolution, there was still
no showing that Torres had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law so as to show remorse for his
previous faults.
Moreover, Torres also failed to present any evidence to demonstrate his potential for public service or that he - now being
70 years of age - still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.

Que vs. Revilla, Nov. 11, 2014

Facts:
Que accused Revilla, Jr. of willfully delaying the final judgment of the lower court against his client. Respondent
successfully filed a petition of certiorari before the Court of Appeals, two petitions of annulment of title and a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court, and a petition for declaratory execution of the lower court’s
decision against his client.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated various canons and provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).

Held:
Respondent’s abuse of court remedies by filing multiple actions praying for the same cause delayed the execution of the
final judgment of the court. The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood is also alleged by the complainant that
unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico who was the previous
counsel of the respondent’s clients. The respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond legitimate means allowed by
professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his clients. The respondent violated his duty as an attorney “never to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”

Due to the respondent’s multiple violations on the CPR, and is found liable for professional misconduct for violations
of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and
12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); and Sections 20 (d), 21 and 27
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law.
Macarubbo vs. Macarubbo, Jan. 13, 2013
Facts:

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo who seeks to be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Court disbarred him for having contracted a bigamous marriage with the complainant and a third marriage with
another while his first marriage was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

Respondent had sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his
personal life. He had asked forgiveness from his children by complainant and maintained a cordial relationship with them
as shown by the herein attached pictures. Records also showed that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his
hometown and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death. He was appointed
as Private Secretary to the Mayor and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-
In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date. Moreover, he became a part-time instructor
in a University. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who
are in dire need.

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement was duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan
Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual
practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He was also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further revealed
that respondent had already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered
by complainant. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with the Court’s directive.

While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to
show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in this case.

After 8 years, he was reinstated to the practice of law.

Lawyer's Oath, Memorize

II. MCLE (Res. dated Jan. 14, 2014) AND RELEVANT SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES (Bar Matter 1645
amending Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, Sec 12)
SAMUEL B. ARNADO v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, AC. No. 9834, 2015-08-26
Exemption in MCLE

Facts:
Atty. Arnado, the complainant, called the attention of this Court to the practice of respondent Adaza of indicating "MCLE
application for exemption under process” for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of "expertise in law"
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850 alleging that respondent has been practicing law for 50 years and "MCLE
Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. The MCLE Governing Board denied the
request for the First Compliance Period (15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004) and the Second Compliance Period (15 April
2004 to 14 April 2007), and noted that respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance
period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.

Issues:
Whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements

Ruling:
The court ruled on affirmative and denied the prayer of the Respondent to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the
matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013, declared him as a
delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and suspended him from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth.

It is noted that application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance
periods had ended and failed to timely follow-up the status of his application. The Respondent furnished with the Court a
letter dated 7 February 2012 directed to the MCLE Office asking the latter to act on his application for exemption and
alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.

Though the MCLE Office acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three
years to inform respondent of the denial of his application (on 1 October 2012) after it received inquiries regarding the
status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption
under process" in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for
exemption. That’s why one of the resolutions of the Court is to remind the MCLE Office of prompt action on matters that
require its immediate attention and to communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period.
However, after the respondent was informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one
year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took time to
satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.

Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies
for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods.

III. NOTARIAL PRACTICE RULE AND JURISPRUDENCE

Agbulos vs Atty Viray, A.C. No. 7350, February 18, 2013

No personal appearance

FACTS:

This is a Complaint against Respondent for allegedly notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy in
violation of the Notarial Law.
Complainant denies that she executed the document and alleged that the signature and the community tax certificate
(CTC) she allegedly presented were not hers. She further claims that she did not personally appear before Respondent for
the notarization of the document and that Mr. Dollente (a client of respondent), benefited from the said falsified affidavit
as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property registered in her name to that of Dollente. Thus, complainant
contended that she was deprived of her property because of the illegal notarization of the subject document.
Respondent, on the other hand, does not deny the fact that he indeed notarized the document. He Claims good faith in
notarizing said document since Client Dollente assured him that it was personally signed by complainant and that the CTC
appearing therein is owned by her.
Commissioner Funa recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, and that he be meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension as a lawyer and six
(6) months suspension as a Notary Public. He further observed that respondent did not attempt to refute the accusation
against him; rather, he even apologized for the complained act
IBP Board of Governors SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month
Modified upon MR
SUSPENDED as Notary Public for six (6) months, in addition to the 1 month suspension from the practice of law
ISSUE:
Whether there was a violation of the Notarial Law.
HELD: YES.
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the necessity of the affiant’s personal
appearance before the notary public
Moreover, Section 12,15 Rule II, of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines the “competent evidence of identity”
referred to above
In this case, respondent admits that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject affidavit but he likewise notarized
the same without the affiant’s personal appearance

To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same
person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable
to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free
act or deed.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized in a number of cases the important role a notary public performs, to wit:
o

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization
by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise,
the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notar
ized document would be undermined

Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted

not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary
public and in degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest
MELANIO L. ZORETA vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO [A.C. No. 6492. November
18, 2004]
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against the Respondent for allegedly notarizing several documents during the
year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired.

Facts:
Complainant alleged that he filed before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of
Contract and Damages against Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter's
failure to honor SPAC's Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano
was the latter's counsel. In said cases, the respondent, who was not a duly commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per
Certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization
evidenced by several documents alleging the notarized commission to expire by December 31, 2002.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty. Simpliciano to submit his answer within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order, yet the Respondent failed to do so.
Contrary to the date of expiry stipulated in the documents presented by the petitioner, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City
in her certification dated October 4, 2002 stated that as per records on file with their office respondent was not duly
commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002. In addition, certification issued by the Clerk of
Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showed that as per records on file with their office respondent was
commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City from January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year 2002
and 2003 he did not apply for notarial commission for Quezon City.

Issue: Whether the Respondent is subject to any Disciplinary Action

Held:
Pursuant to the foregoing certifications of the Clerk of Court, it is evident from the foregoing that when respondent
notarized the aforementioned documents totaling to 590, he was not commissioned as notary public, which was in
violation of the Notarial Law; amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the respondent is hereby barred permanently from being commissioned as notary
public. He is furthermore suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this
decision.

Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence. His lack of
interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence against him can only mean he has no
strong and valid defense to offer.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Thus, an attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and
counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Apropos to the case
at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The Court has
characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents." For such
reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the
notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.

JOSEFINA P. SORIANO vs. ATTY. HUMBERTO B. BASCO [A.C. No. 6648. September 21, 2005]
Violation of Formality requirements Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law
Complainant stated that on June 30, 2000, respondent Atty. Humberto B. Basco, Notary Public of Manila testified before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, that he allegedly notarized a Deed of Sale allegedly executed by complainant Josefina
P. Soriano. He further testified that Josefina Soriano personally appeared before him when he notarized the Deed of Sale.
Since complainant had never appeared before Notary Public Humberto B. Basco, had not seen much less received copy of
the alleged contract, complainant requested for a copy of the alleged contract from the Office of the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff. Thus, the Clerk or Court issued a Certification certifying that the alleged Deed of Sale involving the
Complainant as vendor alleged to have been acknowledged before Notary Public Humberto B. Basco was not among the
document submitted to said office. Complainant also received a certified true copy of the notarial register of Notary Public
Basco which failed to indicate the names of the witnesses, fees charged, the respective residence certificates of the parties
to the documents which he notarized. Although Atty. Basco was duty bound to furnish to complainant a certified true
copy of the alleged deed, he failed to do so despite demand therefor.
Respondent filed his Answer and declared the complainant together with her son went to his office both carrying with
them a duly pre-drafted deed of sale, contents whereof signified that complainant did convey to the son valuable property.
Respondent further stated that he instructed his staff secretary, to effect the clerical entry of notarial particulars of the
original and copies of the said mutually executed deed of sale. However, he failed to check the sufficiency of the notarial
entries which explains the absence of the names of the witnesses and other pertinent data.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of dereliction of duty as a notary public

Held:
Yes. Notably, the allegations of the complainant remain uncontroverted by the respondent. It is very evident that
respondent in discharging the duties as notary public failed to exercise diligence in his performance of his responsibilities
as such.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. Sections 245 and 246 of the Revised
Administrative Code provide.
Here, Atty. Basco violated the Notarial Law by failing to provide all the necessary information regarding the questioned
Deed of Sale entered in his notarial register. He even notarized said instrument even without the notation of the residence
certificate of the party to the document. As a notary public, respondent is required by the Notarial Law to certify that the
party to the instrument acknowledged before him has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence certificate) and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of the certification. Worse, he likewise failed
to send copy of the notarized document to the clerk of court of the proper RTC and to retain a copy thereof for his own
records. These formalities are mandatory and cannot simply be neglected. Failure to perform this duty results in the
revocation of a notary's commission. In Vda. de Rosales vs. Ramos we held:
X x x. The notarial registry is a record of the notary public’s official acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments
recorded in it are considered public documents. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and
there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not
a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the notarial law, the commission of respondent Atty. Humberto B. Basco as Notary Public,
if still existing, is REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in the complaint will be dealt with more severely.
ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES vs. ATTY. MARIO G. RAMOS [A.C. No. 5645. July 2,
2002]
Failure to record notarized documents (Violation of Article 245 and 246 of Notarial Law)

Complainant filed with the NBI a complaint for falsification of public document against her brother.The complaint alleged
among others that the Respondent executed an affidavit before the NBI admitting that when Manuel presented the
purported Deed of Absolute Sale to him for notarization, some defects in the document were observed and that
complainant Rosalinda was not around. The NBI Questioned Documents Division also compared Rosalinda's signature
appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale with samples of her genuine signature, and found that the deficiencies on the
signature on said Deed of Absolute Sale.
Respondent admitted the following in his Answer:
1. Despite his affixed signature on the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, he failed to enter the document in his
Notarial Registry Book.
2. Executing before the NBI an affidavit regarding the matter and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint since on
the ground of mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence, claiming that he simply relied on the
assurances of Manuel that the document would not be used for purposes other than a loan between brother and
sister, and that he affixed his signature thereon with utmost good faith and without intending to obtain personal
gain or to cause damage or injury to another.
The CBD set the case for hearing, yet Complainant never appeared and notices sent to her address were returned
unclaimed with annotation "moved out," and that she failed to leave forwarding address or inquire about the status of the
case.

Subsequently, IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of the CBD that the case against
respondent be dismissed in view of complainant's failure to prosecute and for lack of evidence on record to substantiate
the complaint and also concluded that complainant had lost interest in the further prosecution of this case, and so
recommended its dismissal.
Issue:
Whether the Respondent shall not be held liable of any violation of the Notarial Law?
Held:
No.
The Respondent violated the following:
1. Keeping a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary inclusive of specific information
with regard to the notarized document should be entered therein.
2. Ensuring that the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. In order to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act and deed.
Defendant’s defense cannot be honored since notarization out of sympathy is not a legitimate excuse. In doing so, he
displayed a decided lack of respect for the solemnity of an oath in a notarial document. From his admissions, Atty. Ramos
failed to exercise the due diligence required of him in the performance of the duties of notary public. However his
negligence should not merit disbarment, since it should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by
his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, the commission of respondent as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED and thereafter Atty.
Ramos should be DISQUALIFIED from reappointment to the office of Notary Public.
Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective
immediately.

EMELITA SOLARTE vs. ATTY. TEOFILO F. PUGEDA [A.C. No. 4751. July 31, 2000]
As to concurrently being a witness to the document notarized

Respondent was a municipal judge in the 1960s when, as notary public ex officio, he allegedly notarized certain
documents involving the sale of land situated in Cavite, in which the deeds of sale is claimed by the Respondent to be
spurious due to wrongful partition of and sale property. Complainant avers that respondent Pugeda could not have legally
notarized a document to which he also acted as witness. She also cites as irregular or anomalous the absence of the
vendee's signature in one of the deeds of sale alleged to tantamount to respondent’s constitution of gross misconduct.
In his comment, respondent countered:
1. He was no longer under any obligation to provide petitioner with the documents since he is no longer a notary
public ex officio and petitioner was impatient to wait for the search off documents;
2. There is nothing in the law that prohibits the notary public from signing as witness the same documents he
notarized; and
3. As municipal judge, he avers he was empowered to notarize documents under the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the
Revised Administrative Code. The documents in question were notarized in the 1960s. According to respondent,
this was before the Supreme Court declared in 1980,1 that an ex officio notary public can only notarize
documents if such notarization is in connection with the exercise of his official functions and duties; and
4. Respondent denies that he or his wife was responsible for the partition of the lot subject of the deeds of sale, so
neither of them can be faulted therefor.
Both CFI and CA decisions upheld the validity of the partition and the deeds of sale.

Issue: Whether Respondent is liable as contended by the complainant

Held:
No, the court upholds The IBP’s recommendation that the charge be dismissed. It contends that:
1. complainant was not a party to the documents
2. respondent cannot be faulted for failure of the National archives to provide complainant with copies
3. respondent and his wife takes no partition and sale of the properties.
4. there is no prohibition for a notary public to witness a document which he ratified nor for his wife to sign as
witness. The only exception is when the document to be notarized is a will.
Complainant offered no proof, but only mere allegations, since such a grave charge against a member of the bar and
former municipal judge needs concrete substantiation to gain credence. Furthermore, complainant alleged that she just
discovered the said partition and sale, but on June 7, 1967, they had filed an action for partition and annulment of
document before the Court of First Instance of Cavite.
WHEREFORE, as recommended, the instant complaint is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

ALICE GOKIOCO VS. ATTY. RAFAEL P. MATEO, A.C. NO. 4179, NOVEMBER 11, 2004
As to ante-dating

Alice Gokioco filed an Affidavit-Complaint alleging that: during the pre- trial conference of civil case “Sps. Eustaquio
Gokioco and See Chua-Gokioco vs. Jennifer Gokioco, Sps. Mariano Gokioco and Alice
Gokioco,” they discovered that the complaint in said case was subscribed and sworn to by See Chua-Gokioco before
herein respondent, Atty. Mateo on November 10, 1992.

See Chua-Gokioco however, already died on October 7, 1992 as evidenced by the death certificate issued by the local
civil registrar. Atty. Mateo admitted that although See Chua-Gokioco signed and subscribed the civil complaint at an
earlier date, he only entered the fact of the signing and subscribing of the said complaint much later, that is, on the date of
the filing of the said civil complaint. He purposely delayed the filing of the civil complaint against the herein complainant
and her family because he wanted to make sure that the parties had the opportunity to amicably settle the issues raised in
the civil complaint.
Moreover, respondent averred that his office has no telephone and is about 70 kilometers from the residence of the
Gokioco family in Caloocan; he notarized and filed the complaint on November 10, 1992 without any personal knowledge
of the fact of death of Mrs. Gokioco.

ISSUE: Whether ante-dating may be done.

HELD: NO.

The notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledging the instrument. It cannot be stressed enough that notaries public should be truthful in carrying
out their functions.

They must observe with the highest degree of care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties in
order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.

Courts, agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by notaries
public appended to instruments
REX M. TUPAL, vs.JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, [A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014.]
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.

Facts:

Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. Instead, he notarized affidavits
of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties on the day of the parties' marriage wherein such "package
marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City. Nine affidavits of cohabitation are all notarized by Judge Rojo. Judge
Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice: notarization of affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his
judicial seal on the affidavits, and not requiring the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as
required by law.

The respondent did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation contending that such was connected with his
official functions and duties as a judge. In addition, he contended that The Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage
by the Members of the Judiciary does not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage they will solemnize. Furthermore, he contended that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice since
a judge, as compared to notary public, does not require affixing a notarial seal on the affidavits notarized. Likewise, he
need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he
interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed
the affidavit.

Issues:
Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law

Ruling:
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating: the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law,
Circular No. 1-90, and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges
may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities or only if lawyers or notaries
public are lacking in their courts' territorial jurisdiction.

To be exempt from issuance of marriage license due to cohabitation, the parties must present an affidavit of
cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must
personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation and must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained
the parties' qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage. Based on law and the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties' affidavit of
cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties' marriage.

Furthermore, the Guidelines do not state that the judge can notarize the parties' affidavit of cohabitation. Thus,
judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize, since such
documents are not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages. An affidavit of cohabitation
remains a private document until notarized.

So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official functions and duties, and fails to certify
that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judge's court, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
 Judge Rojo also violated the Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a
notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him.

VICTORINO SIMON vs. JUDGE ALIPIO M. ARAGON, [A.M. No. MTJ-05-1576. February 03, 2005]
Authority of judges to notarize

MTC and MCTC judges may act as Notaries Public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with the
exercise of their official functions and duties. They may not, as Notaries Public ex officio, undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges.
Complainant alleged that the respondent judge was engaged in unauthorized notarial practice having undertaken the
preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bore no direct
relation to the performance of his functions as a member of the judiciary.
Simon further averred that, contrary to the requirements of Circular No. 1-90, the documents notarized by the respondent
judge did not contain any certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in San Pablo, Isabela.
Respondent notarized the documents annexed to the complaint, but explained that he was constrained to do so as there
was no lawyer or notary public. He clarified that, upon learning of Circular No. 1-90 sometime in 1993, he immediately
and voluntarily desisted from further notarizing private documents. Respondent further maintained that he could not be
considered as having violated Circular No. 1-90 during the period 1983 to February 25, 1990, since the said circular has
not yet been promulgated.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge guilty of engaging in unauthorized notarial work

Held:
Undoubtedly, respondent judge acted beyond the scope of his authority as notary public ex officio when he notarized the
aforestated documents not in connection with the exercise of his functions and without complying with the requirement of
certification as to lack of a notary public within his municipality or circuit.

While it is true that the respondent judge should not be held liable for notarizing private documents in violation of
Circular No. 1-90 prior to its effectivity, a review of the records of this case revealed that after February 26, 1990, the
respondent judge notarized seven (7) private documents without certifying the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit.

In Doughlas v. Lopes, Jr., the respondent judge was fined the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for
unauthorized notarization of a private document. Since in the instant case, the respondent judge committed seven (7) acts
of unauthorized notarization, we adopt the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that the respondent
judge be fined Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00).
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, we find respondent Judge Alipio M. Aragon GUILTY of violation of
Circular No. 1-90 for unauthorized notarization of private documents, and is hereby FINED the amount of SEVEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00).

IV. Code of Professional Responsibility

Canons 1-6, The Lawyer and Society
Cases :
ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant, v. ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, JAN. 26, 2016
FACTS:

Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee
that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured of a profitable investment
due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients and investors. As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado
issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests.
All checks were drawn from PSBank. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the
aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account.

Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado. As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado
began to avoid complainant’s calls and text messages. This prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer who
personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado, directing him to settle his total obligation in the amount of
P747,000.00, yet Atty. Salvado refused to receive the said notice. Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he was working
on “something” to pay his obligations. He still refused to personally receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.
Atty. Salvado denied that he told complainant that he had previously entered into various government contracts and that
he was previously engaged in some other businesses prior to engaging in the lending and rediscounting business. Atty.
Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to invest in his business, but it was Atty. Divina’s earnings of good
interest that attracted him into making an investment. The checks he issued were merely intended as security or evidence
of investment. Furthermore, he also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he would request complainant not
to deposit a check knowing that it was not backed up by sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked until the dishonor
of the checks, for which he readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months. IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with modification – increased the period of
suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.

ISSUE:
WON ATTY. SALVADO should be suspended for he violated CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
HELD:
YES.
The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had
observed, complainant’s being beguiled to part with his money and believe Atty. Salvado as a lawyer and businessman
was typical human behavior worthy of belief. Simply put, Atty. Salvado’s stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way
or another, influenced complainant’s decision to invest.
The excuse of “gullibility and inadvertence” deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless
checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience
that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote that the
issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt,
though it was not related to his professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado’s
business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the
court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.

DISPOSITION: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
JIMENEZ VS. FRANCISCO, DEC. 10, 2014
Lawyer-client relationship
Facts: Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She
felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and
Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco
for representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal
implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale and transfer of
Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco
was the one who actively participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the
truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she
reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

Issue: Whether respondent’s actively and passively allowing Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC and in
other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney.

Held: Yes, While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion to make untruthful representations
to the SEC and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for
which a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted. Atty. Francisco could have prevented his
entanglement with this fiasco among the members of Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing
with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were
performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s
indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of evidence presented by the complainant
miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the
legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to
establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.
FOSTER vs. Atty. Agtang, Dec. 10, 2014

FOSTER vs AGTANG
A.C. No. 10579
–
Legal Ethics
–
Borrowing From Clients Not Appropriate

Civil Claims Cannot Be Litigated in a Disbarment Suit

FACTS:
In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a realty dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtang’s
acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for incidental expenses. For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from
Foster as filing fee. He also advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge and get a
favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtang’s demands. On various occasions, Agtang borrowed
money from Foster for his personal use. Such loan amounted to P122,000.00. Foster, being prudent, asked for receipts for
all funds she handed over to Agtang.
Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtang’s negligence and incompetence in drafting the
complaint. She also found out that the filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned out that Agtang
was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked Agtang to return her the balance, the said lawyer failed to do
so hence, she filed an administrative complaint against Agtang. The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually
ordered Agtang to return the balance of the filing fee (P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed from Foster
(P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang be suspended for three months only.
ISSUE
: Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.
HELD
: No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light. In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private capacity, since he resorted to overpricing, an act
customarily related to depravity and dishonesty.

. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Agtang should have
never borrowed from Foster Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall
not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
SIDE ISSUE:
May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from Foster? No. The Court held that it cannot order the
lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases
have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar.
The only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material
bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other. To rule otherwise would in effect
deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court.

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. IVAN M.

SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent., JANUARY 28, 2014
Honesty in lawyer-client relationship
FACTS:
Complainants and Yulo engaged in the services of Solidum for each of their own cases concerning land. Yulo,
pursuant to her land registration case, convinced Navarro to finance the expenses. Navarro paid Php200,000 for the
registration expenses, but later learned that the property was already registered in the name of one Teodoro Yulo.
Meanwhile, Solidum obtained two loans of Php1,000,000.00 from Navarro and one loan of Php1,000,000.00 to
finance his sugar trading business, securing them with postdated checks and drafting a MOA in each and was able to pay a
total of Php900,000.00. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the balance or the interest thereon. The checks issued by
Solidum to the complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were
already closed. When complainants called Solidum’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and
October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest for the succeeding months.
Complainants alleged that Solidum induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest rates. He also prepared
and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that
respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a
different property from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter
property to her for Php1,000,000.00 but he later sold it for only Php150,000.00.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already closed.

ISSUE: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Respondent violated at least four provisions: Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
Solidum was disbarred from the practice of law.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on his loan from the complainants. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could
no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was
unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for
P1,000,000.00, but he later sold the property for only P150,000.00, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value
of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact
that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
9Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan
Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer
open a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are
inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact,
respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second
batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed
that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his
failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it turned out
that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from
his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on
the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to
Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in
this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as
the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a
member of the legal profession. Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of
his client to secure undue gains for himself that warrants his removal from the practice of law.

Is conduct under Rule 1.01 confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties? No. A lawyer may be
disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, FEB. 23, 2004
Sui Generis
Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect blatant
judicial sloth.
Heinz R. Heck is one of the defendants in a Civil Case before the Regional Trial presided by Judge Anthony E. Santos.
Heck and his co-defendant did not receive a copy of the order to schedule the trial on June 10 and 11, 1996. Consequently,
they and their counsel failed to appear therein. Since only the plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, appeared in that
hearing, Judge Santos considered the non-attendance of Heck and his co-defendant as waiver of their right to present
evidence. Judge Santos thereafter ordered that the case to be submitted for decision. He therefore authorized Atty. Singson
to prepare the draft of the decision. The decision issued by Judge Santos was copied verbatim from the draft which Atty.
Singson prepared. Hence, Heck filed an administrative complaint charging Judge Santos with violation of Section 1, Rule
36 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Santos guilty for adopting
Singson’s work as his own.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Santos is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
HELD:
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Santos’ order for the counsel of one of the parties to draft the decision
and his adoption verbatim of the draft clearly violate the Code of Judicial Conduct. The pertinent canons of which read:
Canon 2, a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Canon 3, a Judge should
perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence adjudicative responsibilities. By such order, Judge
Santos abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by no less than the fundamental law of the land. It is axiomatic that
decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench. He must use
his own perceptiveness in understanding and analyzing the evidence presented before him and his own discernment when
determining the proper action, resolution or decision. Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a
decision and parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial sloth.
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants, vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.,
JULY 9, 2013
Fraudulent advice to a client
FACTS: Complainant Lilia Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned
other parcels. Hence, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons, thus
she purchased 7 lands under his advice.

Later, Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels for their medication and other expenses. Atty. Glenn Gaccot offered the
parcels to prospective buyers to help her sell thus he borrowed from Tabang the TCTs.

Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels and caused the publication of
notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale and succeeded in
selling the seven parcels. He received a total of P3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.

Hence, pettioners alleged that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit filed a case before the IBP.

Respondent, contended that the names were not fictitious and petitioners only demanded a balato of 20% from the
proceeds which in his refusal, he was threatened to be defamed and disbarred.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.

RULING: Yes, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the
IBP Board of Governors.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own complicity
does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even
graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting
what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice
and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to
injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, the Court imposes upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.

He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to
rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’ plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity
by repeatedly absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his
Appeal despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a
party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, JULY 8, 2014

Notarizing documents in the absence of client
Facts:
Atty. Juvy Malit had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named Mercedita
de Jesus as its absolute and registered owner, despite Malit’s knowledge as a consultant of the Bataan LGU. Because of
this, the mortagee sued Mercedita for perjury and collection of sum of money.
Malit was also alleged to notarize a lease agreement without the signature of the lessees, and a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) which was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.
Malit filed her comment. After the rejoinder, Mercedita filed an urgent ex-parte motion for submission of additional
evidence which contained 10 files which showed more violations on Malit’s end.
The IBP Commissioner recommended the revocation of Malit’s notarial commission for two years. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved this, but modified the suspension to one year. Malit filed two MRs and maintained that
the additional documents were inadmissible for violating sec. 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice).
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Malit is guilty of violating the CPR
Held: Yes.
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the
instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary
public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew
that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the
real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for
tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Same; A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.—A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.
Notarized Documents; Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence
with The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise,
the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit suspended from practice of law for one (1) year for violating Canon 1 and
Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Her notarial
commission, if still existing, is immediately revoked and is perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a notary
public.
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.
BAYDO,, MARCH 10, 2015
FACTS:
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez. Atty. Catindig
told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez,
and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married
Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA).
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. Sometime in 1997,
Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to
Gomez.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s
scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty.
Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.”
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo
Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican
Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to
prevent any acrimony from developing.
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.

IBP – recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complaint against Atty. Baydo – dismissed for dearth of evidence.

ISSUE:
WON the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.

HELD:

YES.
RATIO:
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the
practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of
the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed
establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high
degree.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a
nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest
degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to give
their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to
properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much
younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered
a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but
on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard
of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own
admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the
process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter
informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint.
The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.
DISPOSITION: Catindig – disbarred. Baydo – dismissed.
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, SEPT. 8, 2015
Immorality and disbarment
Facts:

This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as
an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession."

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of
Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant
avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had
personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married to
Jardiolin;
3. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still being
romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the Petition,
while still being romantically involved with CCC.
Issue:

Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?

Ruling:

Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral conduct.

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.

In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both married
and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant
was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence.

In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and
taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent

Moral turpitude
FACTS:

Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an
action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria
Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned
from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint
against him.

Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for
Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide
is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase “with the inherent
accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve
moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to
retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
ISSUES:
WON conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
WON Sesbreño should be disbarred
HELD:
YES.
YES.
RATIO:

1. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may
not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act
and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x
generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always
be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which
involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are
reached.

The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do
anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreño
cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an absolute and unconditional
pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a circumstance not present in these cases. Here, the Order of
Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations,
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive clemency merely
“commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on
Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The
penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was
released from prison.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by
this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
DISPOSITION: Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by its President, ATTY.
VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, JAN. 14, 2015
Official duties not connected to duties as lawyer
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015

FACTS:
Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard
Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post. Atty. Limpin, the Corporate
Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for
“updating purposes”.
The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President. Mired with allegations of
anomalous business transactions and practices, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC. Guarin filed this
complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty.
Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and
President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as
chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin
as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in
good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
HELD: YES.
Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions
as loopholes.
A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only
where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent
of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.”
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,
22
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice. We thus find that in
filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a
lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, vs PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent
Fabricating spurious court order
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed by Jose Allan Tan against his lawyer Pedro Diamante. Complainant secured the
services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and
Natividad Valencia-Tan. Respondent accepted the engagement however the case was dismissed. Respondent knew of the
dismissal as early as August 14, 2007 but complainant was only informed of such fact on August 24, 2007. Respondent
allegedly asked for the amount of P10, 000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could
not produce the said amount at that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as
payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the
amount of P10, 000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal before the RTC.
In an Order dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been filed out of the time
prescribed. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order dated November
9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the
late Luis Tan. When complainant went to the RTC to follow up his case, it was then that he discovered that the November
9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court. Complainant also found out that, contrary to the
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative
complaint for disbarment against respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR
Held:
Yes. Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated on the
developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence. A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his
client’s interests with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
Respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an
available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus,
causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR
are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions
erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations,
as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.
AMA LAND INC. AGAINST JUSTICES BUESER, ET AL., MARCH 11, 2014
Unfounded charges against members of the judiciary
Facts:

AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.
Due to the project's location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area for the
construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.
(WWRAI) thus, AMALI sent a notice to the latter, yet it was ignored. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office
along Fordham Street that it enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set
up a fence to deny access to AMALI's construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a petition for the
enforcement of an easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. Thus filed a petition
included an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) which was granted.
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building of mixed use (to be known as the
AMA Residences) after AMALI's petition for corporate rehabilitation was approved.

On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer.

On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting the petition of
WWRAI.[

AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with the counsels of
WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust
judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA... had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate
intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1,... Rules 10.01 and
10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:

Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon
10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling:

The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint by substantial
evidence.[9] Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an
administrative... charge against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence

AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against
respondent Justices.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised Penal Code,
provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision" is
punished with prision mayor and... perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a
judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment
or taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law.[12] The term knowingly means "sure knowledge, conscious
and deliberate intention to do an injustice."[13] Thus, the complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the... evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent
to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient
defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision.[14] In other words, the judge was
motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar motive in issuing the judgment.[15] Bad faith is, therefore, the
ground for liability.[16] The failure of the judge to correctly... interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable.

Moreover, AMALI's allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA through an administrative
complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of
resorting to administrative charges against... sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We do not
tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN
Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.,... Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and
Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,[18] we emphatically held that the filing of administrative
complaints or even threats of the filing subverted and undermined the independence of the Judiciary

It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule against it in its cases. That
impression is not at all devoid of basis. The complaint herein is actually the second one that AMALI has brought against
respondent Justices in relation to the... performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its first complaint entitled
Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo
R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,[19] AMALI accused respondent Justices of: (a) dishonesty and
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in violation
of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of... the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The
Court dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the propriety of the interlocutory orders issued by
respondent Justices

The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright disrespect of
the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly degrade the judicial
office, and interfere with the due... performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the Court did not then deem fit
to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its representative personally responsible for the unfounded charges
brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative... to do so in order to uphold the dignity and
reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have
thereby demonstrated their penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not... stopped
doing so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its representatives would be to
reward them with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court and its judicial officers.

Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI's authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice
President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present complaint,
to show cause in writing why they should not be... held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and
baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless
administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt... under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court

ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser,
Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter lack of merit; and (b)
ORDERS Joseph B.

Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the members of the Board of Directors of AMA
Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita to bring the administrative complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show
cause in writing within 10 days from notice... why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for
degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices, and for interfering with the due performance of their work
for the Judiciary.

V. Code of Professional Responsibility

Canons 7-9, The Lawyer and the Legal Profession
Cases:

1. SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION v. ATTY. ELMER A. DELA

ROSA, A.C. No. 10681, February 03, 2015
Failure to pay loan
FACTS:
Complainants alleged that from 1997 until August 2008, respondent served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this
capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect
of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize. Aware of the fact
that complainants had money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, called Henry to borrow money. The
checks were personally encashed by respondent. Demanded the return of payment but failed to do so.
Respondent denied borrowing P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was the real debtor. He also claimed
that complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.
In The IBP Report and Recommendation, it is concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of the legal
profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the
mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with
stipulated interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
HELD: Yes. Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected. As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were
his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and
confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest
within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the
runaround up to this day.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and
confidence. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use
all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.
Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.

2. FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR.vs.LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, PHILIP RYAN DE

GUZMAN, and ROSELLA DE GUZMANBAUTISTA G.R. No. 191247
Quantum meruit, attorney's fees

FACTS:
Sometime in August 1990, Spouses de Guzman engaged the legal services of the petitioner as defense counsel in the
complaint filed against them by one Ms. Chong for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages
involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City. Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels.
While the case was pending before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they were
substituted by their children, who are the respondents.
On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees before the RTC. He alleged, among
others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value
of the subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had
successfully represented them, respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted attorney’s fees.
Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the subject land on the basis
of quantum meruit.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Attorney’s fees.
2. Whether the finality of the decision did not bar petitioner from filing the motion to recover his attorney’s fees.

HELD:
In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s fees – ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services
rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as
indemnity for damages.
The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite to their grant, the
intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in
favor of his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in
favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to
judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination of their reasonable amount are applicable in
one as in the other.
In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation for professional
services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for
damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman
(substituted by respondents) and not to petitioner. The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can
attorney’s fees for professional services be recovered? (2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for professional services
be filed?
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be
availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation
has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only
arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the
fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for
attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of
course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds
thereof delivered to the client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees.
Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment
for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file
a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his
aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is permitted by the rules. As to the
timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned motion to determine attorney’s fees was seasonably filed.
Because petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of attorney’s fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the
Civil Code allows him a period of six (6) years within which to file an action to recover professional fees for services
rendered. Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused petitioner’s legal
representation. For this reason, petitioner’s cause of action began to run only from the time the respondents refused to pay
him his attorney’s fees.
With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s considered view that he is
deserving of it and that the amount should be based on quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an attorney’s professional
fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device
that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for
it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to
reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the
amount of legal fees.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman and respondents for almost
seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was not an easy task for petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for such a
long period of time, considering the heavy and demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the research and
preparation of pleadings, the gathering of documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various legal work necessary
to the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner devoted much time and energy in handling the
case for respondents. Given the considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the quality
of work shown by him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded
reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be paid his professional fee
based on quantum meruit.
The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability
of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part
of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer
acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of
his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client he himself would not
get his due.
The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's fees based on the value of
the property subject of litigation because petitioner failed to clearly substantiate the details of his oral agreement with
Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the property.
3. JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA-
BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP,and KARENOROLA,vs.JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS,
Conflict of interest
Facts
Complainants are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).
Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola
(Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of Emilio.

In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, the parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as
counsel for and in behalf of Heirs of Trinidad; (b) Atty.Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf
of Heirs of Antonio, with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in
behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of
Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the
appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted. Subsequently, respondent filed an Entry of
Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order.
Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines(IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting
interests in the subject case;7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio. Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving
spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance, the same was
obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007. In this
accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written
consent as required under the Rules.

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs
of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on
her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge. In
fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further communications transpired after
these two hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case. He added
that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information
was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance. Finally, he clarified that his representation for
Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a litigator, and that since no settlement was forged between
the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007. In support of his assertions, respondent submitted
the affidavits of Maricar and Atty. Azarraga relative to his limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to
his engagement as counsel for Emilio.
Recommendation and Action of IBP
IBP ruled that respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen as the records
of the cases how that he never acted as counsel for the other complainants. And further contended that while respondent's
withdrawal of appearance was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the consent
of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.20

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules
as complainants themselves admitted that respondent "did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor
did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment." Considering that it was
respondent's first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and,
instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts would be dealt with more severely.

The Issue Before the Court

Whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

Yes. Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice. In Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:
The test of conflict of interest is" whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed
by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests
if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs
of Antonio. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as
administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent
Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very
interest of the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges
against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in

A lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s
previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be
given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.31

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a litigator and for the
purpose of forging a settlement among the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his
conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04,32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written
consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably,
respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his
impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their
express written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in
settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondent’s violation of the aforestated
rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.
 4. REBECCA MARIE UY, YUPANGCO-NAKPIL,Complainant,
- versus - ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY Respondent. A.C. No. 9115
Withdrawal of complaint
Facts:
The petitioner is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy. She was adjudged as the sole and
exclusive legal heir of Pacita by virtue of an Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34. Pacita was a
stockholder in several corporations, wherein one of these companies is Uy Realty Company, Inc., primarily engaged in
acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties. Petitioner, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent,
continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order in declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of
Pacita’s properties; as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits
coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in the corporations. She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial despite an
existing Trust Agreement wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true
and beneficial owner of the same.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held:
YES. The Court finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject
property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent
should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the
slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily,
members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of
the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a guardian of law and justice.
5. Atty. Catalan vs. Atty. Salvosa, July 24, 2012
Former prosecutor appearing as counsel for the accused
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Catalan filed a case for disbarment against Respondent Atty. Silvosa on the following allegations:
1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor;
2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio for P30,000; and
3) Sandiganbayan convicted respondent in a criminal case for direct bribery.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
1. Accused Atty. Silvosa of violating Rule 6.03 of the CPR by appearing as private counsel in a case where he
previously appeared as public prosecutor and further alleged that the defendant and his client are relatives.
2. In a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Prosecutor Toribio testified Atty.
Silvosa, while still a public prosecutor, offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
murder.
3. Sandiganbayan’s ruled in a criminal case convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on May 18, 2006.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
1. His appearance was only for the purpose of reinstatement of bail and denies any relationship between and the
accused.
2. Dismisses the allegations of Prosec. Toribio and such allegations were “self-serving” and purposely dug by Atty.
Catalan and his puppeteer to pursue persecution.
3. While admitting of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, respondent asserts that “conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code do not involve moral turpitude.
IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION:
The IBP ruled that respondent was guilty only of the first charge by appearing and filing a motion to post bail bond
pending appeal and thus violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and gave the penalty of reprimand.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation however modifying the penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for 6 months.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the CPR
HELD: Yes When he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently
forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.”
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the
penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds
for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the
crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is
predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his
conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of
integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this
privilege. Respondent was dibarred.
6. Tumbokon vs. Atty. Pefianco, August 1, 2012
Dividing attorney's fees with non-lawyer
FACTS: An administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent
Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees
the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action
for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their
agreement was reflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was
informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to
reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission which respondent ignored.
Respondent:
Explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the
August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he
clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction
against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.
the Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice
of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
HELD: YES.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their
private capacity.
7. Alvin S. Feliciano vs. Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada, March 11, 2015 A.C. No. 7593,
Appearing in court during suspension
FACTS:
The Court en banc promulgated a Resolution suspending Atty. Lozada in the practice of law for two years. However, in
Civil Case No. 101 v-07, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband,
Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City which such act allegedly constitutes willful disobedience to the resolutions of the Court.
Defendant explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is
embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada
is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted
that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to
give him legal assistance.
Initially, IBP-CBD recommended disbarment. However, such was modified by IBP-Board of Governors recommended
that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.
HELD: Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring
the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension.
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Atty. Lozada's
defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband, she is still
serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance
or clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend
her husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost,
an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
HOWEVER, this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will
always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that
Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a
client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is SUSPENDED for a period of 6 months from practice of law.
8. TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ vs. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, A.C. No. 8339, March 16, 2015
Issuance of bouncing checks
FACTS:
The Complaint prayed for respondent’s disbarment or suspension in relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks
and non-payment of a loan. According to Teresita, Atty. De Vera borrowed money from her and issued postdated checks.
Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment however the checks "bounced" for being drawn
against insufficient funds. Upon another attempt for encashment by the petitioner, checks were dishonored because the
account was closed.
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera, still, she failed to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita to file
complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code.
On the other hand, the respondent claims that the present administrative case is baseless since proceedings before the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were allegedly under reinvestigation since she' did not have the opportunity to answer the
criminal complaint.
Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint was there any
proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position against the
interests of the complainant.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for and found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for
serious misconduct and recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable
HELD:
Yes. Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment"; it is serious or gross when it is flagrant.
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her checks to Teresita
that were subsequently dishonored upon presentation for payment is contrary to ordinary human experience and the
former is presumed to know the consequences of her acts. Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the
laws whether in a private or professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole."A lawyer "may be
removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct
not connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer to him.'"
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
9. MAXIMINO NOBLE III vs. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015
Courtesy to fellow lawyer
FACTS:
In the complaint for damages filed by Orlando against his brother Marcelo (represented by Maximino) and several
defendants, Orlando provided data regarding his IBP dues payment and MCLE Compliance. Maximino claimed that at the
time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP
annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Compliance, not just the second. This is one of the bases of this administrative complaint against Orlando for
being in violation of Bar Matter 1922.
On the other hand, upon receipt of a copy of the complaint for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando,
Maximino discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from
retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees.
Furthermore, records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel in the complaint for
damages containing the above-mentioned contentions and charging of as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of which
he sent to Marcelo for his signature.
The above is the other basis for this administrative complaint for being in violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Respondent’s contention: Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE
compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise
Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil
case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a
"brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust
vexation, which Orlando voluntarily pleaded guilty consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting
insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x.
IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors.
ISSUE/s:
(1) W/N the transgression to the MCLE compliance requirement is a ground for disbarment.
(2) W/N the insulting and offensive private messages of Orlando are violative of the CPR.
HELD:
(1) NO. The failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed
against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of
the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.
(2) YES. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Consequently and pursuant to Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.
The IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they
were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text
messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid).
Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's
offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of
guilty to the crime of unjust vexation was an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a
departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in
their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon
them. Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional
conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as
the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in
dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
10. Mabini Colleges vs. Atty. Pajarillo, July 22, 2015
Conflict of interest
FACTS: Mabini Colleges, Inc. had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two opposing factions - the Adeva Group
and the Lukban Group (complainant) while the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary.
Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet
Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant. Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application
because the Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered as stockholders
in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged
that the complainant was having financial difficulties. In reply, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of
complainant's financial capacity to pay the loan. RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 (later on
raised to P400,000) which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant.
Later on, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage. Complainant then filed a complaint for Annulment of
Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.
Thus the complaint for disbarment against the respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to
exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty.
In response, Respondent’s contended the following:
1. That complainant’s cannot represent the complainant in this disbarment case because they were not duly authorized by
the Board of Directors to file the complaint.
2. there is no Conflict of Interest because he merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve as
its legal counsel and further upheld that documents and information related to the loan transaction between RBP and the
complainant were public records. Thus, he could not have taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate secretary
of the complainant.
Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year. The Board of
Governors of the IBP affirmed such findings.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his appearance as counsel for
RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by complainant against RBP.
HELD: Yes.
1. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client and the latter appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his
former client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent failed to
show any written consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts
representing conflicting interests.
We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan transaction between RBP and the
complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the
complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the
interest of the complainant, his former client.
Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of
the client's opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential
nature was revealed to the attorney by the client. This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an
attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage
in the subsequent adverse employment. Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his
client is irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of interest.
2. A complaint for disbarment is imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. The
complainants can institute the complaint for disbarment even without authority from the Board of Directors of the
complainant.
11. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 125
Privileged communication
FACTS
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG.
During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" which excluded
private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s
for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by
Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of their clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for
certiorari, invoking that the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion:
In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the strict application of the law of agency
In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their client(s) and other information requested by PCGG.
In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds
and with due consideration to equal protection of the law

ISSUE
Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten wealth is
privileged and disclosure of such is unethical.
RULING
The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not
be shrouded in mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case
falls under the first and third exception.

The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides the disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes the importance of maintaining client
confidence. Furthermore, this duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon
15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.

The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled and set aside.
12. People of the Philippines vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 115439-41, July 16, 1997
Limitation of privileged communication

FACTS: The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr., who was formerly the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and Congressman. During his stint, Paredes applied for and was
granted a free patent over a vast tract of land. However, it was cancelled because apparently, it has already been
designated and reserved as a school site. The court found that Paredes had obtained title thereto through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application, and somebody came forward and filed a case of perjury against him. However, the
same was dismissed on the ground of prescription. Then again, another case was filed against him for violation of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce
the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for patent. In all these cases, Paredes was represented by
respondent Atty. Sansaet, a practicing attorney.

Paredes, as defense, contends that he has already been charged under the same set of facts and the same evidence where
such complaint (perjury case where he was already arraigned) has already been dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has
already attached. In support hereof, Paredes presented court records and transcripts as proof of his arraignment in the
perjury case.

However, the documents were found to be falsified, in conspiracy with Paredes’ counsel and the clerk of court where the
perjury case was filed. One Teofilo Gelacio claims that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal. Hence, another case was filed for falsification of judicial records. It was then that respondent Sansaet
offered to testify as a state witness against his client Paredes, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to have
the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by having him and co-respondent prepare and falsify the subject
documents.

But the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the lawyer could not testify
against his own client. In view of such relationship, confidential matters must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to
accused Sansaet, as his lawyer, in his professional capacity, and therefore privileged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by attorney-client
privilege.

HELD: No. There is no privileged communication rule to talk about. The privilege applies only if the information was
relayed by the client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point is when the communication was given, not
when the lawyer was made to testify.
The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein
constitute an exception to the rule.

It may be correctly assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with
the criminal cases since the latter served as his counsel therein. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by other means.
IOW, including physical acts. The acts and words of the parties, therefore, during the period when the documents were
being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to
witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.

However, the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney
is bound to respect. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications are concerned, those crimes were necessarily
committed in the past. But for the privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to
a crime intended to be committed in the future. IOW, if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime which
he has already committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the privilege declares cannot be
broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with
regard to a crime a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s
advice.

Here, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical
acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada were about to falsify the documents. Clearly,
therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the
crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his
present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are
outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.

It is well settled that communication between a lawyer and his client, to be privileged, must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, the
prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is
not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the
interest of justice.

To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and
practice in the noble profession of law.

VI. Code of Professional Responsibility

Canons 10-13, The Lawyer and the Court
Cases:
13. Jimenez and Vizconde / Lozano vs. Atty. Verano, July 15, 2014
acts tending to Influence the legal system
14. Hon. Manahan vs. Atty. Flores, Nov. 13, 2013
Respect for the court
15. In Re SC Resolution dated 28 Apr. 2003, April 17, 2012
Courtesy to the Court/Legal System
FACTS:
Atty. Magdaleno M. Pena filed a complaint against Urban Bank and certain members of its
Board of Directors for recovery of agent’s compensation and attorney’s fees for his services
rendered in evicting the occupants of a bank property in Pasay City. The RTC ruled in favor of
Pena but the bank appealed to the Court of Appeals and motioned to approve a Php 40-million
supersedeas bond for the stay of the execution of the RTC decision pending adjudication of its
appeal in the main case. The court granted the motion and with this, the Urban Bank’s successor
in interest requested not to cancel the bank’s shares which were previously sold at a public
auction. Because of the ensuing disputes, MSCI sought clarification from the court on whether
its resolution prohibitied MSCI from transferring Urban Bank’s shares to the winning bidders.
Urban Bank also filed an identical motion for clarification.
The court acting on the two motions stated that its approval of the supersedeas bond suspended
the running of the one year period for the Bank to redeem the properties sold at the auction and
prohibited the transfer of Union Bank’s MSCI club shares to the winning bidders.
On December 2002, Pena filed an urgent motion to expunge the bank’s motion for clarification
and recall the Court’s resolution on the ground that he was not furnished a copy of the motion
nor given opportunity to be heard on it.
Pena also filed a motion to inhibit and to resolve his urgent motion enclosing as Annexes B and
C purported photocopies of pages 61 and 62 of the Court’s supplemental agenda, internal
documents that are engaged as highly confidential. Pena alleged that based on the handwritten
notes on the right hand margin of the supplemental agenda, the Court merely took note of the
filing of the motion for clarification and did not act further on it. However, the resolution which
granted the motion had been falsified.
Bothered by Pena’s allegations, the First Division of the Court conducted a hearing on where he
got the annexes and if they were authentic. After the hearing, it was believed that the document
was indeed a copy of the agenda but the handwritten notations did not belong to Justice Carpio.
Further, Atty. Pena when asked where he obtained such documents could not provide the court a
proper and justified answer as he only said that the document was in a sealed envelope and was
anonymously mailed to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Pena violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING:
The court ruled that Atty. Pena has violated several canons namely that of Canon, 8, 10 and 11
for failing to give due respect to the Courts. His conduct, demeanor and language with respect to
his cause of action tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary as well as
inflict unfounded accusations against colleagues. The most disconcerting for the Court is his
uncanny ability to obtain confidential and internal court orders and to use them shamelessly in
his pleadings to further his cause. With this, the Court hereby disbars from practicing law Atty.
Pena.
16. Rose Bunagan-Bansig vs. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera A.C. No. 5581. January 14, 2014
Respect for court processes
FACTS:
On May 8, 1997, Respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), sister of Bansig, entered into a contract of
marriage. Despite respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a
certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes
grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in
the Bar.
Thereafter, through several resolutions, respondent was required to file a comment on the petition. However, respondent
repeatedly failed to comply with the resolutions.
After investigation, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be
suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
HELD: No. Pursuant to Rule 1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of CPR, respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment.
Moreover, respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. His obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof”.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it
only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court. Wherefore, respondent is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken
of the Roll of Attorneys.

17. Presiding Judge Jose L. Madrid, Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Sorsogon City, Complainant, v. Atty. Juan S.
Dealca, Respondent | A.C. No. 7474, 9 September 2014
Facts:
The complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona
in a pending case docketed at the Court of Appeals wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.

The parties agreed upon PhP 15,000.00 as attorney’s fees with the following breakdown: 50% payable upon acceptance
of the case; and the remaining balance upon termination of the case. Complainant paid the respondent PhP 7,500.00. Prior
to preparing the appellant’s brief, respondent demanded payment of PhP 4,000.00. The complainant obliged though it was
contrary to the original agreement. Before filing the appellant's brief, respondent demanded payment of the balance
amounting to PhP 3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent withdraw his appearance as complaint’s
counsel without informing the complainant.

Thus, the complainant charged the respondent with misconduct and praying the respondent be “sternly dealt with
administratively.”

Issue:
Whether respondent committed misconduct and violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Held:
The Supreme Court find the respondent violated Canon 22 of the CPR for withdrawing from the complainant’s case
without a good cause. Respondent also violated Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the CPR for demanding full payment before
submission of the complainant-appellant’s brief even though they have an agreement that final payment will be given
upon termination of the case.
The Supreme Court reprimanded the respondent.
18. Aida R. Campos Et Al VS. Atty Eliseo Camos A.C. No. 8644, January 22, 2014
Respect for the court
FACTS:
The complainant, Aida Campos, together with children Alistair and Charmaine, filed the instant complaint for disbarment
against her husband, Judge Eliseo Campos. They alleged that Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious
misconduct in :a) causing the issuance of the original land title in Alistair’s name; b) subsequently misrepresenting
himself as the real owner of the lot ; c) falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed on that the owner’s
copy of the property was missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with
Alistair; d) stating in his petition for annulment of marriage that he is a homosexual despite his admission of an intimate
relation with another woman; and e) choking and boxing his children during a conference in the judge’s chamber.
ISSUE:
Did the above mentioned acts constitute dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct?
RULING:
Of the five issues raised, only the allegation of Eliseo’s engagement in the scuffle inside the chamber of the judge shall be
resolved. In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare accusations were exchanged. It bears stressing that not one
of the parties had presented even one independent witness to prove what transpired inside the chamber of Judge Casals
That a scuffle took place is a fact, but the question of who started what cannot be determined with much certainty. While
admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as self-defense on his part.
While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s narration of the incident, and understands that the successive acts of
the parties during the tussle were committed at a time when passions ran high, he shall not be excused for comporting
himself in such an undignified manner.
Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his own children inside the
chamber of a judge. This Court shall not countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by
people with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice
solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity.
Although Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum and restraint was then expected
from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due respect for the court and lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of
the legal profession. Further, albeit not raised as an issue, the Court views with disfavor of Eliseo’s statement during the
hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline on March 18, 2011 that he doubts Alistair to be his biological son.
As a lawyer, Eliseo is presumably aware that ascribing illegitimacy to Alistair in a proceeding not instituted for that
specific purpose is nothing short of defamation.
All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he conducted himself in a
manner not befitting a member of the bar by engaging in the scuffle with his own children in the chamber of Judge Casals
and recklessly expressing his doubt anent the legitimacy of his son Alistair during the hearing before the CBD.
VII. Code of Professional Responsibility
Canons 14-22, The Lawyer and the Client
Cases :
19. Valentin C. Miranda vs. Atty. Macario D. Carpio, Sep. 26, 2011
Lien / Attorney's fees
Facts
Complainant is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno,
Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant filed a case for the registration of the aforesaid property before the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured
in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit, complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay respondent Twenty Thousand
Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid
respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case,
respondent demanded the additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a
memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the
total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-
owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent
without the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands,
the latter became furious and their relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and owner's
duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same had already been claimed by and released to respondent on
March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's
duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted
that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in
exchange for which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the
demand, for not having been agreed upon.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse claim on the subject OCT
wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal services was 20% of the property and/or actual market
value. To date, respondent has not returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite
repeated demands to effect the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carpio has violated Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-client
relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's
fees. Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his
client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney's possession in the course of
his employment.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the complainant and the respondent
that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area covered by OCT No. 0-94.
Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that would entitle respondent to retain his client's property.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to
the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien,
which by no means is an absolute right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to
his client when due or upon demand.
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver the title of the
complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged entitlement to additional professional fees. He has
breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Further, in
collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor
agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a
case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. Respondent's further
submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum
meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's
professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client." In the present case, the parties had
already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit
does not fully find application because the respondent is already compensated by such agreement.
WHEREFORE, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-
94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
20. ANITA C. PENA VS. ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013
Betrayal of trust
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that she is the owner of a certain parcel of land in which an 8-stores abetment is constructed.
Respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case which she filed against her husband in 1974, and the aforementioned
property was her share in their property settlement. Respondent suggested that she apply for a loan from a bank to
construct townhouses on her property for sale to interested buyers, and that her property be offered as collateral.
Complainant entrusted the title of the property to respondent. When she visited her property, she discovered that her
apartment was already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on her property, which she
later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from Estrella D. Kraus. Respondent
was the Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged. Kraus was respondent's trusted employee who did
secretarial work for respondent.
She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her property using an employee, Kraus, as the instrument in the sale,
and she did not sign any deed selling her property to anyone. Respondent claimed that Kraus never worked in any
capacity in her law office, and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus, were her clients and it was complainant offered
the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses Kraus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by deceiving complainant Anita C. Peña
and conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Ernesto Lampa
RULING:
The court ruled in the affirmative pursuant to standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Canons 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02, and 7, Rule 7.03. It is noted that respondent was in possession of complainant’s copy of the
title to the property, and it was respondent who admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having
executed or signed, the important evidence of the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the
Deed of Sale could not be produced by the Register of Deeds, as it could not be located in the general files of the registry,
and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be considered lost.
Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her Notarial Report for the month of
November 1986, including the said Deed of Sale, which was executed on November 11, 1986. Hence, the investigative
commissioner opined that it appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent
complainant from getting hold of the document. The failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her
Notarial Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale in effect suppressed evidence
on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its
authenticity.
 21. Umaguing vs. Atty. de Vera, Feb. 4, 2015
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
FACTS:
Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman but lost to her rival. Complainants lodged an election protest and engaged
in the services of Atty. De Vera. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera moved at a glacial pace; he rushed the
preparation of the documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits of
material witnesses, which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed
to be signed by the witnesses, they were unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera look for the nearest kin of the
witnesses and ask them to sign and he had all the documents notarized. He hastily filed the election protest with full
knowledge that the affidavits were falsified. In further breach of his oath, and for lack of trust and confidence in the
integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, the complainants withdraw him as their counsel. Complainants sought Atty.
De Vera’s disbarment.
ISSUES :
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.
Whether or not a case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.
1. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts,
every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. Xxx The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins
every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court
or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating
the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified
document before a court. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted
the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath.
2. Yes. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is
a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice in them.

22. REYNALDO RAMIREZ vs. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO A.C. No. 10537 February 3,
2015
FACTS:
Complainant engaged Atty. Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title initiated before the
Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him as per a referral from a friend of Ramirez’s sister. He alleged that
Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy
instead of attorney’s fees. It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court
appearance.
On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez. Atty. Margallo advised him
to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008. On December 5, 2008, the
Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she
would have one prepared.
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Margallo informed
him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief.
On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no word from the
Court of Appeals.
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. She told him that the Court of
Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis of his
claim. She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had
been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April 13, 2009 with a
Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner’s Contention:
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s Contention:
By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense of
P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50%
chance of winning the case. She denied ever having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of
the value of the land subject of the controversy.
Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had begged her to
do so. She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her.
When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had been busy. Her failure to immediately inform
Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because her 8-year-old
daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her contacts.
IBP Findings and Recommendation:
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo
with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution. It found
that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Consequently, the Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the practice
of law for two (2) years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Margallo should be held administratively liable?
RULING: Yes, Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the
case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it appear that the case was dismissed on the merits
when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client.
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
client’s request for information.
23. Bernardino vs. Atty. Santos, Feb. 18, 2015
Negligence / Dishonesty
24. Anglo vs. Atty. Valencia, Feb. 25, 2015
Conflict of interest
WILFREDO ANGLO v. ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, et.al
A.C. No. 10567, February 25, 2015
FACTS: Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm of the respondents, for labor cases. Atty.
Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon the
agreement of both parties.
A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms, represented by the law
firm, which handled complainant's labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case against respondents,
alleging that they violated the rule on conflict of interest.
RESPONDENTS:
Admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia Law Office, but explained that their association is not a
formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements."
According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and
expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer
separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees exclusively.
As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be
handled collaboratively.
They averred that complainant's labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire
law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty.
Penalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of complainant's labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the
termination thereof.
IBP's Report and Recommendation:
IBP Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be
reprimanded. The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the respondents acting
together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as
respondents, having been retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified
theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions
of the CPR.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court found respondents GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said
violations.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is
"whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it
for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the fact that the labor cases
against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification
for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.

VIII. MISC
PROFESSIONAL DEALINGS WITH COURT, CLIENTS, FELLOW
LAWYERS AND SOCIETY
25. Ramiscal vs. Atty. Orro, Feb. 23, 2016
Fiduciary relationship of client and lawyer
Facts:
Complainants engaged in the legal services of respondent to handle a case in which they were defendants seeking the
declaration of nullity of title to a parcel of land in Isabela. Respondent received P10,000 acceptance fee from them and
handled the trial of their case until RTC decided in their favor. Plaintiffs appeals to the CA to which the respondent
requested from the complainants an additional P30,000 for the preparation and submission of their appellee’s brief in the
CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC but the respondent did not inform the complainants. They had trouble
communicating with respondent. When they finally reached him, he requested for an additional P7,000 as fee for filing a
motion for reconsideration which he did not file. Complainants lost their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a
probable worth of P3,391,600.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent may be suspended from the practice of law due to his gross misconduct.

Held:
While complainants and respondent did not appear during the mandatory conferences set by IBP, the IBP found that the
respondent violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 of the Code. The Court agreed with the IBP’s findings that respondent did not
competently and diligently discharge his duties as the lawyer of Ramiscals. The Court believes that the respondent
violated the Lawyer’s Oath which contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 17 and Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18. He failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and discretion and with all
good fidelity to his clients and his unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and to appear
in the administrative investigation of his conduct revealed his irresponsibility and disrespect for the IBP.
26. Malabed vs. Atty. de la Pena, Feb. 9, 2016
use of improper language to fellow lawyer
Facts:

In her Complaint[1] dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and
repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the
complaint filed by... respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against
Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the
complaint filed by respondent on behalf of... his client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. Complainant
claimed that she could not properly defend herself... without a copy of the title. She further claimed that the title presented
by respondent was fabricated.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the lot
owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of
donation respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16 Judge
Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor.

Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge.
Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law, which is a... government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the
accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office

In his Report and Recommendation,[7] Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted the
foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described complainant's counsel
as "silahis" and... accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."
According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross
misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an... officer of the court."
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's recommendation.
The Resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the... evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.[

Issues:

whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Ruling:

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Rejoinder, respondent... maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk
complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative case."[12]

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While
respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper
language in his pleadings. In Saberon v.

Larong,[13] we stated:... x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not... derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is charged. In keeping with the... dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.

For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly
SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
act or acts shall be dealt with more... severely.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
JUDICIAL CLEMENCY
VIOLATIONS IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION
ATTORNEY'S FEES
27. Sanchez vs. Atty. Aguillos, Mar 16, 2016
quantum meruit and atty's fees
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016 |Bersamin, J.,

This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in which the former is found
and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when an
attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during his professional engagement?

FACTS

Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the
latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having
performed the contemplated professional services.
• She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment of
her marriage with her estranged husband.
• She subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he
refused to do the same as he had already started working on the case; that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro
S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had
already performed
• That the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal services
to her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him6
in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he could have
brought a petition for legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was
sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; that because he
rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to
him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and
that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.

IBP also recommended that Atty. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

ISSUE(S)

(a) Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) Whether or not he
should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid.

RULING

Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire amount received from the client

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the foregoing
findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage.
Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either
causes of action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be
disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other
than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British
fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-
marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she
had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension
other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.

As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18,
and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED
P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive
and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely
punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the sum
of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.

LIEN
SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL
CONTEMPT
DESISTANCE OF COMPLAINANT
FILING OF CASES, INVESTIGATIONS AND DECISIONS
28. Cobalt Resources vs. Atty. Aguado, Apr 12, 2016
Crim. vs. adm. Cases
A.C. No. 10781, April 12, 2016
FACTS: This case is about a lawyer who allegedly participated in a hijacking incident of a delivery van carrying
cellphones worth P1.3 million. The complainant CRI owns the van. CRI initially filed its administrative complaint against
the lawyer before the Integrated Board of the Philippines (IBP), which found the lawyer “liable for unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct in falsifying the ID and mission order showing him as the Legal Consultant and the
Assistant Team leader” of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG), which allegedly hijacked the CRI delivery van
“loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3 million” on March 5, 2010. The IBP suspended the lawyer for two years. The
CRI filed a motion for reconsideration praying for Aguado’s disbarment. However, the IBP Board of Governors denied
the motion. This prompted the CRI to elevate the case to the Supreme Court, requesting that “Atty. Aguado be meted...
the penalty for disbarment for falsification of a PASG mission order and ID and for his involvement in the hijacking of the
CRI delivery van and its cargo.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer violated Canon 1 of the CPR that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct”.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court has disbarred the lawyer for gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) for his purported participation in a hijacking incident in 2010.The high tribunal in a unanimous
decision found merit in the accusation against Atty. Ronald C. Aguado of hijacking and falsification of documents. The
SC ordered that Aguado’s name be stricken off the roll of attorneys after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty.
The Court reminded lawyers of their explicit mandate as stated in Canon 1 of the CPR that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct” and that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.”
In its ruling, the SC held that “[c]learly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was
in possession of a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as the
Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation.”
The Court said "From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as charged
in the complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution. These falsified documents found in his possession, as
certified by the PASG, were used to facilitate the commission of the crime".
The SC stressed that Atty. Aguada failed to rebut the allegations as he "presented no other convincing evidence to support
his denial of the crime."
The court emphasized that membership in the Bar “is a privilege laden with conditions, and granted only to those who
possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers as instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice.” Lawyers are “expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,” it added.
29. Nullada vs. Atty. Paulma, Apr 12, 2016
moral turpitude
ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment by reason of dishonesty and conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent Atty. Orlando S.
Paulma (respondent).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount of P650,000.00 as
payment for the latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected member of the community and his being a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted the check
without question.3

Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids. Respondent failed
to make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting complainant to file a
criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006
recommending the filing of the appropriate information against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Miagao,
Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604.9

After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision10 dated October 30, 2008 finding respondent guilty of violation of
BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay.
Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00 representing the amount of the check with interest
pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint; (2) filing
fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance fees of P1,500.00
per hearing.11

Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC),
docketed as Criminal Case No. 346.12 In a Decision13 dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling.
On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory.14

Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this administrative complaint
before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.

In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior to September 30, 2005, he
informed the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the check. Respondent claimed that he merely
issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally
benefit from the proceeds thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no means by which to pay for
the amount of the check.17 He also claimed that complainant threatened him and used his unfunded check to the latter's
personal advantage.18

Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011,19 referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and recommendation.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP issued a Report and
Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as
for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.21

It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude, and
that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed the said offense. Stressing the importance of the
lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to protect the
administration of justice or that he is no longer of good moral character"22 which justifies either his suspension or
disbarment.23

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of Resolution24 adopting and
approving with modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for having been
found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.25cralawred

The Issue Before the Court

The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be administratively disciplined for
having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and modified by the IBP
Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law x x x."
Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the
orderly administration of justice.26 As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity,
which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.27cralawred

In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking
account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is
designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient
funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.

xxxx

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless
presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved
herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public
interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and
obey the laws.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of
public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.30
In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been indubitably
established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath, as
well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v.
Valerio,32 the same penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to respondent
for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34 respondent was ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure
to pay his debts, respondent also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a
wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing instances
when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same violation, the Court finds it appropriate
to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.

As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with
conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or
private capacity.36 Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but
would also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole.37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary
consequences.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and copies
be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
in the land.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
DISBARMENT
30. The Christian Spiritists vs. Atty. Mangallag, Mar 16, 2016
Procedure for disbarment
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case against the respondent attorney did not arise from any attorney-client relationship gone wrong
between the parties but from the ejectment action in which the respondent attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully defeated
the local congregation of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC), whose church
building and other structures were the objects of the action. After the defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties
agreed to settle among themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the notice of appeal and agreeing to voluntarily
vacate and remove their structures by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of
P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the respondent's financial assistance, the defendants reneged on their end of the
agreement; hence, at the respondent's instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and the writ of demolition, by
virtue of which the structures of the defendants were ultimately demolished.

The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to bring the disbarment
complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in causing the demolition of the
structures without the demolition order from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order
of the court, positing that he thereby abused his legal knowledge.

Antecedents

Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church building on the land located in JE 176 Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet,
which was owned by Maria Omiles who had bought it from Larry Ogas;1 that on June 11, 2012, Omiles and Pastor Elvis
Maliked received the summons issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to
answer the complaint for unlawful detainer filed against them by the respondent; that based on the allegations of the
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. R-1256 entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino Omiles and all persons
staying with and/or acting on her behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the Church of the Christian Spiritists in
the Philippines, represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent claimed ownership of the land where the church
of the CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro Loy;2 that the MTC
later on decided the case by declaring the respondent to have the better right of possession; and that the MTC further
declared that the CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice to the respondent exercising his option to
appropriate the building in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil Code.3

As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the defendants,
including the complainant, reneged on the promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the premises by August 31, 2013 in
consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. The writ of execution was issued on December 13,
2013 and the writ of demolition on December 19, 2013. Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla,
accompanied by the respondent and elements of the Philippine National Police, implemented the writ of execution and
writ of demolition on January 22 and January 23, 2014 by demolishing the church building and the pastoral house of the
CSP-PLC.4

Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a demolition order from the MTC; that the dismantled materials
worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had taken advantage of his legal knowledge to cause
the premature demolition of the structures sans the demolition order; that such taking away of the dismantled materials
constituted robbery and malicious mischief; and that his act warranted his disbarment.

In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He counters that the demolition was backed up by a court order;5
that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the parties entered into a compromise agreement by virtue of which the CSP-
PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and surrender the disputed premises in consideration of
P300,000.00 to be paid by him;6 that despite his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the premises even
within the grace period given to them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the judgment, and his motion was granted
by the MTC;8 that the sheriffs report dated November 21, 20139 stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply with the
writ of execution to remove or demolish its structures on the premises; that he consequently sought from the MTC the writ
of demolition; and that the MTC issued the writ of demolition.10

The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs who implemented the writ of demolition; that the sheriffs report
dated January 30, 2014 stated that the conduct of the implementation was peaceful, and that Pante and the other members
of the church personally observed the conduct of the demolition; and that the sheriffs report further stated that Pante
showed no defiance of the lawful order of the court.11

The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in his appropriating the dismantled materials to ensure
compensation for the expenses incurred in the demolition; and that the complaint for his disbarment should be dismissed.

Ruling of the Court

The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers,
or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government service. Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan,
and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed
with the Supreme Court; Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter
who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator. (As amended, Bar
Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.)

Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney may be taken by the
Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified complaint of any person.

Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the Court, the complaint is referred to the IBP
for investigation, report and recommendation. The reference to the IBP is resorted to whenever the factual basis for the
charge may be contested or disputed, or may require the reception of the evidence of the complainant and the respondent
attorney. After the referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings and recommendations on the complaint, subject to
the review by the Court.12 Yet, the Court may dispense with the referral to the IBP and resolve the charge without delay.
This happens particularly when the charge is patently frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only to harass
and spite the respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of administrative complaints against attorneys
in order to emphasize its role as the guardian of the legal profession with the ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys.
The disciplinary power of the Court is both a right and a duty.13 Quite recently, however, the Court has revised Rule 139-
B14 to eliminate any ambiguity about the authority of the Court to directly receive administrative complaints against
attorneys, thus:

Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall
be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as
may substantiate said facts.

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment, suspension and
discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and judges of
lower courts, or against lawyers in the government service, whether or not they are charged singly or jointly with other
respondents, and whether or not such complaint deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions. If the
complaint is filed before the IBP. six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the
Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator.

xxxx

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in other proceedings when the
interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or
to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same
manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly
by the Supreme Court.

The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, [bold emphasis supplied to
indicate the revisions]

Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against attorneys are generally not dismissed
outright but are instead referred for investigation, report and recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC), or any office of the Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such referral ensures that the parties' right to
due process is respected as to matters that require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by the mere evaluation of
the documents attached to the pleadings.15 Consequently, whenever the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC
or other authorized office or individual must conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint, and this
investigation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons because it
serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no cursory evaluation of the pleadings can determine.16

However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the conduct of formal investigation would be redundant
or unnecessary, such as when the protraction of the investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even
be directed at the outset should the Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit.17 Indeed, the Rules of Court
should not be read as preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such speedy relief is warranted.

It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the respondent to the IBP for the conduct of
the formal investigation. The documents he submitted to substantiate his denial of professional wrongdoing are part of the
records of the trial court, and, as such, are sufficient to establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful
entitlement to the demolition of the structures of the defendants in Civil Case No. R-1256.

Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013.18 In the execution of
the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully discharged their functions. The presence
of the respondent during the execution proceedings was by no means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. R-1256. The complainant was then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation,
who did not manifest any resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all, elements of
the Philippine National Police were also present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ of execution.

Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking away the materials of the
demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the defendants, including the complainant and Pante,
opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to
the respondent by August 31, 2013 in exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent
paid the amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano
Omiles, Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives of the CSP-PLC on the same day.19 But the latter reneged on
their part of the agreement without returning the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to exhaust his legal
remedies to enforce the judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly directed him "to exercise his
option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines within thirty (30) days from the
finality of this judgment insofar as the improvements introduced by the defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448
of the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His act of taking the
materials of the demolished structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating them in light of the fact
that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance was most likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in
good faith.

The respondent has called attention to the letter of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc.,21 the mother
organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the effect that it was disavowing knowledge of or participation in the
disbarment complaint, and that it was categorically declaring that the complaint had been filed by Pante only for his
personal interest at the expense of the congregation. The sentiments expressed in the letter manifested the inanity of the
complaint, and the ill motives behind Pante's filing of the complaint against the respondent. The proper outcome for such
a complaint is its immediate dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon Mangallay for its utter
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

IX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHIL. JUDICIARY AND JURISPRUDENCE ON JUDICIAL
ETHICS
31. Muhlach vs. Judge Arroyo, Aug. 25, 2015
Inhibition/disqualification of judges
ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE (EJ) MA. ANGELA ACOMPAÑADO-ARROYO, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY, CAMARINES SUR
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3989-RTJ), August 26, 2015
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: Francisco Perico Dizon, et. al. filed a petition before the MCTC of San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur
praying for the exclusion of Ariel and Charlene Mae G. Muhlach (Spouses Muhlach) from the list of voters of Precinct
No. 10A, Brgy. San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur. The case was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 80.
Hon. Angel A. Tadeo, MCTC, San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur voluntarily recused himself from hearing the case
on the ground that petitioner Edgar Malate is a cousin of his late mother-in-law and Francisco Perico-Dazon is the son-in-
law of the his former clerk of court, Florecito V. Patrocinio. EJ Arroyo scheduled the raffle of the case and was eventually
raffled to Judge Ricky C. Begino (Judge Begino). The Office of the Clerk of Court received a copy of the Order of
Inhibition of Judge Begino, which states that: “An (sic) oral motion of the counsel of the respondents, undersigned judge
hereby inhibit (sic) himself from further trying and ruling of this case to avoid any doubt as to the impartiality of this
court.”
EJ Arroyo issued the assailed order which rendered ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge Begino. It further directed
Judge Begino to continue to hear and decide the case. Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing of the case and resolved
and ruled that the Court is not convinced of the merit being shown by [Spouses Muhlach] for the Undersigned Judge
(Judge for brevity) to inhibit from hearing and deciding this case.
Judge Begino granted the petition for exclusion. Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against
EJ Arroyo. He accused EJ Arroyo of having issued the assailed order, which rendered ineffective the order of inhibition of
Judge Begino, with abuse of authority and with gross ignorance of law and procedure. Complainant contended that EJ
Arroyo had no authority to reverse Judge Begino's order inhibiting himself as such power is vested solely in the Supreme
Court.
EJ Arroyo explained that she noticed in Judge Begino's order of inhibition that on its face, it was improper or defective.
She averred that she was not ignorant of Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998 which provided that “the
duty of the executive judge is to appoint another trial judge under his/her supervision to handle the inhibited case or to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.” EJ Arroyo further explained that the subject case is a petition for exclusion of
the names of Spouses Muhlach from the list of voters which should be decided within ten days from its filing.
She alleged that after Judge Begino decided the case in favor of the petitioners and ordered the exclusion of Spouses
Muhlach from the voters list, Spouses Muhlach appealed the decision to the RTC. It was raffled to Branch 40 presided
over by Judge Noel Paulite (Judge Paulite) who eventually rendered a decision affirming the decision of Judge Begino.
Spouses Muhlach thereafter filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Paulite.
EJ Arroyo submits that should Judge Paulite grant the motion for inhibition, a dilemma would arise because the case
would be assigned to Branch 58 where she is the presiding judge, there being only two branches in RTC San Jose. She
claimed that such scenario would lead her to inhibit from the case because of the administrative complaint filed against
her. Consequently, the case will be referred to the nearest RTC and raffled among the judges in that jurisdiction. She
opined that other delaying tactics may be employed, and soon, it would already be elections day without the case having
decided. Finally, she averred that she had been a judge for 11 years and this is the first time that an administrative case has
been filed against her. ISSUE: Whether or not EJ Arroyo can be held liable for ignorance of the law and abuse of
discretion.
HELD: NO. The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is set forth in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified from participating in a trial. It
must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights,
which requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process, like
notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. Certainly,
a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants.
We agree with EJ Arroyo that the inhibition of Judge Begino is lacking in some elements. Judge Begino simply ruled that
he is inhibiting from the case to avoid any doubts as to the impartiality of the court. Although voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge, such should still comply with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules, that is, it should be based on just or valid reasons.
In the subject order, the reason for the inhibition of the judge was not stated. Neither could it be determined from the
motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel since the motion was done orally, in violation of Section 213 of the same rule.
When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was ineffective, she was in a way, returning the case
back to the presiding judge for the latter to either cure the deficiency or take cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for
the motion. As EJ Arroyo explained, she was aware that she had no authority to revoke or disapprove the order of
inhibition, as such is vested only in the Supreme Court. It was for that reason that she used the word "ineffective." Tersely
put, EJ Arroyo did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino. She correctly asked that the Order be completed to
comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges. When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings, it was a manifestation
and admission on his part that he can hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality expected from an impartial
magistrate. His. subsequent ruling on the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by counsel for the Spouses Muhlach affirmed EJ
Arroyo's position that the earlier order issued on the basis of the oral motion was defective. The assailed order of EJ
Arroyo was issued in the proper exercise of her administrative functions.
Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was
gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. Here, it was clearly established that the only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure
that the case is decided expeditiously and within the period provided under the law. There was no showing that she was
moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate existing Court issuances. In fact, bad faith may be attributed to the
complainant for filing successive motions for inhibition.
While it was pronounced in relation to the performance by judges of their judicial functions, we find that in the matter of
their administrative duties, it can likewise be said that as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability
for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach
against Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompafiado-Arroyo, Regional Trial Court, San Jose City, Camarines Sur for
ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
32. Ascano vs. Judge Jacinto, Jan. 12, 2015
Use of abusive and intemperate language
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., ET.AL. –versus- PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR.

Facts:
An administrative complaint for gross and serious violations of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct & Judicial
Ethics and Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed againts
respondent Judge.
On June 26, 2012, complainants filed a petition for Prohibition with Urgent Application for the issuance of TRO and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction against the municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The same was raffled to respondent’s sala.
Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity. It was subsequently scheduled on July 2 and 3, 2012 to hear the
determination of extension of TRO or issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 of July 2012, respondent “argued, berated, accused,
scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without bases or justification.” They further claimed respondent judge
asked complainants “confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause
of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary.
At the next hearing held on 3 July 2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a call. He exited through
the door used by the judge and the employees of the court. According to the complainants, the Mayor did not speak to
anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when respondent
suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important appointment.
Respondent denied the accusations.
Supreme Court in a resolution, referred the Complaint to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manila for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent judge violated Canons Laws of the New Code for Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
Ruling:
When respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’ witness, he failed to
conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge. He gave petitioners
reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent must have directly
communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that the mayor could no longer
return to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyer knew that.
Tha mandate of the Code is for the judges to not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must
also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent judge is guilty of conduct of unbecoming a judge.
33. OCA vs. Judge Balut, Jan/ 12, 2015
Borrowing money
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 June 16, 2015
[Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION, Complainant, vs. JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.

Facts

On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases
at the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting presiding judge in both
courts. Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano as well
as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

In the MTC Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was the Clerk of Court II, the audit team found unremitted amounts
from the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collection, the Clerk of Court General Fund (CCGF) collections, and the
Fiduciary Fund. In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 2003 totaled
P2,057,378.59. When asked about the shortages, Salimpade explained that Judge Balut, since 1995, had been getting
money from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted that
she lent her co-employees money which she took from her collections.

In the MTC Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an
unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to P59,545.00. There was total a cash shortage of P106,527.80. Esconde
explained to the audit team that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the collections. He stated that Judge Balut
started borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to MTC
Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was designated Acting Presiding
Judge of MTC Solano and continued the practice of borrowing money from the collections of the court.

In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded Eduardo S. Esconde
without proper turnover of accountabilities. An amount of P846,710.00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs.
Ramos. Both denied that the shortages incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the
offender. Before the final report on the court's shortages was completed, various amounts totaling P802,299.82 were
deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of
part of the shortage of P846, 710.00.

The Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut to pay a fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions
without properly requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge
Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to present his side on
the matter. The Court, in its October 9, 2007 resolution, directed Judge Balut to comment on the audit report and, upon the
recommendation of the OCA, referred the matter to the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Thereafter, the CA, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly
substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. On his admission that he
borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized as he was
previously fined by the Court in its previous resolution.

Law Violated

1. CANON 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct - INTEGRITY

2. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:

"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may
be allowed by law."

Ruling of the SC
The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant.

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The three clerks of court of
MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the
court funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had been borrowing
money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos presented several withdrawal slips where the
back portions were signed either by Judge Balut or his court interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash
withdrawn from the funds of the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge," "for
Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the money withdrawn were given to Judge
Balut.

Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification stating that his cash accountability as of April 2002 with the
Fiduciary Fund was P207,774.42 and there were certifications issued by the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his
accountabilities with the court funds.

The Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. Because of the sensitivity of his
position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting
standards of morality, decency and competence. He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his
action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and
deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds. He miserably failed
to become a role model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and decency,
both in his official and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the
service even on the first offense. For said reason, the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court
has never tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public accountability, and diminish,
or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.

Procedure

1. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial and financial audit. Consequently, it filed an
administrative case against Judge Balut et al on the basis of audit report conducted.

2. The Court ordered Judge Balut to pay a fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly
requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to
the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to present his side on the matter.

3. The OCA sought reconsideration, asked for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be
required to comment on the findings of the financial audit.

4. The Court granted the motion and directed Judge Balut to comment on the audit report and referred the matter to
the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

5. The CA recommended the dismissal of the charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly
substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. Dissatisfied, the OCA
filed an appeal to SC.

6. The SC found Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued
earned leave credits.
34. Tormis vs. Judge Paredes, Feb. 4, 2014
Sub-judice / misconduct of judge
Facts:
Jill was a former student of judge Paredes at Southwestern University College of Law in Cebu. In his class
discussions, Judge Paredes named Jill’s mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis, then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge
Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the
law; and also included her brother, Francis Tormis, in his discussions stating that he was a “court-noted drug addict”.
 Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother, in
accepting a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused in a criminal case. Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes
be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Judge Paredes denied the accusations. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of
which he had investigated as the executive judge; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against
Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of
Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the
investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the
marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other
judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams were also
discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and legal ethics were taught; that he talked
about past and resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in
discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and
some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications. Judge Paredes
further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his discussions in class; that the
matter was not also brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he
admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place
in the judiciary; and that he suggested that Francis should be removed from the judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the influence of Judge
Tormis.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond for
the temporary release of an accused. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section
14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent
matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. That he merely followed procedure, he issued a temporary receipt
and on the following business day, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court.
The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the
Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only a week after.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the
subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.
In Jill’s reply, she claimed that her mother has nothing to do with her filing the complaint; that Judge Paredes violated the
Subjudice Rule when he discussed her mother’s case in class which was not yet resolved by the Court at that time and
thus was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature. Jill
claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother as a “drug addict.”

Issues:
1. Whether or not Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
2. Whether or not Judge Paredes may be administratively held liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and
Francis Tormis.
3. Whether or not Judge Paredes is guilty of violating the subjudice rule.
4. Whether or not Judge Paredes is guilty of grave misconduct for accepting a cash bail bond for the temporary
release of an accused in a criminal case.

Rulings:
1. Yes, Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. His use of intemperate language during class
discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the
laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times.
CANON 4: PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety
and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-
tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to
always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.

2. Yes, Judge Paredes may be administratively held liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis
Tormis. The court rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held administratively liable for his comments
against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial functions.
Jurisprudence, as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only
in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday activities. When Judge
Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances had no relevance to
the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations. The inclusion
of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action
by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes
should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled
for remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to
act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

3. Yes, Judge Paredes is guilty of violating the subjudice rule. The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. Courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such
facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams
involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. He still could not
make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage
scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Judge Paredes
violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
CANON 3: IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor
shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

4. No, Judge Paredes is not guilty of grave misconduct. Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is
grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a
charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of his official duties. Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against
Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as
“misconduct.” They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes
cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00
o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused
deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary
receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held administratively
liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is
pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to exercise other
powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to court
administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an
Executive Judge since he was the only judge available at that time. In addition, the judge assigned to the court where the
case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond.
Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays.
35. Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria, Apr. 2, 2014
Posing in social media

FRANCISCO LORENZANA vs. ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO

A.C. No. 5712. June 29, 2005
FACTS: Francisco Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo with violation of the Civil Service
Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the practice of the law
profession.
Complainant alleged that respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until
his retirement, was a member of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). He was also a member of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of law. He lives in a house and lot owned by
complainants family without paying any rental and refuses to leave the place despite the latters demands.
RESPONDENT:
Respondent countered that his membership in the PLEB of Quezon City, representing the NGO, was without fixed
compensation. As regards his designation as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the same is authorized under
Section 406 of the Local Government Code of 1991; and his monthly allowance/honorarium is allowed under Section
393.mWhile he received allowances, honoraria and other emoluments as member of the PLEB and of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, even as he is in the government service, the same is authorized by law. Hence, there was no double
compensation. He admitted having appeared as private counsel in several cases. However, his clients were his relatives
and friends, among them were complainants father and brother Ricardo. He emphasized that his services were pro bono.
IBP:
found that respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa while concurrently employed as a legal
officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office is not unlawful. Such appointment is in accordance with the Local
Government Code of 1991. Nor could respondent be found liable for receiving honoraria as a Lupon member, since the
Local Government Code of 1991 authorizes Lupon members to receive honoraria, allowances, and other emoluments.
With respect to respondents appointment as PLEB member, IBP Commissioner Aguila stated that the same is not an
exception to the prohibition against dual appointments or employment of government officials or employees. IBP
Commissioner Aguila found that respondents court appearances as counsel for litigants do not constitute private practice
of law since complainant failed to show that he received compensation.
However, respondent should still be held liable for violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations since he failed to
show that he was permitted by his Office to appear as counsel for his clients.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the civil service law and be administratively liable.
HELD: For accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently employed as Legal
Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn
contravene his Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of law,
Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from concurrently holding any
other office or position in the government is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution. Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
It is clear that this provision pertains only to the compensation of PLEB members. It cannot be construed as an exception
to the Constitutional and statutory prohibition against dual or multiple appointments of appointive public employees.
Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office
allow his appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes.
Indeed, respondent, in accepting such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987,
and the Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Attorneys Oath.
On respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa while serving as Legal Officer V of the Manila
Urban Settlements Office, we agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order, being allowed by
law.
We now determine whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed as Legal Officer V in the Manila
Urban Settlement Office. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the
government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding ones self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
In the case at bar, respondents appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence presented by complainant shows
that he had an extensive practice of law. While employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila,
he maintained a law office. The pleadings he signed as counsel for his clients filed with the courts indicate his office
address as Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, Quezon City. Following is the letter head appearing
on the letters and envelopes[9] sent to his clients
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila Urban Resettlement) is not really
strict when it comes to appearing in some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to render service even
on holidays without additional compensation. At most, he should have asked written permission from his chief as required
by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that (n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department.

NB: Most cases were sourced from Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo’s PALETH syllabus.