G.R. No.
155635 November 7, 2008 On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
FACTS:
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca,
then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA to both American
parents.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Alix. From
then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter,
sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.. On February
22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the dissolution
of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal
requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix.
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, Rebecca, however,withdrew the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath
that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living
separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City
RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca
also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their
daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of
cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino
citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is
no valid divorce to speak of.
Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the RTC order, Vicente went
to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction which was granted by the CA
The CA effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and reversed and set aside the
Order of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rebecca is a Filipino Citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic
2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid
RULING:
1. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained
her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of
an effective repudiation of such citizenship.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of
Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a
Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given
only on June 8, 2000
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on
June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the
1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to
coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that
prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino
citizen. The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But
from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of,
or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22,
1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
2. The judgment of divorce is valid.
At the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but
represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. Being an American
citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
Hence, Rebecca’s petition for nullity of marriage must be denied for lack of cause of
action since by virtue of the valid divorce decree, there is no longer a marriage to dissolve
or speak of.
GR. No. 139868 June 8, 2006
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,
vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.
FACTS:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted
daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it,
she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as
executor. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to
Richard’s renunciation of his appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q.
Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law
Offices as ancillary administrator.
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom
he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire
estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the
Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or
any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as
ancillary administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as
heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of
Audrey’s estate.The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by
the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988. The trial court also issued an
Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT
No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided
interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the
Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for
distribution to the heirs.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed
a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to
Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that
under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since
Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the
Makati property should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated
December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the
Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided
interest in the Makati property to respondent.
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an
amended complaint for the annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February
12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. Respondent contended that petitioner willfully
breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of
Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will.
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then
the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾
thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should
now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner
contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before
the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the
State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged
that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that
Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also
alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and
cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial
court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per
Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed since the law of the nationality of
the testator was not applied
RULING:
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the
annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The
CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to follow
the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted
to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the
national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have
distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also
found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance
with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s
adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate
according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted
to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in
Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625,
it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing
in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and
Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the
Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated
and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief
Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City
on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State
of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the
State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such
law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial
court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of
Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the
case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the
trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as
Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project of
partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and
deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action
appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance
that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission
to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in
sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission
of the real issues involved in the case.
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.
FACTS:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing
Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA
Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store (Robinson’s) in
Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided
to purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00. Respondent allegedly paid to the
cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store.
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury
Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee
approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She,
however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in
her favor. She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office
located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the
Guess employees as agreed upon.
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly
subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly
demanded payment for the black jeans. They supposedly even searched her
wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another argument.
Respondent, thereafter, went home.
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of
Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did
not concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off duty.
Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu
Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive it. Respondent
also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was
furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes
of canceling respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed
that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter. With the above experience,
respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and
social humiliation. She thus filed the Complaint for Damages before the RTC
against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis
Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She
demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
In their Answer, They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that
respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment. They emphasized that
they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was
arrogant in answering their questions. As counterclaim, petitioners and the other
defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint
and counterclaim of the parties.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision in favor of the
respondent.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of moral damages and attorneys fees is proper
RULING:
YES.
The "abuse of rights" principle under Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that "
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith."x x x32 The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.33
In this case, petitioners concluded that respondent who failed to make such
payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether
she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question
now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard
giving respondent a cause of action against them.
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she
paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu
Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when
voices were raised by both parties. Considering, however, that respondent was
in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official
receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such
payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have
been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard
and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the
guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to
respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing
bad acts on the part of respondent. 1âwphi1
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to
respondent’s employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in
collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in the eyes
of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite
the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible.
A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise, he opens himself to liability.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners
obviously abused their rights.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20
and 2 of the Civil Code which read:
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages
and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s
wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Moral damages are
not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They
should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of
the wrong done.They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable
the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering he has undergone.