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[ GR No.

128096, Jan 20, 1999 ] the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and
PANFILO M. LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-the-fact.
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, the Sandiganbayan
allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases eleven (11) amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein
Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and
jurisdiction. Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused was dropped from the
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and case.
documentary proofs, are as follows: On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief
with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector,
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco
Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC- and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996),
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring,
Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner- and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,
intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the
exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has
CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary
the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng
gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even
in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a
before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended
legitimate police operation. informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 and No. 1094 (sponsored
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II,
modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali
multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was approved by the the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to
Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal"
Ricardo de Leon. from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A.
No. 7975.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those
charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for murder before These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No.
8249. The law is entitled, "AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It took timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein
effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under
5, 1997. the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a "b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which
ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996." petitioner's cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet
On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional
1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus
"After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of
Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to
rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature procedural due process
enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines
approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent "c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the
provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which
are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject
Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1),
opinion. Article VI of the Constitution."

xxx xxx xxx For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while
Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
"Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said
are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post
Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong
yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan." They further argued that
issued this court has competence to take cognizance of if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due
these cases. process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered
"To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before
vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations recourse to the Supreme Court.
in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate
concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the
decide the cases." [Emphasis supplied] law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, intervention be dismissed.
including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all This Court then issued a Resolution requiring the parties to file simultaneously
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional
hereof." Petitioner argues that: memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed
"a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by
the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of
the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive
the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the
the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the nonextendible reglementary period.
resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of (a) Provincial governors, vice-
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and governors, members of
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
one. The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who provincial treasurers, assessors,
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged engineers, and other provincial
in the present case. department heads;
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of (b) City mayors, vice-mayors,
the 1973 Constitution, which provides: members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
"SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court,
engineers, and other city department
to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over
heads;
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees (c) Officials of the diplomatic service
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, occupying the position of consul and
higher;
in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
(d) Philippine Army and air force
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the colonels, naval captains, and all
following provision in Article XI, Section 4: officers of higher rank;
"Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the (e) Officers of the Philippine
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its National Police while occupying the
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law." position of provincial director and
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created those holding the rank of senior
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in superintendent or higher;
chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas (f) City and provincial prosecutors and
Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, P.D. No. 1861, R.A. No. 7975, and R.A. their assistants, and officials and
No. 8249. Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. prosecutors in the Office of the
8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases: Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as (g) Presidents, directors or trustees,
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows: or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall universities or educational institutions
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and up under the
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act Compensation and Position Classification Act of
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the 1989;
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused (3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to
are officials occupying the following positions in the the provisions of the Constitution;
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the the Constitution;
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of Grade '27' or higher under the Compensation and
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: Position Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
with other crimes committed by the public officials and exclusive jurisdiction over them.
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in
xxx xxx x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
relation to their office.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
corresponding to salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the the approval hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A.
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
7975 provides:
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case "SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No.
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution or orders of the
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal
over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
at the time of the commission of the offense:
over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well
as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has (a) Provincial governors, vice-
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to governors, members of
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
to appeals and petitions for review filed with provincial treasurers, assessors,
the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to engineers, and other provincial
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the department heads;
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special (b) City mayors, vice-mayors,
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except members of the sangguniang
in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14- panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
A, issued in 1986. engineers, and other city department
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, heads;
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled (c) Officials of the diplomatic service
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying
colonels, naval captains, and all positions lower than grade '27,' or not otherwise covered by the
officers of high rank; preceding enumeration.
(e) PNP chief superintendent and xxx xxx xxx
PNP officers of higher rank;
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
their assistants, and officials and including those employed in government-owned or controlled
prosecutors in the Office of the corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, jurisdiction over them.
or managers of government-owned or x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
controlled corporations, state
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
universities or educational institutions
or foundations; "SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts."
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
classified as Grade '27' and up under the Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before
Compensation and Position Classification Act of the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a
1989; and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of
the provisions of the Constitution; the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue
that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the amendedinformation has the rank of Superintendent or higher. On the
the Constitution;
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who
(5) All other national and local officials classified as is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain
Grade '27' or higher under the Compensation and cases, contends that the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
Position Classification Act of 1989. 8249.
"b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under
and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following
relation to their office. requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A.
3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
"In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or
positions corresponding to salary Grade '27' or higher, as felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal
Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph
Pambansa Blg. 129.
but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
[Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office." The phrase "other offenses reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily
or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form
committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under said of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it
officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses shall apply to "all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the
mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary
reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to to petitioner and intervenors' arguments, the law is not particularly directed
whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just
which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by
the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
Petitioner and intervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate
their right to equal protection of the law because its enactment was particularly In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing the Sandiganbayan for their participation in the passage of the said
argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the
reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him
arbitrariness. as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos
as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. R.A.
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators
and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the
concurrence of four elements, namely:
Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction; Philippines.
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against
petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and
participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class, since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is
all of which are present in this case. the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The
Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to
presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of
cases could have been affected by the amendments of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A.
substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, 7975.
evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A.
had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be
which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
(a) which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or passage.
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was Supreme Court to review questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate
(b) review facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if
committed; or
the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome.
which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject
(c)
the law annexed to the crime when it was committed, provisions of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the
which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it
(d) testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction
offense in order to convict the defendant. of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only
(e)
the situation of a person to his disadvantage. have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is severally interpreted and
that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here
(f) effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249
was lawful; expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the
deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word
(g) he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction "define" in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article
or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts".
is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under
treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a petitioner and intervenors.
penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot
to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary
be challenged as unconstitutional.
rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
Petitioner's and intervenor's contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at
which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of the trial.
R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors
the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural
right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in
procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the
order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of
requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore,
over criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including
does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their
of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may
office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was necessary to constitute the crime charged." (Emphasis
reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof supplied)
that the Sandiganbayan "shall continue to function and exercise its
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law."
imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple the facts that constitute the offense."
murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the
amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors
In People vs. Montejo, we held that an offense is said to have been wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate
committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected"
relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of
with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance official function of the offenders.
of his official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and
the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the Information." In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations for murder
reads:
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates: "AMENDED INFORMATION
"SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions "The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY
ordinary and concise language without repetition not AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4
but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
common understanding to know what offense is intended to SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ,
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
judgment." (Emphasis supplied) AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT.
JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF
As early as 1954, we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
is the actual recital of the facts." The real nature of the criminal charges is
ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP.
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
information."
BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime
explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
"The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will "That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue,
enable him to make his defense, and second, to avail himself of Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY
prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ,
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and advantage of their public and official positions as officers and
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must members of the Philippine National Police and committing the
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring
with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in
mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity
"That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to
ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We
SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense
A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office" is not
GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the
SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 discharge of the accused's official duties.
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to
In People vs. Magallanes, where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial
office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police
Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for
concealing the crime herein above alleged by among "It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
others falsely representing that there were no arrests made allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of
during the raidconducted by the accused herein at evidence after trial.
Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila on or about "In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960]), where the
the early dawn of May 18, 1995. amended information alleged
"CONTRARY TO LAW" Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such,
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal has organized groups of police patrol and civilian
accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to their public office, there commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x
is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by x special policemen, appointed and provided by him
the said principal accused wasintimately related to the discharge of their with pistols and high power guns and then
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under
indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then his command x x x supervision and control where his
killed the latter while in their custody. co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner investigations, as well as assumed the authority to
and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended arrest and detain persons without due process of law
information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories
and without bringing them to the proper court, and
concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the
of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, on or
his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin
about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
the arrests made during the raidconducted by the accused" surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the
was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were
raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately functions and would not have been committed had they not held
preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection
City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far away between the offense and the office of the accused.
from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the
amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in "Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the
accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the
latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely
allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting
the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the
two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and
killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining
jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not
the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial."
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office" does not appear in the information, which
only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between
the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the
offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge
of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of
the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby


sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction
over said cases.

SO ORDERED.
[ GR Nos. 120681-83, Oct 01, 1999 ] April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for
JEJOMAR C. BINAY v. SANDIGANBAYAN ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites
for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 and the informations
No. 1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution
then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has under gone various denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for
changes, the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos. reconsideration.
7975 and 8249. Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, to set aside the
exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied
accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 220 of the Revised
due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente
Penal Code is the central issue in these consolidated petitions.
lite before he could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to his motion for
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution
others, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other
Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said
After allowing and considering petitioner's reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June
cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the
22, 1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending
1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in petitioner pendente lite.
deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
The facts, as gathered from the records, are as follows: took effect on May 16, 1995.
G.R. Nos. 120681-83 On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the his cases to the "proper court" for further proceedings, alleging that when the
Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court,
one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, and two for violation it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The informations, which were subsequently a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioner's motion, holding thus:
amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as
crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner's incumbency as Mayor of Grade "27" under the compensation & Position Classification Act
Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the offenses
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar
six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim
Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, original
Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The
due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a
resolution of this motion. salary grade lower than Grade "27", because at the time of the
commission of the offenses charged he was paid a salary which
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying merits a grade lower than Grade "27" does not hold water. In 1986
petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the
opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before yet in existence. From the very definition of he very Act itself, it is
the petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to the motion for evident that the Act was passed and had been effective only in
reconsideration. 1989. The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a "Motion to time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite." The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated by his classification under the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School.
Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the This was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A.
Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade
Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e)
"27", it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the
jurisdiction over the accused herein.
Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution,
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended
Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting
salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade "28" under the Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note:
salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the
Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the
Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary
preparation of the information and to approve the same for filing with the proper
grades of the Compensation & Position classification system court.
prepared by the Department of Budget and Management
pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was
Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade "27." filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per
the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation
and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the
Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that
Sandiganbayan.
the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San
motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against
reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No.
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the
refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed
restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The as OMB-0-94-0149.
Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M.
restraining order prayed for. Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an "Addendum to Petition (To allow the violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended "with proper
introduction of alternative reliefs)," praying that, should this Court hold that the court." The resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman
him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in
preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.
informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations. No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the
G.R. No. 128136 landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was
subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts
Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay's co-
as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the
petitioners are officials of the same municipality.
Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash
Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C.
the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the
Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings
respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The
Sandiganbayan denied the accused's motion to quash in a Resolution dated V
June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the
the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction prosecutors guilty of forum shopping?
involved in the Binay petition.
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before
Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
the RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the
Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the
RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order common question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the
issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
I
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Order dated June 21, 1996. On The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the
August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same subject cases.
order. On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July
reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment. 7, 1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution Presidential Decree No. 1861, the pertinent provisions of which state:
ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
the Sandiganbayan. amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
The petition raises the following issues: Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
I Code;
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the officers and employees in relation to their office,
filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the Regional Trial including those employed in government-owned or
Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the controlled corporations, whether simple or
offense? complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision
II correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that
waiver from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
after the filing earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter where the penalty prescribed by law does not
repudiating it, seeking another court of the same category and finally to exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six
respondent court? (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
III
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated Trial Court.
the rule on duplicity of information?
xxx.
IV
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the
not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect when the
double jeopardy?
information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August (d) Philippine army and air
11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City. force colonels, naval
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall (e) PNP chief
exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank;
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
(f) City and provincial
as amended, otherwise known as the
prosecutors and their
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, assistants, and officials
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman
Code, where one or more of the
and special prosecutor;
principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the (g) Presidents, directors
government, whether in a permanent, or trustees, or managers
acting or interim capacity, at the time of of government-owned or
the commission of the offense: controlled corporations,
state universities or
(1) Officials of the executive branch
educational institutions or
occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise foundations;
classified as grade "27" and higher, of (2) Members of Congress and officials
the Compensation and Position thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act under the Compensation and Position
No. 6758), specifically including: Classification Act of 1989;
(a) Provincial governors, (3) Members of the judiciary without
vice-governors, members prejudice to the provisions of the
of the sangguniang Constitution;
panlalawigan, and
(4) Chairmen and members of
provincial treasurers,
Constitutional Commissions, without
assessors, engineers,
prejudice to the provisions of the
and other provincial
Constitution; and
department heads;
(5) All other national and local officials
(b) City mayors, vice-
classified as Grade "27" and higher
mayors, members of
under the Compensation and Position
the sangguniang
Classification Act of 1989.
panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public
engineers, and other city officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a)
department heads; of this section in relation to their office.
(c) Officials of the c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
diplomatic service connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
occupying the position of 14-A.
consul and higher;
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying (c) Officials of the diplomatic service
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as occupying the position of consul and
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers higher;
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
(d) Philippine army and air force
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
colonels, naval captains, and all
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
officers of higher rank;
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas (e) Officers of the Philippine National
Pambansa Blg. 129. Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding
xxx.
the rank of senior superintendent or
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, higher;
congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and
of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section 10
their assistants, and officials and
thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete
prosecutors in the office of the
publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
newspapers of general circulation.
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of
managers of government-owned or
P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
controlled corporations, state
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise universities or educational institutions
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: or foundations.
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act classified as Grade "27" and up under the
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are 1989;
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at he time of
provisions of the Constitution;
the commission of the offense:
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
position of regional director and higher, otherwise
he Constitution; and
classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of (5) All other national and local officials classified as
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
(a) Provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and complexed with other crimes committed by the
provincial treasurers, assessors, public officials and employees mentioned in
engineers, and other provincial subsection (a) of this section in relation to heir office.
department heads; d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city 14-A, issued in 1986.
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
other city department heads; corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, Grades.
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case The Constitution states that in providing for the standardization of
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive qualifications required for their positions," thus:
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because: The Congress shall provide for the standardization of
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the compensation of government officials, including those in
crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were government-owned or controlled corporations with original
not classified as Grade 27. charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.
enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758 provides in Section 2
amended by R.A. No. 7975. thereof that differences in pay are to be based "upon substantive
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
intend municipal mayors to come under the requirements of the positions.' In short, the nature of an official's
position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as
A well.
In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme
Binay argues: known as the "grade" defined in Presidential Decree No. 985 as
xxx. The new law's consistent and repeated reference to including
salary grade show[s] an intention to base the separation of xxx all classes of positions which, although different with respect
jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the regular to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to
courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification
compensation. The essence of grades is pay scales. requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes
Therefor, pay scales determine grades. of positions within one range of basic compensation.
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification from the City Personnel Officer of The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of one's position -- the level of
Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to
P10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was that of another position. It is the official's Grade that determines his or her
supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758. salary, not the other way around.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification from the It is possible that a local government official's salary may be less than that
Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating: prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and
x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. financial capability of his or her respective local government
Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with unit. Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the official's grade.
Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-
TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of
November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA the House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as
6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. well as the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions.
Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
due to budgetary constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor to "determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials,
Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, where applicable" and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject
Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may to a set of guidelines found in said section.
serve.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in
DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by the Section 4a(5) was "necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for
Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to
therein. grades 27 and above." The same rationale applies to the enumeration in
Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
exhaustive list.
the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758
and the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the
Salary level is not determinative. An official's grade is not a matter of proof, but category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles
a matter of law of which the Court must take judicial notice. the matter:
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation
Position Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A.
27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are "local officials classified as Grade '27' In the Court's Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,"
reconsideration, we treated the above provision as "confirmatory of the Salary
under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors."
R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are "[o]fficials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, C
otherwise classified as grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Petitioner Binay cites previous bills in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of
Position Classification Act of 1989," under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as the Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal
amended by R.A. No. 7975. officials from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve
B these officials ,especially those from the provinces, of the financial burden
brought about by trials in Manila.
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in
Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the
est expressio alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort
excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
original jurisdiction. Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory
clear and unambiguous. The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are
4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of "[o]fficials of clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
otherwise classified as grade '27' and higher, of the compensation and Position exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-
Classification Act of 1989." 759[1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable
intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain
SCRA 233[1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to
meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
The premise of petitioners' argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
is exclusive. It is not. The phrase "specifically including" after "[o]fficials of the (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should
otherwise classified as grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as
Position Classification Act of 1989" necessarily conveys the very idea of non- their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved
exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus,
alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v.
way of example only. In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable CA., 145 SCRA 654[1986]).
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration: The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is
x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witness in proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by
new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
their case would come from Baguio City and San Nicolas,
another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute
Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended
the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the
to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a
accused.
statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that: effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard enactment of the statute.
by which to implement its intent, and courts have no choice but to R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the
apply it. Congress has willed that positions with Grade 27 and rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislature's
above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to "criminal cases in which trial
and this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional will. has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating: Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts. There is no
up to the present, the Court has been confronted with the problem reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
of those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for The term "proper courts," as used in Section 7, means "courts of competent
'petty crimes,' the so-called 'small fry' -- the barangay officials, the jurisdiction," and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
municipal officials and employees, postal clerks and letter amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation but
carriers and the like -- who are involved with 'nickel-and-dime' construed in conjunction with the latter.
cases and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and
The term "proper courts" as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to
theft. xxx
"regular courts," but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the
xxx xxx xxx intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the the regular courts, it should have employed the term "proper regular courts" or
Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions in "regular courts" instead of "proper courts." Accordingly, the law in the third
Government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the court. paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975, uses the term "regular courts," not "proper courts":
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal
officials are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
courts are not bound by a legislator's opinion in congressional debates jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or
regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying
personal opinion of the legislator. Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the positions lower than salary grade "27," or not otherwise covered
view of the entire Congress. by the preceding enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]
D Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner 1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun
Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not
7975, which provides: apply.

Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial 2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
proper courts. (a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong: Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before
it, then the case shall be referred to the 2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun
Sandiganbayan. as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as (a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a
before it, the case shall be referred to the regular case pending before it, the case shall be referred to
courts. the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
of the approval of R.A. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains
pending before a regular court, the latter loses
jurisdiction over the said cases. jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application Sandiganbayan.
of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case
8249, which states:
pending before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
jurisdiction over said cases.
approval hereof.
II
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislature's intent and in
any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy
R.A. No. 7975. disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the
subject cases by the Ombudsman.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., The Court explained
the purpose of the foregoing provision. Article III of the Constitution provides that:
x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
[Sandiganbayan's] jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of bodies.
a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory provision does not only The constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
court." x x x. Moreover, those cases where trial had already including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party
7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.] to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayan's the administration of justice.
jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature. However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
Congress has, furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case pending before it or capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a
8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort already long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition
apply to cases the trials of which have not yet to start. of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows: defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons
for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already
the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a
begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
apply.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The
sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to COA furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
and circumstances peculiar to each case.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the length of delay and the the report, the Tanodbayan was informed that this
simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet
therein. The "unexplained inaction" of the prosecutors called for the dismissal released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty
of the cases against petitioner Tatad. days within which to explain/clarify the findings in the
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court also ruled that there was no violation report and is subject to change or modification
depending upon the explanation/clarification to be
of the right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for
submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this
the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential
decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and information from the COA the preliminary
the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, investigation was held in abeyance until the
submission of the final report.
preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies.
The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, 1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final
and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused. Report on Audit of Makati was received by the Office
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, the complexity of the issues and the failure of of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for
purposes of the ensuring preliminary investigation to
the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time
the Tanodbayan which received the same on March
spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
22, 1989.
In Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, the Court, considering also the
complexity of the cases ("not run-of-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the 1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the
fifteen (15) adverse findings, above elsewhere
parties' lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated
stated as the basis of Bobby Brillante's complaint.
therein.
In petitioner Binay's case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the 1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the
documentation and analysis of its findings and
disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office
preparation of the final report.
of the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately
explains the length of the delay: 1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of a Supplemental Report on Findings No. 1 and 3.
This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.
the Tanodbayan an affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay,
Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson Irasga, 2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents
Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, supporting the COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio,
Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the corresponding
Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the following subpoena directing the respondents to submit their respective
offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple counter-affidavits.
Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor
Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec.
Jejomar Binay submitted his counter-affidavit on
3(e) of R.A. 3019. May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon,
1.1. Brillante's complaint was based on the initial Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato
findings and observations of the COA on the Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June
examination of the cash and accounts covering 6, 1990, Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990.
transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988 Feliciano Bascon submitted his Supplemental
and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last Affidavit on November 22, 1990.
quarter of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were must have involved complicated legal and factual issues which
conducted on September 27, 1990, October 26, do warrant or justify a longer period of time for preliminary
1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990. investigation.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy xxx
of this Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved
municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme Court against COA close to three (3) years from the time all the counter-affidavits
Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on Audit, with were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact that
a manifestation that said petition is submitted to support Binay's
very few documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. In
stand as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
the above-entitled cases, the preliminary investigation of all ten
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit (10) cases was terminated in merely two (2) years and four (4)
containing allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay; months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading, on April
30, 1992.
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992
affidavit of Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his comment Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his
thereto on April 30, 1992. suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the were not valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our
pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject cases
Deputy Special Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the
in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in
preliminary investigation of the case.
question are valid an petitioner's suspension pendente lite must be upheld.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was
approved by the Special Prosecutor, who forwarded Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the
subject cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman.
the same and the entire records to the Office of the
Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the
Ombudsman for review and/or final action.
exercise thereof. Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the on the part of the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman submitted to the latter its review action
III
for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is
some of the recommendations of the Review Panel within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will
now dispose of the following issues raised by them:
and directed the preparation and filing of the
informations. (1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission of an information alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial
on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the Court.
determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct (2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before
it s own review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed
the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their another information alleging the same facts before the Regional
resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29, Trial Court.
1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, constitutes double jeopardy.
unable to rely on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit in The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions
15 reports caused the investigation and examination of of duplicity of information and forum shopping.
thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents
considering that no less than the Chairman of the Commission on Petitioners invoke the rule that "the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches
Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members had cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such
to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
and analysis of the initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases instance." They claim that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan
was a "subsequent happening or event" which cannot oust the RTC of its criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less
jurisdiction. barred by the rules of estoppel.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the
information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the
under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan. first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no
jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the
by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel. As a
consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of
Appeals that: double jeopardy. Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information
pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated
which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from
the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule
filing the same complaint later with the competent court. The
presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging not one
plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a
offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:
mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a
situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which
contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent existing laws prescribed a single punishment for various offenses.
court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately,
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the
in derogation of the law. duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117:
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases that estoppel prevents a party
Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the
from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked.
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being
that jurisdiction is vested by law.Even in those instances where the Court xxx
applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of (e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases
the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case offenses;
here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the
RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the xxx
Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the Here, petitioners are faced not with one
previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTC's jurisdiction. information charging more than one offense but with more than
There were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for one information charging one offense.
the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly
any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners. speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other
plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, court would make a favorable disposition. We discern no intent on the part of
the complaint or information filed in court is required to be brought in the name the State, in filing two informations in two different courts, to "gamble that one
of the "People of the Philippines." Even then, the doctrine of estoppel does not or the other court would make a favorable disposition."
apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions. Violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder, is a public offense. Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after
Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence, investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas
charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another
complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners of, among
others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding
probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action,
charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first,
this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas,
respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
[ GR Nos. 122297-98, Jan 19, 2000 ] did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally refuse to
CRESCENTE Y. LLORENTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN issue Mayor's permit to the ice plant and resawmill/box factory of
R. F. Diamante and family, without sufficient justification, after
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the due demand and payment of license fees were made, said refusal
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the criminal cases against then to grant Mayor's permit being not only personal but for the
municipal mayor Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr. for violations of Republic Act No. purpose of giving undue advantage to similar businesses in town
3019, as amended. and as an act of discriminating against the interest of the
Petitioner Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr. was elected municipal mayor of complainant to the latter's damage and prejudice.
Sindangan, Zamboanga in 1988 and 1992. On May 8, 1995, he was a "CONTRARY TO LAW.
candidate for congressman, second district of Zamboanga del Norte, and was
duly elected. "Manila, Philippines, March 31, 1995
"(s/t) DANIEL B. JOVACON, JR.
On August 6, 1993, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed with the
Sandiganbayan an information against Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr., municipal "Special Prosecution Officer I"
mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, P/Sgt. Juanito Caboverde and The trial of both criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun.
Jose Dy for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
committed as follows:
On May 16, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7975, amending
"That on or about June 12, 1989, in the Municipality of Sindangan, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, providing:
Zamboanga del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this "SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
Honorable Court, accused Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr., Municipal
jurisdiction in cases involving:
Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and P/Sgt. Juanito
Cadoverde of the defunct Integrated National Police and as such "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
public officers and the other accused Jose Dy, a private known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
individual, conspiring with each other and acting with evident bad 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
faith, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally seized Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
(sic) 930 sawn knockdown wooden boxes owned by Godofredo occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
M. Diamante without any search and seizure warrant and without a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
issuing any receipt of seizure thereby causing undue damage and commission of the offense:
injury to said Godofredo M. Diamante and this offense was "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
committed in relation to the office of the said public officers. regional director or higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and
"CONTRARY TO LAW. higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
"Manila, August 6, 1993. 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(s/t) GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA
"(a) Provincial governors, vice governors, members of
"Special Prosecution Officer III" the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
On February 2, 1994, the three accused were arraigned before the assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang
Sandiganbayan and pleaded not guilty.
panglungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
On March 31, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the city department heads;
Sandiganbayan another information against petitioner for violation of Section
3 (f), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, committed as follows: "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
"That on or about July 5, 1993, and for sometime subsequent
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
thereto, in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines, and
other officials of higher rank;
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of "(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, with grave abuse of authority, "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and On September 7, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, First Division denied the motion
special prosecutor; to refer Criminal Case No. 22655 to the Regional Trial Court. On October 10,
"(g) Presidents, directors, or trustees, or managers of 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities On September 14, 1995, Sandiganbayan, Third Division also denied the
or educational institutions of foundations. motion to transfer Criminal Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial Court.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Hence, petitioner filed these petitions for certiorari.
Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
On December 27, 1995, the Court consolidated the two cases.
Classification Act of 1989;
On February 23, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8249, an act
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions redefining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
of the Constitution;
On September 1, 1999, we gave due course to the petitions.
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and The issue raised in these two cases is whether or not Republic Act No. 7975
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification No. 3019, as amended, against municipal mayors.
Act of 1989. We have resolved this issue in recent cases ruling that the Sandiganbayan
"b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials has jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in municipal mayors.
relation to their office. There is no merit to petitioner's averment that the salary received by a public
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection official dictates his salary grade. "On the contrary, it is the official's grade that
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. determines his or her salary, not the other way around." "To determine whether
the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore,
"In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
reference should be made to Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. An official's grade
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law which the court must take judicial
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their notice."
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that "the municipal
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758
Pambansa Blg. 129." and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto." Additionally, both
the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position
On July 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, a
Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal mayor under Salary Grade
motion to dismiss or transfer Criminal Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial
27. Consequently, the cases against petitioner as municipal mayor for
Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga.
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, are within the exclusive
On the same date, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, First Division, a jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
motion to refer Criminal Case No. 22655 to the Regional Trial Court,
Sindangan, Zamboanga. WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the consolidated petitions at bar, for lack
Petitioner averred that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7975 divested the of merit.
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over criminal cases against municipal mayors
for violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, who receive salary less
No costs.
than that corresponding to Grade 27, pursuant to the Index of Occupational
Services prepared by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. 143047, Jul 14, 2004 ] Position Classification Act of 1989." He contended that under Section 4 of P.D.
RICARDO S. INDING v. SANDIGANBAYAN No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction over the crime charged against
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil him. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial notice of Adm. Order
Procedure for the nullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution of the No. 270.
Sandiganbayan (Second Division), which denied the petitioner's omnibus
motion with supplemental motion, and its Resolution dated April 25, 2000, In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
denying the petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the same. asserted that the petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
The Antecedents Norte, one of those public officers who, by express provision of Section 4
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7975, is classified as
charging petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original jurisdiction over
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. the case, regardless of his salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.
3019, committed as follows:
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for denying the petitioner's omnibus motion. According to the court, the
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Information alleged that the petitioner has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public provides that the petitioner, as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
officer, being a Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in Dapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.
the performance of his official functions, particularly in the
operation against drug abuse, with evident bad faith and manifest On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his omnibus
partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, motion, citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court in Organo v.
faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or users to Sandiganbayan, where it was declared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest
enable him to claim or collect from the coffers of the city amendment to the law creating the Sandiganbayan, "collated the provisions
government a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement for on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan," and that "the original
actual expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust operations, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on
knowing fully well that he had no participation in the said police the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction
operations against drugs but enabling him to collect from the but on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and
coffers of the city government a total amount of P30,500.00, employees."
thereby causing undue injury to the government as well as the In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28,
public interest. 1999 and entered a plea of not guilty.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Division of the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan's September 23, 1999 Resolution. The motion was, however,
On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.
the case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending as
for the referral of the case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal follows:
Trial Court for appropriate proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein that
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05
under Administrative Order No. 270 which prescribes the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, he is a February 1997 made the jurisdiction of the
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary Grade Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the
penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within
(SG) 25. He asserted that under Republic Act No. 7975, which amended
its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises original
accused government officials and employees.
jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes committed by officials of local
government units only if such officials occupy positions with SG 27 or higher,
based on Rep. Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the "Compensation and
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in "Lilia B. Organo the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as those within the
versus The Sandiganbayan and the People of the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only means
Philippines," G.R. No. 133535, 09 September 1999, that the said sangguniang members shall be within the exclusive
settles the matter on the original jurisdiction of the original jurisdiction of the said court regardless of their Salary
Sandiganbayan as a trial court which is over public Grade.
officials and employees with rank and salary grade 27
In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are
and above.
very well aware that not all the positions specifically mentioned
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
committed, he was already occupying the position of Sangguniang Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, the
Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. legislature has explicitly made the officials so enumerated in RA
8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive original
that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He asserts that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because of the nature of these
under Adm. Order No. 270,Dapitan City is only a component city, and the officials' functions and responsibilities as well as the power they
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang can wield over their respective area of jurisdiction.
PanlungsodMembers I with SG 25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606,
The threshold issue for the Court's resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan
as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of
has original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang
Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Prosecutor, contend that Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Act.
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan
The Court rules in the affirmative.
has original jurisdiction over violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended,
committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
without qualification and regardless of salary grade. They argue that when Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential
Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware Decree No. 1606," took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates
that not all the positions specifically mentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1) the cases falling within the original jurisdiction of the
were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically included therein, viz: Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act
No. 8249, entitled "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
members of the sangguniang panlungsod are specifically
Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." The
included as among those falling within the exclusive original
amendatory law took effect on February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
enumerates the cases now falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the the Sandiganbayan.
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep.
such officials of the executive branch other than the regional
Act No. 8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of
director and higher and those specifically enumerated. To rule,
the commission of the offense. Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a
otherwise, is to give a different interpretation to what the law criminal case is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution
clearly is. of the action, not at the time of the commission of the crime. However, Rep.
Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an exception thereto
and higher as the sole factor to determine the exclusive original as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could have in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning period is
simply stated that the officials of the executive branch, to fall the time of the commission of the offense. This is plain from the last clause of
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of these two provisions which reads:
should have been occupying the positions with a Salary Grade of
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
27 and higher. But the express wordings in both RA No. 7975
[exclusive] original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
and RA No. 8249 specifically including the members of
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, D. Philippine army and air force colonels,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices naval captains, and all officers of higher
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, rank;
Title VII, [Book II] of the Revised Penal Code, where one
E. PNP chief superintendent and PNP
or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
officers of higher rank;
the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the F. City and provincial prosecutors and their
commission of the offense: assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and
In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the
special prosecutor;
crime charged was committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August
9, 1997. The applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of G. Presidents, directors or trustees, or
Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined managers of government-owned or
in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus: controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: 2. Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
1989;
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more 3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
of the principal accused are officials occupying the provisions of the Constitution;
following positions in the government, whether in a 4. Chairmen and members of Constitutional
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
commission of the offense: of the Constitution; and
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the 5. All other national and local officials classified as
positions of regional director and higher, Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of and Position Classification Act of 1989.
the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically B. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
including: employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation
to their office.
A. Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
assessors, engineers, and other In cases where none of the principal accused are
provincial department heads; occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27"
B. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
the sangguniang panlungsod, city 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
other city department heads; jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
C. Officials of the diplomatic service Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may
occupying the position of consul and be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided
higher; in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining
the government officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as "occupying
grouped them into five categories, to wit: the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." In
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
other words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in the
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials specifically
grade 27 and higher. . .
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall
Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Classification Act of 1989;
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the
3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the
provisions of the Constitution; executive branch with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph
4. Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; 7975, with the phrase "officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
and of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." Or the category in
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade paragraph (5) of the same provision relating to "[a]ll other national and local
"27" and higher under the Compensation and Position officials classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and
Classification Act of 1989. Classification Act of 1989" would have sufficed. Instead, under paragraph (1)
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
27 or higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically includedthe following 7975, Congress included specific officials, without any reference as to their
officials as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: salary grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials, regardless
of their salary grades, to be specifically included within the Sandiganbayan's
A. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there would have been no
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial need for such enumeration. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that words in
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial a statute should not be construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction
department heads; which will give them some force and meaning is possible.
B. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and their salary grades, within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
other city department heads; apparent from the legislative history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In
C. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 1353, which was substantially
of consul and higher; adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator
Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
D. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
explained:
and all officers of higher rank;
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the
E. PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions in
rank;
the government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the
F. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and court.
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall
and special prosecutor;
exercise original jurisdiction over cases assigned to it only in
G. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials
government-owned or controlled corporations, state occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are
universities or educational institutions or foundations; otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a Category New Position Title Grade
certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the 16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE
Sandiganbayan.
...
The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers
such as the justices of the Supreme Court and constitutional Foreign Service
commissions are not subject to the original jurisdiction of the ...
Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.
Foreign Service Officer, Class II 23
The bill provides for an extensive listing of other public
officers who will be subject to the original jurisdiction of the Foreign Service Officer, Class I 24
Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others, Members of
Congress, judges and justices of all courts. ...
More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate 18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE
Bill No. 844, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and
became Rep. Act No. 8249. Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the ...
Sandiganbayan in Rep. Act No. 7975, thus: Local Executives
SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO ...
… City Government Department Head I 24
By way of sponsorship, Mr. President we will issue the full
City Government Department Head II 26
sponsorship speech to the members because it is fairly technical
may we say the following things:
...
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975
was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and Provincial Government Department
25
leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became Head
effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution
to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit: ...
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over City Vice Mayor I 26
public officials whose salary grades were at Grade
"26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the City Vice Mayor II 28
lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the City Mayor I 28
Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose
salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over City Mayor II 30
other specific public officials holding important
positions in government regardless of salary grade; 19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE
Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, Sangguniang Members
amended Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included within the
...
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered
them "big fish" and their positions important, regardless of their salary grades. Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I 25
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II 27
enumerated in (a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member 26
of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the
Department of Budget and Management in 1989, then in effect at the time that
Rep. Act No. 7975 was approved. For example: Office of the City and Provincial Prosecutors
Prosecutor IV 29 In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of
Prosecutor III 28 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation
of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. Members of the Sangguniang
Prosecutor II 27 Panlungsod are specifically included as among those within the original
Prosecutor I 26 jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, or even Section 4 of Rep. Act
Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and No. 8249 for that matter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original
prosecutors, without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included jurisdiction over the petitioner's case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.
in Rep. Act No. 7975 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the consuls, city department heads, provincial IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The
department heads and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, albeit Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25,
classified as having salary grades 26 or lower, were also specifically included 2000 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
within the Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction. As correctly posited by the
respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of, and had taken SO ORDERED.
into account, these officials' respective salary grades when it deliberated upon
the amendments to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress
passed into law Rep. Act No. 7975, specifically including them within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it obviously intended
cases mentioned in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2
of Rep. Act No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to
(g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the
legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute. From the
congressional records and the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the
legislature undoubtedly intended the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of
Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid subsequent
laws, to be included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if
the accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court
has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases
where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not
among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1)(a) to
(g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section
4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be
under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the principal
accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this
construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in
statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut
magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute its every word.
[ GR NO. 158187, Feb 11, 2005 ] receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due to West
MARILYN GEDUSPAN v. PEOPLE Negros College, Inc., thus accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN in
the course of the performance of her official functions, had given
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of unwarranted benefits to Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi Medical Center,
government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated herein represented by accused DR. EVANGELINE C.
under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and FARAHMAND, to the damage and injury of West Negros College,
Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan assumes a negative Inc.
view in the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor contends otherwise, a view shared by the
respondent court. Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that
In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that
injunction and/or issuance of a temporary restraining order, Geduspan seeks the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Region
VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.
to annul and set aside the resolutions dated January 31, 2003 and May 9,
2003 of the respondent Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division. These resolutions In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent court denied the motion
denied her motion to quash and motion for reconsideration, respectively. to quash. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution
On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27525 for dated May 9, 2003.
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner Hence, this petition.
Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health
Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional Manager/Director of
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman Region VI of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth).
of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, However, her appointment paper and notice of salary adjustment show that
Inc., respectively. The information read:
she was appointed as Department Manager A of the Philippine Health
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1999, and for Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26. Philhealth is a
sometime subsequent thereto, at Bacolod City, province of government owned and controlled corporation created under RA 7875,
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this otherwise known as the National Health Insurance Act of 1995.
Honorable Court, above-named accused MARILYN C.
Geduspan argues that her position as Regional Director/Manager is not within
GEDUSPAN, a public officer, being the Regional
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. She cites paragraph (1) and (5),
Manager/Director, of the Philippine Health Insurance
Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Corporation, Regional office No. VI, Iloilo City, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
confederating and mutually helping with DR. EVANGELINE C. original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
FARAHMAND, a private individual and Chairman of the Board of a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Mandalangan, Bacolod City, with deliberate intent, with evident Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
unlawfully and feloniously release the claims for payments of more of the accused are officials occupying the following
patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with Philippine Health positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
Insurance Corp., prior to January 1, 2000, amounting to NINETY acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and 64/100 of the offense:
(P91,954.64), Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center,
Tiong Bi, Inc. despite clear provision in the Deed of Conditional (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
Sale executed on November 27, 1999, involving the sale of West positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
that the possession, operation and management of the said Compensation and Position Classification Act of
hospital will be turned over by West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including;
Bi, Inc. effective January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 'Grade
Act of 1989. 27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
The petition lacks merit.
(a) xxx xxx xxx
The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the
Philhealth, she is not occupying the position of Regional Director but that of (b) xxx xxx xxx
Department Manager A, hence, paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 of RA 8249 (c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
are not applicable.
(e) xxx xxx xxx
It is petitioner's appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that (f) xxx xxx xxx
determine the classification of her position, that is, Department Manager A of (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
Philhealth. of government-owned and controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of institutions or foundations." (Underscoring
Philhealth. She, however, contends that the position of Department Manager supplied).
A is classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary
respondent court. She is at present assigned at the Philhealth Regional Office grade 26. While the first part of the above quoted provision covers only
VI as Regional Director/Manager. officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the
Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a temporary restraining second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whose
order on the alleged disregard by respondent court of the decision of this Court positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision
in Ramon Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan. of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.

However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco. In that case, the Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with
accused Ramon Cuyco was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her.
Office (LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation,
of the crime in 1992 his position of Regional Director of LTO was classified as as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is
Director II with salary grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the
had no jurisdiction over his person. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:
at the time of the commission of the offense and that position was among those A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that
enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction: following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and
amended to read as follows: Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten
wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14
original jurisdiction in all cases involving: and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4;
or more of the accused are officials occupying the and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
following positions in the government, whether in a To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the Philhealth, a government-owned and controlled corporation. The position of
commission of the offense; manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and
the offense for which she was charged was committed in relation to her office
as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[ GR NOS. 147706-07, Feb 16, 2005 ] Likewise, a scrutiny of the seven (7) secondary purposes of
PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN the corporation points to the conclusion that it exists for
business. Obviously, it is not involved in the performance of a
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or particular function in the exercise of government power. Thus, its
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations officers and employees are not covered by the GSIS and are
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the under the SSS law, and actions for reinstatement and backwages
provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt are not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission but
Practices Act? The petitioner, represented by the Office of the Special by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Prosecutor (OSP), takes the affirmative position in this petition for certiorari
The Supreme Court, in the case of Trade Unions of the
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Efren L. Alas contends
Philippines and Allied Services vs. National Housing Corp., 173
otherwise, together with the respondent court.
SCRA 33, held that the Civil Service now covers only government
Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of the Office of the owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative
Ombudsman, two separate informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA charters, those created by an act of Congress or by special law,
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general
with the Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against Efren L. Alas. The legislation. The Highest Court categorically ruled that the Civil
charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered Service does not include government-owned or controlled
into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the corporation which are organized as subsidiaries of government-
Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing owned or controlled corporation under the general corporation
Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government. law.
In Philippine National Oil Company Energy Development
On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of
Corporation vs. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26, the Supreme Court
jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After
considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled that emphasized that:
PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein The test in determining whether a government-
respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. According to owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil
the Sandiganbayan: Service Law is the manner of its creation such that
After a careful consideration of the arguments of the accused- government corporation created by special charter
are subject to its provision while those incorporated
movant as well as of that of the prosecution, we are of the
under the general corporation law are not within its
considered opinion that the instant motion of the accused is well
coverage.
taken. Indeed, it is the basic thrust of Republic Act as well as (sic)
Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by President Decree Likewise in Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service
No. 1486 and Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249 Commission, 201 SCRA 601 it was held that "by government-
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers owned or controlled corporation with original charter we mean
unless private persons are charged with them in the commission government-owned or controlled corporation created by a special
of the offenses. law and not under the Corporation Code of the Philippines" while
The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank in Llenes vs. Dicdican, et al., 260 SCRA 207, a public officer has
is a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a been ruled, as a person whose duties involve the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the function of government.
government owned corporation, the same is not created by a
special law. It was organized and incorporated under the Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing pronouncements of the
Corporation Code which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. It was Supreme Court, the accused herein cannot be considered a
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under public officer. Thus, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction over
SEC No. AS094-005593 on June 22, 1994 with a lifetime of fifty his act.
(50) years. Under its Articles of Incorporation the purpose for
Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
which said entity is formed was primarily for business, xxx
filed this petition arguing, in essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned
or controlled corporation as the term was defined under Section 2(13) of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Likewise, in further defining the jurisdiction of the directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as to the manner of corporations with original charters whenever charges of graft and corruption
creation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their officers are involved. However, a question arises whether the Sandiganbayan has
to fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating Officer jurisdiction over the same officers in government-owned or controlled
of the PPSB at the time of commission of the crimes charged, respondent Alas corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code in view
came under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. of the delimitation provided for in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the 1987
Constitution which states that:
Quoting at length from the assailed resolution dated February 15, 2001,
respondent Alas, on the other hand, practically reiterated the pronouncements SEC. 2. (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches,
made by the respondent court in support of his conclusion that the PPSB was subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government,
not created by special law, hence, its officers did not fall within the jurisdiction including government-owned or controlled corporations with
of the Sandiganbayan. original charters.
We find merit in the petition. It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
separate and distinct from the Civil Service Commission. The same is
Section 2(13) of EO 292 defines government-owned or controlled corporations
governed by Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
as follows:
"the present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined Unless the specific words of the function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
text or the context as a whole or a particular statute, shall require law." This provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as
a different meaning: defined under Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated
xxx xxx xxx its creation, thus:

(13) government owned or controlled corporations refer to any Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to
agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or such other offense committed by public officers and
indirectly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
least 51% of its capital stock: provided, that government owned law. (Italics ours)
or controlled corporations maybe further categorized by the On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority vested under the 1987
department of the budget, the civil service commission and the Constitution, enacted RA 7975 maintaining the jurisdiction of the
commission on audit for the purpose of the exercise and Sandiganbayan over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
discharge of their respective powers, functions and government-owned or controlled corporations without any distinction
responsibilities with respect to such corporations. whatsoever. Thereafter, on February 5, 1997, Congress enacted RA
From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a government-owned or controlled 8249 which preserved the subject provision:
corporation, and organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code as Section 4, Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government while the
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves officers of
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of
RA 7354, otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section, Title
of, among others, "to encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following
of savings among the general public, especially the youth and the marginalized
positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
sector in the countryside xxx" and to facilitate postal service by "receiving
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
collections and making payments, including postal money orders."
of the offense,
It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents,
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of responsibilities provided by law. By including the concerned officers of
regional director, and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act under the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including: legislature evidently seeks to avoid just that.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government- WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or the assailed resolution dated February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is
educational institutions or foundations. (Italics ours) hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of "presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations" within the SO ORDERED.
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any
distinction with respect to the manner of their creation.

The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the
legislature to include the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it
could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. Corollarily, Article XI Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, on the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the government's
prosecutory arm against persons charged with graft and corruption), includes
officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations,
likewise without any distinction.
In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, this Court, already mindful of the pertinent
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, ruled that the concerned officers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether created by special law
or formed under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Otherwise, as we emphasized therein, a major policy of
Government, which is to eradicate, or at the very least minimize, the graft and
corruption that has permeated the fabric of the public service like a malignant
social cancer, would be seriously undermined. In fact, Section 1 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act embodies this policy of the government, that
is, to repress certain acts not only of public officers but also of private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

The foregoing pronouncement has not outlived its usefulness. On the contrary,
it has become even more relevant today due to the rampant cases of graft and
corruption that erode the people's faith in government. For indeed, a
government-owned or controlled corporation can conceivably create as many
subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code as it might wish, use
public funds, disclaim public accountability and escape the liabilities and
[ GR NOS. 146646-49, Mar 11, 2005 ] Ana May freed herself and dashed out of the chambers crying. She threw the
ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN payroll on the table of her co-employee, Elizabeth Q. Manubay. The latter
sensed something was wrong and accompanied Ana May to the
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil restroom. There she told Elizabeth what happened.
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolution dated December 18, 2000
On March 9 and July 1, 1998, two Informations for violation of R.A. 7877 (the
of the Sandiganbayan (1st Division) and Order dated January 11, 2000 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04. Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995) were filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 24490 and 24702.
The instant petition stemmed from the sworn complaint of Ana May V.
Also on July 1, 1998, two Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed with
Simbajon against Judge Rogelio M. Esteban, filed with the Office of the City
the same court, docketed as Criminal Cases. 24703-04.
Prosecutor, Cabanatuan City on September 8, 1997, docketed as I.S. Nos. 9-
97-8239. On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness on the ground that
In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual employee of the City
he has been placed four (4) times in jeopardy for the same offense.
Government of Cabanatuan City. Sometime in February 1997, she was
detailed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cabanatuan The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but directed the prosecution
City, upon incessant request of Presiding Judge Reogelio Esteban, herein to determine if the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were
petitioner. committed in relation to petitioner's functions as a judge.
After her detail with Branch 1, the item of bookbinder became vacant. Thus, On September 3, 1999, the prosecution filed Amended Informations in
she applied for the position but petitioner did not take any action on her Criminal Cases Nos. 24703 and 24704 quoted as follows:
application. On July 25, 1997, when she approached petitioner in his
Criminal Case No. 24703:
chambers to follow up her application, he told her, "Ano naman ang magiging
kapalit ng pagpirma ko rito? Mula ngayon, girlfriend na kita. Araw-araw That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City,
papasok ka dito sa opisina ko, at araw-araw, isang halik." ("What can you offer Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
me in exchange for my signature? From now on, you are my girlfriend. You Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO
will enter this office everyday and everyday, I get one kiss.") Ana May refused M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of
to accede to his proposal as she considered him like her own father. Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who
after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May
Petitioner nonetheless recommended her for appointment. Thereafter, he V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his
suddenly kissed her on her left cheek. She was shocked and left the girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for
chambers, swearing never to return or talk to petitioner.
the signing of complainant's permanent appointment as a
On August 5, 1997, at around 9:30 in the morning, Virginia S. Medina, court bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as
interpreter, informed Ana May that petitioner wanted to see her in his such, with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there
chambers regarding the payroll. As a subordinate, she complied. Once inside, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left cheek
petitioner asked her if she has been receiving her salary as against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
a bookbinder. When she answered in the affirmative, he said, "Matagal na
pala eh, bakit hindi ka pumapasok dito sa kuwarto ko? Di ba sabi ko say iyo, CONTRARY TO LAW.
girlfriend na kita?" ("So you've been getting the salary for sometime
Criminal Case No. 24704
already. Why didn't you report here in my office? Didn't I tell you, you're my
girlfriend.") That on or about the 25th day of June 1997 in in Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Again, Ana May protested to his proposal, saying he is like a father to her and
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO
that he is a married man with two sons.
M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of
Petitioner suddenly rose from his seat, grabbed her and said, "Hindi pwede Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who
yan, mahal kita." ("I can't allow that for I love you.") He embraced her, kissing after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May
her all over her face and touching her right breast. V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his
girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for
the signing of complainant's permanent appointment as a
bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as Petitioner contends that the alleged acts of lasciviousness were not committed
such, with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there in relation to his office as a judge; and the fact that he is a public official is not
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left cheek an essential element of the crimes charged.
against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
The Ombudsman, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
maintains that the allegations in the two (2) Amended Informations in Criminal
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cases Nos. 24703-04 indicate a close relationship between petitioner's official
On September 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Amended functions as a judge and the commission of acts of lasciviousness.
Informations on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
The petition is bereft of merit.
the crimes charged considering that they were not committed in relation to his
office as a judge. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249, reads in part:
On November 22, 1999, before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the motion
to quash, the prosecution filed the following Re-Amended Information in SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
Criminal Case No. 24703: exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:x x x
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
"That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, other crime committed by the public officials and employees
Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO
M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of In People v. Montejo, we ruled that an offense is said to have been committed
Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of
after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. This is in
the signing of complainant's permanent appointment as a accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes the charge is the
bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. Hence, where the
such, with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there information is wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab private complainant, kiss relationship/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of
her all over her face and touch her right breast against her will official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.
and consent, to her damage and detriment. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27, 1987, petitioner, as
CONTRARY TO LAW." presiding judge of MTCC, Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, is vested with the power
to recommend the appointment of Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder. As
which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
alleged in the Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04, she
On December 18, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion to was constrained to approach petitioner on June 25, 1997 as she needed his
quash the Amended Informations, holding that "the act of approving or recommendation. But he imposed a condition before extending such
indorsing the permanent appointment of complaining witness was certainly a recommendation - she should be his girlfriend and must report daily to his
function of the office of the accused so that his acts are, therefore, committed office for a kiss. There can be no doubt, therefore, that petitioner used his
in relation to his office." official position in committing the acts complained of. While it is true, as
petitioner argues, that public office is not an element of the crime of acts of
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration, but was denied by the
lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated January 11, 2001.
Code, nonetheless, he could not have committed the crimes charged were it
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. not for the fact that as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction City, he has the authority to recommend the appointment of Ana May as
over Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness filed against bookbinder. In other words, the crimes allegedly committed are intimately
petitioner. connected with his office.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. The Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04
contain allegations showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by
petitioner in relation to his official function.
Accordingly, we rule that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting the Amended
Informations for acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution and


Order of the Sandiganbayan dated December 18, 2000 and January 11, 2001,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[ GR NOS. 161784-86, Apr 26, 2005 ] Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the
DINAH C. BARRIGA v. SANDIGANBAYAN Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their
possession and control public funds in the amount of ONE
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIVE PESOS (P1,305.00)
nullification of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. Philippine Currency, representing a portion of the Central Visayas
27435 to 27437 denying the motion to quash the Informations filed by one of Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund)
the accused, Dinah C. Barriga, and the Resolution denying her motion for intended and appropriated for the projects classified under Level
reconsideration thereof. I and III particularly the construction of Deep Well and Spring Box
The Antecedents for Level I projects and construction of water works system for
Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/recipients,
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion with the and for which fund accused are accountable by reason of the
Sandiganbayan for the admission of the three Amended Informations duties of their office, in such capacity and committing the offense
appended thereto. The first Amended Information docketed as Criminal in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
Case No. 27435, charged petitioner Dinah C. Barriga and Virginio E. Villamor, mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully
the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal Mayor, respectively, of Carmen, unlawfully and feloniously disburse and use said amount of
Cebu, with malversation of funds. The accusatory portion reads: P1,305.00 for the Spring Box of Barangay Natimao-an, Carmen,
That in or about January 1996 or sometime prior or subsequent Cebu, a barangay which was not included as a recipient of
thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, CVWSP Trust Fund, thus, accused used said public fund to a
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, public purpose different from which it was intended or
above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C. appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the
BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor government, particularly the barangays which were CVWSP
and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of Trust Fund beneficiaries.
Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and custody CONTRARY TO LAW.
public funds amounting to TWENTY- THREE THOUSAND
FORTY-SEVEN AND 20/100 PESOS (P23,047.20), Philippine The accusatory portion of the third Amended Information, docketed as
Currency, intended for the payment of Five (5) rolls of Criminal Case No. 27437, charged the same accused with illegal use of public
Polyethylene pipes to be used in the Corte-Cantumog Water funds, as follows:
System Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, for which That in or about the month of January 1997, or sometime prior or
they are accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each Court, above-named accused Virginio E. Villamor and Dinah C.
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Barriga, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and
misappropriate, take, embezzle and convert into their own Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of
personal use and benefit said amount of P23,047.20, and despite Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and control
demands made upon them to account for said amount, they have public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN
failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government. THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 96/100
CONTRARY TO LAW. (P267,537.96) PESOS, representing a portion of the Central
Visayas Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund),
The inculpatory portion of the second Amended Information, docketed as intended and appropriated for the projects classified under Level
Criminal Case No. 27436, charging the said accused with illegal use of public I and Level III, particularly the construction of Spring Box and
funds, reads: Deep Well for Level I projects and construction of water works
That in or about the month of November 1995, or sometime prior system for Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/
or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of recipients, and for which fund accused are accountable by reason
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable for the duties of their office, in such capacity and committing the
Court, above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together
and DINAH C. BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously disburse and use said amount of further held that the offices of the municipal mayor and the municipal
P267,537.96 for the construction and expansion of Barangay accountant were constituent elements of the felonies of malversation and
Cantucong Water System, a project falling under Level II of illegal use of public funds. The graft court emphasized that the rulings of this
CVWSP, thus, accused used said public funds to a public Court in People v. Montejo and Lacson v. Executive Secretary apply only
purpose different from which it was intended and appropriated, where the office held by the accused is not a constituent element of the crimes
to the damage and prejudice of the government, particularly the charged. In such cases, the Information must contain specific factual
barangay beneficiaries of Levels I and III of CVWSP. allegations showing that the commission of the crimes charged is intimately
CONTRARY TO LAW. connected with or related to the performance of the accused public officer's
public functions. In fine, the graft court opined, the basic rule is that enunciated
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and admitted the Amended by this Court in Montilla v. Hilario, and the ruling of this Court in People v.
Informations. The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the said Montejo is the exception.
Amended Informations on the ground that under Section 4 of Republic Act
The petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
No. 8294, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes
charged. She averred that the Amended Informations failed to allege and Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the aforementioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioner claims that the graft court committed grave
show the intimate relation between the crimes charged and her official duties
as municipal accountant, which are conditions sine qua non for the graft court abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
same.
to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense. She averred that the prosecution
and the Commission on Audit admitted, and no less than this Court held in Tan In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Special Prosecutor averred
v. Sandiganbayan, that a municipal accountant is not an accountable that the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari, from a denial of a motion to
officer. She alleged that the felonies of malversation and illegal use of public quash amended information, is improper. It posits that any error committed by
funds, for which she is charged, are not included in Chapter 11, Section 2, Title the Sandiganbayan in denying the petitioner's motion to quash is merely an
VII, Book II, of the Revised Penal Code; hence, the Sandiganbayan has no error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It asserts that as ruled by the
jurisdiction over the said crimes. Moreover, her position as municipal Sandiganbayan, what applies is the ruling of this Court in Montilla v.
accountant is classified as Salary Grade (SG) 24. Hilario and not People v. Montejo. Furthermore, the crimes of malversation
and illegal use of public funds are classified as crimes committed by public
The petitioner also posited that although the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
officers in relation to their office, which by their nature fall within the jurisdiction
over offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
of the Sandiganbayan. It insists that there is no more need for the Amended
office, the mere allegation in the Amended Informations that she committed
the offenses charged in relation to her office is not sufficient as the phrase is Informations to specifically allege intimacy between the crimes charged and
merely a conclusion of law; controlling are the specific factual allegations in the office of the accused since the said crimes can only be committed by public
officers. It further claims that the petitioner has been charged of malversation
the Informations that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge
and illegal use of public funds in conspiracy with Municipal Mayor Virginio E.
of her official duties and the commission of the offenses charged. To bolster
her stance, she cited the rulings of this Court in People v. Montejo, Soller v. Villamor, who occupies a position classified as SG 27; and even if the
Sandiganbayan, and Lacson v. Executive Secretary. She further contended petitioner's position as municipal accountant is only classified as SG 24, under
that although the Amended Informations alleged that she conspired with her Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction over
co-accused to commit the crimes charged, they failed to allege and show her the said crimes. The Office of the Special Prosecutor further avers that the
petitioner's claim, that she is not an accountable officer, is a matter of defense.
exact participation in the conspiracy and how she committed the crimes
charged. She also pointed out that the funds subject of the said Amended The Ruling of the Court
Informations were not under her control or administration. The petition has no merit.
On October 9, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the
motion of the petitioner. The motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise, We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that based on the allegations
denied, with the graft court holding that the applicable ruling of this Court of the Amended Informations and Rep. Act No. 8249, it has original jurisdiction
was Montilla v. Hilario, i.e., that an offense is committed in relation to public over the crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds charged in the
office when there is a direct, not merely accidental, relation between the crime Amended Informations subject of this petition.
charged and the office of the accused such that, in a legal sense, the offense Rep. Act No. 8249, which amended Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,
would not exist without the office; in other words, the office must be a provides, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. The graft court crimes and felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one
of whom belongs to any of the five categories thereunder enumerated at the not derive any personal gain or profit; in malversation, the
time of the commission of such crimes. There are two classes of public office- offender in certain cases profits from the proceeds of the crime.
related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first, (3) In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to
those crimes or felonies in which the public office is a constituent element as another public use; in malversation, the public fund or property is
defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such applied to the personal use and benefit of the offender or of
that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the another person.
office; second, such offenses or felonies which are intimately connected with
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the public office of the
the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee while in accused Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor is a constituent element of
the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct. malversation and illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayor's
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended Informations alleged that
crimes and felonies under the first classification. Considering that the public the petitioner conspired with her co-accused, the municipal mayor, in
office of the accused is by statute a constituent element of the crime charged, committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant
there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information specific factual is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable officer is of no
allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. However, cases lodged against her. It must be stressed that a public officer who is not
the Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a
involving crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds
enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the second classification if the or property if such public officer or private individual conspires with an
Information contains specific factual allegations showing the intimate accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds
connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, or property.
and the discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper or In United States v. Ponte, the Court, citing Viada, had the occasion to state:
irregular. The requirement is not complied with if the Information merely
alleges that the accused committed the crime charged in relation to his office Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-perpetrator,
because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law. accomplice or abettor in the crime of malversation of public funds,
committed by a public officer, have the penalties of this article
Two of the felonies that belong to the first classification are malversation also imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained
defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal
by some jurists and commentators (among others the learned
use of public funds or property defined and penalized by Article 220 of the Pacheco) we can only answer the question affirmatively, for the
same Code. The public office of the accused is a constituent element in both same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we have already advanced in
felonies.
Question I of the commentary on article 314. French
For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the jurisprudence has also settled the question in the same way on
following essential elements: the ground that the person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the
other culprit in the acts which constitute the crime." (Vol. 2, 4th
(a) The offender is a public officer;
edition, p. 653)The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada
(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason support their views as to the correct interpretation of the
of the duties of his office; provisions of the Penal Code touching malversation of public
(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property funds by a public official, is equally applicable in our opinion, to
for which he is accountable; and the provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing that crime,
and we have heretofore, in the case of the United States vs.
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty prescribed by this
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted section of the code upon a public official who took part with
the taking by another person of, such funds or property. another in the malversation of public funds, although it was not
For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public funds or property, the alleged, and in fact clearly appeared, that those funds were not
prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: in his hands by virtue of his office, though it did appear that they
were in the hands of his co-principal by virtue of the public office
(1) The offenders are accountable officers in both crimes. held by him.
(2) The offender in illegal use of public funds or property does
The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial treasurer
in committing six counts of malversation is also a co-principal in committing
those offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an accountable
public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation.
We reiterate that the classification of the petitioner's position as SG 24 is of no
moment. The determinative fact is that the position of her co-accused, the
municipal mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last paragraph of
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the principal accused
is classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense.
We agree with the petitioner's contention that under Section 474 of the Local
Government Code, she is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor
is she obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an accountable
officer within the context of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed,
under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual
control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. Even
then, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant
can never be convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal Code. The
name or relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling
factor. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that
as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account
and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not
malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence,
a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal government may be held guilty of
malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates
the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of


merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[ GR NO. 169328, Oct 27, 2006 ] II
JULIAN A. ALZAGA v. SANDIGANBAYAN THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
This Petition for Certiorari assails the April 25, 2005 and August 10, 2005 JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25681-25684, which IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
respectively reversed the May 27, 2004 Resolution of the court a quo and JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE ARMED FORCES
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM (AFP-
On October 7, 1999, four separate Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RSBS) IS A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 were filed against petitioners Julian A. Alzaga, CORPORATION
Meinrado Enrique A. Bello and Manuel S. Satuito relative to alleged III
irregularities which attended the purchase of four lots in Tanauan, Batangas, THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
System (AFP-RSBS). Alzaga was the Head of the Legal Department of AFP- JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
RSBS when one of the lots was purchased. Bello was a Police Superintendent IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
and he succeeded Alzaga as Head of the Legal Department. It was during his JURISPRUDENCE THAT PETITIONERS ALZAGA AND
tenure when the other three lots were purchased. Both were Vice Presidents BELLO[,] WHO WERE BOTH VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE
of AFP-RSBS. On the other hand, Satuito was the Chief of the Documentation AFP-RSBS[,] AND PETITIONER SATUITO[,] WHO WAS
and Assistant Vice President of the AFP-RSBS. ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE AFP-RSBS[,] ARE
Petitioners filed their respective Motions to Quash and/or Dismiss the COVERED AND EMBRACED BY THE POSITION
informations alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them "MANAGERS" MENTIONED UNDER SECTION 4 a (1) (g) OF
and their alleged offenses because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity created PD NO. 1606, AS AMENDED.
for the benefit of its members and that their positions and salary grade levels The petition is without merit.
do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 4
The AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of P.D. No. 361 (1973) in December
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 (1978), as amended by R.A. No. 8249
1973 to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement
(1997).
system, as provided for in R.A. No. 340 (1948). It is similar to the Government
On May 27, 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners' motions to dismiss Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) since
it serves as the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of
for lack of jurisdiction.
those in the military service.
However, in a Resolution dated April 25, 2005, the Sandiganbayan reversed
its earlier resolution. It held that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or The AFP-RSBS is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a
controlled corporation thus subject to its jurisdiction. It also found that the Board of Trustees and Management Group, and funded from congressional
appropriations and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP;
positions held by Alzaga and Bello, who were Vice Presidents, and Satuito
donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and all earnings
who was an Assistant Vice President, are covered and embraced by, and in
of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.
fact higher than the position of managers mentioned under Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, thus under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 8249, grants
jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan over:
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition raising
the following issues: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
I known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
officials occupying the following positions in the government
JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
IN A MANNER NOT ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE the commission of the offense:
PERSON OF THE PETITIONERS
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of over the persons of the petitioners and the Resolution dated August 10, 2005
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: x x x x
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government- SO ORDERED.
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
In People v. Sandiganbayan, where herein petitioners Alzaga and Satuito
were respondents, this Court has ruled that the character and operations of
the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest thus the same is a government
entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds. In Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, we held that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation under R.A. No. 9182, otherwise known as The Special
Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002. These rulings render unmeritorious petitioners'
assertion that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners' claim that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over them since their positions as vice presidents and assistant
vice president are not covered nor embraced by the term "managers" under
section 4 of RA. No. 8249.
We held in Geduspan v. People, that while the first part of section 4 covers
only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the
second part "specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions
may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. In the latter category, it is the
position held and not the salary grade which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government owned and controlled corporations, are under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
In the instant case, petitioners Alzaga and Bello were Head of the Legal
Department while petitioner Satuito was Chief of the Documentation with
corresponding ranks of Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice President. These
positions are not specifically enumerated in RA. No. 8249; however, as
correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, their ranks as Vice Presidents and
Assistant Vice President are even higher than that of "managers" mentioned
in RA. No. 8249.
In sum, the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a
government-owned and controlled corporation and that it has jurisdiction over
the persons of petitioners who were Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice
President when the charges against them were allegedly committed.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed


Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated April 25, 2005 that the AFP-RSBS is
a government-owned and controlled corporation and that it has jurisdiction
[ GR No. 180122, Mar 13, 2009 ] 3. There were no records of the excavation and disposal of
FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN unsuitable materials and of road filling works having been
made by the previous engineers, Rodolfo de los Santos
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil and Noel Lobrido at the time said activities were allegedly
Procedure assailing the Resolution dated 2 March 2007 of the First Division executed;
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26583 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Robert P. Balao, et al.," which denied petitioner Felicisimo F. 4. The excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling
Lazarte, Jr.'s Motion to Quash. The Resolution dated 18 October 2007 of said works were overestimated to the prejudice of the
government:
court denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration is likewise challenged in
this petition. a. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW) road, the
The antecedents follow. entire width of 10.00 meters was used in
calculating the volume of cut of unsuitable
In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original materials when the undisturbed natural grounds
contract for the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services on both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters;
Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project, with
a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the World Bank under the b. the mathematical calculation in determining the
Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983 between the Philippine volume of cut of unsuitable materials are contrary
to the contract's technical specifications which
Government and the IBRD-World Bank.
provides for cut measurements, i.e.[,] by end-
A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August area method;
1990. In April 1991, the complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.) was
designated Project Engineer of the project. c. in a 10.00 ROW road, an effective width of 8.70
meters was used in calculating the volume of
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of road fill when the undisturbed natural grounds on
unsuitable materials and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters
A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report of Physical apart;
Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered certain
deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some d. the mathematical calculations in determining the
volume of roadfill are contrary to the contract's
supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved concrete pouring; (2)
technical specifications, specifically Section 3.11
survey results of original ground and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of
thereof, i.e., by end-area method.
earth fill actually rendered on site; (4) test results as to the quality of materials
and compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions attesting to the demolished 5. No laboratory test was made to ascertain the quality of
concrete structures. imported road fill materials.
The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s In a Memorandum dated 27 June 1991, the Project Office recommended the
further verification, it was established that there was no actual excavation and termination of the infrastructure contract with A.C. Construction.
road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction. Fajutag, Jr.'s findings In its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory and Acceptance Committee
are summarized as follows: determined the total accomplishment of the contractor at 40.89%, representing
P3,433,713.10 out of the total revised contract amount of P8,397,225.09
1. No topographic map was appended, even if the same is
inclusive of Variation Order No. 1 in the amount of P710,717.54. Thereafter,
necessary in land development works; a discarded
drawing sheet: "Spot Elevations and Existing Gradelines" said Committee recommended that the temporary project suspension imposed
by the contractor, which incurred delays in the project completion, be referred
of the project site was found, but this contrasted
to the Legal Department for appropriate action.
significantly with the alleged joint-survey results in
support of the Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1; On 19 August 1991, the Manager of the Legal Department issued a
2. No laboratory tests were conducted to ascertain Memorandum addressed to the General Manager of NHA endorsing approval
of the Regional Projects Department's (RPD's) recommendation. The NHA
unsuitability of materials, even if the same should have
General Manager through a letter dated 29 August 1991 informed the
been required as essential basis thereof;
contractor of the rescission of his contract for the development of the said
project upon his receipt thereof without prejudice to NHA's enforcing its right The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the
under the contract in view of the contractor's unilateral and unauthorized Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses ROBERT P. BALAO,
suspension of the contract works amounting to abandonment of the project. FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS,
Despite the rescission notice issued by the NHA per letter dated 29 August JOSEPHINE O. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL
1991, the contractor continued working intermittently with very minimal H. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF
workforce until such time as the award of remaining infrastructure works is SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED
effected by NHA to another contractor. (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT),
In March 1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per Resolution No. 2453, committed as follows:
approved the mutual termination of the A.C. Cruz Construction contract and That in or about the month of March, 1992 at
awarded the remaining work to Triad Construction and Development Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental,
Corporation (Triad). The contract amount for the remaining work was Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
P9,554,837.32. Thereafter, representatives from A.C. Cruz Construction, Honorable Court, above-named accused, ROBERT
Triad and NHA-Bacolod conducted a joint measurement at the site to P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V.
determine the total accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction inclusive of DACALOS, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR.,
accomplishments after NHA inventory. JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, and
NOEL H. LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being the
The Project Office was subsequently informed by the Central Office that the
General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt. Office,
accomplishments made by A.C. Cruz Construction after the NHA inventory
would be paid directly to said contractor by Triad. As of 27 March 1992, Triad Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project
had issued checks in favor of A.C. Cruz Construction amounting to One Million Mgt. Officer A and Supervising Engineer, Diliman,
Quezon City, in such capacity and committing the
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which were received by Arceo M. Cruz per Official
offense in relation to office and while in the
Receipt No. 3003.
performance of their official functions, conniving,
In its Memorandum dated 22 June 1992, the Regional Projects Department confederating and mutually helping with each other
recommended to the General Manager that the fund settlement to A.C. Cruz and with accused ARCEO C. CRUZ, a private
Construction be effected. individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz
Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in under Construction with address at 7486 Bagtikan Street,
the inventory report as accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Makati City with deliberate intent, with manifest
Fajutag, Jr. brought these irregularities to the attention of the Commission on partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there
Audit (COA). willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to be paid
to A.C. Construction public funds in the amount of
After its special audit investigation, the COA uncovered some anomalies, TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX
among which, are ghost activities, specifically the excavation of unsuitable HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY
materials and road filling works and substandard, defective workmanship. FIVE CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE
Laboratory tests confirmed the irregularities. CURRENCY, supposedly for the excavation and
Further, according to the COA, while it is true that the fourth billing of A.C. Cruz roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Construction had not been paid its accomplishments after the August 1991 Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact no
inventory found acceptable by NHA amounting to P896,177.08 were paid such works were undertaken by A.C. Construction
directly by Triad. Effectively, A.C. Cruz Construction had been overpaid by as as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the
much as P232,628.35, which amount is more than the net payment due per Commission on Audit, thus accused public officials
the computation of the unpaid fourth billing. in the performance of their official functions had
given unwarranted benefits, advantage and
Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional Projects Department preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C.
and Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee, and other NHA Construction and themselves to the damage and
officials were charged in an Information dated 5 March 2001, worded as prejudice of the government.
follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
INFORMATION
On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising considered and passed upon in the assailed Resolution.
the following grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute Nonetheless, after a careful review of the same, the Court still
an offense; (2) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of probable cause of
form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature the Office of the Ombudsman to indict accused Lazarte, Jr.,
and cause of the accusations against them have been violated by the Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz of the offense charged. In its
inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the Memorandum dated July 27, 2004 and May 30, 2006, the
individual participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience prosecution was able to show with sufficient particularity the
with the Resolution dated 27 March 2005. respective participation of the aforementioned accused in the
On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution commission of the offense charged. The rest of the factual issues
by accused Lazarte, Jr. would require the presentation of
denying petitioner's motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in part:
evidence in the course of the trial of this case.
Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose
participation in the alleged offense is specifically mentioned in the The Court also maintains the validity and sufficiency of the
May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., information against accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and
Cruz. The information has particularly alleged the ultimate facts
the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC),
constituting the essential elements of the offense charged which
which undertook the inventory and final quantification of the
are as follows:
accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of
Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly had to 1. that accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, and Lobrido are
rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or the Project Office public officers being the Department Manager, Project
as to which materials were actually installed; and that he Management Officer A, and Supervising Engineer of the
supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory NHA during the time material in the criminal information;
Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his not and
being able to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly 2. that the said accused, in their respective official
saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed
capacities and in conspiracy with accused Cruz, a private
are matters of defense which he can address in the course of the
individual and the General manager of A.C. Cruz
trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to
Construction, have acted with manifest partiality or
accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit.
evident bad faith and have given unwarranted benefits,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby preference, and advantage to Arceo C. Cruz and A.C.
resolves as follows: Cruz Construction or have caused damage and prejudice
to the government, by "[causing] to be paid A.C. Cruz
(1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine Angsico and Virgilio
Construction public funds in the amount of Two Hundred
Dacalos' Motion to Admit Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006
is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos
attached thereto, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is and Thirty Five Centavos (P232,628.35) supposedly for
hereby DISMISSED insofar as the said accused-movants are the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy
Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the
concerned.
fact that no such works were undertaken by A.C. Cruz
(2) The Motion to Quash dated October 2, 2006 of accused
Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted
merit. Let the arraignment of the accused proceed as scheduled by the Commission on Audit."
on March 13, 2007. The other factual details which accused Lazarte, Jr. cited are
SO ORDERED. matters of evidence best threshed out in the course of the trial.

Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution Hence, the instant petition which is a reiteration of petitioner's submissions.
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Pertinently, it held:
jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan in: (1) upholding the validity and sufficiency
The Motion for Reconsideration of accused Lazarte, Jr. merely of the Information despite its failure to make out an offense and conform to the
reiterated the grounds and arguments which had been duly prescribed form; (2) denying his motion to quash considering that the
remaining averments in the Information have been rendered unintelligible by Petitioner's main argument is that the Information filed before the
the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused; and (3) using as Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the essential elements of the crime
bases the Prosecution's Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to charged as it failed to specify the individual participation of all the accused.
supplement the inadequacies of the Information. In addition, petitioner avers
The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the
that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
Sandiganbayan.
accusation against him had been violated for failure of the Information to
specify his participation in the commission of the offense. Petitioner also At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not
argues that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to
as no damage or injury had been made or caused to any party or to the quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari
government. Finally, petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan lost its but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special
jurisdiction over him upon the dismissal of the charges against his co-accused defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards
as the remaining accused are public officers whose salary grade is below 27. interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in
In its Comment dated 21 December 2007, the Office of the Ombudsman, a single court.
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that separate
allegations of individual acts perpetrated by the conspirators are not required This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in
in an Information and neither should they be covered by evidence submitted denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of
to establish the existence of probable cause. Allegations regarding the nature jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
and extent of petitioner's participation and justification for his acts which lies. And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to
constitute the offense charged are evidentiary matters which are more properly have committed grave abuse of discretion.
addressed during trial. The Ombudsman reiterates our ruling in Ingco v. The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the
Sandiganbayan that the fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not
motion to quash is the sufficiency of the averments in the information that is, the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the crime defined in law. Matters aliunde will not be considered.
essential elements of the crime defined by law. And relying on the case
of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,the Ombudsman states that informations need Corollarily, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that:
only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor are to be proved during the SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.--A complaint or
trial. The Ombudsman moreover maintains that the Sandiganbayan has information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
jurisdiction over petitioner. The Ombudsman argues that it is of no moment designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions
that petitioner's position is classified as salary grade 26 as he is a manager complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
within the legal contemplation of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of Republic Act offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
No. 8249. offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
In his Reply dated 9 October 2008, petitioner strongly asseverates that, When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of
according to the Constitution, in a conspiracy indictment the participation of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
each accused in the so-called conspiracy theory should be detailed in order to
apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against them in relation to The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
the participation of the other accused. A general statement that all the accused sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
conspired with each other without stating the participation of each runs afoul is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper
of the Constitution. Petitioner adds that the ultimate facts intended by law refer judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of
to determinate facts and circumstances which should become the basis of the the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
cause of action; statement of facts which would be in complete accord with the included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and
constitutional requirement of giving the accused sufficient information about elements of the specific crimes.
the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. Petitioner also avers The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such
that the Ombudsman's reliance on and citation of the cases of Ingco v. particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the
Sandiganbayan and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is misplaced and misleading. offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. Another purpose is to enable accused, if found
guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts that no such works were undertaken by said construction company as revealed
constituting the offense charged is sufficient. by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
Pertinently, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, reads: of the accused in the allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.--In addition to acts or underscores the fact that under Philippine law, conspiracy should be
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer or it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime
in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x
for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
sedition.
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. But
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of
concessions. the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes
The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are as the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in
follows:
the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will
1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.
in conspiracy with him;
Notably, in People v. Quitlong, as pointed out by respondent, the Court ruled
2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the on how conspiracy as a mode of committing the offense should be alleged in
performance of his official duties or in relation to his public the Information, viz:
position;
x x x Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the
3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of
government or private party; secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted others. Verily, an accused must know from the information
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but
also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the
components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the
The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither
Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and Supervising is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
in relation to the office and while in the performance of their official functions, enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied
connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with accused upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will
bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The felonious understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said,
on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows
the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of With regard to the alleged irregular use by the Sandiganbayan of the
the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to Prosecution's Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement
commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a the inadequacies of the Information, the Court finds adequate its explanation
sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the in the first assailed resolution, to wit:
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated
It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was ordered
crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them
by this Court because the prosecution failed to satisfactorily
(15A C.J.S. 842-844).
comply with an earlier directive of the former Chairperson and
x x x Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an Members of the First Division, after noting the inadequacy of the
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to information, to clarify the participation of each of the accused. In
commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters ordering the reinvestigation, the Court noted that the
agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith prosecution's July 27, 2004 Memorandum did not address the
to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the apprehensions of the former Chairperson and Members of the
accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has First Division as to the inadequacy of the allegations in the
been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement information.
to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in
This time, despite a reinvestigation, the prosecution's
the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or
Memorandum dated May 30, 2006 still failed to specify the
"confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly
participation of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos.
appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting The most recent findings of the prosecution still do not address
conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity the deficiency found by the Court in the information. The
of purpose or the community of design among the accused must
prosecution avers that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117 of the
be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or
Rules of Court, in determining the viability of a motion to quash
its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts
based on the ground of "facts charged in the information do not
constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just constitute an offense," the test must be whether or not the facts
inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened
essential elements of the crime as defined by law. The
to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In prosecution contends that matter aliunde should not be
establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to
considered. However, in the instant case, the Court has found the
support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may
information itself to be inadequate, as it does not satisfy the
be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused. requirements of particularly alleging the acts or omissions of the
In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be said accused-movants, which served as the basis of the
confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A allegation of conspiracy between the aforementioned accused-
conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of movants and the other accused, in the commission of the offense
an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or charged in the information.
concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to hear the case.
statement of the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the
As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that
Information.
petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a
The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any damage or department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled
injury caused to any party or the government, likewise are matters of evidence corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls
best raised during trial. within the ambit of its jurisdiction. Apropos, the Court held in the case
of Geduspan v. People which involved a regional Manager/Director of Region
As to the contention that the residual averments in the Information have been
VI of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade
rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-
accused, the Court finds that the Information sufficiently makes out a case 26, to wit:
against petitioner and the remaining accused. It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely
classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the above-
quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with
the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof
"specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions
may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner
together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together
with her.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled
corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction
of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her
salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:


A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that
to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a
violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a
public official or employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department
manager of Philhealth, a government-owned and controlled
corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned
in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which
she was charged was committed in relation to her office as
department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the
subject matter of the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutionsdated2 March 2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court resolves that the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused. Accordingly, pursuant to law, the Court has no recourse
but to sentence the accused, Irenorio B. Balaba, to an
[ GR No. 169519, Jul 17, 2009 ] indeterminate sentence of 10 YEARS AND ONE DAY as
minimum, to 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND ONE DAY of Reclusion
IRENORIO B. BALABA v. PEOPLE Temporal as maximum. He shall suffer the penalty of perpetual
This petition for review assails the 15 December 2004 Decision and 24 August special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27178. In its 15 malversed which is P114,186.34.
December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Irenorio SO ORDERED.
B. Balaba's (Balaba) appeal of the 9 December 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50 (trial court), finding him guilty of On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated
Malversation of Public Funds. In its 24 August 2005 Resolution, the Court of that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals.On 6 August 2003,
Appeals denied Balaba's motion for reconsideration. Balaba filed his Appellant's Brief.

On 18 and 19 October 1993, State Auditors Arlene Mandin and Loila Laga of The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Appellee's Brief, filed a
the Provincial Auditor's Office conducted an examination of the cash and Manifestation and Motion praying for the dismissal of the appeal for being
accounts of the accountable officers of the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol. improper since the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.
The State Auditors discovered a cash shortage of P56,321.04, unaccounted In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed Balaba's
cash tickets of P7,865.30 and an unrecorded check of P50,000 payable to appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the
Balaba, or a total shortage of P114,186.34. Three demand letters were sent to appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the accounts. Unsatisfied with the case.
Balaba's explanation, Graft Investigation Officer I Miguel P. Ricamora
On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked that
recommended that an information for Malversation of Public Funds, as defined
and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, be filed against he be allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper court, the
Sandiganbayan. In its 24 August 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
Balaba with the Sandiganbayan.
Balaba's motion.
In an Information dated 26 April 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
charged Balaba with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. The On 7 October 2005, Balaba filed his present petition before this Court where
Information against Balaba reads as follows: he raised the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court. Balaba claims that
That on or about October 19, 1993, in the Municipality of it was due to inadvertence that the notice of appeal was filed before the Court
Guindulman, Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds that his appeal was
Honorable Court, the said accused, Assistant Municipal dismissed on purely technical grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the rules
Treasurer of Guindulman, Bohol and accountable public officer to afford him an opportunity to correct the error and fully ventilate his appeal
for the funds collected and received by virtue of his position, on the merits.
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and
The petition has no merit.
take away from said funds, the total amount of P114,186.34,
which he converted to his personal use and benefit, to the Upon Balaba's conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an
damage and prejudice of the government. appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No.
8249 (RA 8249), which further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
CONTRARY TO LAW.
reads:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
During his arraignment on 17 May 1996, Balaba entered a plea of not guilty.
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Trial soon followed.
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty. The dispositive jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
portion of the 9 December 2002 Decision reads: (Emphasis ours)
There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of
Balaba's appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment
Balaba seeks to appeal.
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled:
An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the
appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper
appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to
appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the
correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the
case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the
second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court
would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court reads:
"An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall
not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright." (Emphasis ours)
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only
after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its
Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January
2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction
on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January
2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial
court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it
dismissed Balaba's appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 15 December 2004


Decision and 24 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 27178.

SO ORDERED.
she received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound
to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with
deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of
P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the
[ GR No. 167304, Aug 25, 2009 ] damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.
PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN CONTRARY TO LAW.
Before this Court is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
reverse and set aside the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER
dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION dated
of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction. November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following: Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of
an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash
City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the
she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under same liquidation papers were still in the process of evaluation by the
a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had
on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante
19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade
no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the
Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the
latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher,
receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No.
1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy 6758.
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that
respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate The OSP filed its Opposition dated December 8, 2004 arguing that
charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on
otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial
OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed
the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said
Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB- court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant
Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
probable cause to indict respondent Amante. Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4
of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the
accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads salary grade of city local officials/heads.
as follows:
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated February 28, 2005,
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion of which
subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, reads:
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is
public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however,
of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
having obtained cash advances from the City Government of The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby
Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND considered moot and academic.
NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which
SO ORDERED. In its Reply dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of
Hence, the present petition. public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission
Petitioner raises this lone issue: of other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al. wherein this Court
JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES The petition is meritorious.
MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE. The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
As a background, this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan,
petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding et al., thus:
v. Sandiganbayan. According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor
implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,
under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11,
1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the
adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
in relation to public office. promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded
Respondent Amante, in her Comment dated January 16, 2006, averred that, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
with the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23,
it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub- amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on
paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249
Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x
over cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member
higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with
his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a)
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of
to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of the Sandiganbayan.
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the This Court rules in the affirmative.
three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was
Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged
respondent proceeded to cite a decision of this Court where it was held that commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The
it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of
waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members
the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
(a) of the said two provisions states: other city department heads.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
occupying the position of consul and
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known higher;
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. (d) Philippine army and air force
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised colonels, naval captains, and all
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials officers of higher rank;
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP
commission of the offense: officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are their assistants, and officials and
involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of
managers of government-owned or
the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted
controlled corporations, state
on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the
pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
following:
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise 1989;
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal provisions of the Constitution;
Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
the Constitution; and
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the (5) All other national and local officials classified as
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
(a) Provincial governors, vice- mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
governors, members of the
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
sangguniang panlalawigan and
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
heads; Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically
enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and the general qualification that the public official must belong to
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction
be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However,
member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is included
the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975.
they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The
exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors,
amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding is
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge
engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial
is one of those enumerated public officials under Section
prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees,
mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary
universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could exercise
Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies
jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in
office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the
relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the
Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v.
alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the Sandiganbayan where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
(g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade.
following ratiocination: According to petitioner, the Indingcase did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating
Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the
that the Congress' act of specifically including the public officials
therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or
Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is
true in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the
No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a)
public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with
to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the
Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling
Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases
that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court
involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of
they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically
enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are
1606 as amended, so that when they are committed even by
those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No.
public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to
1606, as amended, provides that:
the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan.
When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or
4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might
to their office. have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the
allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those
assumed jurisdiction over the case.
public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may
not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the
R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code
but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her
offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of
ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
the law had been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases
connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have
accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the
1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one
accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the
hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to
employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is
his office. Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, where the crime
misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in
involved was murder, this Court held that: Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in
the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed
accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this
position or rank of the offender - that is, whether he is one of those Court held:
public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court
Section 4. x x x.
elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, where the public official was committed in relation to [an accused's] office" by referring to the
charged with grave threats, this Court ruled: principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and
to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained
v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla
allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of
v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in
his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan
when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article relation to the accused's office if "the offense cannot exist without
282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the
crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief
Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special
Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an
Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a
threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter
particular case may show that
had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner's
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime x x x the offense therein charged is intimately
charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner's connected with [the accused's] respective offices
official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent and was perpetrated while they were in the
in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused performance, though improper or irregular, of their
was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no
attended said public hearing" and that "accused's violent act was personal motive to commit the crime and they would
precipitated by complainant's criticism of his administration as the not have committed it had they not held their
mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latter's aforesaid offices. x x x
privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant's
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not
mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply
stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same
section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and
above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The
intention of the lawmakers î º who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers î º to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005
is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
contended that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting
the appearance of Atty; Sitoy as counsel for the private offended parties, as
the Rules of Court expressly provides that a private offended party may
intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of offenses.
Magno, in his comment filed on December 15, 2003, insisted that what he
questioned before the RTC was the appearance and authority of the private
prosecutor to prosecute the case in behalf of the Ombudsman. He stressed
[ GR No. 171542, Apr 06, 2011 ] that while the Office of the Ombudsman can designate prosecutors to assist
ANGELITO P. MAGNO v. PEOPLE in the prosecution of criminal cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing or
authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to fiscals, state
Through a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks
prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not extend to private
the reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
practitioners/private prosecutors. He further stressed that while the Order of
September 26, 2005 in "People of the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Augustine A.
the RTC states that the Office of the Ombudsman is the proper legal and
Vestil, Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et al" (docketed as CA-
authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did not affect the right to intervene
G.R. SP No. 79809), and its Resolution dated February 6, 2006 denying
personally, as the Office of the Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the
respondents' motion for reconsideration. The assailed rulings denied the
private respondents in prosecuting the civil aspect of the case.
petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and upheld the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTQ of Mandaue City, which precluded Atty. On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, declared that the private
Adelino B. Sitoy from acting as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. DU- prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the
10123. prosecution of the civil aspect of the case is concerned.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS The respondents moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision. On
September 26, 2005, the CA amended its decision, ruling that the private
On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for
prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder against several
intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration with any
accused, including Magno, who were public officers working under the
lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case.
National Bureau of Investigation.
Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the amended CA decision, Magno
During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the
elevated the dispute to this Court through the present petition for review
formal appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private
on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure.
prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The oral objection was reduced to writing on July 21, 2003 when PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
Magno filed an opposition before Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City, citing Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition
the provisions of Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770. for certiorari; the power to hear and decide that question is with the
The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment, while the accused Sandiganbayan. To support this contention, Magno invokes Engr. Teodoto B.
submitted their joint opposition. The respondents likewise submitted their Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I. Mapayo, etc., et al. where the Court held that
comments to the opposition of the other co-accused. the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive power to issue petitions for certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
On September 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling that "the
Ombudsman is proper, legal and authorized entity to prosecute this case to Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural lapse, Magno adds, the
the exclusion of any other entity/person other than those authorized under R.A. private prosecutor cannot be allowed to intervene for the respondents as it
6770." would violate Section 31 of RA No. 6770. Section 31 limits the Ombudsman's
prerogative to designate prosecutors to fiscals, state prosecutors and
In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of
government lawyers. It does not, Magno maintains, allow the Ombudsman to
the Order, which the RTC later denied in its October 1, 2003 Order.
deputize private practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf of the Office
Proceedings before the CA of the Ombudsman.
On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through the Ombudsman for the RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS
Visayas and Atty. Sitoy, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. They
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
submitted its memorandum on February 8, 2008. Substantively, the corresponding to Salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in
Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case pursuant to the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads: mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not amend
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Section 31 merely allows the
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
Ombudsman to designate and deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist
herein provided.
in the investigation and prosecution in certain cases. The Ombudsman opines
that the two provisions of law "are not diametrically opposed nor in conflict," as The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
"a private prosecutor may appear for the private offended complainants in the over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prosecution of an offense independent of the exclusive right of the prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
Ombudsman to deputize." The Ombudsman, however, did not address the ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including
the RTC in this case. quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or
which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. l, 2, 14 and
THE COURT'S RULING
14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
We resolve to grant the petition. these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well
RTC's decision not to allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
of the Ombudsman promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply
thereof establishes the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction: to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan.
In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
jurisdiction in all cases involving: Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in including those employed in government-owned or controlled
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
commission of the offense: and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
xxxx exclusive jurisdiction over them.
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office. action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with
it the filing of civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared that:
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit
theretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be action shall be dismissed. This defense may be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the interposed at any time, during appeal or even
case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the after final judgment. Such is understandable, as
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not
deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over determine or conveniently set aside.
resolutions issued by RTCs in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or We note that Magno had already raised - in his supplemental motion for
of their appellate jurisdiction. reconsideration before the CA - the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the
We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot. In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a CA's Decision became final. The CA did not even consider this submission,
petition for certiorari before the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its choosing instead to brush it aside for its alleged failure to raise new or
discretion for not dismissing the information for Malversation thru Falsification substantial grounds for reconsideration. Clearly, however, its lack of
of Public Document. The CA refused to take cognizance of the case, holding jurisdiction is a new and substantial argument that the CA should have passed
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition. upon.
Recognizing the amendments made to PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975, we The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel to
sustained the CA's position since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the cure the jurisdictional defect of its petition before the CA
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to include petitions for "mandamus, The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case since
prohibition, certiorari habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and
Magno raised the issue of jurisdiction before the CA's decision became final.
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
Further, even if the issue had been raised only on appeal to this Court, the
In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition CA's lack of jurisdiction could still not be cured. In Machado, citing People of
for certiorari filed by Magno. While it is true that the interlocutory order issued the Philippines v. Rosalina Casiano, we held:
by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the
In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
CA. Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan,
which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of
public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
of the National Bureau of Investigation. actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
authority, we overrule the September 26, 2005 Amended Decision of the CA assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a
and the subsequent denial of Magno's motions for reconsideration. matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the CA's judgment, issued without parties or by estoppel." However if the lower court had
jurisdiction, is void. jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given
theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,
void and cannot be given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue on on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position - that the lower
court had jurisdiction.
jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final judgment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioner's petition for review on certiorari,
We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v.
Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al., as follows: and DECLARE the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79809, promulgated on September 26, 2005, as well as its Resolution of
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by February 6, 2006, NULL AND VOIDfor having been issued without jurisdiction.
the parties1 action or conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer
The respondents are hereby given fifteen (15) days from the finality of this confederating together and mutually helping x x x each other, with
Decision within which to seek recourse from the Sandiganbayan. No costs. deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause the
SO ORDERED. release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor
Francisco Adalim, accused in Criminal Case No. 10963, for
Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by Honorable
Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan,
Eastern Samar, and thereafter placed said detention prisoner
[ GR No. 175457, Jul 06, 2011 ] (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused RUPERTO A. AMBIL,
RUPERTO A. AMBIL v. SANDIGANBAYAN + JR.'s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused
Ambil's residence for a period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by less which act was done without any court order, thus accused in
petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado the performance of official functions had given unwarranted
Sr. assailing the Decision promulgated on September 16, 2005 and benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to
Resolution dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case the prejudice of the government.
No. 25892.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The present controversy arose from a letter of Atty. David B. Loste, President
of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.
the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No.
10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They
petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report dated January 4, reason, however, that Adalim's transfer was justified considering the imminent
1999, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the
criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) of provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalim's sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was
Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of the to be held.
IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and
longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he rested its case after the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against petitioners. filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with Reservation to
Nonetheless, in an Information dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. Present Evidence in Case of Denial but the same was denied.
and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty.
R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, Juliana A. Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum dated August 4, 2000,
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from
recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the
1998 to 2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim's lawyers
amendment of the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners
that he directed the transfer of Adalim's detention to his home. He cites poor
from Jail under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC)
security in the provincial jail as the primary reason for taking personal custody
against the remaining accused. The Amended Information reads:
of Adalim considering that the latter would be in the company of inmates who
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for were put away by his sister and guards identified with his political opponents.
sometime prior [or] subsequent thereto, [in] the Municipality of
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of
Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the
Eastern Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [the] above-named accused,
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the Provincial Governor of Adalim was arrested while they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern
Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White, she sought the
alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein
Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both having been public
petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor's safety.
officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such,
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner
Samar. He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of
murder case filed against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6)
Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White's account that he spotted years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.
inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political
Hence, the present petitions.
rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan,
gesture to him with a raised clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
sister for help. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.'s residence for almost I
three months before he posted bail after the charge against him was
downgraded to homicide. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019,
AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO PETITIONER'S CASE BEFORE
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
Eastern Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano
fetched him at home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. II
White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalim's arrest and arguing with WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS
the jail guards against booking him for detention. At the provincial jail, PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF
petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed him that he was under SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED.
the governor, in the latter's capacity as a provincial jailer. Petitioner claims
that it is for this reason that he submitted to the governor's order to relinquish III
custody of Adalim. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to INTENT, MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR
be dilapidated and undermanned. According to him, only two guards were GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF
incharge of looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells in the jail, each SAID SECTION 3(e).
housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was IV
unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several nipa huts within the
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL
perimeter for use during conjugal visits.
GOVERNOR AND JAILER UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
assailed Decision finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. CODE OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC
3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners ACT 6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A
have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of more DETENTION PRISONER.
comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges that other
V
detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under
detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE
of the court or when he is admitted to bail. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY
OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners' defense that Adalim's transfer
was made to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not VI
personally verify any actual threat on Adalim's life but relied simply on the
advice of Adalim's lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID
fence of the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from other NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s failure to turn over Adalim DOUBT.
despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of
Interior and Local Government. For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the
Sandiganbayan:
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have accorded undue
MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN preference to Adalim for liability to attach under the provision. Further, the
CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes of applying
OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL. Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the unwarranted benefit redounded, not
to his person as a mayor, but to his person as a detention prisoner accused of
II
murder. It suggests further that petitioners were motivated by bad faith as
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim despite instruction from Asst.
REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates petitioners' lack of authority to take
ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE LATTER custody of a detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that
SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 6,
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft
ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
of merit.
III
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or
THE COURT A QUO'S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts
GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST, SPECULATIVE.
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x x
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial governor has authority to take personal benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11(5) of the RPC. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.'s assignment of errors can be condensed shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
into two: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to the justifying concessions.
circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements
purpose under Article 11(6) of the RPC. must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with
does not apply to his case because the provision contemplates only manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3)
transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public officer his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public discharge of his functions.
officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the mayor pursuant As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers
to his duty as a "Provincial Jailer" under the Administrative Code of 1917. discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the
Considering this, petitioner believes himself entitled to the justifying Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers
circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty. charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249. The pertinent
between him and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:
was merely following the orders of a superior when he transferred the SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.--The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from criminal liability. exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
absence of jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that it is enough
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence
officials occupying the following positions in the government, characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
the commission of the offense: but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade `27'
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act men never fail to take on their own property." x x x
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident
bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s contention that he is
assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;] authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the
"Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
x x x x
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
local chief executives over the units of the Philippine National Police within
corresponding to Salary Grade `27' or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers their jurisdiction:
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, Philippine National Police.--The extent of operational supervision
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of
xxxx Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A.
No. 6975), otherwise known as "The Department of the Interior
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
and Local Government Act of 1990," and the rules and
question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO regulations issued pursuant thereto.
shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 6975 on the Bureau of Jail
22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions Management and Penology provides:
corresponding to salary grade `27' or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise
vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co- supervision and control over all city and municipal jails. The
principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the
jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses
in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them - the
shall be subsidized by the National Government for not more than
Sandiganbayan.
three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act.
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. An officer in control
In Sison v. People, we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in
as follows: his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself.
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition
to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the
they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral duties." If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than the power Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in
of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act Section 1737 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the
within the law. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to
rules are followed, but he does not lay down the rules, nor does he have accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been
discretion to modify or replace them. superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which
has authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No
case, neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the person under detention by legal process shall be released or
parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted
within the bounds of law. In the event that the subordinate performs an act ultra to bail.
vires, rules may be laid down on how the act should be done, but always in
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under
conformity with the law. detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. government, much less the governor. This was amply clarified by Asst. Sec.
cites Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial Ingeniero in his communication dated October 6, 1998 addressed to petitioner
jails in support. Section 1731 provides: Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.--The governor 06 October 1996
of the province shall be charged with the keeping of the
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to administer the same
in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for Provincial Capitol
the government of provincial prisons. The immediate custody Borongan, Eastern Samar
and supervision of the jail may be committed to the care of a jailer
to be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of jailer Dear Sir:
shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and
be filled in the manner in which classified positions are filled, and the reports earlier received by this Department, relative to your
if so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to all the benefits and alleged action in taking into custody Mayor Francisco "Aising"
privileges of classified employees, except that he shall hold office Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested
only during the term of office of the appointing governor and until by virtue by a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No.10963.
a successor in the office of the jailer is appointed and qualified,
unless sooner separated. The provincial governor shall, under If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord
the direction of the provincial board and at the expense of with the provision of Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
the province, supply proper food and clothing for the which mandates that an arrested person be delivered to the
prisoners; though the provincial board may, in its discretion, let nearest police station or jail.
the contract for the feeding of the prisoners to some other person. Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in
(Emphasis supplied.) taking custody of the accused municipal mayor is
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the power of
again, nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor as the supervision vested unto the provincial governor over provincial
"provincial jailer," or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take jails. It does not, definitely, include the power to take in custody
personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision is that any person in detention.
the provincial governor's duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct
of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, yourself within the bounds of law and to immediately deliver
administrative acts pertain only to those acts which are necessary to be done Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order to avoid legal
to carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared by the legislative complications.
body or such as are devolved upon it by the Constitution. Therefore, in the
exercise of his administrative powers, the governor can only enforce the law Please be guided accordingly.
but not supplant it.
Very truly yours, public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions. (Italics supplied.)
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, we affirmed that a
Assistant Secretary prosecution for violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the
accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial concessions.
jailer." Said petitioner's usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s second contention, Section 2(b) of
open and willful defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a former
R.A. No. 3019 defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive
political party mate, betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
attended his actions.
unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal from
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section
the crime. As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the offense benefits to a private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient
consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any party, including the of such benefits take petitioners' case beyond the ambit of said law?
government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, We believe not.
administrative or judicial functions. In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather
than "private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits,
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving
unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged advantage or preference for a reason. The term "party" is a technical word
with murder, by causing his release from prison and detaining him instead at having a precise meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from "person"
which, in general usage, refers to a human being. Thus, a private person
the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability
simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more
of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is
comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer
not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that
the "provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
corporations charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions" In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the
and he is not such government officer or employee. Second, the purported provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s residence, they
unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer. accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the
has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
inMejorada v. Sandiganbayan where we held that a prosecution for violation Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of
accusedpublic officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other his official, administrative or judicial functions. The word "unwarranted" means
concessions." Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada, lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the
improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from
corrupt practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its
some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or
reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or
desirability; choice or estimation above another.
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree
with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a
sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear place other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more
comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move about
the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or
the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to
government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of
"public officers" may not come within the term.It is a strained Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayor's life would
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to be put in danger inside the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their
the existence of any risk on Adalim's safety. To be sure, the latter would not acts although apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative,
be alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and
Akyatan's gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, concurrence of sentiments.
the same would still not constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant
Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.'s willful
Adalim's detention outside the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts
cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s order to move Adalim from jail,
within the perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate
despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate,
Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring a
repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the 85 days that Adalim court order to transfer a person under detention by legal process is
stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s house. More importantly, even if Adalim could
elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the
have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a
intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his power to transfer
court order was still indispensable for his transfer.
Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances resulting in the violation charged, makes them equally responsible as
claimed by petitioners. conspirators.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No.
fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 3019 punishes a public officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of
11 of the RPC, any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1)
exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. In order for this month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from
justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the public office. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No.
accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special law,
or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and
right or office. Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s case. the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of
when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve
to state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the (12) years and four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-principal without
due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his office. the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance to his credit, petitioner
Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of
obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the
Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH
a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any criminal liability. For this MODIFICATION. We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino
justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A.
an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an
purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and
lawful. Only the first requisite is present in this case. one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.
While the order for Adalim's transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who With costs against the petitioners.
was then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner SO ORDERED.
Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail
Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the
provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him to the house of
petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation
under Article 17(1) of the RPC.
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at
the same object, one performing one part of and another performing another
DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE LOPEZ, MARIANO
CRUZ andFERDINAND CRUZ. While the other
respondents, P/CINSP. FERNANDO BILLEDO and SPOI
DANIEL OCAMPO be ABSOLVED from any criminal liability for
lack of sufficient evidence. Further, there being an administrative
case filed before the PLEB-Pasay City against police
respondents, let the said forum continue its proceedings, and that
the same be considered CLOSEDand TERMINATED, insofar as
this Office is concerned.
[ GR No. 175091, Jul 13, 2011 ]
SO RESOLVED.
P & CHIEF INSPECTOR FERNANDO BILLEDO v. WILHELMINA WAGAN
After the criminal informations for Violation of R.A. No. 3019 were filed, the
At bench is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as petitioners Police Chief cases were remanded to the CPO for the conduct of the new preliminary
Inspector (PCI) Fernando Billedo, Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Rodrigo investigation on motion of the accused.
Domingo, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Jorge Lopez, Ferdinand Cruz, and Mariano
Cruz (petitioners), allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Judge On July 27, 2001, the CPO recommended the dismissal of the cases for lack
Wilhelmina Wagan (public respondent) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch of merit. Pertinently, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito Vibandor
111, Pasay City (RTC), in issuing the Orders dated: (1) May 8, 2006; (2) July explained that there was no fault on the part of the Cruzes when they reported
12, 2006, and (3) August 26, 2006, in Civil Case No. 00-0089, entitled "Nilo a group of individuals drinking along an alley which prompted the police
Jay Mina, et al. v. Mariano Cruz, et al." for damages. The assailed orders officers to respond to a call of duty. The facts and circumstances surrounding
denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by one of the petitioners, Ferdinand Cruz. their arrest were clearly spelled out in the Affidavit of Arrest of the police
officers. While it may be argued that the Cruzes may have been biased, there
The Facts: appeared to be a semblance of truth to their report when private respondents
The case stemmed from the arrest of complainants Alberto Mina, Nilo Jay Mina were arrested by the police officers. Besides, the subsequent filing of the
and Ferdinand Caasi on February 27, 2000 along an alley, Interior 332, Edang corresponding information after the inquest investigation for a violation of a city
Street, Pasay City, by petitioners-police officers. They were reported to have ordinance, is per se an imprimatur of the legality of their arrest.
been caught in flagrante delicto drinking liquor in a public place. The After giving a careful look at the records of the case and the facts
complainants alleged that their arrest was unlawful and was only upon the and incidents that transpired, the undersigned Ombudsman
inducement and unjustifiable accusation of Ferdinand Cruz and Mariano Prosecutor agrees with prosecutor Vibandor that there is doubtful
Cruz (the Cruzes). Thereafter, they were charged before the Metropolitan merit of the offenses filed for Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019
Trial Court of Pasay City (MeTC) with a violation of City Ordinance No. 265 against the accused. It appears that the arresting policemen have
(Drinking Liquor in Public Places), which was docketed as Criminal Case No. in fact filed a case for Violation of Ordinance against the three (3)
00-621. complainants which was indorsed for Inquest Investigation and
On March 20, 2000, after the said incident, the complainants filed Civil Case later filed in court. This shows that there was substantial basis, of
No. 00-0089 against the petitioners for damages. their performance of official duty, for otherwise, it would not have
passed the inquest. Hence, the presence of manifest partiality or
Subsequently, criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners
evident bad faith is gravely questionable to warrant filing of
before the City Prosecution Office (CPO) and the Office of the
Violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019.
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Unlawful Arrest and Violation of R.A. No. 7438
(Act Defining Rights of Person Under Custodial Investigation). The PREMISES CONSIDERED, undersigned respectfully
CPO dismissed the case for lack of merit while the Ombudsman, in its Joint recommends for the APPROVAL of the instant Resolution of
Resolution dated October 13, 2000, dismissed both complaints for lack of Atty. Vibandor and the RECALL of the Informations filed with the
probable cause, but recommended the filing of 3 corresponding criminal Pasay City Regional Trial Court.
informations for Violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Thus: Meanwhile, the complainants were found guilty by the MeTC for Violation of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended City Ordinance No. 265. Their conviction was affirmed by the RTC, Branch
that an Information of VIOLATION OF R.A. 3019, SEC. 3 (e), for 114, Pasay City. Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
three (3) counts be FILED in court against SPO3 RODRIGO
Civil Case No. 00-0089, on the other hand, proceeded with the trial with the Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that a cause of action
complainants presenting their first witness. Before cross-examination, for damages arising from the acts or omission complained of as
Ferdinand A. Cruz, one of the petitioners, filed his Motion to Dismiss, alleging an offense is different and distinct from the prosecution of the
therein that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the civil case offense itself. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
and not the RTC; and that conformably to Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the the extinction of the civil action, unless the extinction proceeds
complainants are barred from filing a separate and independent civil action. from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. Besides, it is elementary
Public respondent denied the motion to dismiss in her assailed May 8, 2006
Order stating, among others, that under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code, that an accused may be civilly liable even if acquitted of the crime
the crime of "unlawful arrest" is punishable by arresto mayor and a fine not charged.
exceeding 500 pesos which, under R.A. No. 7691, falls within the jurisdiction A Second Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it was also denied by
of appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case public respondent in her questioned August 26, 2006 Order.
may be, contrary to the movant's claim that it was the Sandiganbayan which Aggrieved, petitioners come before this Court. While they admit that they are
has jurisdiction over the ancillary action for damages. aware of the principle of the hierarchy of the courts, they opted to directly
Public respondent further explained that had there been a criminal case for appeal before this Court considering that the issue to be resolved entails an
unlawful arrest filed before the MeTC, the civil case for damages should have interpretation of Section 4, R.A. No. 8249, otherwise known as the
been transferred to it, but, there was none. She also stated that the movant "Sandiganbayan Act," which provides:
failed to attach certified copies of resolutions/orders dismissing the complaint Section 4.Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further
for unlawful arrest. Thus, she could not simply rely on bare assertions or
amended to read as follows:
conjectures but must resolve the issues raised based on competent proof.
x x x
Petitioner Ferdinand Cruz then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was In case private individuals are charged as co-principal,
denied in the assailed July 12, 2006 Order. Public respondent wrote that the accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
situation was not within the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. The
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
provision suggests of two (2) situations. First, a criminal action has been
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
instituted before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be jurisdiction over them.
simultaneously instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the
criminal case, is still pending upon the filing of the criminal action, in which Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
case, the civil case should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
for consolidation and joint determination. action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with and jointly determined in, the same
Considering the circumstances surrounding the case, the public respondent proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
opined that the case did not fall in any of the two cited situations. Thus, she
filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with
wrote:
it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of
By reason of the dismissal of the criminal complaint for unlawful such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
arrest during the preliminary investigation stage, there was no recognized: Provided, however, that where the civil action had
criminal action for unlawful arrest, from which the instant civil heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
case was based, that was ultimately filed with the Metropolitan been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Trial Court of Pasay City, the appropriate court to hear and try Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
such offense under R.A. 8249. Consequently, there is no transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the
appropriate court to which the instant case should be transferred case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
as mandated under Section 4 of R.A. 8294. There should not criminal action, otherwise, the separate civil action shall be
have been any problem had the criminal case for unlawful arrest deemed abandoned." [Emphasis Supplied]
prospered or reached the appropriate court as ratiocinated by this In this petition, the petitioners presented this lone ISSUE
Court in its Order dated May 8, 2006. But there was none.
xxxx
WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR ANY The rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory
OTHER COURTS HAS THE JURISDICTION TO TRY CIVIL and, therefore, not appealable, "even on pure questions of law." Neither can
CASE NO. 00-0089 GIVEN THE MANDATORY it be subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be
SIMULTANEOUS INSTITUTION AND JOINT reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after
DETERMINATION OF A CIVIL LIABILITY WITH THE trial. The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall
CRIMINAL ACTION AND THE EXPRESS PROHIBITION TO useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by
FILE THE SAID CIVIL ACTION SEPARATELY FROM THE having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such
CRIMINAL ACTION AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 4 orders may be contested in a single appeal.
OF REPUBLIC ACT 8249?
All told, the Court finds that the public respondent committed no grave abuse
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no commission of a grave of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
abuse of discretion which can be attributed to the public respondent in issuing orders.
the challenged Orders dated May 8, 2006, July 12, 2006 and August 26, 2006.
As correctly pointed out by the public respondent, the subject civil case does WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
not fall within the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part of
this provision contemplates only two (2) situations. These were correctly
SO ORDERED.
pointed out by the public respondent as follows: First, a criminal action has
been instituted before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the
requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be
simultaneously instituted with it; and Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the
criminal case, is still pending upon the filing of the criminal action, in which
case, the civil case should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case
for consolidation and joint determination.
Evidently, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this
case. No criminal action has been filed before the Sandiganbayan or any
appropriate court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the subject civil
case can be transferred or consolidated as mandated by the said provision.
It is also illogical to consider the civil case as abandoned simply because the
criminal cases against petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A
reading of the latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil
case will only be considered abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and
the civil case was not transferred to the court trying the criminal case for joint
determination.
The criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the
preliminary stage for lack of probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil
case instituted prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is already baseless
as the complainants can prove their cause of action in the civil case by mere
preponderance of evidence.
While the dismissal of the criminal cases against them for Violation of R.A. No.
7438 (Acts Defining Rights of Persons Under Custodial Investigation) and
unlawful arrest and the conviction of the complainants for Violation of City
Ordinance No. 265 (Drinking Liquor in Public Place), might be factors that can
be considered in their favor, the petitioners should have proceeded with the
trial of the civil case pending before the public respondent instead of filing this
petition.
[Petitioner] Jesus Torres y Uchi was the principal of Viga Rural
Development High School (VRDHS). On April 26, 1994, he
directed Edmundo Lazado, the school's collection and disbursing
officer, to prepare the checks representing the teachers' and
employees' salaries, salary differentials, additional compensation
[ GR No. 175074, Aug 31, 2011 ] allowance (ACA) and personal emergency relief allowance
(PERA) for the months of January to March, 1994. Lazado
JESUS TORRES v. PEOPLE prepared three (3) checks in the total amount of P196,654.54, all
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the dated April 26, 1994, viz: PNB Check Nos. C-983182-Q for
Resolution dated September 6, 2006 and Resolution dated October 17, P42,033.32; C-983183-Q for P95,680.89; C-983184-Q for
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29694. P58,940.33 (Exhs. "A", "B" and "C"). The [petitioner] and Amador
Borre, Head Teacher III, signed the three (3) checks (TSN, Aug.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: 30, 2001, pp. 4-8).
In an Information dated November 15, 1994, petitioner Jesus U. Torres was Upon the instruction of the [petitioner], Lazado endorsed the
charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds before the Regional checks and handed them to the accused. It was the custom in
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, Virac, Catanduanes, the accusatory portion of the school for Lazado to endorse the checks representing the
which reads: teachers' salaries and for the accused to encash them at PNB,
That on or about the 27th day of April 1994, or sometime Virac Branch and deliver the cash to Lazado for distribution to the
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, teachers (Id., pp. 12-17).
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the The following day, April 27, 1994, the accused encashed the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Principal three (3) checks at PNB, Virac Branch but he never returned to
of Viga Rural Development High School, Viga, Catanduanes, and the school to deliver the money to Lazado (Id., pp. 8-9).
as such by reason of his office and duties is responsible and
accountable for public funds entrusted to and received by him, to Evidence for the Defense
wit: PNB Checks (sic) Nos. C-983182-Q for P42,033.32; C- The [petitioner] admitted that he encashed the subject checks at
983183-Q for P95,680.89; C-983184-Q for P58,940.33, all dated PNB, Virac Branch in the morning of April 27, 1994 but instead of
April 26, 1994 in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED NINETY- going back to the school, he proceeded to the airport and availed
SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR PESOS and of the flight to Manila to seek medical attention for his chest
FIFTY-FOUR CENSTAVOS (P196,654.54), Philippine Currency, pain. Two (2) days after, around 4:30 o'clock in the morning of
representing salaries, salary differentials, additional April 29, 1994, while he and his nephew were on the road waiting
compensation allowance and Personal Emergency Relief for a ride, three (3) armed men held them up and took his bag
Allowance from January to March 1994 of the employees of the containing his personal effects and the proceeds of the subject
said school, taking advantage of his position and committing the checks. He reported the incident to the police authorities, but he
offense in relation to his office, encashed said checks with the failed to recover the money (TSN, Nov. 12, 2002, pp. 11-25).
Philippine National Bank, Virac, Catanduanes Branch and once
in possession of the money, did then and there willfully, unlawfully On August 31, 2005, after finding that the prosecution has established all the
and feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misapply, elements of the offense charged, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting
misappropriate, embezzle and convert to his personal use and petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, the decretal portion of
benefit the aforementioned amount of money, to the damage and which reads:
prejudice of the Government. WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jesus Torres y Uchi
Contrary to law. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of
public funds as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and
Evidence for the Prosecution 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, and to 18 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to suffer
the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; and to pay the The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
fine of P196,654.54 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
insolvency. regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, upon his conviction, petitioner's remedy should have been an appeal
On September 8, 2005, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal, where it was
indicated that he was seeking recourse and appealing the decision of the RTC to the Sandiganbayan. There is nothing in said paragraph which can
before the Court of Appeals. conceivably justify the filing of petitioner's appeal before the Court of Appeals
instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any
On February 10, 2006, petitioner filed a Manifestation and jurisdiction to review the judgment petitioner seeks to appeal.
Motion acknowledging that he filed the appeal before the wrong
tribunal. Petitioner eventually prayed, among other things, that the case be It must be emphasized, however, that the designation of the wrong court does
referred to the Sandiganbayan for appropriate action. not necessarily affect the validity of the notice of appeal. However, the
designation of the proper court should be made within the 15-day period to
In its Comment filed on June 29, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor General appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct
prayed that the appeal be dismissed outright, since transmittal to the proper appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded
court, in cases of erroneous modes of appeal, are proscribed. to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
On September 6, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal, the would apply, the relevant portion of which states:
dispositive portion of which reads: Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. - x
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule x x An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall
50 of the Rules and Section 4 of SC Circular No. 2-90, the instant not be transferred to the appropriate court, but shall be
appeal hereby is DISMISSED OUTRIGHT for lack of jurisdiction. dismissed outright.

SO ORDERED. In the case at bar, petitioner sought correction of the error in filing the appeal
way beyond the expiration of the period to appeal the decision. The RTC
promulgated its Decision on August 31, 2005. Petitioner filed his Notice of
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied in the Appeal on September 8, 2005. Petitioner tried to correct the error only on
Resolution dated October 17, 2006. February 10, 2006 when he filed his Manifestation and Motion. Clearly, this is
Hence, the petition raising the sole error: beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial
court. Therefore, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it dismissed
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONER'S APPEAL OUTRIGHT
INSTEAD OF CERTIFYING THE CASE TO THE PROPER Besides, even if we look into the merits of his arguments, the case is doomed
COURT. to fail. Contrary to petitioner's argument, We find that he is an accountable
officer within the contemplation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
Petitioner maintains that he inadvertently filed the notice of appeal before the hence, is untenable.
Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner implores that the
Court exercise its sound discretion and prerogative to relax compliance to An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised
sound procedural rules and to decide the case on the merits, considering that Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by
from the beginning, he has been candid and straightforward about the fact that reason of the duties of his office. The nature of the duties of the public officer
the case was wrongfully filed with the Court of Appeals instead of the or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for
Sandiganbayan. which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which
determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public
officer or employee. Hence, a school principal of a public high school, such
The petition is without merit. as petitioner, may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with
Paragraph 3, Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), which defined public funds and misappropriates the same.
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provides: Petitioner also posits that he could not be convicted under the allegations in
the Information without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
accusations against him. He maintains that the Information clearly charged
him with intentional malversation and not malversation through negligence,
which was the actual nature of malversation for which he was convicted by the
trial court. This too lacks merit.
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through
negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal
intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not
show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude
the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence
because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges
willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still
be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the
offense.Explicitly stated -
x x x [E]ven on the putative assumption that the evidence against
petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence, but the
information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case, his conviction under the first mode of
misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is
committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpapresent in the offense is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper. x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions


dated September 6, 2006 and October 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29694 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
the People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB, which challenges such
order.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the Sandiganbayan
erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over offenses involving the heads of
the legal departments of government-owned and controlled corporations.
[ GR Nos. 166948-59, Aug 29, 2012 ] The Ruling of the Court
PEOPLE v. MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a
This case is about the Sandiganbayan's criminal jurisdiction over graft charges stock or non-stock corporation, AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a
filed against the Legal Department Head of the Armed Forces of the government-owned and controlled corporation. Consequently, respondent
Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefit System (AFP-RSBS) and his AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of
co-accused. R.A. 8249 that defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the Sandiganbayan changed its
The Facts and the Case position and ruled that AFP-RSBS is after all a government-owned and
In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into controlled corporation, having been created by special law to perform a public
alleged anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found function. Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to
that when acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of the accused since Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly
sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price and conspired to commit the crime charged, did not hold any of the government
the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted purchase price. positions enumerated under that section, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended
would be held by the vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds to read as follows:
of sale in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, according
to the Committee, to enable the AFPRSBS to draw more money from its funds Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes. exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
General Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt
the unregistered deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands in General Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for falsification of public documents or II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 4 to Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) occupying the following positions in the government,
3019, Sections 3(e) and 3(g). whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
Acting on the Committee's recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x x
acquisition of lands in Iloilo City informations before the Sandiganbayan in (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado managers of government-owned or controlled
Enrique A. Bello, Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie corporations, state universities or educational
Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel, Felipe institutions or foundations. (Emphasis ours)
Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. Notably, in its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan defined the
3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of falsification of public documents under word "manager" used above as one who has charge of a corporation and
Article 171, RPC. control of its businesses or of its branch establishments, and who is vested
Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the with a certain amount of discretion and independent judgment. The
informations on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan cited Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed., 1968 to support
the case. On February 12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and this definition.
ordered the remand of the records to the proper courts, hence, this petition by
After a quick check of the same dictionary source but of a later edition, What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by law must commit the
however, the Court finds this additional definition of "manager:" offense described in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 while in the performance of
A manager is one who has charge of corporation and control of official duties or in relation to the office being held. Here, the OMB charged
Bello of using his office as Legal Department Head to manipulate the
its businesses, or of its branch establishments, divisions, or
documentations of AFP-RSBS land acquisitions to the prejudice of the
departments, and who is vested with a certain amount of
government.
discretion and independent judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the
The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above definition that includes
Sandiganbayan decision dated February 12, 2004 and resolution dated
"divisions, or departments," which are corporate units headed by managers.
The United States case of Braniff v. McPherren also referred to "divisions" and February 2, 2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31, and DIRECTS
the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these cases, immediately ARRAIGN all
"departments" in relation to the position of "manager." Under this definition,
the accused, and resolve accused Raul Aposaga's motion for reinvestigation.
respondent Bello would fit into the term "manager," he having charge of the
AFP-RSBS Legal Department when the questioned transactions took place.
SO ORDERED.
In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used in Section 4(a)(1)(g),
the Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this
doctrine, a proper construction may be had by considering the company of
words in which the term or phrase in question is founded or with which it is
associated. Given that the word "manager" was in the company of the words
"presidents, directors or trustees," the clear intent, according to the
Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning of the term "manager" to officers who
have overall control and supervision of government-owned and controlled
corporations.
But as the OMB puts it, the enumeration of the officials in each of the
categories in Section 4(a)(1) should be understood to refer to a range of
positions within a government corporation. By the variety of the functions they
perform, the "presidents, directors or trustees, or managers" cannot be taken
to refer only to those who exercise "overall" control and supervision of such
corporations.
The directors or trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations do
not, for example, exercise overall supervision and control; when they act
collectively as a board, the directors or trustees merely lay down policies for
the operating officers to implement. Since "managers" definitely do not have
the same responsibilities as directors and trustees or as presidents, they
belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the definition above,
has charge of a corporation's "divisions or departments." This brings Bello's
position within the definition.
Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan does not exercise
jurisdiction over him because his rank at the time of the acts complained of
was merely that of Police Superintendent in the Philippine National Police. But
the criminal information does not charge him for offenses relating to the regular
police work of a police officer of his rank. He is rather charged for offenses he
committed in relation to his office, namely, that of a "manager" of the Legal
Department of AFP-RSBS, a government-owned and controlled corporation.
subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned
and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and
electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
Project ("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong,
Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and
obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation
(Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and
[ GR Nos. 169823-24, Sep 11, 2013 ] committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of
HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to
said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action
engineering and architectural design and to construct the Project,
involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering
respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public
that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten
officials.
wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close
associates.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Case
Criminal Case No. 28002
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari the resolutions
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines,
promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO
Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17,
T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President
2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations) and August 10, 2005
of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal
(denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to
friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further
quash), alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed
the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physician of the
Antecedents Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal relation,
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30, 2004 intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal (PNPP) Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC)
Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign
Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),
Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002). more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation
(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows: ($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having
Criminal Case No. 28001 business, transaction, and application with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the
HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the engineering and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the
then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts
there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering
and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled
DISINI's ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts
stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary
billion) shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure
stock having then a book value of P100.00 per share of stock, and and obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos,
for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT. DETERMINING THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF THE
CONTRARY TO LAW. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLY
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal
ABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED TO UPHOLD
actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did
not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to THE 'SUFFICIENCY' OF THE INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASE
quash. NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENT COURT
DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION.
to obtain the Sandiganbayan's favorable action on his motion for permission
to travel abroad. He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations. D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) DESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the motion to quash. PRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THE
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, ACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO
2005, but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
2005 through the second assailed resolution. ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.
Issues Ruling
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging The petition for certiorari has no merit.
that: 1. Preliminary Considerations
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in
OFFENSES CHARGED. G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan, which involved
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT the civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
RULED THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OF damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.)
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE THE filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against
INFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. Disini and others.The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that
1, 2, 14 AND 14-A". Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through the misappropriation of public funds,
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of
ASSUMED JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THE corruption, as follows:
REQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THE
ACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER. 3. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVE ABUSE cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, relationship x xx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering
DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO PRESCRIPTION. the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN government. x x x x 13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and
DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active
PERIOD. collaboration and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand
E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN of their association and influence with the latter defendant
DETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD. assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
x x x x(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies
and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which defendants
received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge,"as
unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations it has prejudged the matter. x x x
like the Westinghouse Corporation; xxxx
(d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case,
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in
a contract awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot
exorbitant amount that included defendant's staggering possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an
commissions defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the even hand.
contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991, the PCGG transmitted the records of can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints
Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit: subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of that the records of the same should be forwarded to the
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319 Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer
92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to your has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct
Office for appropriate action the records of the attached criminal such preliminary investigation and take appropriate
case which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in action. (Bold emphasis supplied)
certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also parts
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its
of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-] filed with the conduct of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus
Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court
have been sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, with the Court
party defendants in the civil cases.
requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became the
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the subject of Disini's motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for proper Case No. 28002.
action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the 2. Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction
PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases similar over the offenses charged
to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses
Ostensibly, the PCGG's letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling
charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002. He
in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being
Government (Cojuangco, Jr.), viz:
filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 1, 2, 14
x x x [T]he PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by
facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither
intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration cases;
subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the
General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x. PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal,
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the
orders against petitioner's properties, it was on the basis of regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan
acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy has jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001
funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4(c) of
conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints
initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the
recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office
but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates. following its finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to
sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002. Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the
intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the
7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction
Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness
cases involving:
in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case No. 28001 and
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act wealth was no longer necessary. With Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No. 0013, the PCGG had
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to
officials occupying the following positions in the government E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense: That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked
xxxx the PCGG with assisting the President in "[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
office. enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,"
issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied) expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth
covered President Marcos' immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.
corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned Contrary to Disini's argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the R.A. No. 8249 applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and Subsection
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:
court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, xxxx
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.x x x x a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
officials occupying the following positions in the government
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them. the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
xxxx
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini's being
sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-
assessors, engineers and other provincial department principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the
heads; offenses charged.
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang 3. The offenses charged in the informations have not yet
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other prescribed
city department heads;
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered,
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time
consul and higher;
when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all prescriptive period is interrupted.
officers of higher rank; The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered,
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the promised and given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
superintendent or higher; Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that
President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime
special prosecutor;
of corruption of public officials.
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001
owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or
is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the "same penalties
educational institutions or foundations;
imposed upon the officer corrupted." Under the second paragraph of Article
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery), if the gift was accepted by the
'27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a
1989; crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three
Constitution; times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, however,
in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. (bold that the longer prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes
emphasis supplied) committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was
approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given
xxxx retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986 as the time of the commission
higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b, signifying the of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to
plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. accord with People v. Pacificador.
To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides
Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring that prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by
the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable
14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 3326 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not would have dared to question the legality of these transactions.
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution (Citations omitted)
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead
double jeopardy. of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto is also enlightening, viz: involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it
similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the
day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution
an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the
PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only
of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the
prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless through the PCGG's exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of
a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013
ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a
Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been
cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply regularly done in the course of official functions.Considering further that during
the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the
the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the
no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of
unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the
question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records
Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. the conduct the preliminary investigation. In accordance with Article 91 of
Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which the Revised Penal Code and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of Justice, the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman
prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According
violation of the special law was not known at the time of its to Panaguiton:
commission, the prescription begins to run only from the In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
constitutive act or acts.
Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings
its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and
The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive,
In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc
thus:
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
While it may be observed that the term "judicial the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of
with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
them shall be included in the complaint or information.
investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public
the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February
now be understood either executive or judicial in 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President
character: executive when it involves the Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his
trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any position as President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in
kind of investigative proceeding instituted against consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini,
the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of and
to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right
for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of
to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
control.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense Penal Code are:
charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the
filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for 1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts
purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of or presents to a public officer; and
prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five 2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or
years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, presents are given to a public officer under
up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of circumstances that will make the public officer liable
the Ombudsman. for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
4. The informations were sufficient in form and substance The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime.
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave
to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers,
may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to
motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances
offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not that would make him liable for direct bribery. The second element of corruption
considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under
the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable
the Prosecution to proceed to trial. for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos
received or accepted Disini's offers, promises and gifts an essential element
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials)
in direct bribery the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the
and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No. 3019) have
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under
sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
of Court, viz:
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation
with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such
family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or
pecuniary advantage from any person having some
business, transaction, application, request, or contract
with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family
or close personal relation has to intervene in the business
transaction, application, request, or contract with the
government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A.
No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the
offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-
Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the
same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations
and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2)
Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested
and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from
Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application
with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the
public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal relations,
intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the
resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 16, 2005 by the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a
Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium!PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the
construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as
amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the
provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption
[ GR No. 168539, Mar 25, 2014 ] by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the
PEOPLE v. HENRY T. GO latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation
to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of
more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly
the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation
Philippines.
of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today
nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the within which to show cause why this case should not be
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance considering that the accused is a private person and the public
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
(NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. deceased, and not an accused in this case.
Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction
disadvantageous to the government. over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged
to have conspired with a public officer.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed
Section 3(g) ofR.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not
against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the
the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the
deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by
before the SB as follows: any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the The prosecution filed its Opposition.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE,
then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to which read thus:
his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone
Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-
conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this (1) that the accused is a public officer;
case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the government; and
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and
dismissed. (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty,
held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
I consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE herein private respondent.
JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether
EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090
herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating
ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged
THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
II
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY no public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution
ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A against respondent may not prosper.
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO The Court is not persuaded.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019.
POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can
no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The
III
only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge
WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who
QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
CASE NO. 28090 Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for
The Court finds the petition meritorious. Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides: infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death,
he should have been charged.
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however,
does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
x x x x with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby. Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment
for conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done
The elements of the above provision are: by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act
of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in
everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or criminal law, this Court in US. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done or While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed
written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is
for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime
alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or
unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty
more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy
survivors. Thus, this Court held that:
to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person importance, when considered together with the
cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or other evidence of record, in establishing the
intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one existence, of the consummated crime and its
person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the commission by the conspirators.
acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
found guilty of the offense.
extent and character of their respective active participation
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
Information filed against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of
admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is
Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more
the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co- persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators. through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State
actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible
and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons
for the whole, the same as though performed by himself
alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices," would be frustrated if the
alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other
death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who
than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
conspired with such public officer in violating the AntiGraft Law.
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others,
done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly
Peralta as to the nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as explained in one case where this Court held that
construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit: x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an of each (conspirator) without taking into
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to consideration the close and inseparable relation of
commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the each of them with the criminal act, for the
law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion commission of which they all acted by common
and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view
is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed
commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act
morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts of the band or party created by them, and they are
in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the all equally responsible x x x
State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired
undisturbed. However, when in resolute execution of a and confederated in the commission of the felony proved,
common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
importance in the determination of the liability of the investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to
any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well
be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction
conspiracy. of the court.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in Thus, it has been held that:
the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a
imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in
this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his
criminal liability.
person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs
x x x x to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his
once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals.
This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the x x x x
ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent "[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the
display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such defendant may be waived either expressly or
criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable. impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of is deemed to have submitted himself to the
conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive
presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion
matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
evidence to prove or disprove its presence. submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion as well as in his Urgent Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose
Motion to Resolve that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must
SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said
3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the
Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the
present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court
SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the jurisdiction over the person."
Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of Verily, petitioner's participation in the proceedings before the
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the
Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters
No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied which called for respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction.
the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court's jurisdiction
became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues over him. x x x.
that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant
case. In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to
question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the
Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an
liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation in Criminal Case No.
28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that
Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case
involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the
government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended
by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the
instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried
jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter,
this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it
does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person
of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean
that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the
law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the
alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere
incidents in the main case and the main case has already been pending for
over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court
would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means,
promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the


Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.
and
[...] processing, approving and granting loans under the
GSIS Bahay Ko Program to Fifty-Three (53) borrowers of [Jose
De Guzman]'s land development project known as Teresa
Homes amounting to Fifty-Two Million and One Hundred Seven
Thousand Pesos (Php52,107,000.00), despite the knowledge of
the fact that the lots covered were intended for commercial
purposes and by causing the over-appraisal in the amount of
[ GR Nos. 205963-64, Jul 07, 2016 ] Thirty-Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred
Forty-Eight Pesos and Thirty-Six Centavos (Php33,242,848.36)
AMANDO A. INOCENTES v. PEOPLE + of the land and buildings offered as collaterals, thus causing
We resolve the Petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court by petitioner undue injury to the Government.
Amando A. Inocentes (Inocentes), assailing the Resolutions dated February CONTRARY TO LAW.
8, 2013 and October 24, 2012 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 entitled People of the Philippines v. Amando A. On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution finding
Inocentes, et. al. probable cause and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the
accused. To avoid incarceration, Inocentes immediately posted hail.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On July 10, 2012, Inocentes filed an omnibus motion (1) for judicial
Inocentes, together with four (4) others, was charged with violating Section determination of probable cause; (2) to quash the informations filed against
3(e) or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended. The informations read: him; and (3) to dismiss the case for violating his right to the speedy disposition
That on or about October 2001 or immediately prior or of this case (omnibus motion). In this motion, he argued as follows:
subsequent thereto, in Tarlac City, Tarlac, Philippines and within First, the informations filed against him were fatally defective because they did
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named not allege the specific acts done by him which would have constituted the
accused, Amando A. Inocentes, Celestino Cabalitasan, Ma. offense. All that was alleged in the informations was that he conspired and
Victoria Leonardo and Jerry Balagtas, all public officers, being the cooperated in the alleged crime.
Branch Manager, Division Chief III, Property Appraiser III, and
Senior General Insurance Specialist, respectively, of the Second, there is no evidence showing how he cooperated or conspired in the
Government Service Insurance System, Tarlac City Field Office, commission of the alleged offense. The findings of the investigating unit
committing the crime herein charged in relation to and in taking revealed that the connivance was perpetuated by the marketing agent and the
advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating borrowers themselves by misrepresenting their qualifications. The GSIS
with Jose De Guzman, through manifest partiality, evident bad Internal Audit Service Group Report even said that it was the marketing agent
faith or gross inexcusable negligence; did then and there willfully, who had the opportunity to tamper and falsify the documents submitted before
unlawfully and criminally [gave] undue preference, benefit or Inocentes' office.
advantage to accused Jose De Guzman by processing and Third, the informations filed against him should be quashed because the
approving the housing loans of Four Hundred Ninety-One (491) Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the case. At the time of the
borrowers of [Jose De Guzman] 's housing project under the commission of the alleged offense, Inocentes held a position with a Salary
GSIS Bahay Ko Program, with a total amount of loans amounting Grade of 26. He likewise claims that he cannot fall under the enumeration of
to Two Hundred Forty-One Million Fifty-Three Thousand Six managers of GOCCs because his position as department manager cannot be
Hundred Pesos (Php241,053,600.00), knowing fully well that the placed in the same category as the president, general manager, and trustee
said borrowers/grantees were not qualified and were not under of the GSIS
the territorial jurisdiction of the Tarlac City Field Office, thereby
giving said borrowers/grantees unwarranted benefit and causing Fourth, Innocentes insisted that the case against him must be dismissed
damage and prejudice to the government and to public interest in because his right to the speedy disposition of this case had been violated since
the aforesaid amount. seven (7) years had lapsed from the time of the filing of the initial complaint up
to the time the information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed its opposition and In its comment, the OSP counters that what Inocentes asks at this point is for
Inocentes filed his reply, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed this Court to examine and weigh all the pieces of evidence and thereafter
resolution. The Sandiganbayan maintained its jurisdiction over the case absolve him of all charges without undergoing trial.
because Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
The OSP said that the Office of the Ombudsman did not act arbitrarily in
8249, specifically includes managers of GOCCs - whose position may not fall
conducting the preliminary investigation and finding probable cause.
under Salary Grade 27 or higher - who violate R.A. No. 3019. It also ruled that
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan likewise found probable cause after considering
the informations in this case sufficiently allege all the essential elements
all the pleadings and documents submitted before it and saw no sound reason
required to violate Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. to set aside its finding.
Further, it said that it already determined the existence of probable cause when
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation
it issued the warrant of arrest in its minute resolution dated May 10, 2012.
saying that it will no longer submit its comment as the OSP, pursuant to its
Lastly, it held that the delay in this case was excusable considering that the expanded mandate under R.A. No. 6770, shall represent the People before
records of this case were transferred from the Regional Trial Court in Tarlac this Court and the Sandiganbayan.
City, where the case was first filed. OUR RULING
In his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes reiterated the same arguments he We find the present petition meritorious.
raised in his omnibus motion. In addition, he asserted that the present case
against him should be dismissed because the Office of the Ombudsman Preliminary Considerations
dismissed the estafa case against him for the same transactions. He also filed The Constitution, under Section 1, Article VIII, empowers the courts to
a supplemental motion attaching a copy of the affidavit of a certain Monico determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
Imperial to show (1) that there existed political persecutions within the GSIS amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
against the critics of then President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, instrumentality of the Government. This is an overriding authority that cuts
and (2) that the GSIS branch manager relies on the recommendation of his across all branches and instrumentalities of government and is implemented
subordinates in approving or disapproving real estate loan applications. through the petition for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides.
The Sandiganbayan remained unconvinced. On the contents of the affidavit, it Inocentes, through this remedy, comes before this Court asserting that there
agreed with the prosecution that these are matters of defense that must stand was grave abuse on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it exercised its
scrutiny in a full-blown trial. With respect to the dismissal of the estafa case discretion in denying his omnibus motion. This extraordinary writ solely
against him, the Sandiganbayan said that the dismissal of that case does not addresses lower court actions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
necessarily result in the dismissal of the present case because the same act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse
may give rise to two (2) or more separate and distinct offenses. of discretion is a circumstance beyond the legal error committed by a decision-
To contest the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes filed the making agency or entity in the exercise of its jurisdiction; this circumstance
present petition asserting, among others, that the quantum of evidence affects even the authority to render judgment.
required to establish probable cause for purposes of holding a person for trial Under these terms, if the Sandiganbayan merely legally erred while acting
and/or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest was not met in this case. He within the confines of its jurisdiction, then its ruling, even if erroneous, is not
argued that absent any allegation of his specific acts or evidence linking him the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. If, on the other hand, the
to the anomalous transactions, probable cause can hardly exist because it Sandiganbayan ruling was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting
would be imprudent to insinuate that Inocentes knew of the criminal design to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then this ruling is fatally defective on
when all he did was only to approve the housing loan applications. Obviously jurisdictional ground and should be declared null and void.
relying on his subordinates, Inocentes claimed that he could not have
conspired with them when he had no personal knowledge of any defect. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan denied Inocentes' omnibus motion (1)
to judicially determine the existence of probable cause; (2) quash the
On April 10, 2013, we required the respondents to comment on Inocentes' information that was filed against him; and/or (3) dismiss the case against him
petition, and deferred action on the issuance of a temporary restraining order for violation of his right to speedy trial. In determining whether the
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion, we
shall review the Sandiganbayan's judgment denying the omnibus motion in the
light of each cited remedy and the grounds presented by Inocentes to support
them.
The Sandiganbayan hardly committed any grave abuse of discretion in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that
the indictment contains a statement of facts relied
denying the motion to quash the information.
upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
Inocentes is unyielding in his position that the informations filed against him concise language, with as much certainty as the
should be quashed based on the following grounds: (1) that all the information nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can
alleged is that Inocentes conspired and confederated with his co-accused enable a person of common understanding to know
without specifying how his specific acts contributed to the alleged crime; and what is intended, and with such precision that the
(2) that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Inocentes because he was accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
occupying a position with a salary grade less than 27. subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
On the contention that the informations did not detail Inocentes' individual xxx xxx xxx
participation in the conspiracy, we have underscored before the fact that under
our laws conspiracy should be understood on two levels, i.e., a mode of Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough
to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense
committing a crime or a crime in itself.
in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word,
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we explained that when conspiracy is charged "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements and all the elements must connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations basic facts constituting
be set forth in the information, but when it is not and conspiracy is considered the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
as a mode of committing the crime, there is less necessity of reciting its understanding would know what is intended, and with such
particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a
the offense, to wit: plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. [italics
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of supplied]
conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in With these guidelines in mind, Inocentes' challenge with respect to the
the complaint or information. informations filed against him necessarily fails as he could gather that he is
xxx xxx xxx one of those GSIS officials who conspired in approving the anomalous
transactions. Accordingly, the informations filed against Inocentes in this case
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when are valid because they adequately provide the material allegations to apprise
conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode him of the nature and cause of the charge.
of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the information because On the issue on jurisdiction, it is of no moment that Inocentes does not occupy
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The a position with a salary grade of 27 since he was the branch manager of the
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal GSIS' field office in Tarlac City, a government-owned or -controlled
liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their within the coverage of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
participation in the crime. The liabilities of the conspirators is The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by
collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People v. controlled corporations, and state universities shall be within the exclusive
Quitlong, we ruled how conspiracy as the mode of committing the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We have clarified the provision of
offense should be alleged in the information, viz: law defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by explaining that the
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those officials specifically
the components of conspiracy or allege all the enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
details thereof like the part that each of the parties regardless of their salary grades. Simply put, those that are classified as
therein have performed, the evidence proving the Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
common design or the facts connecting all the Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In
accused with one another in the web of conspiracy. this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the
Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
the same degree of particularity required in
Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even low-level probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override
management positions fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We the public prosecutors' determination of probable cause to hold
settled this point in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan and Geduspan v. People. an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan was correct in must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public
denying Inocentes' motion to quash; hence, there was no grave abuse in the prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining
exercise of its discretion regarding this matter. whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that
courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the
A redetermination of a judicial finding of probable cause is futile when
the accused voluntarily surrenders to the jurisdiction of the court. information filed against the person charged is valid on its face,
and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be
In the present case, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan imputed to the public prosecutor.
separately found that probable cause exists to indict and issue a warrant of
arrest against Inocentes. However, what Inocentes brings before this Court Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or
right now is only the finding of the Sandiganbayan of probable cause for the that the prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, a judge's determination of probable cause is limited
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the
Under our jurisdiction, any person may avail of this remedy since it is well- arrest warrants should be issued against the accused. [emphasis
established in jurisprudence that the court may, in the protection of one's supplied; citations omitted]
fundamental rights, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of
Under this ruling, we made it clear that the judge does not act as an appellate
evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's
In People v. Castillo, we discussed the two kinds of determination of probable determination of probable cause; rather, he makes a determination of probable
cause independently of the prosecutor's finding. Despite the fact that courts
cause, thus:
should avoid reviewing an executive determination of probable cause, we are
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: not completely powerless to review this matter under our expanded judicial
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable power under the Constitution.
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a We are aware, however, that Inocentes availed of this remedy after he had
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and posted bail before the Sandiganbayan which, in our jurisdiction, is tantamount
to voluntary surrender. Simply put, questioning the findings of probable cause
to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime
by the Sandiganbayan at this point would be pointless as it has already
as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
acquired jurisdiction over Inocentes.
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
not that function has been correctly discharged by the public upon (1) his arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant, or (2) his
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. For this
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a reason, in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan we held that even if it is conceded
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled that the warrant issued was void (for nonexistence of probable cause), the
to pass upon. accused waived all his rights to object by appearing and giving a bond, viz:
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of
is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy the jurisdiction of the court. [...]
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption from the
for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent
ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he
issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through
the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition"
reliefs. [omission and emphasis ours] of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both
in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay
Therefore, at this point, we no longer find it necessary to dwell on whether
is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of
there was grave abuse on the part of the Sandiganbayan in finding the
close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or
existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Had Inocentes
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at
brought this matter before he posted bail or without voluntarily surrendering
bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan
himself, the outcome could have been different. But, for now, whether the
findings of probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of discretion - thereby to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative
making the warrant of arrest void - does not matter anymore as even without assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
the warrant the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of
presented during the preliminary investigation merited
Inocentes.
prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the
The Sandiganbayan should have granted Inocentes' motion to dismiss first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
for violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases; it took seven treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three
long years before the information was filed before it. out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged
The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve the criminal charges failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required
against Inocentes for seven (7) years, violated Inocentes' constitutional right by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case against him, as well as complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such
its own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of
almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation.
A person's right to a speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged
Section 16, Article III of the Constitution: giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to
resolve the case. [emphasis ours]
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings
but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as The Sandiganbayan insists that the delay in this case is justifiable because the
well as in all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any informations were initially filed before the RTC in Tarlac City. However, after
party to a case may demand expeditious action of all officials who are tasked going over the records of the case, we find that the period of time in between
with the administration of justice. the incidents that could have contributed to the delay were unreasonable,
oppressive, and vexatious.
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, we held that the long delay of close to three (3)
years in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the According to the Sandiganbayan, the complaint in the case at bar was filed
Tanodbayan constituted a violation not only of the constitutional right of the sometime in 2004. After the preliminary investigation, on September 15, 2005,
accused under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but also of the the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding probable cause to
constitutional guarantee to "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in charge Inocentes. Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights, viz: November 14, 2005, the prosecution filed the informations with the RTC of
Tarlac City. However, on March 14, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary ordered the withdrawal of the informations filed before the RTC. From this
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be point, it took almost six (6) years (or only on May 2, 2012) before the
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the
law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, To our mind, even assuming that transfers of records from one court to another
including substantial compliance with the time limitation oftentimes entails significant delays, the period of six (6) years is too long
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the solely for the transfer of records from the RTC in Tarlac City to the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process Sandiganbayan. This is already an inordinate delay in resolving a. criminal
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only complaint that the constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused to due
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but
process and to the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the dismissal of the legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the
criminal case is in order. subject computerization contract had been mutually
Moreover, the prosecution cannot attribute the delay to Inocentes for filing cancelled by the parties thereto even before the
Anti-Graft League filed its complaint.
numerous motions because the intervals between these incidents are
miniscule compared to the six-year transfer of records to the Sandiganbayan. Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation
proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on
The prosecution likewise blames Inocentes for not seasonably invoking his
the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office
right to a speedy disposition of his case. It claims that he has no right to
of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same
complain about the delay when the delay is because he allegedly slept on his
within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its
rights.
mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it.
We find this argument unworthy of merit, in the same way we did As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:
in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial: the State
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is
resolution of their case because they were unaware that the consistent with due process.
investigation against them was still ongoing. They were only
informed of the March 27, 2003 resolution and information Plainly, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the informations were filed
skews the fairness which the right to speedy disposition of cases seeks to
against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when
maintain. Undoubtedly, the delay in the resolution of this case prejudiced
they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on
Inocentes since the defense witnesses he would present would be unable to
June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably
recall accurately the events of the distant past.
assumed that the proceedings against them have already been
terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why Considering the clear violation of Inocentes' right to the speedy disposition of
petitioners never followed up on the case altogether. Instructive his case, we find that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in not
on this point is the Court's observation in Duterte v. acting on the case within a reasonable time after it had acquired jurisdiction
Sandiganbayan, to wit: over it.
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have WHEREFORE, premises considered, Inocentes' petition is GRANTED. The
urged the speedy resolution of their case because resolutions dated February 8, 2013 and October 24, 2012 of the
they were completely unaware that the investigation Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 are
against them was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case, hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For violating Inocentes' right to a
we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely speedy disposition of his case, the Sandiganbayan is
asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the case against him.
which is the proper procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their SO ORDERED.
explanation and after four long years of being in the
dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume
that the charges against them had already been
dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman
failed to present any plausible, special or even novel
reason which could justify the four-year delay in
terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay
- the many layers of review that the case had to
undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail
- has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as
was the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident
before us does not involve complicated factual and

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