Succession Cases (INCOMPLETE

SUCCESSION
CASE NOTES
SUCCESSION IN GENERAL
RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as following:
SECTION 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.
The Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession.
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner
in exchange for a devisee of a piece of land.
The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of WANDA because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest
title to the land in the usufructuary and it is vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
ARTICLE 728
The decisive proof that the present donation is operative inter vivos lies in the final phrase lies in
CUEVAS vs. CUEVAS the final phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away the land “because I am
reserving it to him upon my death.”
By these words the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in favor of
another (a right essential to ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the
naked title to the property in favor of the donee.
…such irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos because it is incompatible with the
idea of a disposition post mortem.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she
should retain the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime but that the naked title should
irrevocably pass to the donee. It is only thus all expressions discussed can be given full effect; and
when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the possession, cultivation, harvesting, and
all other rights and attributes of ownership, she meant only the dominium utile, not the full
ownership.
The words rights and attributes of ownership should be construed ejusdem generis with the
preceding rights of possession, cultivation and harvesting expressly enumerated in the deed. Had
the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership she had no need to specify possession,
cultivation and harvesting since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor
would she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the rights and attributes of
ownership that she reserved for herself.
To respect the terms of the donation and at the same time express gratitude for the donor’s
benevolence constitutes sufficient acceptance.
JUTIC vs. CA EXHIBIT 4 is not a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a
desire. It is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donation.
Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules established in the title on succession.
MAGLASANG vs. CABATINGAN In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor
Deed of Conditional Donation Inter Vivos for House and is still alive.
Lot
In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken
into account—
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor
to dispose of the properties conveyed;
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(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donation as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners
prior to CABATINGAN’s death. The phrase to become effective upon the death of the donor – admits
of no other interpretation but that CABATINGAN did not intend to transfer the ownership of the
properties to PETITIONER/S during her lifetime.
That the donations were made in consideration of the love and affection of the donor does not
qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same
reason.
As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should have
been complied with under ARTICLE 728 of the CIVIL CODE, otherwise the donation is void and would
produce no effect.
The subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case PETITIONERS
predecease CONCHITA CABATINGAN. One of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa
is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly
what CABATINGAN provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should
take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferred to
the donee or independently of and not by reason of her death, she would not have expressed such
proviso in the subject deeds.
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature
of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the
requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under ARTICLE 805 AND 806 of the CIVIL CODE.
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee,
the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the provisions of law. Thus,
the trial court did not commit reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of donation null and
void.
GANUELAS vs. CAWED • donation inter vivos – the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may
Deed of Donation of Real Property be deferred until the death of the donor.
If the donation takes effect during the donor’s lifetime or independently of the donor’s death,
meaning that the full/naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
donee during the donor’s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of the
donation, the donation is inter vivos.
• donation mortis causa— nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the
death of the donor-testator.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor’s death, meaning the full/naked ownership
of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor’s death, then it is at that
time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in
a last will and testament.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the
validity/revocation of the donation depends upon its nature.
donation inter vivos— it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by
ARTICLE/s 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on
contracts will apply.
donation mortis causa— the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the
validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
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In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right,
title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to URSULINA prior to the death of
CELESTINA. The phrase to become effective upon the death of the donor admits of no other
interpretation but that CELESTINA intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to URSULINA
on her death, not during her lifetime.
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor,
the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation
is a postmortem disposition. One of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that
the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and
affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee
and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the
deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In
other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.
As the subject deed, then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under
ARTICLE 728 of the CIVIL CODE should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void
and produces no effect.
The attesting witness failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus violating
ARTICLE 806 of the CIVIL CODE.
DEL ROSARIO vs. FERRER The document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling.
Irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa,
where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act.
A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of
the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently
held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that
the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated
property while they lived.
The three donee/s signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required.
An acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement
only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be
accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The
reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of
the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of
the property donated.
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent
assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by
then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non
habet.
VILLANUEVA vs. SPOUSES BRANOCO (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
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(4) The specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor
indicates that the donation is inter vivos rather than a disposition mortis causa.
(5) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa or a provision in the deed to the effect
that the donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria; such
statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give
effect to the real intent of the transferor;
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than
mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of
the deed.
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ARTICLE 774
CORONEL vs. CA Petitioners argue there could have been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because they were then not
yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
ARTICLE 774 of the CIVIL CODE defines succession as a mode of transferring ownership.
ARTICLE 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to be
extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will
or by operation of law.
PETITIONERS-SELLERS in the case at bar, being the sons and daughters of the decedent CONSTANCIO P. CORONEL
are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. thus, at the point their father drew his
last breath, PETITIONERS stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights
or obligations pertaining thereto, became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights
to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
BALUS vs. BALUS The right to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of
Extrajudicial Settlement a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well
as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, since RUFO lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at
the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, PETITIONER and RESPONDENT/s never inherited the subject lot from their father.
PETITIONER and RESPONDENT/s were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus,
any issue arising from the supposed right of PETITIONER as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated
by the fact that, in the eyes, of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of PETITIONER and
RESPONDENT/s as compulsory heirs of RUFO at any given point in time.
PETITIONER’s contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject
property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their
intention of having the subject property divided/partitioned by assigning to each of the PETITIONER and
RESPONDENT/s a specific 1/3 portion of the same.
Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It
seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific
property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.
In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates
PETITIONER’s claims in the present case.
ARTICLE 776
MANUEL UY vs. VALBUECO
LIU vs. LOY A prior contract to sell made by the decedent during his lifetime prevails over a subsequent contract of sale made
by the administrator without probate court approval. It is immaterial if the prior contract is a mere contract to
sell and does not immediately convey ownership.
FRANK LIU’s CONTRACT TO SELL became valid and effective upon its execution and bound the estate to convey
the property upon its execution and bound the estate to convey the property upon full payment of the
consideration.
An administrator needs court approval to sell estate property, otherwise the sale is void. Court approval of the
sale of estate property is clearly required under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court which enumerates the instances
when the court may allow the sale or encumbrance of estate property. More importantly, Section 91 of Act No.
486 (Land Registration Act) and Section 88 of the PD No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) specifically require
court approval for any sale of registered land by an executor or administrator.
The laws explicitly require court approval before any sale of estate property by an executor or administrator can
take effect. The purpose of requiring court approval is to protect creditors. In this case, FRANK LIU is a creditor
and he is the person the law seeks to protect.
The orders of the probate court dated March 19 and 23 1976 approving the contracts of the LOY/S are void. The
orders did not ratify the sales because there was already a prior order of the probate court dated February 24
1976 approving the sale of LOT 5 and 6 to FRANK LIU. Hence, the probate court had already lost jurisdiction over
LOT 5 and 6 since the lots no longer formed part of the ESTATE OF JOSE VANO. In fact the administratrix of the
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estate filed a MR of the orders of the probate court approving the contracts of the LOY/s because she already
executed a deed of sale covering LOT 5 and 6 in favor of FRANK LIU.
The LOY/s impliedly admitted that their contracts of sale dated August 19, 1968 and December 16, 1969 were
ineffective when they belatedly asked in 1976 for court approval of the sales. If the LOY/s believed that their
deeds of sale in 1968 and 1969 were valid, they would not have asked for court approval in 1976. By asking for
court approval, they necessarily admitted that without court approval, the sale to them was ineffectual.
The LOY/s are not buyers and registrants in good faith considering that they bought from a seller who was not
registered owner. TEODORO VANO signed both contracts of sale but the titles to the lots sold were in the name
of ESTATE OF JOSE VANO. And since the titles to LOT 5 and 6 were in name of ESTATE OF JOSE VANO, the LOY/s
were on notice that court approval, for the sale of estate property. The ex-parte motion for the court approval of
the sales filed by the LOY/s some 7 or 8 years after the sales transaction reveals a less than honest actuation,
prompting the administratrix to object to the court’s approval.
CONDE vs. ABAYA The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right
to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.
• Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, he
may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure the
acknowledgment of a natural child since it does not last during his whole life but depends on that of the
presumed parents as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.
• Usually, the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and pertains
exclusively to him only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime.
As an exception and in (3) cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child:
1. if he died during his minority; or
2. while insane; or
3. after action had been already instituted
• An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs
of the presumed parents in (2) cases:
1. in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child;
2. upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child executed by the
father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be
transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of the child who
claims acknowledgment as a natural child.
• And it is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights
which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the
component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity to
establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in terms and conditions of Article 118
of the Code. So, that in order that it may constitute a portion of the child’s inheritance it
is necessary that the conditions and terms contained in Article 118 shall be present, since
without them the right that the child held during his lifetime being personal and exclusive
in principle and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of transmission would and
should have been extinguished by his death.
Therefore, where no express provision like that of Article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment
of a natural child is in principle and without exception extinguished by his death and cannot be transmitted as a
portion of the inheritance of the deceased child. On the other hand, if said right formed a part of the child’s
inheritance, it would be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from
the presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain
circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a natural child with a legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural
child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a legitimate child would not only be unreasonable but
as stated in one of the citations most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law and in accordance with the
general principles thereof.
LA HU NIU vs. COLLECTOR The widow and minor children of a deceased Chinese merchant resident and doing business in the Philippine
Islands at the time of his death are not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands solely by reason of such
relationship— Ng Hian vs. Collector
It may be said that it does not appear in the record of this case that the applicant is a merchant. It appears simply
that her husband was, at the time of his death, a resident Chinese merchant doing business in the Philippine
Islands and that he died leaving property including a mercantile business. The assumption of the appellant is that
the mere fact of the death of a merchant makes his wife and children also merchants as it leaves to them as heirs
and next of kin a mercantile business as a part of their inheritance. The SC does not believe that this necessarily
follows. But if it does, the fact remains that she is not resident merchant. She is still outside of the Philippine
Islands and has never held the status of a resident merchant. She must, therefore, establish her right to enter as
a merchant in the first instance. This she did not do. She did not present the section 6 certificate which is the only
evidence upon which her right to enter can be based.
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It necessarily follows that the applicant is not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands upon the status of her
deceased husband; and that when she seeks to enter upon her own personal status she must produce the
evidence which the law requires to establish that status. Not having done this, her application to enter was
properly denied.
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE vs. CA The rationale of a group insurance policy of mortgagors, otherwise known as the mortgage redemption insurance,
is a device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee, it has to
enter into such form of contract so that in the event of the unexpected demise of the mortgagor during the
subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from such insurance will be applied to the payment of the
mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the mortgagor from paying the obligation. In a similar vein, ample
protection is given to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in the event of death; the mortgage obligation
will be extinguished by the application of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness.
Consequently, where the mortgagor pays the insurance premium under the group insurance policy, making the
loss payable to the mortgagee, the insurance is on the mortgagors interest, and the mortgagor continues to be a
party to the contract. In this type of policy insurance, the mortgagee is simply an appointee of the insurance fund,
such loss- payable clause does not make the mortgagee a party to the contract.
The INSURED (LEUTERIO) did not cede to the MORTGAGEE (DBP) all his rights or interests in the insurance, the
policy stating that: In the event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with the Creditor [DBP] shall have
been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor and the balance
of sum assured, if there is any, shall then be paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor.
When DBP submitted the insurance claim against petitioner, the latter denied payment thereof, interposing the
defense of concealment committed by the insured. Thereafter, DBP collected the debt from the mortgagor and
took the necessary action of foreclosure on the residential lot of private respondent.
• Insured, being the person with whom the contract was made is primarily the proper
person to bring suit thereon. Subject to some exceptions, insured may thus sue, although
the policy, is taken wholly or in part for the benefit of another person named or unnamed,
and although it is expressly made payable to another as his interest may appear or
otherwise.
• Although a policy issued to a mortgagor is taken out for the benefit of the mortgagee is
taken out for the benefit of the mortgagee and is made payable to him, yet the mortgagor
may sue thereon in his own name, especially where the mortgagee’s interest is less than
the full amount recoverable under the policy.
• Insured may be regarded as the real party in interest, although he has assigned the policy
for the purpose of collection, or has assigned as collateral security any judgment he may
obtain.
And since a policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will or succession to any person whether
he has an insurable interest or not, and such person may recover it whatever the insured might have recovered,
the widow of the decedent MR. LEUTERIO may file the suit against the INSURER GREPALIFE.
ROBLES vs. batacan Thus, on the nature of the work performed by SEVERINO GERONIMO, he was the tenant on the subject parcel for
quite a time and was recognized by ERNESTO ROBLES as such discharging such tasks as supervising the harvest,
cutting down bushes, clearing the land, picking up the fallen nuts, and paying the laborers like the coconut
gatherers, and huskers from his 1/3 share. This was based on the declarations of several witnesses, including the
PETITIONER himself and the several documents presented by ATANACIO in which his father was described by the
PETITIONER as his kasama to whom was being given his bahagaui or share.
As for the RESPONDENT’s right to succeed his father, the RESPONDENT COURT was correct in affirming the ruling
of the trial court that, as the son of SEVERINO GERONIMO, ATANACIO had the right to take over as agricultural
tenant in the PETITIONER’s land in accordance with RA No. 1199 and RA No. 3844. ATANACIO was the only heir
interested in succeeding his father as his brother, BENEDICTO had not seen fit to claim his right and in fact
defaulted in resisting the PETITIONER’s claims in the ejectment suit. Significantly, when in his prayer the
PETITIONER asks for authority to appoint the said BENEDICTO to succeed his father, it is presumably as his watcher
only and not as agricultural tenant. The PETITIONER’s consistent claim, it should be noted is that SEVERINO
GERONIMO was not his tenant but only his watcher.
SAN AGUSTIN vs. CA Is petitioner entitled to notice? No.

SECTION 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. — In case of loss or theft of an owner's
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate
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certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to
him or for :the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be
filed by the registered owner or other person it interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing,
direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued
in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Consequently, it is sufficient that the notice under SECTION 109 is sent to the ROD and to those persons who are
known to have or appear to have, an interest in the property as shown in the Memorandum of Encumbrances at
the back of the original/transfer certificate of title on file in the office of the ROD. From a legal standpoint, there
are no other interested parties who should be notified, except those abovementioned since they are the only
ones who may be deemed to have a claim to the property involved. A person dealing with registered land is not
charged with notice of encumbrances not annotated on the back of the title.
Here, PETITIONER does not appear to have an interest in the property based on the memorandum of
encumbrances annotated at the back of the title. His claim, that he is an heir (nephew) of the original owner of
the lot covered by the disputed lot and the present occupant thereof is not annotated in the said memorandum
of encumbrances. Neither was his claim entered on the Certificate of Titles in the name of their original/former
owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the time of the filing or pendency of the case. Clearly, PETITIONER is
not entitled to notice.
The proscription under CA No. 141 on sale within the 5-year restrictive period refers to homestead lands only.
Here the lot in dispute is not a homestead land, as found by the trial and appellate courts. Said lot is owned by
GSIS, under TCT No. 10028 in its proprietary capacity. Moreover, as far as the violation of the 5-year restrictive
condition imposed by GSIS in its contract with PETITIONER's predecessor-in- interest is concerned, it is the GSIS
and not PETITIONER who had a cause of action against private respondent.
In this case, the GSIS has not filed any action for the annulment of Exhibit "D", nor for the forfeiture of the lot in
question. In our view, the contract of sale remains valid between the parties, unless and until annulled in the
proper suit filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. For now, the said contract of sale is binding upon the heirs of
MACARIA VDA. DE CAIQUEP, including PETITIONER who alleges to be one of her heirs, in line with the rule that
heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in- interest.
RABADILLA vs. ca It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death
codicil appended of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
last will and testament of testatrix aleja descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.
Thus, the PETITIONER, his mother and sisters are compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, DR. JORGE RABADILLA
succeeded by the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, DR. JORGE RABADILLA.
Under ARTICLE 776 of the CIVIL CODE, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person,
not extinguished by his death.
Whatever rights DR. JORGE RABADILLA had by virtue of subject CODICIL were transmitted to his forced heirs at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the CODICIL on the deceased DR. JORGE RABADILLA were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said CODICIL, TESTATRIX ALEJA devised LOT 1392 to DR. JORGE RABADILLA subject to the condition that the
usufruct thereof would be delivered to the RESPONDENT every year. Upon the death of DR. JORGE RABADILLA,
his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property and they also assumed his decedent’s
obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to RESPONDENT. Such obligation of the instituted heir
reciprocally corresponds to the right of RESPONDENT over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance which is
now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, RESPONDENT has a cause
of action against PETITIONER and the trial court was wrong in dismissing the complaint.
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of PETITIONER that the RESPONDENT has only a right of usufruct
but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly
limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the will, as to the application of any of its
provisions, the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must
be adopted.
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar yearly to
MARLENA BELLEZA COSCUELLA. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, DR. JORGE RABADILLA, his heirs,
and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected,
9
MARLENA BELLEZA COSCUELLA shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The
non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof
to the testatrix’s near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose
ALVAREZ vs. ca property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value for damages.
PETITIONER/S contend that the liability arising from the sale of LOT 773-A and LOT 773-B made by ROSENDO
ALVAREZ to DR. RODOLFO SISON should be the sole liability of the late ROSENDO ALVAREZ or of his estate after
his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs.
ARTICLE 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either
by his will or by operation of law.
ARTICLE 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
ARTICLE 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs except in cases where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissibly by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
• The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before
the residue is distributed among said heirs. The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from
the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in
fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
• Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
• The rule is a consequence of the progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties that,
as observed by VICTORIO POLACCO, has characterized the history of these institutions. From the
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from
patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare
cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of
its performance by a specific person and by no other.
PETITIONER/s being the heirs of the late ROSENDO ALVAREZ, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their
father’s transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That PETITIONER/s did not inherit the
property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into
the mass of their father’s hereditary estate, and that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totaliry for
the payment of the debts of the estate. It must, however, be made clear that PETITIONER/s are liable only to the
extent of the value of their inheritance.
pamplona vs. moreto Under ARTICLE 776 of the NCC the inheritance which RESPONDENT/s received from their deceased parents
and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by
their parents’ death. And under ARTICLE 1311, paragraph 1, NCC, the contract of sale executed by the deceased
FLAVIANO MORETO took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the RESPONDENT/s herein.
Accordingly, to the RESPONDENT/s is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of
781 sq. meters to the PETITIONER/s (which was the original obligation of their predecessor FLAVIANO MORETO)
and not only ½ thereof. RESPONDENTS must comply with said obligation.
10
ledesma vs. MCLACHLIN PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: the trial court was wrong in holding that the properties inherited by the defendants
promissory note from their deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their
deceased father, who died without leaving any property.
While it is true that under the provisions of the Civil Code, children presents his father or mother who died before
him in the properties of his grandfather/grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child
answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father/mother because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with
the benefit of inventory, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. Herein
defendants as heirs of EUSEBIO QUITCO in representation of their father LORENZO QUITCO are not bound to pay
the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did not inherit anything.
The claim for the payment of an indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its collection
before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his father, and the properties
inherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of the indebtedness
contracted during the lifetime of said person.
ARTICLE 777
INING vs. VEGA LEON died without issue; his heirs are his siblings ROMANA and GREGORIA, who thus inherited in equal shares.
In turn, ROMANA’s and GREGORIA’s heirs— the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’
passing. Under ARTICLE 777 of the CIVIL CODE, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death.
RIOFERIO vs. CA Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without a doubt have legal personality to bring suit in
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF A behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of ARTICLE 777 of the NEW CIVIL CODE,
DECEASED PERSON WITH QUITCLAIM that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance
of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if the administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the
heirs in the rules on party representation— Section 3, Rule 3, and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
The rules, while permitting an executor/administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do
not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special
proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no
administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of
an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect
the rights and interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of
the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes (2) exceptions –

(1) If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
(2) When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party
defendant.
Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover the property of the estate is as compelling
when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator, but he is
either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
The rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the
pendency of administration proceedings has (3) exceptions, the 3rd being when there is no appointed
administrator such as in this case.
HEIRS OF TOMAS CALPATURA vs. PRADO
FELIPE vs. HEIRS OF ALDON
EASTERN vs. LUCERO
11
EMNACE vs. CA Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of VICENTE TABANAO has no legal capacity to sue since she was
PARTNERSHIP never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can
file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of VICENTE TABANAO.
From the very moment of VICENTE TABANAO’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights VICENTE TABANAO had against the partnership and PETITIONER were transmitted
to RESPONDENTS by operation of law, by succession which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.
Moreover, RESPONDENTS became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment VICENTE
TABANAO died.
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of SALVACION TABANAO as executrix or administratrix
is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors, who stepped into the shoes
of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. From the
moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of PETITIONER’s obligations as outlined
in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to RESPONDENTS. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and
seek the court’s intervention to compel PETITIONER to fulfill his obligations.
IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE SECTION 1, RULE 92 grants concurrent jurisdiction between municipal and city court and Courts of First Instance
LAVIDES’ vs. CITY OF LUCENA in the appointment of guardians either with respect to the person or property of the minor or incompetent,
PETITION FOR GUARDIANSHIP except that where the value of the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the
municipal or city courts, the guardianship proceedings shall be instituted in the CFI.
It is clear therefore, that the value of the property of the minor or incompetent sought to be placed in
guardianship determines which court has jurisdiction. And that property referred to is the individual estate of the
minor so much so that when there are more than one minor or incompetent sought to be placed under
guardianship, what determines which court has jurisdiction is the value of the individual property of each minor
or incompetent.
For what is decisive is not the total value of the estate of the decedent but the value of the individual share, of
each of the minor heirs for whom a guardian is sought to be appointed individually not collectively.
BONILLA vs. CA While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing
the case up to its completion.
The records of this case show that the death of FORTUNATA BARCENA [DECEASED PLAINTIFF] took place on JULY
9 while the complaint was filed on MARCH 31, FORTUNATA BARCENA was still alive and therefore the court had
acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby
a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted.
Under SECTION 16, RULE 3 of the RULES OF COURT, whenever a party to a pending case dies… it shall be the duty
of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death… and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representatives.
This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased PLAINTIFF when he manifested before the
RESPONDENT COURT that FORTUNATA BARCENA died on JULY 9 and asked for the proper substitution of parties
in the case.
ARTICLE 777 of the CIVIL CODE provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent. From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners
of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the
heirs acquire definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to
the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or
intestate proceedings.
When FORTUNATA BARCENA died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation [CIVIL CASE NO. 856] was
not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired
interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore no reason for
the RESPONDENT COURT not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the DECEASED PLAINTIFF.
Under SECTION 17, RULE 3 of the RULES OF COURT, after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and be substituted
for the deceased, within such time as may be granted. The question as whether an action survives or not depends
on the nature of the action and the damage sued for.
In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
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Following the criterion, the claim of the DECEASED PLAINTIFF which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of
land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives
even after her death. It is therefore, the duty of the RESPONDENT COURT to order the legal representative of
the DECEASED PLAINTIFF to appear and to be substituted for her.
Under SECTION 17, RULE 3 of the RULES OF COURT, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative
fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased.
In the instant case, RESPONDENT COURT did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor
children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them
because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family.
BORROMEO-HERRERA vs. BORROMEO
DELA MERCED vs. DELA MERCED The law in point in the present case is ARTICLE 777 which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted
ILLEGIMATE CHILD from the moment of death of the decedent.
Since EVARISTA died ahead of her brother FRANCISCO, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former
as one of the heirs. Subsequently when FRANCISCO died, his heirs – his spouse, legitimate children and
RESPONDENT JOSELITO, an illegitimate child inherited his share in the estate of EVARISTA. JOSELITO does not
claim to be an heir of EVARISTA by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late
FRANCISCO in the latter’s share (or portion thereof) in the estate of EVARISTA.
The present case relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the share of his late father in the estate
of the decedent EVARISTA, ownership of which has been transmitted to his father upon the death of EVARISTA.
There is no legal obstacle for RESPONDENT JOSELITO, admittedly the son of the late FRANCISCO, to inherit in his
own right as an heir to his father’s estate, which estate includes a 1/3 undivided share in the estate of EVARISTA.
GAYON vs. GAYON To begin with, it is not true that MRS. GAYON has nothing to do with the land subject of PLAINTIFF’s complaint.
As the widow of SILVESTRE GAYON she is one of his compulsory heirs and has accordingly, an interest in the
property in question. Her own motion to dismiss indicated merely a necessity of amending the complaint, to the
end that the other successors in interest of SILVESTRE GAYON instead of the latter, be made parties in this case.
Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place by operation of law, from the moment of the death of the decedent
and the inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death, it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would be sued not as
representatives of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in question even if the
precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decedent. Hence
they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
PALICTE vs. RAMOLETE Does MATILDE PALICTE fall within the term successor-in-interest? YES.
REDEMPTION
The rule is that the term successor-in-interest includes—
• one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of redemption;
• one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption;
• one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law;
• one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the property sold;
• the wife as regards her husband’s homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband’s
title passes to her.
A surety cannot redeem the property of the principal sold on execution because the surety by paying
the debt of the principal, stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor, and consequently is
not a successor in interest in the property.
In the case at bar, PALICTE is the daughter of the late DON FILEMON SOTTO whose estate was levied upon on
execution to satisfy the money judgment against it. She is one of the declared heirs in SP 2706-R. As a legitimate
heir, she qualifies as a successor-in-interest.
ARTICLE 777 of the CIVIL CODE states that, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent.
At the moment of the decedent’s death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedent’s liabilities.
In fact, they may dispose of the same even while the property is under administration. If the heirs may dispose
of their shares in the decedent’s property even while it is under administration. With more reason should the
heirs be allowed to redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an administration.
Respondents contend that petitioner must positively prove that the (3) other co-heirs, the administrator, and the
intestate court had expressly agreed to the redemption of the disputed parcels of land.
13
The SC sees no need for such prior approval. While it may have been desirable it is not indispensable under the
circumstances of this case. What is important is that all of them acquiesced in the act of redeeming property for
the estate. There is no clear proof of such approval. What is beyond dispute from the records is that they did not
disapprove nor reprobate the acts of the PETITIONER. There is likewise nothing in the records to indicate that the
redemption was not beneficial to the ESTATE OF DON FILEMON SOTTO.
It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed and determinate pending the order of distribution
but the heir’s interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of its properties is greater than anybody
else’s, definitely more than the administrator’s who merely holds it for the creditors, the heirs and the legatees.
LOCSIN vs. CA The trial court and the CA were wrong in declaring the RESPONDENTS of DONA CATALINA, entitled to inherit the
properties which she had already disposed of more than 10 years before her death.
For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of the decedent’s death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening
of the succession. The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not
vest in his heirs until such time.
Property which DONA CATALINA had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer
formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only
the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those
transfers were one and all treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and
compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent’s gifts inter vivos does not inure to the RESPONDENTS since
neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
LLENARES vs. CA
GEVERO vs. CA
SUAREZ vs. CA
LORENZO vs. POSADAS
ARTICLE 779
RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA The jurisdiction of the CFI BULACAN became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late FATHER
RODRIGUEZ on MARCH 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will
being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will,
and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by SECTION 3, RULE 76, of the RULES OF
COURT:
SECTION 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will is delivered to,
or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and
place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice
of such time and place to be published (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if
no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will,
the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered.
Since the testament of FR. RODRIGUEZ was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while
petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, (8) days later,
the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
PETITIONERS object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction,"
and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province.
The SC cannot disregard FR. RODRIGUEZ's 33 years of residence as parish priest in HAGONOY, BULACAN (1930-
1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his
birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction.
The power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of
the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither party denies that the late FR.
RODRIGUEZ is deceased, or that he left personal property in HAGONOY, PROVINCE OF BULACAN.
The place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of
venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled is properly called venue.
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The estate proceedings having been initiated in the BULACAN CFI ahead of any other, that court is entitled to
assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions
of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that—
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. (Section 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of
the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose
jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account. Only after final decision as to the nullity of testate
succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action.
The institution of intestacy proceedings in RIZAL may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will
of FATHER RODRIGUEZ is pending. The BULACAN CFI was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in
question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate.
BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ The very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed
CONFORMATION OF DIVISION AND that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if
RENUNCIATION OF HEREDITARY RIGHTS legally tenable such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby.
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments.
Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operatives takes
precedence over construction that will nullify a provision of the will.
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the
part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So, compelling is the principle that intestacy should
be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be
varied for the purpose of giving it effect. As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be
followed and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld.
ARTICLE 780
BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ In the instant case, there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate
in the manner set forth in PARAGRAPH (V) of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of
the conjugal estate but since the husband after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be
probated.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights.
ARTICLE 781
HEIRS OF MAURICIO NATIVIDAD The following provisions of the Civil Code are clear on this matter:
ARTICLE 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either
by will or by operation of law.
ARTICLE 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
ARTICLE 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.
In the present case, RESPONDENTS, being heirs of SERGIO, are now liable to settle his transmissible obligations,
which include the amount due to petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder of SERGIO's estate to
them, in accordance with SECTION 1, RULE 90 of the RULES OF COURT.
ARTICLE 783
RABADILLA vs. CA A will is a personal, solemn, revocable, and free act by which a person disposes of his property to take effect after
USUFRUCT his death. Since the will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the
wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a compromise
agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a will.
HERREROS vs. GIL There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the clear requisites of the
law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural but
statutory and statutory requirements should be satisfied.
The right to make a testamentary disposition of one’s property is purely of statutory creation, and is available only
upon a compliance with the requirements of the statute. The formalities which the Legislature has prescribed for
15
the execution of a will are essential to its validity and cannot be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the
measure for the exercise of the right, and the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by a compliance with
this mode.
For the purpose of determining whether a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in
executing it is entitled to no consideration. For that purpose only the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in
the language of the statute, can be considered by the court, and whether the will as presented, shows a
compliance with the statute.
In interpreting the legislature’s thought, courts have rigidly opposed any exception tending to weaken the basic
principle underlying the law, the chief purpose of which is to see that the testator’s wishes are observed. It is
possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought he had made a will, but the statute says he had
not. The question is not one of his intention, but of what he actually did, or failed to do. It may happen that wills
truly expressing the intentions the testators are made without observations of the required forms; and whenever
that happens, the genuine intention is frustrated. The legislature has thought of it best and has therefore
determined, to run the risk of frustrating (that intention in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating
the formation of spurious wills, by the absence of forms. The evil of defeating the intention is less than the evil
probably to arise by giving validity to wills made without any form or, in derogation of testator’s wishes,
fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his estate.
It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so, but we cannot break
down the legislative barriers protecting a man’s property after death, even if a situation may be presented
apparently meritorious.
MONTINOLA vs. HERBOSA

MERZA vs. PORRAS EXHIBIT B does partake the nature of a will. A will is defined in the Civil Code of Spain, as the act by which a person
disposes of all his property or a portion of it and in ARTICLE 783 of the NEW CIVIL CODE, as an act whereby a
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death. EXHIBIT B comes within this definition.
Being of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities of law, EXHIBIT B is entitled to
probate as an independent testamentary disposition. In the absence of any legal provision to the contrary, and
there is none in this jurisdiction, it is the general, well-established rule that two separate and distinct wills may be
probated if one does not revoke the other and provided that the statutory requirements relative to the execution
of wills have been complied with. As seen, EXHIBIT B embodies all the requisites of will, even free of such formal
or literary imperfections as are found in EXHIBIT A.
It follows that EXHIBIT B is a legal and effective vehicle for excluding lawful heirs from testate or intestate
succession. Article 849 of the Civil Code of Spain, does not require that the disinheritance should be accomplished
in the same instrument by which the maker provides for the disposition of his/her after his/her death. The article
merely provides, that disinheritance can be effected only by a will (any will) in which the legal cause upon which
it is based is expressly stated.
The instruments EXHIBIT A and B should be admitted to probate, subject of course to the right of the disinherited
person to contest the disinheritance.
VITUG vs. CA The conveyance is not one of mortis causa which should be embodied in a will.
SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT
A will has been defined as a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of
his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death. In other words, the
bequest or device must pertain to the testator.
In this case, the monies subject of SAVINGS ACCOUNT NO. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds. There
is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal,
having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, because it was to take effect after the death of one
party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own
properties to the other. The agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership by mere
stipulation and that it is no cloak to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations.
Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several
bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account.
In the case at bar, when the SPOUSES VITUG opened SAVINGS ACCOUNT NO. 35342-038, they merely put what
rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which
16
would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it cannot be
said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that
contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the
Civil Code.
ARTICLE 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do
something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain,
or which is to occur at an indeterminate time.
Under the provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the happening of an event which is
(1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time. In either case, the element of risk is present. In
the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other.
• However, as we have warned: But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law
its operation or effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such
agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or
to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such
vice has been imputed and established against the agreement involved in this case.
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful
purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and
conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is that MRS. VITUG having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a
vested right over the amounts under SAVINGS ACCOUNT NO. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the
RESPONDENT COURT ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by MRS. VITUG, the SC holds that the
court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
SEANGIO vs. REYES The holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir but rather as its title, simply contains a
KASULATAN SA PAG-AALIS NG MANA disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a
form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or descendant.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
ARTICLE 784
CASTANEDA vs. ALEMANY The will of DONA JUANA MORENO was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it
as witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in conformity with law.
There is nothing in the language of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the
appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his
express direction.
• That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if
he does not sign it, that it be signed by someone in his presence and by his express direction. Who
does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference.
17
The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testatrix
is of no consequence.
• The English text of section 618 is very plain. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish
edition of the code have been corrected in the second.
• (2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only
purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will.
ARTICLE 788
DIZON vs. DIZON The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly appears
that his intention was otherwise.
The testator’s wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be
faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executor’s heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither those
interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator’s will.
VDA DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
DEL ROSARIO vs. DEL ROSARIO In the interpretation and construction of testamentary provisions the intention of the testator controls.
BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ FELIX BALANAY, SR. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his ½ share of the conjugal partnership but
CONFORMATION OF DIVISION AND insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his ½ share in the conjugal estate,
RENUNCIATION OF HEREDITARY RIGHTS it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in the Civil Code.
PARAGRAPH (5)
Subject to the observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition may be given
effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become
effective upon the death of FELIX BALANAY, SR. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided
among the children and the surviving spouse.
By reason of the surviving husband’s conformity to his wife’s will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his
½ conjugal share be a part of his deceased wife’s estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition
made in PARAGRAPH (V) of the will without prejudice, of course to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes
of the compulsory heirs.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate
in the manner set forth in PARAGRAPH (V) of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of
the conjugal estate but since the husband after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be
probated.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights.
ARTICLE 789
ESTATE OF RIGOR vs. RIGOR The said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any
indefinite time thereafter.
In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession
opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper. In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs
were his three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously,
when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister,
who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact
date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his
death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of his
nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's
nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs
presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan,
who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise,
18
although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father
Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative belogning to the Rigor family.
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in
Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria
before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's
grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that
reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to
the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and
which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who
was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate
became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death,
who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In
that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary.
But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer
the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he
had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical
career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954
and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor
has ever studied for the priesthood"
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is
that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the
parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
DEL ROSARIO vs. DEL ROSARIO The reservation of property in a will to the children of the legatee thereof in case of the latter’s death must be
regarded as a legacy if made so by express words; otherwise the children of the legatee take by inheritance.
RABADILLA vs. CA In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its
provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must
be adopted.
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver (100) piculs of sugar yearly to
MARLENA BELLEZA COSCUELLA. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, DR. JORGE RABADILLA, his
heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected,
MARLENA BELLEZA COSCUELLA shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The
non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof
to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
ARTICLE 791
DIZON vs. DIZON
VDA. DE VILLAFLOR vs. JUICO The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
YAMBAO vs. GONZALES It appears that on August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to appellees all her properties
situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was probated in 1948. Immediately, thereafter, appellant went to appellees
to request that he be placed as tenant of the rice land which, by an express provision of said will, they were
directed to give to him for cultivation, as tenant, and when they refused alleging that they had already given it to
another tenant he filed the present action.
In holding that the provisions of the will relied upon by appellant imposes only a moral but not a legal obligation,
the trial court went on to consider the import of the word "PAHIHINTULUTAN" employed with reference to
appellant. In its opinion said word only means to permit or to allow, but not to direct appellees to appoint
appellant as tenant. Rather, it opines, it merely contains a suggestion to employ because the testatrix did not use
the words "IPINAGUUTOS KO" which she used in connection with other provisions of the will, so that there is no
clear indication that it was her intention to make such provision compulsory.
19
The SC believes that, however, that the trial court has not properly interpreted the real import of the wish of the
testatrix. Analyzing it carefully, the same contains a clear directive to employ appellant as may be seen from the
words preceding the word "PAHIHINTULUTAN", which say: "DAPAT DIN NAMAN MALAMAN NG DALAWA KONG
TAGAPAGMANA NA SILA MARIA PABLO AT ANGELINA GONZALES NA SILA AY MAY DAPAT TUNGKULIN O
GANGPANAN GAYA NG MGA SUMUSUNOD."
The words 'DAPAT TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN" mean to do or to carry out as a mandate or directive, and having
reference to the word "PAHIHINTULUTAN", can convey no other meaning than to impose a duty upon appellees.
To follow the interpretation given by the trial court would be to devoid the wish of the testatrix of its real and
true meaning.
ARTICLE 792
BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ The rule is that the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.
Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be
separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because
although she was a co-owner thereof her share was inchoate and pro indiviso. But that illegal declaration does
not nullify the entire will, it may be disregarded.
ARTICLE 795
IN RE WILL OF RIOSA The statutes in force at the testator’s death are controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with such
statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying
the later statute are the following: "As until the death of the testator the paper executed by him, expressing his
wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a will, the law in force at the testator’s
death applies and controls the proof of the will."
Were the Supreme Court, to accept the foregoing proposition and the reasons assigned for it, it would logically
result that the will of JOSE RIOSA would have to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the
statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect.
The testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by
the courts. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it
becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take
effect on the property until a future time.
ENRIQUEZ vs. ABADIA The validity of a will as to form is to be judged not by the law in force at the time of the testator’s death or at the
time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the
time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and
after the death of testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and
among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest
then becomes a completed act.
From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes
a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the Constitution against a subsequent change in the
statute adding new legal requirements of execution of will, which would invalidate such a will. By parity of
reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at
the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and
his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which
dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest
the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession.
The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.
IBARLE vs. PO The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether
such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the death
of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is always
deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death.
The provision and comment make it clear that when CATALINA NAVARRO VDA. DE WINSTANLEY sold the entire
parcel to the CANOY SPOUSES, ½ of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration
being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included
the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were
20
necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his
own opposition.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ABADA vs. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.
ABAJA Therefore, Abada's will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.
There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in
the will.
This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.
Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew
or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that
Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions
would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
21

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SUCCESSION

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

MANUEL UY vs. VALBUECO

SAN AGUSTIN vs. CA Is petitioner entitled to notice? No.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes (2) exceptions –

MONTINOLA vs. HERBOSA

This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.

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