PEOPLE VS.

GONZALES

• In a decision dated October 31, 1984, the

Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII
(38), in Criminal Case No. 13661

• "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta

Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia
Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio
Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the
accused, except Rogelio Lanida who
eluded arrest and up to now has remain at
large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in
the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral
damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay
the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd
Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of
Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.

• Through their counsel, all the accused, except

of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of
appeal from the trial court's decision. During
the pendency of their appeal and before
judgment thereon could be rendered by the
Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-
appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr.,
withdrew their appeal and chose instead to
pursue their respective applications for parole
before the then Ministry, now Department, of
Justice, Parole Division.

• On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals

rendered a decision on the appeal of Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision
in that the lone appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of
P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the
basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the
appellate court certified this case to us for
review.
 IVLER VS. MODESTO
• The petition seeks the review 1 of the
Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s
ruling finding inapplicable the Double
Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property. This,
despite the accused’s previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution..
• Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,
petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail
for his temporary release in both cases.
• On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty
to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
• The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity
of offenses in the two cases.
• After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in
a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC
the suspension of proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on
17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question. Without acting on
petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with
the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of
this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
• Relying on the arrest order against petitioner,
respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s
loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
IVLER vs. HON. MODESTO
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in
August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries for injuries sustained
by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle.
Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property
On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to
the charge in reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries and was meted out
the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, Ivler moved to quash the
Information of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property for
placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
MeTC: denied the motion to quash
RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in
dismissing his Motion to Quash
ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in the information
charging him with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property
(YES)
Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property having
been previously convicted in reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries for injuries for the same offense. Ivler
submits that the multiple consequences of
such crime are material only to determine his
penalty
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the
ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in
the case of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in
criminal reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime;
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude
or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses
which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass
of intentional crimes.
2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent
Prosecution for the Same Quasi-offense
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not
be prosecuted again for that same act. For
the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The
law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and
cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts
Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing
single prosecution of multiple felonies falling
under either of two categories: (1) when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies); and (2) when an
offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in
lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only
serve the maximum of the penalty for the
most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
the mental attitude behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, a single mental attitude regardless
of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting
in one or more consequences. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime
resulting in one or more consequences.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of
quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is
conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense
to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an
offense which is a necessary means for
committing another.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should
proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the consequences.
In imposing penalties, the judge will do no
more than apply the penalties under Article
365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first
level court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to
seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the
MTC ordered his arrest following his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death
of respondent Ponce’s husband.
RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not to
be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from, among others,
post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting
that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise,
finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from
the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not
be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-
offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws,
is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such
that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing
an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence
Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 .

for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty
shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile,
the lenient schedule of penalties under Article
365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not
be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366.

RULING:
We find for petitioner.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his
Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner

from prosecution’s placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be “twice put

in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that
petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
charge.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on

Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the
Penalty.

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same

facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC,
namely, Article 365.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice,

doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
 PEOPLE VS PUGAY had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay No. L-74324
accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the
17November1988
scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the
THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2)
main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.
OF THE R.P.C.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the
respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to
arising from different acts directed against miranda is
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only
and decide to commit it." "A man must use common
for the act that was committed by him. **Conspiracy
sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is
may be implied from concerted action of the assailants
his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from
in confronting the victim. Criminal Responsibilities:
instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment."
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary
to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from
FACTS OF THE CASE: The accused are pronounced
any act committed by his companions who at the same
by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt
time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF
for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and
R E C K L E S S I M P R U D E N C E R E S U LT I N G T O
sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years
HOMICIDE SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient
(prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison
evidence that appears in the record establishing
temporal) as maximum and for samson to be
qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Miranda and the
granted the mitigating circumstance that he never
accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run
INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF
errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On
HOMICIDE
the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in
the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after
HELD: JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS
midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT
companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started
FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun
M U R D E R WA S L O W E R E D TO T H E A B O V E
of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its
JUDGEMENTS.
contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told
Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda
on fire making a human torch out of him. They were For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate,
arrested the same night and barely a few hours after FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
the incident gave their written statements. SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with
the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No.
ISSUES OF THE CASE: Is conspiracy present in this L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now
case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an
what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused? information which reads as follows:

There is no: CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same
quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not
essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if,
at the time of commission of the crime, the accused
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza
of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
and assisting one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, taking advantage of their
superior strength, and with the decided purpose
to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE
body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire POLICE
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani
Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying

circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and
superior strength, and the means employed was
to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing another wrong, that is the
burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.

• Upon being arraigned, both accused

pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. After trial, the trial court rendered
a decision finding both accused guilty on
the crime of murder but crediting in favor of
the accused Pugay the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused
interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING

T H E S TAT E M E N T S O F A C C U S E D -
APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF
FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT
ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING

T H AT T H E S U P P R E S S I O N B Y T H E
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL
TO ITS CASE.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING

CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY
OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF
 FAJARDO VS. PEOPLE
At b a r i s a Pe t i t i o n f o r Re v i e w
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the reversal of the
February 10, 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
with modification the August 29, 2006
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding
petitioner guilty of violating Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended. cr
Facts:
That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in
the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality
of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring,... confederating and mutually helping
one another, without authority of law, permit or
license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and control two (2) receivers
of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US...
with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US
with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short
magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35)
pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and
fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition,
which items were confiscated and... recovered
from their possession during a search conducted
by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special
Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office,
Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01
(9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan
of the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun
between her waist and the waistband of her
shorts, after which, she entered the house and
locked the main door.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28,
2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava
(SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion
of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of
the house and throw something. The discarded
objects landed near the wall of petitioner's...
house and inside the compound of a neighboring
residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1
Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio
announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness,
recovered the discarded objects, which turned out
to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol,...
model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN)
763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a
defaced serial number. The recovered items were
then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan
(SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them
in applying for and obtaining a search... warrant.
petitioner and Valerio failed to present any
documents showing their authority to possess the
confiscated firearms and the two recovered
receivers, a criminal information for violation of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against... them.
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She
refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared by
the raiding team, because the items allegedly
belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff
sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized
inside petitioner's residence were declared
inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2
receivers recovered by the policemen outside the
house of petitioner before the warrant was served
were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the...
plain view doctrine.
Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted
of illegal possession of a part of a firearm,
punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended. They were sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6)
months, and twenty-one (21) days to... five (5)
years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of
prision correccional, and ordered to pay a
P20,000.00 fine.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated
December 3, 2009. Hence, the present recourse.
The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal
possession of part of a firearm.
Issues:
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession
of firearms, the RTC explained:
Ruling:
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by
accused, holding that the same were already
denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002
and April 20, 2005, respectively denying the
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to
Evidence. The said Orders were not... appealed
and have thus attained finality. The RTC also
ruled that petitioner and Valerio were estopped
from assailing the legality of their arrest since they
participated in the trial by presenting evidence for
their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they
have effectively... waived such irregularities and
defects.
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is
a former soldier, having served with the Philippine
Army prior to his separation from his service for
going on absence without leave (AWOL). With his
military background, it is safe to conclude that
Zaldy Valerio is... familiar with and knowledgeable
about different types of firearms and ammunitions.
As a former soldier, undoubtedly, he can
assemble and disassemble firearms.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential
element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's
control... and management. This has to be so if
the manifest intent of the law is to be effective.
The same evils, the same perils to public security,
which the law penalizes exist whether the
unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its
owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object
of... this law[,] the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
I]n order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the
accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the
same, even if such possession was made in good
faith and without criminal... intent.
o convict an accused for illegal possession of
firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as
amended, two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm ammunition or explosive which
may be proved by the presentation... of the
subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of
witnesses who saw accused in possession of the
same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused
has no license or permit to own or possess the
firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may
be established by the... testimony or certification
of a representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused has no license
or permit to possess the subject firearm or
explosive
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were
convicted of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives, punishable under paragraph 2,
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A.
No. 8294
Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the
RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law,
and held that the search warrant was void
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two
receivers were admissible as evidence. The
liability for their possession, however, should fall
only on Valerio and not on petitioner.
In the present case, a distinction should be made
between criminal intent and intent to possess.
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is
sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession
of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was
animus possidendi... or an intent to possess on
the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is,
however, without regard to any other criminal or
felonious intent which the accused may have
harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal
intent here refers to the intention of the accused
to commit... an offense with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. This is not important in
convicting a person under Presidential Decree
No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found
guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient
that the accused had no authority or license to
possess... a firearm, and that he intended to
possess the same, even if such possession was
made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this
case, part of a firearm, is committed when the
holder thereof:
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the
firearm.[24]
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor
constructive possession of the subject receivers.
The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that
he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the
receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses
saw petitioner holding the receivers,... before or
during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioner's possession of the
receivers was merely incidental because Valerio,
the one in actual physical possession, was seen
at the rooftop of petitioner's house. Absent any
evidence pointing to petitioner's participation,
knowledge or consent in Valerio's... actions, she
cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the
receivers.
Petitioner's apparent liability for illegal possession
of part of a firearm can only proceed from the
assumption that one of the thrown receivers
matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of
her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to convert such... assumption
into concrete evidence.
it was ascertained that Valerio is not a duly
licensed/registered firearm holder of any type,
kind, or caliber of firearms.[29] To substantiate his
statement, he submitted a... certification[30] to
that effect and identified the same in court.[31]
The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification,
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED with respect to
petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable... doubt.
unlawful possession of firearms or must there be
an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the
law? This query assumes significance since the
offense of illegal possession of... firearms is a
malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in
which case good faith and absence of criminal
intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a
rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It
is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate
the act must be... distinguished. A person may not
have consciously intended to commit a crime; but
he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by
the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the
first (intent to commit the crime), there must be
criminal intent; in the second (intent to...
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited

Principles: act is done freely and consciously.

The rule is that ownership is not an essential

element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to...
one's control and management. This has to be so
if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective.
The same evils, the same perils to public security,
which the law penalizes exist whether the
unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its
owner or a borrower. To accomplish... the object
of this law the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever.

But is the mere fact of physical or constructive

possession sufficient to convict a person for
 TIGOY VS. CA
Facts:
the two trucks to stop.
On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in
the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, was allegedly
introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo
who signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport
construction materials from Larapan,... Lanao del Norte to
Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered
into between Ong and Bertodazo
Rolando Dingal, Forester of the DENR, together with Teodoro
, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner
Rodolfo Tigoy who had been employed by him as truck
drivers for two (2) years and ten (10) years, respectively, to
bring the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao
del Norte which... is about fifteen (15) minutes away from
Iligan City. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in
Larapan for the loading of the construction materials by
Lolong Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the trip to
Dipolog City. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo,
Sumagang... and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to
return to Larapan at four o'clock in the morning the next day.
When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with bags of
cement and were half-covered with canvas.[2] Before
departing, they allegedly checked the... motor oil, water,
engine and tires of the trucks to determine if the same were in
good condition.
t same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector Rico
Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City),
while escorting Provincial Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC
Arts Center in Ozamis City, along with the members of the
Special Operation Group, received a... dispatch from the
466th PNP Company situated at Barangay Bongbong,
Ozamis City, informing him that two trucks, a blue and green
loaded with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did
not stop at the checkpoint. Upon receiving the report, Tome,
along with PO2 Peter Paul
Nuqui and PO3 Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol vehicle,
a mini cruiser jeep, to intercept the two trucks at Lilian
Terminal, Ozamis City.[3]... t the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui,
who was the only one in uniform among the police officers,
flagged down the two trucks but the same just sped away
and proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta City.
Aboard their patrol vehicle, they chased the trucks and
overtook the same... at Barangay Manabay. They blocked the
road with their vehicle causing the two trucks to stop.
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only one in
uniform among the police officers, flagged down the two
trucks but the same just sped away and proceeded towards
the direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their patrol vehicle,
they chased the trucks and overtook the same... at Barangay
Manabay. They blocked the road with their vehicle causing
Meanwhile, Ermelo delos Santos, Chief of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Community and
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO),[6]
after receiving a call from the Ozamis City Police Station that
two trucks were apprehended... transporting sawn lumber
without a permit and were brought to the City Hall, sent
Echavez, Juanito Taruc and Lucio Penaroya, to investigate.
Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal the
registration papers of the two trucks and appearing therein
was the name of Nestor Ong as the owner. After ascertaining
that the sawn lumber loaded on the two trucks did not have
supporting documents, Dingal and his... companions scaled
the subject lumber and prepared a tally sheet.
On October 6, 1993, an Information was filed against Nestor
Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for
possession of forest products without legal permit,... Ong and
petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the
arraignment.   Sumagang died after the case was filed while
the other co-accused, Lolong Bertodazo, was not arrested
and has remained at large.
the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision... finding
accused Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy [GUILTY] beyond
reasonable doubt of possession of dipterocarp lumber
[VALUED] at more than P22,000.00 without the legal
documents as required by existing laws and regulations,
penalized as qualified theft, this
Court sentences them to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor to eighteen (18) years
and three (3) months of reclusion temporal. The lumber and
the conveyances used are forfeited in favor of the
government. With costs.
Issues:
Declaring that "constructive possession" of unlicensed lumber
is not within the contemplation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705,... the core issue presented is whether or not petitioner
Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting
lumber without the necessary permit in violation of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, provides:
Section 68.  Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or
Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from... private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required  under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .

There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code:

1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing
timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting

lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68
of the Code.  He, Sumagang and the rest of their companions
were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante delicto as
they were... transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to
Dipolog City.

Petitioner's actions adequately show that he intentionally

participated in the commission of the offense for which he
had been charged and found guilty by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals.

Principles:

In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of

an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the present
case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. 
It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the
act... prohibited by the special law, and that it is done
knowingly and consciously.[14]

Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is

not necessary to prove conspiracy.[15] Conspiracy may be
proven by circumstantial evidence.[16] It may be deduced
from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is...
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.[17] It is not even required
that the participants have an agreement for an appreciable
period to commence... it

• whether or not  Roberto Tigoy was guilty of the crime

charged
 US VS AH CHONG pushed open by someone bent upon forcing
his way into the room

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - The defendant warned the intruder "If you
Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact
enter the room, I will kill you."

• Seizing a common kitchen knife

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this which he kept under his pillow, the
case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself,
because from the very nature of these facts and from the
defendant struck out wildly at the
circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these intruder (when he entered the room)
proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was who turned out to be his roommate
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, Pascual

however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to • Pascual ran out upon the porch
the weight of the evidence touching those details of the heavily wounded

incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the • Recognizing Pascual, the defendant
following statement of the material facts disclose by the record called to his employers who slept in
may be taken to be substantially correct:
the next house and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up
Facts: Pascual's wounds

• Pascual died from the effects of the

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at wound the following day

"Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, • The roommates appear to have been
Rizal Province
in friendly and amicable terms prior to
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the t h e i n c i d e n t , a n d h a d  a n
same place as a house boy or muchacho
understanding that when either
returned at night, he should knock
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached that the door and acquaint his
house some 40 meters from the nearest companion with his identity

building
• The defendant alleges that he kept
the knife under his pillow as personal
No one slept in the house except the two protection because of repeated
servants who jointly occupied a small room robberies in Fort McKinley

toward the rear of the building, the door of • Defendant admitted to stabbing his
which opened upon a narrow porch running roommate, but said that he did it
along the side of the building
under the impression that Pascual
was "a ladron (thief)" because he
This porch was covered by a heavy growth forced open the door of their sleeping
of vines for its entire length and height
room, despite the defendant's
warnings

The door of the room was not furnished with •

a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as • Defendant was found guilty by the
a measure of security, had attached a small trial court of simple homicide, with
hook or catch on the inside of the door, and extenuating (mitigating)
were in the habit of reinforcing this circumstances, and sentenced to 6
somewhat insecure means of fastening the years and 1 day presidio mayor, the
door by placing against it a chair
minimum penalty prescribed by law

•
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about Issue:
10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly • Whether or not the defendant can be
awakened by some trying to force open the held criminally responsible

door of the room

Holding:
• No.

He called out twice,  "Who is there?”

Ratio:

He heard no answer and was convinced by

the noise at the door that it was being
 • By reason of a  mistake as to the
facts, the defendant did an act for
which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual
was actually a thief, he will not be
criminally liable/responsible because
it would be self-defense), but would
constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known
the true state of the facts (i.e. if he
knew that it was actually Pascual, he
would be guilty of homicide/
assassination)
playing a trick on him
• The defendant's ignorance or mistake
of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
• "The act itself foes not make man
guilty unless his intention were so"
prior to the date of the incident, one of which took
• The essence of the offense is
the wrongful intent, without
which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must
•
depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him."
• If one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which
will justify a killing, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them,
he is legally guiltless of the homicide
supposed them to be, but which would constitute
• The defendant was doing no more
than exercise his legitimate right of
self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty
•
of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts
defendant acquitted of the crime
•
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is
acquitted.
• Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of felony
Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC
FACTS:
• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a
cook was suddenly awakened by some trying to
force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed
and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no
answer and was convinced by the noise at the
door that it was being pushed open by someone
bent upon forcing his way into the room. The
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber
or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he
was struck just above the knee by the edge of the
chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression)
which had been placed against the door. Seizing
a common kitchen knife which he kept under his
pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or
muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was
• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called
to his employers and ran back to his room to
• There had been several robberies not long
place in a house where he was employed as cook
so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
• trial court held it as simple homicide
ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he
the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act.
HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the
NO.
• GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must
be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability
under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code
• Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different
from that which he had intended to commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the
act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so
o “ Actus me incito factus non est meus actus” -
an act done by me against my will is not my act
• GR: courts have recognized the power of the
legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases,
the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the
intent of the doer
• EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard
to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed
• ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
• defendant at the time, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts
been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to
have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or
even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to
the facts, or in the means adopted by him to
defend himself from the imminent danger which
he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the
accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police
of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower
court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year
and six months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed
separately from this judgment.
Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances
FACTS:
Ø Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary
Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the
following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene
in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant
and asked that he be given four men.
Ø The same instruction was given to the chief of
police Oanis who was likewise called by the
Provincial Inspector.
Ø Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to
the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with
their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by
the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already
wounded, and looking at the door where the shots
came, she saw the defendants still firing at him.
Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it
turned out later that the person shot and killed
was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas
but a peaceful and innocent citizen named
Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Ø According to Appellant Galanta, when he and
chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the
latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was.
Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the
same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson
HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of
murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES.
Ø ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
Ø appellants found no circumstances whatsoever
which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants
had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could
even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim
was unarmed.
Ø "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall
be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention."
Ø a peace officer cannot claim exemption from
criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or
violence in making an arrest
Ø The crime committed by appellants is not
merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should
be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice.
Ø 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may
be taken as a justifying one:
• offender acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-
present
 • injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.-not
present
Ø According to article 69 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than
that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed.
 PEOPLE VS BINDOY
Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Occidental
Misamis, for appelant was stenced to 12 years and 1
day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased with the amount of P1,000. The crime
charged against the accused is homicide.
In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in
a tuba wineshop. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to
Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she
already have one, but Bindoy threatened to injure her if
she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife,
attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he
carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine
shop to see what;s happening, instead got stabbed in
the chest by Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy
succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas,
wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the
left behind the accused and with such violence that the
point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest who was
then behind Bindoy.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?
HELD: Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the
testimony of the accused, Pacas and Bindoy were
actually for the possession of the bolo. When Pacas let
go of the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew
towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio
Omamdam came up and who was therefore hit in the
chest without Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it
was caused accidentally and without malicious intent
because he was only defending his possession of the
bolo which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him
and his conduct was perfectly lawful. The Court
therefore acquitted Bindoy based on the facts stated.
"In many criminal cases, one of the most important aids
in completing the proof of the commission of the crime
by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act.”
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Bindoy
G.R. No. L-34665 (August 28, 1931)
Villamor, J.
the unfortunate usisero.
FACTS: In May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a
tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod,
municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers:
Donato Bindoy, Faustino Pacas and his wife
Tibay. Bindoy offered some tuba to Pacas' wife
but she refused to drink having already done so,
Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not
accept. There ensued an interchange of words
between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in
to defend his wife, attempting to take away from
Bindoy the bolo he carried.
This commotion attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam (deceased), who lived near the
market. Emigdio left his house to see what was
happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were
struggling for the bolo. In the course of this
struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging
himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the
latter's hand towards the left behind the accused,
with such violence that the point of the bolo
reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was
then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the
fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there
any indication that the accused was aware of
Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for,
according to the testimony of the witnesses, the
latter passed behind the combatants when he left
his house to satisfy his curiosity. There was no
disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and
Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were
nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on
good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to
wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he
hit Omamdam; he was only defending his
possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to
wrench away from him, and his conduct was
perfectly lawful.
The wound produced Emigdio Omamdam's
death, but the defendant alleges that it was
caused accidentally and without malicious intent.
BACKDROP IN COURTS:
CFI of Occidental Misamis – finding the accused
guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to
the penalty of twelve years and one day of
reclusion temporal.
Issue: WON the accused should be acquitted.
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that the
appellant is entitled to acquittal according to
Article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. The witness for the
defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the
defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy
were actually struggling for the possession of the
bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former
had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left
side, at the very moment when Emigdio
Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the
chest, without Donato's seeing him, because
Emigdio had passed behind him. The same
witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at
his home later, and asked him about his wound
when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound."
And then continued: "Please look after my wife
when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding
further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did
not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The
testimony of this witness was not contradicted by
any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.

Obiter dictum: (If ever i relate yung case sa

Art. 4 (1))
If, in his (Bindoy) struggle with Pacas, the
defendant had attempted to wound his opponent,
and instead of doing so, had wounded
Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his
act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a
misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we
have said, this is not the case.

Final Ruling: Judgment is reversed.

PEOPLE v. MELITON BUYCO, GR No. L-539, 1948-01-27
Facts:
first class private of the Military Police... fire several shots with
a Thompson submachinegun against Irineo
Gellangala, Apolonio Ikoy, and Napoleon Zambales, hitting
them on different parts of their bodies and as a result Irineo
Gellangala and Apolonio Ikoy died instantaneously and
Napoleon Zambales died a few days later.
The trial court, presided over by his Honor, Judge Jose
Quisumbing, after due trial, rendered judgment on May 8,
1946, finding the following facts as proven... that during a
dance on the occasion of the feast of the patron saint of
barrio... there was a verbal brawl followed by a fist fight
between Cornelio Soliman and an unknown individual who
later resulted to be a resident of Iloilo City... accused Meliton
Buyco, now appellant, who was on patrol with his six
companions, fired in the air two discharges from his Thompson
submachinegun; that Eusebio Davila, who saw Meliton Buyco
fire, approached the latter end... prohibited him from firing
again to avoid personal injury among those present; that
Meliton Buyco replied that Davila leave him alone because he
was an agent of the law;
Meliton Buyco fired another shot aimed at a group of persons,
among them Pedro Sambales and his son Napoleon
Zambales, and a bullet of this last shot bit Napoleon
Zambales, who died after six days in St. Paul's Hospital, City
of Iloilo; that Eusebio Davila tried to place Meliton Buyco under
arrest but the latter threatened him with his Thompson
submachinegun, and when Eusebio Davila... attempted to
succor the three wounded persons, Meliton Buyco warned him
to withdraw from the spot, and in view of this attitude on the
part of the accused, Eusebio Davila desisted from his purpose
through fear that he might be another victim of Meliton Buyco.
The defense, through the testimony of the appellant Meliton
Buyco and of his companions, the MP soldier Enrique
Bernales and Corporal Braulio Taleon, and Lt. Jose M. F. Pelo,
and the musician Antonio Herradura, attempted to prove that
on the night in question Corporal Braulio
Taleon, the appellant Meliton Buyco, and Pvt. Enrique
Bernales, and four other companions, arrived at barrio
Trapiche from their station in Guimbal, near the auditorium
where a dance was being held; that the jeep used by them
developed engine trouble, and while they were fixing... it, they
heard that a fight was going on inside the auditorium causing
public disorder which the municipal policemen under the
command of Chief Eusebio Davila could not pacify; that the
accused Meliton Buyco, followed by Cpl. Braulio Taleon and
Private Enrique Barnales, entered... the auditorium, intervened
in the fight to pacify the combatants, but were unsuccessful;
that one of the combatants hurled... that one of the
combatants hurled... the accused admits the killing and his
counsel frankly asserts in his brief (p. 7) that his client, acting
in defense of the person of Corporal Taleon "directed a burst
of TG (Thompson Gun) shots to Taleon's assailant".
The... from... law must be applied to the facts. In the mind and
eyes of the law in... such cases, even though the motive might
have been successfully concealed from the human perception
of others, and might be known only to the agent and to his
God, still there it was impelling the agent to the criminal
transgression. The defense would have us deem it strange...
that the appellant should have willfully killed the three victims
above named. But truth is at times stranger than fiction, and
under the established facts the actual case is one of those
instances.
The trial judge found and held that the defendant was guilty of
the crime charged;
Issues:
The... trial judge found and held that the defendant was guilty
of the crime charged;... which said agent is criminally liable,
pursuant to article 4, paragraph
1, of the Revised Penal Code
Although the wrongful act be committed against a person
other than the one whom it was intended to injure, this fact
does not excuse the offender from criminal liability for the
voluntary commission of a wrongful act or misdemeanor,
according to paragraph 3 of Article
1 of the Penal Code" (Now art. 4 of Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
The evidence discloses, as found by the same judge, that
Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala died from bullets
discharged by the same shot which was aimed at the former. It
will be remembered that the shot was fired from a submachine
gun and, as already staged, it appears... that the appellant so
fixed the mechanism of his submachine gun that a single pull
at the trigger would fire several bullets automatically in
succession.
article 48 of our
Revised Penal Code, gives an example of the first case
mentioned therein of a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave felonies as follows; A person fires a gun
against another with intention to kill the latter, and not only kills
him but also a third person who... was beside the victim: here,
he says, we have a single act, a single shot, which produces
two homicides
Although the wrongful act be committed against a person
other than the one whom it was intended to injure, this fact
does not excuse the offender from criminal liability for the
voluntary commission of a wrongful act or misdemeanor,
according to paragraph 3 of Article
1 of the Penal Code" (Now art. 4 of Revised Penal Code.

Under... art, 249, in relation to article 4, paragraph 1, of the

Revised Penal Code, the instant defendant must be held to
have thereby committed the crime of homicide

All acts punishable by the law are presumed to be voluntary in

the absence of proof to the contrary. With respect to crimes of
personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for... all the consequences thereof.

Principles:

As said in the Ricafort case, supra. " * * * In this, as in almost

every crime apparently without motive, the motives which
might exist are innumerable motives unknown perhaps to the
relatives of the deceased who testified at the trial and not even
disclosed to the... three who cooperated in a certain measure
in the crime

In the McMann case, supra. the court said; "The question of

motive is of course very important in cases where there is
doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who
committed the act, but in this case, where it is proved beyond
all doubt that the defendant was... the one who caused the
death of McKay, it is not so important to know the exact reason
for the deed". In the case at bar the accused admits having
caused the death of the victims, aside from the evidence
against him.
PEOPLE v. CIRILO MAGALONA THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED CIRILO MAGALONA.
Y ONOON, GR No. 143294,
2003-07-17
Ruling:

Facts: the trial court correctly found appellant guilty

On May 25, 1994,... while the spouses
Arimbuyutan and their children, namely, Rommel,
Rosendo, Jr., Rosalie, Rosemarie, Regina, Ruby,
Roldan and Resty, were sleeping in their hut,
there was an explosion beneath the floor. Said
explosion killed Resty and injured
Rosario, Roldan, Rosemarie and Rosalie.
based on the sworn statements of Rosendo
Arimbuyutan, Sr., Bienvenido Sabater and Adelina
Mendoza, the suspect was appellant Cirilo
Magalona alias William.
While he was taking coffee, Sabater saw a
person, named William, pass by in front of his hut
and the hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. He also
saw William hiding behind the acacia tree in front
of his hut, which was about five (5) to six (6)
meters away. Said acacia tree was... between his
hut and the hut of Arimbuyutan. Then he saw an
explosion under the floor of the hut of
Arimbuyutan and saw William running towards the
direction of the "flood control. "
Adelina Mendoza... testified that... appellant
knocked at her door and conversed with her. He
told her that he was... very angry at Rosendo
Arimbuyutan, Sr. and that he would return and kill
him.
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
is hereby AFFIRMED
Even if appellant, in detonating a hand grenade
under the hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.,
intended to kill Rosendo, but instead killed his
son, Resty, and seriously injured other family
members, appellant is liable for all the
consequences of his unlawful act. Where such...
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be
considered as reckless imprudence.[74]
Where malice or intention to cause injury exists,
the act should be qualified by the felony it has
produced.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court
Principles:
Where such... unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
[74]
Where malice or intention to cause injury exists,
the act should be qualified by the felony it has
produced.

The trial court held that the testimony of Avelina

Mendoza showed that appellant had a motive to
harm complainant Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.

It also ruled that the testimony of Bienvenido

Sabater established that appellant was
responsible for the... explosion

Issues:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting

Magalona.
 PEOPLE VS Opero
G.R. No. L-48796 June 11, 1981
Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable: Art. 4
FACTS:
• April 27, 1978 4 am: Salvador Oliver, a
GSIS security guard assigned to the House
International Hotel at Ongpin Street, Binondo,
Manila, was informed by Demetrio Barcing,
another security guard, that he picked up a 3
year-old girl loitering at the second floor of
the building. Rafael Ordona, a janitor, told
Oliver that the girl is from Room 314 so
Oliver called up Room 314 and when nobody
answered, he and Barcing brought the girl to
Room 314. When nobody answered Oliver’s
knock, he pushed the door open and smelled
foul odor from the room. He covered his
nose with a handkerchief and they entered
the room where they saw Liew Soon Ping
dead faced down on the bed with both feet
tied, her body is bloated and a towel covered
her mouth. Oliver called up the homicide
division of the Manila Police. They saw a
small baby crying and trying to get out of a
crib near the bed of the dead person.
• They called her wife, Dr. Hong, who was
in Cebu. He came back immediately and
found their personal effects worth P30,221 to
be missing.
• Diego Opero, Asteria Avila and , Milagros
Villegas were picked up by the Samar P.C.
and some of the missing articles.
o Diego Opero: He and Lacsinto subdued
the victim by assaulting her, tying up her
hands and feet stabbing her and stuffing her
mouth with a piece of pandesal.
o Milagros Villegas: Identified the stolen
clothes which were given to her by Opero
o Asteria Avila: she was not a party
• Dr. Angelo Singian finding that the cause
of death is the pandesal
• RTC: Diego Opero for robbery with
homicide together with Reynaldo Lacsinto
and Milagros Villegas (accessory). Asteria
Avila was acquitted.
• Only Diego Opero appealed
o He never intended to kill the deceased,
his intention being merely to rob her, for if
indeed he had the intention to kill her, he
could have easily done so with the knife, and
therefore, his liability should be only for
robbery
ISSUE: W/N Diego Opero should only be
liable for robbery.
HELD: NO. judgment appealed from being in
accordance with law and the evidence,
except as to the nonappreciation of the
mitigating circumstance of having no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, which nevertheless does not call
for the modification of the penalty of death as
imposed by the lower court, is hereby
affirmed.
• The intention is to prevent the deceased
from making an outcry, and so a "pandesal"
was stuffed into her mouth, the mitigating
circumstance of not having intended to
commit so grave a wrong may be
appreciated. The stuffing of the "pandesal" in
the mouth would not have produced
asphyxiation had it not slid into the neckline.
According to Dr. Singian, the movements of
the victim that caused the "pandesal" to slide
into the neckline were, however, attributable
to them for if they did not hogtie her, she
could have easily removed the "pandesal"
from her mouth and avoided death by
asphyxiation.
• What is important and decisive is that
death results by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery
• Art. 49 applied only to cases when the
crime committed befalls a different person
from the one intended to be the victim
o Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the
principals when the crime committed is
different from that intended - In cases in
which the felony committed is different from
that which the offender intended to commit,
the following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony
committed be higher than that corresponding
to the offense which the accused intended to
commit, the penalty corresponding to the
latter shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
• There still remains one aggravating
circumstance to consider, after either one of
the two aggravating circumstances present,
that of superior strength and dwelling, is
offset by the mitigating circumstance
aforesaid. The higher of the imposable
penalty for the crime committed, which is
reclusion perpetua to death, should therefore
be the proper penalty to be imposed on
appellant.

Automatic review of the death

sentence imposed on Diego Opero
for robbery with homicide with
which he was charged in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Manila, together
with Reynaldo Lacsinto and Milagros
Villegas, who, however, did not
appeal their conviction with much
lesser penalty, the last-named, as a
mere accessory after the fact.
Another accused, Asteria Avila was
acquitted
 The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible
US VS VALDEZ author of the death of Venancio Gargantel, and he was
properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge
appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the
US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ
 offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that
G.R No. L-16486   22 March 1921 committed. ( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)

FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent

out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the
accused, Calixto Valdez and six others among who was the
deceased, Venancio Gargantel. During their work, the accused
began to abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel
complained, saying that it would be better if he would not
insult them. The accused took this as a display of
insubordination, thus, he moved towards Gargantel, with a big
knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the
accused had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the
latter, evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril,
threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its
surface to be seen no more.

As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by

drowning, as a consequence of having thrown himself into the
water and upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the
accused. The Judgment rendered against the accused. Having
been convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused
alleged on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of
inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated
homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of

Venancio Gargantel.

HELD:  

The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused,

enunciated the following doctrine: 

“ That even though the death of the injured person should not
be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very
grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary
artery , occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under
the circumstances in which that person was placed,
nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused
compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap
into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the
injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a
mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack
manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the
deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting
him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision
appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted
as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as
the death of the injured person was due to the act of the
accused.”
 US VS CASTROMERO - For this case Rape was consummated, because sexual
assault was perpetrated by force and intimidation

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED
Issue: A P P E L A N T C A S T R O M E R O I S G U I LT Y B E Y O N D
Whether or not Castromero is liable for the serious physical injuries REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES.
suffered
by the victim?

Held:
There is no doubt that the rape was consummated because the mere
touching of the labia by the male organ is already consummated
rape. The Supreme
Court decided that the respondent is liable to the serious physical
injuries incurred
by the victim. The fact that Castromero created the sense of danger
in the mind of
the victim which caused her to jump off the window is enough
reason to make him
liable for serious physical injuries.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused Celerino Castromero was found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the      crime of Rape with Serious
Physical Injuries sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. That
on the February 26, 1993 at about 2am in the province of
batangas philippines,the accused armed with a balisong
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge w/
the offended party Josephine Baon against her will and
consent and as a consequence thereof she suffered serious
physical injuries, by jumping down through the 2nd  floor
window of her house.

Castromero and Baon are relatives. Josephine Baon's

husband is the second-cousin of Castromero. They were
neighbors wherein their houses are located a mere 50 meters
apart. During the incident Castromero's penis due to their
movement sideways was able to touch Baon's private parts.
When Baon, noticed that Castromero was no longer holding
the knife she tried to escape by pushing him off and jumping
through the 2nd  flr window. Upon falling down she yelled for
help wherein her inlaws came out to help her and bring her to
the hospital, as she was experiencing intense pain.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Was Rape committed in this case?

- In determining if rape was consummated or merely

attempted,  we observe that there was NO complete of
perfect penetration of the complainant's organ.
- To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration
of the complainant's private organ is NOT essential. Even the
slightest or mere touching of the lips of the female organ, or
labia of the pudendum, is sufficient.
- In people vs. Dela Pena (233 SCRA 573) held that the
mere touching of the external genitalia of the penis capable of
consummating a sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge.
PEOPLE v. JUAN QUIANZON, GR No. 42607, 1935-09-28
Facts:
responsibility.
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of
a deceased person was being held in the house of Victorina
Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacidn, of the municipality of
Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of relatives
and friends. The incident that led... to the filing of these
charges took place between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for
food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all
appearances, had the victuals in his care. Aribuabo was a
sexagenarian and so... was Quianzon. It was the second or
third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same
purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a
firebrand and applied it to the neck of the man who so
pestered him. Aribuabo ran to the place where the people
were... gathered exclaiming that he was wounded and was
dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound
in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of
this wound on the tenth day after the incident.
injuries, simply because the doctor was of the opinion that the
ictim's statement immediately after receiving the wound,
naming the... accused as the author of the aggression, and
the admission forthwith made by the accused that he had
applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded him,
besides, with a bamboo spit
improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to
"wound of the deceased was very serious and it was
difficult... to determine whether he could survive or not."
Issues:
universal application, and lies at the foundation of all
It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was
the accused who inflicted the wound which resulted in
Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but
only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not
necessarily fatal and the deceased would... have survived it
had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza
had placed to control or isolate the infection.
The possibility, admitted by said physician, that... the patient
might" have survived said wound had he not removed the
drainage, does not mean that that act of the patient was the
real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal
consequence could have followed, and the fact that the
patient had so acted in a paroxysm of... pain does not alter
the juridical consequences of the punishable act of the
accused.
Ruling:
"One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to
be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or
immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other
causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of
accused is wrong in imputing the natural consequences of his
criminal act to an act of his victim.
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of
instruction and of intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed should be taken into consideration in favor of
the appellant, without any aggravating circumstances adverse
to him
Principles:
when a person dies in consequence of an internal
hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctor's
orders, not because of carelessness or a desire to... increase
the criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his
nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by said
assailant, the crime is homicide and not merely slight physical
wound might have healed,in... seven days... one who inflicts
an injury on another will be held responsible for his death,
although it may appear that the deceased might have
recovered if he had... taken proper care of himself, or
submitted to a surgical operation, or that unskilled or
the death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical
operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound.
The... principle on which this rule is founded is one of
criminal
jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to
contemplate and to be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts.
PEOPLE v. QUIANZON / G.R. No. 42607 / September 28,
1935
FACTS:
Juan Quianzon, after being fed up with Andres Aribuabo
applied a firebrand on hi
s abdomen. He died after 10 days. Three witnesses
corroborated to facts and Quia
nzon also owned up to his act.
The trial court charged Quianzon of homicide. His counsel
argued that it should
only be convicted serious physical injuries as Aribuabo died
because of his care
lessness and his disobedience to his doctors.
ISSUE: Whether Quianzon committed homicide.
RULING:
The Supreme Court said that Quianzon s contention was
without merit. The doctor ev
en said that it was difficult if the victim would survive or not.
His act was th
e direct cause of the victim s death
The SC held that Quianzon was guilty of murder with
additional mitigating circum
stance because of his admission to the crime
 PEOPLE VS ABARCA However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the
two other persons he shot in the adjacent room but his liability
People of the Philippines vs Francisco Abarca (Criminal shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca
Law II) has no intent to kill the other two persons injured. He was not
January 31, 2016 also committing a crime when he was firing his gun at Koh – it
Fahima Abobakar being under Art. 247. Abarca was however negligent
FACT: because he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no
one else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for  less
serious physical injuries through simple negligence  for the
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, injuries suffered by the two other persons who were in the
caught his wife having sexual intercourse with one Khingsley adjacent room when the incident happened.
Paul Koh inside the Abarca residence. The two also caught
Abarca  looking at them and so Koh grabbed his pistol and
thereafter Abarca fled. One hour later, Abarca, armed with an
armalite, went to the gambling place where Koh usually stays
and then and there shot Koh  multiple times. Koh died
instantaneously. However, two more persons were shot in the
adjacent room. These two other persons survived due to
timely medical intervention.

Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex

crime of murder with frustrated double murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.

HELD:  No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247

of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse

in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills
any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter. These elements are present in this case.

Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time
Abarca caught his wife with Koh and the time he killed Koh,
the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarca’s rage.
Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh.
PEOPLE VS BALMORES
is an impossible crime as defined in the Revised
People Vs. Balmores
Penal Code, which provides:
85 Phil. 493

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. – Criminal

Facts: responsibility shall be incurred . . .
Balmores was found guilty of attempted
estafa through falsification of a government
2. By any person performing an act which would
obligation. He attempted to cash in a be an offense against persons or property, were it
sweepstakes ticket that was obviously not for the inherent impossibility of its
falsified (the ¼ ticket was split into ⅛,
accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate to ineffectual means.
and the winning ticket number written in ink
(emphasis supplied)
at the bottom left part of the halved ticket).
He presented his falsified ticket to a PCSO
booth. The PCSO employee manning the Interestingly, in the recent case of Gemma T.
booth saw that the ticket was obviously Jacinto vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
162540, July 13, 2009, the Supreme Court found
falsified, and had Balmores arrested.
an accused guilty of an impossible crime and
Balmores waived the right to counsel, and
sentenced her to six (6) months of arrresto mayor.
pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted
estafa.

Here, the accused was a collector for a company

called Mega Foam Int’l Inc. (Mega Foam) and
Issue:
received a PhP10,000 check as payment from a
WON Balmores committed an impossible Mega Foam customer. However, instead of
crime.
turning over the check to Mega Foam, the
accused took the check and had it deposited into
Held: her brother-in-law’s bank account. It turns out the
No; The recklessness and clumsiness of the the check was not funded.
act of falsification did not make the crime

an impossible one under Paragraph 2 Article Both the regional trial court and the Court of
4 of the RPC.
Appeals ruled that the accused was guilty of
qualified theft. The Supreme Court modified the
1 .)The alteration of a losing
judgment and ruled that the accused was guilty of
sweepstakes ticket would constitute a crime an impossible crime. According to the Supreme
Court:
only if an attempt to cash it were done,
which is

what occurred in this case.

. . . the personal property subject of the theft must
have some value, as the intention of the accused
is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further
bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides
that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is
dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the

postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but
the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was
actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and
applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the
latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no
harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held
Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review
by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an
impossible crime as defined and penalized in
paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59,
both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the
factual impossibility of producing the crime. . .
. . . the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1)
that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was
done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent
impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime
under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was
further explained by the Court in Intod in this
wise . . .
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of
an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e.,
a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet, but
gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner’s case is closely akin to the
above example of factual impossibility given in
Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the
acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioner’s evil
intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam
showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.
Were it not for the fact that the check bounced,
she would have received the face value thereof,
which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was
only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken
by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the
cash to replace the value of said dishonored
check.
Going back to CSI:NY, a person who tries to
murder a dead person is guilty of an impossible
crime (see People vs. Balmores, 85 Phil. 493,
496 (1950). In his book, Justice Reyes writes:
A fired at B, who was lying on bed, not knowing
that B was dead hours before. In crime against
persons, as would have been in this case, it is
necessary that the victim could be injured or
killed. A dead person cannot be injured or killed.
Had B been alive when he was shot, and as a
consequence he died, the crime committed by A
would have been murder, a crime against
persons.” (Reyes, I Revised Penal Code, p. 86
[2008])
One of the requisites of an impossible crime is
that “the act was done with evil intent”. In CSI:NY,
the father had the evil intent of injuring/killing the
daughter’s boyfriend but did not have the evil
intent of killing a commuter. Was the father guilty
of an impossible crime?
• A person who tries to murder a dead
person is also guilty of an impossible
crime. A dead person cannot be injured or
killed again. (People vs. Balmores, 85 Phil.
493 (1950))
• Another example is a man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with
the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and
finds the pocket empty.
• The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish
criminal tendencies. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not a
defense in the Philippines but the act is
penalized by itself.