Intl409 Midterm Essay Iranian IO

Foreign Intelligence Entity Threat Analysis
Prepared for; Dr. Valerie Davis

Prepared by; David Doolittle
INTL 409 - Midterm Assignment

AMU
July 4, 2017
In 2009 Ali Khamenei reorganized the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
intelligence branches. 1 He formed the intelligence organization (IO) consolidating a complex
framework of intelligence roles and appointed Hossein Taeb its leader. 2 IO reports directly to
Khamenei's office through a functionary. 3 To envision how the IO may threaten the United
States requires understanding antagonism within Iranian society. Iranian political mechanics are
driving forces in establishing courses of actions (COA) within the IO, and through exploration
establish better analytic understanding of the threat environment. Mechanics typology include:
segments of society, rings of power, political parties, and the clergy. Examining typology two
conflicting agendas emerge. COA are then determined by what conflicting agenda is dominant.
Assimilating all this information paints a clearer picture of specific U.S. facilities, personnel, and
interests possibly at risk. The reorganized IRGC intelligence still has multiple purposes. To
better suit its mission or as a result of factors mentioned above, it is constantly changing.
Without understanding those changes denying, disrupting, or neutralizing the IRGC IO activities
will be extremely difficult.
May 5, 1979 Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini created the IRGC to support and
protect the the Islamic revolution. The IRGC did so through eliminating opposition and
supporting the growth of Shia Islamist movements across the Muslim world. 2009, the IRGC had
evolved into an economic and political force incredulously trusted by the clerical elite to exhibit
Iran's sovereignty. The IRGC assumed this role during the Iran-Iraq war. IRGC made up the
majority of foreign fighting forces, while the Artesh (Iranian military) took a supporting role.
The IRGC has used Article 150 of the Iranian constitution, being productive during peacetime, as
its main justification in consolidating large sections of the economy under its control. 4
Economic consolidation by the IRGC is privatization completed by the militaristic nomad
segment of Persian society. The former Iranian President Khatami, in 1999 saw its an
incalculable risk to end IRGC economics activities. 5 The current President, Rouhani, has
actively questioned the IRGC's economic activity, explicitly with the challenging of a mines
purchase made by an affiliate firm through the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). 6 The
organizations tenure with Khamenei and the position Iran's former president, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad a former IRGC commander, raised the organization to makes internal conflict
more difficult now. The IRGC have used the TSE to register and privatize industries helping
avoid international sanctions. 7 Recently the IRGC have also acquired banking licenses through
the central bank of Iran (CBI) allowing greater private capital to be raised than through
traditional Shia donation societies, Bonyads, and religious tax. 8 According to Matthew Frick,
“Militaries around the world are in the business of spending money, not making it. The economic
activity of the IRGC is one more example of the uniqueness of this institution.” 9 In the last two
decades the IRGC has accumulated: pipelines, airports, jetties, banks, mines, telecommunication
providers, shipping companies, and most of the construction contracts for all infrastructure
projects that accumulate profit. 10
In Iran's underground economy the IRGC are thought to have a conservative estimate of
25% of the market share. 11 This includes illicit drug trades of which IRGC have been caught in
abetting Albanian mafias, the Taliban, and Italian criminal organizations. 12 13 For these reasons
and more the militaristic nomad segment of Iranian society have climbed societal ranks to having
lasting financial influence again over the Iranian economy.
By gaining considerable power in controlling interests in public sector and illicit
economies these business relationships threaten United States national security. IRGC actions to
Doolittle: July 2017: 1

support terrorism in the region have cost U.S. Service members lives. 14 Intelligence provided
helps build the advantage Iranian actors and proxies need to carry out terrorist acts. The
economic relationships facilitate Iranian intelligence, including IO, in being able to conduct these
advantage building actions covertly. Actions include: building influence networks, establishing
espionage cells, supporting militias, facilitating transportation to training centers, and collection
management. Covert actions and covers associated with Iranian intelligence consistently are
supported by funds earned in various business endeavors.
The IRGC owns controlling interest in the largest construction company in Iran, Khatam
al-Anbiya (KaA). 15 KaA employs 40,000 and in 2015 had profits of 12 billion USD. 16 KaA has
been described as a, “mix between Army Corps of Engineers, Bechtel, and Halliburton.” 17
Contract employees sometimes are acting deep cover for the IRGC. This allows for greater
18
freedom of movement into and out of countries where IO needs to conduct a covert action or
build a cell. Strategically the IRGC and KaA alliance may pose more significant threats.
KaA is considered by some analysts as the economic wing of the IRGC. 19 What the KaA
doesn't own in the process of infrastructure they will. Contracts are often won on no bids because
the KaA performs labors for cheaper then market value. 20 It is expected the IRGC takes an at
least 10% skim off all KaA contracts. 21 The largest of which was a 2.5 billion USD rail network
in Southern Iran, 2.05 gas field development, and 2 billion subway system in Tehran. 22 Meaning
the IRGC likely made a three quarter of a billion USD on domestic contracts. Due to the IRGC's
control over the banking industry when a infrastructure lease or product is in risk of defaulting
on payments to a foreign country the IRGC seizes it to be administered by the KaA instead of
risking losing it to the debt issuer. KaA employees alongside the IRGC seized an oil rig leased
from a Romanian firm, after the loan issued by an Iranian bank was in default in 2011. 23 This
type of dominance of the resource economy ensures the critical assets needed to furnace Iranian
society remain in the hands of the militaristic nomad segment. KaA are engaged in domestic
resource management policies which could lead Iran to enter its historical cyclical phase of
anarchy.
KaA have also built several dams that are diverting large sections of renewable water
While record harvests of wheat and pistachios are reported,
resources to agricultural irrigation. 24
the IRGC has effectively ensured Iran will face water scarcity issues in the next 25 years
This could possibly result in the displacement
according to Iran's former agricultural minister. 25
of 50 million Iranians. Tehran has already considered rationing water as residents are upset at
26
the misuse of water by government officials to keep the sidewalks cool among other things. 27
There is growing support that the rerouting of water has been done by the IRGC to cater to
powerful landowners and favored ethnic communities. 28 Major lakes are down to nearly 5% of
their former sizes. Rivers operate at creek strength upstream from major dams. The World
29
Resource Institute considers a country 'water stressed' when it diverts over 60% of it water
The IRGC's resource management projects through KaA have
source to public and private use. 30
helped in diverting 80% to agriculture and the population. 31 This is a strategic miscalculation by
the IRGC to possibly shore up support from the bazaar agricultural subset segment. It could
become a prevalent United States policy issue in the next decade when the global community
deals with the growing repercussions of resource mismanagement.
Phase oriented movements (POM) dominate Persian history. Iran historically follows
cycles of governance including chaos or anarchy as mentioned above. These cyclical phases, non
coincidentally, follow the influential segmentation of Persian society: the bazaar merchant class,

The chaotic governance phase
clerical bodies, militaristic nomads, and political elite. 32
mentioned could create various conflicts throughout the region when the Islamic republic
collapses and an unparalleled refugee crises begins. This could be due to scarcity issues or a
number of different compounding variables. Conflict prone militaristic nomads could also search
for adversaries to blame for the resource misfortunes. When Iran continues on its path it won't
need foreign intervention for regime change, it likely will conquer itself after a period of chaotic
uncertainty in which major ethnic regions will conduct self governance.
POM has 4 stages. It begins with: relative stability through a coalition bazaar and
political elite government, clerical usurpation occurs as economic inequality grows, the
militaristic nomads claim control, expansionist conditions eventually create anarchy where no
segmentation has advantages. 33 Taeb's appointment should not be seen as Khamenei becoming
more involved with intelligence due to policy necessity, but an internal audit by the supreme
leader in anticipation of history repeating itself.
Iranian's brought chess from China to western civilization. 34 Arguably then Iranians have
known the rules of the 'game' for longer, therefore making it easier to play against one another
and win without finishing. A talented chess player completes the maxim of Sun Tzu's greatest
teaching, winning without conflict. When all the pieces are in place, the reiterations to a
competitor's moves accounted for, a sound strategy can prove nearly unbeatable. 35 Opponents
versed in chess strategy therefore can realize they've been beaten just by the pieces being in the
right position.
High level political strategy, as Iranian leadership understands, requires accurate
intelligence on the opponent to put pieces in the right places. By controlling information the
IRGC receives and uses for operations, Khamenei may think the IO is a pawn piece to keep the
militaristic nomads power in check or measure how relative their control of governance is. Ali
al-Hasan al-Tusi Nizam al-Mulk, an 11th-century Persian statesmen wrote, “It is the king’s duty
to know everything that goes on... They must be directly responsible to the king and not to
It is also traditional Persian statecraft to support the opposition to create
anyone else.” 36
leverage, creating the illusion of alliance in multiple agendas. 37 However Taeb's own
intelligence priorities follow the traditional militaristic nomad agenda and contradict traditional
Persian statecraft.
When the controlling power is the militaristic nomads they have been confrontational
throughout the Persian gulf seeking to reacquire territories lost from previous POM. These
actions gain tremendous public support by victimizing Iranians to a convenient enemy. Before
the latest cycle began with the Pahlavi dynasty Persia lost substantial territories in modern gulf
coast countries (GCC), Yemen, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and western Afghanistan. These
concessions occurred mostly to countries in the sphere of western civilization and Russia. 38
A former IRGC commander, Mansouri, had the following to say: “if Iran doesn't fight in
these countries the next day the conflicts will be in Tehran”, and “the Americans can not
anticipate what is in store for them at the strait of Hormuz” 39 . Taeb's autobiography condemns
the American's for failing a regime change attempt during the 2009 election, referred to as the
“Velvet Revolution” in Farsi. 40 Taeb here is victimizing Iranians by blaming the United States
for organizing riots which likely resulted from contentious election results. Taeb emphasizes Iran
is “owed” for the damages done to them, and Iran should guide countries in the region. 41 Taeb is
also confidant the US could not “maneuver at the strait of Hormuz if they (Iran) didn't want them

to.” 42

Taeb's sentiments compliment the IRGC achievements while maintaining a direct
channel to obfuscate true intentions of the militaristic nomads to Khamenei. Taeb's loyalty has
been questioned on several occasions, when he was accused of meeting with American
intelligence representatives and later as the subject of embezzlement accusations. 43 Rouhani
removed Taeb from his position at the ministry of intelligence and security (MOIS) as
counter-espionage (CE) head for his questionable tactics in forcefully ending the 2009 election
Taeb has more recently been linked to vegetable oil smuggling through a Dubai based
riots. 44
Still despite demotions and scandals Khamenei may believes he can depend on Taeb
firm. 45
because his family hails from important Shia religious organizations.
Perhaps though Khamenei doesn't trust him at all and this is one way to ensure the IRGC
receives unreliable leadership. This would be tanfih. Tanfih is the concept of taken the sting out
of a adversarial position. 46 Tanfih is visible in all segments of society and helps for COA
development against an adversary. One of the IRGC's strategic goals is to set up 1,800 to 3,000 4
man cells in Iraq and Afghanistan. 47 When invaded these teams would attack the rear of an
adversary targeting communication and supply lines. 48 In effect the sting of an initial invasion
would be hampered by an overwhelming guerrilla effort against it. Khamenei could also be
purposefully putting a leader whom would cause distension with the public, lessening the
militaristic nomads support from the population.
An important facet to this internal political game is Iranians respect another through
deliberate deception and perception management, or taqiyya. 49 Taeb could just as easily be
attempting to manipulate Khamenei for the IRGC's benefit as Khamenei is trying to control that
organization, or the IRGC still maintains its former framework knowing misinformation can be
fed to Khamenei through Taeb. The possible antagonistic agendas make it difficult for analysts
to establish consistent patterns in IRGC intelligence activities therefore making threat analysis
difficult. This could seem like deception if an analyst mirror images these COA to their own
intelligence priorities. Taken under the context of Iranian societal segmentation and accepted
cultural norms, what appears to be deception may be to demonstrate tanfih or taqiyya against an
internal opponent in a different segment of society.
The IRGC could be trying to escape rigid rings of power the Islamic republic has put in
place since taking control after the revolution. Rings of power in Iranian society are all trying to
gain an edge over another while keeping motivations unclear. When one party out compliments
the other a concession to abdicate influence is made without transferring between rings. 50
The most inner ring is the patriarchs: Grand Ayatollahs of which 10 exist, the assembly
of experts, sources of emulation, and the current representative of the hidden Imam until his
The next ring is the 600 to 1,200 functionaries employed by the
return the jurist al-Fiqh. 51
patriarchs, mostly emissaries of the supreme leader. 52 These delegates hold high non clerical
positions and can intervene in any manner of state on Khamenei or another grand ayatollahs
behalf. 53 During Khatami's administration the IRGC intelligence functionary was Ali Izaidi. 54 In
the current IO this could be the same individual but it's largely unknown which functionary
coordinates between the Khamenei and Taeb's offices. The IRGC is not tied to a particular
president, as its respondent to the Supreme leader. If Izaidi has not been usurped by another for
his position then it's likely he remains the primary functionary because of tenure. In fact most
Iranians are not aware who the functionaries actually are. 55 This likely creates an omnipresence
of the patriarchs through threat of intervention in manners of state. The third concentric ring is
the military and political elite, which would include the IRGC in addition to parliament. 56 The

most outer ring includes those whom were former military and political officials such as
Mansouri mentioned above. 57 Their political opinions and commentary are highly regarded by
current members of the three other rings.
There are four major political parties: the Conservative Right, Modern Right, Islamic
Left, and Reformist. 58 Various coalitions exist within the parties as well. In the Iranian
parliament, or majles, the current majority of seats are held by the conservative right represented
by the military clergy association (MCA) coalition. 59 The Ninth Government, as it is known by
other members of the majles, “reads like a roster of former IRGC soldiers and commanders.”
Almost all of the MCA are former IRGC whom held appointments by Khamenei or high ranking
positions within the IRGC. 60
Clerical ascension observes a different hierarchy: Theqatoleslam (Trusted by God),
Hojatoleslam (Proof of God), Ayatollah (Sign of God), Ayatollah 'Ozma (Grand Ayatollah), and
Marja-e-taqlid-e Motlaq (Highest symbol of emulation). Ranking once depended on religious
scholastic achievement and contribution in Islamic outreach to reach Hojatoleslam. 61 In the last
few decades mid level clerical appointments have become increasingly associated with family,
landowners, and economic associations. 62
Many of the highest ranking IRGC were required to reach Hojatoleslam to demonstrate
their ideological adherence. 63 It is also culturally accepted to start a prestigious families clerical
or political ascension through favoritism. 64 Several of the MCA come from privileged families,
granted a mid or high level clerical title through their birthright, and serve in maljes after being
IRGC. This is how the current composition of maljes has taken on the militaristic nomad
segment of society. The militaristic nomads appeal to many because they depend on cultural
imposed victimization belief Shia Muslims traditionally share against majority powers. This is
very prevalent in their festivities such as the infamous self beatings during holy days. There is
guilt associated with this feeling of not being able to come to the aid of their successor to
Mohammed when he was murdered by Sunni militants. The easiest human way to rid oneself of
guilt is to redirect it to another. The MCA nationalize this feeling into promises of protection,
reparations, and action. The more active the IRGC is abroad in Shia majority Muslim areas, the
more political statements the MCA make feel like promises and translate into elected majorities.
By now two driving antagonistic forces are apparent in modern Iranian society. The
segments being the clergy and militaristic nomads. The power rings only attempt to keep these
segments divided, pushing less power upon the military and associated parties representative of it
away from taking the power of the patriarchs. The IRGC is different though, it began as a pillar
to the revolution and Islamic ideological belief in the Shia revolution is central to its existence.
The MCA is proof of this conflagration that transcends traditional rings of power. It has changed
the role clerical appointments are given in Iranian society from religious to societal standing
requirements. The IO is a unique intelligence service. It sits between each listed force and as one
author puts its parent organization, the IRGC, acts like an “octopus” infiltrating all levels of
Iranian society. Khamenei has had to cede influence to the IRGC because initially he needed
them to retain regime legitimacy after Khomeini's death, therefore in more modern years the
militaristic nomads agenda has been expressively dominant.
Khomeini was the face of the revolution and remembered as such. As Khamenei's peers
say “he lacks the charisma” the revolutionary founder had. In 1989, when he was self appointed
from a former president and Hojatoleslam to Ayatollah, the decision was met with resistance
However the assembly of experts chose Khamenei based on his tenure as
from the clergy. 65

President and accomplishments that held together the Islamic republic in its early years. 66 To
qualm it Khamenei put more of the revolutions defense responsibilities into the IRGC and built
ministry cabinets composed of top IRGC leadership. 67 Khamenei also holds veto power over
elections. 68
2009 may be important aside from the creation of the IO because this was when the
reformist movement experienced a surge. Reformist parties consist mostly of young (18-35)
technocrats and bazaar middle class segments of Iranian society. This movement towards reform
threatened the policies the militaristic nomads pursued through the IRGC. With disputed results
the IRGC supported their incumbent candidate and former commander, Ahmadinejad. The
MOIS, respondent to the President, backed the IRGC in this instance also. 69 Khamenei could
have chosen to veto even if the reformist candidate had won but instead his effective powers
were taken over by the IRGC in this instance. The IRGC became a veto against the reformist
candidate through aggressive actions, assertions of foreign influence, and brutal tactics.
The election riots were of course blamed on the United States and Israel as attempted
regime change. 70 IRGC representatives bused in rural voters to centers on the day of the election
and provided soldiers to 'protect' the integrity of results from 'foreign intervention'. 71 There is no
official proof the results were changed from the reformist candidate winning but the margin was
IRGC intelligence by this time had developed an signals interception
well within error. 72
program through business partnerships with Iranian telecom. 73 Effectively they were able to shut
down the internet and telecommunications during the elections. Riots broke out for nearly a year.
74
Citizens were imprisoned, tortured, and hundreds are thought to have been executed. 75 Taeb
was integral to the MOIS effort as the head of CE during the proceedings. 76 Taeb was only one
of many MOIS personnel which became scapegoats.
Experts have remarked MOIS and IRGC intelligence operations are nearly intelligible.
Taeb has likely contributed MOIS trade craft into the IO making the differences even less. IO
may use similar covers and operational procedures to the MOIS but overall intent is incredibly
different. The MOIS is tasked with anti opposition and domestic security intelligence. The IRGC
activities are training, equipping, and advising forces in support of the Islamic revolution abroad
in addition to building self defense measures within Iranian border. 77
Parts of the IRGC foreign policy directives include: establishing rear support in event of
an invasion, securing the strait of Hormuz as a strategic advantage, aiding opposition to the
Israeli state, and supporting the 'poor' in the Muslim world. 78 'Poor' is a synonym for deposed,
oppressed, and persecuted in Shia lexicons. The IRGC could therefore be classified as primarily
a foreign expeditionary force but retains the ability to defend Iran alongside the Artesh. An
example of its domestic role is missile defense, controlling public dissent, and owning economic
industries. The IO assists the activities occurring abroad through recruitment and transportation
of candidates into Iran where they receive most instruction. Here is where Taeb's CE experience
brought from previous employment would be useful to the IRGC activities abroad, in developing
clandestine tradecraft and building networks abroad.
Iranian intelligence rings, cells, informants and presence have been discovered in:
Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 79 , Azerbaijan, Iraq, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya 80 , Sudan,
Afghanistan, South Africa, Gambia, Cyprus 81 , Georgia 82
, Thailand, India, Canada 82 , the United
States, South American and European countries . Officials that dismantled a cell in
83 84
Azerbaijan in 2010 remarked the IRGC cells were incredibly foolish demonstrating amateurish
trade craft and therefore bad training that led to being discovered. 85 However with Taeb at the

head of IRGC intelligence now it would appear covert capabilities have improved according to
an intelligence official. Iranian intelligence personnel have been described as, “courteous,
The IO was ambitious in 2010. It
tolerant, persuasive, and incredibly difficult to recruit.” 86
became an operational threat with more privatized funding, better human resources, and supply
chain management in 2017.
The IRGC claims to have built a 30,000 person human intelligence network on the South
American continent in 2013. 87 The IRGC IO is realistically thought to have grown from 2,000
personnel in 2006 to much larger present day. 88 If these claims are correct then it possibly refers
to the total number of assets, not IO IRGC QF or Hezbollah proxy personnel, in South America.
That number would be more reasonable as Iran can establish deep penetration cells wherever
there is a Shia presence. It all originates in branch tasking from the IRGC headquarters.
The IRGC is headquartered at Ha Qasr-e Firouzeh (Firouzeh Palace) in the rural town of
Firouzeh Palace is where Taeb's office is also believed to be located. Taeb's office has
Kamali. 89
six separate branches underneath it: foreign intelligence, financial, instructional, political,
sabotage, and special assignments. 90 The foreign intelligence branch is thought to have
approximately 1000 field officers. IO foreign intelligence acts as a support, logistics, and
91
The special assignments force size is unknown but likely is

collection unit on the adversary. 92
comparable to the foreign intelligence branch. It likely handles the most sensitive missions such
as supporting forces to have the capabilities to attack the United States and Israel. This
clandestine effort if discovered would have an impact on Iranian inclusion in the global
marketplace and being able to retain plausible deniability in operations. The IO special
assignment branch is the one most likely to associated with the IRGC Quds Force (QF), a special
forces type organization. The QF and IO special assignments branch share similar foreign
missions.
Responsibility is broken down into division based on geographical locations for the
IRGC QF so it's assumed the IO special assignment branch would operate similarly. 93 From the
process of recruitment to an operation being undertook the goal of plausible deniability always
appears to be the forefront of strategic intelligence directives. Iran wants to be a regional
influential force without taking credit for those efforts. Iranians claim that foreign invasions have
It is in a way harking back to the chess
taught the them "the value of hiding their true face". 94
analogy, moving the pieces into place with taking limited action but incredible strategic
placement to overcome the enemy.
The IRGC-QF however fight openly alongside those clandestinely supported groups. One
of the QF biggest achievements has been in the war against ISIS. The QF can publicly work
alongside the Popular Mobilization Units of Iraq, a conglomeration of Shia militias. Many of
these militias were started as cells the IO and QF developed. 95 The QF can also aid the IRGC
foreign directives by bringing in subject matter experts to their particular combat environment.
One instance is when a Hezbollah bomb maker, whom specialized in miniaturized devices, was
thought to have been brought into a specialized training camp in Iran. 96 Normally 1-2 IRGC-QF
act in a supervisory role whilst an equally small number of IO personnel are affiliated with
establishing the cell from the recruitment phase of operations. 97 One intelligence official
remarked Iran prefers “intimate” operations carried out on “precision targets”. 98 It can only be
assumed this translates into the overall human resources delegated to an area as well. An intimate
number of personnel for each cell help the IO adapt strategy to an individual level based on a
group's capability and intentions.

Both organizations within the IRGC work out of Iranian embassies and cultural centers in
closed up portions of the buildings. Unlike other nations that report their activities to an
ambassador the Iranian intelligence personnel report directly back to the IRGC IO. 99 This would
appear to require complex communication and transportation networks to coordinate collection
efforts from cells. Iran however operates in the field with indistinguishable services. Operatives
meet in public places or mosques, using common vehicles for transportation, and often will use a
For example the mundane 1998 Toyota Camry was used for
third party to set up meetings. 100
transportation of assets and operatives in Johannesburg. 101 In comparison Russia drives
intelligence personnel around in limos. It's not that the IRGC can't afford it. According to
independent investigators in Iran annual salaries in USD of IRGC officers include: “285 making
between 3 million and 20 million, approximately 485 make above 20 million, and the 180
highest ranking officers make between 20 and 40 million”. 102 It is done this way to promote how
indistinguishable IO officials want intelligence to appear from personnel conducting it.
The IO foreign intelligence and special assignment branches likely builds cells that range
in size depending on the task. A cell discovered in Azerbaijan had 22 operatives 103 , 12 were
found in Kuwait , and most recently 8 Bahrainis were arrested with connections to IRGC 105
104
.
The Azerbaijan cell was set up as a deep penetration espionage unit tasked with collecting
intelligence on western countries, Azerbaijani officials, and Azeri ethnic counterrevolutionaries.
106
It operated for nearly a decade before discovery. As opposed to the Bahrain cell established
for bomb construction, assassinations, and possibly acts of terrorism. 107 108 It consisted mostly of
already established militants, trained in Iran for specific tasks. The makeup of these foreign cells
usually will then be determined by the operational requirement. The phase of deployment more
signifies if the IO or QF will be working with the group. More IO personnel are likely to be with
a cell when its in the recruitment phase and more QF personnel are present if it openly will be
attempting its task.
Recruitment is likely accomplished through the foreign intelligence branch at cultural
centers, the candidate is then transported to a training camp for a specific task, and then returned
to the target country to carry out the task. Tasks can be: spying on adversary facilities,
Newly formed cells
assassination, become a sleeper cell, or conduct an act of terrorism. 109
identify their own targets, based on access they may have or opportunity present. 110 This is
important because it determines the recruited individuals are granted IO support because they
have access already. What this means is cells can be comprised of contractor workers already in
place on United States facilities. Considered the most important recruitment center is the Dar
Al-Tawahid hotel in Mecca. 111 Shia Muslims around the world who participate in Hajj when
they are in the holy city are vulnerable to the perceived persecution and bigotry from the Sunni
government. The IO likely sees Dar Al-Tawahid hotel as a nexus to communicate with the entire
Shia global population therefore making it important.
Intermittently financiers might visit and audit the established cell or to transfer funds to
key members if the IO representative is not available. Financial transfers are mostly conducted
out of the foreign branches to Iranian banks, some of which are now under the IRGC's control. 112
The two primaries include the Bank Saderat and Bank Melli, not to mention non profit trusts of
Bonyads for various Shiite causes. 113 114 Individuals convicted of spying for the IRGC in Kuwait
were found with 250,000$ USD, maps of “vital sites”, and communications equipment. 115 The
Kuwait cell was likely in the early stages of development. The money likely was to buy supplies
for a task or establish a FOB for transportation logistics. IO assignments typically last six months

to a year with a cell, this completes the recruitment training and deployment process. 116 Existing
militant cells in opposition to the adversary are first sought for recruitment. 117
A trusted handler may also run larger cells. A cell discovered in Yemen had been active
for a few years and was run by a former IRGC commander. 118 The handling may also be through
a third party such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. The IO liaison for a cell can quickly mobilize short
term logistics support likely due to the vast businesses the IRGC owns in transportation
industries. In 2011 when Egypt deposed Mubarak, IO supposedly moved their Egyptian
Hezbollah cells operatives and assets there to Iran via an IRGC run airlines. 119 In Bahrain when
authorities discovered a terrorist bomb making factory, the cell's leader had already been moved
When a cell is given a terrorist task on a target it is authorized by Khamenei's inner
to Qom. 120
circle, mostly militaristic nomads now, and the QF supervisors disappear after the order is
This method completes a cycle of operations that leaves Iran
received by the cell leadership. 121
not complicit in a supported cells actions.
Cells are not exclusively Shia Muslims. Iran has cooperated with various religions, drug
cartels, Sunni Muslims, and ethnic groups to pursue their ends. The Kuwaiti cell mentioned
comprised of: six Kuwaitis, two Arabs, two Lebanese, a Bahraini, Syrian, Dominican, and
The IRGC has also collaborated with Al Qaeda (AQ). In recent years Iran facilitated
Iranian. 122
AQ supporters Muhsin al Fadhli and Adel Radi Saqr al Wahabi al Harbi in running operatives
through Iran, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to Syria. 123 Eventually most members of
the cell will make their way to Iran, Sudan, Lebanon, or Venezuela for training. Iranian
intelligence has created separate training camps for different ethnics groups and tasks in Iran.
This may deconflict ethnic tensions allowing different ideological indoctrination and propaganda
to certain groups to show Iran's support of causes in the region. As an example Iran supports the
Kurds against Turkey (PKK) 124 but actively eliminates Kurdish opposition (PDK) in
125
Northeastern Iraq.
Research uncovered 17 training camps within Iran associated with the IRGC each with
specially designated regiments for trainees. There are 3 camps for generic role training for IRGC
intelligence and foreign trainees. These include: foreign terrorism at Imam Ali Air Base near
Tehran, law enforcement procedures at Wali-I-Assar Base near Shiraz, and ideological training
at Quds Operations College in Qom. 126 Then there are ethnic separations, at what could possibly
be processing facilities or talent farms, of various individuals before being sent to more specific
task oriented training. Bahrainis may be initially processed at Manzaiyah near Qom but Turkish
Kurds head to Mashhad first. Iraqi Shiites meet at Al-Nasr Camp whereas Tajik Shia are at
Manzariyah again. 127 The ethnic geographical separation could be to also streamline training
processes. Facilities are closer to the designated geographical areas they are set to train for. Task
specific training camps include: demolition and sabotage near Isfahan, two camps for airport
infiltration at Mashhad and Shiraz, urban warfare at Baadineh Center, survival training at Malek
Ashtar Camp in Amal, missile systems training at Semnah Center, commando training at
Telecabin Axis, specialized training at Lowshan Garrison, and unknown training regiments at the
Masmoumieh Religious Seminary as well as the Imam Ali Sa'd Abad Palace. 128
If a count is kept that makes 13 training camps. The last four are specific to threat the IO
poses to United States facilities, personnel, and interests in GCC. A facility at Bandar Abbas is
Camps at Abadan, Ahwaz, and Qeshm all focus
used for training in underwater demolitions. 129
on marine warfare. The fact that nearly one quarter of training camps are dedicated to a form
130
of tactical naval warfare studies implies Iran would put a larger emphasis in their strategy on

controlling the strait of Hormuz. As Tanfih, cells could be established with the task of attacking
United States naval ports and vessels once the militaristic nomads decide closing the strait is the
most likely COA. Personnel could employ fast attack suicide bomb rafts, plant explosives in
premeditated positions, or launch an armed assault on a base. This could limit a United States
response to closing the strait by disabling naval power. It would be an effective way to ensure
any counter attack is suppressed or the initial response is limited until reinforcements arrive. The
United States 5th Fleet is situated near Manama. Efforts to employ Tanfih could focus on this
sprawling base as it would likely be the first order of response to Iran shutting the strait.
Taeb has expressed his confidence in this geographic location as well. 131 Perhaps he does
so because he knows advanced capabilities were in place. At the bomb making factory
discovered by authorities near Manama there was enough C-4 explosive to sink multiple
warships, technological advanced lathing equipment to build explosive formed perpetrators
(EFP), and specialized magnets to build sticky bomb devices. 132 Similar factories were found in
India, Thailand, and Qatar before terrorist attacks were attempted there as well. 133 Iran is thought
to not be able logistically to provide the ability for rapid escalation to proxies of arms in
Afghanistan according to a CENTCOM commander. 134 It can however build that capability over
a longer period of time through sleeper cells in countries where a strategic advantage will need to
be established against the United States such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar.
This would require consistent intelligence presence with recruiting, training, and placing
sleeper cells. Analysts recommend that Iran won't strike first and it wouldn't risk the
The same was said about Japan and Pearl Harbor, or numerous not anticipated
repercussions. 135
intelligence failures. It is likely true, the clerical regime may see a preemptive strike as a means
to lose control quickly from a global foreign intervention. The militaristic nomads may not see it
this way. If facing a sudden loss of influence and wealth the militaristic nomads segment may
close the strait under a justification caused by foreign terrorism. Possibilities could include a
false flag of ISIS sinking an Iranian ship or attacking oil infrastructure near the strait. Once it is
closed the process of reopening could then be done for concessions from the adversaries of the
region: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, the United States presence there, and Israel. If there is
an immediate counter attack against Iranian elements closing the strait, sleeper cells can be
activated and used to suppress that effort.
The IO's role would be finding the right candidates for this task, recruiting, collecting
intelligence on targets, then transporting them in and out of Iran for training. During training
individuals would likely fly out of their host country, to a neutral country, then to Iran. 136 An IO
representative would assist in transporting the individual to a training camp based on their
geographic origin. For GCC cells this would likely be Marzaniyah. From there any of the marine
warfare camps could be attended for this task. Since sleepers would have to basically wait until
this scenario occurred, the IO may take a more localized role after training to have the cell
collect intelligence on the targets.
Cells might return then at point for ideological training or more specialized task to make
their spying more effective such as airport infiltration. This skill could allow the cell members to
travel without representation from the IO to neutral countries where forward operating bases are
set up. An IRGC FOB for arms smuggling was discovered in Lagos and Gambia. 137 These
locations likely provided cells in Saharan Africa, South America, and Central America a safe
location to conduct transport logistics. Neutral third countries Iran favors using do not require
background checks for rental homes or storage units. 138 This is a pillar to their operational

supply chain if logistics do not take a direct route with one of the IRGC run airlines or shipping
companies. These airlines include: Pouya Air , Qeshm Fars Air, Iran Air, Aseman Air, and
Mahan Air among others. 139 Sea shipping companies are various. The oldest being Valfjar
Shipping began by the IRGC in 1986. 140 They mostly originate out of jetties and seaports held
by the IRGC at Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, and Muscat. 141 South African intelligence organization,
National Intelligence Agency, dealt heavily with IRGC and MOIS efforts to establish lasting
presence beginning in the early 2000's.
In South Africa Iranian intelligence conducted deep penetrations in the early 2000's NIA
Covers may take these forms in countries where the IO wants to make a deep
officials feared. 142
penetration to gain attack advantages over its adversaries that are also neutral in conflicts. Areas
such as Syria, Yemen, and Iraq will have different intelligence networks compared to Bahrain,
Qatar, and South Africa. Covers observed by NIA when Iranian intelligence conducts deep
penetrations included: students, merchants, counselors, shopkeepers, bank clerks, construction,
carpet salesmen, industries owned personnel, humanitarian organization personnel, hotels
tourism, and media journalists. 143 IRGC had a specific list of targets they attempted to recruit
individuals with access to. Those targets included: news media companies, defense contractors,
government agencies, private business firms, humanitarian organizations, and medical
technology companies. 144
If there isn't a localized support for the IRGC's cause they will just create the
environment where it is. This is what IO personnel did in a small border province of Iraq in order
to create human transportation networks for the QF. 145 According to Iraqi intelligence officials
Iran created the Arkan Isnad al-Kawthar organization and had it affiliate itself with various large
relief organizations such as the Red Crescent. 146 Therefore Arkan could operate openly as a
legitimate, “economical, construction, commerce, supply, and transportation organization.” 147
Effectively the organization alone allowed Iran to build an intelligence infrastructure in the
border province next to Abadan. This network building technique seems to repeated in other
areas as well.
The Mustadafin, Janbazan, and Ahl-ul Bait Foundations were established in South Africa
beginning in 1991 with the expressed desire of promoting cultural acceptance for Shiism. 148
Ahl-ul Bait spread from there to the United Kingdom, Benin, Netherlands, Dubai, and Lebanon.
149
The organization's center would distribute literature and give seminars on Shiism. The Cape
Town Ahl-ul Bait center had anywhere from 100 to 120 people attending study sessions, prayers,
and seminars nightly. 150 Cape Town provided a consistent stream of individuals with varying
levels of access to attempt recruitment, and penetrations.
At the time Iran's intelligence priority was building up the military and establishing a
nuclear program. South Africa offered technological industries in satellites, sensors, and ballistic
It demonstrates when the priorities shift
missiles the Iranians are believed to have penetrated. 151
so do the IRGC's efforts and this is expected elsewhere as well. Before IRGC focused on South
Africa they aided the Mujahideen in the Serbian Bosnian war. The IRGC saw the ability to fight
openly against the United States and NATO in the Bosnian Serbian war as an imperative to
protecting Muslims in the region, as they also currently likely believe. It also allowed the
fledgling intelligence services experience in identifying Mossad and CIA networks in the region.
A practice which has become invaluable to the IRGC and has helped keep Iran a mostly denied
area to foreign intelligence.

With the recent GCC economic blockade of Qatar for support of terrorism and ties to
Iran, expect Iran to establish a greater presence here using some of these covers and indirectly
similar targets to the examples offered. The IO has a vested interest in recruiting access or
establishing an espionage cell against the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in
Qatar. The COACH helps deconflict and issue attack sorties in the fight against ISIS. Iran could
use this information to manipulate the battlefield after ISIS is defeated and gain strategic
advantages over air support to United States forces as well as its allies.
The IO is a complicated organization, its roles and predicting where threats will emerge
requires a deeper understanding of Iranian culture. This paper hopes to have identified key
typology in internal political mechanics within the Islamic republic, how they build COA for the
IO and IRGC through cultural norms, what impacts the IRGC has on the Iranian economy, and
how all of this is expressed as a dominant agenda by the IRGC in intelligence efforts abroad. The
economic reliance of the Iranian economy on the IRGC can not be stressed enough. The largest
strategic threats from Iran will come from the policies, namely resource management, the IRGC
conducts. The IRGC is a unique organization that changes everything expected from historical
POM Persian society follows as it attempts to move into other typologies through the MCA and
undermining the patriarchs.
This may mean that the Persian area has escaped historical precedence in the latest POM.
Even if this is so Iran can and will build the capabilities to defend itself, strategic locations, and
build advantages through intelligence. The threats of which can not be rapidly advanced but if
built over time will have lasting impacts of on United States efforts in event of open conflict
through use of tanfih. The GCC appear as a continuing strategic priority of the militaristic
nomads, Taeb, and Khamenei to control therefore intelligence threats will centralize from the IO
in this region. The IO may have already established operational capabilities in these regions and
have acting espionage cells engaged in penetration activities as some case studies demonstrate.
Although deeper lasting penetration are likely in neutral non conflict prone regions, such as the
South African operational analysis demonstrated. There is no shortage of effort as only a handful
of the examples of Iranian intelligence activity have been explored in this paper. Further study of
the context of other nations listed interactions with the IO may give better understanding to the
formulaic ideas presented here.

Notes.
1. Udit Banerjea. "Revolutionary Intelligence: The Expanding Intelligence Role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps."
Journal of Strategic Security 8, no. 3 (2015), 93-106. doi:10.5038/2375-0901.8.3.1449.
2. ibid
3. ibid
4. Youhanna Najdi, and Mohd A. Karim. "The Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Future of
Democracy in Iran: Will Oil Income Influence the Process?" Democracy and Security 8, no. 1 (2012), 72-89.
doi:10.1080/17419166.2012.654053.
5. Wilfried Buchta. Who Rules Iran? : the Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. Washington, D.C.: The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.
6. "A Financially Stressed Rouhani Takes On His Opponents Worldview." Stratfor. Last modified January 13, 2015.
https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/financially-stressed-rouhani-takes-his-opponents.
7. Michael Rubin. "How Iran Uses the Tehran Stock Exchange As a Terror Front." Commentary Magazine. Last modified May
31, 2017. https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-east/iran/tehran-stock-exchange-iran-terror-sanctions/.
8. Alan Eyre. "Cable: 09RPODUBAI409_a." WikiLeaks. Last modified October 5, 2009.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI409_a.html.
9. Matthew Frick. Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps: An Open Source Analysis. Fort McNair, Washington D.C.: National
Defense University: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2008.
10. ibid
11. Saeed Ghasseminejad. "How Iran's Mafia-like Revolutionary Guard Rules the Country's Black Market." Business Insider.
Last modified December 10, 2015.
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13. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2016.
14. Ambassador Dore Gold. "Inside the Octopus: Unraveling Iran's Terrorist Quds Force." Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs.
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15. Michael Rubin. "Deciphering Iranian Decision Making and Strategy Today." AEI. Last modified January 28, 2013.
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16. ibid
17. ibid
20. Bayram Sinkaya. The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. 2016.
22. Alan Eyre. "Cable: 09RPODUBAI494_a." WikiLeaks. Last modified November 17, 2009.
23. Department of State. "Cable: 06IRANRPODUBAI15_a." WikiLeaks. Last modified November 13, 2006.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06IRANRPODUBAI15_a.html.
24. Ben Cohen. "Iranian Water Crisis Becoming a National Security Threat, Leading Water Expert Warns | Jewish & Israel News
Algemeiner.com." Algemeiner. Last modified May 18, 2017.
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25. ibid
26. ibid
27. Golnaz Esfandiari. "Water Crisis Looms In Iran." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Last modified March 19, 2014.
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28. ibid
29. Ben Cohen. "Iranian Water Crisis Becoming a National Security Threat, Leading Water Expert Warns | Jewish & Israel News
Algemeiner.com." Algemeiner. Last modified May 18, 2017.
https://www.algemeiner.com/2017/05/18/iranian-water-crisis-becoming-a-national-security-threat-leading-water-expert-warns/
30. Jason Rezaian. "Iran’s Water Crisis the Product of Decades of Bad Planning - The Washington Post." Washington Post. Last
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31. Golnaz Esfandiari. "Water Crisis Looms In Iran." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Last modified March 19, 2014.
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33. ibid
34. H.J.R Murray. A History of Chess The Original 1913 Edition. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2015.
35. Mihai Suba. Dynamic Chess Strategy. 2010.
37. Andrew Campbell. "Iran and Deception Modalities: the Reach of Taqiyya, Kitman, Khod'eh and Taarof." Free Online
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39. Elly Beitol. "‫ اﮔﺮ درﺑﺎره زﻧﺪه ﺑﻮدن‬/‫ ﺟﻨﮓ ﺑﺎ داﻋﺶ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﺎ اﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻞ اﺳﺖ‬:‫ رﻓﯿﻘﺪوﺳﺖ در ﮔﻔﺖوﮔﻮی ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻠﯽ ﺑﺎ ﻓﺎرس‬/2- «‫ﭘﺮوﻧﺪه »اﻟﯽ ﺑﯿﺖاﻟﻤﻘﺪس‬
‫" ﺧﺒﺮﮔﺰاری ﻓﺎرس‬.‫ ﺟﻠﻮﺗﺮ اﺳﺖ‬5+1 ‫ﺗﻮان دﻓﺎﻋﯽ اﯾﺮان از ﺧﯿﻠﯽ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی‬/‫ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻠﯿﺎن ﻣﺪرﮐﯽ ﻫﺴﺖ ﭼﺮا ﺳﮑﻮت ﺷﺪه‬. Last modified 2017.
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13950405000756.
40. Hossein Taeb. "‫ﺑﯿﻮﮔﺮاﻓﯽ ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﻃﺎﺋﺐ‬." Biographyha. Last modified 2016.
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41. ibid
42. ibid
43. Iraj Mosteghi. "‫ اﯾﺮج ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﯽ‬،‫ ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﻃﺎﺋﺐ ﯾﮑﯽ از ﺧﻄﺮﻧﺎکﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﭼﻬﺮهﻫﺎی اﻣﻨﯿﺘﯽ‬- Gooya News." Gooya News - Unbiased Iran News |
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44. ibid
45. ibid
39.
47. Anthony H. Cordesman, and Martin Kleiber. Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern
Gulf. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007.
48. ibid
39.
50.-60. Wilfried Buchta. Who Rules Iran? : the Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. Washington, D.C.: The Washington
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63. Glenn E. Curtis, and Eric J. Hooglund. Iran: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research
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64. ibid
66. ibid
67. ibid
68. ibid
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nuclear agreement." Jane's Defense Weekly, September 2015.
70. Iraj Mosteghi. "‫ اﯾﺮج ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﯽ‬،‫ ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﻃﺎﺋﺐ ﯾﮑﯽ از ﺧﻄﺮﻧﺎکﺗﺮﯾﻦ ﭼﻬﺮهﻫﺎی اﻣﻨﯿﺘﯽ‬- Gooya News." Gooya News - Unbiased Iran News |
News on Iran | ‫اﺧﺒﺎر اﯾﺮان در ﮔﻮﯾﺎ ﻧﯿﻮز‬. Last modified February 7, 2017. http://news.gooya.com/2017/02/post-547.php.
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76. Elly Beitol. "‫ اﮔﺮ درﺑﺎره زﻧﺪه ﺑﻮدن‬/‫ ﺟﻨﮓ ﺑﺎ داﻋﺶ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﺑﺎ اﺳﺮاﺋﯿﻞ اﺳﺖ‬:‫ رﻓﯿﻘﺪوﺳﺖ در ﮔﻔﺖوﮔﻮی ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻠﯽ ﺑﺎ ﻓﺎرس‬/2- «‫ﭘﺮوﻧﺪه »اﻟﯽ ﺑﯿﺖاﻟﻤﻘﺪس‬
‫" ﺧﺒﺮﮔﺰاری ﻓﺎرس‬.‫ ﺟﻠﻮﺗﺮ اﺳﺖ‬5+1 ‫ﺗﻮان دﻓﺎﻋﯽ اﯾﺮان از ﺧﯿﻠﯽ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی‬/‫ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻠﯿﺎن ﻣﺪرﮐﯽ ﻫﺴﺖ ﭼﺮا ﺳﮑﻮت ﺷﺪه‬. Last modified 2017.
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13950405000756.
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117. ibid
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131. Hossein Taeb. "‫ﺑﯿﻮﮔﺮاﻓﯽ ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﻃﺎﺋﺐ‬." Biographyha. Last modified 2016.

modified May, 2017.
134. Eric Parks. “Iranian Weapons Smuggling Activities in Afghanistan”. JIEDDO J2 Open Source Augmentation and Analysis
Cell (OSAAC). CENTCOM (November 24, 2007)
135. Kenneth Katzman. “Iran's Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” Congressional Research Service. January 23, 2012
138. ibid
139. TheTower.org Staff. “Expert: Iran Using Civilian Planes to Weapons, Troops to Syria,” The Tower, Last modified April 14,
2017. http://www.thetower.org/4857-expert-iran-using-civilian-planes-to-ferry-weapons-troops-to-syria/
140. “IRGC Exporting Weapons Through Proxy Companies,” Iran Focus, Last modified March 9, 2017.
http://www.iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31355:irgc-exporting-weapons-through-proxy-c
ompanies&catid=9:terrorism&Itemid=114
141. ibid
142. Will Jordan. “Spy Cables: South African spies wary of Iran operations”. Al Jazeera, Last modified February 23, 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/spy-cables-south-africa-spies-iran-operations-guardian-ssa-tehran-undercover-carpet--1
50219184023503.html
144. ibid
145. “Iranian Activities In Iraq” MNCI-2005-001140: Iraqi Intelligence Organization (Full Translation). April 7th, 2005
146. ibid
147. ibid
148.-151, Aljazeera. “Operational Target Analysis of Iran Activities in South Africa”. National Intelligence Agency of South
Africa (NIA). Johannesburg, SA (January 2010)

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Foreign Intelligence Entity Threat Analysis

Prepared for; Dr. Valerie Davis

INTL 409 - Midterm Assignment

Doolittle: July 2017:​ 1

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Doolittle: July 2017:​ 3

Doolittle: July 2017:​ 4

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​ The special assignments force size is unknown but likely is

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Eyre, Alan. "Cable: 09RPODUBAI409_a." WikiLeaks. Last modified October 5, 2009.

Doolittle: July 2017:​ 19

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"Shia Political Thought." Al-Islam Organization. Last modified 2016.

Suba, Mihai. Dynamic Chess Strategy. 2010.

Taeb, Hossein. "‫ﺑﯿﻮﮔﺮاﻓﯽ ﺣﺴﯿﻦ ﻃﺎﺋﺐ‬." Biographyha. Last modified 2016.

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The special assignments force size is unknown but likely is

Doolittle: July 2017: 7

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