G.R. No.
L-56158-64 March 17, 1981 warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven persons
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO
(ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN
(ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER,
OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM,
ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed
DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, to order a change of
venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in
the implementation of the right to bail are involved in this petition which, even
if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have been
the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, no doubt
under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them
to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They
ignored the principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution
is with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the
questions raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the
bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken. Accordingly, in a
resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the
Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private
respondents, the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza. It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition
was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People
v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the
People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor
General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are
instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will
not, therefore, improve their legal standing." Nonetheless, it did not press the
legal point but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the
setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan,
presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the
criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or
place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the
evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search
believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta.
Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed
with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company
proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two
common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo
Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and
Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC
provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate
complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia,
Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14)
other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal
Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause
against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However, without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their
temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose
Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been
released from detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the
murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at
the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers
from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused
are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been
released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed,
there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the
families of the witnesses." The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies
sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following
resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor
General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail
bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by
certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by
Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue
or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice;
(b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo
Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at
Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from
January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and
that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c)
[Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without
prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People
assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." Thus, the issue of a v. San Diego. As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court:
change of venue has become moot and academic. The comments respectively "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived
submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the
Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
submitted for decision. present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents,
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should
there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be
be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on
bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must
that ground." These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we
be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso
have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime
Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.
whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that
place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate
is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof.
of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." The Constitutional Convention of 1971 But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept
wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep
where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: the balance true." This norm which is of the very essence of due process as
"In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the
in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice,
is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail
for which courts have been established." Why a change of venue is imperative was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an
was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise infirmity of a jurisdictional character.
by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to
appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are
private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and
afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of
effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros
the days of trial. Because of qqqts fear, they may either refuse to testify or
Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the
testimony falsely to save their lives. Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not
resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the
averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro
petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard
Manila. Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question
on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents
of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that
is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
he had "no objection to the transfer. It may be added that there may be cases
where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than
terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses
who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be
kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of
venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed
before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this
particular case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in
view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the
bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was
granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the
 G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015
ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
RICHARD NATIVIDAD, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated January 18, 2011
and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32723 which reversed and set aside the Decision dated February 23,
2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed the Joint
Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
The antecedent facts are as follows:ch
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing
Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga
City under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased
construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from
petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and
Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the
purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery and the
remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the
last delivery, all of which shall be via postdated checks.
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials
amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent
and his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery,
respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks,
drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and
P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her
savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were,
however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner
communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for
payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and
assured petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her
savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once
again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn
was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several
demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to
file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City.Thus, on August
12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong,
the accusatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 337902
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto,
in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out,
draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN
MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check described
below:
Check No. : 2960203217
Drawn
Against : Metrobank
In the amount : Php434,430.00
Postdated /
Dated : October 20, 2003
: AMASEA GENERAL
Payable to MERCHANDIZE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said
accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
upon its presentment which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused
failed lo pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 337903
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto,
in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out,
draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND
 CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN
MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check described
below:
Check No. : 2960203218
Drawn
Against : Metrobank
In the amount
: Php13,032.00
Postdated /
Dated : October 20, 2003
: AMASEA GENERAL
Payable to MERCHANDIZE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said
accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
upon its presentment which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused
failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days
alter receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
recommending that respondent and his partners be charged in court with the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code
as well as for Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 (BP 22), which was later
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the
prosecution had proven all the elements of violation of BP 22 as against
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos.
337902-03 finding the accused, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and is sentenced to pay a fine equivalent to
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), for Check No.
2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos for Check
No. 2960203218 or a total penalty of Two Hundred Thousand
Thirteen Thousand Thirty Two Pesos (Php213,032.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. However,
accused MILO MALONG, is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Both accused Malong and Natividad are
ordered to jointly pay the private complainant the total sum of
Four Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Two
Pesos (Php447,462.00) which are the face value of the two (2)
checks issued, subject of these cases, with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum and three percent (3%) penalty per
month as stipulated in the invoices, reckoned from the date of
receipt of the demand on February 28, 2004, until the amount is
fully paid, plus the costs of suit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the
MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since
the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic,
the venue of the action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the
offense actually transpired in Makati City. Respondent also pointed out that
during the retaking of petitioner's testimony on March 14, 2008, the records of
the case did not show that the public prosecutor manifested his presence in
court and that he delegated the prosecution of the case to the private
prosecutor. Thus, since there was no appearance for the public prosecutor,
nor was there a proper delegation of authority, the proceedings should be
declared null and void.
On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in the following wise:
Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a quo]
the issue of authority of the private prosecutor to present witness
Morillo in the absence of the public prosecutor during the March
14, 2008 proceeding, and only did so after obtaining an adverse
judgment, it would be an injustice if all the proceedings had in the
case would be set aside.
The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A
violation of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory offense, which is
oft-repeated in our jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, jurisdiction
may be had in several places where one of the acts material to
the crime occurred.
 Accused Natividnd postulates that since the checks were
presented suid dishonored in Makati City, which is not the place
where it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo] lacks
jurisdiction. This argument is, at best, specious. The fact remains
that the bank where it was presented lor payment is in Makati
City. These checks passed through this bank for clearance,
confirmation, and or validation processes. Moreover, the eventual
dishonour indeed took place or was completed at the end of the
collecting bank in Makati City, where the private complainant
maintains her account over which the court [a quo] has
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant Natividad's
appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the appealed
decision of the court [a quo] is hereby AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision,
reversed the lower courts' rulings and dismissed the case without prejudice to
its refiling in the proper venue, the pertinent portions of said Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of the offense
happened in Pampanga. It was indisputably established that the
subject checks were issued to private complainant at petitioner's
office in Pampanga. Said checks were drawn from petitioner's
account in Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
The second element of the offense or the knowledge of dishonor
of the checks by the maker also transpired in Pampanga. After
private complainant was informed of the dishonor of the checks,
she immediately proceeded to petitioner's office in Pampanga,
personally informed him and his companions of the dishonor of
the checks and tendered a demand letter for the payment of the
construction materials.
Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the drawee
bank also happened in Pampanga. Upon maturity of the subject
checks, private complainant deposited the same in her savings
account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch. Subsequently,
she was informed by the latter bank that the subject checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense happened in
Pampanga. Consequently, the case can only be filed in said
place. Unfortunately, private complainant filed the case in Makati
City, under the erroneous assumption that since she deposited
the subject checks in Equitable PCI Bank, Makati City, and was
informed of lite dishonor of the checks by the same bank, the case
may be filed in Makati City. However, as correctly argued by the
OSG, the act of depositing the check is not an essential clement
of BP 22. Likewise, the fact that private complainant was informed
of the dishonor of the checks at her bank in Makuti City did not
vest the MeTC, Makati City with jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case. To reiterate, a transitory crime can only be tiled in any
of the places where its constitutive elements actually transpired.
And, knowledge of the payee of the dishonor of the checks is not
an element of BP 22. The law speaks only of the subsequent
dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank and the knowledge of
the fact of dishonor by the maker. Consequently, none of the
elements of the offense can be considered to have transpired in
Makati City. Thus, the venue of the instant case was improperly
laid.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the following argument:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI CITY DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE DESPITE A CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE OFFENSE
WAS COMMITTED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF SAID
COURT.
Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place where the
dishonored checks were deposited, had jurisdiction over the instant case. In
support of her contention, petitioner cites the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, wherein it was held that since the check drawn in violation of BP 22
was deposited and presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of
the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the RTC of Pampanga clearly had
jurisdiction over the crime of which accused therein was charged. Thus,
petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that the Makati MeTC
did not have jurisdiction to try the instant case. That none of the essential
elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 occurred in the City of Makati is
belied by the Nieva doctrine recognizing the jurisdiction of the court of the
place where the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment.
Petitioner went on lo state that all the elements of violation of BP 22 were duly
proven beyond reasonable doubt. First, the prosecution sufficiently
established that the respondent issued the subject checks as shown by the
documentary evidence submitted. They were issued for value, as payment for
the construction supplies and materials which petitioner delivered to the
accused.
As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was clearly shown
that respondent had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in or credit with
the drawee bank, which subsequently dishonored the subject checks. Section
2 of BP 22 provides that "the dishonor of a check when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." In this
case, petitioner states that the prosecution was able to sufficiently show that
the subject checks were presented within the time period required by law. In
fact, written demand relaying the fact that the drawee bank dishonored the
subject checks was even personally delivered by petitioner to respondent as
evidenced by the demand letter signed by respondent. Thus, respondent
cannot deny that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in his account
with the drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently
dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was
already a closed account.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State,
is in line with the appellate court's and respondent's stance that the MeTC had
no jurisdiction over the instant case. According to the OSG, the act of
depositing the check is not an essential element of the offense under the
Bouncing Checks Law. Citing the ruling in Rigor v. People, the OSG posited
that the place of deposit and the place of dishonor are distinct from each other
and that the place where the check was issued, delivered, and dishonored is
the proper venue, not the place where the check was deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila. x x x
The check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro
Manila. x x x The information at bar effectively charges San Juan
as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information. Although the check was dishonored by the
drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has
drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of
issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential
part of the offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan.
There is no question that crimes committed in San Juan are
triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig.
On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus claimed that the
MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case for none of
the essential elements of violation of BP 22 occurred therein.
The contention is untenable.
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and
requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while
some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's
essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try
the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed.
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the
Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit and the place of dishonor as
distinct from one another and considered the place where the check was
issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as
the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court, however,
cannot sustain such conclusion.
In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San
Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against
Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the check at PS
Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had been
dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand
the repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the
accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes
committed in. San Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends that the
RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been offered to
show that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of
hmrfficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The Court,
however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the
drawee. Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly showed that
the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends thai the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
h;ui no jurisdiction over this case since no proofhas been offered
that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that
knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality
of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The contention is untenable.
x x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on
 November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated
February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was
deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus,
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in
any of the places where any of the elements of the
offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Jisars
as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction
of courts in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information.
Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee,
Associated Baisk, sit its Tariac Branch, appellant
has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San
Juan. The place of issue airul delivery was San Juan
and knowledge, as an essential part of she offense,
was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is
no question that crimes committed in November,
1989 in San Juan arc triable by the RTC stationed in
Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case
sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig
City.
The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had
offered sufficient proof that the check drawn in violation of BP 22 was issued,
delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in
the Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon the RTC of
Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it held, cither expressly
or impliedly, that the place where the check was deposited is not the proper
venue for actions involving violations of BP 22, it is true that the Court, in Rigor,
acknowledged the feet that the check was issued and delivered at the Rural
Bank of San Juan, while the same was deposited wilts the PS Bank of San
Juan. But such differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to
conclude that the court of the place of deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction over
violations of BP 22. In the absence, thereiore, of any ground, jurisprudential or
otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance
of a doctrine that is simply inapplicable to the issue at hand.
In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner is
more squarely on point with the instant case. In Nieva, the accused delivered
to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against the Commercial Bank of
Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check was deposited in the
Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands, joven was advised,
however, that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the
reason that the account against which the check was drawn is a "closed
account." Consequently, the accused was charged with violation of BP 22
before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the accused that said court
had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court categorically ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein as
none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga,
suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The evidence
discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for
encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the crimes of which
petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg.
22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes and so is
the crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed.
In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People, wherein the modes of appeal and
rules of procedure were the issues at hand, the Court similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations,
Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on the ground that, inter
alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is
categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that
the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality
or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22
may be tiled in any of the places where any of its elements
occurred - in particular, the place where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered, or dishonored.
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was
drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal that
Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the
LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor. As
such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly took cognizance of
 Criminal Case No. 45414 as It had the territorial jurisdiction to try
and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present
petition remains warranted.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that
the court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for
encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of
BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn,
issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its
jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was
deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable
PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the
instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed
outright due to certain procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title
III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall
represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
State.
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended
party to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the
offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court, when
there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its
agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private
offended party, when there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the
interest of substantial justice so requires.
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court,
in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment,
but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the
aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double
jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or
bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in
a criminal case. This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final
and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not under Rule 65, and was
not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the Republic, the same should
be summarily dismissed. The unique and special circumstances attendant in
the instant petition, however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the merits
and not solely on technical grounds.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case
is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is
different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based
on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of
the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the
accused will not result in his acquittal. In the oft-cited People v. Salico, the
Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the
legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because
the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a
reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint decide the case on the
merits or that the defendant is not gniity. Dismissal terminates the
proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does noi show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc.The only case in which the word dismissal is
commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its:
evidence, the defendant moves for me dismissal and the court
dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show
beyond a reasonable doubt thai the defendant is guilty; for in such
case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is
decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal,
inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again
prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is
elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be
prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the
ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not
decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt
or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The
appellate court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that
none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court's
jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show
respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal
did not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be
repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
showing a grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down
as improper. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties
raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of
review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does
not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties-litigants. In De Vera v. Spouses Santiago, the Court categorically
ruled that the issue of whether the appellate court erred in annulling the RTC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law, to wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law. The resolution
of such issue rests solely on what the law [B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended] provides on the given set of circumstances as alleged
in petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of ownership and
possession with damages.
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely "whether
the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that
the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court." Evidently,
therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural
rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is
concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at
the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided
by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case
involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to
the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.
More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be
considered as an acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot likewise claim that
his constitutional right to protection against double jeopardy will be violated.
In Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez, the Court held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions
thereto which finds application to the case at bar has been laid
down by this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the
order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial
court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the
dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an
acquittal or based upon consideration of the
evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is
purely legal so that should the dismissal he found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence of the
foregoing requisites. First, as early as the stage of respondent's appeal of the
MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent had already been moving for the
dismissal of the case alleging the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the CA's dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered to have been with
respondent's express consent. Second, as earlier mentioned, the dismissal
herein is not an acquittal or based upon a consideration of the merits. Third,
the question raised in this case is based purely on a question of law. In view
therefore of the presence of all three requisites, the Court finds that petitioner's
appeal of the appellate court's dismissal cannot be barred by double jeopardy.
As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant petition in the
absence of the OSG's participation, the circumstances herein warrant the
Court's consideration. In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, the Court gave due
regard to the ends of substantial justice by giving due course to a petition filed
before it by the private offended party, viz.:
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo, however,
provided an exception to the above doctrines in this manner:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals,
only the Solicitor General may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
or represent the People or the State in criminal
proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of
Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320
[1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be
better served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive
manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an
offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner
has sufficient personality and a valid grievance
against Judge Adao's order granting bail to the
alleged murderers of his (private petitioner's) father.
 x x x x
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of
the appellate court's ruling on this point. Clearly, the assailed
Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It
cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court
is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any
recourse to rectify the public injustice brought about by the trial
court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to file
administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge
and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to
address a substantive issue in law.
In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of substantial justice, it
must give due course to the instant petition and consequently rule on the
merits of the same. The circumstances surrounding this case left petitioner
with no other suitable recourse but to appeal the case herself. Not only was
there an absence of support from the OSG, said government office also took
a position in contrast to the rights and interests of petitioner. Moreover, as
discussed above, the arguments which ran counter to petitioner's interest as
well as the grounds used to support them were simply inapplicable to the issue
at hand. In fact, these erroneous contentions were adopted by the appellate
court in their entirety, dismissing the instant case in a manner not in accord
with law and applicable jurisprudence. For the Court, now, to apply procedural
rules in their strict and literal sense by similarly dismissing, as the CA had,
petitioner's action poses serious consequences tantamount to a miscarriage
of justice. To rule that the accused can postpone criminal prosecution and
delay the administration of justice at petitioner's expense on the erroneous
ground of lack of jurisdiction would create a hazardous precedent and open
loopholes in our criminal justice system.
the instant case, the CA, without providing any legal or jurisprudential basis,
would have petitioner start from the very beginning and refile her complaint
before the same court which already had jurisdiction in the first place.
Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural
matters, the Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest the administration of
justice be derailed by an overly stringent application of the rules.Rules of
procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of
proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving
substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation
of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally
construed. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their
merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case
on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression
of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the
Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated February 23, 2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the
Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed the
Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case demand
that the Court forego a rigid application of the technicalities under

the law so as to prevent petitioner from suffering a grave injustice. As disclosed

by the records, petitioner had already fulfilled her end of the agreement in
giving respondent, as early as in the year 2003, construction materials
amounting to half a million pesos and yet up until now, she has not been paid
therefor. In feet, after having sufficiently proven to the satisfaction of both the
MeTC and the RTC her right allegedly violated by respondent, the CA simply
dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-filing of the case with the
appropriate court, her action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the
mistaken reasoning that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over
 G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.
OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby
ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint
Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations
for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another
entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order
dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the
then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of
the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to
ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private
respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now
under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2
Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila
convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion
perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being
at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we,
on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001,
he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela
Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,
Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of
SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan
issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of
arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on
the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons,
the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners
appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department
of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over
the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest
issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners
Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor
Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said
Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge
Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22
October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the
prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution,
Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this
Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532
dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while
referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November
2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous
referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in
the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the
following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing
and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August
17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001
issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in
upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by
then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket
of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago
City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants
of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial
court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to
issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal
issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body
of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court
of Appeals’ ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person
to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may
be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or
through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police
or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over
his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M.
Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992).
Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the
court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were
not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their
"Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall
and/or quash warrants of arrest."
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for
bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their
person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant
for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the
court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication
of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice
Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other
relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the
case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause
without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of
Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And
in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 102), the Court ordered the
case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in
the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez: held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’" The
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents
(such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise
resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send
of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial)
another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the
or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before
requirements therefor.
custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by
his arrest or voluntary surrender. There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the
submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case
law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the
of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of
court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1)
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are
over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by
included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial
has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction
person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over
his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., cited by the Court of Appeals
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law.
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
himself to the custody of the law.
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this,
Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the
there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following
applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused
before considering the application for bail.
who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari
on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issue a temporary restraining
order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent
judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate
the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the
ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we
directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding
with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against
the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, on the prayer of the accused in a petition
for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases
to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in
applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest.
If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large,
and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever
he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of
arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a
person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because
it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether
or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and
he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause
after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the
warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still
be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night. Furthermore, the
continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the
determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it.
Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property
rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come
before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political
climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge
Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal
cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest
issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the
Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable
cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases
on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused,
doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary
of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant
of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x
prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the
proceedings is but proper."
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge
Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he
issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners
might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a
petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash
the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon, we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as
premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that
they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to
the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same
ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of
arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad
asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-
quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to
Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited
decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments
raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the
contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as
having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the
supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of
probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the
petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated
that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under
oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the
Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it
expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification.
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such
indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order
even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court
proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally
evaluating the records x x x.
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim,
Sr. v. Felix and People v. Inting. The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda
and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente
Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part
of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad,
however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the
confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was
given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of
Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy
for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious
reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the
election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City
voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on
one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of
DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason
to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness
is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held
in Webb:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more
than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x
conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial
x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another
case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other
things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s
resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge Anghad summarily
dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the
following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al.,
RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed
to Mr. Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as
the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court
absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a
"narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting
said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his
April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value." This Court agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed,
of what use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-
160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2)
cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of
his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated
October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder
charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the
Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused
therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the
prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed
against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist
our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at
large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented.
A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot
be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the
same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the
fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never
ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution
in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even
the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there
is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño furthermore had
no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas petitioners herein had been
implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt
in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable
value." On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño,
an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability
of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt
certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations
two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary
restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The
bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the
dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this
Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions
about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan,
but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of
arrest. According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to
have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new
warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest
issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the
slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on
the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of
Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated
the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, which issued the warrants of
arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings
conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of
proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders
set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the
warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are
henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new
warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have
been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary
investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available
to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally
examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the
prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of
Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective
criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable
cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the
same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of
probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed
before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued
therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge
Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were
assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As
carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the
following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private
respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which
ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT
included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order
of November 14, 2001.
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with
this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the
same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on
25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.
Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost
no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November
2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous
referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in
Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case
decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed
contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent
Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001
Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12
November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing
of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond
on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing
as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are
cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be
heard on the part of respondent, the prayer to cite public respondent in
contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be
construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001
Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked
where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion
that the case was dismissed.
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as
well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of
abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias
on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People
v. SPO1 Leaño, by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and
No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December
2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and
No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City
of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the
RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the
transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten
(10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the
criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10)
days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed
to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith
warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal,
conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003
is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.