1

G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007

MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MEWAP),

represented by its National President, DR. RAMON A. SULLA, and MEWAP DOH Central
Office Chapter President, DR. GRACELA FIDELA MINA-RAMOS, and PRISCILLA CARILLO,
and HERMINIO JAVIER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, (substituting the former
Executive Secretary Renato de Villa), THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL
DAYRIT and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, respondents.

Facts:
On August 29, 2000, the Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No.
157, substantially stated: “Pursuant to the Notice of Organization, Staffing and
Compensation Action (NOSCA) … All personnel are hereby directed to report to their
new assignments on or before 2 October 2000 pending processing of new appointments,
required clearances and other pertinent documents…”

Petitioner is a union of affected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the

Department of Health. Petitioner filed a complaint to nullify the said memorandum, the
NOSCA and the Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other issuances
implementing E.O. No. 102.

On May 2, 2001, while the civil case was pending petitioners filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners sought to nullify E.O. No. 102
as it allegedly violates certain provisions of E.O. No. 292 and R.A. No. 8522. The petition
was referred to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same. Petitioners ask for a re-
examination to the authority of the President to reorganize a department, bureau or
office in the executive department.

Issue:
Whether Executive Order No. 102 is null and void.

Held:
No. The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of
Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power
of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
 2
G.R. No. 196425 July 24, 2012

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE
AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an
ex-officio member of the Monetary Board, Respondents.

Facts:
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others,
against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the
President. Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA filed a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. as well as the incumbent members
of the LWUA Board of Trustees. Pichay received an Order signed by Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective
written explanations under oath. In compliance, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and
charge of grave misconduct is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not I. E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to
create a public office.

Held:
No. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize
the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Clearly, the
abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within
the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing
"delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
 3
G.R. No. 167982 August 13, 2008

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
MERCEDITAS DE SAHAGUN, MANUELA T. WAQUIZ and RAIDIS J. BASSIG, respondent.*

Facts:
The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Intramuros Administration, composed of
Sahagun, Waquiz and Ferrer, submitted a recommendation to Henson for the approval
of the award of said contract to Brand Asia, Ltd. On the same day, Henson approved
the recommendation. A contract of service to produce a video documentary on
Intramuros for TV program airing was executed between Henson and Brand Asia, Ltd.

Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) filed criminal and administrative charges against
respondents, along with Ferrer and Rustia. Then, the ombudsman in an order held that
there was substantial evidence to hold respondents administratively liable since the
contracts awarded to Brand Asia, Ltd. failed to go through the required procedure for
public bidding under Executive Order No. 301. Respondents and Ferrer were found guilty
of grave misconduct and dismissed from service. Rustia was found guilty of simple
misconduct and suspended for six months without pay.

Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman only has recommendatory, not punitive, powers against erring
government officials and employees.

Held:
No. The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, other
than a member of Congress and the Judiciary, found to be at fault, within the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority as provided in the Constitution, R.A. No. 6770, as
well as jurisprudence. This power gives the said constitutional office teeth to render it not
merely functional, but also effective.
 4
G.R. No. 207791 July 15, 2015

THE CITY OF DAVAO, REPRESENTED BY THE CITY TREASURER OF DAVAO

CITY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF AMADO S. DALISAY, REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR ATTY. NICASIO B. PADERNA, Respondent.

Facts:
The Estate of Amado S. Dalisay are all situated in Davao City. These properties were
advertised for sale at a public auction for nonpayment of real estate taxes. No bidders
appeared on the date of the public auction, thus, the properties were acquired by the
City Government of Davao. More than a year after the public auction, the Declarations
of Forfeiture for the five (5) properties were separately issued by the City Treasurer.

Issue:
Whether or not the City is bound by its officer’s action.

Held:
No. It is the City that would suffer an injustice if it were to be bound by its officer’s suspect
actions. The policy of enabling local governments to fully utilize the income potentialities
of the real property tax would be put at a losing end if tax delinquent properties could
be recovered by the sheer expediency of a document erroneously or, perhaps
fraudulently, issued by its officers. This would place at naught, the essence of redemption
as a statutory privilege; for then, the statutory period for its exercise may be extended by
the indiscretion of scrupulous officers. In other words, the period would become flexible
because extensions of the period would depend, not just on the sound discretion of the
City Treasurer but on his attitude, work ethics and worse, temperament.

Note:
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents. Indeed, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions. Estoppel
should not be invoked except in a rare and unusual circumstance. It may not be invoked
where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied
only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
 5
G.R. No. 72969-70 December 17, 1986

PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION AND HEE ACUSAR, petitioners,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MAYOR CELESTINO E. MARTINEZ, JR., THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF BOGO (CEBU), and SANTIAGO SEVILLA, respondents.

Facts:
Hee Acusar, who was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, was ordered to relocate it on
the ground that it was situated in a tertiary commercial zone, a prohibited area. Although
the period of grace for was extended Acusar failed to comply with the requirement, as
a result of which the Philippine Constabulary considered the cockpit phased out. To add
to his troubles, the Court of First Instance compel the municipal mayor to issue Acusar a
permit to operate a cockpit, declared that he had waived his right to a renewal because
of his failure to relocate.

However, it was Santiago Sevilla who was granted a license to operate a cockpit by
Mayor Martinez by authority of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo and with subsequent
approval of the PC Regional Command 7 as required by law. As only one cockpit is
allowed by law in cities or municipalities with a population of not more than one hundred
thousand, Acusar sued to revoke this license.

Issue:
Whether or not a municipal mayor may issue license.

Held:
Yes. According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the power to
"grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances
and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which they have been granted,"
and the Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to "regulate cockpits, cockfighting and the
keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to existing guidelines promulgated by the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission."
 6
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Facts:
It is substantially stated in Section 1, Executive Order No. 626 that no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government.

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. When
they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of the above
measure. The petitioner sued for recovery

Issue:
Whether or not the executive order is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No.
626-A unconstitutional.
 7
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities. Petitioner instituted the present special civil action against
the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said
executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.

Issue:
Whether or not the president has the power to enact an executive Order to create
municipalities.

Held:
No. If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the
official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely
brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually
creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
 8
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
At its special session, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing
the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary
rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose." The
Governor-General then issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
sold.

Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order.
He was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged.

Issue:
Whether or not the Governor-General can issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice.

Held:
No. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power
to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a
direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the
authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and
corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
 9
G.R. No. 160367 December 18, 2009

EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, ELVIRA J. CANLAS, MARIANITA A. BULANAN, REMEDIOS S. DE

JESUS, and NUNILON J. MABINI, Petitioners,
vs.
SONIA R. LORENZO, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, CECILIO
DE GUZMAN, Vice Mayor, CESARIO LOPEZ, JR., EMILIO PACSON, BONIFACIO CACERES,
JR., NAPOLEON OCAMPO, MARIO CRUZ, PRISCILA REYES, ROLANDO ESQUIVEL, and
CRISENCIANO CABLAO in their capacity as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija, and EDUARDO N. JOSON IV, Vice Governor, BELLA AURORA A. DULAY,
BENJAMIN V. MORALES, CHRISTOPHER L. VILLAREAL, JOSE T. DEL MUNDO, SOLITA C.
SANTOS, RENATO C. TOMAS, JOSE BERNARDO V. YANGO, IRENEO S. DE LEON,
NATHANIEL B. BOTE, RUDY J. DE LEON, RODOLFO M. LOPEZ, MA. LOURDES C. LAHOM,
and JOSE FRANCIS STEVEN M. DIZON, in their capacity as members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Nueva Ecija,Respondents.

Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan issued a resolution declaring the reorganization of all offices of
the municipal government. The resolution was approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. The Mayor, respondent, issued a memorandum informing all employees
of the municipal government that, pursuant to the reorganization, all positions were
deemed vacant and that all employees must file their respective applications for the
newly created positions listed in the approved staffing pattern. Otherwise, they would
not be considered for any of the newly created positions. Instead of submitting their
respective applications, petitioners, filed with the CA a petition. They sought to prohibit
respondents from implementing the reorganization.

Issue:
Whether the case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Held:
No. The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a
petition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that
the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme
necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.
 10
G.R. No. 186487 August 15, 2011

ROSITO BAGUNU, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, Respondents.

Facts:
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to
Felicisimo Bautista. In turn, Bautista, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson
Binag. Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land. He sold the subject
land (third sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for him as the free patent applicant.
The parties’ deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject
of Atty. Binag’s pending free patent application.

The respondents filed a protest against the petitioner’s free patent application. They
asserted ownership over the lot based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale,
executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.

The DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal investigation. They found out that
the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates "the area in dispute including the area
purchased by [the respondents]." The DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner
wrongfully included the subjected lot in his free patent application since this lot belongs
to the respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should be applied.

Held:
Yes. DENR Secretary’s exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner’s free patent application
and his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the
DENR Secretary’s exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case
of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al, which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands
and the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the disputed public
land since this matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since
this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when
they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
 11
G.R. No. 180388 January 18, 2011

GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

HIGHWAYS (DPWH), DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND
EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL
L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER
ANGELITO M. TWAÑO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP
VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN,
VICTORINO C. SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2ND ENGINEERING
DISTRICT, Petitioners,
vs.
ARNULFO D. AQUINO, Respondent.

Facts:
Angelito M. Twaño sent an Invitation to Bid to respondent. The bidding was for the
construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the Porac River. Subsequently the project
was awarded to respondent, and a "Contract of Agreement" was executed between
him and concerned petitioners. The project was duly completed by respondent, who
was then issued a Certificate of Project Completion.

Respondent however, claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners
refused to pay the amount. He thus filed a Complaint for the collection of sum of money
with damages before the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent need to exhaust all administrative remedies.

Held:
No. The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two
decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant
government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the
issues in the present case involve the validity and the enforceability of the "Contract of
Agreement" entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of law and clearly
beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH.
 12
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive

Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

Facts:
When the truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel because the
driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Jovito Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner fifteen days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should
not be forfeited. Private respondents failed to submit the required explanation. RED
Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the
forfeiture of the truck.

Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration which was denied. Subsequently, the
case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution
however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against
Layugan and Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court which issued a writ ordering the
return of the truck to private respondents. Layugan and Baggayan filed a motion to
dismiss with the trial court contending that private respondents had no cause of action
for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition
for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which
sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.

Issue:
Whether or not due process was violated because they were not given the chance to
be heard.

Held:
No Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense.

Note:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all
the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction
then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought,
the premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.

Exceptions to the rule:

1. when there is a violation of due process
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned
5. when there is irreparable injury
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
 13
G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO
CABLING, respondents.

Facts:
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the
service for their alleged involvement in the currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Joseph
Abaca was intercepted at the airport carrying a bag containing 2.5 million pesos who
allegedly found said plastic bag where private respondents served as flight attendants.
After having been implicated by Abaca in the incident before the respondent’s
disciplinary board, it was Abaca himself who gave statements private respondents were
not the owners of the said currencies. However, private respondents were surprised to
find out that they were terminated by PAL.

Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for
injunction. The NLRC issued the writ of injunction. PAL moved for reconsideration on the
ground that has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be
issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor
disputes and thereby divesting the labor arbiter of its original and exclusive jurisdiction
over illegal dismissal cases.

Issue:
Whether or not it is an irreparable injury.

Held:
No. Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed
employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at
bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a
petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal
orders. The alleged injury which private respondents stand to suffer by reason of their
alleged illegal dismissal can be adequately compensated and therefore, there exists no
"irreparable injury," as defined above which would necessitate the issuance of the
injunction sought for.

Note:
An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that
no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it
is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when
it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself
or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary
standard for the measurement of damages.
 14
G.R. No. 156686 July 27, 2011

NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, Barangay Sun Valley, Parañaque City, Roberto Guevarra IN HIS
CAPACITY AS Punong Barangay and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY, Respondents.

Facts:
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley issued BSV Resolution entitled
"Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster
Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic".

The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its President,
filed a Petition for a "Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for
issuance of TRO" with the RTC. NSVHAI claimed that the implementation of BSV Resolution
"cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "the affected homeowners acquired their
properties for strictly residential purposes".

NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition wherein it claimed that the BSV Sangguniang
Barangay had no jurisdiction over the opening of the "subject roads". NSVHAI likewise
attached to its Amended Petition its Position Paper which set forth its objection to the
opening of the subject roads for public use and argued that a Barangay Resolution
cannot validly cause the opening of the subject roads because under the law, an
ordinance is required to effect such an act.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Held:
Yes. It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s actions to see if it
acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local
problem to be resolved within the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
found that the trial court committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for
petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under the
Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an
ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject
roads belong to the City Government of Parañaque.
 15
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in
his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.

Facts:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including
those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his
official position. Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between
the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case
against him. The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation
of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree).

Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty
of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service. Respondent
Ombudsman approved the resolution. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had
been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, directives, or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against
a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument
has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition
which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et
al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
 16
G.R. No. 169042 October 5, 2011

ERDITO QUARTO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO M. TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS A.
GAYYA, Respondents.

Facts:
On January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to
investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles. The committee designated the
DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the actual investigation" In the course of the
investigation, the DPWH – IAS discovered that several emergency repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved
and paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in government
losses. Charges of Plunder, Money1aundering, Malversation, and violations R.A. No.
3019 and the Administrative Code were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
against several high ranking DPWH officials and employees. The petitioner denied the
allegations against him, claiming that he merely relied on his subordinates when he
signed the job orders and the inspection reports. In contrast, the respondents admitted
the existence of irregularities in the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of
DPWH service vehicles, and offered to testify and to provide evidence against
the DPWH officials and employees involved in the anomaly in exchange for their
immunity from prosecution.

The petitioner’s claim that the respondents are the "most guilty". However, the
Ombudsman invokes this Court’s policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman’s
exercise of his discretion in matters involving his investigatory and prosecutorial powers.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion.

Held:
No. The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with
a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, freed, to the extent possible
within our governmental system and structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial
intervention, and insulated from outside pressure and improper influence Consistent with
this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them, the
power to grant immunity to witnesses), and respects the initiative and independence
inherent in the Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service."
 17
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

Facts:
Respondent was summarily dismissed by petitioner for misappropriating funds which was
supposed to be taxes paid to the BIR. Alleging that the dismissal was illegal, respondent
filed a case against petitioner in the NLRC. Petitioner’s contention is that the respondent
is not an employee due to the lack of an employer-employee contract. The labor arbiter
ruled in favor of petitioner.

The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and
remanded the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
was denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme Court.

Held:
No. The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals
by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
addressed to the appellate courts.
 18
G.R. No. 161596 February 20, 2013

ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO and GREGORIO BARREDO, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, and INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,Respondents.

Facts:
IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union, representing the workers, had a bargaining
deadlock with the IPI management. This deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strike
and IPI ordering a lockout. After assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, DOLE Secretary
Torres rendered his decision reinstating the illegally dismissed employees with full
backwages reckoning and declaring the IPI Union as the exclusive bargaining agent
further directing the parties to enter into a new CBA.

A motion for partial reconsideration was filed by herein petitioners for

amendatory/clarifications on the assailed order by Torres. Ultimately, DOLE Secretary Sto.
Tomas issued her Order affirming and declaring that the full execution of the order
“completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case.” Only herein petitioners assailed the
order of Secretary Sto. Tomas by petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the special civil action of certiorari is the proper remedy for the petitioners.

Held:
No. It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case between
petitioners and private respondent IPI have long attained finality. The records show that
petitioners have already been granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has been
executed. Thus, there is nothing for this Court to modify. The granting of the instant
petition calls for the amendment of the Court of a decision which has been executed. In
this light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executory decisions, more so with those
already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correct errors which are
clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments
as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
 19
G.R. No. 85815 May 19, 1989

ELENO T. REGIDOR, JR., ANICETO T. SIETE, CAMILO B. ZAPATOS & RODULFO

ENRIQUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
GOV. WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, Vice Gov. FLORENCIO GARCIA, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Members MARIVIC SAGRADO, MORPHEUS AGOT, CONSTANCIO BALAIS, ALEGRIA
CARIÑO, ERNESTO IRA, PACITA YAP, JULIO TIU and Sangguniang Panglunsod, ROBERT O.
TACLOB, respondents.

Facts:
The petition alleges that respondents acted without authority, and contrary to law,
in issuing the Order of Preventive Suspension against petitioners because under Section
63 of the Local Government Code, a provincial or city official may be preventively
suspended by the Secretary of Local Government, not by the Provincial Governor.
However, the respondents justified that the suspension of the petitioners was a valid
exercise of the Provincial Governor’s power of general supervision over a component
city and that it was done "in pursuance of the provisions of the Local Government Code
and the Rules & Regulations implementing said law.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of preventive suspension issued by respondent Provincial
Governor was within the authority granted by law.

Held:
No. No rule or regulation issued by the Secretary of Local Government may alter, amend,
or contravene a provision of the Local Government Code. The implementing rules should
conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to
create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Vda. de Prieto, L-13912, September 30, 1950). A rule or regulation that was
issued to implement a law may not go beyond the terms and provisions of the law
(People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
 20
G.R. No. G.R. No. 143366 January 29, 2001

LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, petitioner,

vs.
RAMON S. ROCO, respondent.

X --------------------------------------------------X

G.R. No. G.R. No. 143524 January 29, 2001

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION and COMMUNICATIONS,

UNDER-SECRETARY FOR STAFF SERVICES of the DOTC and the ASSISTANT SECRETARY
for LAND TRANSPORTATION, petitioners,
vs.
RAMON S. ROCO, respondent.

Facts:
Roco was appointed by then President Ramos as Regional Director of the LTO-V, a
position equivalent to CES rank level. Subsequently, then President Estrada re-appointed
him to the same position. At the time of respondent's appointment, he was not a CES
eligible. However, during his incumbency, he was conferred CES eligibility by the Career
Executive Service Board. General, who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by President
Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO-V, the same position being occupied by Roco.
Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary issued a Memorandum directing General to
assume the said office immediately. Aggrieved, Roco filed a petition for quo warranto.

Issue:
Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire security of tenure.

Held:
No. As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two requisites must concur in order that
an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit:
a) CES eligibility; and
b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank.
In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES
eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is – CES rank level V, for the
position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the
qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot
successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly
reassigned to other positions in the career executive service.
 21
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 February 15, 2011

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA,
FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON
SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,Respondents.

Facts:
Manila Bay was once brimming with marine life and was a spot for different contact
recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the
abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a
difference.

On January 29, 1999, respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several
government agencies, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law.

Issue:
Whether or not the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila bay is a ministerial act of
petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:
Yes. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-
making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts
to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. A perusal of
other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay.
 22
A.C. No. 5688 June 4, 2009

FELIPE E. ABELLA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, Respondent.

Facts:
Abella filed a complaint for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713) or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees against Atty. Cruzabra. In his
affidavit-complaint, Abella charged Cruzabra with engaging in private practice while
employed in the government service.

Abella alleged that Cruzabra was admitted to the Philippine Bar and was appointed as
Deputy Register of Deeds. Abella pointed out that Cruzabra only stopped notarizing
documents when she was reprimanded by the Chief of the Investigation Division of the
Land Registration Authority.

Issue:
Whether or not Cruzabra is guilty of engaging in notarial practice without the written
authority.

Held:
Yes. It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public,
she did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the DOJ. Respondent’s
superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the
head of the Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her,
respondent failed to present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot
feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition for commission as a
notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.1avvphi1

Note:
The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head
of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, which provides:

"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural,
or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department;
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office
hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair
in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally,
That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become
an officer or member of the board of directors",
 23
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

Facts:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon
located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands
for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay,
summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the
(subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and
as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:
Yes. While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this
stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact,
the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his

profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the
head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior
Authority From The Head Of His Department

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
 24
G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED
BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA
TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.

Facts:
On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National
Police Internal Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office
against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others
(Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury.

On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an
administrative charge for grave misconduct with the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO against Mendoza, et al. based on the same allegations made
by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS.

On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement
Officers (MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza’s case
to his office. The Office of the Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July
24, 2008. Mendoza, et al. filed their position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with his
Order.

Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et al.
for his failure to substantiate his allegations. Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS
recommended the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against
Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure to prosecute.

On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case,
Gonzales forwarded the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas
Gutierrez for her review. In his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of
grave misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsman’s decision that approved Gonzales’
recommendation on October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration on November 5, 2009, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration.

On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.’s case
records to the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On
December 14, 2009, the case was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer
(GIPO) Dennis Garcia for review and recommendation.

GIPO Garcia released a draft order to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio,
for appropriate action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order
to Gonzales’ office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft and endorsed the
order, together with the case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by the
Ombudsman.

On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case,
Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour
assistants on board as hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to
peacefully resolve the hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of
Mendoza and several others on board the hijacked bus.

In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and
the Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough
investigation of the incident. The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-
2010, creating an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).

In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales
accountable for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case
against Mendoza." The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to
promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite
repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking." The IIRC
recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for further determination of possible
administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of Gonzales III is necessary.

Held:
No. That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not conform to the
high standard required in determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an
impeachable offense) and that the President’s power of removal is limited to specified
grounds are dismally inadequate when balanced with the constitutional principle of
independence. The mere filing of an administrative case against the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their
suspension and can interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of Section
12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term allowed under Section 11, a Deputy
Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced to
the very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and
carefully tried to avoid by making these offices independent constitutional bodies.

At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the Deputy
Ombudsman, its decision finding Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave
Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust is patently erroneous. The OP’s decision
perfectly illustrates why the requirement of impeachment-grounds in Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 cannot be considered, even at a minimum, a measure of protection of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
 26
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF

APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

Facts:
A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI
before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder
and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).

The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding

investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if
warranted (1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015,
the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging
them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of
Public Documents (OMB Cases).

Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine.

Held:
No. The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete
extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory
law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935
Constitution.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers
underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on
accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust."
Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the
people."

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight
and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which
is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable
length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now
abandons the condonation doctrine.
 27
G.R. NO. 154098 July 27, 2005

JOSE C. MIRANDA, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SEC. JOSE D. LINA, in his capacity
as Secretary of the DILG,* and FAUSTINO DY, JR. in his capacity as Governor of the Province
of Isabela, Respondents.

Facts:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998
for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then Vice Mayor
Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor
Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority
or official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of
his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he
received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to
vacate his office and he immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Miranda’s
counter-affidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty post after “coercion” by the
Philippine National Police.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner reassumed office under an honest belief that he was no longer
under preventive suspension.

Held:
No. Petitioner’s excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too flimsy to merit
even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer. If
petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have
assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their
own hands.

We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to

petitioner's claim that the Local Government Code, which he averred should apply to
this case of an elective local official, has been violated. True, under said Code,
preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues are joined, and only for a
maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without having had the
chance to refute first the charges against him, and for the maximum period of six months
provided by the Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue, administrative complaints
commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the
Local Government Code. Respondents point out that the shorter period of suspension
under the Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of suspension that may
be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be motivated by partisan
political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of
preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional
body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of whether there has been
grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension. (Emphases
supplied)
 28
G.R. No. 237428

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.

CALIDA, Petitioner
vs
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent

Doctrine:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when
the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or
election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of
integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject
of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Facts:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003
to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two
international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the
Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no
record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession.
Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities,
and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached
a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or
“drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno.
The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs
were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of
Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit
documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in
the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector.
The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno
expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a
private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only
submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice.
Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the
academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve
all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken
in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a
report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against
Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House
of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause,
and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware
of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry
amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in
prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN,
execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The
OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the
OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to
declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether
exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro,
imputing actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before
the House of Representatives.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is a de Jure or de facto officer.

Held:
Respondent is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto. The effect of a finding
that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer.
For lack of a Constitutional qualification, respondent is ineligible to hold the position of
Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, respondent
has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office,
other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive position of Chief
Justice.

Note:
A de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an
appointment or election thereto x x x. He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper
who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the others hand, from
a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of
office has not expired x x x.
 29
G.R. No. 161081 May 10, 2005

RAMON M. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of Occidental

Mindoro, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE T. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Occidental
Mindoro, respondent.

Facts:
In his Letter, the petitioner invoked the principle of separation of powers as applied to the
local government units, i.e., the respondent, as the Governor, the head of the executive
branch, and the petitioner, as the Vice-Governor, the head of the legislative branch,
which is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The petitioner reiterated his request for the
respondent to make a "deeper study" on the matter before implementing his
memoranda on “AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS,
EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN” and “TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOB
ORDER EMPLOYEES AND REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES”. The
request, however, went unheeded as the respondent insisted on obliging the
department heads of the provincial government to comply with the memoranda.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent, as local chief executive, have the authority to terminate or
cancel the appointments of casual/job order employees.

Held:
No, The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the
discharge by the Governor of the executive functions. The Memoranda dated June 25,
2002 and July 1, 2002 of the respondent Governor, which effectively excluded the
petitioner Vice-Governor, the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, from
signing the purchase orders for the procurement of supplies, materials or equipment
needed for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as from appointing
its casual and job order employees, constituted undue interference with the latters
functions. The assailed memoranda are clearly not in keeping with the intent of Rep. Act
No. 7160 and their implementation should thus be permanently enjoined.

Note:
It does not appear whether the contractual/job order employees, whose appointments
were terminated or cancelled by the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 issued by the
respondent Governor, were paid out of the provincial funds or the funds of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Nonetheless, the validity of the said memorandum
cannot be upheld because it absolutely prohibited the respondent Vice-Governor from
exercising his authority to appoint the employees, whether regular or contractual/job
order, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and restricted such authority to one of
recommendatory nature only. This clearly constituted an encroachment on the
appointment power of the respondent Vice- Governor under Section 466(a)(2) of Rep.
Act No. 7160.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of Rep. Act No. 7160, explained that "the
Vice-Governor is now the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The City
Vice-Mayor presides at meetings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Municipal
Vice-Mayor at the sessions of the Sangguniang Bayan. The idea is to distribute powers
among elective local officials so that the legislative, which is the Sanggunian, can
properly check the executive, which is the Governor or the Mayor and vice versa and
exercise their functions without any undue interference from one by the other."
 30
G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994

CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO and VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, petitioners,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. Petitioner
Mayor appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria as General Services Officer of the said City
Government. Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City Government who were
considered for the position of General Services Officer. Before her promotion in 1992, she
had been in the service of the City Government for about thirty-two (32) years. She joined
the City Government on 3 January 1961 as Assistant License Clerk. Through the years, she
rose from the ranks, successively.

Public respondent Civil Service Commission ("Commission") received a letter from

Congressman of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the
promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife.

Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original
appointments and not to promotional appointments.

Held:
No. The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel
actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including,
of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII. To the extent that all personnel
actions occurring after an original appointment, require the issuance of a new
appointment to another position (or to the original position in case of reinstatement), we
believe that such appointment must comply with all applicable rules and prohibitions,
including the statutory and regulatory prohibition against nepotism. To limit the thrust of
the prohibition against nepotism to the appointment issued at the time of initial entry into
the government service, and to insulate from that prohibition appointments subsequently
issued when personnel actions are thereafter taken in respect of the same employee,
would be basically to render that prohibition.
 30
G.R. No. 224302

HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON. DANILO S. CRUZ, HON.
BENJAMIN T. POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBANG, JR., and the INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP),Petitioners
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA.
GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO S. SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-
WAGAN, HON. ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE PACITA M. ZURAEK,
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, and HON. VICTORIA C. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, Respondents

Facts:
The Judicial & Bar Council submitted several lists of nominees for possible appointees to
the vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. The nominees were clustered into several lists with
five (5) nominees for each cluster. President Aquino appointed Justice’s to the vacant
positions, but did not pick the appointees from the clusters concerned but appointed
justices from one cluster to another position. Petitioners who were listed in the cluster for
the 17th Justice questioned the appointments. They contended that the President could
only choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists for each specific
vacancy and no other and the appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a
violation of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointments of the president are valid.

Held:
Yes. The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's
power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers
worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end,
the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and
he, not the JBC, determines the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court.

Note:
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for
the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent
with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one
JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires
the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for
every vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of
three nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the
six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum requirement was
even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for the President's consideration a
total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the
1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well
as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from
any constitutional infirmity.
 31
G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992

PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, petitioner,

vs.
BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations
Commission, EDNA BONTO PEREZ, LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G. LADRIDO III, MUSIB
M. BUAT, DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III, IRENEO B. BERNARDO,
IRENEA E. CENIZA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ROMEO B. PUTONG, ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
RUSTICO L. DIOKNO, BERNABE S. BATUHAN and OSCAR N. ABELLA, in their capacity as
Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission, and GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Facts:
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman
and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the
same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the
Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715, stating:

The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall
all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of
the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and
Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations.

Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this
case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the
respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a
law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
such appointments. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715
which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the
confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.

Issue:
Whether or not Congress may require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of appointments extended by the president to government officers.

Held:
No, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees
referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional
because:

1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by
adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which
are otherwise entrusted only with the President.
 32
G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

Facts:
Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. Pagatpatan, an official in
the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Rabor to apply for retirement, considering
that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with
thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this
advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" issued by the Government Service
Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of
Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to
comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the
following date "2/28/91."

Thereupon, Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service
Commission XI informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what
action [should] be taken on this matter." Accordingly, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of
the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for
work.

Issue:
Whether or not Rabor can extend his service.

Held:
When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results
follow. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be
appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of
his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The
net effect is thus that the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five
(65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That general
statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain
minimum turn-over in the government service and that opportunities for government
service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people,
considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same
general policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still significantly
lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe, North
America and Japan.

The holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with
discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or
employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15)
years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably
with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
 33
G.R. No. 135805 April 29, 1999

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, respondent.

Facts:
On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen
Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission(CSC), Quezon City, a
complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and
nepotism. After the fact-finding investigation, the Civil Service Regional Office No.
8, Tacloban City, found a prima facie case against respondent, and, on March 5, 1996,
issued the corresponding formal charge against him. After a conduct of a formal
investigation, the CSC promulgated its resolution on January 28, 1997 finding no
substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct.
However, the CSC found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two
counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver
and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and
control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and
imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CSC’s resolution was reversed ruling that the
respondent did not appoint his two sons, hence, respondent was not guilty of nepotism.

Issue:
Whether the appointment of the two sons of respondent is within the scope of the ban
on nepotism.

Held:
Yes. One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is
immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of
the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within
the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or
the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
 34
G.R. No. 181559 October 2, 2009

LEAH M. NAZARENO, CARLO M. CUAL, ROGELIO B. CLAMONTE, FLORECITA M. LLOSA,

ROGELIO S. VILLARUBIA, RICARDO M. GONZALES, JR., ROSSEL MARIE G. GUTIERREZ,
NICANOR F. VILLAROSA, JR., MARIE SUE F. CUAL, MIRAMICHI MAJELLA B. MARIOT, ALMA
F. RAMIREZ, ANTOLIN D. ZAMAR, JR., MARIO S. ALILING, TEODULO SALVORO, JR., PHILIP
JANSON ALTAMARINO, ANTONIETTA PADURA, ADOLFO R. CORNELIA, IAN RYAN PATULA,
WILLIAM TANOY, VICTOR ARBAS, JEANITH CUAL, BRAULIO SAYSON, DAWN M.
VILLAROSA, AGUSTIN A. RENDOQUE, ENRIQUETA TUMONGHA, LIONEL P. BANOGON,
ROSALITO VERGANTINOS, MARIO T. CUAL, JR., ELAINE MAY TUMONGHA, NORMAN F.
VILLAROSA, RICARDO C. PATULA, RACHEL BANAGUA, RODOLFO A. CALUGCUGAN,
PERGENTINO CUAL, BERNARD J. OZOA, ROGER JOHN AROMIN, CHERYL E. NOCETE,
MARIVIC SANCHEZ, CRISPIN DURAN, REBECO LINGCONG, ANNA LEE ESTRABELA,
MELCHOR B. MAQUILING, RAUL MOLAS, OSCAR KINIKITO, DARWIN B. CONEJOS, ROMEL
CUAL, ROQUETA AMOR, DISODADO LAJATO, PAUL PINO, LITO PINERO, RODULFO ZOSA,
JR. and JORGE ARBOLADO, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF DUMAGUETE, represented by CITY MAYOR AGUSTIN PERDICES, DOMINADOR
DUMALAG, JR., ERLINDA TUMONGHA, JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES AND ARACELI
CAMPOS, Respondents.

Facts:
Then Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election in the May 14,
2001 elections, but lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R. Perdices. Thereafter, outgoing
Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall
employees.

On July 2, 2001, Mayor Perdices publicly announced at the flag raising ceremony at the
Dumaguete City Hall grounds that he would not honor the appointments made by former
Mayor Remollo. On the same day, he instructed the City Administrator, respondent
Dominador Dumalag, Jr., to direct respondent City Assistant Treasurer Erlinda C.
Tumongha (now deceased), to refrain from making any cash disbursements for
payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new positions.

Issue:
Whether or not the said appointments are prohibited.

Held:
Yes. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude,
losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby
depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments in line with its new policies.

Not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC
Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all "mass appointments." However, it must
be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that
the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and
that the appointments are not in bulk.