Bar Protector Diving System FEMEA

Doc. n.
BP-PRO-TEC-031-E
DISCIPLINE PROCEDURE
Rev. 02 Date 26/01/11
DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

Page. 2 of 60
Revisions Summary
26/01/11 02 Issued for Approval COIM Master K.Ardavanis
Date Revision Revision description Prepared Checked Approved

Doc. n. BP-PRO-TEC-031-E
Rev. 02 Date 26/01/11
DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

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INDEX
1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................ 5
2. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS........................................................................................................... 6
3. DEFINITIONS................................................................................................................................... 6
4. RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................................................ 6
5. ACTIVITIES DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................ 6
5.1. GENERAL ................................................................................................................................. 7
5.1.1. DECK DECOMPRESSION CHAMBERS (DDCS) ............................................................................ 7
5.1.2. SUBMERSIBLE DECOMPRESSION CHAMBER (SDC).................................................................... 7
5.1.3. SDC HANDLING SYSTEM.......................................................................................................... 7
5.1.4. DIVE CONTROL ........................................................................................................................ 7
5.1.5. DIVER SUPPORT SYSTEMS ....................................................................................................... 7
5.1.6. FIRE FIGHTING AND BREATHING APPARATUS............................................................................. 7
5.1.7. SELF PROPELLED HYPERBARIC LIFEBOAT (SPHL) & LIFE SUPPORT PACKAGE (LSP) ................. 7
5.2. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................ 8
5.2.1. BELL DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM..................................................................................................... 8
5.2.1.1. LAUNCH CONTROL CONSOLE - R.I.3 ..................................................................................... 8
5.2.1.2. BELL W IRE - R.I.3 ................................................................................................................ 8
5.2.1.3. CURSOR LOCK/BELL LOCK/BELL TROLLEY - R.I.6.................................................................. 9
5.2.1.4. STRUCTURE ......................................................................................................................... 9
5.2.1.5. HYDRAULIC POWER PACKS/HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ................................................................... 9
5.2.2. HYPERBARIC LIFEBOAT (SPHL) DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM ............................................................. 9
5.2.2.1. LAUNCH CONSOLE - R.I.8..................................................................................................... 9
5.2.2.2. DAVIT/TROLLEY - R.I.4 ......................................................................................................... 9
5.2.2.3. W INCH - R.I.6 ...................................................................................................................... 9
5.2.2.4. STRUCTURE - R.I.4 ............................................................................................................ 10
5.2.3. DIVER HEATING SYSTEM ........................................................................................................ 10
5.2.3.1. CAT PUMP SUPPLY - R.I.3 .................................................................................................. 10
5.2.3.2. HOT W ATER MANIFOLD - R.I.4............................................................................................ 10
5.2.3.3. UMBILICAL W INCH ROTARY JOINT/UMBILICAL CONNECTOR (W INCH END) - R.I.6................... 10
5.2.3.4. UMBILICAL - R.I.6............................................................................................................... 10
5.2.3.5. BELL PENETRATORS - R.I.6 ................................................................................................ 10
5.2.3.6. BELL HEATING MANIFOLD/DIVER’S UMBILICAL/HOT W ATER SUIT/HELMET HEATING SHROUD -
R.I.9 11
5.2.4. BELL PRESSURISATION/BREATHING GAS SUPPLY.................................................................... 11
5.2.4.1. MAIN GAS DISTRIBUTION PANEL - R.I.4............................................................................... 11
5.2.4.2. BELL CONTROL GAS PANEL - R.I.6 ..................................................................................... 11
5.2.4.3. UMBILICAL ROTARY JOINT/UMBILICAL CONNECTOR (W INCH END) - R.I.4.............................. 11
5.2.4.4. UMBILICAL - R.I.4............................................................................................................... 11
5.2.4.5. BELL PANEL SHUTTLE BLOCK - R.I.6................................................................................... 11
5.2.4.6. DIVERS’ UMBILICAL/DIVERS’ HELMET OR MASK - R.I.16....................................................... 13
5.2.5. CHAMBER BIBS..................................................................................................................... 13
5.2.5.1. MAIN GAS DISTRIBUTION PANEL - R.I.4............................................................................... 13
5.2.5.2. CHAMBER PANEL - R.I.9..................................................................................................... 13
5.2.5.3. PIPEWORK TO CHAMBER - R.I.4.......................................................................................... 13
5.2.5.4. BIB MASK/BPR - R.I.12..................................................................................................... 13
5.2.6. CHAMBER LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM .......................................................................................... 14
5.2.6.1. CLIMAPAC/CMU COOLING WATER BOOSTER PUMP - R.I.4................................................... 14
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5.2.6.2. CHAMBER COOLING/HEATING - R.I.6 .................................................................................. 14

5.2.6.3. CO² SCRUBBING - R.I.6 ..................................................................................................... 14
5.2.7. CHAMBER PRESSURISATION SYSTEM...................................................................................... 14
5.2.7.1. MAIN GAS DISTRIBUTION MANIFOLD - R.I.4 ......................................................................... 15
5.2.7.2. DD3 REGULATOR PANEL - R.I.6 ......................................................................................... 15
5.2.7.3. CHAMBER PANELS/PRESSURISATION LINES - R.I.4 .............................................................. 15
5.2.8. SPHL PRESSURISATION/BIB SUPPLY SYSTEM........................................................................ 15
5.2.8.1. MAIN GAS DISTRIBUTION MANIFOLD - R.I.4 ......................................................................... 15
5.2.8.2. SPHL CONTROL PANEL (SAT CONTROL)/PIPEWORK/INTERCONNECT - R.I.3......................... 15
5.2.8.3. ONBOARD SUPPLY - R.I.8................................................................................................... 16
5.2.8.4. EMERGENCY SUPPLY CONTAINER - R.I.3 ............................................................................ 16
5.2.8.5. SPHL SYSTEMS - R.I.6 ...................................................................................................... 16
5.2.8.6. BIB MASK/BPR - R.I.12..................................................................................................... 16
5.2.9. SPHL HEATING/COOLING SYSTEM ......................................................................................... 16
5.2.9.1. SHIPS SUPPLY SYSTEM - R.I.6............................................................................................ 16
5.2.9.2. EMERGENCY SUPPLY SYSTEM - R.I.4.................................................................................. 17
5.2.9.3. ONBOARD FACILITIES - R.I.8............................................................................................... 17
5.2.10. CHAMBER LIGHTING SYSTEM.................................................................................................. 17
5.2.11. SPHL ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ................................................................................................... 17
5.2.11.1. GENERATOR - R.I.8............................................................................................................ 17
5.2.11.2. SPHL ELECTRICAL POWER PANEL - R.I.4 ........................................................................... 18
5.2.11.3. CABLE/PENETRATORS/JB - R.I.6 ........................................................................................ 18
5.2.11.4. STOCKTRONICS COMMS UNIT - R.I.6................................................................................... 18
5.2.11.5. BATTERIES - R.I.4 .............................................................................................................. 18
5.2.12. BELL ELECTRICAL SERVICES .................................................................................................. 18
5.2.12.1. DIVE CONTROL MAIN CONTROL PANEL - R.I.4..................................................................... 18
5.2.12.2. UMBILICAL W INCH JUNCTION BOXES - R.I.4 ........................................................................ 18
5.2.12.3. UMBILICAL W INCH SLIP RINGS - R.I.6 ................................................................................. 19
5.2.12.4. UMBILICAL - R.I.6............................................................................................................... 19
5.2.12.5. CABLE GUILLOTINE - R.I.4 .................................................................................................. 19
5.2.12.6. OIL FILLED JUNCTION BOX - R.I.6 ....................................................................................... 19
5.2.12.7. BELL BATTERY/PENETRATOR/BATTERY SWITCHING UNIT - R.I.6 .......................................... 19
5.2.12.8. SCRUBBER/HEATER - R.I.4................................................................................................. 19
5.2.13. CHAMBER/SPHL ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 19
5.2.14. BELL ANALYSIS...................................................................................................................... 19
5.2.15. CHAMBER COMMS SYSTEM .................................................................................................... 20
5.2.16. BELL/DIVER COMMUNICATIONS .............................................................................................. 20
5.2.16.1. DIVER’S HELMET/MASK - R.I.9............................................................................................ 20
5.2.16.2. DIVER’S UMBILICAL - R.I.6.................................................................................................. 20
5.2.16.3. BELL INT. JB/CABLING - R.I.6 ............................................................................................. 20
5.2.16.4. SHIPS W IRING/COMMS RACK TERMINALS - R.I.4 ................................................................. 20
5.2.16.5. STOCKTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS RACK - R.I.4 ................................................................. 20
5.2.17. AIR SUPPLY SYSTEM ............................................................................................................. 20
5.2.17.1. PIPEWORK - R.I.8............................................................................................................... 21
5.2.17.2. LP COMPRESSOR - R.I4 ..................................................................................................... 21
5.2.18. PRESSURE VESSELS FOR HUMAN OCCUPANCY ....................................................................... 21
5.2.18.1. DOOR SEAL - R.I.8............................................................................................................. 21
5.2.18.2. CHAMBER/CHAMBER SEAL - R.I.4 ....................................................................................... 21
5.2.18.3. PIPE/VALVE - R.I.6............................................................................................................. 21
5.2.18.4. FIRE - R.I.4........................................................................................................................ 22
5.2.18.5. BACTERIOLOGICAL INFESTATION - R.I.6............................................................................... 22
5.2.18.6. PRESSURE VESSEL STRUCTURE ......................................................................................... 22
5.2.18.7. OVERHEAD DOOR .............................................................................................................. 23
5.2.19. SANI-W ATER SYSTEM ............................................................................................................ 23
6. ATTACHMENT .............................................................................................................................. 23
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1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
This report summarises the findings of a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis conducted on the diving
facilities installed on the BAR Protector. This FMEA has been revised as a result of the modification to
the bell and bell handling system, but also covers the other diving and support facilities available
onboard of the vessel in order to verify the whole diving system.
The FMEA addressed all systems with emphasis on five key areas which are considered to give rise
to the greatest risk to life. These five key areas are:
• Pressure vessels (including new SDC) and support systems.

• Diving bell launching and recovery system.
• Divers’ transfer system.
• Divers’ breathing gas supply system.
• Divers’ heating system.
The following methodology was applied:-
Consideration of the actual situation, the system drawings, functional block diagrams, the previous
FMEA and equipment specifications to define the build state and relationship between the major
components of the dive system.
A tabular format was used to record the analysis process on Assessment Sheets. Each major item or
system is listed together with various potential failure modes. In each case the means of detection is
identified, together with the causes of the failure. A separate section then analyses the effect of the
failure in terms of Probability and consequence, thus establishing the risk.
Both the Probability and Consequence Factors are based on experience and each is graded on a
scale of one to four. One equating to the minimum Probability/consequence and four equating to the
greatest Probability/consequence. The Risk Index is defined as Probability Factor x Consequence
Factor. Thus, the risk is expressed as an index from zero to sixteen - the higher the index the greater
the risk.
If the Risk Index is 3 or less then no further analysis is undertaken. If the Risk Index is 4 or greater
then the items contributing to the failure are give further consideration. In this way the FMEA focuses
on the most critical items and avoids superfluous analysis.
The FMEA Assessment sheets (as illustrated below, typical) are sub divided as follows:-.
Column 1 Identification Number

Column 2 Description of System/Component
Column 3 Failure Mode
Column 4 Means of Failure Identification
Column 5 Causes of Failure
Column 6 Probability Factor (P Factor)
Column 7 Consequence Factor (C Factor)
Column 8 Risk Index
Column 9 Comments
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DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

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EUROPEAN MARINE CONTRACTORS EEB-2027
DSV BAR PROTECTOR Revision X

emc DIVING SYSTEM FMEA
ASSESSMENT SHEETS Page X of XX
System: BELL DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM Reference: DWG: P1893/02-DG-001
System Definition Failure Definition Risk Assessment
L C Risk
No Description Failure Mode Failure Detection Cause Comments
Factor Factor Index
1.1 Launch Control Console Power Failure Lights Fail MCCB Failure/Loose Connection 2 4 8
Cable Failure 1 4 4
Fire 1 4 4
1.2 Hydraulic Power Packs 1 & 2 Overheating Temp, Warning Loss of cooling water 1 3 3
1.3 Bell Wire Wire Parts/ Audio from Driver Excessive load due to incident 2 3 6
Socket Fails Visual by CCTV
1.4 Cursor lock/Bell Lock Unable to Open Cannot Lower Bell Mechanical Seizure 3 2 6
Valve Malfunction 2 2 4
Ram Seizure/Pipe Fracture 1 3 3
1.5 Trolley Unable to Move No Movement Ram Seizure 1 3 3

Valve Failure/Pipe Fracture 2 3 6
1.6 Structure Collapse Visual Corrosion 1 4 4

Damage 1 4 4
The BAR Protector diving system and the support services provided by the ship generally provide a
very high level of redundancy which reflects the soundness of the original design. This has been
further enhanced with upgrades undertaken during the life of the vessel. No critical single point failures
have been identified.
It should be noted that the divers’ helmets, masks and bail outs have not been included as part of this
FMEA.
2. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
• BPRO-PRO-TEC-002-E Documentation structure and control

• GL-COR-DSSM-002-E On Board Document System Structure and Management
• IMCA D039 – FMEA Guide for Diving System
3. DEFINITIONS
N/A
4. RESPONSIBILITIES
N/A
5. ACTIVITIES DESCRIPTION
The Bar Protector's Saturation Diving System has been classed by DnV and is maintained in
accordance with both UK and Norwegian Regulations. The fully certified saturation diving system is
able to support up to 16 divers at different depths however, under normal operations, the number of
divers is restricted to 12 men due to the capacity of the hyperbaric lifeboat.
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This comprehensive system consists of 4 Deck Decompression Chambers (DDC), a 3 man

Submersible Decompression Chamber (SDC) and a hyperbaric lifeboat all currently rated to 300
m.s.w. (Design capability of 400-450 m.s.w.) The system is classified “DSV III” by DnV denoting that
the vessel has a classified unrestricted diving system.
The system is comprised of a number of primary components which are briefly described in the
following paragraphs with more detailed explanations in the following sections.
5.1. GENERAL
5.1.1. DECK DECOMPRESSION CHAMBERS (DDCS)
The saturation diving complex onboard the vessel is comprised of four interconnected DDCs and a
control room which enable normal and split level saturation diving activities to be carried out.
There are three living chambers with a total of 16 bunks complete with medical locks, toilets, showers
and washbasins. In addition to the three living chambers there is a single transfer under pressure
(TUP) chamber permitting access to the SDC. The TUP chamber is fitted with a toilet, shower and
washbasin.
5.1.2. SUBMERSIBLE DECOMPRESSION CHAMBER (SDC)

There is a single 6.46m³ hemi-spherical bottom mating SDC with capacity for three divers. The SDC is
launched via a cursor system on guide rails through an aerated moonpool integrated in the ship's hull.
5.1.3. SDC HANDLING SYSTEM

The SDC handling system is located in the SDC hanger compartment, or "bell" handling room,
immediately above the saturation diving complex. Its purpose is to transfer the SDC from the
saturation dive complex through the vessel moonpool and down to the sea bed.
5.1.4. DIVE CONTROL

All support facilities necessary for deep water saturation diving are supplied from a centralised control
room known as “Dive Control.”
5.1.5. DIVER SUPPORT SYSTEMS

An integrated diver support system exists onboard that supplies all gas, water and electrical systems
necessary to support the DDC and SDC operations.
Permanent gas storage exists for up to 13,252m3 (nominal capacity at 200 bar) of helium & oxygen
(heliox) mixtures below deck while there is sufficient non-working deck space for up to 4 x 12 maxi-
tube gas storage quads.
5.1.6. FIRE FIGHTING AND BREATHING APPARATUS

The SDC handling room, Dive Control Room and Saturation Control are all protected by an inert gas
system. The chamber area and the gas hold are protected by a water sprinkler system.
5.1.7. SELF PROPELLED HYPERBARIC LIFEBOAT (SPHL) & LIFE SUPPORT PACKAGE (LSP)
There is a single Self Propelled Hyperbaric Lifeboat (SPHL) with sufficient capacity for 12 divers and a
speed of 5 knots located on the port side of the vessel. It has a chamber size of 1600mm x 3000mm
and has sufficient gas onboard for 3 days endurance.
The vessel normally carries a life support package (LSP) suitable for connecting to the SPHL in order
to provide auxiliary support services once the lifeboat has been launched.
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Saturation Control
Chamber 1
Main Lock 1 Entry Lock 1
Deck
Hatch TUP
Dn
MOONPOOL
65 70 75 80 85 90 95
RUC
Escape
Hatch
Up 8
MEDICAL LOCK
Chamber 3 Chamber 2
Main Lock 3 Entry Lock 3 Entry Lock 2 Main Lock 2
Dn
5.2. DISCUSSION
5.2.1. BELL DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

Ref Block Diagram 01
FMEA Assessment Sheets (ATTACHMENT A)
The block diagram illustrates the relationship between the major components of the bell deployment
system. It demonstrates a high level of redundancy by providing 3 independent hydraulic power units,
two segregated hydraulic rings and 2 bell recovery systems. The highest Risk Index in this Section is
6.
5.2.1.1. LAUNCH CONTROL CONSOLE - R.I.3

All of the control functions are centralised within the console. The control system is electrically based
with no direct mechanical control. Loss of power to the console, which comes from the Dive Control
Main Control Panel, would prevent the recovery of the bell from this location. The most likely source of
a fault is associated with the MCCB or a loose connection although the probability is considered low,
1. To overcome this deficiency a direct manual control system has been installed near each winch,
thus overcoming any electrically related problems and therefore the consequence is also considered
to be low, 3. Fire would equally be a major problem, but as the area is always manned during diving
and it is protected by Halon, this probability is also low, 1.
5.2.1.2. BELL WIRE - R.I.3

The bell wire failure has been given a low Probability Factor, 1, due to its safety factor of 14 to 1. In
the event of failure, the secondary recovery system can be used to recover the bell to surface using
the guide wire winches and cursor winch alternatively the vessel crane could assist with either for
connection by the diver or R.O.V. In the worst case the releasable ballast weights could be utilised. On
this basis a consequence factor of 3 has been allocated.
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5.2.1.3. CURSOR LOCK/BELL LOCK/BELL TROLLEY - R.I.6

Although the Consequence Factor of 2 indicates this is not a very critical area, the Probability Factor
of 3 expresses concern that failure in this area could result in difficulties in handling the bell on the
vessel and quickly completing the mate. The bell lock is exposed to a severe environment and it
should receive particular attention under the PMS.
The mating trolley is traversed by a single hydraulic ram. Although ram failure is very unlikely, the
failure of the control valve or pipework connected to the ram is considered more likely. However the
consequence of the ram failure is more significant as it could require mechanical disconnection while
in the event of hydraulic failure the trolley can be moved with the assistance of a tugger winch and
padeye arrangement.
5.2.1.4. STRUCTURE
Structural failure is very unlikely but very critical to diver safety. This is already fully acknowledged and
receives particular attention through the regular load tests and inspections. The strength has recently
been verified by FEA methods.
5.2.1.5. HYDRAULIC POWER PACKS/HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

Probability is considered to be low, 3, while in the event of a failure the consequence is low, 1,
because of the high level of redundancy in the system. Every component can be supplied from any
power unit on either of the two segregated hydraulic circuits.
5.2.2. HYPERBARIC LIFEBOAT (SPHL) DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

FMEA Assessment Sheets (Appendix 1)
The block diagram and FMEA Assessment sheets identified the following single point failures with a
Risk Index greater than 3. The highest Risk Index in this Section is 8.
5.2.2.1. LAUNCH CONSOLE - R.I.8

The console is of simple, robust design and directly hydraulically controls the three principal
mechanisms required for the launch of the SPHL. It is provided with hydraulic power from power
unit 3 or accumulator power in the case of a “dead ship”.
It is located on the deck and is largely constructed of painted steel materials. It is, therefore, subject to
accelerated corrosion and requires regular attention.
The most likely cause of failure is pipe fracture due to damage or corrosion. Accordingly the pipework
is regularly inspected for external surface corrosion and measures taken to inhibit this corrosion or
renew the pipework as necessary.
5.2.2.2. DAVIT/TROLLEY - R.I.4

As above, due to the exposed location, the equipment and pipework is subject to corrosion. Certain
pipework cannot be readily inspected due to protection plates. Their existence is vital but they are
made demountable.
Ram seizure is considered very unlikely but spares for the various control valves are held.
5.2.2.3. WINCH - R.I.6

The general concerns for the winch system are as per the Davit/Trolley. As with all man riding
winches, particular attention is paid to the braking system and drive mechanism. There is no back up
motor and a spare is therefore held. The wire rope is particularly critical and is covered by the PMS
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for inspection and maintenance.
5.2.2.4. STRUCTURE - R.I.4

Structural collapse is very unlikely. Although exposed to the elements it is situated well inboard and
avoids serious accidental damage. This is already fully acknowledged and receives particular attention
through the regular load tests and inspections.
5.2.3. DIVER HEATING SYSTEM

The diver heating system is considered to be one of the key areas affecting diver safety. This is
particularly critical when diving deeper than 180 msw. As the depth increases, the maintenance of
breathing gas heating particularly becomes more important. If the supply of hot water to the diver
ceases, the breathing gas temperature rapidly drops to ambient temperature and below due to
expansion through the demand valve. Due to the combination of increased density and thermal
conductivity of helium this will be as critical to diver safety as gas failure at the deeper depths. It
should be noted, therefore, that the Consequence Factor of 3 would have been 4 the diving system
was considered for use deeper than 180 msw.
The block diagram and FMEA Assessment sheets identified the following single point failures with a
5.2.3.1. CAT PUMP SUPPLY - R.I.3

A Risk Index of 4 results from concerns over the single source of power which feeds three Cat Pumps.
Failure of the supply MCCB at the Dive Control Main Control Panel, cable or local control panel
reduces the level of effective redundancy provided by having three pumps.
It is however noted that two of these three pumps are relatively small in output to provide the facility to
reduce output according to demand and are not intended for redundancy. Instead a fourth big Cat
pump has been installed as back-up and this is powered separately. This is considered to supply
sufficient redundancy in the event of a failure to continue to supply the divers until they can be
recovered to the surface.
5.2.3.2. HOT WATER M ANIFOLD - R.I.4

The common manifold is a single point failure and should be modified. As hot seawater is very
aggressive the system is vulnerable to corrosion. Accordingly the condition of the pipework is
monitored closely and has been renewed recently with corrosion resistant material. To guard against
failure an emergency jumper hose is held to go directly from the pump output to the umbilical rotary
joint. In case of complete failure fresh water can be connected up to the manifold.
5.2.3.3. UMBILICAL WINCH ROTARY JOINT/UMBILICAL CONNECTOR (WINCH END) - R.I.6

The PMS identifies annual inspections of the rotary joint to check on corrosion and seal condition. A
spare is held onboard the vessel to guard against failure. The bell end rotary joint has now been
replaced with a fixed joint on the new bell.
5.2.3.4. UMBILICAL - R.I.6

Umbilical’s are subjected to very severe duty and their regular inspection and testing is covered by the
PMS. An emergency umbilical is held onboard and there is a hook up manifold to rapidly connect this
to the services, located adjacent to the umbilical winch.
5.2.3.5. BELL PENETRATORS - R.I.6

Experience has shown that the bell penetrators are particularly prone to corrosion. In the case of the
BAR Protector the Bell has been replaced recently and all penetrators have been renewed. Annual
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inspections and sample tests are carried out under the PMS.
5.2.3.6. BELL HEATING M ANIFOLD/DIVER’S UMBILICAL/HOT WATER SUIT/HELMET HEATING SHROUD -

R.I.9
These items are most critical to the maintenance of heating to the diver and must be subject to
specific tests and inspection under the Diving Contractor’s PMS with the exception of the bell heating
manifold.
5.2.4. BELL PRESSURISATION/BREATHING GAS SUPPLY

EMC Drawings EMC-BP-202
EMC-BP-206
The block diagram and FMEA Assessment Sheets identified the following single point failures with a
Risk Index greater than 3.
The highest Risk Index in this Section is 16 - the maximum!
5.2.4.1. M AIN GAS DISTRIBUTION PANEL - R.I.4

Although fire or gross damage in the vicinity of the Main Gas Distribution Panel would constitute a
major hazard (the chambers are also located in this area) the area is always manned and it is covered
by water sprinklers. The panel is also protected against major damage. The failure of an individual
line is more likely, but it would not result in the loss of an essential supply. The Probability of bad gas
(i.e. low/high 0²) would not be immediately life threatening and the continual on line analysis
equipment should prevent occurrence. Also, the use of quick connect whips totally eliminates the risk
of cross contamination but not human error.
5.2.4.2. BELL CONTROL GAS PANEL - R.I.6

The bell panel is supplied with two independent sources of gas and only gross damage or fire would
give rise to hazard. Both are extremely unlikely as the area is always manned during diving and is
Halon protected. Only fire could give rise to the highest Consequence Factor of 4.
5.2.4.3. UMBILICAL ROTARY JOINT/UMBILICAL CONNECTOR (WINCH END) - R.I.4

The PMS identifies annual inspections of the rotary joint and umbilical connector to check on corrosion
and seal integrity. As there are alternative paths for gas through the rotary joint, the Consequence
Factor has been assessed as 2. There is also an emergency umbilical held onboard.

Umbilical’s are subjected to very severe duty and their regular inspection and testing is covered by the
PMS. The bell pressurisation hose provides back up to the divers’ breathing gas hose and thus the
Consequence Factor of a single failure has been assessed as 2.
5.2.4.5. BELL PANEL SHUTTLE BLOCK - R.I.6

The bell gas management panel shuttle block centralises all of the diver gas supply functions and as
such constitutes a single point failure. The block is supplied from the surface by two gas supplies and
from the two onboard gas banks. The loss of surface gas does not result in immediate hazard and
visual warning of this is provided to the bellman.
In the unlikely event of a failure of the working divers’ supply, they can go onto bailout while the
bellman renders assistance on his unlimited independent supply. The only scenario not covered by
this approach is the simultaneous loss of the main bell umbilical and both working divers’ umbilical’s, a
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situation which is considered to be an acceptable risk.

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5.2.4.6. DIVERS’ UMBILICAL/DIVERS’ HELMET OR M ASK - R.I.16

These items are the most critical to the divers’ life and must be subject to specific tests and
inspections under the Diving Contractor’s PMS. The Risk Factor of 16 for gross damage would result
in the total loss of any breathing gas. Failure of the demand valve only constitutes a lower order of
hazard as the bailout bottle provides an independent supply, albeit of limited duration but acceptable
down to 180 msw. If diving was to be conducted at depths greater than 180 msw then the
Consequence Factor would be increased to 4. The bail out system itself was not part of this FMEA.
The failure of the Helinaut reclaim valve, does not constitute a significant hazard due to the protection
devices incorporated into its design. The umbilical’s, divers’ helmets and bellman’s mask, together
with the installed supply and exhaust system have been verified using the GAS SERVICES’ Life
Support Laboratory and is the subject of a separate report (ref P1893-RP-001 Issue 1 Rev 1).
5.2.5. CHAMBER BIBS

EMC-BP-203
EMC-BP-205
The block diagram and FMEA Assessment Sheets identified the following single factors with a Risk
Index greater than 3. The highest Risk Index in this Section is 12.
5.2.5.1. M AIN GAS DISTRIBUTION PANEL - R.I.4

by water sprinklers. The panel is also protected against major damage.
The failure of an individual line is more likely, but it would not result in the loss of an essential supply.
The Probability of bad gas (i.e. low/high 0²) would not be immediately life threatening and the continual
on line analysis equipment should prevent occurrence.
Also, the use of quick connect whips totally eliminates the risk of cross contamination but not human
error.
5.2.5.2. CHAMBER PANEL - R.I.9

With the exception of Chamber 3, only a single incomer brings BIB gas to the chamber panels. This is
via a hose whip which connects to the appropriate mix panel outside Sat Control. The most likely
cause of failure is hose or pipe rupture which would cause a temporary cessation of supply. Under
normal circumstances BIBS are not vital to life and, therefore, a Consequence Factor of only 2 is
applied. Fire would be a major concern but the area is always manned and Halon protected.
The area of greatest concern is the lack of relief valves downstream from the pressure regulators on
the Chamber Panels. The downstream pipework is only thin walled and would not safely withstand
HP gas. It is recommended to fit protection relief valves on each BIB supply line.
5.2.5.3. PIPEWORK TO CHAMBER - R.I.4

The probability of blockage is very low. Fracture of the pipework constitutes a greater risk due to the
increased probability. Some of the pipework is at deck level and all exposed pipework is protected.
Failure of the regulator on the Chamber Panel would allow HP onto the LP pipework.
5.2.5.4. BIB M ASK/BPR - R.I.12

The chambers are fitted with Scott Pressure Vac II masks. The Scott’s are provided with Tescom back
Rev. 02 Date 26/01/11
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Page. 14 of 60
pressure regulators.
The failure of any of the demand valves either open or closed, although quite possible, does not
constitute a major hazard unless this is simultaneous with a major chamber contamination. As a
double failure this is considered an acceptable risk. Additionally a spare set is carried.
The BIB masks and supply/exhaust systems have verified using the GAS SERVICES’ Life Support
Laboratory and is the subject of a separate report (ref. P1893-RP-002 Issue 1 Rev 1).
5.2.6. CHAMBER LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM

Ref: Block Diagrams P1893/01-DG-005 and 006
EMC-BP-216 through 222
EMC-BP-228
EMC-BP-237
EMC-BP-239
EMC-BP-244
Risk Index greater than 3. The highest Risk Index in this section is 6.
5.2.6.1. CLIMAPAC/CMU COOLING WATER BOOSTER PUMP - R.I.4

DELETED
5.2.6.2. CHAMBER COOLING/HEATING - R.I.6

The circulating fan in DDC1 and 2 are electrically powered and only one fan is provided in each main
lock. The entry locks share the same heating/cooling system and therefore do not provide an
alternative refuge. A single failure in either the DDC Control Rack, supply cable, junction boxes,
penetrator or the fan itself would constitute a concerning level of risk. The Index is given as 6.
Although not an immediate hazard, the necessary spares are held onboard to effect a repair to any
component in the power supply chain, including a spare fan and motor.
5.2.6.3. CO² SCRUBBING - R.I.6

The DDC1 and 2 main locks are provided with two scrubbers, however they are fed by power from a
common electrical supply. Fan or motor seizure is no longer of concern, but the comments on the
power supply are the same as given in 3.6.2.
The DDC1 and 2 entry locks are provided with their own scrubbers, but again certain parts of the
electrical supply system are common to the main lock units. Adequate spares for the electrical circuit
should be held.
5.2.7. CHAMBER PRESSURISATION SYSTEM

EMC-BP-203
EMC-BP-205
EMC-BP-209
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5.2.7.1. M AIN GAS DISTRIBUTION M ANIFOLD - R.I.4

line is more likely, but it would not result in the loss of an essential supply. The probability of bad gas
(i.e. low/high O²) would not be immediately life threatening and the continual on line analysis
5.2.7.2. DD3 REGULATOR PANEL - R.I.6

The control logic for DDC3 is different to the other chambers. A separate regulator panel is provided
outside Sat Control to pre-regulate the gas being supplied to the DDC3 chamber panel.
The loss of pressurisation gas is not high level risk. Blocked filters and leaking regulators are not
uncommon, but there is no immediate threat to life unless it occurs simultaneously to a major leak in
the chambers.
These items have been covered specifically within the PMS and spare filters and regulator seats are
held onboard.
5.2.7.3. CHAMBER PANELS/PRESSURISATION LINES - R.I.4

The risk with this equipment is associated with fracture or blockage. Both are very unlikely as HP
pipework is used throughout. Also, DDC1 and DDC2 main locks are provided with two separate
pressurisation supplies and, therefore a single line failure would not constitute a hazard to the diver in
the chamber. Fire is extremely unlikely as the area is always manned during diving and is protected
by fire suppression systems.
5.2.8. SPHL PRESSURISATION/BIB SUPPLY SYSTEM

EMC Drawing EMC-BP-207
The SPHL can be supplied from either the ship (when still on the vessel), its own onboard supplies or
the independent Emergency Support Container for use after recovery of the SPHL after an
evacuation.
5.2.8.1. M AIN GAS DISTRIBUTION M ANIFOLD - R.I.4

line is more likely, but it would not result in the loss of an essential supply. The probability of bad gas
(i.e. low/high O²) would not be immediately life threatening and the continual on line analysis
5.2.8.2. SPHL CONTROL PANEL (SAT CONTROL)/PIPEWORK/INTERCONNECT - R.I.3

The control panel is supplied with two gas supplies from the Main Distribution Manifold. Two
filter/regulator assemblies provide gas to the SPHL. Failure of one of these items gives rise to a Risk
Index of 3. The main area of concern is providing the BIBS with gas in case of internal fire or
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contamination requiring the divers to immediately go onto BIBS on entering the SPHL. As two parallel
lines are provided into the SPHL there is no single point failure.
5.2.8.3. ONBOARD SUPPLY - R.I.8

Only a single onboard bottom mix bank is provided comprising 3x50 litre bottles. At 180 msw these
will provide less than 3 minutes of breathing at 40 RMV for 12 divers. This demonstrates the very
limited capability of BIBS once the SPHL is launched. This problem is not peculiar to the BAR
Protector SPHL as the problem is one of payload and space availability.
There seems little point in recommending the increase of bottom mix, as to provide a more meaningful
duration would require at least 12 bottles, which is not feasible. It also shows that there is not
capability to make up for leaks or medical lock movements. The chamber would be slightly
decompressed every time the medical lock is used.
There is a total of 5 x 50 litre oxygen bottles in the SPHL. Assuming light work rates or 0.8lit/min
oxygen consumption, this will give a duration of 86 hours at 180 msw for 12 divers.
5.2.8.4. EMERGENCY SUPPLY CONTAINER - R.I.3

This independent package is very comprehensive and well thought through. As with the ship supply
total redundancy is provided and there is no apparent single point failure. It must be stressed that the
gas supply system to the container is not available as it is assumed this will be provided by the
rescuing facility. It has, however, been assumed that at least two independent supplies will be
provided.
5.2.8.5. SPHL SYSTEMS - R.I.6

The Chamber Control Panel in the SPHL centralises all of the gas control functions. It is not
vulnerable to damage. The BIBS and the chamber pressurisation are supplied from separate panels.
The oxygen make up to the chamber does not provide the operator with control over flow rate. This is
necessary to cater for the varying number of occupants. It is recommended to fit a suitable flow
meter.
5.2.8.6. BIB M ASK/BPR - R.I.12

The SPHL is fitted with 13 Scott Pressure Vac II masks. The exhaust manifold discharges through
two separate exits each, fitted with two Tescom BPR’s. This is required to handle the flow. Other
concerns related to the masks are as specified for the Chamber BIBS.
5.2.9. SPHL HEATING/COOLING SYSTEM

5.2.9.1. SHIPS SUPPLY SYSTEM - R.I.6

A simple closed circuit hot water supply system is provided comprising a domestic hot water tank,
header tank and circulating pump. Supply and return lines connect to a heat exchanger in the SPHL.
This maintains the chamber at an adequate temperature at all times.
Failure of any part of this system is not life threatening, however, if evacuation occurred
simultaneously to the failure, or during a downtime period then the diver’s safe evacuation would be
compromised. A spare immersion heater is held. Additionally it is recommended that a spare
circulating pump and heat exchanger are held onboard. The power supply and pipework are
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Page. 17 of 60
inspected as part of the PMS.
5.2.9.2. EMERGENCY SUPPLY SYSTEM - R.I.4

The emergency container provides a similar heating system as that installed in the ship. In addition a
cooling water booster pump is provided to supply sufficient cooling water to deal with the maximum
number of occupants.
The Emergency Container system should be covered by the PMS. The lower Consequence Factor is
due to the probable existence of other hot water/cooling water supplied that could be temporarily
supplied by riggers during an actual rescue after evacuation.
5.2.9.3. ONBOARD FACILITIES - R.I.8

The diesel engine constitutes the main single point failure. This unit provides heat and drives the sea
water pump for cooling. It is vital to the survival of the divers. Without it, they would be forced to
donning survival suits. Battery power is sufficient to run the scrubbers. Accordingly a second back up
generator has been installed.
The greatest risk yielding an index of 4 is the blockage of the fuel filter. This is because it is
considered more likely an event than any other in stopping the engine.
It is also stresses that cooling may be as important as heating. Experience has shown that 12 divers in
this type of SPHL will not require heating, but cooling in order to maintain a comfortable environment.
In hotter climates, the cooling system would require to be augmented with a chilling plant as ambient
air and water temperatures would result in life threatening internal temperatures.
5.2.10. CHAMBER LIGHTING SYSTEM

EMC Drawings EMC-BP-216 through 222
EMC-BP-237
EMC-BP-239
The only failures which gave rise to a Risk Index greater than 3 were due to fire, which gave an Index
of 4. As this area is manned and protected by comprehensive fire suppression systems, the risk is
acceptable and no further consideration has been given to the Chamber Lighting Systems.
5.2.11. SPHL ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

EMC-BP-233
As there is no “vital to life” requirement to have electrical services maintained continuously to the
SPHL from either the ship prior to launch, or from the Emergency Container, these areas have not
been considered by the FMEA.
The block diagram and FMEA Assessment Sheets identified the following single point failures within
the SPHL electrical system with a Risk Index greater than 3. The highest Risk Index in this Section is
8.
5.2.11.1. GENERATOR - R.I.8

An emergency generator has now been installed to provide redundancy.
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5.2.11.2. SPHL ELECTRICAL POWER PANEL - R.I.4

This provides all of the switches for the various electrical functions. A battery changeover switch is
provided. Minor defects can be readily repaired and only a major short resulting in a fire would
constitute a significant risk. Onboard fire suppression should deal with this occurrence.
5.2.11.3. CABLE/PENETRATORS/JB - R.I.6

The severance of the scrubber supply cable or failure of the penetrator would constitute a single point
failure, however the Probability Factor of 1 indicates that this is very unlikely.
5.2.11.4. STOCKTRONICS COMMS UNIT - R.I.6

A single unit uses an independent boom mic and talkback speaker connected via separate cables and
penetrators. The unit is also powered from the SPHL electrical panel and its own internal battery.
Communication is vital in this situation and consideration should be given to carrying a spare unit.
However a sound powered phone is installed which is sufficient.
5.2.11.5. BATTERIES - R.I.4

The total battery capacity of 306 Ah at 24V assumes negligible drain for starting and the batteries
being in excellent order. The principal load in the event of a generator failure is due to the 5 DH11 CO²
scrubbers and the DH11 heater. Each draws approximately 3 amps yielding a duration of 17 hours.
After this period the lung powered scrubbers in the survival kits would be required. These could be
used for as long as the Soda Lime lasts and so constitutes a high level of back up. Consideration
should be given to fitting DH-21 scrubbers which draw approximately half the running current with the
commensurate increase in battery life.
Past incidents of hydrogen explosions have occurred in Hyperbaric Lifeboats. This is only due to
incorrect charging procedures being adopted and the venting of the produced hydrogen into the
enclosed space of the SPHL. The battery compartment is sealed and vented outside of the SPHL and,
therefore, the risk is considered to be very low.
5.2.12. BELL ELECTRICAL SERVICES

EMC-BP-223
EMC-BP-229
EMC-BP-238
5.2.12.1. DIVE CONTROL M AIN CONTROL PANEL - R.I.4

All of the bell services are supplied from one transformer in the panel. Four of the five bell external
lights are individually switched but a single MCB feeds the bell’s internal services. It is recommended
that a spare transformer and MCB are held onboard. Fire is a major hazard, but the area is always
manned during diving and is Halon protected.
5.2.12.2. UMBILICAL WINCH JUNCTION BOXES - R.I.4

A loose connection is possible, but once identified can be readily corrected. No specific
recommendations are put forward.
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5.2.12.3. UMBILICAL WINCH SLIP RINGS - R.I.6

Mechanical wear of the contacts yields the greatest risk with an Index of 6. This item is inspected
every month within the PMS.

The loss of individual conductors is relatively likely, albeit with a low Consequence Factor. The
umbilical is externally checked for damage daily (when diving).
5.2.12.5. CABLE GUILLOTINE - R.I.4

The guillotine is part of the emergency ascent capability enabling the divers to sever the cables
contained in the umbilical. Unplanned actuation could give rise to considerable electrical hazard to the
diver.
This malfunction is very unlikely as the actuation requires three separate actions by the divers. The
guillotine is also inhibited against inadvertent actuation by the leak of gas into the hydraulic circuit from
the bell atmosphere as a shear pin is installed which requires above the maximum bell pressure to be
developed in the hydraulic circuit prior to release of the cutter.
5.2.12.6. OIL FILLED JUNCTION BOX - R.I.6

All of the umbilical supplied electrical services are centralised in the externally mounted JB. Flooding
due to leakage is a possibility but the design and second buffer makes malfunction unlikely. Gross
damage due to impact is of concern, however, this is considered very unlikely due to its location within
the bump frame and crash guard.
5.2.12.7. BELL BATTERY/PENETRATOR/BATTERY SWITCHING UNIT - R.I.6

The bell battery housing also conveys the surface power to the internal equipment. Gross damage to
any of the above items is very unlikely, but would cause the immediate failure of all powered lighting
and life support equipment. In such a situation the dive would be aborted. An internal fault could cause
the loss of some services, but this is not considered a major risk.
5.2.12.8. SCRUBBER/HEATER - R.I.4

The failure of this equipment yields a low Risk Index as the dive would be aborted before a significant
environmental problem occurred.
5.2.13. CHAMBER/SPHL ANALYSIS

The block diagram and FMEA Assessment Sheets indicate that there are no failures yielding a Risk
Index greater than 3.
5.2.14. BELL ANALYSIS

The block diagram and FMEA Assessment Sheets indicate that the maximum Risk Index of 4 is if
leakage occurs at any of the umbilical connector or umbilical rotary joints due to seal failure or
damage. The failure would result in a loss of gas flow to the analyser and would therefore be readily
detected. A serious leak would result in gradual depressurisation of the bell which would be indicated
on the depth gauge.
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5.2.15. CHAMBER COMMS SYSTEM

The block diagram and FMEA Assessment Sheets identified various junction boxes which constituted
single point failures. Loose connections within the JB’s or fire were the only scenario assessed to have
an R.I greater than 3. Loose connections would not give rise to any significant hazard as such an
occurrence would only occur on one circuit at a time.
Fire is a considerable hazard but the area is always manned during diving and covered by fire
suppression systems.
5.2.16. BELL/DIVER COMMUNICATIONS

EMC-BP-219 EMC-BP-227
EMC-BP-229 EMC-BP-238
The block diagram and FMEA Assessment Sheets identified in the following single point failures with a
5.2.16.1. DIVER’S HELMET/M ASK - R.I.9

Failure with the comms equipment fitted to the diver’s helmet or mask yields the highest R.I. This is
due to the high probability of failure and illustrates the need for specific inspection and maintenance
within the Diving contractor’s PMS.
5.2.16.2. DIVER’S UMBILICAL - R.I.6

The diver’s umbilical is very critical to the diver’s safety. It is exposed to extreme environmental
conditions and rough handling. It should be subject to frequent continuity and insulation resistance
tests under the Diving Contractor’s PMS.
5.2.16.3. BELL INT. JB/CABLING - R.I.6

The relatively high Risk Index is due to the more likely occurrence of a loose connection. Periodic
inspection should be included in the PMS. The bell is also provided with “through water”
communications and an independent sound powered phone which provides parallel communication
systems albeit of considerably inferior quality.
5.2.16.4. SHIPS WIRING/COMMS RACK TERMINALS - R.I.4

A loos connection or fire is given as the causes for failures in these items. Fire is not likely as the area
is manned and covered by either sprinklers or Halon. The terminals and connections should be
checked as part of the PMS.
5.2.16.5. STOCKTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS RACK - R.I.4

The primary Stocktronics Communication Rack is the focus of all communications and therefore
critical to operations. Accordingly all necessary spare units are held onboard to facilitate essential
repairs.
5.2.17. AIR SUPPLY SYSTEM

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5.2.17.1. PIPEWORK - R.I.8

HP air and oxygen pipework feeding the starboard air dive station is vulnerable to damage and is
adequately protected accordingly.
5.2.17.2. LP COMPRESSOR - R.I4

The LP Air Compressor intake is within the compartment housing the compressor. In the unlikely
event of a fire, toxic fumes could be passed to the diver before the fire was sufficient to shut down the
compressor. There is no means of detecting this occurrence. It is recommended to fit a smoke alarm
in the compartment linked to shut down the compressor. The diver would automatically go onto
backup HP air and would not be hazarded by the shut down.
5.2.18. PRESSURE VESSELS FOR HUMAN OCCUPANCY

Ref FMEA Assessment Sheets (Appendix 1)
The general comments apply to all chambers and bell but specific additional comments are made
against the individual chambers. The highest Risk Index is 8.
Viewports - R.I.8
The rupture of a viewport constitutes a major hazard and results in a Consequence Factor of 4. The
probability factor of 2 is due to the fitment of acrylic protection plates in front of the viewports on all
chambers.
Overheating of viewports by a misaligned external light has been known to cause premature failure.
Only the SPHL chamber has such a fitting. It is recommended that this is inspected daily as part of the
PMS. Viewports in general should be visually inspected in site every month to check for crazing or
damage.
5.2.18.1. DOOR SEAL - R.I.8

Only a major leak due to gross door misalignment would cause a severe hazard. Wear only results in
a gradual degradation of alignment and mechanical failure would have to be the cause. The
monitoring of door leaks is done automatically when the chambers are pressurised, however some
internal doors will rarely see a differential pressure in practice.
It has been recommended that the pressure integrity of all doors is established at least every 3 months
within the PMS (to a pressure difference of 10 msw) however faces and seals are closely examined
every week as part of the PMS.
5.2.18.2. CHAMBER/CHAMBER SEAL - R.I.4

These static seals have been proven to be very reliable, and their integrity is established at each 5
yearly pressure test.
5.2.18.3. PIPE/VALVE - R.I.6

The only large (in excess of one inch) pipe entries into the chamber are the toilet discharges. The
external valves are of flanged design and are not vulnerable to damage. Internally the toilet discharge
is fitted with two interlocked valves in series.
All smaller penetrations were found to be protected by hull stops or non-return valves.
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5.2.18.4. FIRE - R.I.4

Fire represents a major hazard but the external area is always manned during diving and is covered
by water sprinklers.
There is no fixed internal fire suppression equipment but hyperbaric fire extinguishers are provided.
5.2.18.5. BACTERIOLOGICAL INFESTATION - R.I.6

Chambers 1 and 2 are provided with lockers and enclosed cabinets around the Climapac units. These
inhibit the ability to clean and disinfect but there has been no major occurrences of infection in the
past. Although inconvenient it is clear that the divers have been attending to cleanliness.
5.2.18.6. PRESSURE VESSEL STRUCTURE

Although there have been no failures to date, the long term fatigue of diving chambers due to deck
flexure is of concern. The chamber complex fitted on the BAR Protector is relatively compact and
therefore does not suffer unduly compared to other systems. This concern is largely mitigated by the
fact that most systems only routinely work at a relatively shallow depth compared to their original
design depth. If deeper diving (greater than 180 msw) was envisaged then this issue would be worthy
of further review.
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5.2.18.7. OVERHEAD DOOR

The overhead doors in the TL and DDC1 EL are hydraulically actuated. Various failures could result in
the inadvertent opening of the door when the pressure across them is equalised. Due to the weight of
the doors and the confined space severe injury could occur. This mechanism is inspected every month
within the PMS.
5.2.19. SANI-WATER SYSTEM

Ref FMEA Assessment Sheets (Appendix 1)
There are no single point failures that give rise to a Risk Index greater than 3 and therefore no further
consideration has been given to this system.
6. ATTACHMENT
ATTACHMENT A - ASSESSMENT SHEET

ATTACHMENT B - BLOCK DIAGRAMS
BAR PROTECTOR OPERATION MANUAL Rev. 02 Date 26/01/11
DIVING SYSTEM FMEA Page. 24 of 60
ATTACHEMENT A - ASSESSMENT SHEET

System: BELL DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 01
P C Risk
No Description Failure Mode Failure Detection Cause Fact Fact Inde Comments
or or x
1.1 Launch Control Console Power Failure Lights Fail MCCB Failure/Loose Connection 1 3 3
Cable Failure 1 3 3
Fire 1 3 3
1.2 Hydraulic Power Packs 1, 2 or 3 Overheating Temp, Warning Loss of cooling water 1 2 2
Mechanical B/D Gauges Pressure Loss 3 1 3
1.3 Bell Wire Wire Parts/ Audio from Driver Excessive load due to incident 2 3 6
Socket Fails Visual by CCTV
1.4 Cursor lock/Bell Lock Unable to Open Cannot Lower Bell Mechanical Seizure 3 2 6
Valve Malfunction 2 2 4
Ram Seizure/Pipe Fracture 1 3 3
1.5 Trolley Unable to Move No Movement Ram Seizure 1 3 3

Valve Failure/Pipe Fracture 2 2 4
1.6 Structure Collapse Visual Corrosion 1 4 4

Damage 1 4 4
System: SPHL DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 01

P C Risk
or or x
2.1 Launch Console Loss of Control No Movement Pipe/Valve Failure 2 4 8
Pipe Blockage 1 4 4
2.2 Davit/Trolley Ram/Mechanical No Movement Ingress of Dirt/Corrosion 1 4 4

Seizure
Pipe Failure No Movement Blockage/Corrosion 2 4 8
Valve Failure No Movement Wear or Dirt 2 4 8
2.3 Winch Seizure No Movement Ingress of Dirt/Corrosion 2 3 6

Motor Failure No Movement Wear or Dirt 2 3 6
Pipe Failure No Movement Blockage/Corrosion 2 3 6
Valve Failure No Movement Wear or Dirt 2 3 6
Rope Parts Visual Excessive Load/Corrosion 2 3 6
2.4 Structure Collapse Visual Corrosion or Damage 1 4 4

System: DIVER HEATING SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 02

P C Risk
or or x
3.1 Cat Pump supply Power Failure Hot Water Alarm MCCB Failure 2 2 4
Cable Failure 1 2 2
Fire 1 4 4
3.2 Hot Water Manifold Loss of Flow Hot Water Alarm Damage or corrosion 2 3 6
3.3 Umbilical Rotary Joint Loss of Flow Hot Water Alarm Seal Failure 2 3 6
3.4 Umbilical Loss of Flow Audio from Diver Damage or Kink 2 3 6
3.5 Umbilical Connector Loss of Flow Audio from Diver Seal Failure or Damage 2 3 6
3.6 Bell Penetrator Loss of Flow Audio from Diver Damage or Corrosion 2 3 6
3.7 Bell Heating Manifold Loss of Flow Audio from Diver Damage or Corrosion 2 3 6
3.8 Divers Umbilical Loss of Flow Audio from Diver Damage or Kink 3 3 9
3.9 Hot Water Suit Diver Cold Audio from Diver Blockage or Damage 3 3 9
3.10 Helmet Heating Shroud Diver Cold Audio from Diver Blockage or Damage 3 3 9
System: BELL PRESSURISATION/BREATHING GAS SUPPLY Reference: 03

P C Risk
or or x
4.1 Main Gas Distribution Manifold Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Gross Damage or Fire 1 4 4
Bad Gas Analyser Human Error/Contamination 2 3 6
4.2 Bell Control Gas Panel Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Gross Damage or Fire 1 4 4
4.3 Umbilical Rotary Joint Loss of Flow Mara Panel Alarm Seal Failure or Blockage 2 2 4
4.4 Umbilical Loss of Flow Mara Panel Alarm Damage or Kink 2 2 4
4.5 Umbilical Connector Loss of Flow Mara Panel Alarm Gross Damage 2 2 4
4.6 Bell Penetrator Loss of Flow Mara Panel Alarm Gross Damage 1 2 2
4.7 Mara Panel Loss of Flow Audio from Bellman Gross Damage or Leak 2 3 6
4.8 Divers Umbilical Loss of Flow Audio from Diver/ Damage or Kink 2 3 6
Mara Panel Alarm
4.9 Divers Umbilical Loss of Flow Audio from Diver Damage 4 4 16

Demand Valve Malfunction 3 3 9
Reclaim Valve Malfunction 3 2 6
System: CHAMBER BIBS Reference: Block Diagram 04

P C Risk
or or x
Bad Gas Analyser Human Error/Contamination 2 3 6
5.2 Chamber Panel Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Pipe/Hose Failure 2 2 4

Regulator Failure 3 3 9
5.3 Pipework to Chamber Loss of Flow Audio from Diver Pipe Fracture 2 2 4
Blockage 1 2 2
5.4 BIB Manifold Loss of Flow Audio from Diver Damage 1 3 3

Blockage 1 2 2
5.5 Demand BIB Closed Audio from Diver Dirt or Seat Seizure 3 2 6
Open Audio from Diver Seat Damage or Seizure 3 2 6
5.6 Exhaust Valve Closed Audio from Diver Seat Seizure 3 1 3

Open Audio from Diver Seat Damage or Seizure 3 4 12 Scott BIB Only
5.7 BPR Closed Audio from Diver Seat Seizure 3 1 3

Open Audio from Diver Seat Damage or Seizure 3 4 12 Scott BIB Only
System: CHAMBER LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 05 & 006
P C Risk
or or x
6.1 Climapac/CMU Cooling Water Loss of Cooling Humidity Sensor Pipe Fracture 1 2 2
Water Loss of Ships Cooling Water 1 2 2
Booster Pump Humidity Sensor Loss of Power 2 2 4
Failure
6.2 Chamber Cooling/Heating System Loss of Flow Humidity Sensor Pipe Fracture/Blockage 1 2 2
Poor Performance Humidity Sensor Blocked Heat Exchanger 3 1 3
No Performance Humidity Sensor Seized Circulating Fan 2 3 6 { DDC 1 }
Power Penetrator Failure 2 3 6 { DDC 2 }
JB Fire 1 4 4 { & TL }
DDC Control Rack Fire 1 4 4 { Only }
6.3 CO² Scrubbing Poor Performance CO² Analysis Spent Absorbent 2 3 6

Blocked Scrubber 2 3 6
Power Penetrator Failure 2 3 6 { DDC 1 }
Power Cable Failure 2 3 6 { DDC 2 }
JB Fire 1 4 4 { & TL }
DDC Control Rack Fire 1 4 4 { Only }
Fan Seizure 2 3 6 ES & TL Only
System: CHAMBER PRESSURISATION SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 07

P C Risk
or or x
Bad Gas Analysis Human Error/Contamination 2 2 4
7.2 DDC3 Regulator Panel Loss of Flow Pressure Gas Pipe Fracture/Blockage 2 2 4 DDC3 Only
Filter Blocked 3 2 6
7.3 Chamber Panels Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Pipe Fracture/Blockage 2 2 4
7.4 Pressure Up Lines Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Pipe Fracture 2 2 4 DDC3 Els & TL
Only
System: SPHL PRESSURISATION/BIB SUPPLY SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 08

P C Risk
or or x
SHIP SUPPLY
Bad Gas Analysis Human Error/Contamination 2 2 4
8.2 SPHL Control Panel (Sat Control) Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Pipe Fracture 2 1 2
Regulator Fracture 3 1 3
8.3 Pipework/Interface Plate Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Pipe Damage/Blockage 2 1 2
8.4 Ship/SPHL Interconnect Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Damage or Blockage 3 1 3
ONBOARD SUPPLY
8.5 Bottom Mix Bank Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Pipe Fracture 2 2 4
Depletion 4 2 8
EMERGENCY SUPPLY
8.6 SPHL Control Panel (Container) Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Pipe Fracture/Blockage 2 1 2
8.7 Emergency Umbilical Loss of Flow Pressure Gauge Hose Failure 3 1 3

System: SPHL PRESSURISATION/BIB SUPPLY Reference: 08

P C Risk
or or x
SPHL SYSTEMS
8.8 Chamber Control Panel Loss of Flow Audio with Diver Pipe Fracture/Blockage 2 2 4
8.9 Pipe to Chamber Loss of Flow Audio with Diver Fracture/Blockage 2 2 4

Noise PRV Failure 2 3 6
8.10 BIB Manifold Loss of Flow Audio with Diver Fracture 1 3 3

Blockage 1 2 2
8.11 Demand BIB Closed Audio with Diver Dirt or Seat Seizure 3 2 6
Open Audio with Diver Seat Damage or Seizure 3 2 6
8.12 Exhaust Valve Closed Audio with Diver Seat Seizure 3 1 3

8.13 Exhaust Manifold Loss of Flow Audio with Diver Fracture 1 1 1

Blockage 1 2 2
8.14 BPR Closed Audio with Diver Seat Seizure 3 1 3

System: SPHL HEATING/COOLING SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 09

P C Risk
or or x
9.1 Heating Supply from the Ship Heater Failure Temperature Gauge Element Burns Out 2 3 6
Pump Failure Temperature Gauge Seizure/Motor Failure 2 3 6
Heat Exchanger Temperature Gauge Corrosion 2 3 6
Power Failure Temperature Gauge Cable/Connection 1 3 3
Pipe Failure Temperature Gauge Corrosion/Damage 2 3 6
9.2 Heating/Cooling Supply from the Heat Failure 2 2 4

Emergency Container Pump Failure 2 2 4
Heat Exchanger 2 3 6
Power Failure 2 3 6
Pipe Failure 2 2 6
9.3 Diesel Engine Stops Running No Noise Fuel Line Failure 2 2 4

Fuel Pump Failure 2 2 4
Fuel Filter Blocked 3 2 6
Fuel Contamination 2 2 4
Mechanical Failure 2 2 4
9.4 Hot Water Circulating Pump No Flow Temperature Gauge Water Leak 2 4 8
Pump Failure 2 4 8
9.5 Hot Water Pipework No Flow Temperature Gauge Pipe Fracture/Blockage 2 4 8
9.6 Sea Water Pump (Cooling) No Flow Temperature Gauge Block Intake 4 2 8
Pipe Fracture 2 3 6
Insufficient Cooling Temperature Gauge No Chilling Plant 3 4 12 Hot Climate Only
System: CHAMBER LIGHTING Reference: 10

P C Risk
or or x
10.1 Chamber Control Rack Power Loss Loss of Lighting Earth Fault 2 1 2
Fuse Blown/Loose Connection 2 1 2
Fire 1 4 4
10.2 High/Low Power Rack Power Loss Loss of Lighting MCB Failure 2 1 2 DDC3 Only
Loose Connection 2 1 2
10.3 Chamber Control Rack Power Loss Loss of Lighting Fuse Blown/Loose Connection 2 1 2
MCB Failure 2 1 2
Fire 1 4 4
10.4 External Junction Box Power Loss Loss of Lighting Damage 1 1 1 ELs & TL only
Fire 1 4 4
10.5 Penetrators Power Loss Loss of Lighting Loose Connection 2 1 2 Els & TL only
Fire 1 4 4
10.6 Internal Junction Box Power Loss Loss of Lighting Loose Connection 2 1 2
System: SPHL ELECTRICAL SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 11

P C Risk
or or x
11.1 Generator Engine Stops No Noise See P1893-FM-009 3 2 6
No Output Indicator Light Winding Failure 3 2 6
Drive Belt Failure 4 2 8
11.2 SPHL Electrical Power Panel Power Loss Indicator Light Blown Fuse/Loose Connection 2 2 4
Fire 1 4 4
11.3 Cable Power Loss Indicator Light Damage 1 3 3

Fire 1 4 4
11.4 Electrical Penetrator Power Loss Scrubber Fans Stop Short/Loose Connection 2 3 6
Fire 1 4 4
11.5 Internal Junction Box Power Loss Scrubber Fans Stop Loose Connection 2 3 6
Fire 1 4 4
11.6 Stocktronics Communications Unit No Speech No Communications Unit Failure 3 2 6 Sound Powered Tel
11.7 Batteries Gas Explosion Noise Incorrect Charging 1 4 4
System: BELL ELECTRICAL SERVICES Reference: 12

P C Risk
or or x
12.1 Dive Control Main Control Panel Power Loss Alarm Transformer/MCB Failure 2 2 4
Cable failure 1 2 2
Fire 1 4 4
12.2 Ship Wiring Power Loss Loss of Services Damage 1 2 2
12.3 Umbilical Winch External JB Power loss Loss of Services Loose Connection 2 2 4
Fire 1 4 4
12.4 Slip Rings Power Loss Loss of Services Loose Connection 2 2 4

Mechanical Wear 3 2 6
Fire 1 4 4
12.5 Umbilical Winch Internal JB Power Loss Loss of Services Loose Connection 2 2 4
Fire 1 4 4
12.6 Umbilical Power Loss Loss of Services Single Conductor Damage 3 2 6

Total Loss 1 3 3
12.7 Cable Guillotine Power Loss Loss of Services Malfunction 1 4 4

Mechanical Damage 2 2 4
12.8 Oil Filled JB Power Loss Loss of Services Flooding 2 3 6

Gross Damage 1 4 4
System: BELL ELECTRICAL SERVICES Reference: Block Diagram 12

P C Risk
or or x
12.9 Bell Battery Power Loss Indicator Light Flooding 2 3 6
Gross Damage 1 4 4
Short/Loose Connection 2 3 6
12.10 Penetrator Power Loss Indicator Light Short/Loose Connection 1 3 3

12.11 Battery Switching Unit Power Loss Indicator Light Loose Connection 2 3 6
12.12 Scrubber/Heater fan No Flow No Noise Seizure 2 2 4

Motor Failure 2 2 4
Circuit Board Failure 2 2 4
12.13 Internal light No Light No Light Light Blown 3 1 3

System: CHAMBER/SPHL ANALYSIS SYSTEM Reference: Block Diagram 13

P C Risk
or or x
13.1 Pressure Regulator Open Flowmeter Dirt or Seat Seizure 3 1 3
Closed Flowmeter Seat Damage or Seizure 3 1 3
13.2 Pipe No Flow Flowmeter Blocked 1 1 1

Fracture 1 1 1
System: BELL ANALYSIS Reference: 14

P C Risk
or or x
14.1 Umbilical Connector No Flow F’meter on Analyser Blockage 1 2 2
Leakage Tell Tale on
Connector/Bell Seal Failure 2 2 4
Depth Gauge
14.2 Umbilical No Flow F’meter on Analyser Blockage 1 2 2

Leakage Bell Depth Gauge Damage 2 2 4
14.3 Rotary Joint No Flow F’meter on Analyser Blockage 1 2 2

Leakage Bell Depth Gauge Seal Failure 2 2 4
14.4 Drier Tube No Flow F’meter on Analyser Blockage 3 1 3

Leakage Seal Failure Seal Failure 1 2 2
System: CHAMBER COMMS SYSTEM Reference: 15

P C Risk
or or x
15.1 Junction Boxes (ext) No Continuity No Comms Loose Connection 3 2 6
Fire 1 4 4
15.2 Cabling No Continuity No Comms Damage 1 2 2

System: BELL/DIVER COMMUNICATIONS Reference: 16

P C Risk
or or x
16.1 Divers Helmet/Mask No Signal No Comms Component Malfunction 3 3 9
Broken Wire 1 3 3
16.2 Divers Umbilical No Continuity No Comms Damage 2 3 6
16.3 Bell Internal JB No Continuity No Comms Loose Connection 2 3 6

Broken Wire 1 3 3
16.4 Penetrator No Continuity No Comms Short/Loose Connection 1 3 3

16.5 Oil Filled JB No Continuity No Comms Flooding/Short 2 3 6

Gross Damage 1 4 4
16.6 Cable Guillotine No Continuity No Comms Malfunction 1 4 4

16.7 Umbilical No Continuity No Comms Single Conductor Damage 3 2 6

Total Loss 1 3 3
16.8 Umbilical Winch Internal JB No Continuity No Comms Loose Connection 2 2 4

Fire 1 4 4
System: BELL/DIVER COMMUNICATIONS Reference: 16

P C Risk
or or x
16.9 Slip Rings No Continuity No Comms Loose Connection 2 2 4
Mechanical Wear 3 2 6
Fire 1 4 4
16.10 Umbilical Winch External JB No Continuity No Comms Loose Connection 2 2 4

Fire 1 4 4
16.11 Ship Wiring No Continuity No Comms Damage/Fire 1 4 4
16.12 Comms Rack Terminals No Continuity No Comms Loose Connection 2 2 4

Fire 1 4 4
16.13 Stocktronics Communications Rack No Continuity No Comms Loose Connection 2 2 4

Card Defect 2 2 4
16.14 Dive Control Main Control Panel Loss of Power Alarm Transformer/MCB Failure 2 2 4
Cable Failure 1 2 2
Fire 1 4 4
System: AIR SUPPLY SYSTEM Reference:

P C Risk
or or x
17.1 Air Distribution Panel No Flow Pressure Gauge Pipe Failure 1 2 2
Fitting/Valve Failure 2 1 2
Blockage 2 1 2
17.2 Pipework No Flow Pressure Gauge Damage 4 2 8
17.3 LP Air Compressor Intake Contaminated Air None Fire 1 4 4

System: PRESSURE VESSEL FOR HUMAN OCCUPANCY Reference:

P C Risk
or or x
18.1 Viewport Rupture Pressure Gauge Damage or Heat 2 4 8
18.2 Door Seal Major Leak Pressure Gauge Damage or Heat 2 4 8
18.3 Chamber/Chamber Seal Major Leak Pressure Gauge Ageing 1 4 4
18.4 Pipe/Valve Fracture Pressure Gauge Damage 2 3 6
18.5 Electrical Penetrator Fracture Pressure Gauge Damage 1 3 3
18.6 Interlocks on Openings No Operation Cannot Open Seizure 2 1 2

Major Leak Noise Seal Failure 2 1 2
18.7 Fire Fire Audio with Diver Electrical Hazard 1 4 4

Vision
18.8 Bacteriological Infestation Infection Audio with Diver Poor Cleanliness 3 2 6
18.9 Over Pressurisation Chamber Rupture Pressure Gauge Human Error 1 3 3
18.10 Pressure Vessel Structure Rupture Noise Fatigue 1 4 4

Deck Flexure 1 4 4
18.11 Overhead Door Uncontrolled Audio with Diver Actuator Seal Failure 2 3 6
Opening Control Seal Failure 2 3 6
Mechanical Failure 2 3 6
System: SANI-WATER SYSTEM Reference: DWG: EMC-BP-010

P C Risk
or or x
19.1 Hot Water Heating Open Circuit Cold Water Immersion Heater Fails 2 1 2
19.2 Water Tanks Rupture Leakage Overpressure 1 1 1
19.3 Pipe Work Fracture Leakage Damage 2 1 2
19.4 Ships Water Fails No Supply No Water Pump Failure 1 1 1

Pipe Fracture 1 1 1
ATTACHMENT B - BLOCK DIAGRAMS

01 Bell & SPHL Deployment System
HYDRAULIC HYDRAULIC HYDRAULIC

POWER POWER POWER
UNIT 1 UNIT 2 UNIT 3
MAIN BELL GUIDE CURSOR

TROLLEY CURSOR SPHL EMERGENCY
BELL PLIERS LIFTING WIRE LOCK
RAM WINCH DAVIT ACC
WINCH CYLINDERS WINCHES CYLINDERS
MAIN
CLUMP
BELL BELL PLIERS TROLLEY TROLLEY SPHL
WEIGHT
WIRE
BELL
02 Diver Heating System
FRESH WATER
MAIN MAIN MAIN MAIN MAIN FROM SHIP FILTER
GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR
NO. 1 6KV NO. 3 6KV NO. 2 6KV NO. 4 6KV NO. 5 6KV FILTER
SEA WATER
ALPHA ALPHA FROM SHIP
6KV 6KV LAVAL ELECTRICAL LAVAL
STEAM HEATER STEAM
440V 440V STEAM HEAT EX HEAT EX STEAM
FROM FROM
SHIP SHIP
MAIN SWITCHBOARD
SHIP CONTROL ROOM CAT
MAIN DECK SAT PUMP
CONTROL PANEL
MAIN
SUPPLY PUMP PUMP PUMP
PANEL NO. 1 NO. 2 NO. 3
DIVING SHIPS
EMERGENCY EMERGENCY
GENERATOR EMERGENCY GENERATOR
440V POWER 440V DUMP DUMP
440V DIVE
CONTROL
EMERGENCY SAT CONTROL MAIN
SWITCHBOARD EMERGENCY SUPPLY CONTROL
D DECK PANEL AIR DIVER STATIONS UMBILICAL WINCH ROTARY JOINT
PANEL
UMBILICAL
UMBILICAL CONNECTOR
DIVING BELL HOT WATER MANIFOLD

LEGEND
CONTROL DIVERS UMBILICAL
ELECTRICAL POWER HELMET HOT WATER SHROUD
FLUID
HOT WATER SUIT
03 Bell Pressurisation/Breathing Gas
MULTIPLE INCOMERS
FROM GAS TUBES
GASMIZER
SYSTEM
MAIN GAS
DISTRIBUTION
PANEL
MAKE-UP
BELL OXYGEN
GAS RECLAIM
CONTROL
GAS PANEL
GASMIZER
SYSTEM
DIVERS
BELL
PRESSURISATION BREATHING GAS
UMBILICAL
ROTARY
JOINT
UMBILICAL
UMBILICAL
CONNECTOR
HELIOX MARA HELIOX

BIBS
BANK 1 PANEL BANK 2
EMERGENCY
HELIOX PRESSURISATION GAS
BANK 3 RECLAIM
EQUIPMENT
BELLMAN
MASK
BAIL
OUT
BOTTLE
DIVER 1 DIVER 2
HELMET HELMET
BAIL BAIL
OUT OUT
BOTTLE BOTTLE
04 Chamber Bibs Supply/Exhaust

MULTIPLE INCOMERS
PORT
FROM GAS TUBES
DECK
O
2
DECANT
STORAGE
PANEL
QUAD
MAIN GAS
MIX DISTRIBUTION
MAKER
O MANIFOLD
2
DECK
STARBOARD
PANEL
DECK
DECANT
PANEL
DDC 3
TREATMENT
OXYGEN MIX 1 MIX 2
REGULATOR
MIX
PANEL PANEL PANEL
PANEL
PANEL
DDC 1 DDC 1 DDC 2 DDC 2

BIBS O TL
2 ML EL EL ML DDC 3
PANEL PANEL PANEL
PANEL PANEL PANEL PANEL
LEGEND
DDC 1 DDC 1
MIX
TL
ML EL
EL ML EL ML
O
2
VENT
05 Chamber Life Support System
SHIP COOLING MAIN SUPPLY
ECU 1 SHIP COOLING ECU 2

MAIN RETURN
1 2
SV SV
SV SV SV SV SV SV
CHILLER HEATER CHILLER HEATER CHILLER HEATER CHILLER HEATER CHILLER HEATER
DDC 1 ML TL DDC 2 ML DDC 3 ML DDC 3 EL

06 Chamber Life Support System Electrical and Control
SAT CONTROL
SAT CONTROL
EMERGENCY
MAIN SUPPLY SUPPLY
PANEL PANEL
CHAMBER HIGH / LOW

CONTROL POWER
RACK RACK DDC 3
ECU CONTROL
UPS
ECU 1 RACK
RACK
DDC 1 TL DDC 2 ECU

ANALISERS CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 2
RACK RACK RACK
JB
14
JB
3 JB
6
JB JB JB JB
JB JB
2 4 17 15
9 7
JB JB
13 11
CLIMAPAC JB JB JB CLIMAPAC JB JB
FAN 33 34 25 FAN 22 21
CLIMAPAC JB
EMERGENCY
JB FAN 30 JB
EMERGENCY SCRUBBER
EMERGENCY 31 27
SCRUBBER SCRUBBER
JB EMERGENCY EMERGENCY
EMERGENCY
34 SCRUBBER
SCRUBBER SCRUBBER
COMEX JB COMEX
SCRUBBER 29 SCRUBBER
COMEX TEMPERATURE HUMIDITY
SCRUBBER SCRUBBER SCRUBBER SENSOR
SENSOR
TEMPERATURE HUMIDITY
TEMPERATURE HUMIDITY
SENSOR SENSOR
SENSOR SENSOR TEMPERATURE HUMIDITY
TEMPERATURE HUMIDITY SENSOR SENSOR
ML EL SENSOR SENSOR
DDC 1 DDC 2
DDC 3
TL
07 Chamber Pressurisation System
AIR AIR
BANK BANK
MULTIPLE INCOMERS
(HELIUM AND MIX)
FROM GAS TUBES
AIR
COMPRESSOR
MAIN GAS
DISTRIBUTION
AIR MANIFOLD
DISTRIBUTION
PANEL
MIX 2 HELIUM
PANEL PANEL
DDC 3
REGULATOR
PANEL

TL
ML EL EL ML DDC 3
PANEL PANEL
PANEL PANEL PANEL PANEL
HELIUM HELIUM
MIX MIX
OR OR
AIR AIR
ML EL TL EL ML EL ML
DDC 1 TL DDC 2 DDC 3

LEGEND
HELIUM (2%)
HELIOX (BOTTOM MIX) OR AIR

08 SPHL Pressurisation/Bibs Supply
MULTIPLE INCOMERS
FROM GAS TUBES IN SHIP
MAIN GAS EMERGENCY EMERGENCY

DISTRIBUTION GAS QUAD GAS QUAD
MANIFOLD
HLB
CONTROL PANEL
(SAT CONTROL) HLB
CONTROL PANEL
(CONTAINER)
SHIP / HLB
INTERFACE PLATE
EMERGENCY
CONTAINER
INTERCONNECT
UMBILICAL
SHIP / HLB
INTERCONNECTS
VENT VENT
BPR
BPR ONBOARD
BOTTOM MIX
BANK
BIB
CHAMBER
EXHAUST
CONTROL
MANIFOLD ONBOARD
PANEL
OXYGEN
BANK
BIBS SUPPLY
BIB
SUPPLY
PRESSURISATION ONBOARD
MANIFOLD
AIR
BANK
HLB CHAMBER
PRV
HLB
09 SPHL Heating/Cooling
EMERGENCY
SHIPS
CONTAINER
SYSTEMS LOCAL
HEADER SEAWATER
HEADER TANK SUPPLY
TANK
HOT
HOT
WATER
WATER
CYLINDER
CYLINDER COOLING
CIRCULATING
CIRCULATING IMMERSION MOTOR WATER MOTOR
PUMP
IMMERSION MOTOR PUMP HEATER BOOSTER
HEATER
BULKHEAD
CONNECTOR
EMERGENCY
SHIP/HLB UMBILICAL
INTERCONNECTS
HLB HEADER
TANK
CIRCULATING ENGINE
PUMP HEADER
TANK
STATIC STATIC
HEATER HEATER
KI
HEATER
CIRCULATING
PUMP
ENGINE
AND
COOLING
OVERBOARD COOLING COOLING JACKET
SEAWATER
DUMP UNIT UNIT
PUMP
HLB CHAMBER
HLB
10 Chamber Lighting
SAT CONTROL
SAT CONTROL
EMERGENCY
MAIN SUPPLY
SUPPLY
PANEL
PANEL
CHAMBER HIGH / LOW

CONTROL POWER
RACK RACK DDC 3
CONTROL
DDC 1 TL DDC 2 RACK
ML ROOF LIGHTS
CONTROL CONTROL POWER
RACK RACK RACK
ML ROOF LIGHTS
ML ROOF LIGHTS
EL ROOF LIGHTS
ML ROOF LIGHTS
BUNK LIGHTS
EL ROOF LIGHTS
BUNK LIGHTS
JB ROOF LIGHTS
JB
JB JB JB
JB JB JB
JB JB JB JB JB JB JB
ROOF ROOF ROOF
LIGHTS ROOF ROOF ROOF LIGHTS ROOF LIGHTS
BUNK LIGHTS LIGHTS LIGHTS BUNK LIGHTS BUNK
LIGHTS LIGHTS LIGHTS
ML EL EL ML EL ML
DDC 2 DDC 2
DDC 1 TL
11 SPHL Electrical System
POWER FROM SHIP POWER FROM SHIP

MAIN SWITCHBOARD EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD
SAT CONTROL SAT CONTROL EMERGENCY

SUPPLY
MAIN EMERGENCY
(SOURCE UNKNOWN)
SUPPLY PANEL SUPPLY PANEL
ELECTRICAL
CONNECTOR
DIVE CONTROL
MAIN CONTROL
PANEL EMERGENCY
CONTAINER
POWER
SROCKTRONICS
SUPPLY
TRANSFER FROM BOAT
BULKHEAD
CONNECTOR
EMERGENCY
UMBILICAL
SHIP / HLB
INTERCONNECTS
POWER
COMMS
ELECTRICAL
ELECTRICAL
CONNECTOR CONNECTOR
EXT
LIGHT HLB ELECTRICAL
O2 POWER PANEL
O2
He
ANALYSERS
24V
INT BATTERY
SCRUBBER
LIGHT 24V
FANS EMERGENCY BATTERY
(5 OFF) HEAT GENERATOR
CIRCULATING
JB
PUMP
DIESEL
GENERATOR
BOOM ENGINE
MIC
STOCKTRONICS
HEATER COMMS ENGINE
FAN TALKBACK UNIT START
SPEAKER CONTROL
ENGINE
MAIN DC STARTER
HLB CHAMBER
CONVERTER
HLB
12 Bell Electrical Service
SAT CONTROL SAT CONTROL

MAIN EMERGENCY
POWER PANEL POWER PANEL
DIVE CONTROL
MAIN CONTROL
PANEL
BELL
TERMINAL
LIGHT
RAIL 1
SWITCHES
BELL
EXTERNAL LIGHTS
AND POWER
UMBILICAL
WINCH EXTERNAL
JUNCTION BOX
SLIP
RINGS
UMBILICAL
WINCH INTERNAL
JUNCTION BOX
UMBILICAL
POWER
CABLE
CABLE
GUILLOTINE
OIL - FILLED
JUNCTION
BOX
EXTERNAL DATA
LIGHT X 5 LOGGER
EMERGENCY
PLATE
LIGHT X 5
INT CAMERA
INTERNAL TRANSDUCER
EMERGENCY
POWER
CHARGER BATTERY CONTROL PANEL
POD POD
HEATER X 2 HYDROCARBON THROUGH

ANALYSER WATER
COMMS
SCRUBBER X 2 THROUGH THROUGH
DATA WATER WATER
INCOMING CHANGE
LOGGER
COMMS COMMS
POWER OVER
ELECTRONIC BATTERY
ROV
MODULE POD POD
EMERGENCY
STAB PLATE
13 Chamber/SPHL Analysis
SATURATION CONTROL VENTS

ANALYSIS PANEL
O O O O
2 2 2 2
ANALYSER ANALYSER ANALYSER ANALYSER
CO CO CO CO
2 2 2 2
DRIER DRIER DRIER DRIER
SPAN HELIUM
DIVERS GAS
FROM DIVE
CONTROL PANEL
ML EL EL ML EL ML
DDC 1 HLB TL DDC 2 DDC 3

14 Bell Gas Analysis
DIVE CONTROL VENTS

ANALYSIS PANEL
O2 O2 O2 O2
CO2 CO2
ANALYSER ANALYSER
HELIUM
SPAN
DRIER
DIVERS GAS
TO SAT CONTROL
ANALYSIS PANEL
ROTARY
JOINT
UMBILICAL GASMIZER DIVE

CONTROL
PANEL
PANEL
UMBILICAL
CONNECTOR
BELL
15 Chambers Communication Systems
SAT CONTROL
SAT CONTROL
EMERGENCY
MAIN SUPPLY
SUPPLY
PANEL
PANEL
CHAMBER HIGH / LOW

CONTROL POWER
RACK RACK
DDC 1 DDC 2 DDC 3

CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
RACK RACK RACK
CHANGEOVER PANEL STOCKTRONIX COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
SAT CONTROL / ENT / COMMS / CALL ALARM
BULL HORN BULL HORN BULL HORN BULL HORN BULL HORN BULL HORN BULL HORN
MICROPHONE MICROPHONE MICROPHONE MICROPHONE MICROPHONE MICROPHONE MICROPHONE
CALL BUTTON CALL BUTTON CALL BUTTON CALL BUTTON CALL BUTTON CALL BUTTON CALL BUTTON
ENTERTAINMENT ENTERTAINMENT ENTERTAINMENT ENTERTAINMENT
BUNK COMMS BUNK COMMS BUNK COMMS

CALL BUTTON CALL BUTTON CALL BUTTON
BUNK ENT BUNK ENT BUNK ENT
SP SP SP SP SP
PHONE PHONE PHONE PHONE PHONE
ML EL ML EL ML EL
tup
DDC 1 DDC 2 DDC 3
SP SP SP SP SP
PHONE PHONE PHONE PHONE PHONE
16 Bell Communications Functional Block Diagram
SAT CONTROL SAT CONTROL

MAIN EMERGENCY
SUPPLY PANEL SUPPLY PANEL
DIVE CONTROL
MAIN CONTROL
PANEL
NAUTRONIX RECORDER 1 THRU WATER

COMMUNICATIONS
RECORDER 2 UNIT
COMMUNICATIONS
SP
DIVE CONTROL RACK
PHONE TERMINALS
COMMUNICATIONS PANEL
UMBILICAL
WINCH EXTERNAL
JUNCTION BOX
SLIP TWC
RINGS TRANSDUCER
UMBILICAL
WINCH INTERNAL
JUNCTION BOX
UMBILICAL
COMMUNICATIONS
CABLE
EMERGENCY
CONNECTION UMBILICAL
POINT CABLE
GUILLOTINE
OIL - FILLED
JUNCTION
BOX
TWC COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSDUCER JUNCTION
BOX
EMERG.
BULL
HORN
TWC TWC &
MIC SP
ELECTRONIC UNIT PHONE
INT BULL
POWER HEADSET HORN
CAMERA & DIVER 3
TWC PANEL MIC
BATTERY UMBILICAL
DIVER 1 DIVER 2
UMBILICAL UMBILICAL DIVER 3
MASK
DIVER 1 DIVER 2
HELMET HELMET
17 Air Supply System Functional Block Diagram
AIR AIR
BANK BANK
1 2
INTAKE
ON DECK
HP AIR
COMPRESSOR
AIR
DISTRIBUTION
PANEL DIVE SAT
CONTROL CONTROL
BIBS BIBS
LP AIR
COMPRESSOR
INTAKE FROM
COMPARTMENT
PORT STARBOARD
AIR AIR
STATION STATION
BELL STANDBY
CHARGING AIR DIVE
PANEL PANEL
TO WORKSHOPS TO HYPERBARIC
LIFEBOAT
CHARGING
TO SHIP BA
CHARGING

Bar Protector Diving System FEMEA

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DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

26/01/11 02 Issued for Approval COIM Master K.Ardavanis

Date Revision Revision description Prepared Checked Approved

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................ 5

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

5.2.6.2. CHAMBER COOLING/HEATING - R.I.6 .................................................................................. 14

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

• Pressure vessels (including new SDC) and support systems.

The following methodology was applied:-

Column 1 Identification Number

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

EUROPEAN MARINE CONTRACTORS EEB-2027

DSV BAR PROTECTOR Revision X

1.5 Trolley Unable to Move No Movement Ram Seizure 1 3 3

1.6 Structure Collapse Visual Corrosion 1 4 4

• BPRO-PRO-TEC-002-E Documentation structure and control

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

This comprehensive system consists of 4 Deck Decompression Chambers (DDC), a 3 man

5.1.2. SUBMERSIBLE DECOMPRESSION CHAMBER (SDC)

5.1.3. SDC HANDLING SYSTEM

5.1.4. DIVE CONTROL

5.1.5. DIVER SUPPORT SYSTEMS

5.1.6. FIRE FIGHTING AND BREATHING APPARATUS

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

Main Lock 1 Entry Lock 1

Main Lock 3 Entry Lock 3 Entry Lock 2 Main Lock 2

5.2.1. BELL DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

5.2.1.1. LAUNCH CONTROL CONSOLE - R.I.3

5.2.1.2. BELL WIRE - R.I.3

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

5.2.1.3. CURSOR LOCK/BELL LOCK/BELL TROLLEY - R.I.6

5.2.1.5. HYDRAULIC POWER PACKS/HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

5.2.2. HYPERBARIC LIFEBOAT (SPHL) DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

5.2.2.1. LAUNCH CONSOLE - R.I.8

5.2.2.2. DAVIT/TROLLEY - R.I.4

5.2.2.3. WINCH - R.I.6

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

for inspection and maintenance.

5.2.2.4. STRUCTURE - R.I.4

5.2.3. DIVER HEATING SYSTEM

5.2.3.1. CAT PUMP SUPPLY - R.I.3

5.2.3.2. HOT WATER M ANIFOLD - R.I.4

5.2.3.3. UMBILICAL WINCH ROTARY JOINT/UMBILICAL CONNECTOR (WINCH END) - R.I.6

5.2.3.4. UMBILICAL - R.I.6

5.2.3.5. BELL PENETRATORS - R.I.6

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

5.2.3.6. BELL HEATING M ANIFOLD/DIVER’S UMBILICAL/HOT WATER SUIT/HELMET HEATING SHROUD -

5.2.4. BELL PRESSURISATION/BREATHING GAS SUPPLY

The highest Risk Index in this Section is 16 - the maximum!

5.2.4.1. M AIN GAS DISTRIBUTION PANEL - R.I.4

5.2.4.2. BELL CONTROL GAS PANEL - R.I.6

5.2.4.3. UMBILICAL ROTARY JOINT/UMBILICAL CONNECTOR (WINCH END) - R.I.4

5.2.4.4. UMBILICAL - R.I.4

5.2.4.5. BELL PANEL SHUTTLE BLOCK - R.I.6

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

situation which is considered to be an acceptable risk.

DIVING SYSTEM FMEA

5.2.4.6. DIVERS’ UMBILICAL/DIVERS’ HELMET OR M ASK - R.I.16

5.2.5. CHAMBER BIBS

5.2.5.1. M AIN GAS DISTRIBUTION PANEL - R.I.4

5.2.5.2. CHAMBER PANEL - R.I.9