PEOPLE vs.

ESTENZO

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 2891, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy, accused",
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had testified in his defense,
his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to
cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters
pertinent and material to the case.

Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected to the proposed
procedure, but this notwithstanding, respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and subsequently
issued the questioned Order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the witnesses of the defense are required to testify orally in open court

RULING:

The Court ruled to that the witnesses are required to testify orally.

The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure
for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent
authority, demands confrontation, not for the Idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed
upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and
personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage to be
obtained by the personal appearance of the witness before the judge, and it is this it enables the judge
as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness
testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which
may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony.

There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring that the direct testimony of the witness be
given orally ill court. Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of
litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions
directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and
competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness.
PEOPLE vs. OBNGAYAN

FACTS:

Pedro Bagay was tending to his carabao when he was shot by Apolonio Obngayan, who was rushed to
the clinic of Dr. Bobila.

Dr. Eleuterio Acosta, who attended to the victim that same evening, testified that when he saw Pedro
Bagay he was in a semi-conscious condition, but after the emergency operation and the administration
of intravenous injection and infusion of blood plasma, his condition improved and he regained fully his
consciousness.

It was while the late Pedro Bagay was in the clinic of Dr. Bobila that P.C. Investigator Emiliano Agustin
was able to take his ante mortem statement. According to Emiliano Agustin, he questioned the victim
about the incident, and his questions, and the answers given by the latter, were written down by him,
after which the victim affixed his thumbmark thereon using his own blood. These proceedings were
witnessed by Severo Bello and Federico Belisario who also affixed their signatures on the same
document. In the aforesaid ante mortem statement, the deceased pointed to Apolonio Obngayan as the
person who shot him. Pedro soon died.

A criminal complaint was then filed against Obngayan, along with Nestor Taberdo and Delfin Padaoil.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ante mortem statement is admissible as evidence

RULING:

Appellant further questions the admissibility of the ante mortem statement (Exhibit B) on the ground
that there is no evidence that the statement was read to or acknowledged by the victim before his
thumbmark was impressed thereon by the constabulary investigator. Undoubtedly, a written dying
declaration which is not read by the declarant or read to him by another and is not signed or in any way
recognized by him after it is written, is not admissible in evidence. This error, however, is of no moment,
considering that the P.C. investigator, Emiliano Agustin, before whom the declaration was given,
testified as a witness in the case, and he related the statements made to him by Pedro Bagay, and these
statements are clearly admissible as a dying declaration of the latter. The admissibility of dying
declarations is not dependent on their being made in any particular form. It may have been an oral
statement or ejaculation made to a casual bystander, a mere formal statement to a physician, relative or
friend, or answers to questions put by the person to whom the declaration is made or a writing signed
by the declarant, or an affidavit.

It is plain from the evidence of record that appellant was identified as the assailant of the deceased, not
only because of the ante mortem declaration, but also by the clear and positive testimony of Alingan
Bagay. Appellant concedes that Alingan Bagay was not actuated by improper motives in implicating him
in the commission of this serious offense. We have held that a prosecution witness' lack of motive to
make a false imputation against the accused strengthens the credibility of said witness.
PEOPLE vs. AYSON

FACTS:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station.
It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the
PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986.

On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten note,
saying that he is willing to settle irregularities. On the day of the investigation, Felipe Ramos was
confronted about the findings of the Audit Team, wherein Ramos answered that the proceeds had been
"misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented
from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next
investigation”. No compromise agreement was reached.

About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime
of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City.

At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June
21, 1988, which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on
February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his
"handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked
as Exhibit K.

By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth,"
except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it
appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City
Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the
accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when
he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also
declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on
February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear
that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the handwritten note of Felipe Ramos as well as Ramos’ statement during the PAL
investigation can be admitted

RULING:

The Court ruled to admit the pieces of evidence.

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too,
that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit
A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February
8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities,
was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-
called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

PEOPLE vs. SALVERON

FACTS:

Gloria de Felipe was allegedly robbed and raped by Raul Salveron, Jesus Dalida, Mauricio Dumangas and
several other unidentified persons. During the trial of the rape case, Raul Salveron and Jesus Dalida were
killed by unknown attackers, while Mauricio Dumangas was badly injured. Dumangas pointed at Rosibal
de Felipe, the husband of Gloria de Felipe, Marianito Billones, Jr., and Jessie Vito as the attackers. It was
during the pendency of this case that Rosibal de Felipe was himself gunned down allegedly by Henry
Salveron, son of the late Raul Salveron. An information was filed against Henry Salveron.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Victoriano Gregorio as its star witness, who testified that he had
seen Henry Salveron with a long firearm at the time of the incident. On the other hand, Henry gave an
alibi that he and his uncle went out for hunting.

Trial court ruled to convict Henry Salveron

ISSUE:

Whether or not Salveron should be convicted

RULING:

The Court ruled to convict Henry Salveron.

Gregorio saw Salveron with a rifle seconds after gunshots rang out. Rosibal de Felipe was dead on the
ground. There was no other conclusion but that Salveron had killed Rosibal.

The nitrate burns on Salveron's hands only affirmed that conclusion. The claim that he had gone hunting
was too pat for the trial judge, who understandably felt that the story had been concocted to explain
the nitrate burns. The paraffin test did not violate the appellant's right against self-incrimination as it
involved only an examination of a part of his body. As Justice Holmes said in Holt v. United States:
 [T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.

The fact that Gregorio was not in the list of witnesses that was attached to the information was
satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. The record shows that the criminal complaint filed with the
municipal court on March 29, 1986 did not include Gregorio among the witnesses because his sworn
statement was taken only on April 1, 1986, and it was this list that was merely copied when the
information was prepared by the provincial prosecutor. At any rate, the omission did not disqualify
Gregorio from testifying later because, as we said in People v. Pacabes:

We have held in a long line of decisions that the prosecution is allowed to call witnesses
other than those named in the complaint and information. While the accused in a
criminal prosecution is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, it does not mean that he entitled to know in advance the names of all the witnesses
for the prosecution. The success of the prosecution might be endangered if such right be
granted to an accused for the known witnesses might be subjected to pressure or
coerced not to testify. The time for the accused to know all the witnesses against him is
when they take the witness stand.

PEOPLE vs. MALIMIT

FACTS:

Edilberto Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask
his employer (Onofre Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken
aback when he saw JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias "MANOLO" coming out of the store with a bolo,
while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life." Florencio
Rondon, a farmer, also saw Manolo rush out of the front door of Malaki’s store with a blood-stained
bolo. Malaki died and it was discovered that the store was ransacked, and the wallet of Malaki was
missing from his wallet.

Malimit a.k.a. Manolo argued that the the admission as evidence of Malaki’s wallet violates his right
against self-incrimination. He also questioned the admissibility of the prosecution witnesses due to the
alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not to admit the wallet as a piece of evidence

(2) Whether or not to admit the testimony of the prosecution witnesses

RULING:

(1) The Court ruled to admit the wallet as a piece of evidence.

 The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to
remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the
custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in
accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional
short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card,
residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the
crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet
taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence
certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove
that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's
culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing
appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.

(2) The Court ruled that the testimony of the witnesses is admissible.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on
September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime,
this fact alone does not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the
witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the occurrence of
the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact the natural reticence of most
people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this
case, is of judicial notice. At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that
the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight
and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the established rule of
evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function
best performed by the trial court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the
witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial.

ARZADON vs. ARZADON

FACTS:

Laureano Arzadon, as administrator of the estate of Loreza Angco, demands the surrender of several
rural properties.

The evidence was presented in the manner contained in the following recorded statement:

At the trial of this case on the same day, the attorneys, to expedite the matter, agreed
to file their allegations in writing in order that the trial court might render judgment at
the hearing thereof, and the partied thereupon submitted their in written allegations in
the form of statements of their respective witnesses.
These so-called proofs are nothing more than certain papers signed by the counsel of the contending
parties, and containing averments seemingly made by various witnesses. At the bottom of that of the
plaintiff, which is signed by Attorney A. M. Jimenez, there appears the following:

The undersigned attorney rejects all and each one of the immaterial proofs that the
defendant may offer to the court, denies under oath the presentation of documents
lacking legal validity, the declarations that may be in conflict with those made by the
witnesses of the defendant, excepting therefrom in case of admission by the court, and,
lastly, presents two documentary proofs, Exhibits A and B of the complaint.

That of the defendant, signed by Attorney Lucas Paredes, contains the following:

The defendants object to the documents which the plaintiff has offered as evidence, for
the reason that they are immaterial, and in the event their objection is overruled they
take exception thereto. As documentary proof they offer Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 of the
defendants, and with this they rest their case.

CFI ruled to dismiss Laureano Arzadon’s complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court should admit the complaint

RULING:

The Court ruled that trial court should admit the complaint.

Among the irregularities contained in the case herein, the most remarkable is that which is alleged as
the first error committed in the judgment, the attorney who alleges it being the same one who
contributed thereto, and who also suffered therefrom by exposing his complaint to be dismissed on
account of lack of legal proof. This lawyer, together with the counsel for the adverse party, moved that
his proof be admitted in the form in which it was made, in order, as he now shows, to dispense can not
constitute a trial. It is an open and manifest violation of various laws.

This supreme Court, before which the case is submitted for a review of the proofs thus presented, can
not even admit them; they do not constitute legal proof of any kind. It is erroneous to say that it was the
duty of the court below to accept the agreements of the parties, not with respect to the facts, but as to
the manner of offering their respective proofs. The order of trials is not personal matter between the
parties, one that they may ignore or renounce as if it only concerned them privately. The form of a trial
is a matter of public order and interest.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES vs. CRUZ

FACTS:

Private respondent Camille T. Cruz filed a complaint against petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. for
breach of contract of carriage committed when petitioner changed private respondents original itinerary
of Boston to Chicago, Chicago to Tokyo, Tokyo to Manila to a new itinerary of Boston to New York, New
York to Tokyo and Tokyo to Manila, thereby downgrading private respondent on two legs of her return
flight to Manila from business to economy class (flights from Boston to New York, and from Tokyo to
Manila). Petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim alleging therein that the flight on
which private respondent was originally booked was cancelled due to maintenance problems and bad
weather, and that the airline had done its best to re-book private respondent on the next available
flights.

Trial progressed until 1995 when it was petitioners turn to present its witness on three scheduled dates.
Two of the settings were cancelled when petitioners counsel filed notice for oral deposition of one
Mario Garza, witness for petitioner, in New York. Private respondent filed her opposition and suggested
written interrogatories instead. However, in an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court denied private
respondents opposition, thus allowing the deposition to proceed. The oral deposition took place in New
York on July 24, 1995 or notably two days before the issuance of the trial courts order allowing the
deposition to proceed.

During the trial proceedings, petitioner presented the deposition record of its witness while private
respondent reserved her right to cross-examine and present rebuttal evidence.

Private respondent, likewise, questioned the conduct of the oral deposition as irregular and moved for
suppression of the same on the following grounds: (1) The deposition has been improperly and
irregularly taken; (2) These irregularities or defects were discovered by the plaintiff during the hearing
and plaintiff has acted with reasonable promptness after having ascertained the existence of the
aforesaid irregularities and defects.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the oral deposition should be admitted

RULING:

The Court ruled not to admit the oral deposition.

Respondent court also correctly noted that private respondents objections to the oral deposition had
been made promptly and vehemently, as required by the Rules, but these were wrongly disregarded as
immaterial by the trial court.

We note with approval respondent courts ruling disallowing the depositions and upholding private
respondents right to cross-examine:
 xxx [The] deposition was not a mode of discovery but rather a direct testimony by
respondents witness and there appears a strategy by respondent to exclude petitioners
participation from the proceedings.

While a months notice would ordinarily be sufficient, the circumstances in this case are
different. Two days of trial were cancelled and notice for oral deposition was given in
lieu of the third date. The locus of oral deposition is not easily within reach of ordinary
citizens for it requires time to get a travel visa to the United States, book a flight in July
to the United States, and more importantly substantial travel fare is needed to obtain a
round trip ticket by place (sic) from Manila to New York and back to Manila

Petitioners [private respondent] right to cross examine and to present rebuttal evidence, having been
reserved earlier, needed no reiteration. Even then, this was nevertheless manifested and even
vehemently argued. As defendants oral deposition was admitted, despite substantial issues raised
against it in the interest of justice, similar consideration, aside from substantial and technical basis, also
dictates that petitioners [private respondent] right to cross-examine and present rebuttal evidence
should be granted. An even handed treatment of the parties would require the same attitude towards
the acceptance of petitioners [private respondents] right to cross-examine and present its rebuttal
evidence on the same.

SAVORY LUNCHEONETTE vs. LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO

FACTS:

The Savory Luncheonette through a Court Prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a
complaint charging the private respondents to whom We shall refer at times as LAKAS PILIPINO, with
unfair labor practice. To sustain its charges, petitioner presented as its key witness, its legal counsel,
Atty. Emiliano Morabe. As legal counsel, Atty. Morabe had allegedly taken charge of the labor-
management problems of the petitioner and had thereby acquired first-hand knowledge of the facts of
the labor dispute.

Atty. Rodolfo Amante, counsel of LAKAS PILIPINO, was called to cross-examine Atty. Morabe, but failed
to do so on five occasions, even with warnings that his right to cross-examine will be deemed waived.
Atty. Morabe succumbed to a heart attack during the trial proceedings, and Atty. Amante never got to
cross-examine the former.

LAKAS PILIPINO filed a motion to strike out the direct testimony of Atty. Morabe from the records on the
ground that since cross-examination was no longer possible, such direct testimony "Could no longer be
rebutted." Petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion contending that by private respondents'
repeated failure and refusal to cross-examine despite all the time and opportunity granted by the court,
they are deemed to have the same.

Respondent court ordered to have the direct testimony of Atty. Morabe stricken off records.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations erred in striking out the direct testimony.

RULING:

The Court ruled that CIR erred in striking out the testimony.

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is
a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
Thus, where a Party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it,
he necessarily forfeits the rights to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.

The case of the herein petitioner, Savory Luncheonette, easily falls within the confines of the
jurisprudence given above. Private respondents through their counsel, Atty. Amante, were given not
only one but five opportunities to cross-examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, but despite the warning and
admonitions of respondent court for Atty. Amante to conduct the cross-examination or else it will be
deemed waived and despite the readiness, willingness, and insistence or the witness that he be cross-
examined, said counsel by his repeated absence and/or unpreparedness failed to do so until death
sealed the witness's lips forever. By such repeated absence and lack of preparation on the part of the
counsel of private respondents, the latter lost their right to examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, and they
alone must stiffer the consequences. The mere fact that the witness died after giving his testimony is no
ground in itself for excluding his from the record so long as the adverse party was afforded an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination but through fault of his own failed to cross-examine the witness.

ORTIGAS JR. vs. LUFTHANSA AIRLINES

FACTS:

Francisco Ortigas, and defendant Lufthansa German Airlines, appealed from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, condemning the defendant to pay plaintiff an indemnity for the former's failure
to "comply with its obligation to give first class accommodation to a Filipino passenger holding a first
class ticket," This was due to giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the improper conduct of its
agents in dealing with him which was filled with discrimination.

During the trial, there were several postponements of the trial from both sides. Three hearings were
postponed on the request of the plaintiffs, 4 on the request of both parties, and 10 on the request of
respondents.

Due to so many postponements made by the respondent, including the no-show of their European
employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their favor. One of their witnesses was stricken from the
list due to his non-appearance in the day that the cross-exam on him was to be finished and the judge
moved for a finality regarding the postponements (ie. no postponements were to be made again)
Ortigas claimed that while in Rome, the discrimination against him took place. Moreover, when he asked
for a seat change to first class during the stop overs, he wasn’t given any. He was only given the option
when he was already in Hong Kong, about 3 hours only from Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in striking out the testimony of Lazarri even if his testimony was not
finished

RULING:

Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been
wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru
the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed
due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby
rendered incompetent.

In the case at bar, however, the Supreme Court has not opted not to rely exclusively on the foregoing
considerations. In order to satisfy as to whether or not defendant stands to be irreparably prejudiced by
the impugned action of the trial court relative to the testimony of Lazzari, the justices have just the
same gone over the transcript thereof. After considering the same, they claimed that even his direct
testimony, without taking into account anymore his answers to the cross-examination questions of
counsel for plaintiff, cannot be of much weight in establishing the defenses in defendant's answer.

However, the trial court's action cannot be categorized as arbitrary or oppressive or as amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this second order was but a logical consequence of the previous
order denying defendant's motion for postponement. With such denial, the next thing in order was to
declare the presentation of evidence of the defendant terminated. Accordingly, it was necessary to
determine what evidence could be considered to be for the defendant. And so when counsel for plaintiff
asked the court to strike out the testimony so far given by Lazarri, there was practically no alternative
for the court but to grant the same. Indeed, defendant's counsel could not and did not offer any
objection thereto.

PEOPLE vs. SENERIS

FACTS:

Private respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel was charged for the crime of parricide in the fatal stabbing
of Eduardo Pimentel y Orario, the lawful husband of private respondent. Co-accused Mario Nemenio y
delos Santos was already convicted of participating in the crime when Mario offered to be a witness
against Pilar.

Counsel for private respondent commenced his cross- examination of prosecution witness Mario
Nemenio y delos Santos, which cross-examination however was not completed on that session for lack
of material time. However, prosecution witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos was shot dead by the
Integrated National Police patrols while allegedly escaping from the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm,
Zamboanga City, where he was then serving his sentence. Consequently, the completion of his cross-
examination became an impossibility.

Respondent judge issued an order declaring as inadmissible the entire testimony of the deceased
witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos on the principal ground "... that the defense was not able to
complete its cross-examination of said witness ..."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mario’s unfinished testimony may be admitted as evidence

RULING:

The Court ruled to admit the testimony.

The conduct of a party which may be construed as a implied waiver of the right to cross-examine may
take various forms. But the common basic principles underlying the application of the rule on implied
waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examination an opposing
witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. Thus, where a party
has had the opportunity to cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.

Respondent judge's full reliance on the Lufthansa German Airlines case cannot be sustained. To be sure,
while the cross-examination of the witness in the aforesaid Lufthansa case and that of the witness in the
present action were both uncompleted, the causes thereof were different in that while in the present
case it was the death of the witness, in the Lufthansa case, it was the unjustified and unexplained failure
of Lufthansa to present its witness on the scheduled date for his cross-examination which had already
been preceded by several postponements initiated by Lufthansa itself, thus depriving the other party
the opportunity to complete the cross-examination of said witness. Consequently, this Court therein
correctly ruled as inadmissible the testimony of the said witness on the principle that "... when cross-
examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the
witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent ..." (supra, at p. 636).

As clear as day, the Lufthansa ruling therefore applies only if there is a finding that the cause for non-
completion of the cross-examination of a witness was attributable to the very party offering the said
witness. Consequently, the same is inapplicable to the instant action as the cause for the non-
completion of the cross-examination of petitioner's witness was a fortuitous event as he was killed, as
per the pleadings submitted in this action, by the law enforcers (Integrated National Police Patrols) after
his escape from prison. As a matter of fact, respondent judge, in his questioned order, did not lay any
basis for the application of the Lufthansa ruling as he failed to make any finding that the non-completion
was due to petitioner, the party offering the witness, whose testimony he declared as inadmissible in
evidence. A reading of the questioned order reveals that respondent judge ruled as inadmissible said
questioned testimony mainly because private respondent can no longer finish her cross-examination;
hence incomplete. However, private respondent advanced in this action the cavalier theory that the
failure of her counsel to complete his cross-examination of petitioner's witness was due to the fault of
or was attributable to the petitioner, People of the Philippines, because it was the very agents of State
who killed its own witness; hence, making the questioned testimony of petitioner's witness inadmissible,
per the Lufthansa ruling.

PEOPLE vs. GOROSPE

FACTS:

In a verified complaint, Feliciano Gorospe was charged for the crime of forcible abduction with rape.
Gerardo Fajardo was originally a co-accused, but his name was dropped and Oscar Alvaran was named
instead.

During the trial proceedings, the cross-examination on the testimony of Gerardo Fajardo (who was
presented as a witness) was not finished due to his failure to appear in spite of a warrant for his arrest.
Nevertheless, the trial court ruled to convict Gorospe as well as co-accused Bulanadi for the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in deciding the case in spite of the fact that Fajardo’s cross-
examination was not finished

RULING:

The trial court committed no error in admitting the testimony of Fajardo although the defense had not
finished its cross-examination. An examination of the transcript of Fajardo's testimony shows that he
was subjected to detailed cross-examination on material points. In fact, the cross-examination was
lengthier than the direct examination.

While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense that a
cross-examiner could determine for himself the length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness.
The court has always the discretion to limit the cross examination and to consider it terminated donated
if it would serve the ends of justice.

The Court, therefore, hereby resolves to admit the testimony of Fajardo. This resolution finds support,
though indirectly, from Section 6, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which empowers the court to stop the
introduction of further testimony upon a particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full
that more to the same point cannot reasonably be expected to be additionally persuasive. The position
herein taken by the Court in brushing aside technicalities is in accordance with a fundamental rule that
the provisions of the Rules of Court shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court)."
GIMENEZ vs. NAZARENO

FACTS:

Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein private
respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.

Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention center
and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the
petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against
all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia.

The lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the
opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court.

After the trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while
holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent.

The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein
petitioners, expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the private
respondent, who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution and present his evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right of an accused to cross-examine is lost upon escaping detention.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the lower court is the right has been lost.

It cannot be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and
to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he
virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same
vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection,
may be waived by him.

SPS. DELA CRUZ vs. PAPA IV

FACTS:

The Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for cancellation of titles, recovery of
properties, and damages against several defendants, including petitioner spouses Reuben and Minerva
Dela Cruz.
The Estate presented Myron C. Papa (Myron), its executor, to testify on the substance of the complaint.
At the conclusion of Myron’s testimony on that day, the RTC required the Estate and the latter agreed to
present Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing to identify the originals of certain exhibits, after
which counsels for the defendants, would begin to cross-examine him.

But the Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand. He was taken ill and diagnosed as
suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting respondent Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the
Estate’s co-administrator, to seek repeated postponements of hearings in the case to allow Myron
undergo intensive treatment. Later, the Estate filed a motion for leave to have the defendants cross-
examine Myron by deposition at the hospital where he was confined. Myron eventually succumbed to
the disease before the Estate could commence the deposition proceeding.

RTC granted the Dela Cruzes’ motion to strike out Myron’s testimony on the ground that, due to the
Estate’s fault, such testimony was never completed, depriving the defendants of the opportunity to
cross-examine him.

CA overturned RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myron’s testimony after the RTC ordered the same stricken
out for depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine him.

RULING:

The Court ruled that CA erred in reinstating Myron’s testimony.

The CA appears too hasty in blaming the defendants for the further delays that followed. When Myron
died on August 16, 2001, the obligation to close his aborted testimony and proceed with its other
evidence remained with the Estate. But it did nothing, prompting one of the defendants to ask the RTC
on November 15, 2001 to strike down Myron’s testimony on the ground of the defendants’ failure to
cross-examine him. The Dela Cruzes themselves asked that the case be dismissed for the Estate’s failure
to prosecute after such a long time.

Still, wanting to give the Estate the chance to present additional evidence, on March 13, 2002 the RTC
denied the defendants’ motions. But the Estate did nothing for about a year and eight months until
December 3, 2003 when, rather than present additional evidence, it asked leave to close its case with a
formal offer of its documentary exhibits. Clearly, it was only at this stage that the Estate signaled its
intention to still avail itself of Myron’s unfinished testimony. And the Dela Cruzes did not lose time to
act. On December 5, 2003 they renewed the defendants’ earlier motion to expunge such testimony. And
this time, the RTC granted the motion. It did so correctly since the Estate showed a lack of interest in
offering a substitute testimony for that of Myron’s.
PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN

FACTS:

Gener De Guzman was charged for the crime of rape of Gilda Ambray.

During the trial proceedings, witnesses were presented, including the testimony of Gilda Ambray. The
trial court moved to convict De Guzman

ISSUE:

Whether or not De Guzman is rightfully convicted

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

The accused's contention that it was highly incredible that there was force or intimidation since the
assailant committed three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant
consideration. In the first place, Gilda explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours
mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the time which elapsed from the moment she was at
the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the incident to Tony Antonio.

The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the party who has
called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on cross-
examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an
opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-examination.

The re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing the answer of a witness, or of adding a new
matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation of testimony. In the second
place, on direct examination, Gilda categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice insert his penis
into her vagina. He failed in the first and second attempts because she struggled, but succeeded on the
third because she was already weak. While it may be true that on cross-examination she testified that
she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she was raped three times, no
inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications
of the three separate acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to
testify as to a conclusion of law, among which, legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A
witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be asked or permitted to testify as to whether or not a party is
responsible to the law. Law in the sense here used embraces whatever conclusions belonging properly
to the court.
NG MEN TAM vs. CHINABANK

FACTS:

Chinabank Corporation filed a collection suit against Ever Electrical Manufacturing Company Inc. (Ever),
the heirs of Go Tong, Vicente Go, George Go and petitioner Ng Meng Tam.

During the trial proceedings, George Yap, Account Officer of the Account Management Group of
Chinabank, was called to stand as witness. Chinabank objected, citing Rule 5 of the Judicial Affidavit
Rule. China Bank said that Yap cannot be compelled to testify in court because petitioner did not obtain
and present George Yap’s judicial affidavit. The RTC required the parties to submit their motions on the
issue of whether the preparation of a judicial affidavit by George Yap as an adverse or hostile witness is
an exception to the judicial affidavit rule.

RTC ruled to deny petitioner Ng Men Tam’s motion to examine Yap without a judicial affidavit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a hostile or adverse witness can be examined without a judicial affidavit

RULING:

The Court ruled that such witness can be examined.

Section 5 of the JAR contemplates a situation where there is a (a) government employee or official or (b)
requested witness who is not the (1) adverse party’s witness nor (2) a hostile witness. If this person
either (a) unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or (b) refuses without just cause to make
the relevant documents available to the other party and its presentation to court, Section 5 allows the
requesting party to avail of issuance of subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses being excluded they are not
covered by Section 5. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius: the express mention of one person, thing,
or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Here, Yap is a requested witness who is the adverse party’s witness. Regardless of whether he
unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to present the
documents, Section 5 cannot be made to apply to him for the reason that he is included in a group of
individuals expressly exempt from the provision’s application.

In this case, parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and answered interrogatories to parties
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They therefore complied with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court. Before the present controversy arose, the RTC had already issued subpoenas for Yap to
testify and produce documents. He was called to the witness stand when China Bank interposed its
objection for non-compliance with Section 5 of the JAR. Having established that Yap, as an adverse
party witness, is not within Section 5 of the JAR’s scope, the rules in presentation of adverse party
witnesses as provided for under the Rules of Court shall apply. In keeping with this Court’s decision in
Afulugencia, there is no reason for the RTC not to proceed with the presentation of Yap as a witness.
In sum, Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its application adverse party and hostile witnesses.
For the presentation of these types of witnesses, the provisions on the Rules of Court under the Revised
Rules of Evidence and all other correlative rules including the modes of deposition and discovery rules
shall apply.