Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. (in press) Primal impression and enactive perception. In Dan Lloyd and
Valtteri Arstila (eds.) Subjective Time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
1
Following Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), we take ‘enactive’ to signify that
perception (and cognition more generally) is characterized by a structural coupling
between the agentive body and the environment, which is both physical and social, which
generates action-oriented meaning.
2
3
For a criticism of this idea, cf. Zahavi (1999 and 2003).
7
4
Henry in Phénoménologie matérielle describes Husserl’s Vorlesungen zur
Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins as the most beautiful philosophical
work in our century (1990, p. 31).
8
Husserl’s revision
With respect to (2), this means that the occurrent primal impression is
partially either the fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of the previous
protention. With respect to (1), primal impression constrains protention,
the primal impression provides partial specification of what I am
anticipating. Primal impression includes a protentional specification.
Again, it is not
… iA plus p[B…C…D…] …
6
The effect here is similar to the phi phenomenon, where the color of a dot that
appears later has an effect on my experience of the apparent color of the apparently
moving dot.
7
Other examples of effects of content on experienced temporal sequence can be found
discussed in Gallagher (1998).
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References