VENTURA VS.

SPOUSES ABUDA
G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married
to Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In
1980, Socorro married Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban on the other
hand was also married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the death of his previous wife.
Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline.

Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining
portion was purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban and
Evangeline also had small business establishments located in Delpan St., Tondo (Delpan Property). When
Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline.

Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora,
petitioner’s mother, discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of the
sale, claiming that petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban. .
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any
right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal
properties of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision, applying Article 148 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties.

RULING:

No. CA’s decision was sustained.

 In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the
actual contribution of the parties.

It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition
of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is
evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of
land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11
December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to
Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the
property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property
prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the
marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.

As correctly pointed out by the CA. settled is the rule that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests
upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of
an issue. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove that Socorro contributed funds for the
acquisition of the properties which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do. Hence, Socorro cannot be
considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
 SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA
and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents.

FACTS:

ATTY. LUNA, initially married in a civil ceremony on September 10, 1947 herein intervenor-
appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), with whom they begot seven children, one of which is
Gregorio Luna, one of the respondents herein. ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart
from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into
a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic and on the same date, ATTY. LUNA
contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned
to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

During their cohabitation, some properties were acquired by ATTY LUNA under his name and which
became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999: 1) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit at the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project; 2) the law books, office
furniture and equipment found therein.

Said properties were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage which led to
petitioner’s filing of the complaint.

The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage
between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD
became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and
2. Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the
latter to any rights in property.

RULING:

1. No. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish
Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions
under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of
the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.
Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on
July 12, 1997. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree
dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in
this jurisdiction.

2. No. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during their
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,
on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce
Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death
of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Code clearly states:
 Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue
of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.

Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of
proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, did not serve the purpose. In
contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption
that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should
then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of
gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the pro indiviso share of Atty.
Luna in the condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of
Atty. Luna.