G.R. No.

200465, April 20, 2015

JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO, Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution2 dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 14 October 2008 and 12 February 2009
of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be REMANDED to Branch
40 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for further appropriate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.3
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).4 The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her
reads:
That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the
Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
and as such, have a complete control and exclusively manage the entire business of A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
acquires, in violation of her duty as such and the confidence reposed on her, personal interest or equity
adverse to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then and there entering
into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew, the
sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should
have accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the damage and
prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had entered into an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink products at the same school. By virtue of a
Memorandum of Agreement between the school and the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the school
principal, directed petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson. Instead,
petitioner claimed that the principal had no business and authority to require her to produce financial
statements, and that the said reports had been posted on the school bulletin board.

The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the financial reports of the Cooperative.
The committee was composed of Aurora Catabona (Chairperson), Monica Nealiga (member), with Noemi
Olazo (Chairperson-auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who later executed their respective affidavits in
support of the charge against petitioner. Based on the documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the
records of actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements prepared by petitioner, the audit
committee found that petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3) years in the
following amounts: School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 - P54,008.00; S.Y. 1999-2000 - P40,503.00; and S.Y.
2000-2001 - P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly
misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so. Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board Resolution
authorizing the filing of criminal charges against petitioner.

After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by
way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged
(Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally
liable.

On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, thus:
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offense or predicated thereon, and considering that violation of [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be
punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not
less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, this Court (RTC) has
no jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant case which properly pertains to the first level
courts.cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds that it has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no jurisdiction, further
discussions over the defense' allegation that there was a violation of the principle of primary jurisdiction
and that the private complainants used a falsified resolution to purposely empower them to file the instant
case become moot and academic.

IT IS SO ORDERED.6
On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private prosecutor's motion for a reconsideration
of the order of dismissal.7 The RTC held:
Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal sanctions/liability for violation of acts or
omission prescribed therein. If ever, the liability is only for damages and for double the profits which
otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative. It is a fundamental rule in law that an act or omission is
not a crime unless there is a law making it so and providing a penalty therefor. Otherwise put, the facts
charged in the information do not charge an offense. And even assuming arguendo that they do constitute
an offense, the penalty therefor is that provided under paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of R.A. [6938] which is
"imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court," which falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the first, not the second level court.

Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the prosecution is the undisputed fact that
before this case was filed in Court, conciliation/mediation process for the amicable settlement of the dispute
was not availed of by the private complainants who are all members (directors) of the A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in accordance with the by-laws of the Cooperative and the
Cooperative Code itself and the Guidelines for the Implementation of Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative
dispute (Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The dispute involving the parties is certainly a dispute
and issue between and among directors, officers or members of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is governed by the Guidelines.

Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until the Office of the President as outlined in
the Cooperative Code and in its implementing rules not having been resorted to by the complainants, the
rule on primary jurisdiction was violated and this Court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and determine the
present case.8
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.

On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders dated
October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and remanded the case records to the RTC for further
proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its decision. 9

Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, raising the
following issues:
1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S DECISION OF DISMISSAL, HAS THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAN, UNAMBIGUOUS
AND CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124 OF RA-6938 IN
REFERENCE TO THE PENAL SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF [SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE
[CODE], RA-6938 AND ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE DERIVED FROM ITS INTERPRETATION
OF A SUPPOSED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WHICH INTERPRETATION, EVEN SUBJECT
PETITIONER TO A HIGHER PENALTY OF 5 YEARS TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY THAT
TFIE RTC SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE AND USED IT AS A GROUND TO REVERSE
THE DECISION OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE OTHER GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR
THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGE OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF [SECTION] 46 OF
RA-6938, (COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON PRIMARY
JURISDICTION - EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE COOPERATIVE LEVEL
BEFORE GOING TO COURT.

3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE THAT DISMISSAL
OF THE CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL, AND THE
DISMISSAL IS NOT APPEALABLE.

4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER
PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.

5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW AND AMENDED COOPERATIVE

CODE RA-9520 COULD POSSIBLE APPLY TO THIS CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE
OF EXPOSE (SIC) FACTO LAW.]10

The petition has no merit.

Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which the OSG points out
as the proper remedy to assail the CA decision.

Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because the assailed CA decision is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits that the Court ordered the exclusion of the CA as one of
the party respondents, and considered the petition as one filed under Rule 45, since the focal issue raised
in the petition is a question of law calling for an interpretation of Sections 46 and 124 of RA 6938, in
relation to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
RA 7691. She adds that had she chosen to file an appeal by certiorari, the Court would be faced with the
same question of law.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.11 In Mercado v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court had again stressed the distinction
between the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65, to wit:
xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, decisions,
final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under
Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule,
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken
under Rule 45. xxx.13
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,14 the Court explained
that one of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse
of discretion. It is also well settled that a party cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules
of Court because said procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct applications. The
remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and the original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, when petitioner adopts an improper remedy, petition may be
dismissed outright.

However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as when the petition before it is clearly
meritorious and filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65.15 In accordance with the liberal spirit which
pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court may treat the petition as having been
filed under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable reasons were proffered by petitioner for a more liberal interpretation
of procedural rules. Although it was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65, the petition at bench lacks
substantive merit and raises only questions of law which should have been duly made in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.16

On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over petitioner's criminal case for violation of Section
46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of RA 6938, the Court affirms the CA ruling
that it is the RTC, not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction over her case.

In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information,
in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty
provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. 17 Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine.

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise.
xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine, fall under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended:

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter
be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of RA 6938
provides only for a civil liability but not a criminal sanction, hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction over her
criminal case which is punishable under paragraph 4 of Section 124:

Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are hereby
prohibited
(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is imposed shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than
One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members),
Section 47 (Compensation) and Section 124 (Penal Provisions) of RA 6938, are plain, unambiguous, and
categorical. She submits that statutory construction of such clear provisions, especially if prejudicial to her
rights as an accused and would subject her to higher penalty, should not be allowed.

On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner's case pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938:
(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Section 47 (liability of
directors, officers and committee members), Section 50 (disloyalty of a director) and Section 51 (illegal
use of confidential information) shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both
at the court's discretion; (Emphasis supplied)
The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a clerical error because the "liability
of directors, officers and committee members" is undisputedly governed by Section 46 of RA 6938, while
Section 47 thereof deals with the compensation of directors, officers and employees, to wit:

Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and committee
members, who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or pecuniary
interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee member shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members and other persons.

When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty, any
interest or equity adverse to the cooperative in respect to any matter which has been reposed in him in
confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the cooperative, be liable for damages and for double the profits which
otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.

Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision in the by-laws fixing their compensation,
the directors shall not receive any compensation except for reasonable per diem: Provided, That any
compensation other than per diems may be granted to directors by a majority vote of the members with
voting rights at a regular or special general assembly meeting specifically called for the purpose: Provided
further, that no additional compensation other than per diems shall be paid during the first year of existence
of any cooperative.

The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any compelling reason to warrant a
departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on why the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction over her criminal
case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, thus:

The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistakes or
misprints which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat
or impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole
enactment and no specific provision is abrogated. To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the
nullification of the statute and give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court to give a statute
a sensible construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or absurdity. It is its
duty to arrive at the legislative intent and in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule under which it
must be held without variance or shadow of turning the legislature intended to make a typographical error,
the result of which would be to make nonsense of the act, and not to carry out the legislative scheme, but
to destroy it.

xxxx

Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec] 124, paragraph 4, as the trial court did,
is necessary and therefore, warranted the dismissal of the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. To reiterate,
[Sec] 46 of the Code, entitled "Liability of Directors, Officers, and Committee Members," provides for
violations under which the said officers could be held liable for, and the corresponding liability for damages
and profits from the said violations. Since the said [section] does not provide for penal sanction, an
application of [Sec] 124, paragraph 3 should follow as the said provision evidently refers to the penal
sanction on erring directors, officers and committee members. It would make no sense if we were to
follow what clearly appears to be a clerical error, that is, applying [Sec] 124, paragraph 4 instead, just
because paragraph 3 of the same [section] refers to [Sec] 47, which upon examination of the Code provides
for the "Compensation" of the directors, officers and other employees of the cooperative.

We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section] 124 (3) should refer to "[Section] 46 (Liability
of Directors, Officers and Committee Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a Director) and [Section] 51
(Illegal use of confidential information)." Following this interpretation, violation of [Sec] 46, therefore, is
punishable by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than
five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion, which under B.P. Blg. 129,
shall be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.18
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in Section 124 (3) of RA 6938 on
the liability of directors, officers and committee members, has been recognized and duly corrected when
the legislature enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the Cooperative Code of the Philippines to be
known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008." Pertinent portions of the corrected provision read:

ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and committee
members, who are willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or pecuniary
interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee members shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members, and other persons.

xxxx

ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are hereby
prohibited.
xxxx

(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Article 45 on the Liability of
Directors, Officers and Committee Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a Director, and Article 49 on
the Illegal Use of Confidential Information shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or
imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion;
[Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when the Cooperative filed a
criminal case against petitioner without undergoing conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the
Cooperative Code and the By-laws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or
mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner,
because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative dispute and should have been
resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not an intra-cooperative dispute.
Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among members of the same cooperative. The
instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The
Board Resolution authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board of Directors, for and in behalf
of the Cooperative, is proof that this is not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the jurisdiction of the
regular court.19
Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability, and her role in the prosecution
of the offense is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. 20 In petitioner's criminal case for violation
of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real offended party, while the Cooperative and its members are
mere private complainants and witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly,
such criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is not one arising between
or among members of the same cooperative.

On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal,
hence, final and unappealable, the Court rules in the negative.

In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court stressed that demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence
operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested
its case" and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.23
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not
decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal
does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court.24 As aptly noted by the CA:
The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the case against her is an acquittal.
It should be emphasized' that "acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal
does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the
proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show
that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information
is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."25
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against double jeopardy due to
its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds the CA
in ruling that the dismissal having been granted upon petitioner's instance, double jeopardy did not attach,
thus:
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this appeal. It
must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer to
evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.

The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has
been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the
accused.

Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's
consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence. As correctly argued
by the People, where the dismissal was ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is deemed
to have waived his protection against doubly jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon
motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach.26
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the prosecution of her case before the RTC
for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res judicata because
the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution27 dated August 13, 2012, granted her demurrer to evidence
and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-
CR.28 In support of her flawed argument, petitioner points out that the private complainants [officers and
directors of the Cooperative] and the subject matter [unreported sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of
both cases are the same, and that the case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually and necessarily
included in the case for falsification of private documents.

At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.29 At
any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related to double jeopardy which embrace's a prohibition
against being tried for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper.
There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense
as in the first.31 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before
a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.32

In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double jeopardy are present in view
of the MeTC Resolution33 dated August 13, 2012 which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and
acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.
Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite of double jeopardy — a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first — is present. Such question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is
addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are
set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offense involved. 34

Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in the information for Section
46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a crime for falsification of private document
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The test to determine whether an offense
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided under Section 5, Rule .120 of the
Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for falsification of private document
in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 01-
197750, the Court holds that the first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not necessarily include
and is not necessarily included in the second offense.

The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand, alleged that petitioner, being then
the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, as part of her duty to prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year 1999-
2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola products in violation of Article 172 (2) 35 of the RPC. The
elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; 36(2) that the
falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third
party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other hand, that being then such
officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to it,
in violation of her duty and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with Coca-Cola
in her own personal capacity, knowing fully well that the sales profits of such products should have accrued
to the Cooperative. The essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the offender
is a director, officer or committee member; and (2) that the offender willfully and lcnowingly (a) votes for or
assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors,
officers or committee member.

Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification of
private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged
in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily include
or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to attach—a second jeopardy
is for the same offense as in the first—is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also
have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part
of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special, law enacting
it.

Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held:

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense
or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under
the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.38

Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct offenses as discussed above—
the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the
Cooperative Code (RA 6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes
as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed
against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against
one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other. 39

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363, are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 182926 June 22, 2015

ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, or the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez,
DKT PHILS., INC., represented by ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated
August 28, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR.
SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated September 21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No. 0356.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc.,
represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still its
Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses in the
amount of ₱1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of ₱810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed
reimbursement for it.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The accusatory portion
of the Information filed against her reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a
juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729
of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from
EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (₱810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(₱1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines,
Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of 1,810.00 to
her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provision of Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article 171, No. 6 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005. 4

On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment5 on the ground that none of the
essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the
MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue.

In the Order dated November 2,2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case for
arraignment, the decretal portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that accused has already submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by filing cash bond for their respective temporary liberty, set this
case for ARRAIGNMENT on November 22, 2005, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning at the Session Hall, 10th
MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.

The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on November 09, 2005, is hereby set aside.

SO ORDERED.6

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied it in a
Resolution7dated January 24, 2006.

Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order and January
24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis
or merit.9On Navaja's contention that the case for falsification of private document against her was filed
with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to wrong venue, hence, the RTC ruled:

The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed out by the MCTC, the improper venue
was already resolved squarely by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that "there are sufficient
evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna".

This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly
Lavaro who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her
presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms.
Lavaro's statement "describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The
borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that
the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself."

In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically states
that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made
in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was
done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention would necessarily result in a "neither here no there"
situation.10

Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.

In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in toto the
September 21, 2006 RTC Order.

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution dated May 7, 2008.
Aggrieved, she filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues: I. THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.

i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of falsification of a private document was
committed in Jagna, Bohol.

ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed or established from the alleged
acts of the petitioner on a totally different and unrelated time and occasion.

iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for the protection of the rights of the
accused and to prevent undue harassment and oppression.

II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF FILING A

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING IMPROPER VENUE IN THE INSTANT
CASE.

III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE FILING OF A

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH.11

The petition lacks merit.

On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over her case for
falsification of a private document, Navaja argues that not one of the three (3) essential elements 12 of such
crime was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol. She insists that there is no showing in the
Information, or even in the complaint-affidavit and the annexes thereto that the crime of falsification of a
private document was committed or consummated in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the allegation in the
complaint-affidavit that the subject receipt was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol, cannot determine
the venue because the place of issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said crime. It was also
impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged request for
reimbursement under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4, 2003, was
prepared and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu City, while the subject receipt was issued on October
2, 2003 by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of the issuance of the subject
receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, hence, there is no crime of falsification of
private document to speak of. She explains that any damage that private respondent could have suffered
would only occur when it pays the request for reimbursement in the Travel Expense Report submitted on
October 6, 2003, but not before that date, much less at time of the issuance of the said receipt.

Navaja's arguments are misplaced.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. 13 This principle was explained by the Court
in Foz, Jr. v. People,14 thus:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore,
the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.15

In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction
over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from
its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,16 the Court said that both provisions categorically place the
venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also
where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually falsified,
to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the falsified
document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended.17

Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the case because
not one of the essential elements of falsification of private document was committed within its jurisdiction,
the allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make out a prima faciecase that such crime
was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the Information clearly alleged that she committed such crime
thereat, to wit:

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a
juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729
of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from
EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (₱810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(₱1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines,
Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of 1,810.00 to
her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during trial.
xxx18 Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that the she committed the said
crime in Jagna, Bohol, viz:

"4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the amount of Php1,810.00 she supposedly incurred
at Garden's Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02 October 2003 she sent to the DKT
office in Metro Manila is hereto attached as Annex "C".

5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in Bohol, it was found that the actual
amount she incurred at Garden's (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the duplicate original official
receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the cashier of Garden's Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as
Annex "D".

6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon receiving it with the intent of causing damage to
DKT."19

Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information and not by the result of proof 20, the Court holds that Navaja's case for falsification of private
document falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.

Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol,
cannot be sustained at this point where the prosecution has yet to present evidence to prove the material
allegations of the charge against her, which include the place where the subject receipt was falsified.
However, given that the defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue may be raised at any stage
of the proceeding, the Court stresses that if the evidence adduced during the trial would show that the crime
was indeed committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC should dismiss the case based on such
ground.

On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of because at the time
of the issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, the Court
sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need not be present, as Article 172 (2) 21 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, states that mere intent to cause such damage is sufficient.22

Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor as to the
sworn statement of a certain Cheryl Labarro23 for purposes of determining venue was misplaced, as her
sworn statement pertains to an incident in Miravilla Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate
and distinct from the facts material to the case. She adds that the CA's reliance on the said statement in
upholding the venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.24 She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that the actions of the accused on
a different occasion maybe used to confer venue in another case, since venue must be determined solely
and exclusively on the facts obtaining in the instant case and cannot be inferred or presumed from other
collateral allegations.
The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the factual issue of whether
the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,25 the Court held:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of
fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set
of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on
a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.

Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City, is a
question of fact. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and, subject
to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
parties during trial.26In certain exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve
factual issues, viz:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are
not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.27

Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.

It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry
even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings
are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.28 In this case, the CA, the RTC and the MCTC all agree that the issue of improper
venue was already resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that "there are sufficient
evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna." 29 The Court perceives no compelling
reason to disturb such factual finding.

Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor
without specifying the factual and legal bases of its resolution, the Court finds that the RTC had squarely
addressed such issue as follows:

This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly
Lavaro who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her
presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms.
Lavaro's statement "describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The
borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that
the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself."

In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically states
that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made
in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was
done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention would necessarily result in a "neither here no there"
situation.30

On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's 31 aforesaid statement in upholding the venue of
the case violates Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,32 the Court holds that such evidentiary rule
has no bearing in determining the place where the crime was committed for purposes of filing a criminal
information which merely requires the existence of probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., 33 the Court
expounded on the concept of probable cause in this wise:

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed by the suspects.1âwphi1 It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction.34

Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed liberally in favor her favor as the
accused, and strictly against private respondent, given its purpose of preventing harassment and
inconvenience by compelling the accused to appear in a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed. Yet, private respondent willfully chose to prosecute separately the other cases for
falsification of private document against her in different jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City, Bacolod City, Iloilo
City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to harass and drain her financial resources, when all these criminal cases,
involving minimal amounts of actual damages,35 should have been filed in one(1) criminal jurisdiction to
avoid multiplicity of actions.
The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound ruling thereon:

The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed against her should be filed in one jurisdiction
would be a blatant violation of the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a criminal case other than where
the offense was allegedly committed.

In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have been committed in different venues, then
it is just unfortunate that whatever complaints have to be filed, will have to filed in those different venues.
To do otherwise would be procedurally fatal.36

To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases
is an essential element of jurisdiction.37 Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not
be done in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for
any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that as it may, Section 5
(4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a change of venue
or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are serious and weighty
reasons present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial
trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.38 That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification in different jurisdictions, which
unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway places can hardly be
considered as compelling reason which would prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.

Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases she allegedly
committed in different jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate filing of cases is
only consistent with the principles that there are as many acts of falsification as there are documents
falsified39 and that the venue of such cases is where the document was actually falsified 40.

The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.

On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave procedural error in filing a petition for
certiorari from the denial of her motion to quash. She posits that venue is an element of the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of a criminal proceeding, and that lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be interposed at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, even if a party fails to file a motion to quash,
the accused may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on, and such objection may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal.

On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari
to question the denial of a motion to quash in cases where grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or when the lower court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. She claims that not only
did the lower court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash, but there is likewise
the issue of improper venue that need to be settled with finality and dispatch. In support of her assertion,
she cites a ruling41 that when the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court
should dismiss the case, instead of ordering its transfer.

Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar42 where the Court
reiterated the fundamental principle that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and, therefore,
not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari, thus:

In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that "a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an
adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue
with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the
manner authorized by law."
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order in the following circumstances:

(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion;

(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief;

(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;

(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and

(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch
in the consideration thereof.43

As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja failed to prove
that any of the said special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse of discretion she
imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly
denied her motion to quash.

Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be discussed further, as they are properly
resolved in due course of the proceedings in the instant case before the MCTC and, when an unfavorable
verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 28, 2007 and
the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 197582 June 29, 2015

JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal application of procedural rules to correct the penalty imposed
in the Decision1dated January 14, 2009 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67,
in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which had already attained finality in view of petitioner's failure to
timely file an appeal.

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Petitioner obtained a cash loan . from respondent Matrix Finance Corporation. As partial payment for her
loan, petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863 to 0032868. The six checks have a
uniform face value of ₱6,667.00 each.
Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the drawee bank for payment. However,
all the checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a closed account.

Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the payment of the face value of the
dishonored checks culminated in her indictment for six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP
22). The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174, and were raffled off to Branch 67,
MeTC of Makati.

In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the issuance
of the six rubber checks. For each count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of
₱6,667.00, the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six consolidated cases was computed in the total amount of
₱40,002.00. The fallo of the decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S. Sumbilla GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For each count, she is sentenced to pay n. fine
of ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She is likewise ORDERED to
indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 12% annual
legal interest from September 21, 2002 until full payment.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)

Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration 3 before the MeTC.
The Motion was denied in the Order4 dated April 17, 2009 being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure. The MeTC further noted that the prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner will not suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal.

Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for having been filed beyond the 15-
day reglementary period.

With the denial5 of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying her appeal, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the Rules which was docketed as SCA No. 09-1125 and raffled off to Branch
61, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by
petitioner, the RTC dismissed7 the petition for certiorari. The Motion for Reconsideration8 filed by petitioner
met the same fate of dismissal.9

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review 10 under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. The CA, however, ruled that an ordinary appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court is the correct remedy under the circumstances because the RTC rendered the decision in the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.11

On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011 Resolution 12 of the CA denying her Motion
for Reconsideration,13 petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file the instant petition. 14

On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari 15 within the period of extension
granted in our Resolution16 dated September 7, 2011. She ascribed to the CA a sole error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON
TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE DUTY OF GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON THE
SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE A CLEAR
PRESENCE OF SUCH VIOLATION OF LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN HER PETITION WHICH
COULD HAVE MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER COURT.17

Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court instead of an ordinary appeal before the CA. She also fully grasped19 the effects of her erroneous
filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to challenge the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of six counts of
violation of BP 22. Knowing that her conviction had already attained finality, petitioner seeks the relaxation
of the rules of procedure so that the alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC can be modified to
make it in accord with existing law and jurisprudence.

Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere statutory privilege can only be exercised in
accordance with the rules, and the lost appeal cannot be resurrected through the present remedial recourse
of a petition for review on certiorari.

The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14,
2009, which is already final and executory, may still be modified.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 321169
to 321174 rendered by the MeTC, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of
BP 22. For every count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, petitioner
was meted a penalty of fine of PS0,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She
assails the penalty for being out of the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22, and the
subsidiary imprisonment to be violative of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001, and the
holdings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals.20 Petitioner asserted that the maximum penalty of fine that can be
imposed against her in each count of violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value of the
dishonored check only or ₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for each count is thus excessive. She further
implied that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment contravened Section 20 of Article III of the
Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt.

Section 1 of BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an accused found criminally
liable for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; or (2) a
fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, and shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00; or
(3) both such fine and imprisonment. The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive
(fine and imprisonment) penalty pertains to the court.

If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the amount of the face value of the rubber
check which in no case should exceed ₱200,000.00.
Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is ₱6,667.00. Under Section 1 of BP 22, the
maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on petitioner is only 1!13,334.00, or the amount double the
face value of each check. Indubitably, the MeTC meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond the
maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. The fine of ₱80,000.00 is more than 11 times the
amount of the face value of each check that was dishonored.

Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00), the MeTC incorrectly computed the
amount of fine using the total face value of the six checks (₱40,002.00). The same error occurred in
Abarquez v. Court of Appeals,21 where we modified the penalty of fine imposed in one of the consolidated
cases therein (Criminal Case No. D-8137) to only double the amount of the face value of the subject check.

Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and executory after petitioner failed
to timely file a Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.22 Upon finality of the judgment, the Court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.23

Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has the power and
prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires
it.24 After all, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of
the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the
latter,25 as specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.

Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of substantial justice is at
stake and where special and compelling reasons called for such actions. 26 In Barnes v. Judge Padilla,27 we
declared as follows:

x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly
or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the
case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself had already declared to be final.

The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison 28 when the
Court corrected the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence imposed on the accused
which exceeded the period of the imposable penalty. The correction was made in the interest of justice and
only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else. 29

Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and inherent power of the Court to correct
the erroneous penalties meted on the accused in a final and executory judgments, and make it conform to
the penalty prescribed by law.
The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were the reasons anchored upon in
Estrada v. People32 in ruling that it is befitting to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner even though the
notice of appeal was belatedly filed.

In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is outside the range of the penalty
prescribed by law was duly corrected even if it was already final on the ground of substantial justice, thus:

In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner.1awp++i1 If his
penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would be made
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum,
to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by
law. Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of
2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum should only be anywhere
between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial
justice demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the court to
suspend its own [R]ules or except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require. x x x Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from
the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice." Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving
the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof." After all, the Court's "primordial and most
important duty is to render justice x x x."34 All the accused in Almuete v. People,35 People v. Barro,36Estrada
v. People,37 and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison, 38 failed to perfect their appeal on their
respective judgments of conviction, but the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the
finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is, thus,
no reason to deprive the petitioner in the present case of the relief afforded the accused in the cited cases.
Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the
maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was
convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess. 39

Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22. Moreover,
since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the fine or one day for each
amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition
of judgment of conviction by the trial court,40 if petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence.
Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be accordingly corrected within
the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the penalty of fine of ₱80,000.00 meted
on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 for each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to
double the face value of each rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00 only.

Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 41 and Administrative Circular No. 12-200042 that
supposedly limited to fine the imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and without any subsidiary
imprisonment, suffice it to quote the clarifications in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on
February 14, 2001:

x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to

1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Big. 22; and

2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty of violating
the provisions of B. P Big. 2 2, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering
that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the
imposition of penalties for violations of B. P Big. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary
imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the accused's inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in
B.P. Big. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P.
Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should
be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide
that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be
deemed a hindrance.

It is, therefore, understood that

1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations
of B.P Big. 22;

xxxx

3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.

x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)

In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which
proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was already settled in the negative in
Lozano v. Martinez.44Pertinent portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read:

Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? x x x

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.1âwphi1 It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed
by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

xxxx

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. 45 (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.

Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Big. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (₱13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant
Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from September
21, 2002 until full payment.
No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized

representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3,
Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER
DOES" Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August
15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and
prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate
and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized
under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a
clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.1

According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the
facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the following:

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell
personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17,
2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled,
took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No.
WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a
Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly
removed with a piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping
fee of ₱500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.

In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo
Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City,
herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp
on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then
considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered
immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and
carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is ₱26,250.00. According to
complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were not paid by the respondents. 2

The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three
(3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint
was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A preliminary investigation
took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell
president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion
in I.S. No. 2003-1935.

In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent
Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp
restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was
an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its
clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with
him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell. 4

In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City
Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against
the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:

We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The
elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases,
thereby negating the existence of the crime.

xxxx

We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels
of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21
of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions
of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey
Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was
still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in
both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them in Court. 6

Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated
July 25, 2003, stating:

That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted
design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp
then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging
to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation
of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell
Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth ₱26,250.00 and other consequential
damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW,

San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.7

The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel
Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2, 2004. The
Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds:
extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that
charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.

In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:

1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.

2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
prescription of the crime.

3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."

4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003.
5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this
Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the
offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already
extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.9

In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the
cases.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004
Order11 to argue among other points that:

6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of
offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the
Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however,
filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period. 12

Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.

The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting
respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:

For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for
the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.

These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City
Ordinances.

Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R.
No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).

In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act
No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY
SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL
BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that
the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against
the private respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the
Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section
1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:

x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with
the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states
that "the institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense
charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."17

Petitioner contended further that:

the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the
criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the
criminal action in these cases had prescribed.

xxxx

The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged
are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it
was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these
criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in
any other way.

Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not
apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the
complaint should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary
Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance
and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information."18

Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.

In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion.
They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the
Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period
commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months
after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003,
the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.

In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge
Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases
of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month
prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-
2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of
the respondents and upheld the respondent judge’s Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution
dated April 16, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.

Hence, this Petition.

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against
respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."

Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a
municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months,
filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is
because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint
shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.

In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases
based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their
Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged
with more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that
petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of
the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge
Santiago23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense
and not the crime itself.

In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February
10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also
maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary
investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons
aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition"26 before the court.

The Petition is denied.

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended,
is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal
ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any
other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.

The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the
same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

xxxx

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either
by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities,
such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de
officio.

The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:

SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that
the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting
for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities.
An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United
States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963
of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct
when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts
and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint
was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez
on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations
of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation
of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129,
vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years
and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly
in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants
to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General
that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section
1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there
be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again
yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases
is a substantive right.30

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then
files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People
v. Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are
concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of
Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint
before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the
filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings
by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the
original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the
period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had
two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had
already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of
the case against respondents. According to the Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service
Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:

SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by
the prosecutor signing the same.

The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –

a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;

b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof;

c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and

d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:

SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the
crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential element
of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election Code which punishes the
carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g.,
the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."

Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:

SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:

a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office
of the Ombudsman; or
 b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed cannot try the case on its merits.

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.

xxxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted
only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1âwphi1

Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and established
Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for
particular regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of
the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur,
La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.

The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the
Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1âwphi1

The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal
of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances
and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll
the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the
applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.

The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem
here sought to be corrected.33

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs.
People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."

The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and
89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED. 3

Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an
aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos
(₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the
Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the
pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal
proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the
RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00
and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of ₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of
₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included
in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against
respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October
2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC,
Branch 218, Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5
October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court
although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded
before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore,
not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that
started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153. 4

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review 5 on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.

In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.

On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private
complainant to comment on the petition.

In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for
violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.

In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the
[respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the
five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section
1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or
information against the petitioner before the proper court.

The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having
been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had
therefore, clearly prescribed.

xxx

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, as amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the filing of the complaint or information
with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date
the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of
Act 3326, as amended.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section
2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and
special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes 8 likewise applies to special
laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.9

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1âwphi1 According to the OSG, while
it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23
November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of
criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the
period of prescription of the offense charged.10 It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private
complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this
Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.11 that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying
on Zaldivia,12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid
ruling.

Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with
the Fiscal’s Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still
within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in
accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be
dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified
true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly
fatal to the cause of the petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office
did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of
a special law.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises.
She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal
Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 14 and Section 1, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her
is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326,
as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal
ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.

The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of
BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original
or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted
by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified
true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service
undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense
committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin," as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for
more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days
but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance
with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution
of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint
or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case
of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s
Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of
merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with
respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.18 is not controlling
in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings
for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even ruled that investigations
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the
Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours with the instant case,
this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they
had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights
and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein
respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace
period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases
reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed
a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings
on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City
Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she
predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings
only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account
of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of
the offender is to file the requisite complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.

G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as
Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary
of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person
in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or
deny such letter-request or motion.

The Case

This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on June 27,
2011 in Civil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing
petitioner’s petition for mandamus.2

Antecedents

History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were
massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal
suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest
proceedings were conducted against petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler)
Airport Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering
more than a hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.3
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special
Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.

On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations
for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. 4 On December 1, 2009, 25
informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region,
in Cotabato City.5

On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno
requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro
Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 6 On December 8, 2009, the
Court granted the request for the transfer of venue. 7 However, on December 9, 2009, but prior to the
transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing
of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC. 8 Later
on, additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211,
the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court. 9

The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he was
arraigned on January 5, 2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12

In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre.13 It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of
February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both
dated December 7, 2009.14

On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. 15 On
September 7, 2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,16 wherein Dalandag was listed as one
of the Prosecution witnesses.17

On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima
and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the
informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre
through his two sworn declarations.18 Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on October 22,
201019 and November 2, 2010.20

By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.

Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil
Case No. 10-124777),22 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the
various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.

On January 19, 2011,23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil Case No.
10-124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.

In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 2011 24 and February 18, 2011,25 respondents
questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.

On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, 26 which the RTC in Manila
granted on March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.

Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
On March 21, 2011,27 the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.

On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena.28 Petitioner opposed the motion to quash the
subpoena on April 15, 2011.29 The parties filed other papers, specifically, respondents their reply dated
April 26, 2011;30 petitioner an opposition on May 12, 2011;31 and respondents another reply dated May 20,
2011.32

On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing
the petition for mandamus.34

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE

AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE
MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATION
THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QC
RTC; and,

2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS

PROTECTION PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT
FOR HIS COMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS
MADE THAT HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION.35

The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as
an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power
and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power
to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public
prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. 36

The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is
also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court. 37

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a
sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive
Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception,
however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 38

The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of
discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in
this regard that petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to
be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as
one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion
as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the
complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense
involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a
participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.

The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are,
namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court;
and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).39 These modes
are intended to encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission
to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting
him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.

These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.

Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several
accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the
Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial court
must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a)
there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no
other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony
of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude.

On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:

Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires
to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department,
shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal
Code or its equivalent under special laws;

b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and

f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a
State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition
be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall
prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under both rules
are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the trial
court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the
DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.

A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule
119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of
the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or
refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for
his discharge.40 The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the
exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. 41

While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in
order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial
court,42 such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the
proper administration of justice.43 Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and
the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor should
know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best
qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know
the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case,44 as well as the availability
or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one,
and the like.45

On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge
a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection
Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and
said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to
testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness
be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the
certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge
of the witness.46 The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the
information.47

The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness
since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful
prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981
were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre
was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was
necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his
participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he
later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his
discharge against those now charged for the crimes.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer.
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order
to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to
direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised,48or to compel the retraction or reversal
of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.49

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but
may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that
respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as
petitioner's recourse.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued on
June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.

G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 174764-65

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner
notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related
to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close
associates.

The Case

Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio
T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations) 1 and August 10, 2005
(denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash), 2 alleging that the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act
3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).

The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 28001

That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then
President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s
ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining
Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock
having then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction
Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical
construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project") of the National Power
Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand
E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office and
in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said Burns and
Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct the
Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Criminal Case No. 28002

That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then
President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and golfing partner
of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first
cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family, taking
advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the
National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign
consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from
Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business, transaction, and
application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused
DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and
Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said
PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by
accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled
by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions
and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure
and obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering
and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished
by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed
the motion to quash.6

On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s
favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both
informations.

As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution
denying the motion to quash.8

Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005, 9 but the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second assailed resolution. 10

Issues

Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT SECTION 4,

PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE
THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED JURISDICTION

WITHOUT HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT
THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN

IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE

APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT OF

INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE

OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE ‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS
INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED
ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
ITSDISCRETION.

D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING

TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE
OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11
 Ruling

The petition for certiorari has no merit.

1.Preliminary Considerations

To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled
Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.)
filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against Disini and others.13 The
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-
defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is appropriation of public funds,
plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, 14 as follows:

4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband
of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio
Disini obtained staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear power
plant contract from the Philippine government.

xxxx

13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active
collaboration and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking
undue advantage of their association and influence with the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent
disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:

xxxx

(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which
defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions
from foreign corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges
and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded
to Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously
exorbitant amount that included defendant’s staggering commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed
for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15

Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:

In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG
(G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate
action the records of the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in
certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also parts of the causes of action in the civil
complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been
sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil cases.

Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to
you for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an
impartial investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x

Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner
and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal
complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it
was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to
the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct
the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it
has prejudged the matter. x x x18

xxxx

The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be
impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and
intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be
prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the
petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as
an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such
preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)

It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary
investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the
Court in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,20

with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject of
Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.

2.

Sandiganbayan has exclusive and

original jurisdiction over the offenses charged

Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges
were being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the
offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the
allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved
sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG;
and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer,
he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the
purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially
filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the
appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately
family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.

We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its
jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:

xxxx

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher,
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

xxxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them. x x x x

It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan,
with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in
Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the
ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being
established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.

Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded
through the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and
architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project
(PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer
necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case
No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during
his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or
using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the
PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.

Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 22

applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which
follows:

xxxx

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in
Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to
such public officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection
4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to
and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a private
individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a
public official in the commission of the offenses charged.

3.

The offenses charged in the

informations have not yet prescribed

In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the
time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.23

The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and
presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering
and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to
be awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime
of corruption of public officials.24

The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of
the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted." 25 Under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer
in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act,
he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than
three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of
prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.

As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By
express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses
committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period
was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive period
of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which
was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not
being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the
time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to
accord with People v. Pacificador .

For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to
offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:

Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an
aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his
right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the
"blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute
of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of
action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does
not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord
that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which
became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed,
emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of
the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.

Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein,
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation.
When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet
set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known these crimes committed prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and
conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question
the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31

Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the
time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although
the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest
loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and
conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered
it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of
the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-
known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through
the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the
PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which
partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the
course of official functions.32

Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was
possible prior to 1986.

We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office
of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation. 33 In accordance with Article
91 of the

Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription.
According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are
both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings
for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before"
investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage.
With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control.

The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the
public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription.
Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the
discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman.

The informations were sufficient in form and substance

It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense
charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges
no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may
be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the
essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not
considered.38

The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise,
there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.

The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002
(violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6,
Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the

name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth that
Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with
then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents
to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as President, committed the offense
in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini,
President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do
the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of
causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the
gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.

The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:

1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and

2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under
circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish
the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and
gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts,
President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking
advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances
that would make him liable for direct bribery.39

The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under
circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even
without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential
element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns
& Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.

The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019
is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:

1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;

2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage
from any person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the
government;

3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to
intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.

The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of
Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the
family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and free access to
President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations,
requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the
entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the
PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal relations,
intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for
Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on
January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 164538 August 9, 2010

METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a
compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its
own motion, even though complete reparation [has] been made of the damage suffered by the private
offended party. Since a criminal offense like estafa is committed against the State, the private offended
party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the
crime."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Court
of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision2 dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 and its further
Resolution3 dated July 12, 2004 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. 4

Factual Antecedents

On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. In the affidavit5 of petitioner’s audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was alleged that
the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered
anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client Universal
Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the only voting members of the branch’s
credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to ₱200,000.00; that through the
so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only ₱125,000.00 and actual
maintaining balance of ₱5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling ₱81,652,000.00 6 against
uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area branch; that, consequently,
Universal was able to utilize petitioner’s funds even before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks
expired; that Universal’s withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval
of petitioner’s head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason "Account Closed"; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.

In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and
claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and
daily transactions.

Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement7 whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of
₱50,990,976.278 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations in the
sum of ₱300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the
remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any, on December 31, 2001." 9
Findings of the Prosecutor

Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor
Edad) in her Resolution10 dated July 10, 1997 found petitioner’s evidence insufficient to hold respondents
liable for estafa. According to Prosecutor Edad:

The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the
liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the relations between
the parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the
part of respondents.11

Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the case be dismissed. 12

On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review.13

Ruling of the Department of Justice

On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:

It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa only against its employees
and treat with kid gloves its big time client Universal who was the one who benefited from this transaction
and instead, agreed that it should be paid on installment basis.

To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which will
result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa was committed
in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so
with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal.

Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the ₱53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited with
Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and
the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Further,
no damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal. 14

A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March 1, 2000 by then
Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero.16

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.17

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By Decision18 of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. Citing
jurisprudence19 wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent
the rise of such liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. 20 Hence,
according to the CA, "[j]ust as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase transactions
on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot be made liable
[for] the same transactions."21 The CA added that "[s]ince the dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal
ground, public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to file an information in court."22
Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment23 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) where the
latter, despite being the statutory counsel of public respondent DOJ, agreed with petitioner that the DOJ
erred in dismissing the complaint. It alleged that where novation does not extinguish criminal liability for
estafa neither does restitution negate the offense already committed. 24

Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other responsible
individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause
their inclusion in the information.25 This notwithstanding, however, the CA disposed of the petition as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED. Consequently, the
resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.26

Hence, this instant petition before the Court.

On November 8, 2004, we required27 respondents to file Comment, not a motion to dismiss, on the petition
within 10 days from notice. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment 28 while
respondent Jose C. Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted his Comment 29 on the petition. The Secretary of
Justice failed to file the required comment on the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment and
respondent Rogelio Reynado (Reynado) did not submit any. For which reason, we issued a show cause
order30 on July 19, 2006. Their persistent non-compliance with our directives constrained us to resolve that
they had waived the filing of comment and to impose a fine of ₱1,000.00 on Reynado. Upon submission of
the required memorandum by petitioner and Adraneda, the instant petition was submitted for resolution.

Issues

Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:

1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability.

2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable for the
offense charged.

Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did not
absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the settlement affects
only the civil obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of the respondents. Petitioner
thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing
apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By petitioner’s claim,
citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda,31 the "negotiations pertain [to] and affect only the civil
aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution for the offense already committed." 32

In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and passes on the sole
responsibility to his co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to conceal the pertinent documents being
the head of petitioner’s Port Area branch. Nonetheless, he contends that because of the Debt Settlement
Agreement, they cannot be held liable for estafa.

The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even prayed before the CA to give
due course to the petition contending that DOJ indeed erred in dismissing the complaint for estafa.
Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether the execution of the
Debt Settlement Agreement precluded petitioner from holding respondents liable to stand trial for estafa
under Art. 315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.33

Our Ruling

We find the petition highly meritorious.

Novation not a mode of extinguishing

criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability for estafa not affected by compromise or novation of contract.

Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability."34

In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation
of contract. In Firaza v. People35 and Recuerdo v. People,36 this Court ruled that in a crime of estafa,
reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the accused does not
extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno 37 and in People v.
Ladera38 that "criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a
public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even though
complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party." Similarly in
the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda 39 cited by petitioner, we held that in a crime of
estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount misappropriated, after the commission of the
crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his criminal liability.

Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement entered into
after the commission of the crime does not extinguish accused’s liability for estafa. Neither will the same
bar the prosecution of said crime. Accordingly, in such a situation, as in this case, the complaint for estafa
against respondents should not be dismissed just because petitioner entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement with Universal. Even the OSG arrived at the same conclusion:

Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into between
petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the latter’s liability as
a corporate entity but not the criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa
against petitioner Metrobank. x x x40

Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly glossed over in the body of the
assailed Decision of the CA.

Execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement did not prevent the incipience of criminal liability.

Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the disposition absolving the
respondents from criminal liability because of novation is still erroneous.

Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that
"contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even
if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof."41

In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The intention of the
parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the beneficent provisions of said
agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to the agreement,
respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the crime they committed. It may
do well for respondents to remember that the criminal action commenced by petitioner had its genesis from
the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their positions
as responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a contractual dispute or matters strictly between petitioner
and Universal. This being so, respondents cannot rely on subject settlement agreement to preclude
prosecution of the offense already committed to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent
the incipience of any liability that may arise from the criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the
execution of the agreement between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of
the respondents.

Determination of the probable cause, a function belonging to the public prosecutor; judicial review allowed
where it has been clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.

In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. 42 The Secretary of Justice, however,
may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.

"Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial."43 Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his
discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law."44 Tested against these guidelines, we find that this case falls under the exception
rather than the general rule.

A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edad’s Resolution dated July 10, 1997 readily reveals that
were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed probable cause to indict respondents for
the crime charged. From her own assessment of the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioner’s auditor, her
preliminary finding is that "Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been sufficiently established." 45 Interestingly,
she suddenly changed tack and declared that the agreement altered the relation of the parties and that
novation had set in preventing the incipience of any criminal liability on respondents. In light of the
jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor should not have gone that far and executed an
apparent somersault. Compounding further the error, the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s petition, ruled out
estafa contrary to the findings of the prosecutor. Pertinent portion of the ruling reads:

Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the ₱53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited with
Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and
the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Further,
no damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal.46

The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense
best left to the trial court’s deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To
emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is
"not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only
such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof."47 A "finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged."48 So we held in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals:49
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming the dismissal of
the criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of whether or not it committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In requiring "hard facts and solid
evidence" as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to
stand trial for the crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause – that it is a
reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does
it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more than
"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." Herein, the DOJ reasoned
as if no evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were
teeming; or it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was
adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene committed
the crime/s complained of. In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised its discretion,
amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its resolutions amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists against respondents.
As perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough
to excite her belief that respondents are guilty of the crime complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary
Cuevas50 we had occasion to rule that the "presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."51

Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the sufficiency of evidence on hand,
we do not hesitate to rule in the affirmative. We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may
arise when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.

Non-inclusion of officers of Universal not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.

The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioner’s appeal from the resolution of the prosecutor gave another ground
– failure to implead the officers of Universal. It explained:

To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which will
result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa was committed
in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so
with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal. 521avvphi1

The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge against respondents rests
upon the same evidence used to charge co-accused (officers of Universal) based on the latter’s
conspiratorial participation, the non-inclusion of said co-accused in the charge should benefit the
respondents.

The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.

Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must be charged
with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private complainant, are the ones obliged
to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it.

Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court53 mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either
by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to
be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the
circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private
complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG
correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the inclusion of certain employees of Universal
who were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore,
cannot seriously argue that because the officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves
should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the
public prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty
thereof were charged.

Mandamus a proper remedy when resolution of public respondent is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when "any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust or station."54 The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion
neither may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of
the prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However,
the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to
prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes
mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he
refuses to file the corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His
act is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the
other hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime
of estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latter’s finding and
proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the
concept of probable cause as pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice
are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse. 55 The present case calls for
the application of the exception. Given the facts of this case, petitioner has clearly established that the
public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 58548 promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the Resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1,
2000 of the Secretary of Justice, and its Resolution dated July 12, 2004 denying reconsideration thereon
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The public prosecutor is ordered to file the necessary information
for estafa against the respondents.

G.R. No. 171222 February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG.
GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 174786

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, and the
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
 DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity members for hazing, this
case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school authorities under Republic
Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.

The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has been characterized by
law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and responsibility. 1 This responsibility has
been amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school authorities to take any
action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in
the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal
acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure that the
crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.

It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy
(PMMA) were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-
Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed2 the Information against them on
the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in
the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.

Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the
Information.

THE CASE BACKGROUND

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. 3 In order to
reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory "Indoctrination
and Orientation Period,"4 which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001.5 Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.6

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of investigation, it
forwarded its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary investigation and
possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of
2005.8 Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution 9 finding
probable cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez),
Leotharius C.Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) –
collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Iba, Zambales (RTC–Zambales).

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding of
probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM)
Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant SeniorGrade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant
Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang
(Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS.
Dominador Operio (Operio) – collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the
findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered re-docketed for the purpose
of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against respondents for grave misconduct and abuse
of authority.10 The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case
charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of hazing.11

Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal accused,
Alvarez et al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino,
Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to Quash the Information. 13 They argued that
the Information did not contain all the essential elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there
was no allegation that the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA,
especially considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover, they stressed
that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization.
Also underscored was the absence in the Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part
of the "physical, mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and
enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members." Furthermore, they
emphasized that there was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that
they had permitted the activity.

As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already been
dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated
in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.

The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the Information alleged the
material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the crime of
accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the principals must
be prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the
Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation
that the supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether the
academy was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.

Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned, 15 the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against them.
According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed
with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal
responsibility was subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice,
there must be a principal by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In this
case, as there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom
they could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case
against the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices could no
longer stand on its own.

In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the allegations
therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment that the alleged hazing
was not part of the "physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members" of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), pursuant to Section 1
of the law.16 It must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical determination
that the PMMA was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.

Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against Bayabos et
al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to Quash,17 adopting the grounds raised
by that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August 2006. 18 However, on 3 August 2006, the
Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB Resolution II) dismissing the case against him. According
to the court, since Velasco was similarly situated as Bayabos et al., the Information against him must
likewise be quashed in light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively, Velasco et
al.), explaining that they, too, had been charged under the same Information for the same offense.19 It is
unclear from the records20 whether the accused Aris and Mabborang surrendered or were arrested, or
whether the Order of Arrest21 was recalled prior to the dismissal of the case.

Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this Court on 13 March
2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another Petition challenging SB
Resolution II.
 THE ISSUES

The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough evaluation of
the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed by this Court as follows:

I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the
dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused

II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the prosecution
of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law

OUR RULING

With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed
outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals
had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not
ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the
latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established.22 In People v. Rafael,23 the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: "The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal." Accordingly, so long as the
commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their
criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal. 24 We note in the present case
that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment25 dismissing the case against Alvarez
et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals,
because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the
case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of
Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported
principals.

Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against respondents.

Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional right, the Rules of Court
requires that the information charging persons with an offense be "sufficient." One of the key components
of a "sufficient information" is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense charged,
subject of the complaint.26 The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough
to enable persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged against them. 27 This
approach is intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed. 28 The
information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied upon. 29

At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court based on the
grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the claim that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed on that ground,
the basic test30 is to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the essential elements
of the crime as defined in the law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity
of the claims therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of
the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.

We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:

Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks
or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National
Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's
Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of
National Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered
as hazing for the purposes of this Act.

Sec. 4. x x x x.

The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge
thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices
for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied)

The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1) a person
is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering
or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an
organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons
defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological
suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they
may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above
elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to
or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.

First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an organization. Under
the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams,
fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives,
companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. 31 Attached to the Department of
Transportation and Communications,32 the PMMA is a government-owned educational
33
institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine
officers.34 Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.

We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was warranted for
failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to the duly
recommended and approved "testing and training procedure and practices" for prospective regular
members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element
of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not
by the prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the requirements thereof. 35 Thus, the prosecution’s
failure to point out in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that
Information.

Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. The
Information charging respondents reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses [RADM]
VIRGINIO R. ARIS, [LTSG.] DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS,[LTJG.] MANNY G. FERRER, [LTJG.] RONALD
G. MAGSINO,[LTJG.] KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, [LTJG.] GERRY P.DOCTOR, [ENS.] DOMINADOR
B. OPERIO, JR., and [ENS.] DENNIS S. VELASCO, as accomplices for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing
Law), committed as follows:

That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the campus of the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso, Province of Zambales,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS,
President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the
Cadets; (LTJG.) MANNY G. FERRER, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, Security Officer;
LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG.GERRY P. DOCTOR, Batl. Mast.; ENS.
DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, Mess
Officer, all public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, committing the
offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their duties as such public officers being the
school authorities and/or faculty members did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or
have actual knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen,
against probationary midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. during the school’s Indoctrination and
Orientation; and, fail to take any action to prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of
psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. thereby causing the
instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FERNANDO BALIDOY,
JR.36

As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a
prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent
the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice,
for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term37 – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and
incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of
law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia,
both "the designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense." The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument38 in his Petition before this Court that
the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for
continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not cure this
defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not
constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing. Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the
Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by
amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision
also states that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point
out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash40 that there was no defect
in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and
the eventual dismissal of the case.

This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
information.1âwphi1 Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash
would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.

Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and the petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions
dated 27 January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 186460 December 4, 2009

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GUALBERTO CINCO y SOYOSA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated 30 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01537
which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated 14 July 2005, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106,
Quezon City, in Criminal Cases No. Q-98-79944, No. Q-99-89097 and No. Q-89098,2 finding accused-
appellant Gualberto Cinco y Soyosa guilty of two counts of simple rape.

The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

In November 1998, an information3 was filed before the RTC accusing appellant of acts of lasciviousness,
thus:

Criminal Case No. Q-98-79944

That on or about the 30th day of November 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual abuse upon the
person of AAA,4 a minor, 14 years old, by then and there touching her body and mashing her breast, against
her will and without her consent which act debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and human
dignity of said complainant as a human being, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

Subsequently, on 18 August 1999, two separate informations 5 were filed with the RTC charging appellant
with rape. The accusatory portions of the informations read:

Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097

That on or about the month of November, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of
force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undressed [AAA], a
minor, 14 years of age, inside her room of the house located at XXX, and thereafter have carnal knowledge
with [AAA] against her will and without her consent.

Criminal Case No. Q-99-89098

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means
of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undressed [AAA], a
minor, 14 years of age, in the sala of their house located at XXX, and thereafter have carnal knowledge
with [AAA] against her will and without her consent.
Thereafter, the aforementioned cases were consolidated. When arraigned on 7 February 2000, appellant,
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. Trial on the merits followed.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Dr. Mariella Castillo and AAA. Their testimonies, woven together,
bear the following:

Herein private complainant, AAA, was born on 21 August 1984 in the province of YYY. When she was 12
years old, her aunt, BBB, took her from the custody of her paternal grandmother and brought her to BBB’s
residence located at XXX. Since then, AAA lived in the said house with BBB and herein appellant (BBB’s
common-law spouse/live-in partner).

On 1 November 1998, at around 6:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, was inside the house watching
television. Appellant entered the house and proceeded to the kitchen. He took a knife therefrom and poked
it at AAA. He told her not to shout or he would kill her. He tied her two hands at the back of her head and
removed her skirt and panty. She began to cry, but he told her to stop doing so. He went on top of her,
spread her thighs, and inserted his penis into her vagina. He then made push and pull movements. As she
felt pain in her vagina, she tried to push him away but to no avail. He pinched her breast which was very
painful. After satisfying his lust, he untied her hands, put on his shorts and left her. She then stood up and
put on her clothes. She went to the comfort room and saw her panty stained with blood.

In the latter part of November 1998, at about 4:00 p.m., AAA was inside the house while appellant was
drinking with friends outside. Later, appellant, then armed with a knife, entered AAA’s room and approached
AAA. He pointed the knife at her neck and told her not to make noise. He covered her mouth with a
handkerchief and tied her hands with a nylon rope. He then removed his pants and brief, stripped her of
her shorts and panty, and went on top of her. He inserted his penis into her vagina and made up and down
movements. Before leaving her, he warned her not to tell anyone of the incidents or he would kill her.

Subsequently, AAA went to the barangay hall to report the incidents. However, upon arriving thereat, she
told the barangay officials that she was merely "touched" and not raped by appellant. She was forced to
make such statement because appellant’s siblings, namely, Sonia and Roel, threatened to kill her if she
would divulge the truth. Appellant was eventually arrested and detained. She then filed with the Office of
the Prosecutor, Quezon City, a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against appellant.

Thereafter, AAA confided to BBB that appellant raped her. BBB accompanied AAA to the office of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Marilac Hills, Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thereupon,
AAA disclosed to a social worker that she was raped by appellant. After the interview, the social worker and
BBB accompanied AAA to Camp Crame where the latter underwent physical and genital examination,
which was conducted by Dr. Mariella Castillo (Dr. Castillo). In the said genital examination, Dr. Castillo
found that AAA had an estrogenized hymen with healed laceration at the 6:00 o’clock and 8:00 o’clock
positions. The deep notches, being in the posterior part of the hymen, indicate that the same had been
lacerated before, but were now healed. The notches were caused by penetration injuries or by an object
being inserted through the hymen opening to the vaginal canal.

Afterwards, appellant was charged with two counts of rape.6

The prosecution also proffered documentary evidence to buttress the testimonies of its witness, to wit: (1)
provisional medical certificate of AAA issued by Dr. Castillo (Exhibit A); 7 (2) final medical certificate of AAA
issued by Dr. Castillo (Exhibit B);8 (3) sworn statement of AAA (Exhibit C);9 and (4) AAA’s birth certificate
(Exhibit D).101avvphi1

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant, Gregorio Frias and Roel Cinco to refute
the foregoing accusations. No documentary evidence was adduced. Appellant denied any liability and
interposed an alibi.
Appellant claimed that he was not in the house when the alleged incidents occurred. He testified that from
8:00 a.m. to midnight of 1 November 1998, he sold ice cream in Cubao, Quezon City. He went home in the
morning of the following day, 2 November 1998. Also, during the latter part of November 1998, he sold ice
cream for the whole day in the same place and went home in the morning of the following day. He alleged
that AAA had ill motive to fabricate the rape charges, because he caught her several times stealing money
from his box inside the house.11

Gregorio Frias, friend of appellant, narrated that on 1 November 1998, he and appellant were selling ice
cream in Cubao, Quezon City. At about 5:00 p.m. of the same day, he went to appellant’s house and upon
arriving therein, he noticed that the people inside were arguing about the loss of money. On 30 November
1998, he and appellant were selling ice cream in Cubao, Quezon City. 12

Roel Cinco, brother of appellant, stated that on 1 November 1998, he was watching television inside
appellant’s house. At around 6:00 p.m., appellant arrived at the house. Later that evening, appellant
quarreled with BBB because AAA had several times stolen money from him. 13

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant of rape in Criminal Case Nos. Q-99-89097 and
Q-89098. Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua in both cases. He was also ordered to pay AAA
in each of the cases the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. With respect to Criminal Case No. Q-98-79944 for acts of
lasciviousness, appellant was acquitted therein for failure of the prosecution to establish said charge.
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 30 January 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 12 February 2008.14

In his Brief, appellant assigns a lone error, thus:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE INFORMATIONS UNDER CRIMINAL
CASE NOS. Q-99-89097 AND Q-99-89098 AS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION FOR THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO STATE WITH PARTICULARITY THE
APPROXIMATE DATES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPES.15

Appellant maintains that the approximate times and dates of the commission of the offense must be stated
in the informations; that the informations in the instant cases do not state the approximate times and dates
of the alleged rapes; that although AAA testified that the first rape occurred nearly before All Saints Day of
1998, the information in Criminal Case No. Q-89098, nonetheless, states that such incident transpired on
1 November 1998; that the informations are fatally defective; that the times and dates of the alleged rapes
are so indefinite, thereby depriving appellant of the opportunity to prepare for his defense; that appellant’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated; and
that by reason of the foregoing, appellant is entitled to an acquittal. 16

An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor
and filed with the court.17 To be considered as valid and sufficient, an information must state the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed. 18 The purpose of the requirement for the
information’s validity and sufficiency is to enable the accused to suitably prepare for his defense, since he
is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 19

With respect to the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the information the precise date
the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may
be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make
the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the commission of rape is
not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman
through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its
commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the
complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the
date of its actual commission.20 In sustaining the view that the exact date of commission of the rape is
immaterial, we ruled in People v. Purazo21 that:

We have ruled, time and again, that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape
cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that where the time or place or any
other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the
commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place
alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided
it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint
or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court.

This Court has upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely alleged the month
and year of its commission.22 There is no cogent reason to deviate from these precedents, especially so
when the prosecution has established the fact that the rape under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097 was
committed prior to the date of the filing of the information in the said case. Hence, the allegation in the
information under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097, which states that the rape was committed on or about
November 1998, is sufficient to affirm the conviction of appellant in the said case.

Appellant’s allegation of variance between the date of the commission of rape in Criminal Case No. Q-99-
89098 and that established by the evidence during the trial is erroneous. AAA categorically testified that
she was raped by appellant on 1 November 1998.23 This is consistent with the allegation in the information
under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89098 that appellant raped AAA on 1 November 1998.

Since the sole issue raised by appellant was resolved by this Court in favor of the validity of the informations
filed against him, then the subsequent trial court proceedings and the resulting judgment of conviction
against appellant should likewise be affirmed, there being no other questions raised by appellant as to
them. We further uphold the penalty imposed on appellant by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, was the law pertinent to the rapes
committed on 1 November 1998 and in the latter part of November 1998. The law states that the death
penalty shall be imposed if the rape victim is a minor, and the offender is the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.24The qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship with the
offender must be alleged in the complaint or information and proved during the trial to warrant the imposition
of the death penalty.25

The informations in Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097 and Q-99-89098 allege that AAA was a minor at the
time she was raped. However, there is no allegation therein that the offender, herein appellant, is the
common-law spouse of AAA’s parent. Thus, the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
cannot be properly appreciated. In the absence of such qualifying circumstances, the rapes in the instant
cases are treated as simple rapes. Under Republic Act No. 8353, the penalty for simple rape is reclusion
perpetua.

We also sustain the RTC and the Court of Appeals’ award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00
and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 to AAA, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.26 Nonetheless, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 should be
deleted, as no aggravating circumstance in the commission of rapes was proven. 27
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 30 January 2008, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01537,
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is deleted.

G.R. No. 201620 March 6, 2013

RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA JAIME, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the May 17, 2011
Decision1 and March 30, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 00952.

In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code,3 viz:

That on or about the 10th day of September 2000 in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having obtained and received from one Cynthia
Jaime various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of ₱705,685.00 for the purpose of selling the
same on consignment basis with express obligation to account for and remit the entire proceeds of the sale
if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of time and despite repeated demands
therefor, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to remit proceeds of the sale of said
items or to return any of the items that may have been unsold to said Cynthia Jaime but instead has willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to his/her own use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia Jaime in the aforementioned amount of
₱705,685.00.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution’s evidence sought to prove the following facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-law,
Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia), were engaged in a jewelry business. Sometime in the first week of September
2000, Senador went to see Rita at her house in Guadalupe Heights, Cebu City, expressing her interest to
see the pieces of jewelry that the latter was selling. On September 10, 2000, Rita’s daughter-in-law and
business partner, Cynthia, delivered to Senador several pieces of jewelry worth seven hundred five
thousand six hundred eighty five pesos (PhP 705,685).5

In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Cynthia and Senador, the latter undertook to sell the
jewelry thus delivered on commission basis and, thereafter, to remit the proceeds of the sale, or return the
unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15) days from the delivery.6 However, as events turned out, Senador
failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold jewelry within the given period. 7

Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita demanded from Senador the return of the unsold jewelry or
the remittance of the proceeds from the sale of jewelry entrusted to her. The demand fell on deaf ears
prompting Rita to file the instant criminal complaint against Senador.8

During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered to Rita Keppel Bank Check No. 0003603 dated
March 31, 2001 for the amount of PhP 705,685,9 as settlement of her obligations. Nonetheless, the check
was later dishonored as it was drawn against a closed account.10
Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing evidence of the prosecution, and
instead, she relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven and
established during the trial differ. In particular, Senador asserted that the person named as the offended
party in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According
to Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during
trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as
witness. Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al.11 (Uba) and United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog
(Lahoylahoy),12 Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated.

Despite her argument, the trial court, by Decision dated June 30, 2008, found Senador guilty as charged
and sentenced as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds RAMONCITA SENADOR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ESTAFA under Par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to indemnify the private complainants, RITA JA[I]ME and CYNTHIA JAIME, the
following: 1) Actual Damages in the amount of ₱695,685.00 with interest at the legal rate from the filing of
the Information until fully paid; 2) Exemplary Damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00; and 3) the amount
of ₱50,000 as Attorney’s fees.

Senador questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. However, on May 17, 2011, the appellate court
rendered a Decision upholding the finding of the RTC that the prosecution satisfactorily established the guilt
of Senador beyond reasonable doubt. The CA opined that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the following undisputed facts, to wit: (1) Senador received the pieces of jewelry in trust
under the obligation or duty to return them; (2) Senador misappropriated or converted the pieces of jewelry
to her benefit but to the prejudice of business partners, Rita and Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed to return
the pieces of jewelry despite demand made by Rita.

Further, the CA––finding that Uba13 is not applicable since Senador is charged with estafa, a crime against
property and not oral defamation, as in Uba––ruled:

WHEREFORE, the June 30, 2008 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Dumaguete City, in
Criminal Case No. 16010, finding accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Senador filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated March 30, 2012. Hence,
the present petition of Senador.

The sole issue involved in the instant case is whether or not an error in the designation in the Information
of the offended party violates, as petitioner argues, the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the information and the
evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal, 14 more so if the
variance relates to the designation of the offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice
the substantial rights of the accused.15
As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador’s reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba, the appellant was
charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the person against whom the
defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person injured
is material. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime against property
that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the name of the offended party.
Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the
information.16 Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property,
Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal:

SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.—The complaint or information must state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must
be described under a fictitious name.

(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must
be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.

(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be
inserted in the complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous
designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was
sufficiently described and identified.

Lahoylahoy cited by Senador supports the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is generic or one
which is not described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous
designation of the offended party is material and would result in the violation of the accused’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error, Lahoylahoy teaches,
would result in the acquittal of the accused, viz:

The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an offense shall have been
described with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall
be deemed immaterial. We are of the opinion that this provision can have no application to a case where
the name of the person injured is matter of essential description as in the case at bar; and at any rate,
supposing the allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the robbery charged in this case would not be
sufficiently identified. A complaint stating, as does the one now before us, that the defendants "took and
appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof the sum of ₱100"
could scarcely be sustained in any jurisdiction as a sufficient description either of the act of robbery or of
the subject of the robbery. There is a saying to the effect that money has no earmarks; and generally
speaking the only way money, which has been the subject of a robbery, can be described or identified in a
complaint is by connecting it with the individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. And clearly,
when the offense has been so identified in the complaint, the proof must correspond upon this point with
the allegation, or there can be no conviction.17 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the offense was money in the total sum of PhP 100. Since money is
generic and has no earmarks that could properly identify it, the only way that it (money) could be described
and identified in a complaint is by connecting it to the offended party or the individual who was robbed as
its owner or possessor. Thus, the identity of the offended party is material and necessary for the proper
identification of the offense charged. Corollary, the erroneous designation of the offended party would also
be material, as the subject matter of the offense could no longer be described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v. Kepner,18 Sayson v. People,19 and Ricarze v. Court of Appeals20 support
the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is specific or one described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended party is not material
and would not result in the violation of the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not result in the acquittal of the accused.

In the 1902 case of Kepner, this Court ruled that the erroneous designation of the person injured by a
criminal act is not material for the prosecution of the offense because the subject matter of the offense, a
warrant, was sufficiently identified with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense
charged. We held, thus:

The allegation of the complaint that the unlawful misappropriation of the proceeds of the warrant was to the
prejudice of Aun Tan may be disregarded by virtue of section 7 of General Orders, No. 58, which declares
that when an offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty to identify the act,
an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. In any event the defect, if
defect it was, was one of form which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant on the
merits, and can not, therefore, under the provisions of section 10 of the same order, affect the present
proceeding.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction of Sayson for attempted estafa, even if there was an erroneous
allegation as to the person injured because the subject matter of the offense, a check, is specific and
sufficiently identified. We held, thus:

In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been described in the
complaint with sufficient certainty as to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured
shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any
substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop
similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the
proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to
the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank
which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject
matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly
identify the particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property
under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial,
for purposes of convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended
party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the
information." 22 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine espousing an erroneous designation of the person injured is not
material because the subject matter of the offense, a check, was sufficiently identified with such
particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged.23

Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses against property, if the subject
matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as
in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the
acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable,
such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation
of the offended party is immaterial.

In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic property.
Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total
amount of ₱705,685.00." The charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt
Agreement24signed by Senador and presented during trial, which enumerates these "various kinds of
jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685," viz:

Quality Description

1 #1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5 grams

1 #2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams

1 #1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills 14 kt. 4.1 grams

1 #319 1 set creolla w/brills 14 kt. 13.8 grams

1 #1301 1 set creolla 2 colors w/brills 20.8 grams

1 #393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. 14 grams

1 #2155 1 yg. Bracelet w brills ruby and blue sapphire 14 kt. 28

grams

1 #1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt. (oval) 14.6 grams

1 #2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 8.8 grams

1 #206 1 set double sampaloc creolla 14 kt. 14.2 grams

1 # 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6 grams

1 # 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 kt. 2.0 grams

1 #2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 4.5 grams

1 #1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. 12.6 grams

1 #1851 1 pc. lady’s ring w/ brills 14 kt. 7.8 grams

1 # 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 grams

1 #1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 kt. 4.1 grams

Thus, it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze that is applicable to the present case,
not the ruling in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The error in the designation of the offended party in the information is
immaterial and did not violate Senador’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her.

Lest it be overlooked, Senador offered to pay obligations through Keppel Check No. 0003603, which was
dishonored because it was drawn against an already closed account. The offer indicates her receipt of the
pieces of jewelry thus described and an implied admission that she misappropriated the jewelries
themselves or the proceeds of the sale. Rule 130, Section 27 states:

In criminal cases. except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to
be compromised. an offer of compromise by the accused may he received in evidence as implied admission
of guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

Taken together, the C A did not err in affirming petitioner's conviction for the crime of estafa.1âwphi1
In light of current jurisprudence,25 the Court, however, finds the award of exemplary damages
excessive.1âwphi1 Art. 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good. Nevertheless, "exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich
one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious actions."26 On this basis, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of PhP
100,000 is reduced to PhP 30,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 17, 2011 and Resolution dated March 30, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in C A-G.R. CJ.C No. 00952, finding Ramoncita Senador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of ESTAFA under par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages he reduced to PhP 30,000.

G.R. No. 164015 February 26, 2009

RAMON A. ALBERT, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari1 of the Resolutions dated 10 February 20042 and 3 May 20043 of the
Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004 Resolution granted the prosecution’s Motion to Admit the Amended
Information. The 3 May 2004 Resolution denied the Motion For Reconsideration of petitioner Ramon A.
Albert (petitioner).

The Facts

On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information alleged:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao hereby
accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of
Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being
then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying the said position
with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in
relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused
FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S.
ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development,
Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make
it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly
described in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax
Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two
pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land,
and by reason of accused’s misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount of ₱4,535,400.00 which
is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury
to the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and his
co-accused.

On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the following grounds:
(1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy
disposition of cases and to a speedy trial were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February 1999
finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not supported by evidence. 5

On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Hold
Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the
condition that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned. 6 On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, or on
13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of "not guilty." In the Resolution
dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold
Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel.

On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and ordered the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum dated 6
January 2003, the SPO who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the
indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause. However, the Ombudsman, in an Order
dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of the Ombudsman.

In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner
on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the order of the
Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003.

In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the Ombudsman’s
denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by
the prosecution with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The scheduled
arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003.7

On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The Amended
Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office of Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses RAMON
A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A.
3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being
then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying the said position
with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in
relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused
FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S.
ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development,
Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter
and make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property
particularly described in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which
Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the
two pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural
land, and by reason of accused’s misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount of ₱4,535,400.00
which is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue
injury to the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is substantial and,
therefore, not allowed after arraignment.

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In its Resolution of 10 February 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution’s Motion to Admit
Amended Information. At the outset, the Sandiganbayan explained that "gross neglect of duty" which falls
under Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable negligence" under Section 3(e), and held
thus:

In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect or refusal causes
undue injury compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable negligence where undue injury is a
constitutive element. A change to this effect constitutes substantial amendment considering that the
possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended.

It may be considered however, that there are three modes by which the offense for Violation of Section 3(e)
may be committed in any of the following:

1. Through evident bad faith;

2. Through manifest partiality;

3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.

Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under said section of
the law should suffice to warrant conviction.10

However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of the information be formal
or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the event that the accused had not yet
undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely
"provisional," then the prosecution may still amend the information either in form or in substance.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of
3 May 2004. Hence this petition.

The Issues

The issues raised in this petition are:

1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED INFORMATION; AND

2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FURTHER PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On Whether the Sandiganbayan

Should Admit the Amended Information

Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

xxx

Petitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the information may be made
after a plea. The rule does not distinguish between a plea made during a "provisional" or a "permanent"
arraignment. Since petitioner already entered a plea of "not guilty" during the 13 March 2001 arraignment,
then the information may be amended only in form.

An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an accused, for the first
time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. 11 The accused is formally
informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an indispensable
requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. 12

The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or "conditional" arraignments is not

sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of
Court.13 However, in People v. Espinosa,14this Court tangentially recognized such practice, provided that
the alleged conditions attached thereto should be "unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened."
Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment; otherwise,
the arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional.15

In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes of the Sandiganbayan
Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states that the "[a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea
of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed on accused
persons travelling (sic) abroad."16 In the Resolution of 16 April 2001,17 the Sandiganbayan mentioned the
arraignment of petitioner and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and
to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions attendant thereto which, however, were limited only to
petitioner’s itinerary abroad; the setting up of additional bailbond; the required appearance before the clerk
of court; and written advice to the court upon return to the Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the
provisional or conditional nature of the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down in Espinosa,
the arraignment of petitioner should be deemed simple and unconditional.

The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the Information may be made
but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.
Petitioner contends that replacing "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence" is a
substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his rights. He asserts that under the
amended information, he has to present evidence that he did not act with "gross inexcusable negligence,"
evidence he was not required to present under the original information. To bolster his argument, petitioner
refers to the 10 February 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change "constitutes
substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one
originally intended."18lawphil.net

We are not convinced.

Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as follows:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.— In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.

This crime has the following essential elements:19

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and

3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."20 In Uriarte v. People,21 this
Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted
with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable
negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side or person rather than another.22 "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will.23 "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.24 "Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. 25

The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with "evident bad faith and manifest
partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty." The amended information, on the other hand, alleges that
petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable
negligence." Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" with "gross
inexcusable negligence." Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA 3019—
specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is under
Section 3(e) of the statute—the question remains whether or not the amendment is substantial and
prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.

The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information
is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to
the complaint or information as amended.26 On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with
additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore,
adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at
anytime.27lavvphil

In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from the Information.
Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even after arraignment
and plea being beneficial to the accused.28 As a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be
included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes that the
same constitutes an amendment only in form. In Sistoza v. Desierto,29 the Information charged the accused
with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but specified only "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as
the modalities in the commission of the offense charged. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was not
mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is committed
by dolo or culpa, and although the Information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing
the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. 30In so ruling, this
Court applied by analogy the pronouncement in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan31 where an accused charged
with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of malversation through negligence when
the evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a conviction
for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful
offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of
"gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges "manifest partiality" and "evident
bad faith" as modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in
form.

On Whether Petitioner’s
Right to a Speedy Trial was Violated

Petitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against him was filed on 15 June 1992, but it was resolved
by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on 26 February 1999, or after a period of almost seven (7)
years. Four (4) years thereafter, the SPO, upon reinvestigation of the case, recommended that the case
against petitioner be dismissed for lack of probable cause, but this recommendation was denied by the
Ombudsman. A Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information was later filed by the prosecution and
granted by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution of 10 February 2004. Thus, petitioner
maintains that it took the Office of the Ombudsman twelve (12) years since the initial filing of the complaint-
affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense under the Amended Information, in violation of
petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.

Petitioner’s contentions are futile.

The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution which provides: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right, however, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements
of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.32 A simple mathematical computation of the period
involved is not sufficient. We concede that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend
with the realities of everyday life.33
After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy trial was not
infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-affidavit filed against
petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original Information against petitioner was raised in
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution denying the
said motion. It appears that the said delays were caused by the numerous motions for extension of time to
file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by petitioner’s co-accused, and that no actual
preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan properly held that a
reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order. Although the reinvestigation inadvertently resulted
to further delay in the proceedings, this process could not have been dispensed with as it was done for the
protection of the rights of petitioner himself. It is well-settled that although the conduct of an investigation
may hold back the progress of a case, it is necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised
or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.34 The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid and regular
course of judicial proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered vexatious, capricious,
oppressive, or unjustified. Hence, petitioner’s contention of violation of his right to a speedy trial must fail.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 10 February 2004 and 3
May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25231.

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-
Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and
Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63,
Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.

The Antecedents

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a
false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of
the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.2
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for
a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998.
The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the
MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by
falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did
not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly laid
since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used)
and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has
jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because: (a) the third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not alleged
with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court
when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while
the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. 4 The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that
the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. 5 The MeTC-Makati City
subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration.6

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-
Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on
the rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should
be in the place where the false document was presented.

The Assailed RTC Decision

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos.
174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue
with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject
document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,]
then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]

xxxx

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court of
Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself
which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false
certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al.,
based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but
rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati
City.9 (emphasis ours)

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the
order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City
also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-
Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision
in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.10

The Petition

The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for perjury
against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than
our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the
petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the perjury.
In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’ view. In his Manifestation and
Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General
also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional
giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the
criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should
be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take
cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the
criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The
reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such
that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense
are available.13

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In
determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over
it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from
its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where
the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a
statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a
sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required
to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five
days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In
relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of
the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in
different fora.14

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive
and administer oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.15(emphasis ours)

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the
allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information
sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping
was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth
elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were
also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.16

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have
been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay
City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is
the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant
to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements
constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay
City.

Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the division
rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was
the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified petitions
filed with the court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified
petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in
Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or
Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the verified
petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged
falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We
cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v. Cañet18 which ruled:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information
that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material
to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist
of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring
deleted]

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in Manila.
We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and
sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As
supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice 19 that, in turn, cited an
American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva that –
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before
a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is
complete when a witness' statement has once been made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of how the
crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the
defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case
(Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the
Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material
matter.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their respective
arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of
Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect. 21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand,
is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American
case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took
effect.22

The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation in court
of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing
law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of
the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 23 for the procedural
aspect.

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in
which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare,
depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he
does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand
pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of
holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.

This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 539224 and 539325 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States.26 Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable
in our jurisdiction.27

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court of the
place where the crime was committed.

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a false
document in a judicial proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where
the false document was presented since the presentation was the act that consummated the crime.

The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC29 interestingly explains
the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No.
1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:30
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional
Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed
Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly
repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321
of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the
Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under the
Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but
our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions
of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious
proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on false testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury.
[italics ours]

With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the
provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
[emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a
criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on
any material matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially involved perjured
statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in
Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where
the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would
have been the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge involved an actual testimony
made before the SEC.

In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an affidavit
that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the
affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no
distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making
of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in
criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits).
Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs
of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not
the offense charged in the Information.

The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions filed in
court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn
statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled
that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these
cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate copies of
the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue." 31 To the Court,
"whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is
immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement," 32citing Cañet
as authority for its statement.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very
categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the
impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting that
Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false
testimony in civil cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182 of the
RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Cañet ruling
would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no
such distinction was made under Cañet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make
any distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion
of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers
to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based
on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is
the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time
General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14,
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly included,
as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place.1âwphi1 This
change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,34 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of
Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in
the place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints
for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and
Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of
the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by
Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and
venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law
so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized
person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the
RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit
under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit
since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed
through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place
where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at
the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.

G.R. No. 199210 October 23, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RICARDO M. VIDAÑA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from a Decision1 dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04019, entitled People of the Philippines v. Ricardo M Vidana which affirmed the Decision 2 dated June 26,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 in Criminal Case No. 2163~G
The trial court convicted appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña of one (1) count of rape in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.

The accusatory portion of the lnformation3 dated February 6, 2004 for rape in relation to Republic Act No.
7 61 0 reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of September 2003, at x x x Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs
and intent to have carnal knowledge of [AAA 4], his own daughter, a minor, 15 years old, and while using
his influence as a father, over said minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of and sexual intercourse with said minor against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.

After more than a year of being at large since the issuance on September 1, 2004 of the warrant for his
arrest,5appellant was finally arrested and subsequently arraigned on January 30, 2006 wherein he pleaded
"NOT GUILTY" to the charge of rape.6

The prosecution’s version of the events that transpired in this case was narrated in the Plaintiff-Appellee’s
Brief in this manner:

[Appellant] and wife [BBB] were separated in 1998. They have four (4) children namely: [AAA], [CCC],
[DDD] and [EEE]. In 1999, [appellant] began living in with a certain Irene Valoria, his common-law wife,
who became the aforementioned children’s stepmother. They were staying in a one-bedroom house owned
by a certain Edgar Magsakay at Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva Ecija. At night, [appellant] and his common-law
wife sleep in the sala while the children occupy the bedroom. [AAA] is the eldest of the brood and was 15
years old in the year 2003, having been born on 13 June 1988.

Around midnight of 16 September 2003, [appellant] was alone at the sala and the children were asleep
inside the bedroom. [AAA] suddenly was jolted from her sleep when somebody pulled her out of the bed
and brought her to the sala . She later recognized the person as her father, herein [appellant], who covered
her mouth and told her not to make any noise. At the sala, [appellant] forcibly removed [AAA]’s short pants,
t-shirt, bra and panty. As she lay naked, [appellant] inserted his penis into [AAA]’s vagina. [AAA]’s ordeal
lasted for about five (5) minutes and all the while she felt an immense pain. [Appellant] tried to touch [AAA]’s
other private parts but she resisted. During the consummation of [appellant]’s lust upon his daughter, he
warned her not to tell anybody or else he will kill her and her siblings.

The next day, [AAA] went to the house of Francisco and Zenny Joaquin. Spouses Joaquin are friends of
[appellant], whose house is about 500 meters away. Zenny Joaquin noticed something was bothering [AAA]
so she confronted the latter. [AAA] broke down and revealed to Zenny what happened to her at the hands
of [appellant]. Taken aback by the trauma suffered by the young lass, Zenny promptly accompanied [AAA]
to the police to report the incident.

The examination of the medico-legal officer on [AAA] revealed "positive healed laceration at 7 o’clock
position positive hymenal tag."7 (Citations omitted.)

On the other hand, the defense presented a contrasting narrative which was condensed in the Accused-
Appellant’s Brief, to wit:

[Appellant] together with his family were living in the house of Edgar Magsakay in Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva
Ecija. He has four children but only three, namely: [EEE], [CCC] and [DDD] were staying with him. His
daughter [AAA] was staying with his kumpare Francisco Joaquin at Purok 2, Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva Ecija,
since August 15, 2003. He did not have the opportunity to visit her nor was there an occasion that the latter
visited them. On September 16, 2003 at 4:00 to 5:00 in the morning, he was at the fields harvesting together
with Irene Valoria (his wife and stepmother of his children). They finished at around 5:00 to 6:00 in the
evening, then they proceeded home (TSN November 14, 2008, pp. 2-4).

[EEE] corroborated in material points the testimony of his father [appellant]. (TSN, February 13, 2009, pp.
2-5)8

Trial on the merits ensued and at the conclusion of which the trial court rendered judgment against appellant
by finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 31 of Republic
Act No. 7610. The dispositive portion of the assailed June 26, 2009 RTC Decision is reproduced here:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, this court
sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay [AAA] ₱50,000 in moral damages. 9

Insisting on his innocence, appellant appealed the guilty verdict to the Court of Appeals but was foiled when
the appellate court affirmed the lower court ruling in the now assailed March 18, 2011 Decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 26 June 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 2163-G, finding the accused-appellant RICARDO M. VIDAÑA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.10

Hence, appellant takes the present appeal and puts forward a single assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION

OF SECTION 5 IN RELATION TO SECTION 31 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610.11

Appellant vehemently denies his eldest child’s (AAA’s) allegation of rape by asseverating that he could not
have raped AAA because, on the date when the alleged rape took place, she was living in Francisco and
Zenny Joaquin’s house and not in his residence where the alleged rape was consummated. This assertion
was corroborated on material points by appellant’s son, EEE. Furthermore, appellant insists that the
credibility of AAA is suspect since her narration of the alleged rape incident does not indicate that she
resisted appellant’s carnal desires.

We find no merit in appellant’s contention.

Not unlike most rape cases, appellant hinges his hopes for freedom on undermining the credibility of AAA’s
testimony. Since AAA is the only witness that can connect appellant to the crime, appellant beseeches this
Court to take a closer look at AAA’s testimony and, at the end of which, render a judgment of acquittal.

It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.12 Furthermore, it is likewise settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and respect, if not conclusiveness, since
the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the facts in whose direct presence and under
whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their respective versions of the events that made up the
occurrences constituting the ingredients of the offense charged. 13

A careful review of the evidence and testimony brought to light in this case does not lead to a conclusion
that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were mistaken in their assessment of the credibility of AAA’s
testimony. Absent any demonstration by appellant that both tribunals overlooked a material fact that
otherwise would change the outcome of the case or misunderstood a circumstance of consequence in their
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, we are thus inclined to affirm the facts as established by the
trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

We are of the opinion that the testimony of AAA regarding her ordeal was delivered in a straightforward and
convincing manner that is worthy of belief. The pertinent portions of her testimony are reproduced below:

[PROS.] FLORENDO

Q We are referring to this particular case. During the last setting, you stated that you were raped on
September 16, 2003. Is that right Miss Witness?

A Yes Sir.

Q And where were you at that time on September 16, 2003 when your father raped you?

A In our house at x x x, Nueva Ecija, Sir.

Q And what were you doing before your father raped you on September 16, 2003?

A We were sleeping with my siblings, Sir.

Q And where was your father at that time?

A He was also there in our house, Sir.

Q He was sleeping with you?

A No Sir. They were sleeping in the sala.

Q You said "they". You mean your father has companions?

A When my stepmother is present, she was sleeping with my father, Sir, but when she was not there, my
father sleeps alone in the sala, Sir.

Q So, about what time of the day on September 16, 2003 that you said you were raped by your father?

A I cannot remember exactly the time, Sir. As far as I can recall, it was almost midnight, Sir.

Q And you said you were sleeping?

A Yes Sir.

Q How were you awakened?

A He pulled me out of the place where we were sleeping, Sir.

Q You were sleeping on a bed?

A Yes Sir.

Q You said you were pulled. Who pulled you from your bed?

A My father, Sir.

[PROS.] FLORENDO

At this point, Your Honor, may we just have it on record that the witness is crying again.

PROS.] FLORENDO

Q He pulled you to what place?

A He pulled me to the sala where he was sleeping, Sir.

Q I thought your father had a companion in the sala at that time?

A When my stepmother was not there, he was alone in the sala, Sir.

Q When your father pulled you, you did not shout, you did not scream?

A I was not able to shout or scream because he covered my mouth and told me not to make noise, Sir.

Q Was that your first time that your father raped you on September 16, 2003?

A No Sir.

Q So, he pulled you out of the bed, out of the bedroom and took you to the sala?

A Yes Sir.

Q What did he do to you while you were already in the sala?

A He forcibly removed the shorts I was wearing then, Sir.

Q You were only wearing shorts at that time?

A Yes Sir. Shorts and also a dress.

Q What dress was that?

A T-shirt, Sir.

Q Aside from the shots and t-shirt, you were not wearing anything?

A I was wearing shorts, t-shirt, panty and bra, Sir.

Q Did your father succeed in removing your shorts?

A Yes Sir.

Q What else did he do after removing your shorts?

A He also removed my panty and inserted his penis into my vagina with a warning that I should not tell it
to anybody because he will kill us all, Sir.

Q What do you mean by "penis"?

A "Titi", Sir. (Male sexual organ)

Q His sexual organ was erected or not at that time?

A Erected, Sir.

Q And he inserted it to what part of your body?

A Inside my vagina, Sir.

Q And what did you feel when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?

A It was painful, Sir.

Q And how long was his penis inserted inside your vagina?

A About five (5) minutes, Sir.

Q Aside from that, he did nothing to you? He only inserted his penis?

A Yes Sir.

Q He did not kiss you?

A No Sir.
Q He did not touch your other private parts?

A He was trying to touch my other private parts but I resisted, Sir.

Q And after doing that, what did he do next if there was any?

A Nothing more, Sir.14

The quoted transcript would show that when AAA testified and, thus, was constrained to recount the torment
she suffered at the hands of her own father, she broke down in tears in more than one instance. This can
only serve to strengthen her testimony as we have indicated in past jurisprudence that the crying of a victim
during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates
the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic experience. 15 It is also worth noting that
appellant’s counsel did not even bother to cross-examine AAA after her direct examination by the
prosecutor.

We have previously held that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would
expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the
death or lifetime imprisonment of her father.16 That legal dictum finds application in the case at bar since
appellant did not allege nor prove any sufficient improper motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him
of such a serious charge of raping his own flesh and blood. His allegation that AAA’s admission in open
court, that she is not close to him and that they do not agree on many things, 17 cannot suffice as a
compelling enough reason for her to fabricate such a sordid and scandalous tale of incest.

With regard to appellant’s contention that AAA’s lack of resistance to the rape committed against her, as
borne out by her own testimony, negates any truth to her accusation, we rule that such an argument
deserves scant consideration. It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure to shout or offer tenuous
resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused since rape
is subjective and not everyone responds in the same way to an attack by a sexual fiend. 18

Furthermore, we have reiterated that, in incestuous rape cases, the father’s abuse of the moral ascendancy
and influence over his daughter can subjugate the latter’s will thereby forcing her to do whatever he
wants.19 In other words, in an incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed
where the overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice.20

We likewise rule as unmeritorious appellant’s assertion that he could not have committed the felony
attributed to him because, at the date of the alleged rape, AAA was not residing at the place where the
alleged rape occurred. Jurisprudence tells us that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime, thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and
a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 21

Moreover, we have held that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same
having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. 22 Based on this doctrine, the corroborating
testimony of appellant’s son, EEE, who, undoubtedly, is a person intimately related to him cannot serve to
reinforce his alibi.

In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant.1âwphi1 However, the trial court
erred in impliedly characterizing the offense charged as sexual abuse under Sections 5 and 31 of Republic
Act No. 7610.

Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, it is required that "the complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it." The information clearly charged
appellant with rape, a crime punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the relevant
portions of which provide:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

The same statute likewise states:

Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

In the case at bar, appellant was accused in the information with feloniously having carnal knowledge of
his own minor daughter against her will by using his influence as a father. Considering further that the
minority of AAA and her relationship to appellant were both alleged in the information and proven in court,
the proper designation of appellant’s felony should have been qualified rape. As such, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, in lieu of the death penalty, pursuant to Republic Act No.
934623 must be imposed. Furthermore, in line with jurisprudence, the award of moral damages should be
increased to ₱75,000.00 in addition to the award of civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts
of ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00, respectively.24 Likewise, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04019, affirming the conviction of appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña in Criminal Case No.
2163-G, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:

(1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole is imposed upon appellant
Ricardo M. Vidaña;

(2) The moral damages to be paid by appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is increased from Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00);
 (3) Appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00);

(4) Appellant Ricardo M. Vidaña is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00); and

(5) Appellant Ricardo M Vidaña is ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all
damages at the legal rate of six percent (6) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 183100

People of the Philippines

v.

Rogelio Abrencillo

BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal seeks to undo the conviction of the accused for the rape he had committed against AAA, [1] the
15-year-old daughter of BBB, his common-law wife. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, in Gumaca,
Quezon (RTC) sentenced him to death on March 4, 2002 on the ground that the crime was qualified by his
being the step-father of the victim and her minority under 18 years. By its January 29, 2008 decision
rendered in CA-G.R.CR-HC No. 01123,[2] however, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction but
found the crime to be simple rape, reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

The records show that the accused and BBB started their cohabitation when AAA and CCC, who were twin
sisters, were only about three years of age; that the common-law partners lived with BBB's daughters in
the same house for the next 12 years; that a father-daughter relationship developed between the accused
and BBB's daughters, with AAA and CCC even considering him as their own father and addressing him
as itay (father); that AAA frequently accompanied him when he gathered wood and made charcoal in a hut
in the nearby forest; that on March 1, 1999, BBB left the house early to sell fish; that AAA was left alone in
the house and had lunch by herself because he went out to chat with neighbors; that after her lunch, AAA
took a nap in the house, but his return to the house awakened her; that taking advantage of AAA being
alone in the house, he took off his pants and laid down beside her; that he embraced her, but she brushed
away his arms; that he then got up and started taking her shorts off; that she resisted and held on to her
shorts; that in frustration, he went to take his bolo and poked its sharp tip unto her throat while threatening
to kill her; that she became petrified with fear and could not do anything more after that; that he then undress
her, went on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina; that the penile insertion caused her pain;
that he then made push and pull motions until he spent himself inside her; that she could only beg for him
to stop but he paid no heed to her pleas; that she cried later on; and that he left her alone afterwards.

The records further show that once the accused left her alone, she ran to the house of her Lolo Armin and
reported what the accused had just done to her; that Lolo Armin accompanied her to the police station to
report the rape; that she narrated in her complaint affidavit that the accused had raped her even before that
time, when she was still younger; and that she underwent physical examination by the municipal health
officer, Dra. Constancia Mecija, about two hours after the commission of the rape.

Dra. Mecija rendered the following findings in the medico-legal report relevant to AAA's physical
examination, viz:
xxxx

Genital Examination:

Pubic hair fully grown, moderate labia majora and minora coaptated, fourchette lax, Vestibular mucosa
pinkish.Hymen, tall, thin with old healed complete laceration at 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock position;
corresponding to the face of a watch. Edges rounded, Hymenal orifice admits a tube of 2.5 cm. in
diameter with moderate resistance, vaginal walls tight. Rugosities prominent.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted in the body of the subject at the time of
examination.

2. Old healed hymenal laceration, present.[3]

xxxx

The Provincial Prosecutor of Quezon filed in the RTC the information dated March 26, 1999 charging the
accused with qualified rape allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of March 1999, at Barangay No. 8 Poblacion, in the Municipality of Gen. Luna,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a bolo, with lewd design, by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AAA, his step-daughter, and a
minor, 15 years of age, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW .[4]

The accused pleaded not guilty to the information on September 6, 2000.

During the trial, the accused denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, although he admitted being in the
house at the alleged time of the rape. He insisted that nobody was in the house when he returned that
afternoon from his chore of gathering wood in the nearby forest; that upon learning from a neighbor that
AAA had left the house with her kabarkada, he himself did the cooking and waited for her to return home;
and that he scolded her, causing her to run away from home.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, convicting the accused for qualified rape and prescribing the death
penalty. It considered AAA's testimony as credible and reliable because the medico-legal findings
corroborated her accusation. It found that the rape was qualified by relationship, the accused being her
stepfather, and by her minority, she being 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. It
ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Court finds the accused ROGELIO ABRENCILLO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for rape under Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by RA 8353 and sentencing him the penalty of DEATH. He is further ordered to pay the amount of
P75,000.00 to AAA as indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[5]

On intermediate review, the accused claimed that the medico-legal evidence did not prove recent sexual
intercourse in view of the finding of old healed laceration that indicated the non-virgin state of AAA.

Nonetheless, the CA, upholding the conviction but downgrading the offense to simple rape because the
accused was not AAA's stepfather due to him and BBB not having been legally married, disposed thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
accused shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in addition to the indemnity and damages awarded
therein.

SO ORDERED.[6]

In his appeal, the accused reiterated his arguments in the CA, [7] still assailing the credibility of AAA's
accusation of a recent coerced sexual encounter with him.

We affirm the conviction.

Firstly, the findings of the RTC and the CA deserve respect mainly because the RTC as the trial court was
in the best position to observe the demeanor and conduct of AAA when she incriminated the accused by
her recollection of the incident in court. The personal observation of AAA's conduct and demeanor enabled
the trial judge to discern whether she was telling the truth or inventing it.[8] The trial judge's evaluation, which
the CA affirmed, now binds the Court, leaving to the accused the burden to bring to the Court's attention
facts or circumstances of weight that were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted by the lower
courts but would materially affect the disposition of the case differently if duly considered. [9] Alas, the
accused made no showing that the RTC, in the first instance, and the CA, on review, ignored,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted any facts or circumstances supportive of or crucial to his defense. [10]

Secondly, carnal knowledge of AAA as an element of rape was proved although Dra. Mecija's findings
indicated no physical injuries on the body of AAA.[11] Rather than disproving the commission of the rape,
the absence of a finding of physical injuries on AAA corroborated her testimony that she became petrified
with fear and could not offer any physical resistance to his sexual assault after he poked the sharp tip of
the bolo unto her neck.

It is relevant to mention that carnal knowledge as an element of rape does not require penetration. Carnal
knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.[12] Indeed, all that is
necessary for rape to be consummated, according to People v. Campuhan,[13] is for the penis of the
accused to come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. Hence, rape is consummated
once the penis of the accused touches either labia of the pudendum.

Thirdly, we reject the posture of the accused that AAA's old-healed hymenal lacerations, as Dra. Mecija
found, disproved the recent commission of the rape charged. Proof of the presence of hymenal laceration
in the victim is neither indispensable nor necessary in order to establish the commission of rape. Hence,
whether the hymenal lacerations of AAA were fresh or healed was not decisive. [14] In this connection, it is
timely to remind that the commission of rape may be proved by evidence other than the physical
manifestations of force being applied on the victim's genitalia, like the presence of hymenal laceration. For
sure, even the sole testimony of the victim, if found to be credible, suffices to prove the commission of rape.
This rule avoids the situation of letting the rapist escape punishment and go scot-free should he commit the
rape with only himself and the victim as the witnesses to its commission.

Fourthly, the CA correctly prescribed reclusion perpetua. The rape that was committed was not qualified
rape because the accused and BBB were not legally married to each other. What the records show, instead,
was that they were in a common-law relationship, which meant that he was not the stepfather of AAA,
contrary to the allegation of the information. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape through
force, threat or intimidation of a woman 12 years or over in age is punished by reclusion perpetua.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever
the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Although the information alleged the use by the
accused of a deadly weapon (bolo) in the commission of the rape, the CA still correctly prescribed the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua because the information did not allege the attendance of any aggravating
circumstances. With the intervening revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (i.e., effective on December
1, 2000) in order to now require the information to state the "acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances xxx in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstance
and for the court to pronounce judgment,"[15] the Prosecution became precluded from establishing any act
or circumstance not specifically alleged in the information if such act or circumstance would increase the
penalty to the maximum period.[16]

Lastly, the Court reduces the indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in view of the crime actually proved
being simple rape. However, the RTC and the CA did not award exemplary damages to AAA, despite her
being entitled to such damages by reason of her minority under 18 years at the time of the rape, and
because of the use by the accused of the bolo, a deadly weapon. This recognition of her right accords with
the perceptive pronouncement in People v. Catubig[17] to the effect that exemplary damages were justified
regardless of whether or not the generic or qualifying aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
information because the grant of such damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code was intended for
the sole benefit of the victim and did not concern the criminal liability, the exclusive concern of the State.
For that purpose, therefore, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are hereby fixed.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on January 29, 2008, subject to

the MODIFICATION that Rogelio Abrencillo is ordered to pay AAA the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and the further amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the moral
damages of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 179962 June 11, 2014

DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 1 filed by Dr. Joel C. Mendez
(petitioner) assailing the June 12, 2007 and August 13, 2007 resolutions 2 of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA)3 The assailed resolutions granted the prosecution's Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court
and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENTS

The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Department of Justice against
the petitioner. The BIR alleged that the petitioner had been operating as a single proprietor doing business
and/or exercising his profession for taxable years 2001 to 2003 under the following trade names and
registration addresses:5

1. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa

 Registered with Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 39 – South Quezon City

2. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa

Registered with RDO No. 39 – South Quezon City

3. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa

Registered with RDO No. 40 – Cubao

4. Mendez Body and Face Skin Clinic

Registered with RDO No. 47 – East Makati

5. Weigh Less Center

Registered with RDO No. 21

6. Mendez Weigh Less Center

Registered with RDO No. 4 – Calasiao Pangasinan

Based on these operations, the BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns for taxable
years 2001 to 2003 and, consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due the
government.6

In his defense, the petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single proprietor under these trade
names in Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando. However, he countered that he did not file his
income tax returns in these places because his business establishments were registered only in 2003 at
the earliest; thus, these business establishments were not yet in existence at the time of his alleged failure
to file his income tax return.7

After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found probable cause against
petitioner for non-filing of income tax returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and for failure to supply
correct and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year 2003, in violation of the National
Internal Revenue Code.8Accordingly an Information9 was filed with the CTA charging the petitioner with
violation of Section 255 of Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997). The Information reads:

That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the
above named accused, a duly registered taxpayer, and sole proprietor of "Weigh Less Center" with principal
office at No. 31 Roces Avenue, Quezon City, and with several branches in Quezon City, Makati, San
Fernando and Dagupan City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his Income
Tax Return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount of ₱1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges
and interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

The accused was arraigned11 and pleaded not guilty on March 5, 2007.12 On May 4, 2007, the prosecution
filed a "Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court."13 The amended information reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the
above named accused, doing business under the name and style of "Weigh Less Center"/Mendez Medical
Group", with several branches in Quezon City, Muntinlupa City, Mandaluyong City and Makati City, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his income tax return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for income earned for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in
the estimated amount of ₱1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest (underscoring and
boldfacing in the original).14

The petitioner failed to file his comment to the motion within the required period; thus on June 12, 2007,the
CTA First Division granted the prosecution’s motion.15 The CTA ruled that the prosecution’s amendment is
merely a formal one as it "merely states with additional precision something already contained in the original
information."16The petitioner failed to show that the defenses applicable under the original information can
no longer be used under the amended information since both the original and the amended information
charges the petitioner with the same offense (violation of Section 255). The CTA observed:

the change in the name of his business to include the phrase "Mendez Medical Group" does not alter the
fact the [petitioner] is being charged with failure to file his Income Tax Return... The change in the branches
of his business, likewise did not relieve [the petitioner] of his duty to file an ITR. In addition, the places
where the accused conducts business does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction... nor ... change the nature of
the offense charged, as only one [ITR] is demanded of every taxpayer. We likewise see no substantial
difference on the information with the insertion of the phrase ‘for income earned’ for it merely stated the
normal subject matter found in every income tax return.

The petitioner filed the present petition after the CTA denied his motion for reconsideration.17 THE
PETITION

The petitioner claims in his petition that the prosecution’s amendment is a substantial amendment
prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is substantial in nature
because its additional allegations alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to him
and affect the form of his defense.18 Thus, he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Adopting the observation of a dissenting CTA justice, he claims that to change the allegation on the
locations of his business from San Fernando, Pampanga and Dagupan City to Muntinlupa and
Mandaluyong cities would cause surprise to him on the form of defense he would have to assume.

The petitioner adds that the change in the date of the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002 would
also alter his defense considering that the difference in taxable years would mean requiring a different set
of defense evidence. The same is true with the new allegation of "Mendez Medical Group" since it deprived
him of the right, during the preliminary investigation, to present evidence against the alleged operation and
or existence of this entity.19 In sum, the amendments sought change the subject of the offense and thus
substantial.20 RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT

The respondents claim that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the CTA resolutions.
Under Rule 9, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of CTA, the remedy of appeal to the CTA en banc is the
proper remedy, to be availed of within fifteen days from receipt of the assailed resolution. The filing of the
present petition was clearly a substitute for a lost appeal. Even assuming that certiorari is the proper
remedy, the CTA did not commit an error of jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion. On the
contrary, the assailed resolutions were in accord with jurisprudence. The amended information could not
have caused surprise to the petitioner since the amendments do not change the nature and cause of
accusation against him. The offense the petitioner probably committed and the acts or omissions involved
remain the same under the original and the amended information, i.e., his failure to file his ITR in 2002 for
income earned in 2001 from the operation of his businesses.21
Neither would the change in the date of the commission of the crime nor the inclusion of the phrase "Mendez
Medical Group" cause surprise to the petitioner since he was fully apprised of these facts during the
preliminary investigation. Likewise, the original information already alleged that the petitioner’s failure to file
an ITR refers to "taxable year 2001."

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the preparation of the defense contemplated in the law does not
strictly include the presentation of evidence during the preliminary investigation because this stage is not
the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. ISSUES:

1. Is the remedy of certiorari proper?

2. Whether the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are substantial
in nature and must perforce be denied?

COURT’S RULING

We resolve to dismiss the petition.

Preliminary consideration

The petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari
is available when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. After failing in his bid for the CTA to reconsider its admission of the amended information, the only
remedy left to the petitioner is to file a petition for certiorari with this Court.

Contrary to the prosecution’s argument, the remedy of appeal to the CTA en banc is not available to the
petitioner. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order,
resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends
to assail. What Section 9 Rule 922 of the Rules of the CTA provides is that appeal to the CTA en banc may
be taken from a decision or resolution of the CTA division in criminal cases by filing a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1, Rule 43, the remedy of a petition for review is
available only against a judgments or a final order.

A judgment or order is considered final if it disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates
a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If
the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done
to resolve the merits of the case, as in the present case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s
only remedy after failing to obtain a reconsideration of the ruling is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Nonetheless, while we rule that the petitioner availed of the correct remedy, we resolve to dismiss the
petition for failure to establish that the CTA abused its discretion, much less gravely abused its discretion.

Amendment of information

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the matter of amending the
information:

Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without

leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to
the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. According to jurisprudence,

substantial matters in the complaint or information consist of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. 23 Under Section 14, however, the prosecution is
given the right to amend the information, regardless of the nature of the amendment, so long as the
amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the second
paragraph of Section 14.

Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from
seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the
accused.24 One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the arraignment of the accused of the
charge of against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense
against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then
the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information.

To illustrate these points, in Almeda v. Judge Villaluz, 25 the prosecution wanted to additionally alleged
recidivism and habitual delinquency in the original information. In allowing the amendment, the Court
observed that the amendment sought relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in
the event of conviction. Since they do not have the effect of charging an offense different from the one
charged (qualified theft of a motor vehicle) in the information, nor do they tend to correct any defect in the
trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the amendment sought is merely formal.

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,26 the prosecution sought during trial to amend the information from frustrated
to consummated murder since the victim died after the information for frustrated murder was filed. The
accused refused to be arraigned under the amended information without the conduct of a new preliminary
investigation. In sustaining the admission of the amended information, the Court reasoned that the
additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the
trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Again, there is no change in the nature of offense
charged; nor is there a change in the prosecution’s theory that the accused committed a felonious act with
intent to kill the victim; nor does the amendment affect whatever defense the accused originally may have.

In short, amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original one;27 or
do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form
of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments.

In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the alleged change in the
date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase "doing business under
the name and style of Mendez Medical Group;" (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of petitioner’s
operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase "for income earned." We cannot see how these amendments
would adversely affect any substantial right of the petitioner as accused.

The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase "for income earned"

At the outset we note that the actual year of the commission of the offense has escaped both the petitioner
and prosecution. In its Motion to Amend the Information, the prosecution mistakenly stated that the
information it originally filed alleged the commission of the offense as "on or about the 15th day of April,
2001" – even if the record is clear that that the actual year of commission alleged is 2002. The petitioner
makes a similar erroneous allegation in its petition before the Court.
Interestingly, in its August 13, 2007 resolution, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CTA
implicitly ruled that there was in fact no amendment of the date in the information by correctly citing what
the original information alleges. This, notwithstanding, the petitioner still baselessly belaboured the point in
its present petition by citing the erroneous content of the prosecution’s motion to amend instead of the
original information itself.28 This kind of legal advocacy obviously added nothing but confusion to what is
otherwise a simple case and another docket to the High Court’s overwhelming caseload.

That the actual date of the commission of the offense pertains to the year 2002 is only consistent with the
allegation in the information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for the taxable year 2001. Since the
information alleges that petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001, then the
offense could only possibly be committed when petitioner failed to file his income tax return before the due
date of filing, which is on April of the succeeding year, 2002. Accordingly, the addition of the phrase "for the
income earned" before the phrase "for the taxable year 2001" cannot but be a mere formal amendment
since the added phrase merely states with additional precision something that is already contained in the
original information, i.e., the income tax return is required to be filed precisely for the income earned for the
preceding taxable year.

The nature of the remaining two items of amendment would be better understood, not only in the context
of the nature of the offense charged under the amended information, but likewise in the context of the legal
status of the "Mendez Medical Group."

The addition of the phrase "doing business

under the name and style of Mendez
Medical Group and the change and/or
addition of the branches of petitioner’s
operation

Under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), a resident citizen who is engaged in the practice of a
profession within the Philippines is obligated to file in duplicate an income tax return on his income from all
sources, regardless of the amount of his gross income.29 In complying with this obligation, this type of
taxpayer ought to keep only two basic things in mind: first is where to file the return; and second is when to
file the return. Under Section 51 B of the NIRC, the return should "be filed with an authorized agent bank,
Revenue District Officer, Collection Agent or duly authorized Treasurer of the city or municipality in which
such person has his legal residence or principal place of business in the Philippines."

On the other hand, under Section 51 C of the NIRC, the same taxpayer is required to file his income tax
return on or before the fifteenth (15th) day of April of each year covering income for the preceding taxable
year.30 Failure to comply with this requirement would result in a violation of Section 255 of the NIRC which
reads:

Section 255. Failure to File Return, Supply Correct and Accurate Information, Pay Tax Withhold and Remit
Tax and Refund Excess Taxes Withheld on Compensation. - Any person required under this Code or by
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder to pay any tax, make a return, keep any record, or supply
any correct and accurate information, who wilfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such record,
or supply correct and accurate information, or withhold or remit taxes withheld, or refund excess taxes
withheld on compensation, at the time or times required by law or rules and regulations shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than Ten
thousand pesos (₱10,000) and suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than ten (10)
years. [emphasis supplied]

Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from taxable years 2001 to 2003, the petitioner should
have filed a consolidated return in his principal place of business, regardless of the number and location of
his other branches. Consequently, we cannot but agree with the CTA that the change and/or addition of the
branches of the petitioner’s operation in the information does not constitute substantial amendment
because it does not change the prosecution’s theory that the petitioner failed to file his income tax return.

Still, the petitioner cites the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division31 in claiming that the
deletion of San Fernando (Pampanga City) and Dagupan City deprives him of the defenses he raised in
his counter-affidavit.

In Matalam, the prosecution charged the accused with violation of RA No. 3019 for "[c]ausing undue injury
to several [government employees] thru evident bad faith xxx by illegally and unjustifiably refusing to pay
[their] monetary claims xxx in the nature of unpaid salaries during the period when they have been illegally
terminated, including salary differentials and other benefits." After a reinvestigation, the prosecution sought
to amend the information to allege that the accused –

[c]ause[d] undue injury by illegally dismissing from the service [several government] employees, xxx to their
damage and prejudice amounting to ₱1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries during the period when they
have been illegally terminated including salary differentials and other benefits.32

The accused moved to dismiss the amended information for charging an entirely new cause of action and
asked for preliminary investigation on this new charge of illegal dismissal.

The Sandiganbayan observed that (i) there is a clear change in the cause of action (from refusal to pay to
illegal dismissal); and (ii) the main defense of all the accused in the original information – the lack of a
corresponding appropriation for the payment of the monetary claims of the complaining witnesses – would
no longer be available under the amendment. After finding, however, that the complainants’ demand for
monetary claim actually arose from their alleged illegal dismissal, the Sandiganbayan allowed the
amendment because an "inquiry to the allegations in the original information will certainly and necessarily
elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended Information." 33

As to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by an amendment made after he had pleaded to the
original information, Montenegroruled34 that prejudice exists when a defense under the original information
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have, would be inapplicable to the Information as amended.35 Applying this test, the Court disallowed the
amendment for being substantial in nature as the recital of facts constituting the offense charged was
altered.36

The inapplicability of Matalam to the present case is obvious. Here, the prosecution’s theory of the case,
i.e., that petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001 did not change. The
prosecution’s cause for filing an information remained the same as the cause in the original and in the
amended information. For emphasis, the prosecution’s evidence during the preliminary investigation of the
case shows that petitioner did not file his income tax return in his place of legal residence 37 or principal
place of business in Quezon City or with the Commissioner. In short, the amendment sought did not alter
the crime charged.

At first, a change in the location of branches alleged in the information may appear to deprive the petitioner
of his defense in the original information, i.e., the petitioner’s branches in Dagupan and San Fernando were
registered only in 2003 and were therefore "in existent" in 2001. However, this is not the kind of defense
contemplated under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and broadly under the due process of law.

Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the opportunity given to the accused to present his defense evidence
during the preliminary investigation is not exhaustive. In the same manner that the complainant’s evidence
during preliminary investigation is only required to establish the minimal evidentiary threshold of probable
cause, the evidence that the respondent may present during trial is not limited to what he had presented
during the preliminary investigation, so long as the evidence for both parties supports or negates the
elements of the offense charged.
To be sure, the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an
information pertains to the availability of the same defense and evidence that the accused previously had
under the original information. This test, however, must be read together with the characteristic thread of
formal amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the crime or the essence of the offense charged. 38

In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the amended information, alleging the
petitioner’s failure to file his return and consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes. Accordingly, the
petitioner could not have been surprised at all.

We also reject for lack of merit petitioner’s claim that the inclusion of the phrase "doing business under the
name and style of Mendez Medical Group" after his preliminary investigation and arraignment deprives him
of the right to question the existence of this "entity."

The petitioner however has not drawn our attention to any of his related operations that actually possesses
its own juridical personality. In the original information, petitioner is described as "sole proprietor of Weigh
Less Center." A sole proprietorship is a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single
individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof, like the petitioner-accused, to secure licenses and
permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government without acquiring juridical
or legal personality of its own.39

In the amended information, the prosecution additionally alleged that petitioner is "doing business under
the name and style of ‘Weigh Less Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’" Given the nature of a sole
proprietorship, the addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style" is merely descriptive
of the nature of the business organization established by the petitioner as a way to carry out the practice of
his profession. As a phrase descriptive of a sole proprietorship, the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the
"entity" "Mendez Medical Group" because this entity is nothing more than the shadow of its business owner
- petitioner himself.

At any rate, we agree with the prosecution that petitioner has no reason to complain for the inclusion of the
phrase "Mendez Medical Group." In the Reply-Affidavit it submitted during the preliminary investigation, the
prosecution has attached copies of petitioner's paid advertisements making express reference to "Mendez
Medical Group."40

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner.

G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 185587

RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving
Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 185636

RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving
Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 190005

VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine
Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. 1 The mass grave contained skeletal
remains of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the
Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction,
we take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners have chosen to take recourse directly
before us and that the cases are of significant national interest.

Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require consideration. Accordingly,
in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this Court will pass primarily upon the following:

1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.

2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the political
offense doctrine.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of the orders and resolutions of
public respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners for
the crime of multiple murder.

Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division
of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate legal action
on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder,
including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.

The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army
discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte.4Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims
of Operation VD.5

The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8 was immediately
dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and to collect, preserve and analyze the
skeletal remains.6 Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an investigation team composed of intelligence
officers, and medico-legal and DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged
relatives of the victims DNA samples for matching.7

The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the identities of the skeletal remains and even the
length of time that they had been buried. The report recommended the conduct of further tests to confirm
the identities of the remains and the time window of death.9

However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National
Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the names of ten (10) possible victims after
comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives and witnesses. 11

The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. All of them swore
that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never
seen again.

They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among those discovered at the mass grave
site.

Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad, 12 Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),15 Randall B.
Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members
of the Central Committee.

According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement Operation VD, namely, (1)
the Intel Group responsible for gathering information on suspected military spies and civilians who would
not support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group
which would subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the "cleaners" of those
confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not support the movement. 19

From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by members
of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among
others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo
submitted his counter-affidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file counter-affidavits because
they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel
of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary
investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not
served a subpoena.27

In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for
15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners
herein, for the death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro
Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias
Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado,
and 15) Ereberto Prado.29

Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and
Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital
to the success of the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.

The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos,
Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando) on 28 February 2007, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. H-1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution recommending the filing of the
Information.32

On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all
mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them
with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.34

On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6
March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero. 35 The
petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further
proceedings during the pendency of the petition.36

Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners Echanis
and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC
Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues
that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when
committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion. 40

We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition and the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction, and set42 the case for oral
arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on 27 March 2007. 43

The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral arguments:

1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy of petitioner
Ocampo;

2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
 3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion charge against
him in the RTC.44

Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10 days. 45 On 3 April 2007, the
Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under a ₱100,000 cash bond. 46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single Information filed before the
RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15 counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to
Admit Amended Information and New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an Order dated 27 July 2007,
Judge Abando held in abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during
the pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.48

While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28 January 2008 by virtue of
the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March 2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis
and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to
Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant. 50

On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion. 51 Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis
filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before being able to rule thereon, Judge
Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution dated
23 April 2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to transfer the
venue of the case.

The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina
(Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to
the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed their Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration. 55

In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of the case pending the
resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.

On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss. 57

On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando
and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for
the unconditional and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further incarceration. 59

On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando
and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation
of the warrant of arrest against petitioner Baylosis.61

The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009. 62

On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases with G.R. No.
176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner Echanis’s immediate release, to
which the OSG did not interpose any objection on these conditions: that the temporary release shall only
be for the purpose of his attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009;
and that his temporary release shall not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter condition was later modified,
such that his temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of his actual participation in the peace
negotiations.66

On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis under a ₱100,000 cash
bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace negotiations.67

Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition 68 to petitioner Ladlad’s motion to quash
before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on 13 February 2009. 69

On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August 2009. 71

On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge
Medina.72 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.

On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587 and
185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment 74 on 7
May 2010.

On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos. 185636 and
185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December 201076 and on 21 January
2011,77 respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.

On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21 July 2011, petitioner Baylosis
filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of a ₱100,000
cash bail to them considering that they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then
holding negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord. 81

On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the
amount of ₱100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of
their actual participation in the peace negotiations.82

Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.

OUR RULING

Petitioners were accorded due

process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.

A. Preliminary Investigation

A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. 85 While the right to have a preliminary investigation
before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process
in the administration of criminal justice.86

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be
heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the
accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to
a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it.
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's
defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a
chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process. 90

Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not served a subpoena due to the false
address indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor
Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of appearance before the Office of
the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels’ addresses. 93 Thus,
they were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.

Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain
Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case without
furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006
stated that a meeting presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching of Operation
VD was agreed upon.95Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-affidavit dated 22 December
2006 stating that he was in military custody from October 1976 until his escape in May 1985. 96 Thereafter,
the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007 admitted that he made a mistake in
his original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in June 1985. 97 Petitioner Ocampo argues
that he was denied the opportunity to reply to the Supplemental Affidavit by not being furnished a copy
thereof.

Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal
the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution
by 19 days, effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right to due process. 98

As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor Vivero’s
Resolution, which states:

In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the
respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their
counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found
in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur,
Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente
Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance
by their respective counsels.99

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent
were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid.100The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a
respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.101

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named
respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority
of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53 Sct. Rallos St.,
QC,"102 which had never been his address at any time.103 In connection with this claim, we take note of the
fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlad’s wife,104 was sent to the same address, and that she
was among those mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.

Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad’s counsel filed a formal entry of
appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad had
received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.

Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation.
Instead, he refused to participate.

We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to
do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case." 106 Having opted to remain passive during the
preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since
their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.

Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s allegation of collusion to surreptitiously insert the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records. There was nothing surreptitious about the
Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an earlier affidavit and admits the mistake committed
regarding the date of the alleged meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was also
clearly stated. Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his counter-
affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with the opportunity to question the
execution of Zacarias Piedad’s Supplemental Affidavit.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him to
claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of
Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit.
The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of
several other witnesses107 attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.

As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution
of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that
the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from
the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from
Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:

Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution,
or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March 2007,108 the
former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter or
an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for
certiorari directly before this Court on 16 March 2007.

B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in
finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners. 109

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. 111 In fact, the judge’s
personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for
determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.112

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents showing
the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if,
on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and
require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. 113

Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the records
submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against
them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in
the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. 115

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed
to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given
to trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan 117 as
follows:

x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be interfered with in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as
well as the conclusions of law. x x x.

Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a
question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor,
including other documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.

Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the complainants
and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable cause for petitioners’ indictment for
multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As stated above, the trial judge’s appreciation
of the evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal determination if he reviews
the [I]nformation and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the
accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged." 118

Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown by the following portion
of the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:

On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by the Provincial Prosecution
of Leyte Province supported by the following documents: Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn Statements of
Witnesses and other pertinent documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region
VIII and Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains, this court has the
findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged. 119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of
arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not within the
purview of a petition for certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.

The political offense doctrine is not a

ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." 121

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. 122 Thus, when a
killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing
assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished
as rebellion alone.

However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with
simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the
sound discretion of the public prosecutor.123

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the
court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political
motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124

Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly seen
from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.

We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the
defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.125 The proof showing political
motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence
supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.

As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 126 if during trial,
petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion,
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:

SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial
court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as
petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. 127

A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment
for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.128

To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized under Article
134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed
before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.129

However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944.1awp++i1 Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had
already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their
motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and
independence.130 When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed
supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131We eventually ordered the
dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.

Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the ₱100,000 cash bond posted before the
Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty until the termination of the proceedings
before the RTC Manila.1âwphi1

The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in
view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release from detention under the cash bond of
₱100,000 each shall continue under the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period
of their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government or until
the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the
government to inform this Court the moment that peace negotiations are concluded.

WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino
C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination
of the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente
P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until their actual
participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government are concluded or
terminated, or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.