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Pakistan's foreign policy

dilemmas in the new
millennium
Shafqat Ali Shah

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2010

To cite this article: Shafqat Ali Shah (2001): Pakistan's foreign policy
dilemmas in the new millennium, The Round Table: The Commonwealth
Journal of International Affairs, 90:360, 345-356

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 The Round Table (2001), 360 (345–356)

PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN
POLICY DILEMMAS IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM
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SHAFQAT ALI SHAH

In the post Cold War world of the 21st century, Pakistan finds itself isolated and
at odds with the international community. The United States, the world’s sole
superpower, and its G-7 allies, after defeating their rival the Soviet Union and
ending its strategic threat, have started to confidently determine the fate of
global politics. The fall of the Berlin Wall formalized the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the triumph of Western liberal democracies over authoritarian
Communism. In the words of a commentator, William Lind, the ‘civil war of
Western Civilization’ was over. A new Unipolar World Order, under the United
States domination, was established. The world has been made safe for democracy
and the dividends of peace and prosperity were to follow through the forces of
free market economies and Western advanced technologies. Regional conflicts
are controlled either directly by the guardians of the new order, or through the
United Nations.

The new millennium world

I T IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED that economic wellbeing is the only way

to ensure peace, progress, prosperity and democracy in the world. Geo-
economics have acquired currency over geo-strategy and international trade
blocs over m ilitary alliances. Regional econom ic groupings such as the
European Common Market, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) are the new building blocks. The revolution in information tech-

Shafqat Ali Shah is a former faculty member of the University of Sindh and Visiting Faculty at the
University of Virginia. He is also Pakistan’s former Federal Minister for Food & Agriculture. This
article is based on a keynote address given at an International Seminar on ‘Ethnicity, Security and
Foreign Policy of Pakistan in the New Millennium’ at the University of Sindh, 20–21 March 2001.
The views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author and should not be construed
to reflect in any way the policies or position of the Pakistan Government .
ISSN 0035-8533 print/1474-029X online/2001/030345-12 © The Round Table
DOI: 10.1080/0035853012006541 7

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 PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

nology, with its essential components the microchip and computers, satellite
communications, other technologies, and the concomitant free flow across
borders of peoples, wealth, information and ideas have made national boun-
daries porous. The world, in the words of the old cliché, has turned into a
‘global village’.
However, in this ‘village’ there are new diametrically opposite forces at
work. The concept of the nation state as we know it is under threat. Efforts to
strengthen and formalize the European Union as a political entity suggest the
formation of a supra state. At the same time many nations in the developing
world face the dangers of fragmentation and disintegration. Elements such as
international terrorism, the drug trade, nuclear proliferation, ethnicity and mili-
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tancy in religion are more pronounced and have emerged as powerful issues and
instruments in international politics. Virtual States, made up of multinational
corporations and international banks, and other organizations such as the
Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International and the Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), are the new factors in international relations. Then there
are the emergence of what Fareed Zakaria calls ‘illiberal democracies’. These
are countries that call themselves democratic but are democratic only in name.1
In fact, under the rapidly changing global scenario, the concept of democracy
needs to be redefined in order to better correlate the principles of democracy to
the local realities, especially in the developing world today. The ingredients that
made nation states of the industrial age for over 300 years are under serious
challenge and the shape of the international system in the age of technology is
yet to be determined.
The end of the Cold War triggered a fundamental change in the way states
started to think and behave. New theories and serious speculations about the
nature of international politics and the global challenges in the third millennium
were initiated. Some rather provocative notions were debated in the 1990s.
Francis Fukuyama thought that the new era marked ‘The End of History’.2
Samuel Huntington believed that a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ was around the
corner. 3 This passionately debated concept has now been turned into a UN
sponsored ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’. The potential of Muslims and the threat
of Islam to the Western world became a centrepiece in some of these debates.
Some in the West even argued that since the ‘red threat was over there was the
green menace’ to face. 4 Many of these new factors directly and indirectly
impact Pakistan’s position and current difficulties in the new millennium. The
world had changed dramatically almost overnight and Pakistan seemed to have
no acceptable place in it. Pakistan’s present position and predicaments are so
intricately wedded to the recent past that it has placed Islamabad in a ‘twilight
zone’ while the world has moved ahead. To understand Pakistan’s current
quagmire, an objective overview of its past is essential.

Pakistan’s shifting status

Pakistan was a major participant in the Cold War and played a crucial rôle in its
grand finale in Afghanistan (1979–88). Ironically, years after the departure of
the defeated Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the dismantling of the huge
American CIA operational force from Islamabad, Pakistan continues to suffer

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 PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

from the spectre of that conflict and its multiple manifestations. Events in
Afghanistan have a critical bearing on Pakistan’s security, be it human suffer-
ings through natural calamities of a drought; or the form of that country’s
Taliban government and its radical policies. Two decades since the Super-
powers re-played the ‘Great Game’ in Afghanistan, a very large number of
Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan. This huge population is heavily armed and
has the potential to challenge the central authority of its host country. The
border between the two countries has evaporated and exists only on paper.5 The
spread of large-scale lethal w eapons in Pakistani society has created the
commonly known ‘Kalashnikov culture’, introducing violence in the country’s
domestic politics to levels unknown in the past. An even more alarming aspect
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is the increase in the sectarian violence and the philosophical spillover of

religious militancy within the country and its spread beyond Pakistan’s borders.
For instance, the mushrooming of Madressas and other militant religious groups
with their Jihadi arm that have come to be viewed with great disdain by the
world community are a part of that reality.
It was a W estern strategy to create, encourage and applaud the Islamic
Mujahideens, who came from different parts of the world, to wage a ‘holy war’
against the Soviet Union. Today, these Mujahideen groups have turned against
the Western forces that nurtured and legitimized them, and are condemned and
opposed as terrorists. With hindsight it seems that once the Soviet exit was
complete, the West’s participation in the ‘endgame’ in Afghanistan grew half-
hearted. The focus shifted to Europe where momentous and exciting events,
particularly the disintegration of, to use President Reagan’s term, the ‘evil
Soviet Empire’, were underway. A question also comes to mind whether the
USA and some other Western powers anticipated the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis.
Western neglect in settling the Afghan issue at that time has caused it to linger
and acquire new, threatening dimensions. A whole generation of Afghan and
other ‘freedom fighters’ of the past, hardened by war and denied opportunities
to reorient their existence in a peaceful environment, have found expressions in
places like Kashmir, Chechenya, Central Asian Republics and beyond.
The continued devastation and disorder in Afghanistan gave rise to the
Talibans and factors like Osama bin Laden. Afghanistan has become a focus of
world attention following Osama bin Laden’s use of that country as a base for
his anti-American policies and activities. Western concerns are also aroused by
the Kashmir situation, where a local uprising has become bloody and more
violent in recent years. Given the proximity of Kashmir to Afghanistan, the
history of the India–Pakistan conflict, and their emergence as nuclear powers,
the region has the potential for serious conflagration. Although the forces in
Afghanistan and Kashmir have their own dynamics and momentum, the inter-
national community has put the onus of their policies and activities on the
shoulders of Pakistan. Both Afghanistan and Kashmir have come to be regarded
as the cornerstones of Pakistan’s foreign policy, and they are paradoxically its
‘Achilles Heel’.
Pakistan’s foreign policy has serious constraints not only because of its
compulsions in Kashmir and limitations in Afghanistan but also its uncertain
position in the region, for example, its shaky relationship vis-à-vis Iran since the
revolution. Pakistan’s relations with its trusted friend, China, experienced less

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warmth in the 1990s than what both nations had been used to. China has
explicitly suggested that Pakistan put the Kashmir issue on the back burner and
co-exist peacefully with India. China itself has started to mend fences with
India in a very significant way. Pakistan’s traditional policy of passionate
support of Muslim countries and causes has been greatly undermined. For
instance, Pakistan’s anti-Israel policy seems to have lost merit in light of the
fact that the main antagonists, the Palestinians and the Israelis, are dealing
directly with each other since their initiation of the 1993 Oslo peace process.
Many of the Arab countries have made their peace with Israel, leaving Pakistan
to grope for a rationale to continue its past policies. In fact some of the Middle
Eastern countries that Pakistan has supported in the past have shown, in return,
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a degree of indifference in recent years, including Iran, Jordan and Turkey.

More critically, the USA, a strategic partner for much of the time since inde-
pendence, has downgraded Pakistan in its global agenda for the new millen-
nium. There is no other country that has had such a deep influence on and
provided so much support to Pakistan as the United States. Pakistan has had a
love–hate relationship with the United States that has oscillated between its
being seen as a trusted ally on the one hand and a ‘pariah’ on the other. During
the Afghanistan conflict, Pakistan was the darling of the West. Its nuclear
weapons programme was tolerated and large-scale m ilitary and econom ic
assistance was provided. Its military ruler President General Zia ul Haq was
even invited to address the joint sitting of the US Congress and also the United
Nations General Assembly as the spokesman of the Muslim States and the
Umma. There was hardly a country that did not shower favours on Pakistan
during those years. World leaders never missed opportunities to visit Pakistan.
Yet all that changed during the last decade of the 20th century.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Western response in vacating
that occupation was a m ajor event that carried serious ram ifications for
Pakistan, the Gulf and South Asia. These events altered the regional power
configuration and restricted the rôle of local powers. More importantly, a
direct American physical presence in the Gulf was established. Pakistan had
previously held a degree of manoeuvrability, clout and policy options. With
the USA’s direct involvement in the Gulf, Pakistan’s rôle in this key area
was diminished.
It soon became obvious that in the Western global agenda of the new order
India, Pakistan’s m ain adversary, was recognized as a major international
player whose rôle was viewed to extend beyond South Asia. The West’s
political and economic support, complemented by Delhi’s massive military
build up from the 1970s and its 1998 nuclear tests dovetailed with India’s
ambitions to become a world power. The idea of a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council for India is commonly debated in important world capitals.
The general consensus is that the world’s largest democracy and the second
most populous country cannot be ignored. India’s very large IT work force,
second only to the USA’s, and its potential as a huge market for the Western
economic interests and the free market forces has added to its importance.
When India’s moment of greatness arrived it embarked upon a systematic
international campaign to remove the irritant and nuisance called Pakistan. New
Delhi and its supporters in the West launched a relentless negative campaign

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 PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

against Pakistan. Its detractors have attempted to create an image of Pakistan as

a promoter of state sponsored terrorism in Kashm ir and elsewhere. They
suggest that Pakistan has an atrocious human rights record and it encourages
international drug trade. They argue that Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear test response
to India’s, already a dangerous event, carries even greater dangers considering
the possibilities that Pakistan could under desperate conditions transfer its
nuclear technology to countries like Libya and Iran. They add that the potential
of Pakistani nuclear capability to fall in the hands of militant religious groups
that operate at the international level would spell disaster for the region and
world peace. To its enemies Pakistan contains all the ingredients of a ‘rogue
state’. The campaign emphasizes that Pakistan’s current crises have placed it on
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the brink of an economic meltdown and domestic political implosion that could
have a serious destabilizing effect. Some even project Pakistan as a ‘failed
state’ whose efforts to compete with India and to create some form of equi-
librium in South Asia are senseless and absurd. The balance of power has
irrevocably shifted in India’s favour. Thanks to their efforts, Pakistan is now in
the ‘international dog house’.

Paradoxical Pakistan
Pakistan and Pakistanis generally defy logic. Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear explosion
made it the seventh nuclear power of the world provoking world condemnation
and Western sanctions. Incredibly this achievement came at a time when
Pakistan’s per capita income was less than $500 per year, its literacy rate one of
the lowest and its development at a snail’s pace. The country’s internal politics,
economy and social order remain turbulent, fragile and uncertain. Yet its
citizens have demonstrated capabilities to acquire international fame in key
areas. For example, Pakistani scientists, bankers, doctors, scholars, engineers,
sportsmen and other professionals are capable of holding their own against the
best in the world. In recent years, Pakistan’s world image has become so
negative that the international community has started to behave as if the country
is a leper. Since the 1970s any racial slur in England and Europe against the
South Asians was always equated with ‘Paki bashing’, just as today every act of
terrorism with religious overtones is thought to have a Pakistani connection.
The creation of the country in 1947 itself was a wonder. Almost single-
mindedly its dynamic founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah achieved this reality. In
the words of Professor Stanley Wolpert: ‘Few individuals significantly alter the
course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can
be credited with creating a nation state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three’.6
However, Pakistan’s track record since the death of the great man has been
mixed at best. Pakistan’s internal politics have remained enigmatic for a variety
of reasons. The new nation’s birth was painful and had serious legitimacy
problems. The evolution of its political process became shaky after the death of
Mr Jinnah a year after independence, followed by the assassination of its
experienced leader and first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan two years later.
Lack of resources in the form of state infrastructure, qualified manpower and
economic wealth, along with the trauma of Partition and the consequent human
sufferings contributed to the sense of uncertainty. The 1948 Kashmir episode

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added to the young Pakistan’s insecurity. The decision to join the Western
alliance system in the 1950s restored Pakistan’s sense of security, as it became
a beneficiary of American largesse that included significant military, political
and economic support. Indeed, the foundations of Pakistan’s economic base
were established in that period. The Ayub Khan era (1958–68) are considered,
even to this day, the golden years of Pakistan.
However, the most ‘allied of the allies’ at the height of the Cold War and the
front line state of the United States Containment strategy, Pakistan also
experienced neglect, reprimand and outright punishment for disagreeing and
charting an independent course from its benefactor and senior strategic partner.
Pakistan’s disillusionment with the USA began when the latter rushed to India’s
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assistance over Pakistan’s head during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict.
Prior to this event, Pakistan had braved Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev’s
explicit nuclear missile threat against its territory following the U-2 incident.
Consequently, against the American wishes, Islamabad established extremely
close ties with the People’s Republic of China. It is often suggested that
President Ayub’s downfall and even the creation of Bangladesh were a direct
result of those policies. Ironically, it was Pakistan’s very close relationship with
China that helped in building the Sino-American bridge, and consequently,
Pakistan’s transgression was forgiven.7
Within 25 years of independence, Pakistan, the largest Muslim state at the
time, lost half of the country through a humiliating conflict in 1971. A truncated
Pakistan under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto survived the traumatic
experience to play a proactive rôle on the world stage. Bhutto was the most
charismatic leader Pakistan has produced, and his actions changed the politics
of Pakistan for all times. He has left an undeniable imprint, both of good and
bad, on Pakistan’s history. Bhutto’s rôle in the East Pakistan crisis remains
controversial. It was Bhutto who initiated Pakistan’s nuclear programme and
the 1973 Constitution that has bound Pakistan to the parliamentary form of
Government. The 1974 Islamic Conference in Lahore, regarded as the first of
its kind in the 20th century with the largest gathering of Muslim heads of state
and governments, was Bhutto’s brainchild.
Z. A. Bhutto’s politics of peoples’ power unleashed uncontrollable forces of
change in Pakistani society that have never since been harnessed. His policies
of socialism and nationalization ended the sound economic base set by the
Ayub government and destroyed national institutions to such an extent that they
still carry the scars. Witness the deterioration of the banking system, educa-
tional institutions, the industries and the bureaucracy, and the general lack of
discipline in Pakistani citizens. Bhutto propagated freedom to the masses but he
never emphasized the inculcation of responsibility as citizens. His politics were
authoritarian in the guise of democracy and focused on high handedness and
bore the markers of a personality cult.8
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s initiation of Pakistan’s nuclear programme once again
brought US–Pakistan relations on a collision course. Henry Kissinger’s remarks
in 1976 that the USA would m ake a ‘horrible exam ple’ of Bhutto remain
instructive. President Jimm y Carter undertook a crusade against nuclear
weapons proliferation during his election campaign and made Pakistan the
centrepiece of his strategy.9 In that period analysts even gave nuclear weapons a

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 PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

religion; the term ‘Islamic bomb’ was highlighted.10 Interestingly, no one has
talked about a Christian, a Jewish or a democratic bomb to this day. In 1979,
the Carter administration imposed the worst sanctions that Pakistan has ever
experienced. Earlier, Washington initiated a policy of ‘regional influentials’ in
which Israel, Iran and India were seen as playing a predominant rôle in their
respective regions. This led to a reduced importance for Pakistan. The Carter
administration’s aversion to Pakistan was further evident by the fact that
President Carter while visiting India in 1978 bypassed Pakistan. However, the
revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the assassination of
Egyptian President Sadat caused a mortal blow to the Carter–Brzezinski grand
designs. Were these events a form of divine intervention for Pakistan? It was
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poetic justice when General Zia, struggling to survive, turned down President
Carter’s offer of $400 million in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
as ‘peanuts’, and later citizen Jim m y Carter visited the country that he
vehemently opposed and tried to punish when in power.
General Zia ul Haq’s 11-year rule was the longest in Pakistan’s history. His
prolonged survival and eventual exit were related to events in Afghanistan.
Under his leadership Pakistan played a key rôle in successfully confronting a
superpower. During his long tenure Zia faced serious challenges within the
country and from India as well. In 1983 the political forces within the country
launched the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). This effort on
the part of the leading political parties and personalities against military rule in
Pakistan caused violence in interior Sindh. Following the failure of the MRD,
Benazir Bhutto returned from her exile in 1986 to confront General Zia head
on. On both occasions Bhutto loyalists played a prominent rôle; many believed
with tacit approval from the West. In the same year India carried out the
massive ‘Brass Tacks’ military exercise that poised India and Pakistan against
each other in a possible conflict. According to some observers, this move was
designed to pressure Pakistan to withdraw its alleged support of the Sikh move-
ment for an independent state of Khalistan in Eastern Punjab. The ‘exercise’
was timed to coincide with Pakistan’s deep involvement in Afghanistan and the
fluid internal political situation. General Zia’s master stroke of mobilizing
Pakistani troops and pursuing ‘Cricket Diplomacy’ by visiting India on the
pretext to watch a cricket match between the two countries averted a serious
conflict.
Ironically, many of Pakistan’s present difficulties have their roots in the
earlier policies of Bhutto and Zia. For instance, the nuclear programme started
by Bhutto matured during Zia’s period. Both were great believers in a nuclear
Pakistan. Zia used the religious elements to contain the unleashed ‘people’s
power’ of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and against other political challenges to his rule.
This factor received critical impetus from the Afghan conflict. In the past,
religion had never been used as a political instrument in this manner. The
problems were further compounded when ethnic forces, particularly in Sindh,
were encouraged to openly emerge and play an active rôle in the political
process. This led to a serious rural–urban divide in that province; while in the
Punjab the sectarian violence reached new heights. These policies set in motion
forces that have led to an unsettling effect on the mainstream democratic
political process and fracture in the Pakistani society. Both religion and

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 PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

ethnicity have become an entrenched reality in the Pakistani body politic. In

fact it is commonly argued that since the death of Zia the political ghosts of the
two leaders are reflected in the politics and policies of their protégés Benazir
and Nawaz Sharif.
However, Pakistan is not alone in this experience. This pattern of politics has
taken root in the South Asian subsystem. The rise of Hindu fundamentalism in
India and the armed Tamil movement in Sri Lanka reflect this reality. More
importantly, the use of ethnic and religious forces as tools of state power for
domestic as well as external politics has had devastating consequences on main-
stream politics within these countries. India’s use of the Mukhti Bahini during
the 1971 East Pakistan crisis, the Khalistan movement in East Punjab in India,
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the armed uprising in Kashmir, the Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan and

currently the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka are all a part of that pattern. Top
political leaders have paid the price of these policies with their lives. Witness
the violent deaths of India’s Prime Ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi; Sri
Lankan Premier Bandaranaike, and the failed attempt on his daughter President
Chandrika Kumaratunga, and the Pakistani President Zia ul Haq. Bangladesh’s
founder Shaikh Mujib-ur Rahman’s violent death, though not directly related to
the above mentioned issues, is nonetheless instructive.

‘Democracy’ in Pakistan
The induction of Benazir Bhutto, a democratically elected daughter of the
executed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, led many to believe that an era of
true democracy had dawned; that a period of stability, hope and a promise of a
bright future for Pakistan would unfold. That did not happen. Between 1988
and 1999 Pakistan saw seven, including two interim, governments. On four
occasions military interventions facilitated government changes followed by
general elections. In 1999, the military overthrew Nawaz Sharif, the Prime
Minister, with a ‘heavy mandate’, and took power directly after another failure
of a democratic government. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had two
terms each during which their democratically elected governments mismanaged
the country’s affairs.
The leaders in this period devoted themselves to self-aggrandizement, corrup-
tion, nepotism, loot, plunder, high handedness, violence, terrorism; the blatant
violation of laws and frequent breakdown of order became the hallmark of the
Benazir–N awaz Sharif governm ents. The cold-blooded killing of Prim e
Minister Benazir Bhutto’s brother, Mir Murtaza, himself a member of the Sindh
provincial assembly, and his associates in Karachi in 1996, is just one illustra-
tion of the country’s affairs in that period. The letter and spirit of democracy
and the functioning of parliament were undermined through forcible amend-
ments in the constitution. The country’s Presidents and Service Chiefs were
unceremoniously removed. In a shameful act of storming the Supreme Court of
Pakistan, the party ‘loyalists’ of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif threatened the
lives of the Supreme Court Judges, including that of the Chief Justice. Pakistan
demonstrated all the symptoms of an ‘illiberal democracy’ with its worst face:
the ‘tyranny of the majority’. The country was becoming less secure and
unstable.

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 PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

During the 1990s these ‘democratic’ governments fumbled foreign policy

badly. The Afghan conflict festered with a struggle for power that created civil
war conditions and eventually led to the emergence of the Taliban regime.
US–Pakistan relations were once again on a roller coaster. W ashington’s
unequivocal support of the Afghan conflict period began to wane. President
George H. Bush’s refusal to certify Pakistan’s nuclear programme as weapons
free triggered a US law that prevented American arms assistance and reduced
econom ic support for Pakistan. The delivery of conventional w eapons,
including the 28 advanced F-16 aircraft, already paid for, was suddenly stopped
causing a serious dilemma for Pakistan’s security policy. The United States
threatened to declare Pakistan a ‘rogue state’ and slap sanctions on it because of
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its nuclear weapons programme, human rights violations, its alleged involve-
ment in the international drug trade and terrorism. Interestingly, it was ‘deja vu’
for Pakistan when President Clinton imposed sanctions in the wake of its
response to India’s nuclear tests in 1998.
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1989 visit to Islamabad raised hopes
for a new and better chapter in India–Pakistan relations. In the aftermath of this
visit India was able to contain its troubles in East Punjab. But its problems in
Kashmir began to increase. A decade later the uprising in Kashmir had become
violent and bloody. The India–Pakistan ‘brinkmanship’ in Kashmir became
more critical after both countries exploded nuclear devices in 1998. The world
community saw Kashmir as a potential nuclear flashpoint; while Pakistan
insisted that the Kashmir was the core issue that needed to be resolved to bring
a durable peace in the sub-continent. India’s difficulties in Kashmir and the
prodding of the international com munity led Prim e M inister A tal Behari
Vajpayee to visit Pakistan. Mr Vajpayee’s travel to Lahore on a bus, termed as
‘bus diplomacy’, had a twofold purpose. It apparently was aimed at diffusing
tensions and initiating a dialogue for the peaceful settlement of issues between
the two countries. At the same time, it was designed to show the world India’s
maturity as a responsible emerging global power with peaceful intentions.
However, the events in Kargil in the summer of 1999 negated these develop-
ments. It was President Clinton’s direct intervention and pressure exerted on
Pakistan during the 4 July 1999 Nawaz–Clinton meeting in Washington that
retrieved the situation for India and averted a major conflict.
The Kargil episode had multiple implications for Pakistan. This crisis added
to the already precarious position Pakistan faced with American sanctions and
the Commonwealth and the European Union’s severe censure of Islamabad’s
decision to go nuclear. The serious rift that existed between the m ilitary
establishment and the political government widened. India found the perfect
opportunity to paint a picture of itself as a victim and Pakistan an aggressor on
the one hand, and to provoke international humiliation and condemnation for
Pakistan on the other. There is a view that India had allowed Pakistan to be
drawn into Kargil, and its fallout contributed to the military takeover and the
further blackening of Pakistan’s international image.

Pakistan’s problems and policy options

At the dawn of the new millennium, the critical issues confronting Pakistan

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 PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

that need to be addressed urgently are: its development of nuclear weapons

and ballistic m issiles, its relations w ith India and the Kashmir problem,
Afghanistan, religious m ilitancy, ethnicity, dem ocracy and Islam abad’s
equation with the world’s sole superpower. During his tour of South Asia
President Clinton chose to make a four-hour stop in Islamabad after spending
five days in India. In his direct address to the Pakistani nation on 25 March
2000 Mr Clinton spelled out the American agenda for Pakistan. The essence of
his message was that the West did not favour Pakistan’s possession of nuclear
weapons and would welcome the roll back of its nuclear programme. The inter-
national community wanted Pakistan to establish peaceful relations with India
and resolve the Kashmir issue bilaterally through a dialogue. Clinton summed
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up his sermon with the following words: ‘I hope you will be able to meet the
difficult challenges … If you do not there is a danger that Pakistan may grow
even more isolated … If you do meet these challenges our full economic and
political partnership can be restored for the benefit of the people of Pakistan’.
The Clinton trip to South Asia clearly showed the US’s preference for India
over its old but weak ally Pakistan. The message was that Pakistan should
accept India as the preponderant power in the region. The key question from a
Pakistani viewpoint was and is on whose terms and at what cost to Pakistan?
Finally, in Afghanistan the West and other powers want Pakistan to end its
support for the Taliban government and help in securing Osama bin Ladin.
These new major issues require a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Pakistan cannot pursue all its foreign policy goals at the same level. There is
a dire need to prioritize them. It should identify those areas that are most
important and vital to its national interests and security, and be willing to trade
off on the less important ones. For Pakistan there are three options, and a
correct choice m ay help overcome its present predicam ents. First, it can
continue its current posture, with all its suffering and uncertainty, and hope for
‘divine intervention’, like the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to make the
world change its attitude favourably towards Pakistan. Second, Pakistan can
submit to the Western world’s wishes, negotiate an acceptable minimal nuclear
deterrence, sign the CTBT and roll back its nuclear programme. In return it will
receive a few billion US dollars, some debt relief and the promise of future
investments to save the economy and even some prosperity eventually. Pakistan
will have to accept India’s world power status and its own position as a
secondary regional state. The settlement of the Kashmir issue can become part
of that package for a long-term peace in South Asia. In Afghanistan, it can
invite the USA and other powers to play a direct rôle or through the UN to
determine the fate of that country; including the change of the present govern-
ment’s orientation and securing Osama bin Ladin.
The third option can be a prudent middle course. An intelligent compromise
may be the answer. It may be prudent to rethink the entire Kashmir policy.
Pakistan’s security and integrity cannot be held hostage for an area that is not
even an integral part of the nation. Kashmir has to be for Pakistan and not the
other way around. In this context, the status quo in Kashmir would be more
beneficial for Pakistan than its resolution at this point. The timing for a settle-
ment is not right. The recent trends in the region strongly suggest that some
Kashmiris and other interested powers are working towards the third option of

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‘independence’. Such a step would prove detrimental to Pakistan’s national

interests in the long run. India is very much interested in healing its wounds in
Kashmir. Pakistan could consider a bilateral dialogue to end the bloodshed in
Kashmir, and help in acquiring a peaceful and autonomous status for the
disputed territory for now. This could be used as a building block for a more
durable solution in the future. Indeed, such a dialogue should examine the
prospects of establishing a formal and meaningful power equilibrium between
India and Pakistan. This should include a m inimal nuclear deterrent, the
reduction of military forces along the borders and, perhaps, a non-aggression
pact. The real problem between the two countries is that of the imbalance in the
power equilibrium, Kashmir is primarily its symptom. Muslim–Hindu blood
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had already been spilled at Partition, much before Kashmir became an issue of
contention.
In Afghanistan, Pakistan should redefine its strategy. It should play a rôle of
responsible mediation along with Iran and Afghanistan’s supporters in the Gulf.
This effort can be under the um brella of the UN with the blessing of the
Western powers. The goal should be to achieve complete peace and an accept-
able government; followed by a massive reconstruction programme of Afghani-
stan goaded by the world’s richest countries. During this process the Western
countries must engage the present Afghan government and settle their problems
related to terrorism directly.
Pakistan may not be able to escape from signing the CTBT. But it can
bargain on the point of being formally recognized as the seventh member of the
nuclear club and becoming a part of the nuclear regime. It should promise to
sign the document only after all the existing nuclear powers, and those that have
a weapons capability, have done so. It should also aim at getting a substantial
relief in its international debt burden. These measures will help ease the inter-
national pressures on Pakistan and open the way for its greater acceptability in
the international system of the new millennium. More importantly, it will
enable Pakistan to focus on putting its internal house in order because that is
where its real wealth and strength lies in order for it to play a meaningful, pro-
active and respectable international rôle in the 21st century.

Notes and references

1 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracies’, Foreign Affairs, November–
December 1997.
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Hamish Hamilton,
London/Free Press, New York, 1992.
3 Samuel Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993,
pp 22–24.
4 See Judith Miller, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam’, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993.
5 See Ahmed Rashid’s Talibans: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central
Asia, Tauris, London, 2000.
6 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984.
7 For a detailed and interesting account of the rôle Pakistan played in the establish-
ment of China–American relations the following sources are as authentic as can be
available to the public. See F. S. Aijazuddin, From a Head, Through a Head, To a
Head: The Secret Channel between the US and China Through Pakistan, Oxford

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University Press, Karachi, 2000; Sultan M. Khan, Memories & Reflections of a

Pakistani Diplomat, Center for Pakistan Studies, London, 1997; Henry Kissinger,
White House Years, Little Brown, Boston, 1979.
8 For an excellent account of Z. A. Bhutto’s period see the biography by Stanley
Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993; see
also Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, Oxford University
Press, Karachi, 1999.
9 See Shafqat Ali Shah, ‘Pakistan’s Perceptions of US Domestic Politics’, in Leo
Rose and Noor Hussein (eds), United States–Pakistan Relations, University of
California, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1985.
10 See Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney’s The Islamic Bomb, Times Books,
New York, 1982.
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