Medellín v.

Texas

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491

(2008),[1] is a United States Supreme
Court decision that held that even if
an international treaty may constitute
an international commitment, it is not
binding domestic law unless
Congress has enacted statutes
implementing it or unless the treaty
itself is "self-executing." Also, the
Court held that decisions of the
International Court of Justice are not
binding domestic law and that,
without authority from the United
States Congress or the Constitution,
the President of the United States
lacks the power to enforce
international treaties or decisions of
the International Court of Justice.[1]
 Medellín v. Texas

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued October 10, 2007
Decided March 25, 2008
Full case name José Ernesto
Medellín v. Texas
Docket no. 06-984
Citations 552 U.S. 491 (more)
128 S. Ct. 1346; 170
L. Ed. 2d 190; 2008
U.S. LEXIS 2912; 76
U.S.L.W. 4143; 2008-
1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,242; 21
Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S
126
Argument Oral argument
Case history
Prior Medellín v. State, No.
Prior Medellín v. State, No.
71,997 (Tex. Crim.
App., May 16, 1997);
petition denied, S.D.
Tex.; certificate of
appealability denied,
371 F.3d 270 (5th
Cir. 2004); cert.
granted, 543 U.S.
1032 (2005); cert.
dismissed, 544 U.S.
660 (2005) (per
curiam) (Medellín I);
Ex parte Medellín,
223 S.W. 3d 315
(Tex. Crim. App.
2006); cert. granted
Ex parte Medellín,
550 U.S. 917 (2007)

Subsequent Stay and petition

denied, 554 U.S. 759
(2008) (Medellín III)
Holding
Neither Case Concerning Avena and Other
 Neither Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12 (Judgment of Mar. 31) nor the
President's Memorandum to the Attorney
General (Feb. 28, 2005) constitutes
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state
limitations on the filing of habeas corpus
petitions.

Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy · David Souter
Clarence Thomas · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer · Samuel Alito
Case opinions
Majority Roberts, joined by
Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito
Concurrence Stevens
Dissent Breyer, joined by
Dissent Breyer, joined by
Souter, Ginsburg
Laws applied
Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the
Vienna Convention, April 24, 1963, (1970) 21
U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820; Article 36(1)(b)
of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations; Article 94 of the United Nations
Charter; U.S. Const., Art. II, §3

Background
The United States ratified the United
Nations Charter on October 24,
1945.[2] Article 92 of the Charter
established the International Court of
Justice.[3] The ICJ Statute, which
established the procedures and
jurisdiction of the ICJ and was
attached to the U.N. Charter,
delineates two ways in which a nation
may consent to ICJ jurisdiction: It may
consent generally to jurisdiction on
any question arising under a treaty or
general international law, or it may
consent specifically to jurisdiction
over a particular category of cases or
disputes pursuant to a separate
treaty.[4]

In 1969, the United States ratified the

Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of April 24, 1963,[5] and the
Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to
the Vienna Convention of April 24,
1963.[6] Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention requires that foreign
nationals who are arrested or
detained be given notice "without
delay" of their right to have their
embassy or consulate notified of that
arrest. The Optional Protocol provides
that disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the
Vienna Convention "shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice".[7]

The United States withdrew from

general ICJ jurisdiction on October 7,
1985.[8]

On June 24, 1993, José Ernesto

Medellín (an 18-year-old Mexican
citizen) and several other gang
members participated in the murder
of Jennifer Ertman and Elizabeth
Peña, when they raped a 14-year-old
and 16-year-old girl for an hour in
Houston, Texas. Both girls were killed
to prevent them from identifying their
assailants. Medellín strangled one of
the girls with her own shoelaces.[9][10]

Hours after Medellin's arrest he

admitted to his part in the crime and
boasted of having "virgin blood" on his
underpants.[11]

Medellín was arrested five days later,

and signed a confession after being
given his Miranda warning. Texas
authorities did not, however, advise
him of his right to contact his
consulate under the terms of the
Vienna Convention.[9][10] Medellín was
convicted of rape and murder, and
sentenced to death in 1997. He
appealed, and raised the issue of his
Vienna Convention rights as part of
his appeal, but his conviction was
upheld by the trial court and by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.[12]

In 2003, Medellín filed a petition for

habeas corpus in United States
district court. The district court denied
relief, holding that Medellín's Vienna
Convention claim should have been
raised at trial (not on appeal) and he
had failed to show prejudice against
his case arising from the Vienna
Convention violation.[13]

Also in 2003, Mexico brought suit

against the United States in the ICJ,
claiming that the United States had
failed to notify 51 defendants (all
Mexican citizens having been
accused in state courts of committing
crimes in the U.S.) of their Vienna
Convention right to notify their
consulate. Medellín was one of the 51
Mexican nationals named in the suit.
The following year, the ICJ ruled in
Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of March
31) (Avena) that the 51 Mexican
nationals were entitled to review and
reconsideration of their convictions
and sentences.[14]

Medellín's appeal now found its way

to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Medellín raised the ICJ's ruling in
Avena before the Fifth Circuit, but the
federal appellate court denied
relief.[15]

On March 7, 2005, after the ICJ's

judgment in Avena, the United States
withdrew from the Optional
Protocol.[16][17]

Medellín appealed to the U.S.

Supreme Court, which granted a writ
of certiorari.[18]

Before the Supreme Court could hear

the case, however, President George
W. Bush issued a Memorandum to the
United States Attorney General.[19] In
the Memorandum, President Bush
asserted authority under the
Constitution and the various laws of
the United States to order states to
review the convictions and sentences
of foreign nationals who had not been
advised of their Vienna Convention
rights. Because of the President's
Memorandum, Medellín filed a second
case in state court for habeas
corpus.[20] The U.S. Supreme Court
then dismissed Medellín's first
petition for certiorari in a per curiam
decision, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S.
660 (2005) (Medellín I).[21]
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
dismissed Medellín's second
appeal,[20] and the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari a second time.[22]

As Medellín's second appeal was

under consideration in Texas, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon.[23] Although the
decision did not involve individuals
named in the Avena judgment, the
Court held the ICJ's ruling in Avena to
be in error. Absent a clear and
express statement to the contrary in
either the Vienna Convention and the
Optional Protocol, the Court held in
Sanchez-Llamas, the procedural rules
of each nation govern the
implementation of the treaty. Since
Sanchez-Llamas' rights had been
observed under both state and federal
law as well as various rulings of the
Supreme Court, the High Court upheld
his conviction.[23] The ruling in
Sanchez-Llamas did not control
Medellín's case, however, since his
claim was based on the rights
accorded him as one of the
individuals in the ICJ's judgment,
rather than on the Vienna Convention.
Since the ICJ had jurisdiction to
render the decision in Avena at the
time under the Optional Protocol, no
one argued that Sanchez-Llamas
alone foreclosed Medellín's claim.

The case was argued before the

Supreme Court of the United States
on October 9, 2007, with Texas
Solicitor General Ted Cruz appearing
for the state and U.S. Solicitor General
Paul Clement appearing as a friend in
support of Medellín.[24]

Opinion of the Court

On March 24, 2008, the Court affirmed
6-3, with Chief Justice John G.
Roberts writing for a five justice
majority . The Court held that the
Avena judgment is not enforceable as
domestic law. A treaty is not binding
domestic law, it said, unless Congress
has enacted statutes implementing it
or the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it is "self-executing."[25]
None of the relevant treaties – the
Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, or
the ICJ Statute – were self-executing,
and no implementing legislation had
been enacted, the Court found.[26]

The Court also rejected Medellín's

claim that Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter requires the United States to
"undertake to comply" with the ICJ
ruling. Chief Justice Roberts observed
that Article 94(2) of the Charter
provides for explicit enforcement for
noncompliance by referral to the
United Nations Security Council, and
for appeals to be made only by the
aggrieved state (not an individual
such as Medellín).[27] Even so, the
United States clearly reserved the
right to veto any Security Council
resolutions.[27] The majority also held
that the ICJ statute contained in the
U.N. Charter also forbade individuals
from being parties to suits before the
International Court. The ICJ statute is
a pact between nations, Justice
Roberts said, and only nations (not
individuals) may seek its judgment.[28]

Relying on Sanchez-Llamas, the

Supreme Court then held that, absent
a clear and express statement to the
contrary in the relevant treaties,
domestic procedural rules govern a
treaty's implementation.[29]

The Court also rejected Medellín's

argument that the President's
February 28, 2005 Memorandum was
binding on state courts. The Court
relied on Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952),
recognizing that "plainly compelling
interests" were at stake in the
Medellín case. Yet:

Such considerations,
however, do not allow us to
set aside first principles. The
President's authority to act,
as with the exercise of any
governmental power, 'must
stem either from an act of
Congress or from the
Constitution itself.'[30]

The majority concluded that neither

condition had been met. Neither the
government nor the defendant had
cited any statutory authority which
authorized the President to act.
Instead, the President claimed that
the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter
implicitly gave him the authority to
act. The Court disagreed: "The
President has an array of political and
diplomatic means available to enforce
international obligations, but
unilaterally converting a non-self-
executing treaty into a self-executing
one is not among them."[31] The
President also claimed that Congress
had acquiesced in the exercise of
presidential power by failing to act
following the resolution of prior ICJ
controversies. But, Roberts held, "A
review of the Executive's actions in
those prior cases, however, cannot
support the claim that Congress
acquiesced in this particular exercise
of Presidential authority, for none of
them remotely involved transforming
an international obligation into
domestic law and thereby displacing
state law."[32] The President also
founded his action on "related"
statutory responsibilities and an
"established role" in litigating foreign
policy concerns. But none of the
examples cited in the government's
brief supported that conclusion, the
majority ruled, and none of the
examples remotely indicated that the
President may pre-empt state law.[33]

The government had also claimed

that the Memorandum was an
exercise of the President's authority
to resolve international claims under
his executive authority. The Court
recognized that this was a long-
standing practice "never-before
questioned."[34] But relying on Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981), the Court observed that "[p]ast
practice does not, by itself, create
power."[34] Prior uses of executive
authority to settle international
disputes all occurred in narrow
circumstances, and did not involve
the complete setting aside of state
law, as the defendant sought in the
present case.[35]

Finally, Medellín argued that the

President's Memorandum was a valid
exercise of presidential power based
on the president's authority to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed", as granted in the Article II,
§3 of the United States Constitution.
The majority observed that the
government refused to rely on Article
II, §3, which undercut Medellín's claim.
Justice Roberts then concluded that,
since the ICJ's decision in Avena was
not domestic law, the "take care"
clause did not apply.[36]

The judgment of the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals was affirmed.

Justice Roberts' opinion was joined by

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito.

Justice Stevens'
concurrence
concurrence

Justice John Paul Stevens concurred

with the majority, but in his concurring
opinion he stated that even though he
concurs with the result of majority he
thinks "this case presents a closer
question than the Court's opinion
allows." He concludes that the
Supreme Court cannot enforce the
ICJ opinion in Avena. To support that
conclusion he maintains that "terms
of the United Nations Charter do not
necessarily incorporate international
judgments into domestic law."

Dissent
Justice Breyer wrote in the dissent
that in his view, the ICJ treaty was
"self-executing", based on a reading of
other treaties that had gone into
effect without additional
Congressional action; and therefore,
he wrote, "I believe the treaty
obligations, and hence the judgment
[of the ICJ], resting as it does upon
the consent of the United States to
the ICJ's jurisdiction, bind the courts
no less than would 'an act of the
[federal] legislature.'"

One similar example Breyer cited was

the 1796 case Ware v. Hylton, which,
Breyer wrote, was illustrative of what
"the Founders meant when they wrote
[in the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution] that 'all
Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.'" In Ware v. Hylton, the
Supreme Court had agreed with a
British creditor that a provision of the
Treaty of Paris of 1783, which had
been ratified by the United States's
Congress of the Confederation,
overruled a Virginia state law
regarding the repayment of debts to
Britons; and, as the treaty was
"addressed to the Judicial Branch",
Congress had not had to enact a
domestic law enforcing the treaty
provision.

Breyer's dissent was joined by

Justices Souter and Ginsburg.

Execution

Huntsville Unit, the site of executions in the

State of Texas

Medellín was executed at 9:57pm on

August 5, 2008 after his last-minute
appeals were rejected by the Supreme
Court.[37] Governor Rick Perry rejected
calls from Mexico and Washington,
D.C. to delay the execution, citing the
torture, rape and strangulation of two
teenage girls in Houston as just cause
for the death penalty.[38]

Aftermath
In his successful 2012 campaign for
the United States Senate, and 2016
Presidential Candidate Republican
Ted Cruz cited his work as Solicitor
General of Texas on Medellin v. Texas
as the accomplishment of which he
was most proud.[39] "It was by far the
biggest case of my tenure," Cruz said.
[40]

See also
List of United States Supreme Court
cases
Lists of United States Supreme
Court cases by volume
List of United States Supreme Court
cases by the Roberts Court

References
1. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008).  This article incorporates
 public domain material from this
U.S government document.
2. United Nations Charter, 59 Stat.
1051, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
3. Statute of the International Court
of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993 (1945).
4. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 4.
5. Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S.
No. 6820 (1970).
6. Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes to the Vienna
 Convention, 21 U.S.T. 325,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (1970).
7. Article I, Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes to the
Vienna Convention, cited in
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 3.
8. U.S. Department of State Letter
and Statement Concerning
Termination of Acceptance of ICJ
Compulsory Jurisdiction, October
7, 1985, cited in Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No.
06-984), p. 4.
 9. David Stout, "Justices Rule
Against Bush on Death Penalty
Case," The New York Times,
March 25, 2008.
10. Mark Sherman, "Court Backs
Texas in Dispute With Bush,"
Associated Press, March 25,
2008. Archived April 17, 2008,
at the Wayback Machine
11. Allen Turner, "Medellin executed
for rape, murder of Houston
teens," Houston Chronicle,
August 6, 2008.
12. Medellín v. State, No. 71,997
(Tex. Crim. App., May 16, 1997);
 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 5-6.
13. Medellín v. Cockrell, Civ. Action
No. H–01–4078 (SD Tex., June
26, 2003).
14. In the Case Concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Judgment of March 31).
15. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270
(5th Cir. 2004).
16. "Letter from Condoleezza Rice,
Secretary of State, to Kofi A.
Annan, Secretary-General of the
United Nations" (PDF). Retrieved
 24 January 2012. cited in
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 4.
17. Charles Lane, "U.S. Quits Pact
Used in Capital Cases," The
Washington Post, March 9, 2005.
18. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660
(2005) (per curiam) (Medellín I).
19. Memorandum to the Attorney
General, February 28, 2005, cited
in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 7.
20. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W. 3d
315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
21. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
 (2008) (No. 06-984), p. 7.
22. Medellín v. Texas, 550 U. S. ___
(2007) (Medellín II).
23. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548
U.S. 331 (2006)
24. "Medellin v. Texas" . Oyez.
25. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 8.
26. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 10.
27. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 13.
28. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 15.
29. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 13, 21.
30. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 28,
quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579,
at 582.
31. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 30.
32. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 33.
33. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 34-35.
34. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 36,
 quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981), at 686.
35. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 36.
36. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984), p. 37.
37. Supreme Court of the United
States (2008-08-05). "Jose
Ernesto Medellin v. Texas (Per
Curiam)" (PDF). SCOTUSblog.
Retrieved 2008-08-05.
38. McKinley, James C., Jr. (2008-08-
06). "Texas Executes Mexican
Despite Objections" . New York
Times.
39. Zurcher, Anthony. "There's a
Prospect on the Right" , The
Texas Observer, Austin, 24 April
2012. Retrieved on 17 August
2015.
40. Batheja, Aman (July 22, 2012).
"NY Times" .

Further reading
Geslison, Benjamin A. (2009).
"Treaties, Execution, and
Originalism in Medellín v. Texas,
128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008)" (PDF).
Harvard Journal of Law & Public
Policy. 32 (2): 767.
McGuinness, Margaret E. (2008).
"Three Narratives of Medellín v.
Texas". Suffolk Transnational Law
Review. 31 (2): 227. ISSN 1072-
8546 .
Charnovitz, Steve (July 2008).
"Revitalizing the U.S. Compliance
Power". American Journal of
International Law. The American
Journal of International Law, Vol.
102, No. 3. 102 (3): 551–562.
doi:10.2307/20456643 .
JSTOR 20456643 .
Turner, James A. (February 2010).
"The Post-Medellin Case for
Legislative Standing." . American
 University Law Review. 59 (3): 732–
779.

External links
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