ARZHY
2
CASE NO. 1
ART X SEC 1: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA
FACTS: E.O. No. 220 dated July 15, 1987 creates the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR) creating a temporary administrative agency pending the creation
of the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Petitioners contended that
aforementioned EO contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial
and political subdivision.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 220 creates a territorial and political subdivision
RULING: No, what is created is not a public corporation but an executive agency
under the control of the national government. It is more similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create under Section 14 Article X.
CAR does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities, and
municipalities nor was it granted with the power to sue or be sued. It was created
primary to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the covered areas. It is a mere transitory coordinating agency that
would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
MAIN POINT: The creation of autonomous regions contemplates the grant of
political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy.
ARZHY
CASE NO.
ART X SEC 2: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL AUTONOMY
Limbona v. Conte Mangelin, et al
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the act of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII in
ousting him as the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao during the assembly held in his absence as he was
invited by the Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives for consultations on political developments and other issues
affecting Regions IX and XII.
ISSUE: Whether or not the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao are
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts
RULING: Yes, autonomous governments of Mindanao exercise autonomy in
which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency. Autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape
its future with minimum intervention from central government authorities.
However, the President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions. The President shall exercise such powers as may be
necessary to assure that enactments and acts of Sangguniang Pampook and the
Lupong Tagapagapaganap ng Pook are in compliance with national legislation,
policies, plans and programs. Hence, the Court can assume jurisdiction.
MAIN POINT: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. Refer to page 415 of Bernas.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 3
 ART X SEC 2: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL AUTONOMY
San Juan v. CSC
FACTS: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal
was left vacant. Petitioner, who was the Governor of the Province of Rizal,
recommended nominees but none of them met the requirements provided by
law. Private respondent was instead appointed as PBO by DBM Undersecretary
Cabuquit upon the recommendation of Director Abella of DBM Region IV.
Petitioner contended that the power to recommend nominees for the position of
PBO is vested in the Provincial Governor and not in the Regional Director or a
Congressman. Respondent DBM on the other hand issued a Memorandum ruling
that DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position
since none of the petitioner’s nominees met the prescribed requirements.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Head of DBM is free to appoint anyone in
the event that the Governor recommended an unqualified person
RULING: No, the DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of
nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements
and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and
qualifications. The recommendation of the local government head is a condition
sine quo non of the Department’s appointing authority. This is the only way local
autonomy can be given the recognition the Constitution wants it to have.
MAIN POINT: The clear mandate of local autonomy must be obeyed. Where a law
is capable of two interpretations, the scale must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 4
ART X SEC 2: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL AUTONOMY
Drilon v. Lim
FACTS: RTC declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local
governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of
the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is violative of
the policy of local autonomy
RULING: No, Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did
set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version
of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it
was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing
the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but
of mere supervision.
MAIN POINT: There is no violation of the policy of local autonomy when only the
power of supervision is granted to the Secretary of Justice and not the power of
control.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 05
ARTICLE X LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECTION 2 LOCAL AUTONOMY
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties
FACTS: In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations in Cagayan de Oro
City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino. The action was angrily met by civic, religious
organizations and the local government. An Ordinance was passed
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing permit to
any establishment to be used for the operation of casino. Respondent avers
that the action modifies PD 1869, hence null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the autonomy of the local government include the
power to suppress or prevent the operation of PAGCOR.
RULING: No. Although LGUs have been granted the power to enact its own
ordinances and resolutions for the promotion of the General Welfare, such
enactments cannot contravene the provisions of laws enacted by the national
legislature P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code,
the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance remains
unimpaired.
MAIN POINT: Congress retains control of the local government units
although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. Local Government are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. Hence ordinances passed by the
Sanggunian contravening a statute shall be null and void.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 06
ARTICLE X LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECTION 2 LOCAL AUTONOMY
Judge Leynes vs COA
FACTS: Commission on Audit opposes the grant by the Municipality of Naujan
of the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner Judge Leynes for the reason
that the municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the RATA
already received from the Supreme Court. Petitioner aver that the
municipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by the Local
Government Code to enact appropriation ordinances granting allowances
and other benefits to judges stationed in its territory.
ISSUE: Whether or not DBM can, by the issuance of budget circulars, restrict
an LGU from exercising its given legislative powers of providing benefits to
national employees stationed or assignment in their municipality.
RULING: No, the Court upheld the constitutionally enshrined autonomy of
LGUs to grant allowances to judges in any amount deemed appropriate,
depending on availability of funds
MAIN POINT: The power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving
to their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant,
depending on the availability of local funds, ensures the genuine and
meaningful local autonomy of LGUs.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 07
ARTICLE X LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECTION 2 LOCAL AUTONOMY
Batangas CATV vs CA and Batangas City
FACTS: The city of Batangas passed an ordinance requiring CATV (cable
television) operators to apply for a permit from the City Government before
operating, putting up structures, and fixing or increasing rates. When the
Batangas CATV increased its rate, the City Mayor threatened to cancel the
permit of the CATV company if it did not seek the permission of the provided in the LGU Code that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to
Sanggunian to increase its rates. Batangas CATV filed a petition for injunction conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DAR’s approval or
alleging that the Sanggunian has no authority to regulate the rates of CATV clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.
companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR AO violates the autonomy of the Local
ISSUE: Whether or not the autonomy of the local government include the Government Units.
power to regulate the operation of CATVs.
RULING: No, the power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not
RULING: No. Although LGUs have been granted the power to enact its own absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural
ordinances and resolutions for the promotion of the General Welfare, such lands uses has been validly recognized.
enactments cannot contravene the provisions of laws enacted by the national
legislature. MAIN POINT: The power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not
absolute.
MAIN POINT: This does not limit the autonomy of the LGUs to enact
ordinances for the promotion of the general welfare but only that ordinances
must conform to limits of the power granted them and their enactments must
be consistent with the national legislature.

R. Rizon R. Rizon
CASE NO. 09
CASE NO. 08 ARTICLE X LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ARTICLE X LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECTION 2 LOCAL AUTONOMY
SECTION 2 LOCAL AUTONOMY Garcia vs COMELEC
CREBA vs Secretary of DAR
FACTS: Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of
FACTS: The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR Administrative Order Bataan in the May 11, 1992 elections. In July 1, 1993, some mayors, vice-
consolidating all existing implementing guidelines related to land conversion mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. Petitioner avers that it was not municipalities of the province met and constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRAC) to initiate the recall election for the
removal of petitioner Garcia. Petitioner Garcia alleged section 70 of R.A. 7160
is unconstitutional because the people have the sole and exclusive right to
decide whether or not to initiate proceedings and not the PRAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of elective officer provided in the Local
Government Code contravenes the power of the people to initiate recall.
RULING: No, the Constitution did not provide for any mode of initiating recall
elections. Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution allows Congress to enact
a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. Congress was
clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates.
MAIN POINT: The Constitution allows Congress to enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.
Digested by: FRANZ
CASE NO. 10
Article X, Section 3: Local Government: Local Government Code
Malonzo v. COMELEC
FACTS: Mayor Malonzo came on a "Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction", assailing the COMELEC's resolution as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The Petition, in the main, raises the issue of the validity of the
institution and proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of the
service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, and the
proceedings held, resulting in the issuance of the questioned Resolution. Due to
the importance of the matters in issue, and the proximity of the Recall Election
date declared by the COMELEC, the Court, on November 29, 1996, issued a
Resolution ordering the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from
proceeding with the recall election projected on December 14, 1996, and
directing the respondents to file their respective Comments. Private respondents
Liga ng mga Barangay (Caloocan Chapter), filed their Comment, alleging that all
the requirements for the holding of a recall election were duly complied with and
that the petition is therefore without basis. On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment on February 7, 1997,
with the surprising submission that the COMELEC was amiss in its duties as
enforcer of election laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings of the Preparatory Recall Assembly (Liga
ng mga Barangay) violates Section 492 of the Local Government Code.
RULING: No. It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays
are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Thus, the Punong
Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members
of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members
of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
MAIN POINT: The Liga ng mga Barangay is a distinct entity from the Preparatory
Recall Assembly.
CASE NO. 11
Article X, Section 3: Local Government: Local Government Code
Malonzo v. Zamora
FACTS: A supplemental budget was passed by the councilors upon three
readings held on the same day. They were charged with misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was enacted without
sufficient compliance with Section 50, Chapter 3, Title II of the Local Government
Code.
RULING: No, The law does not require the completion of the updating or adoption
of the internal rules of procedure before the Sanggunian could act on any other
matter like the enactment of an ordinance. It simply requires that the matter of
adopting or updating the internal rules of procedure be taken up during the first
day of session. It would be inequitable to read something more into the
requirement of the law and use it as a basis for finding petitioners guilty of
misconduct, especially when the charge is serious enough to warrant a penalty of
suspension from office for three (3) months without pay.
MAIN POINT: There is nothing in the law, however, which prohibits that the
three readings of a proposed ordinance be held in just one session day.
CASE NO. 12
Article X, Section 4: Local Government: Supervision by the President
Ganzon v. CA
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were
filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The
Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon
based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing
about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA
affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987
Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend
and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local
autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution
was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter
ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
RULING: Yes. The Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the
specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337 and the Local Government Code. The
Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed
against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
MAIN POINT: The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the
president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power.
CASE NO. 13
Article X, Section 4: Local Government: Supervision by the President
Joson v. Torres
FACTS: In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province
of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed
with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the letter-
complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code. He
alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not
supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that private
respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the
verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending with the
Office of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of the President over administrative
disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of
general supervision over local governments.
RULING: Yes. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into
facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision
is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be
founded upon knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful
study and investigation. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the
power to discipline.
MAIN POINT: "Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities
and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope
of their prescribed powers and functions."
CASE NO. 14
Article X, Section 4: Local Government: Supervision by the President
Drilon v. Lim
FACTS: The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. In the
exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this
Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is
unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes, because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of
control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on
the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments.
MAIN POINT: Art. X, Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect
to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
(Rechine) CASE NO. 15
ARTICLE X, SEC. 4: SUPERVISION BY THE PRESIDENT
BITO-ONON v. FERNANDEZ
FACTS: Petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon, and respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. were
candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President election for the Liga ng
Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon won the election,
Quejano filed a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors
(BES). Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga
Barangay election issued by the DILG on Memo Circular No. 97-193 as its
issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over
the Liga’s internal organization. Onon alleges that the Liga ng mga Barangay
(LIGA) is not a local government unit. Consequently, the DILG only has a limited
supervisory authority over the LIGA. Onon posits that the issuance of said
guidelines allowing an appeal of the decision of the BES to the regular courts
rather than to the National liga Board is no longer an exercise of supervision but
an exercise of control.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s power of general supervision extend to
the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unit.
RULING: Yes. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled
that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an
association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of
law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials.
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines that the President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Consequently, the ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local
Government Code. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay
as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and
crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing,
through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
(Rechine) CASE NO. 16
ARTICLE X, SEC. 4: SUPERVISION BY THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY v. PAREDES
FACTS: The DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512
an Urgent Motion, invoking the President’s power of general supervision over all
local government units. Petitioner David opposed the DILG’s Urgent Motion,
claiming that the DILG, being a respondent in the case, is not allowed to seek any
sanction against a co-respondent like David, such as by filing a cross-claim,
without first seeking leave of court. He also alleged that the DILG’s request to be
appointed interim caretaker constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs
of the Liga, since the Liga is not subject to DILG control and supervision.
ISSUE: Whether or not DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the president has power of
control over the liga ng mga barangay.
RULING: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of
the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local government,
which exclude the power of control. DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the
president has no power of control over the liga ng mga barangay. President’s
power of general supervision, as exercised by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego,
extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. However, the DILG’s authority over the Liga
is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such
rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
(Rechine) CASE NO. 17
ARTICLE X, SEC. 4: SUPERVISION BY THE PRESIDENT
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. ATIENZA, JR.
FACTS: Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and
Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr.,
then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance
was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Manila approved by
respondent Mayor and became effective after publication. Ordinance No. 8027
reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called “Pan-dacan Terminals” of the oil companies.
The City of Manila and the DOE entered into a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that “the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGU’s
RULING: Yes. Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions is that
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President’s power over
LGUs to one of general supervision: “SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x x” Consequently,
the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of
control over them.
MAIN POINT: Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department
heads, cannot interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they
act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its
own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of
Manila.
In addition: Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted
by local officials, a power that not even its principal, the President, has. This is
because: “Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in
the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are
merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the
President. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the
people. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only,
not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers.”
(Rechine) CASE NO. 18
ARTICLE X, SEC. 4: SUPERVISION BY THE PRESIDENT
PROVINCE OF NEGROS v. COA
FACTS: Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, represented by its then
Governor Rafael L. Coscolluela, and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care
Agreement. Petitioner, through an approved Sangguniang Panlalawigan
resolution, granted and released the disbursement for the hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits of the province’s officials and employees without
any prior approval from the President. After a post-audit investigation, the COA
disallowed the premium payment for such benefits because under AO 103, no
government entity, including a local government unit, is exempt from securing
prior approval from the President granting additional benefits to its personnel.
ISSUE: Whether or not under AO 103, no government entity, including a local
government unit is exempt from securing prior approval from the President
RULING: No. The requirement then of prior approval from the President
under Administrative Order No. 103 is applicable only to departments,
bureaus, offices and government-owned and controlled corporations
under the Executive branch. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the
President’s general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of
the President to be valid.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
(Rechine) CASE NO. 19
ARTICLE X, SEC. 5: TAXATION POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LTO v. CITY OF BULUAN
FACTS: Respondent City of Butuan asserts that one of the salient provisions
introduced by the Local Government Code is in the area of local taxation which
allows LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along with, in its view, the
corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of
tricycles. Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national
government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the
franchising authority over tricycles for-hire of the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (“LTFRB”) but not, it asseverates, the
authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of
licenses to drive such vehicles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LTO has the power to register, tricycles in particular,
as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise devolved to local
government units and that it may be properly tax?
RULING: Yes. Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of government to
raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry out its legitimate
objectives. Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are
inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local
government units by delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory
fiat. To construe the tax provisions of Section 133(1) indistinctively would result
in the repeal to that extent of LTO’s regulatory power which evidently has not
been intended. The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of
the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and
to grant franchises for the operation thereof. These functions of the LTO are
essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the
State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road
worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by
R.A. 4136.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Andalahao
CASE NO. 20
ART X SEC 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
Lina vs Pano 364 SCRA 76 (2001)
FACTS: The City Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna did not issue a Mayor's permit to
initialize PCSO lotto operations in the city in relation to Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 T.
1995. The ordinance prohibited the lotto operations in the province of Laguna.
RTC Branch 93 enjoined the petitioners from implementing or enforcing the
resolution. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
due to lack of merit.
A petition for certiorari was filed seeking the reversal of the decision
ISSUE: WON the City of San Pedro, Laguna can invoke Kapasiyahan Blg 508 T.
1995 in denying the issuance of Mayor’s permit to operate lotto.
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the freedom to exercise contrary views does
not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against
laws duly enacted by Congress. What the national legislature expressly allows by
law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
MAIN POINT: Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights such as levy of taxes and issuances of permits wholly from the
legislature. Legislature has absolute discretion to expand or contract fiscal
powers of local government units.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 21
ART X SEC 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
Petron vs Mayor GR 158881 April 16 2008
FACTS: Petron maintains a depot or bulk plant at the Navotas Fishport Complex
in Navotas. Through that depot, it has engaged in the selling of diesel fuels to
vessels used in commercial fishing in and around Manila Bay.Petron received an
assessment of taxes relative to the sale of diesel from 1997-2001 which used
Ordinance 92-03 (New Navotas Revenue Code) to calculate such dues.
Petron argued that petroleum products are exempt from local business taxes in
view of the ruling of Bureau of Local Government Finance but the protest was
denied by the Navotas Municipal Treasurer with the final demand letter to pay
for the due taxes and argue that what the provision prohibits is the imposition of
excise taxes on petroleum products, but not the imposition of business taxes on
the same.
ISSUE: WON the local government can impose taxes on petroleum products
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the increase in taxes issued by the local
government units in view of their fiscal autonomy would result to that these costs
would still be passed to the consumers triggering the chain of increases that
normally accompany the increase in oil prices. No similarly massive trigger effect
would ensue upon the imposition of business taxes on other commodities,
including those already subject to excise taxation
MAIN POINT: Any prudent adjudication should fully ascertain the mandate of
local government units to impose taxes on petroleum products, and such
mandate should be cast in so specific terms as to leave no dispute as to the
legislative intendment to extend such power in the name of local autonomy.
While Section 133(h) does not generally bar the imposition of business taxes on
articles burdened by excise taxes under the NIRC, it specifically prohibits local
government units from extending the levy of any kind of taxes, fees or charges on
petroleum products. Accordingly, the subject tax assessment is ultra vires and
void.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 22
ART X SEC 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
Yamane vs BA Lepanto Condominium GR 154993 October 25 2005
FACTS: BA-Condominium Corporation owns and holds titles to common and
limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium in Paseo de Roxas,
Makati City. The Corporation is authorized by its By-Laws to collect regular
assessments from operating expenses, capital expenditures on the common
areas, and other special assessments from their members, as provided for in the
Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium
The Corporation received a Notice of Assessment stated that the Corporation is
liable to pay the correct city business taxes, fees and charges from 1995-1997
which proceeded from the tax liability defined in Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati
Revenue Code.
ISSUE: WON the City Government of Makati can impose taxes invoking Section
3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code

RULING: No. The Court ruled that condominium corporations are generally
exempt from local business taxation under the Local Government Code,
irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise. Hence, the
assailed tax assessment has no basis under the Local Government Code or the
Makati Revenue Code, and the insistence of the city in its collection of the void tax
constitutes an attempt at deprivation of property without due process of law
MAIN POINT: The power of local government units to impose taxes within its
territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself, which recognizes the
power of these units “to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.” The significant
limitations are enumerated primarily in Section 133 of the Code, which include
among others, a prohibition on the imposition of income taxes except when
levied on banks and other financial institutions. None of the other general
limitations under Section 133 find application to the case at bar.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 23
ART X SEC 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
Philippine Petroleum vs Municipality of Pililla GR 90773 June 3 1991
FACTS: PPC is engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil base stocks which is
a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pilillia Rizal,
conducting its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of
municipality of Pilillia, Rizal. The Municipality of Pililla, Rizal filed a complaint
against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986; storage
permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor’s permit fee and sanitary permit
inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the last
named fees starting 1985.
ISSUE: WON the Municipality may validly impose taxes on petitioner’s business.
RULING: YES. The Court ruled that while Section 2 of PD 436 prohibits the
imposition of local taxes on petroleum products, said decree did not amend
sections 19 and 19 (a) of PD 231 as amended by PD 426, wherein the municipality
is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers, importers,
producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on
business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of tax
on business of manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products contravenes a declared
national policy, it should have been expressly stated in PD No. 436.
MAIN POINT: A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if
the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products
contravenes a declared national policy, it should have been expressly stated in
P.D. No. 436.
The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present
Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC
No. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere
administrative issuances. Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only
guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and
limit such power of local governments.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 24
ART X SEC 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
Acebedo Optical vs CA GR 100152 March 21 2000
FACTS: Acebedo Optical, a corporation whose nature of business involves
optometry services through hiring optometrist, applied for business permit with
the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan City. A business permit was issued but
restrained the petitioner from performing anything related to optometry and are
constrained only to advertise and sell frames and glasses.
A complaint was brought to the Office of the City Mayor alleging that Acebedo
Optical violated the conditions set forth in its business permit. The permit was
cancelled by the City Mayor and provided 3 months to wind up its affairs.
ISSUE: WON the City Mayor of Iligan issued the permit in accordance with the
law
RULING: NO. The Court ruled that the nature of business of the respondent is
valid under the Optometry Act which allows the hiring of optometrist by
corporations to provide services to the general public and that the employment
of a qualified optometrist by a corporation is not against public policy.
MAIN POINT: Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people which is delegated by the legislature through the Local Government Act.
The police power of the local government is within its limit if it is used
regulate the issue licenses or grant business permits but not to raise
revenue or taxes.
The power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be
exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all
concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.
Case No. 25
Art 10 Sec 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
PLDT v. City of Davao
FACTS: PLDT applied for a Mayor's Permit to operate its Davao Metro Exchange.
Respondent City of Davao withheld action on the application pending payment by
petitioner of the local franchise tax in the amount of P3,681,985.72 for the first to the
fourth quarter of 1999. Petitioners, as a telecommunication franchise, then claimed
that they were exempted from franchise tax pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA 7925.
ISSUE: W/N PLDT is exempted to pay local franchise taxes.
RULING: No. The petitioner is still liable to pay local franchise taxes.
MAIN POINT: The fact is that the term "exemption" in §23 is too general. In
approving §23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress did not intend it to operate as a blanket tax
exemption to all telecommunications entities. The Local Government Unit still has the
power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject
to such guidelines and limitations and the Congress may provide.
Case No. 26
Art 10 Sec 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim
FACTS: Former President Fidel Ramos issued Proc. No. 420 which establishes SEZ
(Special Economic Zone), which grants tax exemption, investment incentives and the
like specified in the second sentence of section 3, in Camp John Hay. Petitioners argue
that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be
established in base areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 thereof of tax exemption
and investment incentives to the therein established Subic SEZ.
ISSUE: W/N second sentence of section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is
unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. It is clear that under section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic
SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and
the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to
be created at the time via presidential proclamation and effect.
MAIN POINT: The power to tax of local governments may not be negated by
executive order through a grant of exemption absent a statute granting such.
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall
implement all necessary policies, rules, and regulations governing the zone, including
investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government departments. Among others,
the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section
12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing
Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new
investment laws that may hereinafter be enacted. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 Case No. 27
Art 10 Sec 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
Manila Electric (MERALCO) v. Province of Laguna
FACTS: Pursuant to the Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991),
respondent province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92 which allows
the respondents to impose franchise tax stated in section 2.09. Petitioners paid the tax
asked by the provincial treasurer amounting to P19,520,628.42. After several months,
MERALCO asked for a refund claiming that the franchise tax it had paid the National
Government pursuant to P.D. 551 was already included in the Provincial Tax
Ordinance. RTC denied the complaint for refund which led the petitioner to question
the constitutionality of Section 2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92.
ISSUE: Whether the imposition of a franchise tax under the said ordinance is
unconstitutional.
RULING: No. Presently, under Article X of the 1987 Constitution, a general
delegation of that power has been given in favor of local government units which gives
them the power to tax.
MAIN POINT: The tax power is granted to the local government by Section 5 of Art
10 which Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic
rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local
government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers.
IF ASKED: The legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened
or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will
have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not
be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.
Case No. 28
Art 10 Sec 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
Batangas Power Corporation V. Batangas City
FACTS: There was a power shortage during the 90s when the National Power
Corporation agrees that for Enron to supply a power station to NPC. Subsequently,
Enron assigned its obligation under the BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) Agreement
to petitioner. BPC then registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer
enterprise. Subsequently, respondent city demanded payment of business tax only for
the years of 1998-99. Petitioner refused to pay insisting that NPC’s exemption from
all taxes under its Charter had not been repealed by the LGC which cannot be impliedly
repealed by a general and later legislation like the LGC citing in support thereof the
case of Basco v. PAGCOR.
ISSUE: Whether or not NPC’s tax exemption privileges under its Charter were
withdrawn by the Local Government Code (LGC).
RULING: Yes. This Court recognized the removal of the blanket exclusion of
government instrumentalities from local taxation as one of the most significant
provisions of the 1991 LGC.
MAIN POINT: The petitioner cannot rely for the exemption on the Basco case as this
was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC, when there was still no law
empowering local government units to tax instrumentalities of the national
government.
 ISSUE/S
Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S
fiscal autonomy

Case No. 29 RULING

Art 10 Sec 5: Taxation Power of Local Government
Smart Communications V. City of Davao Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by
FACTS: Smart contends that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from payment of
franchise tax to the City because the imposition of franchise tax by the City of Davao way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise,
would amount to a violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of are consistent with national goals.
contracts. Respondents invoked the power granted by the Constitution to local
government units to create their own sources of revenue.
MAIN POINT
ISSUE: Whether or not Smart is liable to pay the franchise tax imposed by the City of
Davao. There are therefore several requisites before the President may
interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the
RULING: Yes. Section 151 of R.A. No. 7160, allowed the imposition of franchise tax
by the local government units stated in section 137. national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate
and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues;
MAIN POINT: Since the power of local governments to tax is subject to limitations
imposed by Congress, exemptions granted by the Congress after R.A 7160 bond local and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department
governments.
of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
CHAM
Case no. 30
CHAM
ARTICLE X SEC 6: Share in National Taxes
Case no. 31
Pimentel vs. Aguirre
ARTICLE X SEC 6: Share in National Taxes
FACTS
Province of Batangas vs. Executive Secretary
In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all
FACTS
government departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to
The petitioner comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void
identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures
the provisions in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the
for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non--
LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the Oversight Committees Resolutions Nos. OCD-
personal services items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of
99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-
the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO
2002-001 issued pursuant thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed
43, reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.
provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the
amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for
the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. The petitioner posits that
to subject the distribution and release of the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA,
classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules
and regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the
Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that
the LGUs share in the national taxes shall be automatically released to them. The
petitioner maintains that the use of the word “shall” must be given a compulsory
meaning.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions are unconstitutional
RULING
Yes. The just share of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the
appropriations law or GAA enacted by Congress annually. Under the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount
of five billion pesos was earmarked for the LGSEF, and these provisos imposed
the condition that such amount shall be released to the local government units
subject to the implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms
and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of said fund among
local government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the
Oversight Committee on Devolution.
MAIN POINT
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that
(1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall
be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to
the LGUs.
CHAM
Case No.32
ARTICLE X SEC 6: Share in National Taxes
Alternative Center vs Zamora
FACTS
On a part of the GAA of Pres. Estrada, under the heading
“UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000
(P10 Billion) shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only
when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be
realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees
which the GAA specifies. Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of
IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA
under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released
only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA. A number of NGOs
and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar,
contending that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully
reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the
same under “Unprogrammed funds”
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the questioned provisions violate the constitutional
injunction that the just share of local governments in the national taxes or the IRA
shall be automatically released.
RULING
Yes. While automatic release implies that the just share of the local
governments determined by law should be released to them as a matter of course,
the GAA provisions, on the other hand, withhold its release pending an event
which is not even certain of occurring. To rule that the term automatic release
contemplates such conditional release would be to strip the term automatic of all
meaning.

MAIN POINT
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of
local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not the
release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the
Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
CHAM
Case No. 33
ARTICLE X SEC 6: Share in National Taxes
League of Cities vs COMELEC
FACTS
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of
their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners
also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce
the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities
will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE/S
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution
RULING
Yes. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Even if the exemption
in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.
MAIN POINT
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other
criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city
with an annual income of P100 million or more.
CHAM
Case no.34
ARTICLE X SEC 6: Share in National Taxes
Borja vs COMELEC
FACTS
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros
on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years
which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for
another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. Petitioner contends that
private respondent Capcos service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30,
992 should be considered as service for full one term, and since he thereafter
served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to
have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution and 43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact
that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private
respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the
term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became
mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in
limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a
monopolization of political power.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
The case was about Mayor Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales who was
proclaimed elected three consecutive times. However, his third election in May
1995 was declared invalid by the COMELEC on November 1997 and he had to
step down. The decision is based on plurality of votes in the opponent’s favor
totaling to 1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San
Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service
of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.

RULING RULING: No.

Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because
he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he
only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The
vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a
matter of chance than of design.
Petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. This
was upheld despite the petitioner serving greater portion of that term.
MAIN POINT:
His assumption of office from 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted
as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit.

MAIN POINT
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Pastor
Case No. 35 Pastor
ART X Sec 8: Term of Local Officials Case No. 36
Lonzanida vs. COMELEC ART X Sec 8: Term of Local Officials
Adormeo vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
FACTS:
 The case was about Mayor Talaga, Jr. who was elected two consecutive
times and served two full terms, lost to Bernard G. Tagaro in the succeeding
election of 1998 but won in a recall election on May 12, 2000 during the third
term. He served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga, Jr. also
filed his certificate of candicacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001
elections. COMELEC en Banc reversed the earlier disqualification by first division
and found Talaga, Jr. qualified for the position of city mayor on the ground that
he had not yet served fully the three (3) consecutive terms. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Talaga, Jr. has fully served already for 3 consecutive
terms and cannot be allowed to run in the May 2001 elections.
RULING: No.
COMELEC en banc was right. Talaga, Jr. was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms having lost his third bid in the May 11, 1998 elections, and said
defeat is an interruption in the continuity of service as city mayor of Lucena.
MAIN POINT:
It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Pastor
Case No. 37
ART X Sec 8: Term of Local Officials
Socrates vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On July 2, 2002, a recall election was initiated against Mayor Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates for the reason of loss of confidence. Consequently, Edward M.
Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
However, petitions were made against Hagedorn alleging that he is disqualified
from running a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served
as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms (1992, 1995 and 1998)
immediately prior to the instant recall elections for the same post. COMELEC
sustained that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the recall election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run for the recall election
despite after fully serving 3 consecutive terms as mayor immediately preceding
the recall election.
RULING: Yes.
Although Hagedorn cannot run anymore as a mayor in the 2001
elections, Hagedorn’s new recall term is not a seamless continuation of his
previous three consecutive terms as mayor.
MAIN POINT:
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election
is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
Pastor
Case No. 38
ART X Sec 8: Term of Local Officials
Latasa vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
 Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao
del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioner’s third term,
the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known as the City
of Digos.
In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for
the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise
disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city
mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the
position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served
for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
RULING: No.
The office of the municipal mayor cannot be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office of the city mayor after the acquisition of a
new corporate existence of the latter separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. The Court believes that he did not involuntarily relinquish his office
as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the
conversion.
MAIN POINT:
For the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the
office of the municipal mayor cannot be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
Pastor
Case No. 39
ART X Sec 8: Term of Local Officials
David vs. COMELEC (April 8, 1997)
Article X Sec 8:
“The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
FACTS:
Petitioner Alex L. David, President of Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City
Chapter and Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City, posits
that by excepting barangay officials whose “term shall be determined by law”
from the general provision fixing the term of “elective local officials” at three
years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a
three-year term for such officers.
The Local Autonomy Code (RA 7160), approved last October 1991,
specifically provides that the term of office of barangay officials shall be for three
years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress is prohibited by the constitution from fixing
any term of office for barangay officials.
RULING: No.
The Constitution merely left the determination of such term to the
lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving
to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
exigencies of public service.
MAIN POINT:
The Local Autonomy Code (RA 7160), in its Sec. 43-c, and as validly
enacted by the Congress, shall govern term of office of barangay officials which is
limited to three years only.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 40
ART X SEC 10: TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
 TERM
Rivera v. COMELEC
FACTS: In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales was
elected for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner
filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms
as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution. Respondent states that he served the second term from
1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term 1998-2001 should be counted when his
proclamation as mayor was declared void.
RULING: YES. As of June 30, 2004, he had already served as Mayor for three
consecutive terms. The fact that he was ousted as Mayor on his second term in
the electoral protest does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
He was proclaimed elected in 1998; he assumed the position; and he served as
Mayor until June 30, 2001. He was Mayor for the entire period notwithstanding
the decision of the RTC in the electoral case ousting him as Mayor. Whether as
caretaker or as de facto officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the
perquisites of the office.
MAIN POINT: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 41
ART X SEC 10: TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
TERM
Montebon v. COMELEC
FACTS: Facts: Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as
municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001and 2004 elections.
However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he succeeded and assumed
the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired.
When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor for 2007
elections, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-
term limit rule.
ISSUE: Wether or not Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position
considered an involuntary severance or interruption
RULING: YES. Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004
was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in
an interruption in the service of his term. It cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.
MAIN POINT: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 42
ART X SEC 10: TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
TERM
Ong v. Alegre
FACTS: Joseph Stanley Alegre and Francis Ong were candidates who filed
certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May
10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. On January 9, 2004,
Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny
Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. The petition to
disqualify was based on the three-consecutive term rule were Francis have
assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for 3 consecutive full
terms starting on1995, 1998, and 2001. On the May 1998 elections, Alegre filed
an election protest, before the RTC. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly
elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, although the decision came out
only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty
term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect
of the municipality of San Vicente. Petitioner contends that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty election as his proclamation was
under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor for
the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the
purpose of the three-term limit rule.
HELD: YES. It is true that the RTC ruled in the Election Protest that it was Alegre
who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected
mayor of San Vicente. However, it was without practical and legal use and value,
having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office
and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule.
MAIN POINT: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 43
ART X SEC 10: TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
TERM
Laceda v. Lumena
FACTS: Roberto Laceda, Sr., and Randy L. Limena were candidates for Punong
Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City, during the
October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 23,
2007, Limena filed a petition for disqualification and/or declaration as an
ineligible candidate against Laceda before the COMELEC based on the three-
consecutive term rule. Laceda asserted that when he was elected for his first two
terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his third term,
the Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipality of
Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8806. Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the new
political unit and that he was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laceda has served three consecutive terms?
RULING: YES. While it is true that the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were
merged and converted into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating
Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said that there’ll be a different
local government post. The territorial jurisdiction is the same as before the
conversion. The inhabitants of the barangay are the same group of voters who
elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over
whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong Barangay . Moreover,
Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Lacedas term.
MAIN POINT: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 44
ART X SEC 10: TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
TERM
Dizon v. COMELEC
FACTS: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed
a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor
of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three
previous consecutive terms, he alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in
1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have
filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same
municipality. Morales contend that hem was considered not a candidate in the
2004 elections on the Rivera case (no.40), and this failure to qualify for the 2004
elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007
elections. The COMELEC ruled that Morales did not violate the three-term limit
rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled
that respondent Morales did not violate the three-year term limit when he ran
RULING: NO. The ruling in the Rivera case which was promulgated on 9 May
2007 and was effective immediately, served as involuntary severance from office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption
of continuity of service. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the
mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity
of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30
June 2007.
MAIN POINT: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Macy
Macy
CASE NO. 45
CASE NO. 46
ART X SEC 8- Term of Local Officials
ART X SEC 8- Term of Local Officials
(Alboin v. COMELEC- non existent)
Bolos v. COMELEC
Aldovino v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Dauis,
FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for
Bohol for 3 consecutive terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his
three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September
incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office
2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-
leaving his post as Punong Barangay. After serving his term as a councilor he filed
day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay. Cinconiegue, then incumbent
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the
Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same office, filed a petition for
performance of the functions of his office. Asilo then filed his certificate of
disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum
candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by
limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in
herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for
accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution.
three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has
ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule
already served the maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus
of COMELEC
disqualified to run for the same office.
RULING: NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt
ISSUE: WON there was voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay
their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and
by Bolos
the Local Government Code (RA 7160). The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor
Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of
RULING: Yes. The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioner’s relinquishment
the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007
of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his
term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC
assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1,
granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N.
2004, is a voluntary renunciation. petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy
Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification. “Preventive suspension, by its nature,
by operation of law. He instead renounced his office as Punong Barangay during
does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should
his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It
of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong
noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the
Barangay
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-
term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
MAIN POINT: The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension
Encyclopedia as "a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by
has been imposed.
the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected
MAIN POINT: “Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective
interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation,”
Macy
CASE NO. 47
ART X SEC 8- Term of Local Officials
Aldovino v. COMELEC
FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for
three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September
2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-
day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the
performance of the functions of his office. Asilo then filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by
herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for
three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule
of COMELEC
RULING: NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt
their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code (RA 7160). The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor
Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of
the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007
term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC
granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N.
Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification. “Preventive suspension, by its nature,
does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It
noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-
term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension
has been imposed.
MAIN POINT: “Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective
interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation,”
Macy
CASE NO. 48
ART X SEC 8- Term of Local Officials
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Ph
FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the ARMM’s first and regular elections were
enacted by Congress.
RA No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM schedule their first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials. It was amended and became RA No. 9333
which establishes ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and
on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to match with the
regular national and local elections of the country
ISSUE: WON holdover is constitutional in extending the terms of incumbent
officials
RULING: No. The holdover option violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by
the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their
term through a holdover. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of
appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever
way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
MAIN POINT: the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than
the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen
– a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum,
while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an
express provision of the Constitution.

Macy
CASE NO. 49
ART X SEC 9- Sectoral Representatives
Supangan jr. v. Santos
FACTS: Supangan, Jr. is a member of the Kabataang Barangay of Mabini,
Pangasinan. He was later on elected KB Chairman. Within the same year, he was
elected KB Provincial Federation President of Pangasinan. Petitioner was later on
appointed by President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Pangasinan representing the youth sector. However, at the session hall of the said
Sanggunian, respondent Marissa Domantay presented a letter written by
respondent Local Government Secretary Luis Santos advising the sanggunian
that respondent has been named as member to replace petitioner. Petitioner then
contended that Sec. Santos has no legal authority to designate private respondent
as she has never been elected as KB Provincial Federation President, a
qualification for appointment as member representing the youth sector.
ISSUE: WON the president’s power to appoint can be delegated to the secretary
of local government
RULING: The local government code says that they are appointed by the
President. But the Secretary of local government ma. By authority of the
President inform the sectoral representatives of their appointments. Otherwise
stated, it is actually the President who has made appointments I the cases
involved herein, and the secretary of local government is only the transmitter or
communicator of said appointments. The phrase “As may be provided by law” is
not prospective. Hence it can refer to law already existing at the time the
Constitution was enacted
MAIN POINT: the constitution does not prescribe the qualifications, these are
prescribed by law. And in making the appointments, the President must observe
the qualification requirements.
Check bernas pg 429
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 50
ART X SEC 10. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Creation, abolition, change of boundaries
Tan v Comelec
FACTS: Batas Pambansa Bilang 885 was enacted creating a new province in
the Island of Negros to be known as the province of Negros del Norte, which
took effect on 03 December 1985. Patricio Tan filed a case for prohibition
to stop COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite and implementing the same.
Due to Christmas holiday, this was not acted upon and the plebiscite was
held and ratified only to inhabitants of Negros del Norte excluding the rest
of Negros Occidental province. Petitioner move to stop the implementation
of the said law
.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the new province, Negros del Norte
was constitutional?
RULING: NO. The plebiscite should be “in the unit or units affected” the
Court had said that where a portion of an existing province was being
looped off to form a new province, both the mother province and the
proposed new province should participate and not just the proposed new
province. Certainly, the mother province is affected because its boundary is
substantially altered.
MAIN POINT: If a portion of a province is to be carved out and made into
another province, the plebiscite should include the mother province.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 51
ART X SEC 10. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Creation, abolition, change of boundaries
Tobias v Abalos
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Mandaluyong
and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for
the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion.
The plebiscite was only 124.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18, 621
voted “yes” and 7, 911 voted “no”.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional?
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit.
With regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of
a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and
distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical
consequence.
MAIN POINT: Liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
Frenchy
Case No. 52
ART X SEC 10: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Mun. of Jimenez v Baz
FACTS: The municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO No. 258 of then Pres.
Quirino by virtue of such, the territory of Jimenez was reduced. Sanicaban laid
claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o to Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and
Sinara alto based on EO No. 258. In its resolution, the Provincial Board declared
the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban and held that the previous resolution
approving the agreement between the municipalities was void for the Board
had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as such power was vested in
the Congress and allege that the power to create municipalities is essentially
legislative and consequently Sinacaban created by EO, no legal personality and
right to assert a territorial claim. Denied.
Issue: W/N Sinacaban has legal basis for such territorial claim
Ruling: Yes. The contention that the barangays claimed are not enumerated in
EO will not suffice for it does not say either that Sinacaban comprises only the
barrios. The reason for this is that technical description, containing the metes
and bounds of its territory, is controlling. The fact that there is an agreement
duly approved by the PB will not award them the claimed territories.
Main point: The power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an
administrative nature to carry into effect the laws. They cannot therefore after
such.
Frenchy
CASE No. 53
ART X SEC 10. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Cawaling vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner assails that R.A. No. 8806 is unconstitutional contending, in
essence, that the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and Petitioner contends
that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by
converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two
municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
Issue: WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered.
by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows
the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or
barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code.

Main point: The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a
division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the
Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
Frenchy
RULING:
Yes. Applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood
Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and
supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts,
may be recognized as valid and effective. But Cityhood laws remain void.

CASE NO. 54

ART X SEC 10. LOCAL GOVERNMENT Main point:

Creation, abolition, change of boundaries

The operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
League of Cities of the PH v COMELEC

FACTS:

Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for
violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for
reconsideration which was denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for
reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the
judgement became final and executory. The Court then on the 19th of December
2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the constitutionally of the
Cityhood Laws.
ISSUE:
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 55
ART X SEC 10: CREATION, ABOLITION, CHANGE OF BOUNDARIES
Sema v. COMELEC
FACTS: The ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional.
RULING: No. Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and
cities. The creation of any of the four local government units– province, city,
municipality or barangay– must comply with three conditions. First, the creation
of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict
arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution.
MAIN POINT: Under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress”
can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 56
ART X SEC 10: CREATION, ABOLITION, CHANGE OF BOUNDARIES
Camid v. Office of the President
FACTS: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of
Andong in Lanao Del Sur. Camid contends the following: (1) Municipality of
Andong evolved into a full-blown municipality (since there is a complete set of
officials appointed to handle essential tasks and services, it has its own
highschool, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc. (2) 17 barangays with chairman; (3)
he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO
and DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong. In the Certification
of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f the 33
Municipalities invalidated in a similar case decided by the SC (Pelaez Case).
Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong.
Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in the case of
Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San
Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an
executive order. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto
municipal corporation.
RULING: No. There is no evidence to support the claim of its continued existence
as a corporation. To do so would mean upholding defiance of the decision in the
Pelaez case which nullified its existence as a municipality. Municipal
corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the
community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or
objection for a period long enough to afford title by prescription. The
Certification present in the case at bar has no power nor does it bear any
authority to create or revalidate a municipality.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 57
ART X SEC 10: CREATION, ABOLITION, CHANGE OF BOUNDARIES
Navarro v. Executive Secretary
FACTS: October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
Petitioners filed before the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. They alleged that the creation
of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of
Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large
chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich
resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat
had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only
106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of
Section 461 of the LGC.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 complied with either the population or
territorial requirements prescribed in Section 461 of the Local Government Code
for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.
RULING: No. Hence, the Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for being
short of the statutorily required land area and population. As the law-making
branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that imposed the criteria
for the creation of a province as contained in Section 461 of the Local Government
Code. No law has yet been passed amending Section 461 of the Local Government
Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the creation of a
province.
MAIN POINT: The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local
Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province; hence, any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 58
ART X SEC 10: CREATION, ABOLITION, CHANGE OF BOUNDARIES
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Assoc.
FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
(BAVA), is a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village. Respondent
received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice requesting respondent
to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. Respondent BAVA appealed to
CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and
cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in
the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Petitioner MMDA filed motion for
reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA has the power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community.
RULING: No. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development
authority." All its functions are administrative in nature. There is no syllable in
R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. The
MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is
the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils
that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street.
MAIN POINT: MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political
subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 59
ART X SEC 10: CREATION, ABOLITION, CHANGE OF BOUNDARIES
MMDA v. Garin
FACTS: Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his
driver’slicense was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA
ChairmanProspero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his
preference for his case to be filed in Court. Without an immediate reply from the
chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec
5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation
of legislative authority, allowing petitioner MMDA to fix and impose unspecified
and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC ruled in his favor, directing MMDA to
return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating driver’s license
without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 authorizing MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic rules and
regulations is constitutional.
RULING: No. MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation
endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the community. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers
MMDA or its council to “enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.” It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, People’s Organizations, NGOs and private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are
administrative in nature.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
AR
CASE NO. 60
ART X SEC 11: METROPOLITAN POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City
FACTS: This is a consolidated petition which stemmed from a local ordinance
pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of Public Obstructions.
Gancayco owns a property of which he was able to obtain a building permit for a
two-storey commercial building, which was situated along EDSA. Later, MMDA
sent a notice to Gancayco saying that part of his property had to be demolished,
if he did not clear that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did not comply with.
Gancayco then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of
his property, without due process and just compensation.
MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an ordinance that he
already violated. The RTC, however, declared that the Ordinance was
unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. MMDA appealed to the CA, which
partly granted the appeal.
ISSUE: W/N MMDA was in their authority to demolish Gancayco’s property.
RULING: NO! The court decided that the wing wall of Gancayco’s building was
not a nuisance per se since Gancayco was able to procure a building permit to
construct the building which implies that the building was not a public nuisance,
or a threat to the safety of persons and property. The MMDA is not a local
government unit with policy power. It, therefore, does not possess police power
to demolish a private individual’s property.
MAIN POINT: The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on
development of Metro Manila, and was NOT supposed to act with Police Power
as they were not given the authority to do such by the constitution
AR
CASE NO. 61
ART X SEC 12: HIGHLY URBANIZED CITIES, COMPONENT CITIES
Abella v. COMELEC
FACTS: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene)
filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from
running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her
residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she
was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified
from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However,
when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed
the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second
highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga,
Leyte.
ISSUE: W/N Larrazabal, a resident of Ormoc City, can run as Governor in the
provincial elections.
RULING: NO! The Court ruled that respondent Larrazabal is neither a resident
nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed but a resident and
registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but
independent of the province thereby disqualifying her for the position of
governor of Leyte. This connotes two prohibitions: One from running for, and
second, from voting for any provincial elective official.
MAIN POINT: Article X Section 12 of the Constitution provides for three kinds of
cities:
1. Highly Urbanized Cities as determined by law;
2. Cities not raised in the Highly Urbanized category but whose existing
charters prohibit their voters from voting in provincial elections; and,
3. Component Cities, i.e., cities which still are under a province.
The 2nd category of a city is independent from the province. This independence
includes the incapacity of its residents to run for provincial office.
AR
CASE NO. 62
ART X SEC 14: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS AND
OTHER SIMILAR BODIES
Pimentel v. Ochoa
FACTS: In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the
poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries, dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino."
DSWD issued an order setting the implementing guidelines for the project
renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps) which provides cash
grants to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to meet
certain human development goals. Eligible households selected from priority
target areas are granted health and education benefits for a total annual subsidy
of P15k. AO 16 also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among
DepEd, DOH, DILG, the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and LGUs.
DSWD as lead implementing agency “oversees and coordinates the
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the program” while the LGU is
responsible for the availability of health and education supply, and providing
technical assistance for the Program implementation, among others.
ISSUE: W/N the DSWD Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) embodied in
the 2011 GAA is violative of the Constitution by providing for the recentralization
of the National Government in the delivery of basic services already devolved to
the LGUs, through DSWD’s national program.
RULING: NO! Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program
formulated by the national government itself but implemented in partnership
with the local government units to achieve the common national goal
development and social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the
autonomy of local governments.
MAIN POINT: While it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall
promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure, the
concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of LGUs into "mini-
states." The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct
hand in the formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with
the LGUs concerned.
AR
CASE NO. 63
ART X SEC 15: AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Disomangcop v. Sec. of DPWH
FACTS: Challenged in this petition is the constitutionality and validity of RA 8999
An Act Establishing Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and the DPWH Order 119Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office.
When a plebiscite was held in some areas in Mindanao, only 4 provinces voted
for the creation of the ARMMLanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. RA 6734An Act
Providing an Organic Act for the ARMM contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the
Regional Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the
National Government. President Aquino issued EO426Placing Control and Supervision of the
Offices of DPWH within ARMM under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for Other Purposes. 9 years later,
DPWH Secretary Vigilar issued Order 119 which states that Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects
and facilities under DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.
2 years later, President Estrada signed RA8999 which established the
engineering district in Lanao del Sur. Petitioners, engineers of DPWH-ARMM,
alleged that Order 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it
violates the Constitutional Autonomy of the ARMM because it tasked the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved
to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. They also
challenged RA8999 because prior to sponsorship of the law, no public hearing
nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made.
ISSUE: W/N RA8999 and DPWH Order 119 are invalid and unconstitutional for
violating the autonomy of the ARMM.
RULING: YES! Though RA8999 need not be declared unconstitutional because it
never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a subsequent
enactment. The Organic Act is more than an ordinary statute because they enjoy
affirmation of a plebiscite. Hence, provision thereof cannot be amended by an
ordinary statute, like RA8999, without plebiscite. On the other hand, DPWH
Order 119 is violative of EO426, which was issued pursuant to RA6734 which
created the constitutionally-mandated autonomous region and defined the basic
structure of autonomous government. The office created under Order 119 is a
duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
MAIN POINT: The Constitution specifically provides for the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. Its
constitutionally-granted autonomy must be respected.
AR
CASE NO. 64
ART X SEC 15: AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines
FACTS: RA 10153An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the ARMM with the National and
Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from
the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3)
years thereafter, to coincide with the regular national and local elections. The law
as well granted the President the power to appoint OICs for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. In these consolidated petitions, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA 10153.
ISSUE: W/N RA 10153, which synchronizes the ARMM elections with the
National and Local Elections, violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM.
RULING: NO! The Court upheld RA 10153 in toto. While autonomous regions are
granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated
autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas
reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination.
MAIN POINT: The autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat
national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just
a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having
to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
WEE
CASE N0. 65
ART X, SEC 16: GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE PRESIDENT
Ampatuan v. Puno
FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men
and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. Similarly, the
President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A), amended AO 272,
which delegated the President’s supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy,
petitioners filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the
proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs
operations and seize the regional governments powers, in violation of the
principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the
Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the
principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and
Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act?
RULING: NO. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. The President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory
powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. These
orders did not authorize a take over of the ARMM. They did not give him blanket
authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials. The delegation was necessary to
facilitate the investigation of the mass killings. In short, the DILG Secretary did not
take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
MAIN POINT: Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
power of the President over autonomous regions is the same as his power over
local governments — only one of "general supervision," that is, the power to
ensure that subordinate officers execute and act within existing laws.
WEE
CASE N0. 66
ART X, SEC 16: GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE PRESIDENT
Kulayan v. Tan
FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu by
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed
Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate
the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of
respondent Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued
Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province
of Sulu which cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration.
It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),
which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call
upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder
and lawless violence. Petitioners, Kulayan, et al., claimed that the proclamation
was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the
Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE: Whether or not the a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a
president?
RULING: NO. Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to
call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution
is exclusive to the President.
MAIN POINT: In relation to Section 16 of Article X, Section 4 of Article X of the
1987 Constitution provides that “the President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. XXX shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions. The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central
powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the
prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of
security and defense. The intent behind the powers granted to local government
units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only
with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the
constituents, and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on
local executives.
WEE
CASE N0. 67
ART X, SEC 17: POWERS NOT VESTED TO THE ARMM
RULING: NO. While autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The
framers decided to reinstate the provision [Section 17, Article X] in order to make
it clear once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers to the autonomous
government; those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national
government; the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat
national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections not just a
regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having
act in accordance with national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.

Datu Adas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines

MAIN POINT: Section 17, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that: “all
powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to
the autonomous regions shall be vested in the national government.” Under the
FACTS: RA 10153 (An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in
Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
the ARMM with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes) was
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections to the second Monday of May 2013
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated
and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the regular national and
to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance
local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint OICs
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels.
to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected
under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.

WEE

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 10153 on the basis of its failure to CASE N0. 68
comply with the three reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
ART X, SEC 18 - 19: ORGANIC ACT FOR AUTONOMOUS REGION
Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of
suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the “elective Abbas v. COMELEC
and representative” character of the executive and legislative departments of the
ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power
to appoint OICs unconstitutionally expands his power over the ARMM to
FACTS: The arguments against RA 6734 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
encompass not only general supervision but also control.
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) raised by the petitioners are: (a)
that RA 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that certain
provisions of RA 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of political autonomy, given to the autonomous
region, equates autonomy with independence?
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous
region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution
on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent
upon the outcome of the plebiscite. In support of his argument, petitioner cites
Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. 6734 which declares that “[t]here is hereby created
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and
cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.” Petitioner contends that the tenor of the
above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that
even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region
would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes
were obtained.
ISSUE: Whether or not, for effective creation of the autonomous region, the
required total votes cast in all the units where the plebiscite is called must yield
a majority of affirmative votes?
RULING: NO. As the Constitution says, the creation of the autonomous region
takes effect only after it is ratified in a plebiscite. It is enough for the creation of
the autonomous region that some “provinces, cities, and geographic areas” vote
favorably. In other words, as an examination of the constitutional text shows, for
effective ratification it is not necessary to achieve a “double majority.” It is thus
clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes XXX
in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
MAIN POINT: In connection with Section 18, par. 2, Article X, under the
Constitution and RA 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority if the votes cast in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be
included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a
majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region.
WEE
CASE N0. 69
ART X, SEC 18 - 19: ORGANIC ACT FOR AUTONOMOUS REGION
Ordillo v. COMELEC
FACTS: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes
in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region). The official COMELEC results of the
plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of
5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by
148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic
Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast
only in the province of Ifugao. The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to
declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. They, petitioners,
maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
province as the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Province of Ifugao, which was the only province which
voted for a Cordillera Autonomous Region, can constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region?
RULING: NO. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The Constitution says that an autonomous region shall
consists of provinces, cities and municipalities, and, therefore, not just one
province. Moreover, RA 6766, the Organic Act which was the subject of the
referendum, itself contains provisions which can be implemented only if the new
political entity would consist of more than one province.

MAIN POINT: Section 18, par. 2, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that,
“the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.” To that
regard, the keywords - provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
connote that “region” is to be made up of more that one constituent unit. The term
“region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
by the Maeng Tribal assailed in this case is hereby annulled for lack of
jurisdiction.
Main point: Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal
existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or
special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary
tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural
community.
Ahmad

CASE NO. 71
Ahmad
ART X SEC. 18: Organic Act for Autonomous Regions
CASE NO. 70
Atitiw v. Zamora
ART X SEC. 18: Organic Act for Autonomous Regions
Facts: On July 15, 1987, President Corazon Aquino, promulgated E.O. No. 220
Badua v. CBA (under the Freedom Constitution), creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region
(CAR) — interim and preparatory body — tasked to administer the affairs of
government in the Cordilleras composed of the provinces of Abra, Benguet,
Facts: Quema as the owner of two parcels of land in Abra mortgaged said parcels
Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. Then
of land for to Dra. Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-two (22) years
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, the Congress enacted an act providing for an
later long after the mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption
organic act for the CAR. However, the plebiscite showed that the creation of an
price to the heir Macaraeg. On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land
autonomous region has been rejected by the majority of the region except the
was sold to her by Dra. Valera when she was still alive. However, Rosa could not
Ifugao Province. The 2000 GAA appropriated a total of P18,379,000.00 for the
produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor
CAR’s general administration and support services for that year, in contrast to
Benesa. As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he
the annual appropriation of P36,000,000.00 in the previous years. On July 20,
filed a case before the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. Where the decision of
2000, President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270, which extended the
which forcibly ejected the spouses Badua from the said land. Hereafter the
implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR. He extended the
petitioners filed this case assailing that the CBA’s decision be declared N/V on the
period further to March 31, 2001 by virtue of E.O. No. 328 which he issued on
ground that the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power nor
December 27, 2000.
jurisdiction over the petitioners nor over the private respondent as neither of
them are members of the Maeng Tribe.
Issue: WON the abolition of CAR violates the constitutional mandate in Art. X
(18)
Issue: WON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a
valid and executory decision in a land dispute.
Ruling: No. Because the CAR was not abolished, with the reduction of its
budgetary allocation; what took place was only a discontinuance of its programs
Ruling: No. The Commission on Elections, et al G.R. No. 93054 the Court en banc,
and activities. The CAR created by virtue of E.O. No. 220 is not the autonomous
found that in the plebiscite that was held pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the
region contemplated in the Constitution. A reading of E.O No. 220 easily reveals
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces
that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the
and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera
delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National
Autonomous Region did not come to be. As a logical consequence of that judicial
Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step
declaration, the CBA the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras has not established an
communities of the Cordillera region do not legally exist. The decision rendered
autonomous regional government. Instead, it has created a region, covering a
specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services;
indeed, as its very name denotes it is a mere administrative region.
Main point: Under the 1987 Constitution, the creation of the autonomous
regions shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. In the case of the
Cordilleras, the overwhelming majority of its people had voted against regional
autonomy.
Ahmad
CASE NO. 72
ART X SEC. 18/19: Organic Act for Autonomous Regions
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA
Facts: April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on
ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
military arm (NPA). After President Aquino was installed into office by People
Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all
revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the
President. After the preliminary negotiations, she on September 13, 1986 signed
with Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA) and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President
of CBA) a ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities. The
parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not
undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful
means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing
process until the demands of the Cordillera people shall have been substantially
granted in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement Ambassador Pelaez
signed with Fr. Balweg a joint agreement. Pursuant to this President Corazon C.
Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as E.O. 220. The herein
petitioners question the constitutionality of E.O 220 as it has virtually
preempted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue: WON the measures taken by Pres. Aquino in signing the assailed EO
violated the Constitution as assailed by the petitioners.
Ruling: No. For the reason that EO 220 does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does
not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous
regionsstill exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet
convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs
of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed
and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220.
Main point: The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of
an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. As embodied in the constitution [Art.
X, sec. 18]. As said, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Ahmad
CASE NO. 73
ART X SEC. 18: Organic Act for Autonomous Regions
Pandi v. CA
Facts: On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as
Sec. of the DOH-ARMM issued a Memorandum designating Pandi as OIC of the
IPHO- APGH, Lanao del Sur. On September 15, 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial
Governor Mutilan issued an office order designating Saber also as OIC of the
IPHO- APGH October 5, 1993, Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
quo warranto claiming that he is the lawfully designated OIC of the IPHO-APGH.
On October 14, 1993, the CA issued a TRO enjoining Pandi from further
discharging the functions and duties and On March 21, 1994, Pandi and
Macacua filed a motion seeking the dismissal of Saber’s petition, on the ground
that the issues therein had become moot and academic. Pandi and Macacua
cited as reason the enactment by the ARMM Regional Assembly of the Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25 to which the CA maintained that the Organic
Act of 1989 and the ARMM Local Code could not prevail over the 1991 LGU
Code.
Issue: WON the designation of Saber as OIC by the Provincial Governor as ruled
by the CA is valid.
Ruling: No. the designation of Saber as OIC of the IPHO-APGH on Sep. 15, 1993,
where the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national
government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health
officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and
not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control
over the provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official
authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within
the region. Indisputably, on Sep. 15, 1993, Mutilan had no power to designate
Saber OIC of IPHO-APGH consequently, the designation is void.
The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government
official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by
the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional
Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but after the
issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed the
provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the
provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial
Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of
the provincial health office.
Main point: Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer in the
ARMM, previously a regional official, has also become a provincial government
official, catching up with the status of provincial health officers outside of the
ARMM. The Regional Governor appoints the provincial health officer from a list
of three nominees of the Provincial Governor. The ARMM Local Code provides
that the salary of the provincial health officer shall be paid from regional funds.
The ARMM Local Code also states that if the salary of the provincial health
officer comes mainly from provincial funds, the Provincial Governor is the
appointing power. The power of the Regional Governor to appoint provincial
officials applies only to provincial officials paid by regional funds.
Ahmad
CASE NO. 74
ART X SEC. 18/19: Organic Act for Autonomous Regions
Sema v. Comelec
Facts: ARMM created under RA 6734 as amended by RA 9054. The Province of
Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against
inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989. There are two
legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district
of Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for
the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
MMA Act 201creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao
ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006. On
10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, renaming the first legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City).” Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,” prayed for the
nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing
of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress.
Issue: WON a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA
Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
Ruling: No. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall
have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact
a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of
Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
the Constitution and national laws, the MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Main point: On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an
autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
regions.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE No.75
ARTICLE X, SEC 18&19: ORGANIC ACT (w/o sub)
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GRP

FACTS: On 2008, GRP and MILF were scheduled to sign MOA-AD

Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD signing did not materialize when SC issued a TRO,
enjoining GRP from signing the same, upon motions filed by the petitioners to wit:
the Province of North Cotabato, the City of Zamboanga the Province of Zamboanga
del Norte et al for reasons of public interest, and on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. Some wanted to be excluded also from BJE. Upon review an issue
was raised as culled by petitions and petitions in nterventions. Hence:

ISSUE: W/N respondents violate constitutional provisions on public consultation

when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?

RULING: Yes. Many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation
and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X,
Section 18 of the Constitution provides that only provinces, cities, and geographic
areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph
2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the
ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for
inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar,
Tagoloan and Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE without need of another
NOTE: underlined sentence compares BJE aka Bangsamoro Homeland to
ARMM as proposed by MILF under MOA-AD
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas categorized by BJE. That the present components of
the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in
2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution,
precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the
ARMM, not the BJE.
MAIN POINT (BOLD)

Acronyms:
GRP - Government of the Republic of the Philippines
MOA-AD - Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
MILF- Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
BJE- Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE No.76
ARTICLE X, SEC 18&19: ORGANIC ACT (w/o sub)
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE
FACTS: RA 6734 which provides Organic Act for the ARMM was enacted.
Plebiscite was held later as required by such. Said act scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM officials on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90
days after its ratification.
On June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country. Its enactment stopped COMELEC’s preparations for the ARMM elections to
be held on to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 pursuant to RA 9333 amending RA9140
which amended RA No. 9054 and which amended RA 6734.
Petitioners’ contend that the plebiscite requirement applies to all
amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite
requirement set forth in the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the requirement of a plebiscite applies only in the creation of
autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987
Constitution?
RULING: No, the date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in
the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the
plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be
construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With these wordings as
standard, the court interpret requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions
of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions –
i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must
provide for in the Organic Act – require ratification through a plebiscite. These
amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the
regional government; (b) the region’s judicial system, i.e., the special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the
legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section
20, Article X of the Constitution.
MAIN POINT: BOLD
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE No.77
ARTICLE X, SEC 20: ORGANIC ACT (w/o sub)
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GRP
FACTS: On 2008, GRP and MILF were scheduled to sign MOA-AD Aspect
of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD signing did not materialize when SC issued a TRO, enjoining GRP
from signing the same, upon motions filed by the petitioners for reasons of public
interest, and on the ground that some of its proposition is unconstitutional. BJE was
also found to be incompatible with the constitution as it does not coincide with Sec20,
Art X of the Constitution particularly that BJE have powers not defined by said
provision.
ISSUE: W/N BJE powers are incompatible with Sec20, Art X of the Constitution?
RULING: YES on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an
autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would
expand Art10 Sec 20 provision. The mere passage of new legislation
pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would
not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers
found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the
Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation
vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate its
statement that: The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and
trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such
relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippine. Under our constitutional
system, it is only the President who has that power.
MAIN POINT: BOLD
Note: Read the ruling together with Sec 20(9) Art X