Jep 20 2 73-1 PDF

Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 20, Number 2—Spring 2006 —Pages 73–96
The Role of Family in Family Firms
Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar
H istory is replete with examples of spectacular ascents of family businesses.

The Rothschilds, for example, not only amassed the greatest concentra-
tion of private wealth the Western world has ever seen, they are also
credited with changing the fate of history by financing monarchs and kings— one
of their most famous bets being the support for Wellington’s armies, which ulti-
mately led to the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. At the height of their power, a
French journalist reportedly said in 1841: “There is but one power in Europe and
that is Rothschild” (Ferguson, 1998).
Yet there are also numerous accounts of family businesses brought down by
bitter feuds among family members, disappointed expectations between genera-
tions, and tragic sagas of later generations unable to manage their wealth. One of
the more spectacular examples in U.S. history is the Vanderbilt fortune. Cornelius
Vanderbilt created a fortune in shipping and railroads. He is reported to have been
as driven and ingenious as a businessman can be. However, only 50 years after his
death, several of his direct descendants were penniless. John Kenneth Galbraith (as
quoted in Vanderbilt, 1989), “said that several generations of Vanderbilts showed
both the talent for acquiring money and the dispensing of it in unmatched volume,
adding that they dispensed of their wealth for frequent and unparalleled self-
gratification and very often did it with a forthright stupidity.”
Examples of family businesses are not restricted to history textbooks. Even
y Marianne Bertrand is Professor of Economics and Neubauer Family Faculty Fellow,

Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Antoinette Schoar is
Michael M. Koerner Associate Professor of Entrepreneurial Finance, Sloan School of Man-
agement, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Both authors are
Faculty Research Fellows, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
and Research Fellows, Center for Economic Policy Research, London, United Kingdom.
Bertrand is also Research Fellow, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany.
74 Journal of Economic Perspectives
today a large fraction of businesses throughout the world are organized around
families. The Murdochs at News Corporation, the Waltons at Walmart or the Rigas
at Adelphia are just a few of the many current business dynasties whose fortunes
and misfortunes the media has scrutinized closely. Family firms are characterized by
a concentration of ownership, control and often key management positions among
family members, even after the retirement of the firms’ founders.
Such family arrangements are predominant among privately held firms, but
are also present in a large fraction of publicly held firms. Involvement of families
in businesses is very common in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and in
parts of western Europe and Asia—though there is a lot of heterogeneity across
countries. For example, as reported by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(1999), 65 percent of the 20 largest firms in Argentina have at least a 20 percent
family stake; in Hong Kong this fraction is 70 percent. In contrast, in Japan, the
fraction of family control among the 20 largest firms is only 5 percent. Even in the
United States, families are not absent from large publicly traded firms. Anderson
and Reeb (2003) show that some founding family ownership is present in 35 percent
of firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500 and represents about 18 percent of equity.
Why are family firms so prevalent? What are the implications of family control
for the governance, financing and overall performance of these businesses? These
questions are only beginning to receive attention in the economic research com-
munity. At the core of the debate is the question of whether family firms evolve as
an efficient response to the institutional and market environments, or whether they
are an outcome of cultural norms that might be costly for corporate decisions and
economic outcomes.
The idea that a culture based on strong family ties may sometimes impede
economic development is not new. Such a view dates back at least to Max Weber’s
1904 essay, which argues that strong culturally predetermined family values may
place restraints on the development of capitalist economic activities, which require
a more individualistic form of entrepreneurship and the absence of nepotism.
Another early proponent of this cultural view is Banfield (1958) who described the
“amoral familism” in the south of Italy as one of the main reasons for the smaller
average firm size and slower economic development of the south relative to the
north. He found in his work on families in southern Italy a potential trade-off
between trust among the narrow realm of kinship networks and trust in the society
at large. A similar argument has been developed by Fukuyama (1995), who puts
forth that in societies where people are raised to trust their close family networks,
they are also taught to distrust people outside the family, which impedes the
development of formal institutions in society. Under such a cultural view, subop-
timal economic organizations can emerge when parents put too much weight on
keeping the business in the family, maybe due to a strong sense of duty towards
other family members or a more selfish desire to turn the business into a family legacy.
We first review in this paper the efficiency arguments that have been put
forward to rationalize family ownership and management of businesses. We then
expand on the cultural explanation, under which family ownership and manage-
ment are no longer value-maximizing but rather utility-maximizing for founding
Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar 75
families. In support of a cultural view, we present some preliminary cross-country

evidence linking stronger family ties to worse economic outcomes and to organi-
zational structures that are tilted towards smaller firms, more self-employment, less
reliance on external finance, and a larger fraction of family control among listed
firms. Moreover, the cross-country data show that family norms and values seem
more robustly related to economic outcomes than is another more commonly
discussed cultural variable: trust. One obvious limitation of this cross-sectional
evidence is that family values may be an outcome rather than a driver of economic
development. While we do not offer here any definitive answer to the question of
causality, we do show that family values are quite stable over time across countries
and show little adjustment to economic conditions, at least in the short or medium
run. We also show that the relationship between economic and organizational
outcomes and family values is fairly robust, even after controlling for formal
institutions such as investor protection or legal origin, which has been shown to be
an important historical determinant of formal institutions across countries.
Why Family Firms?
In this section, we explore efficiency-based theories for family firms, under

which family control is a source of comparative advantage for firms, allowing them
to achieve superior economic outcomes over their nonfamily counterparts. In the
following section, we turn to the cultural view, under which strong family values
may inefficiently push business organizations towards family control.
Managing for the Long Term

The enormous longevity and success of some prominent family firms has
prompted a popular perception that family-controlled firms embrace a longer-term
approach to management. Widely-held corporations, in contrast, are often associ-
ated with short-termism and myopia of corporate managers. In the words of
Giovanni Agnelli, the late patriarch of the Italian industrial dynasty (as quoted in
Betts, 2001): “The [family] company is an inheritance to be protected and handed
on. It is the outcome of the next and each generation’s commitment to the last.”
Similarly, John Walton of Wal-Mart describes his family’s perspective on their
involvement with Wal-Mart as follows (Weber and Lavel, 2001): “We view [the
company] really more as a trust, as a legacy we are responsible for, rather than
something we own.” The underlying idea is that the links that binds current
generations to future ones provide family firms with “patient capital,” a focus on
maximizing long-run returns and the desire to pursue investment opportunities
that more myopic widely held firms would not.
The Rothschild family is a case of such dynastic thinking.1 The family began its
ascent with Mayer Amschel Rothschild and pioneered international finance during
1
The following discussion is based on Ferguson (1998).
the industrialization of Europe in the eighteenth century. The Rothschilds made

their fortune from exchange-rate transactions and bond-price speculation, and also
developed the first international government bond market due to their close
connections with governments throughout Europe. An essential part of Amschel
Rothschild’s strategy was to keep control of the business in family hands. The
Rothschild coat of arms was a clenched fist with five arrows symbolizing the five
sons, with the family motto beneath: “Concordia, Integritas, Industria” (Unity, Integ-
rity, Diligence). In his will, Amschel set the rules that would closely tie his family to
the future of the business he had started. In particular, he dictated that all key
positions in the House of Rothschild were to be held by male members of the family
and that the family was to intermarry with their own first or second cousins. Such
rules created a long-term commitment of the Rothschild family to the banking
business.
Substitution
An alternative explanation for the presence of family firms is that family ties
serve as a second-best solution in countries with weak legal structures, since trust
between family members can be a substitute for missing governance and contrac-
tual enforcement. In 1798, Amschel Rothschild sent one of his sons, Nathan, to
England to establish an office from which Nathan would directly handle the firm’s
textile trade with England. Nathan took with him half of the firm’s assets to set up
operations (Bellow, 2003). Giving control to his trusted son likely gave Amschel
much less to worry about than if he had selected an outside manager, who might
have run away with the money. Ferguson (1998) demonstrates that these trust
relationships were a key to the family business success, allowing the business to
cover a wide geographical range at a time when law enforcement and communi-
cation across long distances were impossible. This enabled the Rothschilds to profit
vastly from international business where they had almost no competition, and to
weather political storms in different regions of their empire.
In a recent paper Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) formalize the argu-
ment that family control may be a substitute for weak formal investor protection. If
the pecuniary private benefits of control are large, a founder may decide it is best
to retain a controlling ownership stake in the firm and to appoint a trusted family
successor. This explanation for family-controlled businesses has been mainly ap-
plied to countries with weaker formal institutions, such as many in south Asia,
where private benefits of control are expected to be largest. Note that family
control in this case, while privately beneficial to the family, may be socially ineffi-
cient if this control is used to tunnel capital and resources away from minority
shareholders.
Human Capital
Another often-heard argument for the superiority of family involvement is that
it gives founders access to a better talent pool. This could be true if there is a strong
within-family correlation in managerial talent. This could also be true if the
transmission of knowledge about the business is easier between a founder and his
The Role of Family in Family Firms 77
children than between a founder and some outside manager. For example, family
members may receive exposure to the business even before becoming formally
involved in it. In an interview with Wharton Alumni Magazine (Moffitt, 2000), Brian
L. Roberts, current CEO of Comcast and son of Ralph J. Roberts, the founder of
Comcast, reports going to work with his father as a teen and “learning the nuts and
bolts of the cable business.” His father had “his teenage son sit in on some of
significant deals in the making, positioning Brian at the back of the room and
instructing him to quietly listen.”
Also, families might serve as a capital pooling device in countries where capital
markets are very illiquid and where it is difficult to raise large amounts of money to
start a company. In such environments, family firms can be advantageous if they
promote cooperation and cohesion and ensure that assets are not easily broken
apart. Finally, the easier cooperation that may naturally exist between family
members might also economize on a set of costs associated with the operation of
the organization. For example, there might be less need for spending resources on
monitoring managers that are family members or on coordinating the different
activities they perform.
To again draw on our favorite example, some have argued that business ability
did run in the Rothschild family (at least among Amschel’s sons). Bellow (2003)
comments on how Amschel Rothschild had been unusually successful at molding
his sons in his image without compromising their instinct for independence, while
impressing upon them the importance of brotherly harmony. Such harmony, some
have argued, may have been key in ensuring the coordination of the activities of the
family business across the wide geographic range it covered, and in establishing the
power of the Rothschilds’ business over Europe in the nineteenth century.
Politics
Finally, political connections can provide large benefits for private firms,
especially in economies with high levels of corruption (Fisman, 2001; Faccio,
forthcoming 2006). These connections may result in preferential access to public
resources such as subsidized credit, government contracts or favorable legislation.
Family firms might be especially well-positioned to benefit from those transfers
since they often have extensive kinship networks that stretch across politics and
business. If trust relationships are strong among the family members, family firms
might find it easier to maintain political connections or even build new ones by
sending one or more of their children into politics.
This greater facility of family firms in dealing with the political system creates
private benefits for the family, but can be socially inefficient if resources are
channeled to connected but underperforming firms. In fact, Morck and Yeung
(2004) argue that powerful business families can play an important role in sustain-
ing a high level of political corruption within an economy. If family firms indeed
have longer horizons than their nonfamily counterparts as discussed above, those
firms will be less likely to renege on their implicit contracts with politicians. Because
of this long-term orientation, politicians might prefer to exchange “favors” with
family firms. Therefore, the prevalence of strong family firms might endogenously
lead to extensive “cooperation” between business and government. Morck, Strange-

land and Yeung (2000) argue that, as a consequence, inefficient firms can survive
and create implicit barriers to entry for more efficient and innovative new firms.
Family Values and Family Firms
In contrast to these efficiency explanations for family firms, cultural theories

propose that the organization of business around families may not necessarily be an
optimal adaptation to the economic environment but instead the outcome of a
(partially) predetermined set of norms. Cultures that foster strong family ties may
make it difficult for a founder to dissociate the family from the business, despite the
possible costs this may impose on the business. If such cultural values shape the
preferences of a founder, he might be willing to forgo financial returns in order to
maximize his overall utility, which includes his respect of family values and obliga-
tions. (An alternative to modeling cultural norms as changes in the founders’ utility
function would be to assume that cultural norms impose exogenous constraints on
a founder.) Therefore, family values can create efficiency distortions if they intro-
duce nonmonetary objectives into the founder’s utility maximization that run
counter to the optimal decisions for the business.2
Nepotism
A culture based on strong family ties can give rise to nepotism. Barnett (1960),
for example, analyzes Cantonese entrepreneurs who immigrated to the United
States. He argues that they still use narrow kinship networks in making hiring
decisions even after immigrating. This narrow “familism,” he suggests, ultimately
impedes the ability of these firms to grow. More generally, because founders may
derive utility from seeing relatives involved in the business, they may decide to hire
key managers from within their kinship network rather than turn to more talented
professional managers. Beyond the direct effect of these lower-quality appoint-
ments on performance, nepotism may also have adverse spillover effects in that it
creates negative incentive effects throughout the organization. If lower-down em-
ployees know that promotion decisions are not tied to performance, they might be
less willing to exert high effort or to remain within the family business, thus making
it more difficult to retain talent.
One of the more egregious examples of nepotism is that of Suharto, the
former dictator of Indonesia, and his youngest son, Tommy. Besides controlling
political power in the country, Suharto was also involved in a number of private and
state-owned companies in the economy. Tommy’s dream was to turn Indonesia into
2
By itself, a founder’s desire to maximize the financial well-being of his family does not necessarily lead
to any inefficiency for the business or the economy overall. A founder who wants to maximize the wealth
he passes on to his children would be better off selling the business and distributing the cash flows
among his children (or hiring a professional manager), if he sees that they are unable to run the
business efficiently. It is therefore central to this cultural view that nonmonetary factors enter into the
founder’s decision.
an economic world power by developing a domestic automobile industry. Most

industry observers at the time regarded Tommy’s car project as a vanity-driven
scheme that made no economic sense. But to allow his son to pursue this idea, the
father installed him at the head of a new subsidiary in one of the family firms. He
first tried to produce a domestic car, called the Timor. After this project failed, he
convinced his father to buy him a majority stake in Maserati, the luxury car maker
that produces Lamborghini, which led to similarly disastrous results (Singh and
Loveard, 2001).
Legacy
Cultural beliefs might also dictate a will to build a family legacy, and instill the
desire to ensure survival and family control at all cost. This objective may not always
be aligned with the best long-run strategy, especially if it leads families to display
excessive risk aversion or forgo profitable expansion strategies or mergers with
other firms. Take the example of Tia, a company that was founded in 1933 by
Carlos Steuer and had, by the early 1990s, become a very successful family retail
business in Argentina. By the late 1990s, international pressures led Francisco de
Narvaez, general manager of Tia and grandson of Carlos Steuer, to conclude that
it might be best to sell the business. However, his mother, a large shareholder of
Tia, immediately dismissed the prospect of selling the company, claiming: “I do not
want to sell the company. It’s part of my life. I’ve inherited it from my father, your
grandfather. It’s a sense of life for me, and I do not think I could live with the
decision to sell” (Hill and Doughty, 2000).
The Rothschilds’ history also possibly illustrates the cost of wanting to build a
family legacy. Just as close family control was a key to their nineteenth-century
success, it contributed to their decline in the twentieth century. In 1901, with no
male heir in sight, the Frankfurt House closed its doors after more than a century
in business. For similar reasons the Rothschilds failed to establish a dominant
presence in the United States before the turn of the century. This is often seen as
the reason for their decline in the first half of the twentieth century (Ferguson,
1998).
Inheritance Norms
Finally, perhaps most symptomatic of the cultural constraints within family
firms are the inheritance rules that govern many of these firms. Such inheritance
norms vary from strict primogeniture, where the oldest son inherits everything, to
equal sharing rules among all the sons of a founder. Rigid inheritance rules may
have direct costs for family businesses. It has been argued, for instance, that the
reliance on patrilinear relations by many Chinese businesses (likely a direct out-
come of a Confucian belief system) is a driver of the small average size of these
businesses (for example, Whyte, 1996). In addition, equal sharing rules that involve
all of the sons of a founder in the business might breed conflict, since cooperation
between siblings can be difficult to achieve, despite parental will. Even if strong ties
originally exist between family members, daily interactions within the context of the
family business may lead to brutal infighting. Indeed, there are many examples of
families (and their businesses) ripped apart by such infighting. One extreme such
case is that of the Thammawattana family in Thailand (Bangkok Post, 2003). Before
the matriarch of the family died, she amended the business charter to stipulate that
if any one of her children needed to sell his/her stake in the firm, the remaining
children were the only ones who could buy these shares. In the years following her
death, two of the heirs died from mysterious causes or inexplicable suicides. While
none of the cases has been officially closed and no one has been convicted, the Thai
press interprets these deaths as an outcome of intra-family rivalries.
In contrast, historians describe the emergence of male primogeniture in
continental Europe during the thirteenth century as a consequence of intensified
demographic transition. Goody, Thirsk and Thompson (1976) show that between
the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries the inheritance of land among large
landowners and aristocracy was regulated by primogeniture, which ensured the
stability of family wealth and thus enabled the families to benefit from scale
economies in production. But primogeniture is not without problems either. It
severely restricts the founders’ ability to select the most talented person to take over
the family firm. If the oldest son is not talented, primogeniture will endanger the
survival of the entire business.
While such rigid inheritance rules may be constraining to family businesses, as
discussed above, breaking away from these rules may also be costly if it destroys the
expectations of individual family members about their place in the family and the
business. Backman (2001), for example, describes the problems that plagued the
Jumabhoy family, the richest Indian family in Singapore, when the patriarch
decided in 1992 to pass over two of his sons and, instead, to give a large controlling
stake in the group’s holding company to one of his grandsons, whom he viewed as
the most entrepreneurial member of the family. After six years of costly feuding
between family members at the expense of the company’s health (including secret
acquisition deals and the like), the family eventually sold off what was left of the
company in 1998.
What Do the Data Say (So Far)?
How much systematic evidence is there for the economic superiority of family-
controlled businesses? A reading of the empirical literature so far suggests: not a
lot. Several papers have established that family firms appear to underperform
relative to nonfamily firms in most countries: for example, Claessens, Djankov, Fan
and Lang (2002) for several southeast Asian countries; Morck, Strangeland and
Yeung (2000) for Canada; and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) for Sweden. Also,
Bloom and Van Reenen (2005) find that family firms in France, Germany, Great
Britain and the United States are systematically associated with worse managerial
practices. Two notable exceptions, though, are Khanna and Palepu (2000) who
find that business groups in India, which are for the most part family-controlled,
perform better than stand-alone firms in matched industries; and Sraer and Thes-
mar (2004) who find a premium for family firms in France.
There is also mixed evidence so far as to whether family-controlled firms are

indeed a response to weak formal institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer, 1999; Holmen and Hogfeldt, 2004; Roe, 2003). As mentioned before,
family-controlled businesses are far from absent in the United States even though
there is limited scope for expropriation. Also, a country like Sweden is often used
to exemplify a case where the estimated pecuniary private benefits of control are
low (between 1 and 7 percent of market value) and yet the frequency of family-
controlled firms high (Gilson, 2005). Moreover, Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang
(2002) show that family firms underperform relative to nonfamily firms, and even
other group firms, in several Southeast Asian countries that score relatively low on
the investor protection index.
Of course, one should be careful not to stretch any of the evidence too far,
since these cross-sectional comparisons are subject to many possible omitted-
variable and selection biases. Moreover, one might argue that the observed low
performance of family firms is not inconsistent with high financial benefits for the
families themselves. The low performance may reflect a tunneling of capital out of
the firms by the controlling families. Thus, family firms may be worse for minority
shareholders, but financially beneficial for families. In addition, family members
may receive “favors” from politicians that are not reflected in their companies’
balance sheets.
A few recent papers have made some first steps in demonstrating the role that
nepotism, family structure and inheritance norms may play in driving the perfor-
mance of family businesses. Perez-Gonzalez (2004), Villalonga and Amit (2004) and
Morck, Strangeland and Yeung (2000) show that the lower performance of family
firms is in large part related to the passing of active management and control from
the founder to his or her descendants. For example, Perez-Gonzalez studies 335
chief executive officer (CEO) transitions in firms with concentrated ownership or
founding family involvement. Of these 335 transitions, he finds that 122 involve the
appointment of a “family CEO.” Compared to unrelated CEOs, family CEOs are
associated with about an 18 percent decline in return on assets and a 14 percent
decline in market-to-book ratios in the three-year window after the succession
event. These declines in performance are especially strong when the appointed
family CEO did not attend a selective college.
Using a sample of Danish firms, Bennedsen, Nielson, Perez-Gonzalez and
Wolfenzon (2005) confirm that such findings cannot solely be attributed to the
endogeneity of family CEO successions. Specifically, they use the gender of a
departing CEO’s firstborn child as an instrument for family succession. In Denmark
at least, male firstborns are associated with a higher likelihood of family succession.
Bennedsen et al. find a large drop in performance postsuccession when the
departing CEO’s firstborn is a male, rather than a female. This evidence certainly
does not support the idea that families have a comparative advantage at running
businesses because of intergenerational transmission of managerial talent or better
alignment of incentives.
Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak and Schoar (2005) study the largest busi-
ness families in Thailand, most of which are of Chinese origin. While they find that
one son of the founder (most of the time the eldest son) is typically appointed as
heir of the group when the founder retires, involvement in the group (through
both ownership and management) is most often extended to more than one son.
Specifically, when the founder retires, the assets of a group are divided into a larger
number of group firms when there are more sons. They also find that groups with
more sons record lower performance after the founder retires and, also, delay
restructuring in response to the negative economic shock induced by the Asian
economic crisis. These facts, they conjecture, reflect an attempt to endow each son
with his own part of the company in accordance with some culturally set inheri-
tance norms, even at the cost of performance.
Empirical Analysis
In the following analysis, we try to provide some suggestive evidence to sub-

stantiate the idea that family culture might be a first-order determinant of eco-
nomic outcomes. We first document that there are systematic correlations across
countries between the strength of family ties and economic outcomes. Countries
where family is generally regarded as more important have lower levels of per capita
GDP, smaller firms, a higher fraction of self-employed, fewer publicly traded firms,
and a smaller fraction of total market value controlled by families, on average. In
addition, these economic variables are more robustly correlated with family values
than with other cultural variables such as trust in society. We also shed some
preliminary light on the possibility of a truly causal interpretation of these findings.
Measuring Family Values

To measure the strength of family ties in a cross-section of countries, we rely
on a set of questions from four waves of the World Values Survey: 1981– 84,
1990 –93, 1995–97 and 1999 –2001. The specific questions we focus on are the
following: First, respondents are asked to assess how important family is in their life,
from 1 being very important to 4 being not important at all. Second, respondents
are asked to choose which of the following two statements they agree with:
1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always
love and respect them, or 2) One does not have the duty to respect and love parents
who have not earned it. Also, respondents are asked to choose with which of these
two views they most tend to agree: 1) It is the parents’ duty to do their best for their
children even at the expense of their own well-being, or 2) Parents have a life of
their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of
their children. Finally, we use a set of questions asking respondents about the
qualities they regard as most important for children. We isolate independence and
obedience as most related to the strength of parental authority over their children.
Not surprisingly, these variables are correlated with one another. Countries
where the family is viewed as more important also put more weight on uncondi-
tional parental duty to children and unconditional respect of parents by their
children, and also value obedience rather than independence in their children.
Table 1
Correlation Between Family Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Un)importance of family (1) ⫺.49 ⫺.38 ⫺.41 .13

Parental duty to child (2) .37 .70 ⫺.38
Respect for parents (3) .49 ⫺.34
Obedience of child (4) ⫺.42
Independence of child (5)
Notes: The unit of observation is a country (N ⫽ 70). All family values are country means based on four
waves of the World Value Survey.
Table 1 reports the correlation matrix between these variables. We undertake a

principal component analysis to summarize these five variables into a single index.
Principal component analysis creates a linear combination of the original variables
that captures the variance in the dataset.3 Parental respect by children, parental
duty to their children, the general importance of family in life and the importance
of obedience as a quality in children all have positive coefficients in the creation of
our index, while independence as a quality in children has a negative coefficient.
Countries such as Switzerland, Belarus and the Czech Republic rank around the
25th percentile in the distribution of this index, whereas countries such as Vietnam,
Chile and South Africa rank around the 75th percentile. Closer to the median of
the distribution are countries such as the United Kingdom and Ukraine.4
Family Values and Economic Development

We first establish that countries with stronger family values have lower eco-
nomic development on average, measured by GDP per capita. We run cross-country
3
More specifically, principal component analysis is a technique that can be used to summarize the
information contained in an original set of variables into many fewer variables. In practice, a principal
component analysis defines new variables (the principal components) that are linear combinations of
the initial variables. The first principal component is the linear combination of the original variables
that captures the greatest variance in the dataset; the second principal component is the linear
combination that captures the second greatest variance, and so on. For our analysis, our index is the first
principal component, which captures more than 55 percent of the variance in the dataset.
4
Although we focus on country effects here, an obvious question is how important are country effects
compared to individual characteristics in explaining family values? To address this question, we under-
took a variance decomposition analysis of family values at the individual level. Specifically, we used the
first principal component in the micro data as a single index of family values. We included, as possible
determinants of family values, personal characteristics such as age and gender dummies, and seven
education dummies, as well as country fixed effects and wave fixed effects. Combined, these variables
explain about 20 percent of the variance of the “strength of family” index in the micro data. Country
fixed effects account for about 80 percent of the explained variance, or 16 percent of the total variance.
In contrast, education dummies account for only about 8 percent of the explained variance. For
comparison, we undertook a similar variance decomposition exercise in the micro data for trust, a
variable discussed later in this paper. The same model explains only about 11 percent of the variance
in the micro data. Country effects account for 87 percent of the explained variance, or about 9 percent
of the total variance. We interpret these findings as supportive of the view that family norms have a large
country-level component, and are to a much lesser degree explained by the standard set of individual
demographic characteristics.
regressions of GDP per capita as of 1990 (from the Barro–Lee data set) on our
measures of family values.5 We start with the index created by principal component
analysis described above, which we will from now on refer to as “strength of family,”
for convenience. In the first column of Table 2, we show that the coefficient from
a regression of the logarithm of GDP per capita on the strength of family is highly
negative and significant. Countries with stronger family ties also have lower GDP
per capita. The second column controls for human capital, measured as the
logarithm of the average schooling years in the total population over age 25 as of
1985 (also from the Barro–Lee data set, in which controlling for education reduces
the sample size from 51 to 46 observations.) By adding this variable, we might be
“over-controlling,” since educational choices might themselves be an outcome of
family values. For example, Coleman (1990, p. 580) argues that the changes in the
educational system in England were closely linked to changes in family structure
around the time of the Industrial Revolution. After industrialization, many people
gave up their family farms to move to the city to work in factories. Consequently,
children would not automatically take over the family farm once they grew up, and,
thus, the need for an organized educational system became more important. The
addition of human capital does weaken the effect of family values on GDP by about
half. However, the estimated coefficient stays negative and statistically significant.
The magnitude also stays economically meaningful. A one standard deviation
increase in the strength of families (1.66) is associated with a 23 percent lower level
of GDP per capita, or about a quarter of a standard deviation.
In columns 4 to 7, we repeat the specification in the second column but break
down the “strength of family” variable into its five individual components. Each of
these individual components, except for child independence, relates to GDP per
capita in the expected way. Unconditional respect of parents, a stronger sense of
parental duty towards children, a higher general importance of families and more
weight put on obedience all are associated with lower GDP, conditioning on human
capital.
Family Values or Trust?

Social scientists like Putnam (1995) and Fukuyma (1995) have argued that
only nations with high levels of trust will be able to develop the large-scale
organizations that are needed to compete in a modern economy. In support of this
view, papers such as Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Vishny (1997) have found in cross-country data a positive correlation between trust
and economic development, as well as other economic outcomes such as firm size.
In the light of this earlier work, one may worry that the cross-country differences in
family values we exploit in the regression above are simply picking up on cross-
country differences in the level of trust.
Is there a correlation between family values and trust? Following previous
papers, we measure trust using the following question in the World Values Survey:
5
The Barro–Lee dataset, as well a description of this dataset, is available at 具http://www.nber.org/pub/
barro.lee典.
Table 2
GDP Per Capita and Family Values
Dependent variable: log(GDP per capita) in 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Strength of family ⫺.37 ⫺.15 ⫺.34 ⫺.15

(.06) (.06) (.07) (.07)
Log(schooling) 1.11 1.35 1.33 1.07 1.16 1.43 1.08
(.20) (.17) (.18) (.21) (.19) (.17) (.21)
(Un)importance of 2.36
family (1.12)
Parental duty to child ⫺1.41
(.88)
Respect for parents ⫺1.87
(.69)
Obedience of child ⫺1.62
(.64)
Independence of .07
child (.48)
Trust 3.01 .50 .31
(.74) (.85) (.70)
R2 .47 .70 .68 .66 .69 .69 .64 .25 .47 .70
N 51 52 46 46 46 46 46 52 51 46
Notes: The unit of observation is a country. All family values, except “strength of family,” are country
means directly computed from the World Values Survey. “Strength of family” is the first component
from a principal component analysis of the 5 family values described in Table 1. “Schooling” is defined
as average schooling years in the total population over age 25 as of 1985. Ordinary least squares
estimations; standard errors are reported in parentheses.
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that most
people cannot be trusted?” We find a strong negative correlation across countries
between the strength of families and the level of trust that a citizen places in other
people.6 However, a more careful look at the data indicates substantial heteroge-
neity across countries in the strength and even the direction of this correlation.
Specifically, using the individual-level data, we computed the correlation between
family values and trust country by country. The correlation is negative in about half
of the countries. For example, in the United States and in Canada, the correlation
between trust and family values is negative. In contrast, this correlation is positive
in countries such as India and Ghana.
How much of the correlation between GDP and family values can be explained
away if we include trust as an additional control? We investigate this question in the
last three columns of Table 2. We first confirm earlier results in column 8 by
showing a strong positive univariate correlation between trust and GDP per capita.
In column 9, we include both social norms (family values and trust) in the same
6
For the purpose of our exercise, it would have been preferable that the trust question refer explicitly
only to people outside the family. However, the question we rely on is the only trust question available
in the World Values Survey.
regression. Strikingly, the correlation between GDP per capita and family values
survives conditioning on trust. In fact, the point estimate on family values barely
changes compared to that in column 1. In contrast, there is no statistically signif-
icant correlation between GDP and trust after conditioning on family values. The
same holds after we control for human capital in column 10.
One interpretation of the finding in Table 2 is that the relationship between
GDP and trust ultimately passes through the strength of families. In other words,
the importance of trust for economic outcomes is a function of family values in a
society. Alternatively, the family variables might be a better proxy for trust than the
commonly used trust variable.
Family Values and Organizational Structure

The next question is whether the negative relationship between GDP and
family values also translates into differences in organizational form and industry
structure across countries.7 We explore this question in Table 3.
The industry structure outcome we would most like to study is the total fraction
of family firms in a country’s economy. Unfortunately, such a variable is not
available for many countries. Instead, we use a set of industry structure variables
that we believe are related to the prevalence of family firms. One variable is
establishment size (specifically, the log of the average establishment output). We
expect the stronger reliance on family members in the ownership and management
of family firms to be associated with smaller size on average. As discussed above,
family members may make it a priority to ensure the survival of the family firm for
the next generation and in turn forgo growth opportunities. Reliance on family
members rather than professional managers may also lead to inefficiencies in
decision making that will on average slow firm growth. Finally, average firm size
may be lower because assets are split between different family members at the time
of the founder’s retirement (Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak and Schoar,
2005).
For a similar set of reasons, we use the fraction of self-employed as an industry
structure outcome. Some earlier work has suggested the possibility that family and
culture might be important determinants of self-employment. For example, Hout
and Rosen (2000) find that the level of self-employment in the United States is
correlated with family structure. Children from larger families and those that come
from more traditional household structures are more likely to be self-employed.
Also, some papers suggest systematic differences in self-employment rates of immi-
grants in the United States based on their country of origin. Yuengert (1995) finds
that higher self-employment rates in the immigrant’s country of origin correlate
with higher self-employment rates among these immigrants in the United States.
We construct average establishment size from the United Nations Industry
7
In principle, there are other channels that might generate a negative correlation between the
importance of family and GDP. For example, a labor market channel might be that stronger families
may induce less geographic mobility as children are less likely to move away from their parents to search
for better job opportunities.
Table 3
Industry Structure and Family Values
Strength of family Trust N
Self-employment .04 .07 80

(.01) (.09)
Log(av. establishment size) ⫺.17 1.21 48
(.10) (1.18)
External finance dependence ⫺.02 .07 48
(.01) (.15)
Log(# of firms/population) ⫺.19 1.95 42
(.10) (1.19)
Share of market capitalization .03 ⫺.13 19
controlled by top 5 families (.02) (.18)
Maximal marginal transfer tax ⫺3.45 ⫺6.82 31
rate from parent to child (2.56) (25.60)
Notes: The unit of observation is a country. “Strength of family” is the first component from a
principal component analysis of the five family values described in Table 1. Each row corresponds
to a separate ordinary least squares regression; standard errors are reported in parentheses. See
text for detailed definition of (and sources for) all dependent variables.
Development Organization (UNIDO) database. The UNIDO database reports,

country by country, number of establishments and total output for a set of manu-
facturing industries. Aggregating over the 1990s and all industrial sectors, we
compute average output per establishment for each country in the UNIDO data-
base. The fraction of self-employed is directly constructed from the World Values
Survey. It is defined as the number of self-employed in a country divided by total
number employed (across all waves for a given country).
All rows in Table 3 correspond to separate regressions. Based on our earlier
discussion, we report correlations conditional on the level of trust in a country. In
the interest of space, we only report correlations between these industry structure
variables and our index variable described above, “strength of family.” Table 3
shows that stronger families are associated with a higher fraction of self-
employment and smaller average establishment size. These correlations are signif-
icant at least at the 10 percent level. A one standard deviation increase in “strength
of family” is associated with a 6 percent higher rate of self-employment and a
28 percent drop in average establishment size.
Interestingly, these industry structure variables appear to be statistically more
strongly correlated with the strength of family ties than with trust. While each of
these variables unconditionally correlates to trust in the expected way (more trust
associated with larger firms and less self-employment), this correlation weakens
substantially (and in the case of self-employment, flips sign) when we control for
the strength of families in a given country. The point estimates are also consistent
with a stronger economic role for family values (one standard deviation in trust is
0.14 compared to 1.66 for one standard deviation in the “strength of family” index).
We also report correlations between family values and two industry structure
variables aimed at capturing the different financing choices we expect to see in
family businesses. These variables are a country-level measure of external finance

dependence and the number of listed domestic firms in a country as a fraction of
its total population. Because we cannot directly measure external finance depen-
dence in each country, we proxy for it by measuring whether the industrial
structure of a country is more or less tilted towards sectors that are heavily
dependent on external finance, as measured in U.S. data. We measure external
finance dependence parallel to Rajan and Zingales (1998). Specifically, we start
with COMPUSTAT data and compute within each three-digit industry in the
United States the mean level of external finance dependence across firms in this
industry. External finance dependence is defined as the fraction of capital expen-
diture not financed by internal cash flows. We then use UNIDO data over the 1990s
and compute, for each country, the fraction of total country output that a given
three-digit sector contributes to in that country. External finance dependence in a
country is defined as the weighted average of the U.S. three-digit sector external
finance dependence, where each sector is weighted by its contribution to total
output in that country. We measure the number of domestic firms listed on the
stock market of a given country, as a fraction of that country’s total population, and
averaged over the years 1996 –2000, using the Emerging Market Database published
in 2001 and World Bank data published in 2001.
A higher strength of family is associated with a lower number of listed firms (as
a fraction of total population). A one standard deviation increase in “strength of
family” is associated with a 30 percent drop in the number of listed firms (as a
fraction of total population). There is also a negative association between “strength
of family” and external finance dependence, even though this relationship is not
significant at the 10 percent level.
While there is no available measure of prevalence of family firms as a fraction
of all firms across countries, some researchers have computed measures of the
importance of family control among listed firms in a limited subset of countries.
Specifically, Faccio and Lang (2002) provide data on the fraction of total market
capitalization that is controlled by the top five families for 13 western European
countries between 1996 and 1999. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) provide the
same information for nine east Asian countries. We use this variable in the second-
to-last row of Table 3. After merging this variable with our World Values Survey
sample, we end up with 19 observations. There is positive and significant, univariate
correlation between this variable and “strength of family.” A one standard deviation
increase in the “strength of family” raises the fraction of total market capitalization
controlled by the top 5 families in a country by about 6 percent. That relationship
is economically almost unchanged, though statistically weaker, after controlling for
trust, as reported in the table.
Finally, in the very last row of Table 3, we consider a somewhat different
country-level outcome: the maximal marginal transfer tax rate from parent to child.
These data are collected from Coopers and Lybrand International Tax Summaries
(various years). We view this variable as possibly reflecting a country’s respect for
family ownership. This variable is available for 31 countries that are also covered in
the World Values Survey. There is a negative correlation between the strength of
families within a country and the level of estate tax, although the relationship is
statistically insignificant. In summary, while we cannot directly measure whether
family culture relates to the overall representation of family firms in a given
country, we do find that stronger family values relate to a set of industry structure
variables—such as smaller firm size, higher self-employment rate, lower number of
listed firms and lower reliance on outside financing—that we expect to be related
to the fraction of family firms in a country. In very restricted samples of the data,
there is also some limited evidence that stronger family values are reflected in a
larger share of family control in the stock market and, possibly, lower estate taxes.
Do Family Values Change in Response to Economic Development?

By their nature, the correlations in Tables 2 and 3 cannot shed light on the
direction of causality between family values and GDP. At least in theory, family
values will adjust to economic and institutional changes. As economies develop, and
industrial activities become more important than home-based agricultural produc-
tion, family values may weaken. At the heart of assessing the direction of causality
is the question of how fast family values move and how quickly they respond to
economic change. While we cannot unambiguously rule out such a reverse causality
interpretation, we can provide some evidence suggesting that it is not the main
explanation behind our evidence.
Long-run cross-country evidence on family values does not exist. However, the
World Values Survey has sampled several countries at different points in time,
allowing us to observe how responses to the questions relating to family values have
changed over the medium run. Family values can be compared over about a 20-year
time window for 19 countries from roughly 1980 to roughly 2000. These 19
countries are: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The addition of several
developing nations to the World Values Survey in 1990 also allows us to study
changes in family values over a potentially more interesting set of countries over a
ten-year window from 1990 to 2000. In addition to the countries listed above, the
1990 –2000 panel includes Austria, Chile, China, India, Poland, Portugal, Romania
and Turkey.
Reported in Table 4 are mean family values in the first and last waves of a given
panel. We report these means both across all countries in a given panel and also
after breaking down a given panel into those countries that have experienced
above- and below-median real GDP growth over the panel length.8 Not all family-
related questions were asked in all waves and we therefore focus our attention on
the subset of questions that appear in the relevant waves for each panel.
Several dimensions of family values prove to be remarkably stable over these
8
The fast-growing countries over the 1980 –2000 window are: Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The fast-growing countries over the 1990 –2000 window are: Argentina, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark,
India, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey and the United States.
Table 4
Changes in Family Values Over Time
Panel A: Time horizon 1980–2000
All countries Fast growing countries Slow growing countries
Mean Family Values: 1980

Respect for parents .68 (.15) .69 (.14) .66 (.17)
Parental duty to child .72 (.11) .75 (.10) .69 (.12)
Obedience of child .24 (.10) .24 (.10) .24 (.11)
Independence of child .31 (.13) .31 (.09) .31 (.16)
Trust .38 (.11) .40 (.05) .36 (.15)
Trust .36 (.16) .36 (.12) .37 (.20)
Panel B: Time horizon 1990–2000
All countries Fast growing countries Slow growing countries

(Un)importance of family 1.18 (.09) 1.19 (.12) 1.17 (.04)
Trust .38 (.15) .39 (.16) .37 (.14)
(Un)importance of family 1.13 (.08) 1.13 (.11) 1.13 (.05)
Trust .33 (.16) .34 (.18) .32 (.16)
Notes: Reported in the table are means and standard deviations (in parentheses) across countries. For
each panel, we separate countries into those that have experienced above median growth (“Fast
Growing Countries”) and below median growth (“Slow Growing Countries”) over the panel length.
20- and 10-year time frames, even among developing countries that have experi-
enced very rapid growth. Consider for example the question related to whether one
should always respect one’s parents. If anything, a higher fraction of respondents
answer positively in the later waves (73 percent in 2000, Panel A) than in the earlier
waves (68 percent in 1980, Panel A).9 In India, for example—a country that
experienced rapid growth over the 1990s, after a wave of policy reforms—the
fraction of individuals responding positively to this question increases from
84 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to more than 88 percent at the end of that
decade. Similarly, the mean value of “(un)importance of family” goes from 1.24 to
9
We obtain quantitatively similar results if we control for cohort effects, for instance by netting out age
dummies from the family value variables.
1.09 in India between 1990 and 2000, again indicating, if anything, a move towards
a higher importance of family. There is a slight decrease over time in the fraction
of individuals thinking that parents have a strong duty towards their children (76
percent in 1990, Panel B, compared to 72 percent in 2000, Panel B), but no
systematic evidence of a stronger decline in faster-growing countries.
When it comes to qualities that are valued in children, obedience appears
about as important at the beginning and end of these panels. In Panel B, child
obedience is valued on average across the sampled countries by 34 percent of the
respondents in 1990 and 33 percent in 2000. It appears that child obedience has
become, if anything, a more valued quality over time (in Panel A, 24 percent in
1980 compared to 32 percent in 2000). In India, about 56 percent of respondents
value this quality in children in both 1990 and 2000. One family value that seems
to have changed much more over time is the valuation of independence in
children. A much higher fraction of individuals value this quality in the later survey
years. There is, however, no evidence that this trend is stronger in faster-growing
countries.
We also report changes in the trust variable for these two panels. Interestingly,
the mean level of trust seems to have declined a little over time, even though this
drop is not statistically significant. In Panel B, the average fraction of respondents
trusting others is 38 percent in 1990 across countries, and 33 percent in 2000.
There is no evidence of trust growing at a faster rate in faster-growing countries.
Again, countries are quite heterogenous with respect to trust. For example, 41
percent of people in India in 2000 report trusting other people, compared to 35
percent in 1990. In contrast, in China, 54 percent report trusting others in 2000
compared to 60 percent in 1990.
We can sharpen this analysis a little further by contrasting younger and older
generations across these two time periods. Again, take India as an example. We
computed mean family values in 1990 among those respondents more than 50 years
old, as well as mean family values in 2000 among those respondents younger than
35 years old. We find a striking similarity in mean family values across the two
groups. In fact, younger Indians in 2000 are more likely than older Indians in 1990
to respond that family is very important in their life. Among the five variables we
have focused on in this analysis, the only one along which the two groups appear
to differ systematically is the valuation of independence in children. Consistent with
the view that fertility decisions may evolve more quickly with economic growth, are
the different opinions of each group on the ideal number of children: that ideal
number drops from 2.58 among those over 50 in 1990 to 2.12 among those less
than 35 in 2000.
The overall picture that emerges from this analysis is that family norms are
fairly stable over the short to medium run, even in rapid growth environments and
possibly across generations. Obviously, this insight does not rule out the possibility
of change over a longer run. One would optimally like to study longer panels and
a richer sample of countries and family dimensions. However, it does not appear
that family values change rapidly in response to economic changes.
Are Strong Family Values a Substitute for Weak Formal Institutions?

A related concern about interpreting the causality between family values and
economic outcomes arises from the possibility of a trade-off between formal insti-
tutions and family ties. Some papers such as Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2005)
and Caselli and Gennaioli (2004) begin with an argument that if formal institutions
regarding investor protection, contract enforcement or property rights protection
are weak or nonexistent, strong family ties may provide a second-best solution for
the development of economic activity. If this is true, the correlations documented
in Tables 2 and 3 may be the results of an important set of omitted variables: formal
institutions.
We investigate this possibility in Table 5. The formal institution we focus on in
Panel A is investor protection. Our measure of investor protection is a summary
index from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006; see also La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). This index uses principal component
analysis to create an index based on three variables relating to securities law in a
given country: disclosure standards, liability standards and anti-director rights. The
index varies from 0 to 10, with higher values corresponding to higher levels of
investor protection.
There is a positive correlation of 0.19 between “strength of family” and investor
protection. This is inconsistent with the idea that stronger family values develop in
response to weak investor protection laws. To get more directly at the issue of
omitted variable bias, we present in Panel A of Table 5 regressions of GDP per
capita and all the organizational variables discussed in Table 3 on both “strength of
family” and investor protection. Perhaps it is not surprising, given the positive
correlation between “strength of family” and investor protection, that controlling
for investor protection, if anything, strengthens the correlations between various
economic outcomes and “strength of family” compared to our findings in Tables 2
and 3. In all regressions in Panel A, the estimated coefficient on “strength of family”
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, except for transfer tax and external
finance dependence. Investor protection appears related to these various economic
outcomes in the expected ways, but only the relation between investor protection
and the number of domestic listed firms is statistically significant.
As documented in Table 4, family values appear to move very slowly over time.
This suggests that a better test of the possible endogeneity of family values to formal
institutions would rely on using a more historic perspective on formal institutions
in a given country. While such historic values are not systematically available, a
recent literature has suggested that one important driver of many formal institu-
tions is legal origin. English (common) law countries have been shown, among
other things, to have higher levels of investor protection, superior protection of
property rights, and a more efficient judicial system. Therefore, in Panel B of Table
5, we propose to proxy for past and present formal institutions within a country with
a dummy for whether a given country has a common law tradition.
As a first step, we regressed “strength of family” on a common law dummy (not
reported in the table). The point estimate is positive and statistically significant.
Again, this finding is in contrast to what one might have expected under the view
Table 5
Formal Institutions and Family Values
Panel A: Investor protection
Strength of family Investor protection N
Log(GDP per capita) ⫺.43 .40 40

(.06) (.44)
Self-employment .03 ⫺.07 41
(.01) (.07)
Log(av. establishment size) ⫺.24 ⫺.38 34
(.08) (.60)
(.01) (.09)
(.08) (.56)
Maximal marginal transfer tax ⫺3.75 12.59 31
Panel B: Legal origin
Strength of family Common law N
Log(GDP per capita) ⫺.39 .08 50

(.06) (.23)
Self-employment .04 ⫺.00 76
(.01) (.03)
Log(av. establishment size) ⫺.21 ⫺.06 47
(.09) (.37)
(.01) (.05)
(.08) (.29)
Maximal marginal transfer tax ⫺2.99 ⫺.23 31
Notes: The unit of observation is a country. “Strength of family” is the first component from a principal
component analysis of the five family values described in Table 1. “Investor Protection” is an index of
investor protection (from 0 to 10); “Common Law” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country has
a common law tradition, 0 otherwise. Each row corresponds to a separate ordinary least squares
regression; standard errors are reported in parentheses. See text for detailed definition of (and sources
for) all dependent variables.
that stronger families are a substitute for weak formal institutions. We then repli-
cate in Panel B of Table 5 the regressions of Panel A but replace investor protection
with a dummy for common law.10 As in Panel A, controlling for this measure of the
strength of formal institutions in fact strengthens the correlation between the
10
We obtain similar results if we include dummies for all legal origins instead of simply grouping all
other legal origins into a single “non– common law” category.
various economic outcomes and “strength of family.” All coefficients on “strength

of family” are significant at the 5 percent level, except for transfer tax. As already
shown in prior work, common law origin is associated with a larger number of listed
firms, a lower fraction of family control in total market capitalization and a stronger
level of external finance dependence. There is, however, no systematic relationship
between common law and firm size, fraction of self-employed or estate taxation.
In summary, the findings in Table 5 lend only very moderate support to the
idea that stronger family values should be mainly interpreted as a reflection of weak
formal institutions.
Conclusion
Family values may play an important role in shaping the organization of

businesses and their efficiency. However, the macro-type evidence presented here
can at best be suggestive. More research needs to be done to assess the relevance
of cultural explanations for family firms and the exact mechanisms through which
family values affect firms. It would be of particular interest to understand which
dimensions of family values are most persistent and have the biggest impact on
family businesses. The empirical work in this paper has focused on the strength of
family ties as one source of cultural differences across countries. Other family-
related differences of interest would be variations in inheritance structures or
marriage norms such as polygamy, which might affect the longevity and cohesion
of family firms. The cultural view of family firms implies that these firms might be
less willing to make changes to their overall strategy even when market pressures
ask for such changes. Out of a sense of duty and respect for their elders, younger
generations might find it difficult to change decisions such as where to locate, what
to produce, or which customers to serve. Future work might develop empirical
approaches to investigate such sources of differences between family firms and
nonfamily firms.
Moreover, it will be important to understand the interaction between family
values and the formal institutions within a country. If family values are indeed
(partially) exogenous and do not simply adjust in response to the economic
environment, a more complicated dynamic between family values and formal
institutions will arise. For example, shocks to the market of corporate control or
increased governance pressures could make it more costly to indulge in these
family-centered preferences. Alternatively, better markets for corporate control
could allow families to hire professional managers while maintaining the beneficial
elements of family ownership. A very interesting example of such dynamics between
formal and informal institutions is highlighted in the work by Greif (1989). He
analyzes how kinship relationships and norms between Maghribi traders facilitate
the enforcement of contracts across long distances. These norms gave the Maghribi
traders a comparative advantage when they were forced to leave their original
homestead around Baghdad and move to Northern Africa. However, Greif also
shows that the inability to change these norms hurt them in the long run, since
later on it prevented them from competing effectively with the Genoese traders,
who were developing more advanced formal institutions.
We believe that much can be learned by taking seriously the “family” part of
“family firms.” Our understanding of the nexus between family and firm should
improve with more microeconomic studies that analyze how the structure of a given
family—including its size, gender and age composition—alters the strategic choices
and eventual performance of the family firm. Because of the very detailed data
required to perform such analysis, future micro research on this work might be
forced to proceed on a country by country basis. Ultimately, we believe that a richer
understanding will be gained from the accumulation of many such detailed studies,
spanning a wide range of countries with different cultural norms and formal
institutions.
y We are grateful to James Hines, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, Holger Meuller, Thomas

Philippon, Paola Sapienza, Andrei Shleifer, Timothy Taylor and Michael Waldman for many
helpful comments. Jessica Pan and Raja Surapanani provided outstanding research assis-
tance.
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Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 20, Number 2—Spring 2006 —Pages 73–96

The Role of Family in Family Firms

Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar

H istory is replete with examples of spectacular ascents of family businesses.

y Marianne Bertrand is Professor of Economics and Neubauer Family Faculty Fellow,

families. In support of a cultural view, we present some preliminary cross-country

Why Family Firms?

In this section, we explore efficiency-based theories for family firms, under

Managing for the Long Term

the industrialization of Europe in the eighteenth century. The Rothschilds made

lead to extensive “cooperation” between business and government. Morck, Strange-

Family Values and Family Firms

In contrast to these efficiency explanations for family firms, cultural theories

an economic world power by developing a domestic automobile industry. Most

What Do the Data Say (So Far)?

There is also mixed evidence so far as to whether family-controlled firms are

In the following analysis, we try to provide some suggestive evidence to sub-

Measuring Family Values

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

(Un)importance of family (1) ⫺.49 ⫺.38 ⫺.41 .13

Table 1 reports the correlation matrix between these variables. We undertake a

Family Values and Economic Development

Family Values or Trust?

Dependent variable: log(GDP per capita) in 1990

Strength of family ⫺.37 ⫺.15 ⫺.34 ⫺.15

Family Values and Organizational Structure

Strength of family Trust N

Self-employment .04 .07 80

Development Organization (UNIDO) database. The UNIDO database reports,

family businesses. These variables are a country-level measure of external finance

Do Family Values Change in Response to Economic Development?

Panel A: Time horizon 1980–2000

All countries Fast growing countries Slow growing countries

Mean Family Values: 1980

Mean Family Values: 1990

Are Strong Family Values a Substitute for Weak Formal Institutions?

Panel A: Investor protection

Strength of family Investor protection N

Log(GDP per capita) ⫺.43 .40 40

Panel B: Legal origin

Strength of family Common law N

Log(GDP per capita) ⫺.39 .08 50

various economic outcomes and “strength of family.” All coefficients on “strength

Family values may play an important role in shaping the organization of

y We are grateful to James Hines, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, Holger Meuller, Thomas

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