A.M. No. MTJ-04-1556. March 31, 2005
2002-173 was also ordered quashed by Judge
PURITA LIM, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Isabela, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
In a verified letter-complaint dated June 5, 2003, complainant Purita Lim
charged respondent Judge Cesar M. Dumlao of the Municipal Trial Court
of San Mateo, Isabela, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave
Abuse of Authority.
Complainant averred that she filed two criminal cases for carnapping and
theft with the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35,
against a certain Herman A. Medina. On May 8, 2003, Medina was
apprehended and detained at the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, Santiago City Jail, by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by
then Presiding Judge Fe Albano Madrid of Branch 35.
On May 9, 2003, respondent judge issued three separate orders for the
release of Medina on the ground that he had posted bail with his court.
Complainant alleged that respondent judge frequently approves bail
bonds for cases filed in other courts and outside the territorial jurisdiction
of his court. He also issues search warrants for implementation outside of
his court’s jurisdiction which, resultantly, are often quashed and the
corresponding cases dismissed because the articles seized were
inadmissible as evidence.
As proof, complainant attached copies of Search Warrant Nos. 2002-120,
2002-173, and 2002-180 issued by respondent judge. Search Warrant
No. 2002-120 was ordered quashed on September 2, 2002 by Judge
Anastacio Anghad for being infirmed and fatally defective. The crime was
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the MTC of San Mateo,
Isabela and no "compelling reasons" were stated in the application to
justify its filing before the MTC of San Mateo, Isabela. What is more, it
was found that respondent judge did not conduct a thorough and
extensive inquiry to the deponent and his witnesses as required by the
Rules on Criminal Procedure6 in order to establish probable cause and
the justification for the application.
Search Warrant No.
Anghad on December 18, 2002 as probable cause was not actually
ascertained and searching questions and answers were not conducted.
In another case, Search Warrant No. 2002-180 was likewise quashed
and the articles seized by virtue of the warrant were declared
inadmissible in evidence because the applicant failed to prove "extreme
and compelling circumstances" and the warrant issued did not particularly
describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In view of these instances, complainant requested for an investigation
into the activities of respondent judge. On June 30, 2003, the Court
Administrator referred the complaint to respondent judge requiring his
comment thereon within ten days from receipt, but he failed to file the
required comment notwithstanding his receipt of the order on July 28,
2003 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt. The Court
Administrator sent a 1st Tracer dated October 28, 2003 which
respondent judge received on November 19, 2003. On June 28, 2004,
this Court resolved to require respondent judge to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for his obdurate
refusal to file his comment. On December 8, 2004, with still no response
from respondent judge, the Court resolved to dispense with the comment.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez,
submitted to this Court a Memorandum dated February 15, 2005. In said
memorandum, the Court was informed that respondent judge has been
charged in six (6) administrative cases, including the instant case, to wit:
1. MTJ-01-1339 (Efren Morales vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for Abuse of
Authority. Respondent was fined P5,000.00 in a decision dated February
13, 2002.
2. MTJ-01-1350 (Lorenzo Pascual, et al. vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for
Gross Negligence and Gross Ignorance. Respondent fined P10,000.00 in
a decision dated July 20, 2001.
3. MTJ-03-1519 (Reynaldo Sinaon, Sr. vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for
Grave Abuse of Authority, Misconduct, Dereliction of Duty and Ignorance
of the Law. The case is pending.
4. 03-1442-MTJ (Ester Barbero vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for Abuse of
Authority. The case is pending.
5. 97-394-MTJ (Artemio Alivia vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) – for Anomalous
Reduction of Bailbond. Case pending.
The OCA’s evaluation stated:
The respondent’s failure to submit his comment as required is further
evidence of his defiance of directives issued by his superiors. It is,
furthermore, indicative of his admission of the charges pending against
him. Indeed, the practice of respondent accepting and approving bail
bonds of detained persons who are charged of crimes in courts other
than his own constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
We believe, however, that in the determination of the penalty, we should
consider the fact that he presides over four (4) courts to wit: MTC, San
Mateo, Isabela as presiding judge; MCTC, Alfonso-Lista-Aguinaldo as
acting presiding judge; MTC, Ilagan, Isabela as acting presiding judge,
and MCTC of Tumauini-Delfin Albano also as acting presiding judge.
Thus, the OCA recommended:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court with
the recommendations that the respondent Judge be required to pay a
fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for his obdurate refusal to
file his comment on the complaint. Further, respondent judge be required
to pay a fine of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) and
warned that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more
drastically for approving bail bonds for accused persons who were
detained in places outside his territorial jurisdiction.
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA, except as to the
penalty.
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial court judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge in the province, city or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no
judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant against
Herman Medina were pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was
issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said court. The
order of release therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should
have been issued by that court, or in the absence or unavailability of
Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In this
case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or
unavailable at the time of the posting of the bail bond. In fact,
complainant Lim avers that on the day respondent judge ordered the
release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of
Santiago City, Isabela were at their respective posts.
It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant
bail to an accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The
requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 as quoted above must be
complied with before a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes that
not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but
only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where,
however, the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.
Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the
order of release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought
to be complied with before he can approve Medina’s bail and issue an
order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little
room for error. In the case of Español and Suluen v. Mupas, we have
stated:
Thus, a judge who approves applications for bail of accused whose
cases were not only pending in other courts but who were, likewise,
arrested and detained outside his territorial jurisdiction is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and violates Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. It must be emphasized that the rules of procedure have been
formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules
undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law.
Judges should ensure strict compliance therewith at all times in their
respective jurisdictions.
It is settled that one who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the
public and the court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to
maintain professional competence at all times. When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the
public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be
the mainspring of injustice.
Respondent judge’s predicament is further aggravated by his
unauthorized or irregular issuance of search warrants not once but a
number of times. To our mind, his violations cannot be excused as mere
lapses in judgment but blatant and conscious disregard of basic rules of
procedure.
Moreover, records show that he has been previously charged and found
guilty of similar charges. Respondent judge has been previously fined
Five Thousand Pesos for notarizing the revocation of a Special Power of
Attorney in violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-
90.21 In another case, he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and negligence in the performance of duties for issuing a temporary
restraining order and granting a party’s motion without the benefit of a
proper hearing. He was fined Ten Thousand Pesos.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court characterizes gross ignorance
of the law and procedure as a grave offense. The penalties prescribed for
such offense are: (1) Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government
owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In Gomos, et al. v. Adiong, the respondent judge therein was suspended
from office without salary and benefits for six months after he was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law. We took judicial notice that
previously, he was fined in the sum of P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of
the law and another P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of discretion.
In this case, respondent judge appears undeterred in disregarding the
law. He has continued to exhibit such behavior that betray an
unconcerned stance about the previous penalties he has received and
the warnings previously given that any repetition of similar infractions
shall be dealt with more severely. Thus, we are imposing a penalty more
severe than a fine. Given the circumstances, suspension from office for
six (6) months without salary and benefits is reasonable.
We agree with the OCA that the respondent judge must be held
administratively liable for his unjustified failure to comment on an
administrative complaint. This constitutes gross misconduct and
insubordination. We held in Imbang v. Del Rosario, that:
The office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his
superiors. It is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court,
for respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring him
to comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly and
substantially. After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be
construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and
completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a
recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful
order and directive. (Emphasis supplied)
In that case, we fined the judge in the amount of P10,000.00 for his
failure to comply with our directives. In the present case, a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as recommended by the OCA is
reasonable penalty for respondent judge’s repeated failure to file his
comment on the complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Cesar M.
Dumlao of the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Isabela, is found
GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority
and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of six (6) months
without salary and other benefits with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same shall merit a more serious penalty. He is likewise FINED the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for his obstinate failure to
file comment on the complaint filed against him despite proper notice.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
430 Phil. 197
FIRST DIVISION
[ A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 (formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ), April 11, 2002 ]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE SALVADOR
M. OCCIANO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001.
Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador
B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage
until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a
nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was
not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of
Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for
his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused
her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice
to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate
action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required
respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was
requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize
the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured
that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling
to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in
Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he
carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When
he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting
to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the
influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also
feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they
would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When
they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the
latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license
would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties
that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He
attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as
due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated
28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested
that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to
the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her
prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However,
after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her
own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia
filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was
stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on
17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a
Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took
place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7
May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the
parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so
the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license.
Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines
Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the
marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation
dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of
solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for
doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was
recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority
of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.
Domagtoy, respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to
marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or
place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law
are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability." (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the
ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are
not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons."
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited
to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a
marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void,
and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a
catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily
have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.Disciplinary actions of
this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can
not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for
one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound
by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the
Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power
may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and
impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge

of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined
P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,

concur.
454 Phil. 147
AZCUNA, J.:
In separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, Marlene Olermo a.k.a. Marlene
Tolentino was accused of illegal recruitment in large scale and five
counts of estafa.
In Criminal Case No. 2860-V-93, a prosecution for illegal recruitment in
large scale, the information reads:
That during the period of February to June 1993, in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, representing herself to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did then and there
wil[l]fully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job
placement in a large scale to ARISTON B. VILLANUEVA, MARY JANE
AQUINO-VILLANUEVA, ALFRED BRYANT BERADOR, FRENNIE
MAJARUCON and WILFREDO TUBALE, without said accused having
secured first the necessary license or authority to engage in recruitment
activity from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA), in violation of the aforementioned provision of Law.
Contrary to Law.
The five informations for estafa, on the other hand, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 2861-V-93, 2862-V-93, 2863-V-93, 2864-V-93, and 2865-V-
93, alleged that the appellant violated paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, thus:
In Criminal Case No. 2861-V-93:
That sometime in the month of February 1993 or thereabouts in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, defrauded and deceived one
NAPOLEON APARICIO y CLEMENTE in the following manner to wit:
said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation made to the said complainant to the effect that she has
the capacity and power to recruit and employ complainant abroad and
facilitate the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
knowing said manifestations and representation to be false and
fraudulent and made only to induce said complainant to give, as in fact,
the latter did give and deliver to said accused cash money amounting to
P40,000, but said accused, once in possession of the same, with intent to
defraud and deceive the herein complainant, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert [the
same] to her own personal use and benefit, [and] despite demands made
upon her to return the said amount of P40,000, said accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of the complainant in the aforementioned amount of P40,000.
Contrary to Law.
In Criminal Case No. 2862-V-93:
That sometime in May 1993 or thereabouts in Valenzuela, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, defrauded and deceived one MARY JANE AQUINO-
VILLANUEVA in the following manner to wit: said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representation made to the said
complainant to the effect that she has the capacity and power to recruit
and employ complainant abroad and facilitate the necessary amount to
meet the requirements thereof knowing said manifestations and
representation to be false and fraudulent and made only to induce said
complainant to give, as in fact, the latter did give and deliver to said
accused cash money amounting to P35,000, but said accused, once in
possession of the same, with intent to defraud and deceive the herein
complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misapply, misappropriate and convert [the same] to her own personal use
and benefit, [and] despite demands made upon her to return the said
amount of P35,000, said accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P35,000.
Contrary to Law.
In Criminal Case No. 2863-V-93:
That sometime in May and June 1993 or thereabouts in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, defrauded and deceived one ARISTON B.
VILLANUEVA in the following manner to wit: said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representation made to the said
complainant to the effect that she has the capacity and power to recruit
and employ complainant abroad and facilitate the necessary amount to
meet the requirement thereof, knowing said manifestations and
representation to be false and fraudulent and made only to induce said
complainant to give, as in fact, the latter did give and deliver to said
accused cash money amounting to P35,000, but said accused, once in
possession of the same, with the intent to defraud and deceive the herein
complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misapply, misappropriate and convert [the same] to her own personal use
and benefit, [and] despite demands made upon her to return the said
amount of P35,000, said accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P35,000.
Contrary to Law.
In Criminal Case No. 2864-V-93:
That sometime in the month of March 1993 or thereabouts in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, defrauded and deceived one FRENNIE
MAJARUCON y BACO in the following manner to wit: said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation made to the
said complainant to the effect that she has the capacity and power to
recruit and employ complainant abroad and facilitate the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, knowing said manifestations
and representation to be false and fraudulent and made only to induce
said complainant to give, as in fact, the latter did give and deliver to said
accused, cash money amounting to P20,000, but said accused, once in
possession of the same, with intent to defraud and deceive the herein
complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misapply, misappropriate and convert [the same] to her own personal use
and benefit, [and] despite demands made upon her to return the said
amount of P20,000, said accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000.
Contrary to Law.
In Criminal Case No. 2865-V-93:
That sometime in the month of February 1993 or thereabouts in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, defrauded and deceived one ALFRED
BRYANT BERADOR y OCHOA in the following manner to wit: said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation
made to the said complainant to the effect that she has the capacity and
power to recruit and employ complainant abroad and facilitate the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, knowing said
manifestations and representation to be false and fraudulent and made
only to induce said complainant to give, as in fact, the latter did give and
deliver to said accused cash money amounting to P25,350, but said
accused, once in possession of the same, with intent to defraud and
deceive the herein complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert [the same] to her
own personal use and benefit, [and] despite demands made upon her to
return the said amount of P25,350, said accused failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant in the aforementioned amount of P25,350.
Contrary to Law.
Complainant Napoleon C. Aparicio, jobless, testified that he came to
know appellant through his sister in February 1993. He allegedly talked
with appellant Marlene Olermo a.k.a. Marlene Tolentino regarding the
latter's offer to give him a job overseas. She informed complainant
Aparicio that he needed to pay her P40,000 for a work permit and a plane
ticket to Saipan where he is allegedly to be employed. Aparicio agreed to
pay her the said amount. He made his first payment of P20,000 on March
30, 1993. Appellant allegedly called him up and instructed him to deliver
the money, which he did, to a certain Jennifer Balduesa at Danding
Building, Municipal Site, Valenzuela, Metro Manila where appellant's
office, Jirk Manpower Services, is located. Complainant Aparicio made
his second payment on April 21, 1993. Again, he delivered the amount of
P20,000 to Jennifer Balduesa in appellant's office in Valenzuela upon the
instructions of appellant. He was issued a cash voucher for each
payment he made. Appellant promised him that he would leave for
Saipan on May 3, 1993 and she even showed him his plane ticket.
However, he was not able to leave on said date. The date of his
departure was moved several times by appellant until he began to
suspect something was amiss. Hence, he reported the matter to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant thereafter pretended to
refund the amounts he paid by issuing him a check, which, however,
bounced when it was presented for payment. He later learned that
appellant was not a duly-licensed recruiter.
Complainant Ariston Villanueva, jobless, is married to another
complainant Mary Jane Aquino-Villanueva. They were not married yet
when they first encountered appellant. He testified that he read the
advertisement of appellant in a newspaper, sometime in April 1993,
offering assistance to those who would like to work overseas. He called
the number indicated therein and spoke to appellant. They first agreed to
meet in Greenbelt, Makati, but during the appointed hour, appellant did
not show up. The following day, they spoke again on the telephone and
agreed to meet in the office of appellant in Valenzuela. When they met,
appellant informed him and complainant Aquino-Villanueva that she can
help them find work in Hong Kong. However, they must pay her P35,000
each for their plane fares and placement fees. On May 3, 1993,
complainant Villanueva paid appellant an initial amount of P40,000. On
May 20, 1993, he gave appellant P30,000. Appellant issued him a receipt
for each payment he made.] Their departure, however, kept on being
postponed by appellant. Finally, they asked for a refund of their
payments. Appellant issued three checks on different dates amounting to
P70,000. However, these checks were dishonored when they were
presented for payment. In the end, appellant gave back only P19,000.
Complainants Villanueva and Aquino-Villanueva subsequently inquired
with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) whether or not
appellant was licensed to recruit persons for overseas employment. They
were informed that appellant is not a licensed recruiter and they procured
a certification to this effect.
Complainant Alfred Bryant Berador, a cook, testified that on or about
February 22, 1993, he was introduced to appellant by one of her partners
in the agency. He met her in their office in front of the Municipal Hall of
Valenzuela. He paid her a total amount of P24,000 as placement and
processing fees for his employment in Japan. He was issued a receipt for
each payment made. He was not, however, allowed to leave for Japan
immediately. Complainant Berador was first required by appellant to
undergo a seminar to learn Nippongo for one week. However, on the
fourth day of the seminar, appellant was arrested by the authorities.
Complainant Berador subsequently learned that appellant did not have a
license to recruit workers for overseas employment. He went to the
POEA and was issued a certification stating this fact.
Complainant Frennie Majarucon, jobless, testified that she was
introduced to appellant by her kumadre named Elvie sometime in March
1993. They first met in the office of appellant in front of the Municipal Hall
of Valenzuela. Appellant informed her that she had an available job for
her in Hong Kong and that she would need P45,000 for placement and
processing fees and P2,000 for her passport. Complainant Majarucon
was only able to give P22,000, which was evidenced by the receipts
issued to her by appellant. However, complainant Majarucon never left
for Hong Kong. She thus inquired from the people in appellant's office
whether the amount she paid to appellant can be refunded. She was
promptly informed, however, that appellant had been arrested and was
already in jail for illegal recruitment. Complainant Majarucon then
proceeded to the POEA where she found out that the appellant was
indeed not a licensed recruiter.
For her part, appellant Olermo denied all the charges against her. She
alleged that she was engaged only in visa assistance. She denied ever
having represented herself as possessing authority to deploy workers for
overseas employment. She thus explained that she only offered
complainants Villanueva, Aquino-Villanueva, Aparicio and Majarucon
assistance in processing their tourist visas. With respect to the
accusation of complainant Berador, appellant alleged that she was only
helping him process his trainee's visa.
On August 23, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision convicting
appellant of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Crim. Case No. 2860-V-93, the Court finds accused Marlene
Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as
principal of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale as defined and
penalized under Article 38 in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code,
as amended by P.D. 2018, without any attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and hereby sentences her to a penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency;
(2) In Crim. Case No. 2861-V-93, the Court finds accused Marlene
Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as
principal of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph
2(a) in relation to the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance and,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences her to a
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision mayor as
minimum to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum. The accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness
Napoleon Aparicio the amount of P40,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;
(3) In Crim. Case No. 2862-V-93, the Court finds accused Marlene
Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as
principal of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph
2(a) in relation to the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances and,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences her to a
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision mayor as
minimum to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum. The accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness
Mary Jane Aquino-Villanueva the amount of P35,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;
(4) In Crim. Case No. 2863-V-93, the Court finds accused Marlene
Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as
principal of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph
2(a) in relation to the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances and,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences her to a
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision mayor as
minimum to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum. The accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness
Ariston B. Villanueva the amount of P35,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;
(5) In Crim. Case No. 2864-V-93, the Court finds accused Marlene
Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as
principal of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph
2(a) in relation to the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances and,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences her to a
penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as maximum. The accused is further sentenced to pay
complaining witness Frennie Majarucon y Baco the amount of P20,000,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of
suit.
(6) In Crim. Case No. 2865-V-93, the Court finds accused Marlene
Olermo @ Marlene Tolentino guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as
principal of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph
2(a) in relation to the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code without any attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences her to a
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum. The accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness
Alfred Bryant Berador y Ochoa the amount of P25,350, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Appeal followed and the following are assigned as errors:
I
The trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in not considering the
defense interposed by the accused-appellant.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of the
crimes charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
III
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large-scale recruitment despite
its lack of jurisdiction.
IV
The court a quo gravely erred in disregarding the right of the appellant to
have a competent and independent counsel.
V
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa.
VI
The court a quo gravely erred in ordering the payment of P35,000, to
complainant Mary Jane Aquino Villanueva; P35,000, to complainant
Napoleon Aparicio; P20,000, to complainant Frennie Majarucon and
P35,000, [sic] to complainant Alfred Bryant Berador.
First and Second Issues: Credibility of Witnesses and Proof Beyond
Reasonable Doubt in Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Furthermore, she contends that her alleged act
of illegally recruiting at least three persons was not sufficiently
established by the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code enumerates the acts which
constitute recruitment and placement:
(b) `Recruitment and placement' refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That
any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
Appellant's acts of promising, offering and assuring employment
overseas to complainants fall squarely within the ambit of recruitment and
placement as defined above. The fact that she did not sign nor issue
some of the receipts for amounts received from complainants has no
bearing on her culpability. The complainants have shown through their
respective testimonies and evidence that she was indeed involved in the
prohibited recruitment. In fact, it was even proven that appellant
advertised her services in a newspaper.
Article 38 of the Labor Code renders illegal those recruitment activities
without the necessary license or authority from the POEA. Article 38
provides:
Article 38. Illegal Recruitment. --- (a) Any recruitment activities, including
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Department of
Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal Recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise
or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group. x x x.
Article 39 of the Labor Code, in turn, provides:
Article 38. Illegal Recruitment. --- (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if
illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein; x x
x.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the person
undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13, paragraph
(b), or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code; (2) said person does not have a license or authority to engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the act is committed
against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
All these three elements were proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt. First, the complaining witnesses have satisfactorily
established that appellant promised them employment and assured them
of placement overseas. Appellant even had her office advertised in a
newspaper, undoubtedly to reach more people seeking jobs
abroad. Second, appellant did not have any license to recruit persons for
overseas work. The Licensing Division of the POEA issued a certification
to this effect. Third, appellant undertook the recruitment of not less than
three workers. The complainants herein were recruited individually on
different occasions. The law applies whether the workers were recruited
individually or as a group.
It is not material that complainants Mary Jane Aquino Villanueva and
Wilfredo Tubale were not presented in court to substantiate their claims
against appellant. The law applies if appellant committed the illegal act
against at least three persons, individually or as a group. In the case at
bar, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that at least three
persons were recruited by appellant: Ariston B. Villanueva, Alfred Bryant
Berador and Frennie Majarucon.
With respect to the credibility of these witnesses, it is settled that where
the issue is on credibility, the findings of the trial court will generally not
be disturbed. The trial court has the advantage of hearing the witnesses
and observing their conduct during trial, circumstances that carry great
weight in appreciating credibility. The trial court is thus in a better position
to settle such an issue.
Third Issue: Jurisdiction
or Venue
The defense argues that appellant cannot be convicted of large scale
illegal recruitment because the alleged prohibited acts against
complainants were committed beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela. She points out that in complainant Villanueva's
affidavit, he stated that he first met appellant in her residence in Quezon
City. However, during complainant Villanueva's testimony in court, he
stated that he first met appellant in her office in Valenzuela.
The Rules of Court provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province
wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients
thereof took place. In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that the
element of offering, promising, and advertising overseas employment to
the complainants took place in appellant's office in Valenzuela.
Furthermore, it is elementary that jurisdiction in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations in the information. In this case, the
information filed against appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale
clearly placed the locus criminis in Valenzuela. As stated earlier, it was in
Valenzuela where the complainants were offered or promised overseas
employment by appellant. Furthermore, based on the prosecution's
evidence, the Court is sufficiently convinced that at least one element of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale took place in Valenzuela.
Where some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province or city and some in another, the
court of either province or city has jurisdiction to try the case, it being
understood that the court first taking cognizance of the case will exclude
the others.
Fourth Issue: Right to Competent Counsel
Appellant, next maintains that the court a quo gravely erred in
disregarding her right to a competent and independent counsel. Appellant
notes that during the presentation of the prosecution's first witness on
August 11, 1993, appellant was represented by Atty. Hortensio Domingo,
who was not her retained counsel for the case. During the hearing, Atty.
Domingo manifested that appellant herself requested him to represent
her in that day's hearing since her counsel, Atty. Yuseco, was still in
Cagayan. During the second, third, fourth, and fifth hearings, appellant
was represented by another counsel, a de oficio one, a certain Atty.
Ricardo Perez, again because counsel for appellant was not around.
Because of these instances, appellant claims that she was deprived of
her right to competent counsel because the lawyers who represented her
in the abovementioned hearings were not familiar with her case and,
hence, were not able adequately to protect her interests.
Article III, Section 12, paragraph (1) of the Constitution provides:
"Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right x x x to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. x x x."
The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the appellant to admit something false. Moreover, the words
"preferably of his own choice" do not mean that the choice of a lawyer by
appellant is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense. If this were so, the
tempo of justice would be solely within the control of appellant who could
choose to impede the judicial process by simply selecting a lawyer who,
for one reason or another, is not available to defend her.
Fifth and Sixth Issues: Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt in the
Charges of Estafa, and the Order of Payment
Five separate informations were filed against appellant charging her of
violating subdivision 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Except for the names of the offended parties, the dates of the
commission of the crime, and the amounts involved, all informations were
similarly worded:
That sometime in the month of February 1993 or thereabouts in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, defrauded and deceived one
NAPOLEON APARICIO y CLEMENTE in the following manner to wit:
said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation made to the said complainant to the effect that she has
the capacity and power to recruit and employ complainant abroad and
facilitate the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
knowing said manifestations and representation to be false and
fraudulent and made only to induce said complainant to give, as in fact,
the latter did give and deliver to said appellant cash money amounting to
P40,000, but said accused, once in possession of the same, with intent to
defraud and deceive the herein complainant, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert [the
same] to her own personal use and benefit, [and] despite demands made
upon her to return the said amount of P40,000, said accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of the complainant in the aforementioned amount of P40,000.
Contrary to Law.
Except in Criminal Case No. 2862-V093, the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt appellant's guilt in the cases of estafa.
Subdivision 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code lists ways by
which estafa may be committed:
 2. By means of any of the following pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
There are three ways of committing estafa under this provision: (1) by
using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under this class
of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. Such deceit consists of
the false statement or fraudulent representation of the appellant, which
was made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the
thing by the complainant, it being essential that such false statement or
fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive
which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value. If there is
no prior or simultaneous false statement or fraudulent representation, any
subsequent act of appellant, however fraudulent and suspicious it may
appear, cannot serve as a basis for prosecution for this class of estafa.
The Solicitor General, correctly states in the appellee's brief, that all the
elements of the abovementioned crime have been established beyond
reasonable doubt. Appellant represented herself, personally and by way
of the advertisement in the newspaper, that she can provide
complainants with work abroad. Hence, relying on her representations,
complainants parted with their money and delivered the same to
appellant. The truth, however, was that appellant never had the license
from the POEA to recruit persons for overseas employment.
Complainants were never given any employment abroad and thus they
suffered damage by reason of appellant's illegal acts.
We note, however, that in Criminal Case No. 2863-V-93, the trial court
only ordered appellant to pay complainant Ariston B. Villanueva a total
amount of P35,000 in actual damages. The fundamental principle of the
law on damages is that one injured by a breach of contract or by a
wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just
compensation, commensurate with the loss sustained as a consequence
of the defendant's acts. Actual damages are such compensation or
damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position in
which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or
losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. To
justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the
actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are
duly supported by receipts. In this case, it was duly proven by the
receipts presented by complainant Villanueva and his testimony during
trial that he handed appellant a total amount of P70,000 and only got
back P19,000. Hence, correction of the trial court's award is called for.
Appellant should be ordered to pay complainant Ariston B. Villanueva the
total amount of P51,000 in actual damages in Criminal Case No. 2863-V-
93.
Correction of the trial court's penalty imposed upon appellant in Criminal
Case No. 2863-V-93 is therefore likewise called for. Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 38. Swindling (estafa). ---Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000
but does not exceed P22,000; and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be; x x x.
Hence, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused in
Criminal Case No. 2863-V-93 shall be sentenced to a penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 2862-V093, the prosecution failed to
fulfill its duty to produce evidence showing appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges of estafa committed against Mary Jane
Aquino-Villanueva. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law
to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute
the offense.[32] In the said criminal case for estafa, no proof whatsoever
was adduced by the prosecution. The offended party, Mary Jane Aquino-
Villanueva, was not even asked to testify in open court.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 2860-V-93 finding
appellant Marlene Olermo a.k.a. Marlene Tolentino guilty of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and sentencing her to life imprisonment, as
well as to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)
is AFFIRMED.

II. The judgments in Criminal Cases Nos. 2861-V-93, 2864-V-93 and

2865-V-93, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four
separate offenses of estafa are AFFIRMED in toto.

III. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 2863-V-93 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of estafa is MODIFIED, insofar as appellant is
hereby sentenced to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum and that appellant is further ordered to pay complainant Ariston
B. Villanueva the amount of P51,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, plus costs of suit.

IV. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 2862-V-93 is REVERSED and

appellant is ACQUITTED from the charge of estafa.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

.
516 Phil. 717
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to
nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge
against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article
315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in
finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by
the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In
case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issuance must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint or information.
xxx
This Court finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952 the
following documents to support the motion of the prosecution for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest:
1. The report of the National Bureau of Investigation to Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño as regards their investigation on
the complaint filed by private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten
against Mina Tan Hao @ Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and Victor Ngo y
Tan for syndicated estafa. The report shows that Hao induced Dy
to invest more than a hundred million pesos in State Resources
Development Management Corporation, but when the latter's
investments fell due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy as
payment for his investments were dishonored for being drawn
against insufficient funds or that the account was closed.
2. Affidavit-Complaint of private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten.
3. Copies of the checks issued by private complainant in favor of
State Resources Corporation.
4. Copies of the checks issued to private complainant representing
the supposed return of his investments in State Resources.
5. Demand letter sent by private complainant to Ma. Gracia Tan
Hao.
6. Supplemental Affidavit of private complainant to include the
incorporators and members of the board of directors of State
Resources Development Management Corporation as
participants in the conspiracy to commit the crime of syndicated
estafa. Among those included was petitioner Chester De Joya.
7. Counter-Affidavits of Chester De Joya and the other accused,
Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny S. Hao.
Also included in the records are the resolution issued by State Prosecutor
Benny Nicdao finding probable cause to indict petitioner and his other co-
accused for syndicated estafa, and a copy of the Articles of Incorporation
of State Resources Development Management Corporation naming
petitioner as incorporator and director of said corporation.
This Court finds that these documents sufficiently establish the existence
of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. It bears remembering
that "in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules
of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the
calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an
abundance." Thus, the standard used for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the
accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case
against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a
warrant of arrest against him.
The foregoing documents found in the records and examined by
respondent judge tend to show that therein private complainant was
enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources Development
Management Corporation; that he issued several checks amounting to
P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn,
issued several checks to private complainant, purportedly representing
the return of his investments; that said checks were later dishonored for
insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused,
being incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its
activities and transactions. These are all that need to be shown to
establish probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. It
need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of the crime
charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should be emphasized
that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally
the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do
not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence. In the present case, it is notable that the resolution
issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases
for his findings that there is probable cause to charge all the accused with
violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
P.D. No. 1689.
The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of
the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this
Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on
the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent
the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly
administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant
the application of the exception.
In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to
seek relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he continuously
refuses to surrender and submit to the court's jurisdiction. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and
how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires
such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the
filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the
court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by
the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or
respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the
court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and,
unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the
court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and
conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by
their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by
their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to
evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided
in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the
subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the actual or
constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus
placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by
provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal
with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction,
as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or
real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
Justice Regalado continues to explain:
In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as
long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the
personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the
defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of summons by
publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due
process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license
cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded
against before our courts or administrative tribunals.
Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to
obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the
contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the court's jurisdiction should
give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge.
The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the
custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His
evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of
this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the
court's jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ.,

concur.
430 Phil. 189
FIRST DIVISION
[ A.M. No. MTJ-01-1384 (formerly OCA IPI No. 00-970-MTJ), April 11,
2002 ]
RASMIA U. TABAO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE
ACMAD T. BARATAMAN, MTCC, BRANCH 1, MARAWI CITY,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The present administrative case stems from an affidavit-complaint[1] filed
by complainant Rasmia U. Tabao charging respondent Judge Acmad
Barataman, in his capacity as acting presiding judge of MTCC, Branch 1,
Marawi City, with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion.
Complainant Rasmia Tabao is the private complainant in Criminal Case
No. 9106 entitled "People vs. Samsodin M. Tabao" for abandonment of
minor. It appears that on July 16, 1998, respondent judge issued an
Order[2] granting the motion for bail on recognizance filed by the father of
the accused pursuant to R.A. No. 6036. The motion of the prosecution to
cancel bail on the ground that accused is a certified public accountant
and can afford to post cash bond was denied by respondent judge in an
Order dated June 30, 1999,[3] stating that the law, in allowing bail on
recognizance, does not distinguish whether an accused is rich or poor.
Complainant avers that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in granting the motion for bail on recognizance because (1) it was filed
not by the accused but by his father, Hadji Yusoph Tabao; (2) the
prosecutor was not furnished a copy of the motion and there was no
hearing conducted; (3) it lacked the sworn statement of the accused
signed in the presence of two witnesses; and (4) the motion and its
supporting affidavit were signed by the father of the
accused. Complainant also contends that the accused is not poor but is
a certified public accountant and operates a transport business in Metro
Manila. Thus, it is urged that he should not have been released on
recognizance since he could put up a cash bond.
In his comment, respondent judge alleges that the crime of abandonment
of a minor is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure and hence
bail on recognizance is not required as the court can immediately arraign
and try the accused, pursuant to Section 13 of the Rules; that if he were
the acting judge when the criminal case was filed, he would not issue a
warrant of arrest but order the immediate arraignment and trial of the
case and there would be no need to discuss the matter of bail; and, that
the court can appoint as custodian of the accused his father, a former
City Councilor of Marawi City, who qualifies as a responsible person
under Section 15, Rule 144 of the Rules of Court.
On November 6, 2001, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
submitted a Memorandum[4] finding respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for releasing the accused on recognizance before it
could acquire jurisdiction over his person. The accused was still at large
when the motion for bail was filed. He likewise found the respondent
judge to have violated R.A. No. 6036. He ratiocinated: first, the law
requires that the accused sign in the presence of two witnesses of good
standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending
final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of Court hearing the case
periodically every two weeks. No such sworn statement was executed by
the accused and; second, in order to be released on recognizance, the
accused must be unable to post bail bond. The accused is a CPA and
can afford to post bond. The Court Administrator recommends that
respondent judge be ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00, considering
that it is his first offense, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator. The
respondent judge is liable in granting the motion for bail on recognizance
in clear violation of R.A. No. 6036, for the following reasons:
First. Section 1 of R.A. No. 6036 provides that "any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a person
charged with violation of a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for
which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a fine of two
thousand pesos, or both." Instead of bail, Section 2 states that the
person charged "shall be required to sign in the presence of two
witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding
himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of Court
hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its
discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that
he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a
responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the
responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include
a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the
authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court."
In the present case, it is not disputed that the sworn statement supporting
the motion for bail filed before respondent judge was signed, not by the
accused but by his father. The failure of the accused to sign the sworn
statement is in clear contravention of the express mandate of the law that
the person charged shall sign a sworn statement binding himself to report
to the Clerk of Court. This is a personal obligation imposed by R.A. No.
6036 on the accused and cannot be assumed by the custodian or
responsible citizen who may be appointed by the court. It is different
from Section 15, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which
allows the release of the accused on his own recognizance or that of a
responsible person. R.A. No. 6036 applies to criminal cases where the
prescribed penalty is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a
fine of P2,000.00, or both. In the case at bar, accused stands charged
with abandonment of a minor which carries with it the imposable penalty
of arresto mayor and/or a fine of P500.00. Hence, it was erroneous for
respondent judge to have granted the motion for bail on the basis of the
affidavit of the father of the accused.
Moreover, R.A. No. 6036 allows the release of the accused on his own
recognizance only where it has been established that he is unable to post
the required cash or bail bond. The accused in this case is a CPA who is
engaged in the transport business. We reject the contention of
respondent judge that the law does not distinguish whether the accused
is rich or poor. The distinction is all to clear for the law explicitly provides
that the accused can be released on his own recognizance only if he is
able to clearly establish that he is unable to post cash or bail bond.
We reiterate the rule that although a judge may not be subjected to
disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that
relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary
in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. Judges who wantonly misuse
the powers vested in them by law cannot render fair and impartial justice.
Second. Respondent judge does not deny that the accused in Criminal
Case No. 9106 was at large when the motion for bail on recognizance
was filed and subsequently granted. Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law.[5] Section 15, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may release
a person in custody on his own recognizance or that of a responsible
person. It is a basic principle that bail is intended to obtain provisional
liberty and cannot be granted before custody of an accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender. It
is self-evident that a court cannot grant provisional liberty to one who is
actually in the enjoyment of his liberty for it would be incongruous to give
freedom to one who is free. Thus, we have held that it is premature to
file a motion for bail for someone whose liberty has yet to be curtailed.[6]
In the case at bar, respondent judge was fully cognizant that the court
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused who was
still at large and yet, he entertained and granted his motion for bail. In
doing so, respondent judge violated a tenet in criminal procedure which is
too basic as to constitute gross ignorance of the law. When the law
violated is elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action.[7]
Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should
strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end
that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[8]
In the case of Comia vs. Antona,[9] we found respondent judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law for entertaining an application for bail even
though the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the accused. He
was fined P20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Acmad T. Barataman
liable for gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him a fine of
P20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
474 Phil. 481
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed against Judge Amor A. Reyes of
the Regional Trial Court, Manila for partiality, grave abuse of authority
and oppression in connection with Criminal Case No. 02-201852
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo Talag."
The instant case arose when, on April 18, 2001, a certain Romeo Lacap
filed a complaint against Wilfredo Talag, Leticia Talag and Kenneth
Bautista, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa occasioned
by the dishonor of four checks.
On June 4, 2001, during the preliminary investigation, Wilfredo Talag,
Leticia Talag, and Kenneth Bautista, submitted their counter-affidavits
denying any participation in the transaction allegedly perpetrated by them
to defraud the complainant.
On December 15, 2001, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Estafa against
herein complainant and the dismissal of all the charges against Leticia
Talag and Kenneth Bautista. The Information was filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes, and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-201852.
On May 7, 2002, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration before
the Office of the City Prosecutor, praying for the dismissal of the
complaint against him for utter lack of merit. On even date, he filed an
Omnibus Motion before the trial court: (1) to defer issuance of warrant of
arrest and/or to recall the same if already issued; and (2) to remand case
to the Office of the City Prosecutor pending review of the motion for
reconsideration.
On May 31, 2002, complainant filed with the trial court a Very Urgent
Motion to Set for Hearing Accused's Omnibus Motion to defer issuance of
warrant of arrest and/or to remand case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor pending review of the motion for reconsideration.
According to complainant, on June 11, 2002, he requested his counsel to
determine whether the hearing for the pending motions had already been
set. To his consternation, he was told by his counsel that respondent
Judge ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest without first resolving
the said motions.
Complainant immediately filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals challenging the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Court of
Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court
from enforcing the said warrant. Accordingly, respondent Judge issued
an Order on June 25, 2002, deferring the resolution of the Very Urgent
Motion until after the expiration of the TRO issued by the Court of
Appeals. Thereafter, the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
for lack of merit.
On August 20, 2002, complainant filed a motion for respondent Judge's
inhibition. Two days after, i.e., on August 22, respondent Judge issued
the assailed warrant of arrest against complainant. Meanwhile,
complainant through counsel filed a Notice of Change of Address.
On September 30, 2002, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to
Consider Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the City Prosecutor
pending Review of the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Re-
investigation and to Resolve the Same with Urgency. On October 2,
2002, he filed a Motion to Resolve Motion for Inhibition.
Respondent Judge denied the motion for inhibition and set the case for
arraignment on December 11, 2002. Complainant claims that said order
never reached him or his counsel since it was sent by registered mail to
his previous address at No. 1 Zaragosa Street, San Lorenzo Village,
Makati City, inspite of the Notice of Change Address which was filed as
early as August 28, 2002.
Since complainant failed to attend his arraignment allegedly due to lack
of notice, respondent Judge reset the same to January 22, 2003.
However, the second notice was again sent to the wrong address at
Makati City, again resulting in complainant's failure to attend his
arraignment. As a consequence, respondent judge issued a bench
warrant of arrest.
Subsequently, complainant filed a Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest and
a Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. On February 28, 2003, an
order was issued by the respondent Judge which lifted the bench warrant
but denied the motion for reconsideration.
On May 12, 2003, complainant filed a verified complaint before the Office
of the Court Administrator charging respondent Judge with partiality,
grave abuse of authority and oppression allegedly committed in the
following manner:
 Respondent Judge issued the warrant of arrest on May 23, 2003
despite complainant's pending omnibus motion to defer issuance
(1) of warrant of arrest or to recall the same if already issued and to
remand case to Office of the City Prosecutor, and the very urgent
motion to set for hearing the omnibus motion;
When the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals and a
temporary restraining order was issued, respondent seemed to
have waited for the TRO to expire and for the dismissal of
(2) complainant's petition before the Court of Appeals because she
did not resolve the motion for inhibition, and she immediately
issued a warrant of arrest against him after said petition was
dismissed.
Respondent had a predisposition to deny the motions filed by
complainant since, although she was in haste in issuing the
(3)
warrant of arrest, she nonetheless dilly-dallied in resolving the
motions filed by complainant;
Despite complainant's notice for a change of address,
respondent's order of November 18, 2002, setting his arraignment
(4)
on December 11, 2002, was sent to his and counsel's former
address resulting in his failure to attend the arraignment;
In the same way, the notice of the resetting of arraignment from
December 11, 2002 to January 22, 2003, was again sent to the
wrong address, such that he was not notified of said scheduled
(5)
arraignment. Such lack of notice however, did not stop
respondent Judge from issuing a bench warrant of arrest for his
failure to appear on the scheduled arraignment;
Although respondent Judge lifted the said bench warrant on
February 28, 2003, she nevertheless denied complainant's motion
(6)
for reconsideration relative to the Order dated November 2002
denying the motion for inhibition;
Respondent Judge exhibited partiality and malevolent attitude
when she did not only deny all remedies available to complainant
(7)
but also uttered hostile side-comments during hearings and even
commented that complainant was overly fond of filing motions.
In her comment, respondent Judge refuted the charges in this wise:
She did not consider the omnibus motion dated May 7, 2002 filed
by complainant because its notice of hearing was addressed to
(1)
the Public Prosecutor, for which reason, she issued the warrant of
arrest on May 23, 2003;
She issued the order dated June 25, 2002 deferring the resolution
of complainant's very urgent motion to set the case for hearing in
(2) view of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 14,
2002, enjoining her from enforcing the warrant of arrest issued
against complainant;
Since the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the complainant when the court received the motion to
(3)
set the case for trial filed by Asst. City Prosecutor, she again
issued a warrant of arrest against complainant;
Respondent's issuance of warrant of arrest against complainant
on May 23, 2002, despite the filing of the omnibus motion and the
(4) motion to set the omnibus motion for hearing, was sustained by
the Court of Appeals in its decision dated August 14, 2002,
dismissing complainant's petition;
Inasmuch as the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the complainant, respondent, after the Court of Appeals
(5)
denied complainant's petition and lifted the 60-day TRO, ordered
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against complainant;
Since it was only on October 17, 2002 that the bail posted by
complainant on September 26, 2002 for his provisional liberty
before the Executive Judge of RTC, Makati, was received by
(6)
respondent court, she could not resolve the motion for inhibition
considering that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over his
person;
Complainant is to blame for the delay in the resolution of his
motions because of his penchant in filing defective motions and
(7)
for not immediately submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the
court;
The issuance of a warrant of arrest and confiscation of the bond
of complainant on January 22, 2003 was in accordance with Sec.
(8) 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure in view
of complainant's failure to appear despite notice to him and his
bondsman. The notice of change of address filed by complainant
 pertains to the change of address of his counsel and not to
himself, hence, court processes were sent to his "alleged" old
address. Moreover, Produce Orders of the December 11, 2002
and January 22, 2003 settings were sent to complainant's
bondsman, but this notwithstanding, complainant's bondsman
failed to produce him in court and it even filed a motion of
extension of time to do so;
Complainant's claim of bias and partiality on the part of
respondent in denying complainant's motion for reconsideration
(9) and motion to inhibit is baseless and unfounded considering that
the assailed orders of the respondent were made on the basis of
law and facts of the case.
On August 8, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its
recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
We have closely scrutinized the arguments of the contending parties and
find the charges filed against respondent are baseless.
The Information was filed on May 7, 2002 while the warrant of arrest was
issued May 23, 2003. When complainant filed the omnibus motion on
May 7, 2002, the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
With the filing of Information, the trial court could then issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused as provided for by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The issuance of the warrant was
not only procedurally sound but it was even required considering that
respondent had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of complainant.
Consequently, complainant's charge that respondent Judge failed to act
on the omnibus motion before issuing the arrest warrant is untenable.
Whether respondent correctly disregarded the omnibus motion in view of
the alleged fatal defects is a judicial matter, which is not a proper subject
in an administrative proceeding. It bears noting that respondent court
immediately deferred the execution of the warrant of arrest upon
issuance by the Court of Appeals of the TRO. Incidentally, although the
Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, it eventually
sustained the issuance by respondent of the arrest warrant and
dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Neither can we ascribe partiality nor grave abuse of authority on the part
of respondent for issuing anew an alias warrant after the expiration of the
Court of Appeals' 60-day TRO. With the lifting of the retraining order, no
legal obstacle was left for the issuance of the arrest warrant and thus set
in motion the stalled prosecutorial process by acquiring jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
Complainant blames the respondent for his failure to appear at his
arraignment because the notice was sent to the wrong address despite a
prior notice for change of address. A cursory reading of the notice of
change of address will show that it pertains to the counsel's residence,
not to the complainant's. In view of this, it becomes reasonable for the
court to assume that court processes could be sent to complainant's "old"
and "unchanged" residence. As correctly pointed out by respondent
Judge, the Produce Order of the December 11, 2002 and January 22,
2003 settings were sent to complainant's bondsman. Hence, in
accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, his
bondsman must produce him before the court on the given date and
failing to do so; the bond was forfeited as it was.
On the matter of respondent's denial of the motion for inhibition, suffice it
to say that the issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself
is addressed to his sound discretion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1
of Rule 137, which provides for the rule on voluntary inhibition and states:
"a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reasons other than those above-
mentioned." Taking together all the acts and conduct of respondent
Judge relative to complainant's case, we believe that she did not exhibit
any bias or partiality to warrant her voluntarily inhibition from the case.
Curiously, while complainant decries the alleged respondent's
predilection for denying all his motions, he himself conceded that
respondent Judge has done everything pursuant to law and
jurisprudence. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed, for in
administrative proceedings no less than substantial proof is required.
Apart from bare allegations, there must be convincing evidence to show
that respondent Judge is indeed biased and partial. In administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent Judge committed the
act complained of rests on the complainant. Complainant failed to
discharge this burden.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court resolves to adopt the
recommendation of the Court Administrator, and
accordingly, DISMISS the instant complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.