B.
Elements of Succesion When the mother passes away, the remaining child, Francisca Herrera, filed Deed of Self-
1. A mode of acquisition
2. Transmission of the inheritance
 Of property
1. Butte v Manuel Uy and Sons, 4 SCRA 526
Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Other owners are Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; José V. Ramirez, 1/6; José E. Ramirez, 1/6;
Belen T. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita De Ramirez, 1/6; and José Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.
On October 20, 1951. José V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was
instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned
property. His last will and testament has been admitted to probate, wherein he bequeathed his estate
to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte,
hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial
administrator.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the
late José V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy& Sons,
Inc., defendant-appellee herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After the execution an affidavit to the
effect that formal notices of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale
was duly registered and the old TCT was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in the
name of the vendee and the other-co-owners.
On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy and Son Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the
Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late José V. Ramirez informing it of the
above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs.
Butte.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier’s
check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy a l Sons, Inc. offering to redeem share sold by
Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day
consigned the amount in court and filed the corresponding action for legal redemption. Without
prejudice to the determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market value of the property
sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and
for actual, moral and exemplary damages. May 13, 1959, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.
W/N the plaintiff in the case at bar has a right to redeem the property
By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased person are transmitted to his heirs from the
moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property, rights and obligations that
survive the decedent so from the instant of Jose Ramirez’ death, his heirs became co-owners of an
undivided share and co-owner of the whole property thus they became entitled to exercise the right of
legal redemption as soon as another co-owner has sold his undivided share to a stranger. The
presence of the judicial administrator is of no moment because the rights of the administrator of
possession and administration of the real and personal estate of the deceased do not include the
right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to Manuel Uy and Sons because the right to
redeem only came into existence when the sale was perfected
8 years from the death of Jose Ramirez. The administrator cannot exercise the right of redemption
since the land was sold AFTER the death of Ramirez. The administrator may exercise the right to
redeem only if the right pertains to the estate, and this can only happen if the sale of said portion to
Uy was done before the death of Ramirez.
 Of rights
2. National Housing Authority v Almeida, 525 SCRA 383
Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land with her
children as her heirs. The first child, Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Adjudication claiming to be the exclusive and remaining heir of the deceased, which was based on a
Sinumpaang Salaysay of the latter.
The heirs of the first child filed an annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication which was declared null
and void by the Court of First Instance. On the other hand, the alive child of Herrera filed an
application with National Housing Authority (NHA) to purchase the same lots which was granted by
the same. This was affirmed by the Office of the President. When Francisca Herrera died, her heirs
executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate, approved by NHA and directed the heir of Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado the leave the property.
In RTC, they raised that the Deed of Self-Adjudication was declared of nullity since the other heirs
were disregarded. The heirs of Francisca Herrera countered that the transfer of the purchase of the
subject lots was valid since there was consideration paid. RTC set aside the decision of NHA and
Office of the President, declaring the Deeds of Sale to be null and void. This was affirmed by CA.
(1) Was NHA correct in its resolution in granting the application of the purchase of lots
by Francisca Herrera?
NO. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Margarita Herrera was in fact a will which effectivity commences at
her time of death which means that all her interests as a person should cease to be to hers and shall
be in the possession of her estate until transferred to the heirs by virtue of Art. 774:
“Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law.”
Margarita Herrera is under a contract to sell with NHA such that upon her death, this obligation does
not cease since it is transmissible either by will or by operation of law. NHA cannot make another
contract to sell to other parties since the property was already initially paid for by the decedent. What
NHA should have done was to consider the estate of the decedent as the next person to fulfill the
obligation to pay the remaining purchase price. NHA should have been alert to note that there are
other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after testate or
intestate proceedings.
 Of obligations
3. Estate of Hemady v Luzon Surety, 100 Phil 388
Luzon Surety Co. filed a claim against the Estate based on 20 different indemnity agreements, or
counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety
solidary guarantor. Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the
20 bonds it executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and asked for judgment for the unpaid
premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 % interest thereon. CFI dismissed
the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on failure to state the cause of action.
What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the decedent? Are contingent claims
chargeable against the estate?
Under the present Civil Code (Art. 1311), “Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.”
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot
exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 & 776,NCC,
provides, thereby confirming Art. 1311.
“ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death
to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.”
“ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death.”
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate
before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is
made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the
paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive “depersonalization” of patrimonial rights
and duties. Of the 3 exceptions fixed by Art 1311, the nature of obligation of the surety or guarantor
does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal
inducement for the contract.
Creditor Luzon Surety Co. expects from Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the
counterbonds was the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to
disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a
sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that
the reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as
the money was paid to it.
The 2nd exception of Art. 1311, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional
and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be
expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself,
and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
The 3rd exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Art. 1311 exists when they are “not
transmissible by operation of law”. The provision makes reference to those cases where the law
expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death: legal support, parental authority,
usufruct, contracts for a piece of work, partnership & agency. By contract, the articles of the Civil
Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Art 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is
extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered
intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts
themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his
death to his heirs. The contracts give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under sec.
5, Rule 87. “The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is
bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of
suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something by
way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in
favor of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has
contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole
or in part, he has no right of action against anybody — no claim that could be reduced to judgment.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in
such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement. Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin. Costs against the Administratrix- Appellee.
 Transmission through the estate
4. Limjoco v Estate of Fragante, 80 Phil 776
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its
Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain
and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San
Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for
the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the
law.
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.
YES. The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had
lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for
which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability
of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the
same that it received from the decedent himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a
"person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of
the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial administration
of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and
parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the
heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived
after his death like his pending application at the commission.
3. Object of succession
 Future property v future inheritance
5. Santos v Blas, 1 SCRA 899
Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children. He also
had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married
Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and his former wife acquired during the
first marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the other half
for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima
executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that she
promises that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties she’ll be acquiring to the
heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of them
depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of her
estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with
three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill
her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she
acquired from Simeon Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’ property precisely because
Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving properties upon her death.
Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.
Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it lacks the
formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually executed to avoid
litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate) hence it is a compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that
the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or promise
made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her
husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband.
They can acquire the properties that Maxima promised with them because it was stated in Art. 1347
that “No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized
by law.”. In this case the contract was authorized by law because the promised made by Maxima to
their heirs before she died is a valid reason and it should be enforceable upon her death and her
heirs can now acquire the succession of the properties in issue.
6. De Belen vda de Cabalu v Tabu, 681 SCRA 625 FERRER
Faustina Maslum (Faustina) was the original owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 16776.
The land had a total area of 140,211 square meters. On December 8, 1941, Faustina died without
any children. She left a holographic will, assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and
nieces. The said holographic will, however, was not probated. Benjamin Laxamana was one of
Faustinas heirs. He died in 1960. He had two heirs: his wife and his son, Domingo Laxamana
(Domingo). On March 5, 1975, Domingo executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Laureano Cabalu
covering 9,000 square meters of the land inherited by his father from Faustina.
On August 1, 1994, the legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession
with Partition. The said deed imparted 9,000 square meters of the land covered by TCT No. 16776 to
Domingo. Thereafter, Domingo sold 4,500 square meters of the 9,000 square meters of the land to
his nephew, Eleazar Tabamo. The remaining portion was registered in Domingos name under TCT
No. 281353.
On August 4, 1996, Domingo died. On October 8, 1996, or two (2) months after Domingos death,
Domingo purportedly executed a Deed of Sale of TCT No. 281353 in favor of Renato Tabu (Tabu).
Tabu and his wife Dolores Laxamana subdivided the lot into two which resulted to TCT Nos. 291338
and 291339.
Consequently, petitioners Milagros de Belen Vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabalu, Spouses Angela
Cabalu and Rodolfo Talavera, and Patricio Abus filed a complaint before the RTC seeking to declare
TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339 as null and void. They averred that they were the lawful owners of the
subject property because it was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo, through a Deed
of Absolute Sale, dated March 5, 1975. The RTC declared the deeds dated March 5, 1975 and
October 8, 1996 null and void. On appeal, the CA partially granted the petition and deleted the RTCs
decision declaring the October 8, 1996 null and void.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000
square meter property executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on
March 5, 1975, is valid?
II. Whether or not the Deed of Sale dated October 8, 1996, covering the 4,500
square meter portion of the 9,000 square meter property, executed by Domingo
in favor of Renato Tabu, is null and void?
FIRST ISSUE: The CA did not err in declaring the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale null and void.
Thus, and as correctly found by the RTC, even if Benjamin died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975
could not yet validly dispose of the whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the
sole heir of Benjamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980. Besides, under Article 1347 of the
Civil Code, "No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law." Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future
inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not
yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor
has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustinas will was not yet probated; the object of the
contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the
estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right therein. Domingo became the
owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated
to him.
SECOND ISSUE: The CA erred in deleting that portion in the RTC decision declaring the Deed
of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, null and void.
Regarding the deed of sale covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject property
executed in favor of Renato Tabu, it is evidently null and void.The document itself, the Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, readily shows that it was executed on August 4, 1996 more
than two months after the death of Domingo. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of
the consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is
necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and a party capable of being contracted with.
Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such
contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having been
made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The death of
a person terminates contractual capacity.
The contract being null and void, the sale to Renato Tabu produced no legal effects and transmitted
no rights whatsoever. Consequently, TCT No. 286484 issued to Tabu by virtue of the October 8,
1996 Deed of Sale, as well as its derivative titles, TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339, both registered in
the name of Rena to Tabu, married to Dolores Laxamana, are likewise void. Petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
4. Death of the decedent
 Succession inter vivos (Arts. 50, 51 and 52, Family Code)
 Contractual succession (Art. 1331 old Civil Code, Art. 130 new Civil Code, Art. 84,
Family Code)
5. Succession by will and intestate succession
C. Definition of “decedent”, “testator”, “heir”, “devisee” and “legatee”
1. Distinction among “heirs”, “devisees”, and “legatees”
2. Importance of the distinction between devisees/legatees and heir
D. The inheritance of a person (Arts. 776 and 781)
E. Opening of succession (Art. 777)
1. Significance of the time of death
2. Consequences of Art. 777
7. Bonilla v Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 FERRER
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and
wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title
over certain parcels of land located in Abra. The herein defendants then filed a written motion to
dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the said motion, the plaintiff’s counsel moved to
amend the complaint which was granted. The defendants again filed another motion to dismiss the
complaint. The said motion to dismiss was then heard. On August 19, 1975, plaintiff’s counsel
received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint and on the 23rd of the same month; he moved
to set aside the said order. The court denied the MR filed by the plaintiff’s counsel which the counsel
later on filed a written manifestation allowing the minor petitioners to be allowed to substitute their
deceased mother. From the order, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a second MR of the order dismissing
the complaint but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for review.
WON THE ACTION SURVIVES EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF A PARTY DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE CASE.
Yes. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his
heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
"whenever a party to a pending case dies, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court
promptly of such death, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian
or other legal representatives." Moreover, Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." When Fortunata Barcena,
therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus
acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. In addition,
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted." The question as to
whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. The
claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation
affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even
after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of
the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. Thus, the action in the instant case
survives.
8. Salvador v Sta. Maria, 20 SCRA 603
7 parcels of titled land and 2 parcels of untitled land were owned by Celestino Salvador. In 1941, he
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili. Alleging that the
sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed a suit for reconveyance against said vendees (CFI of
Bulacan, Br. I). 1956, Celestino Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, 21 persons were
substituted as plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance. Meanwhile, a special proceeding for the
probate of his will was instituted. In said proceedings, Dominador Cardenas was appointed as special
administrator (CFI of Bulacan, Br. II). The administrator filed in Br. II an inventory of properties of the
estate, covering the same parcels of land subject matter of the reconveyance action.
Subsequently, Celestino Salvador's will was admitted to probate and Dominador Cardenas was
appointed executor of said will. 23 persons were instituted heirs in the will. Of these, 9
were not among the 21 alleged relatives substituted in the reconveyance case and of the 21
substituted alleged heirs 7 were not instituted in the will. In the suit for reconveyance, the CFI
ordered that the defendants (Sps. Alfonso & Anatolia), to reconvey the parcels of land to the estate of
Celestino Salvador. The defendants Appealed to CA, but the decision was affirmed by CA, with the
correction that reconveyance be in favor of the 21 heirs substituted as plaintiffs therein. 3 years later,
pursuant to an order in the testacy proceedings, Lot 6 was sold so that debtors who filed claims may
be paid. The PNB bought it and the amount was then deposited in the same bank by the
administrator, subject to Court order.
The defendants in the suit for reconveyance executed a deed of reconveyance over the subject
parcels of land, in favor of Celestino Salvador's estate. Revoking the same in accordance with the
final judgment. Br. I ordered a new deed of reconveyance to be executed, in favor of the 21 persons
substituted as plaintiffs in that action. Accordingly, a new deed of reconveyance was made, in favor of
said 21 persons as heirs of Celestino. Subsequently, a new title certificate was issued in the names
of the 21 persons.
Reconveyance court ordered the PNB to release the proceeds of the sale of Lot 6, to the 21 plaintiffs
in the reconveyance case. Apparently, although the passbook was given by the administrator to said
21 persons, no release was made, as the PNB awaited Br. II's order.
On March 1, 1966, Br. II, approved claims against the estate. On March 30, 1966, Br. II (probate
court), ordered return of the passbook to the administrator and release to the administrator by the
PNB of the P41,184.00, or so much thereof is needed to pay the afore-stated debts of the estate.
After failing to get reconsideration of said order, the 21 substituted heirs filed with the Court the
present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to assail the order to pay the debts
of the estate with the P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6; and to question Br. II's (probate court)
power to dispose of the parcels of land involved in the reconveyance suit in Br. I.
Are the parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale of one of them part of the properties of
the estate or not?
Yes. The right of heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally
determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their
rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue after payment of
the debts.
They only contend that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgment reconveyed to
them, not to the estate the same are not properties of the estate but their own, and thus, not liable for
debts of the estate.
Does final judgment in the reconveyance suit in favor of the 21 heirs who substituted
Celestino Salvador, bar the disposition of the reconveyed properties by the settlement court?
– NO
The said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character as heirs
of Celestino; as such, they were substituted in the reconveyance case; the reconveyance to them
was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows that the properties they claim
are, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate. The right thereto as allegedly his heirs
would arise only if said parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having
received the same in the reconveyance action was perforce in trust for the estate, subject to its
obligations. They cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted heirs without the
debts of the estate being first satisfied.
At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone appears more than sufficient to pay the debt and there will
remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to the question of who will receive how much as heirs,
the same is properly determinable by the settlement court, after payment of the debts.
9. Ramirez v Baltazar, 24 SCRA 918
Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this case.
Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the
intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica
Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify
so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then
filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer
against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees
themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire
foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect their
interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of
action.
Do the plaintiffs have the cause of action against the defendant?
Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from
the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to
such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances,
protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In
Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the
commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when the
administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."

10. Puno v Puno Enterprises, Inc., 599 SCRA 585
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises,
Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno,
initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son
of the deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed
entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint
thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all
the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or
income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality
to sue because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a
need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one and
the same. After submitting his corrected birth certificate, the court ordered Jesusa Puno and/or
Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and records of the company from
1962 up to the present including the financial statements of the corporation.
CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11, 2006. According to the
CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his
birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of
paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right to demand that he
be allowed to examine respondent’s books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the
corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the
corporation. His action for specific performance therefore appeared to be premature; the
proper action to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter.
Whether petitioner automatically became stockholder of the corporation and acquire the
rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation.
No. Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation.
Francisco de
Borja
#1 Josefa #2 Tasiana Vda. de de
Tangco Borja
Jose de Cayetano de Matilde de Crisanto de
Borja Borja Borja Borja
The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks
must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that
no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of
the corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the
executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock.
Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is
entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of
Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to receive
dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by
Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized
as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights
over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an
illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is
one for specific performance — to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights
that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.
Petition denied.
11. Reyes v RTC Branch 142, 561 SCRA 593
Petitioner and private respondent were siblings together with two others, namely Pedro and
Anastacia, in a family business established as Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), from which they
owned shares of stocks. The Pedro and Anastacia subsequently died. The former had his estate
judicially partitioned among his heirs, but the latter had not made the same in her shareholding in
Zenith. Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
against petitioner (1) a derivative suit to obtain accounting of funds and assets of Zenith, and (2) to
determine the shares of stock of deceased Pedro and Anastacia that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated [by Oscar, and were unaccounted for]. In his answer with counterclaim, petitioner
denied the illegality of the acquisition of shares of Anastacia and questioned the jurisdiction of SEC to
entertain the complaint because it pertains to settlement of [Anastacia’s] estate. The case was
transferred to. Petitioner filed Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and must
be dismissed. RTC denied the motion. The motion was elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, but was again denied.
Whether Rodrigo may be considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the
shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia
No. Rodrigo must, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a stockholder of Zenith with
respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are
shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a settlement
of the decedent’s estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must
register the transfer of the shares allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He
cannot demand that this be done unless and until he has established his specific allotment
(and prima facie ownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of Anastacia’s estate, there can be
no definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and distribution,
there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the registration, we cannot consider the
transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship as
premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. The
subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacia’s shares) are concerned – Rodrigo cannot be considered a
stockholder of Zenith.
12. De Borja v vda, de Borja, 46 SCRA 577
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of the will of her wife Josefa Tangco upon
her death (CFI Rizal). He was appointed executor and administrator while Jose de Borja (their
son) was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, Jose became sole administrator
Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died and she instituted testate proceedings
with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits. Thus, Jose and Tasiana entered into a
compromise agreement to put an end to all of the pending litigations.
However, Tasiana argues that compromise agreement was not valid, because the heirs cannot
enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the
agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

Whether the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been
probated
YES, the compromise agreement is valid. The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive
P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borjaamong the heirs
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by
Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate
of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or
legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
13. Lee v RTC Branch 85, 423 SCRA 497
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock of Philippine
International Life Insurance Company, Inc. (Philinterlife). After his death, he was survived by his
wife, Juliana Salgado Ortañez, three legitimate children, namely: Rafael, Jose and Antonio and five
illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio, namely: Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes, Jose Ortañez, Romeo
Ortañez, Enrico Manuel Ortañez and Cezar Ortañez.
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez, docketed as SP. Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains
pending at Branch 85 thereof).
Rafael and Jose Ortañez were appointed as special administrators of his estate. However, during the
pendency of the estate proceedings, Juliana Ortañez and her two sons, Rafael and Jose, entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez by
partitioning the said estate among themselves.
By reason thereof, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as
her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner
Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee.
Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership
thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
These transactions were questioned by Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings before the
intestate court. The intestate court declared the Memorandum of Agreement as partially void ab
initio in so far as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stocks was concerned.
The said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The decision
became final.
However, it was not executed since on several occasions the sheriff was barred by the security
guard upon the instruction of the herein petitioners, President Jose Lee and Corporate Secretary
Alma Aggabao of Philinterlife. Thereafter, the intestate court granted private respondent Enderes'
motion to direct the branch clerk of court in lieu of petitioners Lee and Aggabao to reinstate the
name of Dr. Ortañez in the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife and to issue the corresponding
stock certificate pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The said Order was later
upheld by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Whether extrajudicially settling a property under administration by virtue of the MOA without the
approval of the intestate court was proper.
No. In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that an heir can sell his right, interest, or
participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that
may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final
adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have
been given their shares. This means that an heir may sell only his ideal or undivided share in the
estate, not any specific property therein.
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 are
not the only heirs claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez. The records of
this case clearly show that as early as March 3, 1981 an Opposition to the Application for Issuance
of Letters of Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortañez with Ligaya Novicio. This claim by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortañez is admittedly known to the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement before they executed
the same. This much was admitted by petitioner's counsel during the oral argument.
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence, public respondent can never be faulted
for not approving the subsequent sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his mother [Juliana
Ortañez] of the
Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez."
It is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez,
invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate
among themselves, despite their, knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate
and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate
properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the
subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was
likewise void.
Moreover, the intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary
adjunct of the intestate or probate court's power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to
prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
14. Heirs of Sandejas v Lina, 351 SCRA 183
INTRODUCTION (worth-reading to give you a gist of the entire case):
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court approval. The
transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their
consent to it. In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules
of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still alive. In
contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or
administrator the right to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
realty under administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before the probate court
inures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the
avails of the suit
Doctrine: In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.
On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R.
SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as
administrator.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned
were the records of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition.
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed
by Alex A. Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of
land.
Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His counsel is still waiting for official word on
the fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex becomes
a money claim to be filed in Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an order directing the other heirs
of Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new administrator within 15 days from receipt of the
order.
On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for
the appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to
the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an administrator as long as the heirs has found
one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They were reasoning out that it was only
at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court substituted Alex Lina with Sixto
Sandejas as administrator.
On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed
between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor
of Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion.
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and
respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership
of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was
obtained from the settlement court.
What is the settlement court's jurisdiction?
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court. One can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A
stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as
regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but
only with the court's permission.
Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the
intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction
covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills
(Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and
executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a
probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy
manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the
heirs and the beneficiaries.
In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence, that
obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a
separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the
disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased
spouses.
* Re: Intervenor's Standing
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply
for the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in
entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval.
There is no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey.
Notice. Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to
deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on
application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property
according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and
approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator,
the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. "
This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring
only the executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2);or for
authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other
interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of
administration (Section 4).
Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the
deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file the
application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited or injured by
the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
15. Santos v Lumbao, 519 SCRA 408
 Petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate
and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985.
Petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
 Respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the
107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her
lifetime.
 Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her
share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate.
a. It was evidence by documents entitled, “Bilihan ng Lupa”
 Respondents Lumbao later on took actual possession thereof and built a house which they
have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present.
 Lumbaos made several demands from Rita and the heirs for them to execute the
necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in their favor.
a. Lumbaos alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina
Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire
property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been
partitioned
 Lumbaos alleged that the petitioners acted fraudulently and are conspiring with another by
executing a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement portioning among themselves the properties
of Maria, including the subject property.
 Lumbaos then sent a formal demand to petitioners but the latter refused to reconvey the
subject property. So the Lumbaos filed a Complaint for Reconveyance before RTC of Pasig
City.
 Petitioners denied the alleged sale to Lumbaos and that the Extrajudicial Settlement was
duly published as required by law.
  Lumbaos then amended their complaint, discovering that the petitioners executed a Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage in favour of Julieta S. Esplana for P30,000.
 The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the Lumbaos to pay them P30,000
for expenses incurred.
 The CA ruled in favor of the respondent spouses Lumbao.
 Hence the petition:
a. Petitioners contend that they are not bound by the “Bilihan ng Lupa” because it is
null and void for being falsified because of the following:
i. one of those documents made it appear that petitioners Virgilio and
Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared
personally before the notary public, when in truth and in fact they did
not.
ii. Identity of the properties were not established by the evidence
presented
iii. Respondents are estopped by laches from claimining
iv. Claim on the properties had already prescribed.
Whether petitioner heirs bound by the “Bilihan ng Lupa” executed by the Rita, their mother,
in favor of the respondent spouses Lumbao?
YES. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from
the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were
transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations
of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot
escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest
because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common
ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother.
They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also
valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the
personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of
the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.
OTHER ISSUES:
 the documents “Bilihan ng Lupa” is presumed valid being notarized, a public instrument,
unless the contrary has been proved. In the case, petitioners failed to prove the falsity of
the documents
 re: barangay conciliation requirement: while non-compliance with the condition that there
must first be proper recourse to barangay conciliation before filing of complaint in court or
any government offices could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity, the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising
its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to
such exercise of jurisdiction.
16. Rodriguez et al., v Borja et al., 17 SCRA 418
FACTS: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 1963 in Manila. On March 4, his purported last will
and testament was delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan by Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida
Jacalan. Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to
examine the alleged will but before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn
On March 12, 1963, Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, all surnamed Rodriguez
filed before the CFI-Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging,
among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving
a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate.
On the same date Apolonia and Adelaida filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will
delivered by them. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal;
that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the
time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal,
Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in CFI-Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on
March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI-Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same
date, CFI-Bulacan has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support
thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that CFI-Bulacan acquired
jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963,
and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12,
1963.
ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction?
RULING: CFI-Bulacan has jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a probate court becomes vested
upon the delivery thereto of the will even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because, upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio have taken steps to fix the time
and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is
prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Sections 3 Rule 77, of the old
Rules). The use of the disjunctive in the words “when a will is delivered to or a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed” plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit
therein of a decedent’s testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the
petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the
time when the will was delivered.
The power to settle decedents’ estates is conferred by law upon all CFIs, and the domicile of the
testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the court
Where the estate proceedings were initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of
any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts,
even if it were a case of wrong venue (Sec. 1, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court)
Intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy takes
place only in the absence of a valid operative will. Only after a final decision as to the nullity of
testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted. The institution of intestacy
proceedings in one court may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of the
deceased is pending in another court.
17. Nepomuceno v CA, 139 SCRA 206
FACTS: Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament. In the
said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and
only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a
certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had 2 legitimate children (Oscar and Carmelita), but since 1952,
he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner
Nepomuceno as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the
petitioner were married in Tarlca. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to
herein petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased in the CFI-
Rizal and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
The legal wife, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution
of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time
of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her
living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus letters testamentary should
not be issued to her. Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit
relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise.
ISSUE: Whether the disposition in favor of petitioner is valid
RULING: NO. A devise given by a married man estranged from his wife for 22 years prior to
his death, to a woman with whom he has been living for said period of time is void.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate
the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he
had been living in concubinage.
18. Seangio v Reyes, 508 SCRA 177
FACTS: Private respondents (Alfredo, Alberto, Elisa, Victor, Alfonso, Shirley and Betty, all surnamed
Seangio) filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio,
praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa as special administrator and guardian ad
litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners (Dy Yieng, Barabara and Virginia) all surnamed
Seangio, opposed the petition, contending, among others, that Segundo left a holographic will,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.
Subsequently, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by petitioners.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that
the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code.
According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent
of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such
being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule
only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the
same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that
it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent. Petitioners argue that as its
title clearly states, “Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana”, it simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face
is not intrinsically void.
ISSUE: Whether the executed document is a holographic will
RULING: YES. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and
signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator.
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis
ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance
cannot be given effect.
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet
the definition of a will under
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet
the definition of a will under
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet
the definition of a will under
19. De Roma v Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 205
FACTS: Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, administration proceedings were instituted in the CFI-
Laguna by the private respondent, Felicidad Caringal as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed
administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not
been included. The properties in question consisted of 7 parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2
The parties cannot agree upon whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent
vigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the CC. Buhay, citing Article 1062 of the
CC, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the
donation was not officious.
The pertinent provision of the Deed of Donation reads as follows: “…kusang-loob kong ibinibigay,
ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at
tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga
lagay ng lupa…”
ISSUE: Whether collation is allowed
RULING: YES. There is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of
the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and
should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is
irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article
1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it
was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the
donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document,
that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the
donor's intention. Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
20. Dizon-Rivera v Dizon, 33 SCRA 554
FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate
children (Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee),
Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon) and 1 legitimate granddaughter (Lilia Dizon, who is the only
legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. 6 of
these 7 compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants.
Marina is the appellee while the others were the appellants.
 Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries were
the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
 In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million) which
included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Devt
Co
 During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceased’s
estate
 In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her
testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and
Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
 Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised
of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the
cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
 The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where
Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
 The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907 of the
NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE: Whether the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
RULING: YES. Art 788 and 791 NCC provides that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held
that "the intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the
fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to
paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his
last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with
by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may
substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be
given effect.
Of the two projects of partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give
the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix
enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used
the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather
than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries.
Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial
payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which reads:
"Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative
prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her
entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions
included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article
1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
21. Vda. de Villaflor v Juico, 4 SCRA 550
FACTS: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolás Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed
a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno, 1/2 of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villaflor. Don Nicolás Villaflor died on March 1922.
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage,
and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolás Villaflor. Plaintiff Leonor
Villaflor (mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor")
instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta
Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff
became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late
Nicolás Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. (*the will is entirely in
Spanish)
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to ownership of the property upon death of Doña Fausta
RULING: NO. The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doňa
Fausta because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear
a child and because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased then it means
that Doňa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never
acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those
properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the
testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should have specifically stated
in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning any condition.
The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the
fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. (In re Estate of Calderon,
26 Phil. 233.)
SCRA ruling: We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in
clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the
widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow
was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all,
is evident from the expressions used by the deceased uso y , posesi mientras viva" (use and
possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y , posesión " inste of "dominio" or
"propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the
full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or
enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was
instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6).
G. Rules of Severability (Art. 792)
22. Balanay, Jr. v Martinez, 64 SCRA 452
FACTS: Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died in Davao City at the age of 67.
She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix
Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and
Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed for the probate of his mother's notarial will which is written in
English. In that will Leodegaria declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine
conjugal lots”; (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her
fathe; and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during
her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper
partition of the conjugal estate. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and converted the
testate proceeding into an intestate.
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the CFI of Davao, declaring
illegal and void the will of his mother, due to error of the probate court in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity.
ISSUE: Whether the will is void
RULING: NO. The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not
result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not
have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made” (Art 792, Civil
Code). “Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be
upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries. The
statement of the testatrix that she owned the “southern half” of the conjugal lands is contrary to law
because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143,
Civil Code). But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. But the void disposition must be
disregarded.
J.Governing Law of Formal Validity (Art. 795)
As to time of execution of the will
As to the place of execution of the will
Governing law of Substantive Validity of a will
23. Bellis v Bellis, 20 SCRA 358
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was “a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States.” By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate childred; and he also had
three illegitimate children.
On Agugust 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed
that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary
E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children Amos Bellis Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each; and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied,
the remainder shall go to his 7 surviving children by his first and second wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died and the People’s Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the forms of stocks to Mary
E. Mallen and to the 3 illegitimate children various amounts totaling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their legacies.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the prejudice of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine Law should be apply in the probate of the will of Bellis, thus maria and
Miriam are deprived of their legitimes
RULING: NO. Article 16 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. It also provide that intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated be the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. Furthermore, Article 1039 states that capacity to succeed is to be governed
by the national law of the decedent. The court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
Since Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law and the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Hence, the Supreme
Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is
the national law of the deceased.
2. Testamentary Capacity and Intent (Arts. 796 – 804)
A. Testamentary Capacity (Arts. 796, 797 and 798; see also Arts. 37, 38 and 39)
B. Soundness of the mind (Arts. 799 and 800)
24. De Guzman v Intestate Estate of Francisco Benitez, 169 SCRA 284
FACTS: Francisco Benitez died single at the age of 61 years, without descendants, nor ascendants,
nor brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of 14 of coconut land in Laguna, aresidential lot,
and a small savings account (P3,843.08) in the PNB. Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother,
Melquiades Valenzuela, first-cousins of the deceased Francisco Benitez, filed a petition for
administration of his intestate estate and for the issuance of letters of administration to Dionisia.
However, the petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the
deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him and he also filed a petition for probate. De
Guzman later died and was substituted by his heirs.
Dionisia, et. al moved to reject the will on account of insanity. The court rendered judgment
disallowing the will and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate estate of the
deceased. The evidence shows that from January 18, 1929 up to March 12, 1941 Francisco Benitez
was confined at the National Mental Hospital for varying periods of time. This leads the court to the
conclusion that at the time Francisco Benitez executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945 he was
not of a sound and disposing mind. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed.
Petitioners De Guzman assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
finding that the deceased Francisco Benitez 'was not possessed of a sound and disposing mind'
when he executed his will on August 18, 1945, is grounded merely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures, as well as on hearsay and contradictory, biased, and obviously incredible testimony
ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in finding the deceased was not of a sound and disposing
mind when he executed his will on August 18, 1945
RULING: NO. Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which We are not at liberty to review
because in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of Appeals reveals
that that Court carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the testamentary capacity, or lack of
it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found “no compelling reason to disturb the lower court’s
findings and conclusions.” The resolution of that question hinged on the credibility of the witnesses.
The cardinal rule on that point is that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing
their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall
not be disturbed on appeal.
25. Baltazar v Laxa, 669 SCRA 249
FACTS: Pacencia Regala was a 78-year old spinster who executed a will bequeathing all of her
properties to her nephew, Respondent Lorenzo Laxa. The Will was executed in the house of Judge
Ernestino Limpin who read it loud to Pacencia, in the presence of witnesses Francisco Garcia,
Faustino Garcia and Dr. Maria Lioba Limpin. Being without children and siblings, Pacencia
bequeathed all her properties to Lorenzo as they had filial relationship like a mother and a son. Four
years later, Pacencia died.
Lorenzo filed a Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pacencia before the RTC. He
presented evidence of their relationship as well as presented as witness, Limpin, who attested to that
the Will was made in their house, executed by Pacencia and witnessed by her. However, Petitioner
Antonio Baltazar filed an Opposition to the Probate of the Will claiming that Pacencia was not of
unsound mind during the time the Will was executed, aside from claims that Pacencia was under
duress and forced when she signed the Will. He presented a witness, Rosie Mateo, who testified that
Pacencia was forgetful.
The RTC ruled against the Probate of the Will because Pacencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the Will being forgetful. In appeal, however, the CA reversed the RTC’s
decision and granted the probate of the Will of Pacencia. The CA ratiocinated that being forgetful
does not make a person mentally sound so as to render Pacencia unfil for executing a Will. Further,
the Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind.
ISSUE: Whether the probate of the will shall be allowed
RULING: YES. Under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, it is provided that full possession of all reasoning
faculties of the testator is not necessary for a person to be of sound mind, or that the person’s mind
be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. In the present
case, the testimony of Rosie that Pacencia was considered forgetful does not make the latter of
unsound mind that would effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. Thus, forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind. Other than the claim that Pacencia was forgetful, there was no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Pacencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the Will. Thus, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of
the execution of the Will while the burden of proof lies on those who opposed it as provided under Art.
800 of the Civil Code. Absent thereof, the presumption shall prevail. A purported will is not to be
denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession
will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether it will be
probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in the estate of the
deceased.
3. Forms of Wills (Arts. 804 – 819)
A. Notarial Will (Arts. 804 to 808)
Purpose of the Formalities
Written instrument
Language Requirement
26. Suroza v Honrado, 110 SCRA 388
FACTS: Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname
Suroza. Mauro died and Marcelina became the beneficiary of Mauro’s pension. Years after, Agapito
married Nenita. When Marcelina (who was an illiterate) was 73 years old, she allegedly executed a
notarial will which was in English and thumb marked by her. In the will, she allegedly bequeathed all
her properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje.
Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as
administratrix and issued orders allowing the latter to withdraw money from the savings account of
Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among
whom was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them,
alleging that Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the decedent’s
granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an order probating Marcelina’s will.
Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having probated the
fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by
the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in
which the will was written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not take into account the
consequences of the preterition of testatrix’s son, Agapito.
ISSUE: Whether the will is valid
RULING: NO. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
“understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will
was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. That could only mean that the will
was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the
mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or
dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot
testator, is void and was disallowed.
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial
acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead
of “testatrix”. Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the
anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the
supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was
still alive. In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally
conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will
was validly executed. Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be
inexcusable.
27. Reyes v vda. de Vidal, 2 SCUD 53
FACTS: This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and
testament of Maria Zuñiga Vda de Pando who died in the City of Manila on October 29, 1945. A
petition for the probate of said will was filed in the CFI of Manila. Dolores Zuñiga Vda de Vidal, sister
of the deceased, filed an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at
which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the
will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was
not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, and that even if the
signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed
the will.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are genuine.
2. Whether there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was
written
3. Whether the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.
RULING: 1. YES. The standards used by Espinosa (epxpert witness handwiting) in making his
comparative study bear dates much closer to that of the disputed signatures. Thus, he examined four
genuine signatures that were affixed on October 16, 1945, other four signatures that were affixed in
October 1945, one on January 2, 1945, on January 24,1945, and one on September 24 1945, He
also examined one affixed on March 12,1941, only for emphasis. The closeness or proximity of the
time in which the standards used had been written to that of the suspected signature or document is
very important to bring about an accurate analysis and conclusion. The selection of the proper
standards of comparison is of paramount importance especially if we consider the age and the state
of the health of the author of the questioned signatures. He followed the standard practice in
handwriting analysis. It is for this reason that the court hold that Espinosa's opinion deserves more
weight and consideration.
2. YES. The failure of the petitioner’s witnesses to testify that the testatrix knew and spoke
Spanish does not itself alone suffice to conclude that this requirement of law has not been complied
with when there is enough evidence of record which supplies this technical omission. Where the
evidence of the oppositor to the probate of a will shows that the testatrix possessed the Spanish
language, the oppositor cannot later on be allowed to allege the contrary. The fact that the testatrix
was a mestiza española, was married to a Spaniard, made several trip to Spain and some of her
letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor were written in Spanish by the testatrix in her own
writing give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has
been written, which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven. Where the attestation
clause of the will states that the testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language though this
matter is not required to be stated in the attestation clause, its inclusion can only mean that the
instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the
will was written.
3. YES. Witnesses: Cornelio Gonzales de Romero stated that she spoke to the deceased
before the signing of the will, and judging from the way she spoke she was of the impression that the
deceased was of sound mind at the time. To the same effect is the testimony of Consuelo B. de
Catindig. She said that her impression when the deceased signed the will was that she could still talk
and read, only that she was weak. In fact she read the will before signing it. These statements had
not been contradicted. They give an idea of the mental had not contradicted. They give an idea of
mental condition of the deceased in the will differ from each other in certain respects, this is only due
to her age and state of health rather than to a defective mental condition. They do not reveal a
condition of forgery or lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the
writings of old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness,
or weak condition of the writer.
 Testator’s signature at the end of the will
28. Taboada v Rosal, 118 SCRA 195
FACTS: A petition for probate was filed by Petitioner Apolonio Taboada before the Court of First
Instance, attaching therewith the last will and testament of Dorotea Perez. The will, written in
Cebuano-Visayan dialect, consisted of two (2) pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom of the page by Dorotea alone, and at the left margin by three
(3) witnesses. The second page contained the attestation clause and acknowledgement is signed at
the end of the attestation by three (3) witnesses and at the left margin by Dorotea. Since no
opposition was filed, the Court allowed the presentation of evidence.
However, the Court, under Judge Ramon Pamitian, issued an order denying the probate of
the will of Dorotea and ordered the submission of names of the intestate heirs. When a new judge
was assigned in the case, Respondent Judge Avelino Rosal, the Court again denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Apolonio because he failed to comply with the order requiring him to submit
the names of intestate heirs. It ruled that Art. 805 of the Civil Code provides that for a notarial will to
be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the end of the page, but also the subscribing
witnesses in the same place or at the end and of one another because attesting witnesses to a will
attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of testator.
ISSUE: Whether Art. 805 of the Civil Code must be strictly construed in order for a will to be valid
RULING: NO. The requirement of subscription was fully satisfied. Clearly, Art. 805 of the Civil Code
stated that the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator, or by testator’s name
written by another person in his presence, or by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. However, the
signatures of the witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the
attestation. While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from
the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. Thus,
the law is to be liberally construed in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent commission of fraud.
Forms of Wills (Arts. 804 – 819)
A. Notarial Will (Arts. 804 to 808)
29. Balonan v Abellana, 109 Phil 359 DAMILES
 TOPIC: Testator signing through an agent
FACTS: A 2-page Will and Testament by the testatrix Anacleta Abellana was sought to be probated
at rhe CFI of Zamboanga City. ON the second page, which is the last page of the Will, on the left
margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the following
phrase 'Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana' (for the tetattrix Anacleta Abellana). (The CFI admitted
the probate of the will. Hence, this appeal, the petitioner contending that the signature of Juan A.
Abello on top of the phrase ‘por la tetadora Anacleta Abellana did not comply with the requirements of
the law prescribing the manner in which it ill be executed.)
ISSUE: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora
Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the requirements of the law prescribing
the manner in which a will shall be executed?
RULING: The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows: "Every will, other
than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
one another." In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan, 21 Phil., 461, we held that the important thing is
that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction; it is
unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not.
In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under
the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply
with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his
name be affixed thereto by Some other person in his presence and by his express direction. It
appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are constrained
to declare that the said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to
probate.
30. Icasiano v Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422 DAMILES
 TOPIC: Attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses
JURADO BOOK: “It is worthwhile to recall the basic principles on undue pressure and
influence as laid down by the jurisprudence of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will,
the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the
testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his
own.”
FACTS: Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his
appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September
12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in
duplicates, an original and a carbon copy. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer
only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan.
One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have
lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will
was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page
is sufficient to deny probate of the will.
RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the
duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the
original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be
defective, then in law, there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be
probated. The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of.
Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component
pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed. Note that this ruling should not
be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page.
The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.
 Credible v Competent Witnesses
31. Nera v Rimando, 18 Phil 450 DAMILES
 TOPIC: Test of presence
FACTS: At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a
doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other
witnesses were attaching their signatures to the instrument. The trial court did not consider the
determination of the issue as to the position of the witness as of vital importance in determining the
case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact being that one
of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner room,
would not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will. The CA deemed the will valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other witnesses in
the act of affixing their signatures.
RULING: YES. The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the
outer room when the testator and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have
invalidated the will since the attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was not done 'in the
presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the testator and
other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the rooms. The position of the parties must
be such that with relation to each other at the moment of the attaching the signatures, they
may see each other sign if they chose to.
 Signatures on the left margin
32. Lopez v Liboro, 81 Phil 429 DAMILES
 TOPIC: Pagination Requirement
FACTS: In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir. Agustin
Liboro questioned the validity of the said will based on the following ground, among others:
1. The first sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals.
2. That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements.
3. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will.
4. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is known by Don Sixto Lopez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.
RULING: Yes, the will is valid.
1. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by
other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or
characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense
of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning
and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation
of the last sentenceof the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom
ofthe preceding page. Further, the first pages is captioned “Testamento”.
2. The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in Liboro’s
appelant’s brief are incidents not all of which every one of thewitnesses can be supposed to have
perceived, or to recall in the same order inwhich they occurred.
3. Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing hisname. The reason for this
was that he was suffering from “partial paralysis.” Thereis nothing curious or suspicious in the fact
that the testator chose the use ofmark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste
or preference. Both ways are good.
4. There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly placed in the will that
the testator knows the language being used therein. It is a matter that may be established by proof
aliunde.
 Attestation Clause
33. Taboada v Rosal, 118 SCRA 195 DAMILES
 TOPIC: Failure to state the number of pages
FACTS: In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged
last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will
consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at
the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3)
instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses
and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is void for failure to state the number of pages used in writing the will.
RULING: NO. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is
discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. [T]he first page which contains the
entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom
while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as
“Pagina dos” comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page”.
34. Samaniego-Celada v Abena, 556 SCRA 569 DAMILES
 TOPIC: Error in indicating the number of pages
FACTS: Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decent Margarita S. Mayores
(Margarita) while respondent was the decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929. On April 27, 1987,
Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents,
and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins which included petitioner. Before
her death, Margarita executed a will where she bequeathed portions of her undivided shares in real
properties to respondent. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she
likewise designated as sole executor of her will. RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and
testament of Margarita probated and respondent as executor of the will. CA affirmed.
ISSUES: W/N the CA erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities
required by law. – NO.
RULING: We rule in favor of respondent. A review of the findings of the RTC reveal that petitioner’s
arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
“About the contestant’s submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation
clause states that the will is composed of 3 pages while the will, in truth, only consists of 2 pages only
because the attestation is not part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that
the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court is of the considered opinion that error
in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to
invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively
lettered with pages A, B, and C which is sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an
omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief
that the will is the whole instrument consisting of 3 pages inclusive of the attestation clause
and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of
liberal interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.
The Court also rejects the contention that the signatures of the testator were affixed on different
occasions as the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture, and appearance as
compared to the signatures on the succeeding pages. The picture shows that the testator was affixing
her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to
show that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.” We find no reason to
disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC.
35. Lopez v Lopez, 685 SCRA 209 DAMILES
 TOPIC: Error in indicating the number of pages
FACTS: The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with the required statement
in the attestation clause as to the number of pages used upon which the will is written. While the
acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in
accordance with law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the discrepancy between the number of pages in the attestation clause and
the actual number of pages in the will that would warrant its disallowance.
RULING: YES. The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809
of the Civil Code provide that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will
is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. Here, the will
actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of
evidence aliunde.
36. Testate Estate of Alipio Adaba vs. Abaja | 450 SCRA 264 (Failure to state the number of
witnesses)
Facts: Abada and his wife Toray died without legitimate children. Abaja, filed with CFI of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will of Abada. The latter allegedly named as his testamentary
heirs his natural children, Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova; respondent was the son of Eulogio.
Caponong opposed the petition on the ground that Abaja left no will when he died and if such was
really executed by him, it should be disallowed for the reason that, among others, its attestation
clause does not indicate the number of witnesses.
The RTC admitted the probate will. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether the will of Abada is valid notwithstanding the fact that its attestation clause does not
indicate the number of witnesses?
Ruling: Yes. Caponong is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number
of witnesses. On this point, the SC agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial
compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that 3 witnesses signed it.
The SC has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New Civil
Code. In De Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, the SC recognized that there are 2 divergent tendencies in the
law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. In De
Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, the SC noted that Abangan vs. Abangan, the basic case on the liberal
construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the SC.
37. Garcia vs. Lacuesta | 90 Phil 489 (Failure to state that the testator signed through an agent)
Facts: Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed by Atty.
Javier as he wrote the name of Mercado and his name for the testator on the will. However,
immediately after Mercado’s will, Mercado himself placed an “X” mark.
The attestation clause was signed by 3 instrumental witnesses. The said attestation clause states
that all pages of the will were “signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the
witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.” The
attestation clause however did not indicate that Atty. Javier was the one who wrote Mercado’s name.
Issue: Whether the will is valid?
Ruling: No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado caused Atty.
Javier to write the testator’s name under his express direction, as required by Sec. 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Petitioner’s argument that such recital is unnecessary because the testator signed
the will himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark (which
has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the same as a thumb
mark, because the cross mark does not have the same trustworthiness of a thumb mark.
38. Cagro vs. Cagro | 92 Phil 1032 (Attesting signatures)
Facts: Vicente Cagro died on Feb. 14, 1949 in Samar. Since the decedent allegedly made a will prior
to his death, the will was probated before the CFI of Samar. However, the oppositors-appellant
objected the probate proceeding alleging that the will is fatally defective because its attestation clause
is not signed by the attesting witnesses. It is undisputed that the signatures of the 3 witnesses to the
will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is
signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
Issue: Whether the will may be probated even if the signatures of the witnesses do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, and instead, they were placed on the left-hand margin of the page
containing the same?
Ruling: No. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since
the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner-appellee’s contentions is untenable because said signatures are in compliance with the
legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause
not signed by the 3 witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add
such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of
the witnesses.
39. Azuela vs. Court of Appeals | 487 SCRA 119 (Fatally defective attestation clause)
Facts: Petitioner sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Igsolo. However, this was opposed by
Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. According to her,
the will was forged and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the will was not properly
acknowledged. The notary public, Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng
Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”
Issue: Whether the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses as required by Art. 806 of the Civil Code?
Ruling: Yes. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment.
An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that
the same is his/her own free act and deed.
In this case, even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a “jurat”, the will would
nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Art. 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,”
and not merely subscribed and sworn to.
40. Vda. de Ramos vs. Court of Appeals | 81 SCRA 393 (Conflicting testimonies of witnesses)
Facts: Eugenia Danila allegedly executed a will and testament dated March 9, 1963 and a codicil
dated April 18, 1963. Nista, one of the instituted heirs filed a petition for the probate of the 2
documents. Buenaventura and Marcelina Guerra filed an opposition to the petition alleging among
others that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and
Eugenia Danila.
Private-respondent’s contention: The will and codicil were procured through fraud and undue
influence. The formalities required by law for the execution of a will and codicil have not been
complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will
and deed of the testatrix.
Petitioner’s contention: The will and codicil are valid since it complied with the formalities required
by law for the execution of a will and codicil.
Issue: Whether the last will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law, considering 2 of the attesting witnesses testified against their due execution while other non-
subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary?
Ruling: Yes. The law requires at least 3 attesting witnesses to a notarial will. The witnesses shall be
called upon, during probate, to recount the incidents which occurred thereat. To a large extent, admission
to or denial of probate depends on the testimony of these instrumental witnesses.
However, if contrary to expectation, these witnesses, or some of them, should testify against the formal
validity of the will, the proponent of the will may use other evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish
compliance with the formalities prescribed by law. A will is not necessarily void because the witnesses
declared against its invalidity.
41. Guerrero vs. Bihis | 521 SCRA 394 (Disqualifications of a notary public)
Facts: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner and respondent died. Petitioner filed a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent.
Respondent opposed the petitioner’s petition on the ground that the will was not executed and
attested as required by law.
The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Art. 806 of the Civil Code was not complied
with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's
residence at Quezon City before Atty. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in
Caloocan City.
Issue: Whether the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a
notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Art. 806 of the
Civil Code?
Ruling: No. A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts.
It is issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public's authority is co-
extensive with it. Hence, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of
acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is
bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public.
42. Cruz vs. Villasor | 54 SCRA 31 (Disqualifications of a notary public)
Facts: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Cruz. However,
the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging, among others, that one of the witnesses,
Tevel, was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower
court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal
requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.
Issue: Whether the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the Civil Code?
Ruling: No. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as
witness at the same time.
The function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a
function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own
act. He would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment,
which is to minimize fraud.
 Testator and Witnesses to acknowledge the will
43. Garcia v Gatchalian, 21 SCRA 1056
Facts: On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the
municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. On April 2 of the same year,
appellant filed a petition with the court for the probate of said alleged will wherein he was instituted as
sole heir. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G.
Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein, opposed the petition on the grounds that the will
was procured by fraud; that the deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be as his
will; and that the deceased was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the
alleged execution of said will.
After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the document to be the authentic last
will of the deceased but disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Article
806 of the New Civil Code — that the will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be allowed for probate
Ruling: An examination of the document (Exhibit "C") shows that the same was acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator but not by the instrumental witnesses. Article 806 of the New
Civil Code reads as follows:
Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a
copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal provision
to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the
witnesses is indispensable for its validity (In re: Testate Estate of Alberto, G. R. No. L-11948, April 29,
1959). As the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that
the same may not be probated.
 Special Formalities for the Blind (Art. 808)
44. Garcia v Vasquez, 32 SCRA 490
Facts: Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956, written in Spanish, a language she
knew and spoke. The other will was executed in December 1960 consisting of only one page, and
written in Tagalog. The witnesses to the 1960 will declared that the will was first read ‘silently’ by the
testatrix before signing it. The probate court admitted the will.
The oppositors alleged that the eyesight of the testatrix as of December 1960, was so poor and
defective that she could not have read the provisions contrary to the testimony of the witnesses. Dr.
Jesus Tamesis, an opthalmologist testified that the eyesight condition of Gliceria was limited for
distance vision due to a possible glaucoma, a disease that leads to blindness. Records also show
that Dr. Tamesis operated on the left eye of Gliceria to remove her cataract which enabled her to only
see forms but not read.
Issue: Whether or not the 1960 will was validly executed
Ruling: Yes. Art. 808 states that “If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by
one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged.“ The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known
to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.
That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and
understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire. The
testimony of her opthalmologist established that notwithstanding an operation to remove her cataract
and being fitted with the lenses, this did not improve her vision. Her vision remained mainly for
viewing distant objects and not for reading. There was no evidence that her vision improved at the
time of the execution of the 2nd will. Hence, she was incapable of reading her own will. The
admission of the will to probate is therefore erroneous.
45. Alvarado v Gaviola, 226 SCRA 347
Facts: Brigido Alvarado executed a will, “Huling Habilin”, disinheriting Cesar Alvarado, an illegitimate
son. The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the
lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3
instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own
respective copies previously furnished them. Said will was admitted to probate.
Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already suffering from glaucoma.
But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the
testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who
read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those
of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.
Issue: Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will?
Ruling: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the will should have been read by the notary
public and an instrumental witness. However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter
was not. In this case, there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where
the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never
intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the
testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only
then did the signing and acknowledgement take place.
 Doctrine of Liberal Interpretation (Art. 809)
46. Gil v Murciano, 88 Phil 260
Facts: Carlos Gil executed a last will and testament. After his death, it was presented for probate in
the CFI of Manila. This was opposed by his nephew, Roberto Toledo y Gil and sister, Pilar Vda. de
Murciano. The will was initially destroy and was reconstituted. The parties all agreed that the
reconstituted will is a copy of the original will Pilar, opposed on the ground that the attestation clause
does not state that the testator signed the will. It only declares that it was signed by the witnesses.
On the other hand, Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, the administratrix, contends that defective attestation
clause may be cured by inferring in the other parts of the will and inserting a missing phrase to
complete the whole meaning of the attestation clause Despite this defect, the CFI admitted to probate
the will. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid despite its defective attestation clause?
Ruling: The will is valid. It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left out from the copy. The
problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law of wills which require certain
formalities to be fulfilled in the execution but by the rules of construction applicable to statutes and
documents in general. The court may and should correct the error by supplying the omitted word or
words.
It has been said, and experience has shown, that the mechanical system of construction has
operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That would be the effect in this
case if the will under consideration were rejected for the adverse party now concedes the
genuineness of the document. The genuineness is super obvious, and there is not the slightest
insinuation of undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator or fraud.
Coming to the execution of wills, the Supreme Court saw no legitimate, practical reason for objecting
to the testator instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the presence of the latter.
The will is of the testator’s own making, the intervention of attesting witnesses being designed merely
to protect his interest.
47. Caneda v Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 781
Facts: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children executed a last will and testament at his
residence before 3 witnesses and was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad. In the will, it
was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal
properties to several people all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. In the course of
the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that on the
alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of health such that he could not
have possibly executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the testator
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that the
testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of
the late Mateo Caballero. CA affirmed the probate court’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can be
cured under the art. 809
Ruling: No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law. Ordinary or attested wills are governed
by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or
even to the attesting witnesses.
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and
to insure the authenticity thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically state the fact
that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and
that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space provided for his
signature and on the left hand margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental
witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last will and testament.”
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a
fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally omits the fact
that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or the language of the
attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself
which is clearly lacking in this case.
 Dated by the hand of the testator
48. Roxas v de Jesus, 134 SCRA 245
Facts: Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the estate of
the deceased and also delivered the holographic will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a
notebook belonging to deceased, which contained a “letter-will” entirely written and signed in
deceased’s handwriting. The will is dated “FEB./61 ” and states: “This is my will which I want to be
respected although it is not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is
a holographic will of deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed
probate on the ground that it such does not comply with Article 810 of the CC because the date
contained in a holographic will must signify the year, month, and day.
Issue: Whether or not the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
Ruling: Yes, as a general rule, the "date" in a holographic will should be include the day, month, and
year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date "FEB./61" is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of
the holographic will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance. There is no
question that the holographic will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was entirely written, dated and
signed by her, in the language of which she known. All of her children agreed on the genuineness of
the holographic will of their mother.
49. Labrador v Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 170
Facts: Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probate
proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that the will has been
extinguished by implication of law alleging that before Melecio’s death, the land was sold to them
evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold it to Navat. Trial court admitted the will to
probate and declared the TCT null and void. However, the CA on appeal denied probate on the
ground that it was undated. The aggrieved party appealed before the SC alleging that the CA erred in
not allowing the probate proceeding withstanding the fact that in the first paragraph of the second
page of the alleged holographic will, which was written in Ilocano, the testator made mention a date –
“month of March, 17th, 1968.
Issue: Whether or not the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of CC.
Ruling: Yes. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the tenor of the
succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that “this being in the month of March 17th day, in the
year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who
made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father.” This clearly shows that this is a
unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a will.
TOPIC: Proving the Authenticity of a Holographic Will (Art. 811)
50.) Azaola v Singzon, 109 Phil 102, August 5, 1960
Facts: That on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City,
known to be the last residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of
the holographic will, submitted the said holographic will whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made
the sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; The opposition to the probate was
on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend
the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of
August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent "did
not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
Issue: Whether the lower court erred in ruling that the proponent must present three witnesses
Ruling:Yes. We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he
was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of
the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at
the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence
of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For
it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who
know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if
the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator".
There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses
may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811
may thus become an impossibility.
51.) Codoy v Calugay, 312 SCRA 333, August 12, 1999
Facts: On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for
probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August
1978. Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was
a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing
on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured. Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6
witnesses and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records
of the case bearing the signature of the deceased. The second witness was election registrar who
was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same was already
destroyed and no longer available. The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired
familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting
rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts.
The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by
said deceased. The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings
of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but
that he cannot be sure. The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar
with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The
fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where
she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on
appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the
signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceased’s holographic will.
Ruling: 1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in
a statute, is mandatory. In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the
wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals
who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount
consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The
clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic
will was that of the deceased. The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit for
verification as it was no longer available. The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters
of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note. The
will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said
niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document. The
former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will. (As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied
with.) A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will. However, we cannot eliminate the
possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased. Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will,
it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will
is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.
TOPIC: Insertions, Cancellations, Erasures and Alterations (Art. 814)
52.) Kalaw v Relova, 132 SCRA 237
Facts: Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a
petition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's
name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such
was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's name was written
above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator. Rosa contended that the will as first written
should be given effect so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to
the unauthenticated alterations and additions.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: No. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined. However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not
carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which
could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the
seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because
she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.
53.) G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
Facts: Petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time
of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue
influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Private respondent
opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was
in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a
house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial
court admitted the decedent's holographic will. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the
petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not
comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code
Issue: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT ON
THE GROUND OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 814 OF THE CIVIL CODE
Ruling:Yes . A holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with
the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court
held: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa
gave an identical commentary when he said .Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature,
their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
TOPIC: Conflict Rules on Formal Validity of Wills (Arts. 815, 816 and 817)
54.) Vda. de Perez v Tolete, 232 SCRA 722
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens
and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the
husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire
that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate
proceedings of the wills. Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in
Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He
contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further
argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled
to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. For her part, Salud said she was
the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law.
But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already
issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed
Ruling: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens:
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in
this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine
laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of
the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2)
the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been
admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the
laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules
of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
[1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign
country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not
consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of
the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting
that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor
General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section
2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
"original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is
not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices
of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the
Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all
notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
TOPIC: Joint Wills (Arts. 818 and 819)
55.) De la Cerna v Rebaca-Potot, 12 SCRA 576
Facts: Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will ad testament
where they willed that their 2 parcels of land be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while
each of them are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned. Bernabe died.
Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the Court admitted for probate the
said will but only for the part of Bernabe. When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was
instituted by Manuela, but because she and her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was
dismissed. When the same was heard, the CFI declared the will void for being executed contrary to
the prohibition on joint wills. On appeal, the order was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether the will may be probated.
Ruling: Yes, but only the will of Bernabe. Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous,
however, because it was probated by a court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a
final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.
However, this is only with respect to the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife;
considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator. The joint will being prohibited by law, its
validity, in so far as the estate of the wife is concerned, must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.
The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the
testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be given effect. A decree of
probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal validity of the will subject to such
probate.
56. Gonzales v Court of Appeals, 90 SCRA 187
Facts: Isabel Gabriel died (85 yrs old) on June 7, 1961 in Navotas province of Rizal without issue.
Lutgarda Santiago (respondent-lived with the deceased together w/ her husband and children), niece
of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary and
executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog (5 pages) and was executed 2 months prior(April 15,
1961) to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the following
grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by law, 3. the
decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age and
sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said decision
of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC.
Issue: W/ CA erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by
law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible
Held: No. We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code
provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the
disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806
of this Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false
testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted
by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to
the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance,
testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and
that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must first
be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed
of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil
Code should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is
mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must
prove their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their
honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in
that being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become
a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization
Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest
the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We
agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning
character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely,
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily
supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this
Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification
of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of
age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner
submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to
his qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article,
whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes
that the term credible requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in
addition to being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article
805.
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined
by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness
is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo,
No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one
thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says.
Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent,
but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the
rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the
qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821
and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not
mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the
community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person
is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental
witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the
probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for
respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were
"credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable.
57. Samson v Naval, 41 Phil 383
FACTS: On September 20, 1915, Attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila for allowance as the will of Simeona F. Naval, who died in said city two days
previously, a document executed by her of February 13, 1915, and in which he was appointed
executor. It was denied on the ground that said document was not duly executed by the deceased as
her last will and testament, inasmuch as she did not sign it in the presence of three witness and the
two witnesses did not sign it in the presence of each other. Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the
same deceased filed in the same court for allowance as her will, another document executed by her
on October 31, 1914. The petition for allowance was opposed by Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and
Cristina Naval on the ground that the will, the allowance of which is asked, could not be allowed,
because of the existence of another will of subsequent date, executed during her lifetime by the same
Simeona F. Naval, and because said will has been revoked by another executed subsequently by her
during her lifetime. The probate court on February 8, 1916, issued an order, admitting said second
document and ordering its allowance as the last will and testament of said deceased. The oppositors
then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court averring among other things that the will executed on
October 31, 1914 was revoked by the will executed on February 13, 1915 and as such the latter
could not transmit real and personal property.
Issue: Whether or not the will that was executed on October 31, 1914 was revoked by the will
executed on February 13, 1915.
Held: The trial court declared that the first document presented by the executor of the deceased,
Simeona F. Naval, as a will executed by her on February 13, 1915, could not be allowed, on the
ground that it was not executed with the requisites and formalities prescribed by law. Article 739 of
the Civil Code provides that a former will is by operation of law revoked by another valid subsequent
will, if the testator does not state in the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly or
partly. In harmony with this provision of substantive law, we find section 623 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that no will shall be revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise than
by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills. Therefore, according to
the legal provisions, in order that the will of February 13, 1915, that is, the first document presented
as the will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval, could have the effect of revoking that which was
presented afterwards by the G.R. No. L-11823 Revocation by Subsequent Will or Codicil February
11, 1918 Page 2 of 2 petitioners as executed by the same deceased on October 31, 1914, that is, on
a date previous to the execution of the first, it was necessary and indispensable that the later will, that
is, that first presented for allowance, should be perfect or valid, that it, executed as provided by lay in
case of wills. It also appears from the record that the opponents themselves maintained that said later
will, that is, that of February 13, 1915, was not perfect, or executed as provided by law in case of
wills, and the Court of First Instance of Manila has so held in disallowing said documents as the will of
the deceased. So that it very evident that the second will presented, that is, that of October 31, 1914,
was not and could not have been revoked by the first, and the court was not in error in so holding in
the order appealed from. We deem it unnecessary to add a single word mere or cite well-known
doctrines and opinions of jurists in support of what has already been stated.
58.Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto v Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 451
FACTS:On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo
Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament,
these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their
aunt's estate in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case was still pending the parties — Aldina, Constancio,
Panfilo, and Felino — executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The
agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos
then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court
did on March 21, 1964.
3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo
Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT- AN (Testamento),"
dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma
claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials
inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the clerk of
court of the Iloilo CFI. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of
Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier
signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the
petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in the same
court which approved the EJ settelement a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the
proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will which was denied by the CFI. Upon petition to
the SC for certiorari and mandamus, the SC dismissed that petition and advised that a separate
proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the
matters raised by the petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be probated had been
revoked by the burning thereof by the housemaid upon instruction of the testatrix.
ISSUE: W/N the will was revoked by Adriana.
HELD:No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.The
physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is
not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by
another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
" Animus revocandi” is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a
last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in
his presence and under his express direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or
papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all,
much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done
under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both
witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the
place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will
were burned.
The two witnesses were illiterate and does not appear to be unequivocably positive that the
document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe believed that the papers she destroyed was
the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his
information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his
testimony on this point is double hearsay.
It is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very
foundations.
59. Gago v Mamuyac, 49 Phil 902

FACTS: Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel executed a
last will and testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will for probate which was opposed by
Cornelio Mamuyac et. al. Said petition for probate was denied on the ground that the deceased
executed another will on April 16, 1919. Gago presented the April 16 will for probate which was again
opposed by Cornelio et. al. alleging that the will presented by Gago is a carbon copy of the original
April 16 will; such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the deceased; and that said will was not the
last will and testament of the deceased. The RTC found that the deceased executed another will on
December 30, 1920.
ISSUE: W/N the April 16 will was cancelled.
HELD: YES. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not
denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The
law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such
cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence
showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is
shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person
without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or
revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by
the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator
Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to
the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the
evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to
establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the
burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which
wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or
destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be
admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will
was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of
the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original
has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.
60.Rodriguez v Rodriguez, 642 SCRA 642
FACTS: Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San Jose Street, Guadalupe
Nuevo, Makati City. On October 27, 1983, he executed a Huling Habilin at Testamento giving
petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D and E, and his children
Benjamin Rodriguez (deceased husband of respondent Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A,
respondent Buenaventura Rodriguez, apartment B, and respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C.
Juanito later on executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of petitioner who
registered it in her name. Cresenciana then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
respondents who, without her knowledge and consent, leased the units to some other persons who
failed to vacate the premises and pay the rentals thereof.
Respondents in their answer claimed ownership over the property by succession, and
alleged that petitioner is only the registered owner, not the lawful owner of the property because the
Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and void. They filed an action to assail the validity of the sale
arguing that petitioner exerted undue influence over Juanito, who at the time was seriously ill, to
agree to the sale of the property for only P20,000 after knowing that only two apartments were given
to her in the Huling Habilin at Testamento. The MTC in the unlawful detainer case ruled in
respondent’s favor. On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the MTC decision, in that
petitioner’s certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the property. The RTC also
held that the MTC erred in relying heavily on Juanito’s last will and testament which was not
probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed therein. Respondents filed a petition
for review before the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
reinstated that of MTC. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will which was not probated has effect or can confer a right.
RULING: NO. The Court held that respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling
Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been
probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be
dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.” As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant
to the last will of Juanito can not be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said
agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession.
Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito
Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his
death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was valid is an issue that can be resolved only in the
action filed by respondents with the RTC of Makati City. The action in this case is one of unlawful
detainer which is summary in nature and hence the validity of the will shall not be subject to a
collateral attack. The Court’s ruling on the issue of ownership is only provisional to determine who
between the parties has the better right of possession. Thus, the Court reversed and set aside the
decision of the CA.
61.Heirs of Rosendo Lasam v Umengan, 510 SCRA 496
FACTS: The subject lots denominated as Lot 5427 and Lot 992 situated in Tugegarao City belonged
to the spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan. The spouses sold the said lots to their children
Isabel and Irene Cuntapay. It was agreed that the disputed eastern portion shall belong to Isabel
Cuntapay as evidenced by a notarized partition agreement. Isabel was first married to Domingo
Turingan, they had four children named Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria. When the first husband died,
Isabel married Rosendo Lasam. She had two children by him named Trinidad and Rosendo.
In 2001 Rosendo Lasam filed a case against the respondent Vicenta Umengan who is the daughter
of Abdon Turingan, a son of Isabel Cuntapay, for unlawful detainer. The petitioner anchored their
claim on the disputed property on the purported will of Isabel Cuntapay whereby she bequeathed the
said property to Rosendo Lasam. The last will and testament relied upon was not probated. The
MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that they are the owners of the property
based on the alleged will of Isabel Cuntapay.
ISSUE:Whether or not the will of Isabel Cuntapay could be relied upon to establish the petitioner‘s
right to possess the subject lot.
HELD:No. The purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon
to establish petitioners‘ right to possess the subject lot because, without having been probated, the
said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
“No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court…..”
In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: “[a] will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior
to the testator‘s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: N ̳ o will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.‘”
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that “[b]efore any will can have force or
validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested
by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and
testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been
executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was of sound and
disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the validity of the will.” Moreover, the presentation of
the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy. Thus, the petition was denied.
Jurisdiction of the probate court; effects of judgment
62. Gallanosa vs Arcangel
Facts:
Florentino Hitosis executed a will which was eventually submitted to court for probate by Gallanosa,
the testimentary heirs. This was opposed by the testator's legal heirs, namely his surviving brother
Leon.
After hearing, the court admitted the will to probate and appointed an executor named Gallanosa. The
court found that the testator executed his last will with a sound mind, and without fraud or influence.
The opposition did not appeal the decree of the probate court.
11 years later, the legal heirs, oppositors in the probate filed an action for the recovery of the land
subject in the will. They allege that they have been in continuous possession of the land. This was
dismissed by the judge on the ground of res judicata as they were barred from the prior judgment in
the probate proceeding from claiming ownership of the land. The legal heirs did not appeal this case
either.
However, 15 years later, the legal heirs again filed an action for the “annulment” of the will of the
executor claiming that the Gallanosa spouses caused the execution of the will through fraud and
deceit. This was granted by the judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the legal heirs had a cause of action to “annul” the will of the executor?
NOP
Decision:
A testimentary proceeding is a special proceeding for the settlement of the tesator's estate.
A special trial is different from an ordinary action.
A decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. That
the testator was of sound disposing mind at the time he executed the will, and all formal requirements
cannot be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even one for forgery.
Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Validity
63. Dorotheo vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Lourdes Dorotheo, petitioner filed in the probate court a petition to allow into probate the
will of Alejandro Dorotheo who she allegedly took care of before he died. The oppositors were
Alejandro's legitimate children. After hearing, the court admitted the will to probate. Alejandro's
children did not appeal the order, but two year later they filed a “motion to declare the will intrinsically
void” which was granted by the trial court.
Lourdes Dorotheo, petitioner in this case filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but it was
dismissed for failure to file an appellant's brief within the period granted.
Issue:
Whether or not a last will and testament admitted to probate, can still be declared intrinsically void in
another trial? Yes.
Decision:
A probate proceeding deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,
particularly on four aspects:
1.) Whether the will submitted is indeed the decedent's last will and testamentary
2.) Compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills,
3.) The testamentary capacity of the testator's
4.) The due execution of the last will and testament.
Intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the
will has been authenticated. It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid will. Even if the
will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful
heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance then the unlawful dispositions cannot be given effect
Issue of ownership
64. Pastor vs CA
Facts:
Quemada, testamentary heir to the will of Pastor, filed with the probate court a petition to
admit into probate the will of Pastor. It was allowed and he eventually filed a suit for reconveyance of
alleged properties against Pastor JR, the testator's son. Eventually, while a reconveyance suit was
being litigated, the Probate court resolved the question of the royalties payable by atlas and rulling
that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
Issue:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity
Decision:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue is restricted to the extrinsic
validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate
court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass
upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the
estate inventory, considering that theissue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the
reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders
to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of themining
properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said
Probate Order directedspecial administrator to pay the legacy in dispute
65. Jimenez vs IAC
Facts:
Virginia Jimenez filed a petition for the allowance of probate with the probate court of
pangasinan. She was appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of lino Jimenez. She filed an
inventory pf the estate wherein she included 5 parcels of land. As a result, Leonardo Jimenez jr
moved for the exclusion of the properties on the ground that they were already adjudicated to him by
their father.
The probate court ordered the exclusion of the five parcels of land from the inventory.
Issue:
whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to
settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners' present action for
the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.
Decision:
Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as
a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the probate,
court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is necessary to
establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. 11
The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be
settled in a separate action. 12
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is
a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so. 13
Exception to the scope of inquiry
66. Nepomuceno v Court of Appeals
Facts:
Martin Jugo died and left a will where he appointed Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor
of his estate. Petitioner filed a petition for probate but the legal wife of the testator filed an opposition
stating that the will was executed by undue and improper influence on the part of the testator.
The lower court denied probate on the ground that on the face of the will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisional?
No.
Held:
Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Balany vs Martinez, the court ruled that the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue
Probate of a lost will
67. Gan vs Yap
Facts:
Felicidad Yap died and left a will.
Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings with a petition for the probate of a holographic
will allegedly executed by the deceased.
The will was not presented because Felicidad’s husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What was
presented were witness accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly
saw it as well.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to probate the alleged will
on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made
her will known to so many of her relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not
have carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There
was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor’s evidence that
Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.
Issue:
Whether or not a holographic will can be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator? No
Decision:
The will must be presented. The execution and contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may
not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and or read such will. In the case of
ordinary wills, it is hard to convince three witnesses to deliberately lie and if they do, it can be
checked and exposed.
In holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible, only one man could engineer the fraud.
Forgery is also possible in case testimonial evidence of holographic wills will be permitted.
Also, in the case of a lost will, three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they
saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will while in holographic wills, the witnesses only
testify to the handwriting they saw which cannot be tested in court.
I. SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF LOST WILL
68. Marcela Rodelas vs. Amparo Aranza 119 SCRA 16
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by
the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim
Bonilla on the following grounds she was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by
failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator and that the alleged
hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce
no effect. Appellees’ further alleged that lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. The court said that once the original copy of the holographic
will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original. Court notes that the alleged holographic
will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the
lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent,
the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had
discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of
the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not.
If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may
be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the
holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs.
Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
"Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of
the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
J. GROUNDS FOR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
69. Baltazar vs. Laxa 669 SCRA 249
Paciencia Regala was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the
Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was
read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament and affixed her signature at the end of the
said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof. She bequeathed all
her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon and their children Luna and
Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Six days after the
execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and
his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge
Limpin. More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition
with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the will.
Antonio Baltazar and other petitioners filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio
averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his
predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Petitioners filed
an Amended Opposition28 asking to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the
Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia
was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the
Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit;
Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate. YES
(INSANITY) The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. There is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that
Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find
more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the
latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. More importantly, a testator is
presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove
otherwise lies on the oppositor. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the
time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will, however, no
substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same. There was no showing that
Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will.
Furthermore, a scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document
she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She
was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children.
(UNDUE INFLUENCE) Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and
improper influence and pressure cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will. The
allegations of petitioner’s are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio
wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned. We are not persuaded. We
take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son
and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It
is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews
and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice
that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a
testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy. This unquestioned relationship between
Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against
petitioners’ allegations aside from being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial
and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if
not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said
allegations.
70. Pascual vs. De la Cruz 28 SCRA 421
Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the
age of 89 in her residence (San Roque, Navotas, Rizal). A petition for the probate of her alleged will
was filed in the CFI of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was not related by blood but was named in the
said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent. Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and
nieces contested the validity of the will on the ground that the will was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of the testatrix
was obtained through fraud. The probate court upheld the due execution of the will. The oppositors
appealed directly to the Court claiming that the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies
of the subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed, notwithstanding the
existence of inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence
that the will was not signed by all the witnesses in the presence of one another, in violation of the
requirement of the law.
Whether the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.
NO. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a Will was made in favor of
a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure or
influence, for we have numerous instances where strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the
institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the
deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her
own son. Also, her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz,
made him also her sole heir to her property in her Will without any objection from Catalina and
Valentina Cruz. The truth of the matter is that bequests and devises to those in whom the testator has
confidence and who have won his affection are more likely to be free from undue influence that
bequests or devises to others. Appellants invoked presumption of undue influence held to exist by
American authorities where the beneficiary participates in the drafting of execution of the will favoring
him; but since the will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, although nephew of the proponent, we do not
think the presumption applies; for in the normal course of events, said attorney would follow the
instructions of the testatrix; and a member of the bar in good standing may not be convicted of
unprofessional conduct, or of having conspired to falsify a statement, except upon clear proof.
(Addtl info as to the contention of undue influence just in case tanungin) Their main reliance is on the
assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything
unless I knew it" which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that proponent desired.
On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in
Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be
painted thereon in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that proponent's
influence was not such as to overpower to destroy the free will of the testarix. Because if the mind of
the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent had
no need to recourse to the deception averred.lawphil Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the
testarix, who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue
influence, for the reason that the rheumetism of the testarix made it difficult for her to look for all the
witnesses. That she did not resort to relatives or friends is, likewise explainable: it would have meant
the disclosure of the terms of her will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored
by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and recriminations that an aged person would
naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of a will secret can, likewise, account
for the failure to probate the testament during her lifetime.
71. Ozoeta vs. Cuartero 99 SCRA 1041
Carlos Palanca Tanguinlay died leaving a large estate and 3 sets of heirs. In 1884 he
married Cesarea Gano, with whom he begot 3 children. Cesarea died in 1907, and 1 year thereafter,
lived unmarried with Rosa Gonzales and came to have 8 children. While living with Rosa, Palanca
also sustained relation with Maria Cuartero, and by her he came to have 6 children. Realizing in his
old age and failing health that life’s end was fast approaching, he married Rosa Gonzales then later
on made a will. Designated in the will as substitute executor, Roman Ozoeta filed a petition in the
CFI of Manila asking for the probate of the will, for issuance of letters of administration and for his
appointment as special administrator pending probate. Cuartero and her 6 children filed their
opposition, alleging that the will was not executed in accordance with law, that it was procured by
fraud and undue pressure and influence on the part of some of the beneficiaries or some other
person for their benefit, and that the decedent’s signature thereon were procured through fraud and
trickery, the same having been affixed by him without any intention of making the document his will.
Whether the will was obtained by undue influence and improper pressure on the part of the
beneficiaries.
NO. The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper
pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or
suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility
that it may have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.
72. PASCUAL COSO vs. FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA, ET AL., objectors-appellees G.R. No. L-
16763
Nota Bene: Rosario Lopez is a girl/woman. You might get confused in reading the case kasi tunog
lalake ang name. No mention of the participation of Coso in the case.
Testator, a married man, resident of the Phil and a lawyer, met Rosario Lopez in Spain in
1898 and had illicit r with affair for years. She followed him upon returning to the Phil until his death in
February, 1919. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him and the only question
for our determination is whether this influence was of such a character as to vitiate the will. This is an
appeal from a decision of the CFI setting aside a will on the ground of undue influence alleged to
have been exerted over the mind of a testator by one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre
disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator and also provides for the payment to her of
nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way the reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking
care of the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered
from a severe illness.
Whether the influence of having close ties with the testator is of such character which vitiates the will.
NO. (In English and American rule) To be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted
must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free
agency and make his express the will of another, rather than his own. Such influence must be
actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the will in question, either at
time of the execution of the will, or so near as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in
favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which the
testator would not otherwise have made. . . . . . and while the same amount of influence may become
"undue" when exercised by one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere
fact that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will,
unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testator's free agency. The burden is upon
the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence. While it is shown that the
testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence
so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him
express the will of another rather than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by
profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only by a
legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and by a proper
feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.
73. Leticicia Ortega vs. Josefina Valmonte 478 SCRA 247
Placido Valmonte, the husband of respondent, executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of two (2) pages. Petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmonte’s
will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time. She
further alleged that conspiracy exits between the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in
deceiving Placido to sign it. According to Josefina, testator would travel alone and it was in one of his
travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses
Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said
she had no knowledge of the existence of the will, but just serendipitously found it in his attache case
after his death. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity despite his old
age. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized only
because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death. The notary public also testified that to
his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature
on the will
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud
or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and
testament.
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every
will presented for probate should be allowed. Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when
a will may be disallowed. Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the
execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the
existence of fraud. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject
of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence
of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he
would not have made."13 We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. 14 The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent
of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. 15 Unfortunately in this case, other than
the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented. Notably, petitioner
failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the commission of a fraud. There was no
showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the
will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its
due execution.23 Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with
the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives. 2
74. MARINA DIZON-RIVERA VS. RIVERA
G.R. L-24561, JUNE 30, 1970
Agripina Valdez died and was survived by 7 compulsory heirs (6 legitimate children & 1
legitimate grandchild as heir of a pre-deceased legitimate child). She left a will written in Pampango
dialect. The real and personal properties of the testatrix had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.00
(formerly P1,801,960.00).
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced and the last will and testament was
allowed and admitted to probate. One of the compulsory heirs, Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed
executrix of the testatrix' estate.
The legitime of each of the 7 compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11 (1/7 of the half of
the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants).
1. Agripina’s will
 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
practically the entire bulk of her estate among her 6 children and 8 grandchildren as follows: testaments. When expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose
Estela P98,000 mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and
Angelina P106,000 devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own
Bernardita P51,000 criterion for the testator's will.
Josefina P52,000
Tomas P131,000 This was a valid partition of her estate subject only to the legitimes
Lilia P72,000 This is contemplated and authorized par. 1 of Art. 1080: "(S)hould a person make a
Marina P1.1 Million partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
Pablo P69,000
8 grandchildren P72,000
Safeguard to the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
Take note: Marina and Tomas were given more than their respective legitimes, while the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
rest received less than their respective legitimes.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory
heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
2. Marina’s project of partition
Marina submitted a project of partition, adjudicating the properties given them in the will,
The counter-project of partition amounts to distrubtion by intestacy! It nullifies the will, WHICH IS
plus cash and/or properties to complete the respective legitimes to P129,254.96 of those given less
WRONG!
while Tomas and Marina must pay in cash or property an amount necessary to complete the
The counter-project of partition would reduce the testamentary partition made by Agripina
prejudiced legitimes.
to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of
the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the
3. Other heirs COUNTER-PROJECT OF PARTITION
legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a
The oppositors, who were the other 6 compulsory heirs (including Tomas), submitted their
distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Art. 791 and Art. 1091: "(A)
counter-project of partition where they proposed the reduction of all testamentary dispositions
partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
proportionately to the value of 1⁄2 of the entire estate corresponding to the free portion, and the other
him.
half to be divided among the 7 compulsory heirs as constituting their legitimes. This is their proposal:
First ½= divided according to 1/7 share as legitime
Oppositors argument: “I bequeath”= devises
Second ½
The testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property,
Estela 49k citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real
Angelina 53k properties to the respective heirs.
Bernardita 26k
Josefina 26k SC: They are NOT devises!
Tomas 65k This cannot be considered devises: for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will
Lilia 36k and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate that her clear intention was to partition her
Marina 576k whole estate through her will.
Pablo 34k "I bequeath" acquire no legal significance,
8 grandchildren 36k Agripina’s intent were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere
devisees.
4. Ruling of the Lower Court: approved Marina’s project of partition
This is practical and valid solution. (Basis: Arts. 906 and 907 of NCC provides that when Dispositions should not be taken only from the free portion.
the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be competed and satisfied.) The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory
Although both projects of partition tried to adhere to this, the Counter-project of partition will heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the par. 2 of
substantially result in a distribution intestacy, which is in controversion of Art. 791 adding that “the Art. 842 precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided
testratix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted”. he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs."

Issue/ruling: Other matters:

1. Whether the testamentary dispositions in the will are in the nature of devises imputable to
the free portion of the estate and therefore subject to reduction?
The testamentary disposition made by Agripina was in the nature of partition of her estate by will.
Articles 788 and 791
"If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation
by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive
an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render
any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy."
 Oppositors argue that: the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined
since the testatrix' death in January, 1961. The Supreme Court said that there was no legal
basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix.
 Oppositors right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition.
 The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned
as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation
with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate.
  That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the
currency has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like
Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's
purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
75. AUSTRIA VS. REYES
G.R. NO. L-23079, FEBRUARY 27, 1970
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem,
of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners. This opposition
was dismissed and the probate of the will was allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the
respondents all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted
children.
More than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent
Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the
provisions of the decedent’s will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner
Ruben Austria.
Finally, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for
partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect
rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as
heirs.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the institution of the heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that
the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent was false. YES.
Article 850 of the Civil Code which reads, “The statement of a false cause for the institution
of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
From the use of the terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang
mana” (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the
testatrix’s belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the
testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware
that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she
would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her
express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that
statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners’ own proposition, is highly speculative of what
was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that
the decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of
heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
The phrases, “mga sapilitang tagapagmana” and “sapilitang mana,” were borrowed from
the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs
instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the
decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not
bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre
disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter’s children, and the children
of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents
more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively
small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to
exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other
nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy — a result which would
subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Dispositive: The present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
76. AZNAR VS. DUNCAN
G.R. NO. L-24365, JUNE 30, 1966
Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a
will. CFI admitted the will to probate, and declared that Helen Garcia was his natural child. The
declaration was appealaed to this Court: affirmed.
Meanwhile, CFI approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the
provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia
appealed from the order of approval, and this Court reversed the same on the ground that the validity
of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law.
CFI approved the project of partition submitted by the executor, wherein the properties of
the estate were divided equally between Lucy Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized
in his will as his natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after
his death. (Basis: Since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as
heir was annulled. Hence, the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died
intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been
duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees. Hence, this appeal.)
The CFI ruled, and appellee maintains, that there has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a
compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of institution of heir pursuant to Article
854 of the Civil Code, which provides: “The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.”
Appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition. Considering the provisions of the
will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy
nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited.
Based on Articles 906 and 918 of the Civil Code, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not
to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.
In the will of the deceased, Helen Garcia was given a legacy of P3,600.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether there was preterition. NO.
The solution (from three SC Spain decisions cited by Manresa) was that the heir ask that
the legitime be completed and not that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely. This solution is
more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as may be
gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused to Helen Garcia as his natural
daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600. The fact that she was subsequently declared
judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during
his lifetime his subjective attitude towards here would have undergone any change and that he would
have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by
him.
The testator did not entirely omit Helen Garcia but left her a legacy of P3,600.
Therefore, ¼ of the estate of the deceased which consisted of 399 shares of stock and a
certain amount of cash descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of
her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent, she is entitled to a corresponding portion of
all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing.
Therefore, there is no preterition if the heir is given a legacy or devise.
77. BALANAY, JR. VS. MARTINEZ
G.R. NO. L-39247, JUNE 27, 1975
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao
City at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and 6 legitimate children:
Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban
and Emilia B. Pabaonon
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated
September 5, 1970 which is written in English where Leodegaria Julian declared (a) she was the
owner of the "southern half of 9 conjugal lots (b) she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land
which she inherited from her father (c) it was her desire that her properties should NOT be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the
fruits of her properties (d) after her husband's death (age of 82 in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all
the conjugal lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will.
She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her.
Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of respect for his wife's will he waived and
renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their 6 children. In that same instrument he
confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal
properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void for illegally claiming the conjugal lands.
David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz B. Solamo,
Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of
the will and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the
provisions relating to the conjugal assets as compromising the future legitimes.
Lower Court: Will was void and converted to intestate proceedings
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, asked for the
reconsideration of the lower court's order on the ground that Atty. Montaña had NO authority to
withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will,
Lower Court on motion for reconsideration: Denied and clarified that it declared the will void
on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's
arguments.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the will should be void and intestate proceeding should follow. NO.
Illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will and may be disregarded. Felix Balanay, Sr.
could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership but
insofar as it partakes of a donation, it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750
and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support
and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective
upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided
among the children and the surviving spouse.
The preterition of surviving spouse did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
78. ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. 72706, OCTOBER 27, 1987
DOCTRINE: Acain resolved once and for all the issue as to whether or not a surviving spouse could
be preterited. This issue was not definitively answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain resolved that an
adopted child may be preterited. This issue was not resolved in Maninang. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Court did not explain the reason why an adopted child (while given the same
rights and obligations as a legitimate child under the provisions of P.D. 603) could be preterited. It
must be noted that given the said provisions, the adopted child is not entitled to the right of
representation, which is available to a legitimate child. It would seem, however, that with the
provisions of the Family Code, specifically on the status of an adopted child, the preterition of an
adopted child finds greater support.
In May 1984, petitioner Acain filed with RTC Cebu a petition for the probate of the will of
the late Nemesio Acain based on the premise that the decedent Nemesio left a will in which petitioner
and his siblings were instituted as heirs. The will was allegedly executed by Nemesio in February
1960 which was written in Bisaya and was not opposed by private respondents.
In the will, Nemesio bequeathed all his properties to his brother Segundo on the condition
that if Segundo predeceases Nemesio, said properties will be given to Segundo’s children (herein
petitioner).
Segundo predeceased before Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as petitioner.
Private respondents, Virigina (legally adopted daughter of the decedent) and Rosa
(decedent’s spouse) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
 The petitioner had no legal capacity to institute said proceedings
 Petitioner is merely a universal heir
 The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited
 Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
On appeal, IAC granted private respondents’ petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss
the petition for probate of the will of Nemesio. Petitioner argues that:
 The authority of the probate court is limited only to inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated, and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity therof before it is
admitted to probate.
 The preterition mentioned in Art 854 NCC refers to preterition of “compulsory heirs in the
direct line” and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the
direct line. Thus, their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether private respondents have been preterited. YES.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited Insofar as the widow is concerned, Art 854 NCC may not apply
as she does not ascend or descend from the testator although she is a compulsory heir. Stated
otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance for she is not in the direct line. However, the same thing cannot be said
of the other respondent Virginia Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner. Under Art 39 of P.D. No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopted
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited.
Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de
legado, mejora o donacion" The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and
devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil
Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. No legacies nor devises having been provided in
the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his
brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of
a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be
respected.
Side-note on the jurisdiction of probate court (Kelvin: Not really part of the syllabus, but worth noting
and remembering, or just in case Atty. Val would just ask.)
The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this state of the
proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.
Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. For private respondents to have
tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to
be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs
coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
The trial court have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved.
79. NUGUID VS. NUGUID
G.R. NO. L-23445, JUNE 23, 1966
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the testamentary
capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will. However, if it should appear on the face of
the will that the sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is gained from an inquiry into
extrinsic validity, then a probe into the testamentary disposition, and the consequential invalidation
thereof is justified for practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir,
the court is justified in declaring the entire will void if the only testamentary disposition in the
questioned will is the institution of the universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of
the testamentary disposition would be the same as the nullification of the will itself.
Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitime or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, and six
(6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all
surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner RemediosNuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguidsome 11 years before her demise. Petitioner
prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be
issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, concededly the legitimate father
and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will.
Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner RemediosNuguid as universal heir of
the deceased, oppositors - who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line -
were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August, 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection
thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity
and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the
petition without cost.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether there is preterition. YES.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise and bequeath all of the property which
I may have when I die to my beloved sister RemediosNuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga,
Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventeenth day of November, nineteen
hundred and fifty-one.
Sgd. (Illegible)
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. x xx
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify;
to abolish; to do away with. (Citations omitted.)
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line - her parents, now
oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them. They
thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa
"anularasiempre la institucion de heredero, dandocaracterabsoluto a esteordenamiento," referring to
the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner
as the sole, universal heir - nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It
is in this posture that the court says that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died
intestate. Says Manresa: “The statement in Article 854 that, annulment notwithstanding, 'the devices
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Legacies and devices merit
consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will.”
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession
ensues.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply
omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one
in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
The disputed order declares the will in question "a complete nullity." Article 854 of the Civil
Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the will provides for
the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will
is null.
Preterition is Governed by the National Law of the Decedent
80. Cayetano v Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 SERNEO
FACTS: The testatrix Adoracion C. Campos was an American citizen and was a permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; In 1977, she died in Manila while temporarily residing with her
sister, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita
C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. Testatrix left property
both in the Philippines and in the United States of America As Hermogenes Campos was the only
compulsory heir, he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased.
That during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according to the laws
of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.
Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging forgery of
the wiil, and that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent
American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would
work injustice and injury to him. The petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his
legitime (preterition) which was reserved by the law for him.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly
Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge should have denied the reprobate of the will since it
disregarded the legitime of the petitioner
RULING: NO. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a
permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2). However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must
apply.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article 1039,
Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which
is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger,
the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
Fideicommissary distinguished from a testamentary trust
81. Vda. de Mapa v CA, 154 SCRA 294) SERNEO
FACTS: On January 16, 1965, the petitoners Paz Garcia Vda. de Mapa et. al. instituted a
civil case before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the properties left by Concepcion
Mapa de Hidrosollo from the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo which is also subject to a special
proceedings in the same court. They claimed that the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo,
in her last will and testament, instituted Ludovico Hidrosollo as a universal heir with the
obligation as a trustee to the residue of her estate and to hold the same in trust for the
petitioners and the private respondents.
The respondents, in their answer, denied the existence of trust and alleged that
Ludovico Hidrosollo, as the surviving spouse of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosllo, became the
latter's universal heir when she died without ascendants or descendants, so that the
controverted properties became part of the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo. They further alleged
that the civil case instituted by the petitioners was barred by an order denying their motion to
intervene in the special proceedings.
In disposing the case, the lower court ruled that a trust was created and the denial order
of the petitioner's motion to intervene did not deprive them to institute a separate civil action
to recover what pertains to them in their own right. The respondents moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied prompting them to file an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Their appeal
to the appellate court proved fruitful as the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court
and ruled that there is no trust nor fideicommissary substition created in the will of Concepcion Mapa
de Hidrosollo.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a trust was created.
2. Whether or not the denial order constitutes a bar to the civil case instituted.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that there was a trust created. Although the word
"trust" itself does not appear in the will, the testatrix intent to create one is nonetheless demonstrated
by the stipulations in her will.
In designating her husband Ludovico Hidrosollo as a sole and universal heir with the
obligation to deliver the properties to the petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the
legal title should vest in him and in significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as
beneficiarios, she intended that the beneficial or equitable interest over the properties should repose
in them.
Article 1443 of the Civil Code also provides that No particular words are required for the
creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.
However, the trust created by Concepcion should be limited only to the free portion of her
estate.
As to the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that since the denial order was anchored
primarily on the non-existence of or the ineffectivity of the fidecommissary substitution and did not
resolve the issue on trust alleged by the petitioners, such order cannot be considered as an
adjudication on the merits of petitioner's claim against the estate. Hence it is not barred.
Even assuming that a fideicommissary substitution was created, such substitution
cannot be give effect because Article 863 of the Civil Code requires that such substitution
must not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. The petitioners and private
respondents are merely sobrinos of the fiduciary or first heir.
Meaning of one degree apart
82. Ramirez v Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704 SERNEO
FACTS:
Jose Ramirez, a Filipino, died in Spain, with only his widow, Marcelle Ramirez, French, as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI. In the project partition, the property was
divided into two parts: one to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; the other free portion to his
grandnephews, Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, 1/3 of the usufruct of the free portion was
given to the widow and the 2/3 to Wanda Wrobleski, an Austrian.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition. One of their contentions is that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution is valid.
RULING: YES. The vulgar substitution is valid. Dying before the testator is not the only case where a
vulgar substitution can be made for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as
provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their
claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related
to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary
substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly
adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one
tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the
first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the
word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed
this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one
degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates
that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first
heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a
parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or
degree from the fiduciary.
 (b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the
testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the
naked owners."
Duty to preserve and to transmit
83. Crisologo v Singson, 4 SCRA 491) SERNEO
Facts: An action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and
Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located a Plaridel St.,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the improvements existing
thereon. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and
that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly
probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition
submitted to, and approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding No. 453;
that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendant refused to accede
thereto, thus compelling them to bring action.
Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and
not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled
to demand partition thereof.
Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson appealed. At the time of the
execution of the will, the nearest living relatives of the orig owner were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel
and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all
surnamed Florentino.
ISSUE: Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion vulgar or for
sustitucion fideicomisaria?
RULING: SUSTITUCION VULGAR. The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may
not only designate heirs who’ll succeed him, but also substitutes in the event that said heirs don’t
accept or are in no position to accept inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him. Testator may also
bequeath his properties to particular person w/ obligation, on part of latter, to deliver the same to
another, totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular event.
The particular testamentary clause provides for substitution of heir in this manner:
upon death of Consolacion Florentino, whether before or after that of testatrix, property
bequeathed to her shall be delivered or shall belong in equal parts to testatrix's three
brothers, Evaristo, Manuel, Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of
Consolacion Florentino.
If this created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result would be that Consolacion
Florentino, upon death of testatrix, became owner of one undivided half of the property, but if
it provided for sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than
usufructuary rights over same half. In the former, she would be entitled to partition, but not in the
latter. As Manresa says, if fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of property bequeathed by will, but
mere usufructuary rights until time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it’s
obvious that nude ownership over property, upon death of testatrix, passed to and was acquired by
another person, and the person cannot be other than the fideicomisario.
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be
clearly imposed upon first heir to preserve & transmit to another the whole or part of estate
bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon happening of particular event. For this reason, Art
785 of old Civil Code provides that fideicommissary substitution has no effect unless made
expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon first heir the absolute obligation
to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir.
The substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of fideicommissary
kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall
only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof
being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon
appellee's death, whether before or after that of testatrix, her share shall belong to the brothers of the
testatrix.
Prohibition to Alienate Property (Art. 870;
84. Rodriguez v CA, 27 SCRA 546) SERNEO
FACTS: Doña Margarita Rodriguez left a last will and testament leaving no compulsory
heirs or forced heirs and, consequently was free to dispose of her properties even to strangers at will
as provided in her will. The testatrix made letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the
executors under the will. The said last will and testament was legalized by virtue of the resolution or
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila without the appellant’s opposition in, hence the extrinsic
validity of the will was substantially not in question. The executor also presented a project of partition
and the same was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila, again without the opposition of
the appellants. Hence, the intrinsic validity of the will could never be again questioned.
the trust created by the testatrix was then objected to by private respondents, who claimed
to be first cousins of the deceased. Such an objection was overruled by the lower court which granted
letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the will. Such an order of the lower
court was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, which, in the original decision affirmed the
action taken by the Court of First Instance.
The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents resulted in a resolution which
set aside its previous decision and modified the judgment appealed from insofar as the validity of the
provision of clause 10 of the will creating the trusteeship was concerned. The disputed clause reads
thus:
"Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang ‘generator’ at
automobile) hindi maisasanla o maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pag-aaring nasa
Quezon Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang pondo sa gagamitin sa
ipagpapaigi or ipagpapagawa ng panibago at alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng
panahon"
The Court of Appeals held that the above "perpetual prohibition to alienate" the property
mentioned, constitutes a clear violation of Article 867 and Article 870 of the Civil Code. The trust in
question is then a nullity for being in violation of the aforestated rules. There being then no institution
of heirs as regards the properties covered by the trust, the Court of Appeals held that "there should
be intestate succession concerning the same, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to
inherit the properties in accordance with the law on intestacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trust in question should be annulled as being in violation of the
rules against perpetuities and the limitation on the prohibition for the alienation of the
property left by the deceased.
RULING: No. It does not admit of doubt that in the disputed clause the testatrix did make
clear her purpose not to mortgage or to sell forevermore (kailan man) certain properties left by her.
There would seem then some justification for the Court of Appeals in the challenged resolution to
deny force and effect to such a wish considering that "a perpetual prohibition to alienate" is by the
Civil Code forbidden. The more controlling provision, however, as already made mention of is
supplied by Article 870. Its terms are clear: "The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the
estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks categorically. What is
declared void is the testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year
period. In the interim, such a provision does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be
stricken down. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given effect.
This is so even if there could be an element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is
concerned. In the language of a Civil Code provision: "If a testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be
operative shall be preferred.
Respect for the will of a testator as expressed in his last testamentary disposition,
constitutes the principal basis of the rules which the law prescribes for the correct interpretation of all
of the clauses of the will; the words and provisions therein written must be plainly construed in order
to avoid a violation of his intentions and real purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly
stated must be respected and complied with as an inviolable law among the parties in interest.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioners could not challenge the
provision in question. It had no right to vindicate. Such a right may never arise. The twenty-
year period is still with us. What would transpire thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable
future, beyond the power of mere mortals to foretell. At any rate, We cannot anticipate. Nor
should We. We do not possess the power either of conferring a cause of action to a party
when, under the circumstances disclosed, it had none.

Modal Institution (Art. 882)

85. Rabadilla v Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522 SERNEO
Facts: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted
as a devisee of a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly probated before the then CFI of
Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the same Codicil, the subject land was transferred to the deceased,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the Transfer Certificate of Title thereto was issued in his name.Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia
and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Respondent brought a complaintbefore the RTC in Bacolod City, against the above-
mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint
alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.
The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the subject land to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, because it is alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of
the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains
to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja
had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to
deliver the fruits of the devised land.

Issue: WON the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution.

RULING: YES. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the
New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon,
it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the
herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is
evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.