On January 30, 2009, the LA rendered a Decision finding that the respondents were Further, as aptly ruled by the
led by the CA, the petitioners miserably failed to prove that the
1. ABANDONMENT
People's Security, Inc. and Nestor Racho vs. Flores and Tapiru Case Digest
People's Security, Inc. and Nestor Racho vs. Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru
G.R. No. 211312. December 5, 2016
Facts
Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru (respondents) were security guards previously
employed by People's Security, Inc. (PSI). The respondents were assigned at the
varfous facilities of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) pursuant to
a security services agreement between PSI and PLDT. On October 1, 2001, however,
PSI's security services agreement with PLDT was terminated and, accordingly, PSI
recalled its security guards assigned to PLDT including the respondents. On October
8, 2001, the respondents, together with several other security guards employed by
PSI, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) against PLDT and PSI, claiming that they are PLDT employees.
Thereafter, PSI assigned the respondents to the facilities of its other clients such as
the warehouse of a certain Marivic Yulo in Sta. Ana, Manila and Trinity College's
Elementary Department in Quezon City.
Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003, the respondents were relieved from their respective
assignments pursuant to Special Order No. 200310108 dated January 10, 2003 issued
by Col. Leonardo L. Aquino, the Operations Manager of PSI.9 Accordingly, Flores and
Tapiru, on September 6 and 27, 2005, respectively, filed with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment
of service incentive leave pay and cash bond, with prayer for separation pay, against
PSI and its President Nestor Racho (Racho) (collectively, the petitioners).
In their position paper, the respondents claimed that, after they were relieved from
their assignment in the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila on January 13, 2003, they
repeatedly reported to PSI's office for possible assignment, but the latter refused to
give them any assignment. On the other hand, the petitioners, in their position paper,
claimed that the respondents were merely relieved from their assignment in the
warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila and that the same was on account of their performance
evaluation, which indicated that they were ill-suited for the said assignment.
illegally from their employment and, thus, directing the petitioners jointly and
severally liable to pay the former separation pay and backwages.
On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 14, 2010, reversed the LA Decision
dated January 30, 2009. On April 25, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision, reversing the NLRC's Decision dated April 14, 2010 and Resolution dated
June 15, 2010. In finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed, the CA found
that the petitioners failed to prove that the respondents had abandoned their work
and that their defense of abandonment was negated by the filing of a case for illegal
dismissal.
In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners claim that the CA committed
reversible error in ruling that the respondents were illegally dismissed from their
employment. They maintain that PSI never terminated the respondents' employment.
On the contrary, they claim that the respondents freely and voluntarily resigned from
their employment. They also claim that the CA erred when it ruled that they should be
held jointly and solidarily liable to pay the respondents separation pay and backwages
considering that there was absolutely no allegation or proof of participation, bad faith,
or malice on the part of Racho in dealing with the respondents.
Issues:
1. Whether respondents were illegally dismissed.
2. Whether Racho is jointly and solidarily liable with PSI for the
payment of the monetary awards to the respondents.
Rulings
1. Yes. a As rule, employment cannot be terminated by an employer without any just
or authorized cause. No less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article 13
guarantees security of tenure for workers and because of this, an employee may only
be terminated for just or authorized causes that must comply with the due process
requirements mandated by law. Hence, employers are barred from arbitrarily
removing their workers whenever and however they want.
There is no merit to the petitioners' claim that the respondents were not dismissed,
but merely relieved from their respective assignments. While it is true that Special
Order No. 20031010, which the petitioners issued to the respondents on January 13,
2003, indicated that the latter were merely relieved from the warehouse in Sta. Ana,
Manila, such fact alone would not negate the respondents' claim of illegal dismissal.
Indeed, the respondents pointed out that after they were relieved from their previous
assignment, the petitioners refused to provide them with new assignment.
respondents abandoned their work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot
lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. For abandonment
to exist, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must have failed to report for
work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there
must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-
employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts. The Court is not convinced
that the respondents failed to report for work or have been absent without valid or
justifiable cause. After the petitioners relieved them from their previous assignment
in Sta. Ana, Manila, the respondents were no longer given any assignment.
What is more, PSI did not afford the respondents due process. The validity of the
dismissal of an employee hinges not only on the fact that the dismissal was for a just
or authorized cause, but also on the very manner of the dismissal itself. It is
elementary that the termination of an employee must be effected in accordance with
law. It is required that the employer furnish the employee with two written notices:
(1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.
Beyond dispute is the fact that no written notice was sent by PSI informing the
respondents that they had been terminated due to abandonment of work. This failure
on the part of PSI to comply with the twin-notice requirement, indeed, placed the
legality of the dismissal in question, at the very least, doubtful, rendering the dismissal
illegal.
2. No. Anent, the propriety of holding Racho, PSI's President, jointly and solidarily
liable with PSI for the payment of the money awards in favor of the respondents, the
Court finds for the petitioners. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only
when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of
law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made
personally liable for corporate liabilities. The respondents failed to adduce any
evidence to prove that Racho, as President and General Manager of PSI, is hiding
behind the veil of corporate fiction to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime. Thus, it is only PSI who is responsible for the respondents'
illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2013 and Resolution dated
February 7, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115464 and the Decision
dated January 30, 2009 of the Labor Arbiter are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that petitioner Nestor Racho is held not solidarily liable with petitioner People's
Security, Inc. for the payment of the monetary awards in favor of respondents Julius
S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru.
2. AGENCY FEE
Peninsula Employees Union (PEU) vs. Esquivel, et al.
Peninsula Employees Union (PEU) Vs. Michael B. Esquivel, et
al.
G.R. No. 218454. December 1, 2016
Facts:
On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of
Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078
authorizing, among others, the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and
the direct membership of its individual members thereto. On the same
day, the said act was submitted to the general membership, and was duly
ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-
NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one
percent (1 % ) to two percent (2%) of the rank and file employees’ monthly
salaries, brought about by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which
supposedly requires its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their
monthly salaries.
The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency
fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA
has been formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the
Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-
NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such
increase.
Issues:
1. Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased
agency fees.
2. Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements for such increase.
3. Whether the agency is exorbitant and unreasonable.
Rulings
1. Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully
negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect a
reasonable fee called “agency fee” from non-union members who Corollarily, no individual check-off authorizations can proceed therefrom,
are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount and the submission of the November 2008 check-off authorizations
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that the express consent
case they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of of the employee to any deduction in his compensation is required to be
agency fees is recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by the law, which must be
Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to followed to the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply. Thus,
agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi- the CA correctly ruled that there is no legal basis to impose union dues
contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union and agency fees more than that allowed in the expired CBA, .e., at one
employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from percent (1 %) of the employee’s monthly basic salary.
employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the
present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not
disputed. 3. bargaining agreement
2. Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and ( o ) of the Labor
Code mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites
in order to justify a valid levy of increased union dues. These are:
(a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the
members at the general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting,
which shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast,
the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of
such assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations
for check-off duly signed by the employees concemed. In the
present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show
compliance with the foregoing requirements. It attempted to
remedy the “inadvertent omission” of the matter of the approval of
the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly
basic salary of each union member.
While the matter of implementing the two percent (2%) union dues was
taken up during the PEU-NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership
Meeting on October 28, 2008, there was no sufficient showing that the
same had been duly deliberated and approved. The minutes of the
Assembly itself belie PEU-NUWHRAIN’s claim that the increase in union
dues and the corresponding check-off were duly approved since it merely
stated that “the [two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to be
implemented,” meaning, it would still require the submission of such
matter to the Assembly for deliberation and approval.
3. Yes. Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the
increase in union dues from one percent ( 1 % ) to two percent (2% ), as
well as the deduction of the two percent (2%) union dues during PEU-
NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28, 2008,
there was nothing to confirm, affirm, or ratify through the July 1, 2010
GMR. Contrary to the ruling of the OSEC in its March 6, 2012 Order, the
July 1 2010 GMR, by itself, cannot justify the collection of two percent
(2%) agency fees from the non-PEU members beginning July 2010. The
Assembly was not called for the purpose of approving the proposed
increase in union dues and the corresponding check-off, but merely to
“confirm and affirm” a purported prior action which PEU-NUWHRAIN,
however, failed to establish.