1
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26,
1964
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer,
following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4,
1954. Wassmer made the necessary
preparations for the wedding including
making and sending wedding invitations,
buying of wedding dress and other
apparels, and other wedding necessities.
On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for
his bride-to-be advising her that he will
not be able to attend the wedding because
his mom was opposed to said wedding.
And one day before the wedding, he sent
another message to Wassmer advising
her that nothing has changed and that he
will be returning soon. Therefore, Velez
did not appear and was not heard from
again.
Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he
failed to answer and was declared in
default. On April 29, 1955, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees;
and the costs.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure
to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further
argued that he cannot be held civilly
liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded.
He also contested the award of exemplary
and moral damages against him.
Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to
marry is an actionable wrong in this case.
Held:
This is not a case of mere breach of
promise to marry. As stated, mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs
for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance
with Article 21 which provides in
part “any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of
Article 21 entitles the injured party to
receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in
this case. Further, the award of
exemplary damages is also proper. Here,
the circumstances of this case show that
Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the
imposition of exemplary damages against
him.
--------------------------------------------------
Tanjanco v. CA
Facts:
Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli
Santos. Since he promised her marriage,
she consented to his pleas for carnal
knowledge. As a result, she conceived a

child, and due to her condition, she had to
resign from her work. Because she was
unable to support herself and
the baby, and the Apolonio refused to
marry her, she instituted an action for
damages, compelling the defendant to
recognize the unborn child, pay her
monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral
and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner
constitute seduction as contemplated in
Art. 21.
Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere
sexual intercourse or a breach of promise
to marry. It connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, enticement superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded.
In this case, for 1 whole year, the woman
maintained intimate sexual relations with
the defendant, and such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly here there is voluntariness and
mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been
deceived, she would not have again
yielded to his embraces for a year.
--------------------------------------------------
Baksh v. CA
BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Ponente: Davide Jr., J
2
FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales filed for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get
married. The petitioner, an Iranian
medical exchange student, courted and
later on proposed marriage to Gonzales
and therefore agreed to get married by
October 19re 87. Sometime in August,
the petitioner forced Gonzales to live
with him, and a week before the filing of
the complaint, Baksh turned cold towards
Gonzales and started maltreating her
causing her to sustain injuries. The trial
court ruled in favor of Gonzales and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Petitioner now assails the decisions of the
courts.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner liable for violation of
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines?
HELD:
The petitioner is liable for damages not
because of the marriage agreement but
because of violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Baksh
employed deceit and fraud in promising
marriage to Gonzales, a woman of no
loose morals, in order to lure her to do
sexual acts with him. Baksh blatantly
disregarded Filipino traditions on
marriage and acted contrary to morals,
good customs, and public policy.
--------------------------------------------------

ABANAG vs MABUTE
FACTS:
The complainant alleged that respondent
courted her and professed his undying
love for her. Relying on respondent’s
promise that he would marry her, she
agreed to live with him. She became
pregnant, but after several months into
her pregnancy, respondent brought her to
a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to
take drugs to abort her baby. When she
did not agree, the respondent turned cold
and eventually abandoned her. She
became depressed resulting in the loss of
her baby. She also stopped schooling
because of the humiliation that she
suffered. Respondent vehemently denied
the complainant’s allegations and
claimed that the charges against him were
baseless, false and fabricated, and were
intended to harass him and destroy his
reputation. He believes that the
complainant’s letter-complaint, which
was written in the vernacular, was
prepared by Tordesillas who is from
Manila and fluent in Tagalog; the
respondent would have used the "waray"
or English language if she had written the
letter-complaint.
The complainant filed a Reply, insisting
that she herself wrote the letter-
complaint. She belied the respondent’s
claim that she was being used by
Tordesillas who wanted to get even with
him.
The Investigating Judge recommends the
dismissal of the complaint against the
respondent.
It defined what immoral conduct is as
conduct that is willful, flagrant or
shameless, and that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the
community.
3
To justify suspension or disbarment, the
act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.
Grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or an act sound principled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of respondent is
considered as disgraceful or immoral
conduct.
Held:
We find that the acts complained of
cannot be considered as disgraceful or
grossly immoral conduct. Mere sexual
relations between two unmarried and
consenting adults are not enough to
warrant administrative sanction for illicit
behavior.
The Court has repeatedly held that
voluntary intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both
are not under any impediment to marry
and where no deceit exists, is neither a
criminal nor an unprincipled act that
would warrant disbarment or disciplinary
action.
While the Court has the power to regulate
official conduct and, to a certain extent,
private conduct, it is not within our
authority to decide on matters touching
on employees’ personal lives, especially
those that will affect their and their
family’s future.
We cannot intrude into the question of
whether they should or should not marry.
However, we take this occasion to
remind judiciary employees to be more
circumspect in their adherence to their
obligations under the Code of
 4

Professional Responsibility. The conduct
of court personnel must be free from any
taint of impropriety or scandal, not only
with respect to their official duties but
also in their behavior outside the Court as
private individuals. This is the best way
to preserve and protect the integrity and
the good name of our courts.
promise to marry. The CFI declared the
child a natural daughter of the defendant,
ordered Francisco to support the child by
giving a monthly alimony, awarded
actual damages and moral damages. On
appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed
the assailed decision however increased
the amount for actual and moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to ISSUE:

DISMISS the present administrative
complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute, Whether or not the award for moral
Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Circuit damages is valid.
Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of
merit. Nocosts. RULING:

The Supreme Court held that no moral

SO ORDERED. damages can be had in the instant case
because it was the woman who virtually
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- seduced the man by surrendering herself
to him because she a girl ten years older
FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, was overwhelmed by her love for him,
plaintiff vs. she wanted to bind him by having
COURT OF APPEALS, a fruit of their engagement even before
et.al., defendant they had the benefit of clergy.
No.L-14628. September 30, 1960
--------------------------------------------------
FACTS:
CONSTANTINO v. MENDEZ
The complainant Soledad Cagigas is
thirty six years old, a former high school G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
teacher and a life insurance agent. The
petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten AMELITA CONSTANTINO and
years younger than complainant, and an MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter
apprentice pilot. represented herein by the former, his
Intimacy developed between them and mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
thus sometime 1953 after coming from
the movies, they had sexual intercourse vs.
in his cabin. In February 1954, the
woman advised the man that she is IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE
pregnant whereupon the man promised to COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
marry her. Their daughter Chris BIDIN, J.:
Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a
private clinic. However, subsequently the FACTS: This is a petition for review on
man married one Romanita Perez. Hence, certiorari questioning the decision of the
Soledad filed a complaint against Court of Appeals which dismissed
Francisco for acknowledgement of her petitioner’s complaint and set aside the
child as a natural child of the petitioner, resolution of the then Court of First
as well as for support of said child and Instance of Davao, ordering private
moral damages for alleged breach of

respondent: (1) to acknowledge the minor
Michael Constantino as his illegitimate
child; (2) to give a monthly support of
P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay
complainant Amelita Constantino the
sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral
damages; and (4) to pay attorney’s fees in
the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
Petitioner filed with the then CFI of
Davao an action for acknowledgment,
support and damages against private
respondent in June 1975. Petitioner
alleges, that sometime in the month of
August, 1974, she met respondent at
Tony’s Restaurant, where she worked as
a waitress; the following day respondent
invited petitioner to dine with him at
Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; on
the pretext of getting something,
respondent brought petitioner inside his
hotel room and through a promise of
marriage succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with the latter and repeated
whenever respondent is in Manila even
after respondent confessed that he is a
married man after their first sexual
contact.
In respondent’s answer in August 1975,
Ivan admitted that he met petitioner at
Tony’s Cocktail Lounge but denied
having sexual knowledge or illicit
relations with her. He prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of
cause of action.
The trial court rendered a decision, in
favor of petitioner. Respondent is to pay
for actual and moral damages, attorney’s
fees and the costs of the suit. Both parties
filed their separate motion for
reconsideration. Respondent anchored his
motion on the ground that the award of
damages was not supported by evidence.
Petitioner sought the recognition and
support of her son Michael Constantino
as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
5
The trial court granted petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
On appeal the amended decision was set
aside and the complaint was dismissed.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BASED ON
ARTICLES 19 & 21
HELD: NO, PETITIONER CANNOT
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BASED ON
ARTICLES 19 & 21
According to ART. 19 Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
In the case at bar petitioner was already
28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to respondent. Petitioner’s
attraction to respondent is the reason why
she surrendered her womanhood. Had
petitioner been induced or deceived
because of a promise of marriage, she
could have immediately ended her
relation with respondent when she knew
that respondent was a married man after
their first sexual contact. Her declaration
that in the months of September, October
and November, 1974, they repeated their
sexual intercourse only indicates that
passion and not the alleged promise of
marriage was the moving force that made
her submit herself to respondent. The
Supreme Court said “Damages could
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is
not a product of voluntariness and mutual
desire” therefore petitioner is not entitled
to claim for damages based on articles 19
& 21
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
dismissed for lack of merit.
 6

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. vs. in a gentle and polite manner. They

QUIÑONES G.R. No. 175822 (October sought payment for moral and exemplary
23, 2013) damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses as counterclaim. The Regional
A. Legal Facts Respondent, Shirley G.
Trial Court dismissed both the complaint
Quiñones, a ticketing agent of Cebu
and counterclaim stating that the
Pacific Air, bought a pair of black jeans
petitioners acted in good faith and the
worth P2,098.00 from Guess USA
respondent was the one who put herself
Boutique. While she was on her way to
in that situation by inviting the Guess
Mercury Drug Store, a Guess employee
employees to the Cebu Pacific Office to
approached her and said that she failed to
discuss about the issue of payment.
pay for the black jeans. Nevertheless, she
However, the Court of Appeals reversed
presented an official receipt and
and set aside the Regional Trial Court
suggested that they should talk about the
decision stating that there was
matter in the Cebu Pacific Office located
preponderance of evidence showing the
within the mall. While they were in the
petitioners acted in bad faith but,
office, the Guess employees allegedly
Hawayon and Villagonzalo were
humiliated her in front of the clients of
absolved from liability due to good faith.
Cebu Pacific, repeatedly demanded
Since petitioners acted in bad faith,
payment and even searched the
respondent was entitled to damages and
respondent’s wallet to check how much
attorney’s fees.
money she had. Another argument
ensued and after that, respondent went B. Legal Issue Whether or not petitioners
home. The Guess employees submitted acted in bad faith which resulted to the
two letters to the Director of Cebu Pacific Court of Appeals awarding
narrating the incident but the said letters
moral damages and attorney’s fees to
were not received. Respondent filed a
respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones.
complaint for damages against the
petitioners, California Clothing, Inc., C. Ruling Yes, petitioners acted in bad
Excelsis Villagonzalo, Imelda Hawayon faith and the award for moral damages
and Michelle S. Ybañez, alleging that due and attorney’s fees to respondent was
to the incident, she suffered physical proper. The Supreme Court affirmed the
anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, Court of Appeals’ decision.
fright, serious apprehension, besmirched
The principle of abuse of rights under
reputation, moral shock and humiliation.
Article 19 of the Civil Code is present in
She demanded payment for moral,
the case. Respondent complained when
nominal, and exemplary damages, as well
petitioners embarrassed her and insisted
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
that she did not pay for the black jeans
Petitioners stated that they approached despite the issuance of an official receipt
the respondent to clarify whether or not in her favor. The court cited the case of
payment was made and that they Carpio vs. Valmonte in which the
approached and talked to the respondent
 7

elements of abuse of rights were The court denied the application for lack
enumerated. of evidence. So in order to get evidences
for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy
“The elements of abuse of rights are as
illegally set-up two video surveillance
follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty;
cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
employees even took pictures of the said
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
construction of the fence. The Hing’s
another.” The elements stated are
then filed a case against the Choachuy’s
complete in the present case. First,
for violating their right to privacy. On
petitioners continued to insist that there
October 2005, the RTC issued a order
was no payment made when respondent
granting the application of the Hing’s for
already presented the black jeans with the
TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to
original receipt. Second, they accused the
remove the two video surveillance
respondent that not only did she fail to
cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s
pay for the black jeans but she
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals
intentionally stole it and quickly left the
and the RTC’s decision was annulled
shop. Third, the letters sent to the
and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the
respondent’s employer was not only
case to the Supreme Court.
intended to ask for assistance in
collection of the payment but also to ruin
the respondent’s reputation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of
The exercise of rights is subject to two video surveillance cameras of
limitations. Thus, it must be in Choachuy’s violated the Hing’s right to
accordance with the purpose of its privacy.
establishment and not abused.
Respondent was awarded P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P20,000.00 as HELD:
attorney’s fees.
--------------------------------------------------
Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the
Hing vs. Choachuy right of privacy of the Hing’s under
Article 26(1) prohibiting the “prying into
FACTS:
the privacy of another’s residence.”
Picture4 Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Although it is a business office and not a
Development & Resources, Inc. (owned residence, the owner has the right to
by Choachuy’s) filed a case for exclude the public or deny them access.
Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The
latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed
a fence without a valid permit and that it
would destroy the walls of their building.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
v. ALFONSO VERCHEZ, et al.
481 SCRA 384 (2006)
Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.
Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante
(Grace) hired the services of Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) to send a telegram to her sister
respondent Zenaida Verchez-Catibog
(Zenaida), asking her to send money for
their mother Editha Verchez (Editha)
who at that time was confined in a
hospital in Sorsogon. But it took 25 days
before such message was conveyed to
Zenaida.
When Editha died, her husband,
respondent Alfonso Verchez (Alfonso),
along with his daughters Grace and
Zenaida and their respective spouses,
filed an action for damages against RCPI
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon. They alleged that the delay in
the delivery of the message contributed to
the early death of Editha. RCPI argues
that there is no privity of contract
between other respondents except with
Grace, also the delay in the delivery is
8
caused by force majeure, maintaining
further that they exercised due diligence
in choosing their employees; hence they
must be released from any liability. The
RTC rendered judgement against RCPI.
RCPI appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of moral
damages is proper despite the fact that
there was no direct connection between
the injury and the alleged negligent acts
HELD:
RCPI‘s stand fails. It bears noting that its
liability is anchored on culpa contractual
or breach of contract with regard to
Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-
plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents. Article
1170 of the Civil Code provides that
those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to
deliver the telegram within the shortest
possible time. It took 25 days, however,
for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI invokes
force majeure, specifically, the alleged
radio noise and interferences which
adversely affected the transmission

and/or reception of the telegraphic
message. Additionally, its messenger
claimed he could not locate the address of
Zenaida and it was only on the third
attempt that he was able to deliver the
telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to
prosper, it is necessary that one has
committed no negligence or misconduct
that may have occasioned the loss. An act
of God cannot be invoked to protect a
person who has failed to take steps to
forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. One‘s
negligence may have concurred with an
act of God in producing damage and
injury to another; nonetheless, showing
that the immediate or proximate cause of
the damage or injury was a fortuitous
event would not exempt one from
liability. When the effect is found to be
partly the result of a person‘s
participation – whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act –
the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts
of God.
Assuming argued that fortuitous
circumstances prevented RCPI from
delivering the telegram at the soonest
possible time, it should have at least
informed Grace of the non-transmission
and the non-delivery s that she could
have taken steps to remedy the situation.
But it did not. There lies the fault or
negligence.
9
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to
Grace‘s co-respondents following Article
2176 of the Civil Code which provides
that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
RCPI‘s liability as an employer could of
course be avoided if it could prove that it
observed the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage provided in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. RCPI
failed, however, to prove that it observed
all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
------------------------------------------------
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune
Tobacco, Corp.
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted
RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at 55%
shall be charged an ad valorem tax of
“55% provided that the maximum tax
shall not be less than Five Pesos per
pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654,

Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying
“Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all
manufactured by Fortune) as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.
Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these
cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the
RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance
of the rule violated its constitutional right
against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her
motion to dismiss that respondent has no
cause of action against her because she
issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of
her official function and within the scope
of her authority. She claimed that she
acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one
responsible for her acts. She also
contended that the complaint states no
cause of action for lack of allegation of
malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss
was elevated to the CA, who dismissed
the case on the ground that under Article
32, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad
faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be
validly sued in his/her private capacity
for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her
office
10
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should
be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that
a public officer is not liable for damages
which a person may suffer arising from
the just performance of his official duties
and within the scope of his assigned
tasks. An officer who acts within his
authority to administer the affairs of the
office which he/she heads is not liable for
damages that may have been caused to
another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not
amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a
public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for
acts done in bad faith which, being
outside the scope of his authority, are no
longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code, civil liability may
arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior
public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the
same Book, civil liability may arise
where the subordinate public officer’s act
is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a
public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if
his acts were not so tainted with malice
or bad faith.
 11

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a BELTRAN V. PEOPLE OF THE

public officer may be validly sued in PHILIPPINES
his/her private capacity for acts done in
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,
the course of the performance of the
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
functions of the office, where said public
and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO
officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith,
TUAZON, JR. being the Judge of the
or negligence; or (2) where the public
RTC, Branch 139, Makati City,
officer violated a constitutional right of
respondents
the plaintiff.
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
On the second issue, SC ruled that the
decisive provision is Article 32, it being a
special law, which prevails over a general
FACTS:
law (the Administrative Code).
The petitioner filed a petition for nullity
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort”
of marriage on the ground of
in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
psychological incapacity. In her Answer
tortious act which has been defined as the
to the said petition, petitioner’s wife
commission or omission of an act by one,
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
without right, whereby another receives
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal
some injury, directly or indirectly, in
home and lived with a certain woman
person, property or reputation. There are
named Milagros Salting. Charmaine
cases in which it has been stated that civil
subsequently filed a criminal complaint
liability in tort is determined by the
for concubinage. The petitioner, in order
conduct and not by the mental state of the
to forestall the issuance of a warrant for
tort feasor, and there are circumstances
his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer
under which the motive of the defendant
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the
has been rendered immaterial. The reason
Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
sometimes given for the rule is that
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the
otherwise, the mental attitude of the
civil case for declaration of nullity of his
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself,
marriage posed a prejudicial question to
would determine whether the act was
the determination of the criminal case.
wrongful. Presence of good motive, or
Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied
rather, the absence of an evil motive,
the foregoing motion. Petitioner’s motion
does not render lawful an act which is
for reconsideration was likewise denied.
otherwise an invasion of another’s legal
right; that is, liability in tort in not
precluded by the fact that defendant acted
ISSUE:
without evil intent.
Whether or not the pendency of the
------------------------------------------------
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological
incapacity is a prejudicial question that

should merit the suspension of the
criminal case for concubinage.
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds the contention
of the petitioner without merit. The
pendency of the case for declaration of
nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending
the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil
case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based,
but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the aforesaid civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
--------------------------------------------------
CATALAN V. BASA
FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs.
JESUS BASA, respondents
G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.
Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan
was discharged from active military
service. The Board of Medical Officers of
the Department of Veteran Affairs found
that he was unfit to render military
service due to his mental disorder
(schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949,
Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On
June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly
donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of
12
the real property through the execution of
a document, titled, “Absolute deed of
Donation”. On December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company
filed Special Proceedings to declare
Feliciano incompetent. On December 22,
1953, the trial court issued its Order of
Adjudication of Incompetency for
Appointing Guardian for the Estate and
Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus,
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
which is formerly the People’s Bank and
Trust Company, was appointed to be his
guardian by the trial court. On March 26,
1979, Mercedes sold the property
donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her
children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April
1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s
guardian filed a case for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, as well as
damages against herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deed of Absolute
Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio,
as Feliciano never donated the property
to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred
that even if Feliciano had truly intended
to give the property to her, the donation
would still be void, as he was not of
sound mind and was therefore incapable
of giving valid consent. On August 14,
1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the
lower court and Court of Appeals
dismissed the case because of insufficient
evidence presented by the complainants
to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was sane and competent at the
time he executed the deed of donation in
favor of Mercedes Catalan.

Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity
to execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to
Mercedes and later on sold to her
children is legally in possession of the
latter
Are laches and prescription should be
considered in the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the
decisions of the lower court and the
Court of Appeals and denied the petition.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby
a person disposes gratuitously a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Like any other contract, an agreement of
the parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following
requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or
with an exact notion of the matter to
which it refers; (2) it should be free; and
(3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’
intention must be clear and the
attendance of a vice of consent, like any
contract, renders the donation voidable. A
person suffering from schizophrenia does
not necessarily lose his competence to
intelligently dispose his property. By
merely alleging the existing of
schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the
donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano
Catalan had lost total control of his
mental facilities. Thus, the lower court
correctly held that Feliciano was of sound
mind at that time and this condition
continued to exist until proof to the
13
contrary was adduced. Since the donation
was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell
the property to whomever she chose. Not
a shred of evidence has been presented to
prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of
property to her children was tainted with
fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in
question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
The Supreme Court notes the issue of
prescription and laches for the first time
on appeal before the court. It is sufficient
for the Supreme Court to note that even if
it prospered, the deed of donation was
still a voidable, not a void, contract. As
such, it remained binding as it was not
annulled in a proper action in court
within four years.
--------------------------------------------------
MERCADO v ESPIRITU
FACTS:
This case is about the signing of a deed
of sale in which two of the four parties
were minors with age 18, and 19. On the
date of sale, these minors presented
themselves that they were of legal age at
the time they signed it, and they made the
same manifestation
before the notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid
when the minors presented themselves
that they were of legal age.
RATIO:
The courts laid down that such sale of
real estate was still valid since it was
executed by minors, who have passed the
ages of puberty and adolescence, and are
 14

near the adult age, and that the minors Lulu vs Jovita San Juan-Santos
pretended that they had already reached
their majority.
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or
166470 MA. VICTORIA C.
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
HERNANDEZ- SAGUN, TERESA C.
prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere
HERNANDEZ- VILLA ABRILLE and
restrictions on the capacity to act, and do
NATIVIDAD Present: CRUZ-
not exempt the incapacitated person from
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, PUNO, C.J.,
certain obligations, as when the latter
Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA,
arise from his acts or from property
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
relations, such as easements.
- v e r s u s - BERSAMIN, JJ.
Also, these minors cannot be permitted
afterwards to excuse themselves from JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,
compliance with the obligation assumed Respondent.
by them or seek their annulment. This is
in accordance with the provisions of the
law on estoppels. Facts:
*** This is in accordance with the Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or
provisions of the law on estoppel. Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to
the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria
Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through
San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the
estoppel, an admission or representation
latter died due to complications during
is rendered conclusive upon the person
childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left
making it, and cannot be denied or
Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle,
disproved as against the person relying
Sotero C. San Juan.
thereon.
This is also in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 123, Sec 68, Par. A On December 16, 1951, Felix married
Natividad Cruz. The union produced
Rule 123, sec 68, Par. A...”Whenever a
three children, petitioners Cecilio C.
party has, by his own declaration, act or
Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-
omission, intentionally and deliberately
Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa
led another to believe a particular thing to
Abrille.
be true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, act or omission, cannot
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria
be permitted to falsify it.
and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu
------------------------------------------------ inherited valuable real properties from
the San Juan family (conservatively
estimated at P50 million in 1997).
 15

Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with Held:

her father and his new family. She was
No, because of her illnesses and low
then 10 years old and studying at La
educational attainment, needed assistance
Consolacion College. However, due to
in taking care of herself and managing
her violent personality, Lulu stopped
her affairs considering the extent of her
schooling when she reached Grade 5.
estate. With regard to the respondents
appointment as the legal guardian, the
CA found that, since Lulu did not trust
In 1968, upon reaching the age of
petitioners, none of them was qualified to
majority, Lulu was given full control of
be her legal guardian.
her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did
not even finish her elementary education, According to article 38 of the civil code
Felix continued to exercise actual of the Philippines that minority, insanity
administration of Lulus properties. Upon or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-
Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took mute, prodigality and civil interdiction
over the task of administering Lulu's are mere restrictions on capacity to act,
properties. and do not exempt the incapacitated
person from certain obligations, as when
Medical specialists testified to explain
the latter arise from his acts or from
the results of Lulus examinations which
property relations, such as easements.
revealed the alarming state of her health.
Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with -----------------------------------------------
diabetes mellitus and suffering from its
JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and
complications, she also had an existing
ERASMO
artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease
(which was aggravated by her obesity). G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012
Furthermore, they unanimously opined
Doctrine: Proof required to establish
that in view of Lulus intelligence level
domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen
(which was below average) and fragile
running for governor of a province
mental state, she would not be able to
care for herself and self-administer her
medications.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in
Issues: Quezon City. He migrated to Australia
when he was eight years old and acquired
Is Lulu was incapable of taking care of
Australian citizenship. In 2008, he
herself and inherit a parcel of land at
returned to the Philippines and lived in
Marilou Subdivision formerly belong to
Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance
San Juan Family? And who was her legal
to the Philippines and was issued a
guardian?
certificate of reacquisition of citizenship
 16

by the Bureau of Immigration and he establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga

renounced his Australian citizenship. Sibugay.

Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter HELD:

in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private
NO. The COMELEC is incorrect.
Respondent Erasmo, the barangay
Jalosjos has successfully proven by his
captain, opposed the registration.
acts of renouncing his Australian
COMELEC approved the application and
citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he
included Jalosjos in the voter's list. This
has changed his domicile to Zamboanga
decision was affirmed at the MCTC and
Sibugay.
at the RTC.

The LGC requires that a gubernatorial

Jalosjos then filed a certificate of
candidate be a resident of the province
candidacy (COC) for Governor of
for at least one year before the elections.
Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010
For the purposes of election laws, the
elections. Erasmo filed a petition to
requirement of residence is synonymous
cancel the COC on the ground of failure
with domicile: i.e. he must have an
to comply with the one year residency
intention to reside in a particulaar place,
requirement of the Local Government
but must also have personal presence
Code (LGC).
coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to
present ample proof of a bona fide
The question of residence is a question of
intention to establish a domicile in Ipil,
intention. To determine compliance with
Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he
the residency/domicile requirement,
first moved back to the Philippines, he
jurisprudence has laid down the
was merely a guest or transient at his
following guidelines:
brother's house in Ipil, and for this
reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his
domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the
(a) every person has a domicile
elections.
or residence somewhere;

ISSUE:
(b) where once established, that
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct domicile remains until he acquires a new
in holding that petitioner did not present one; and
ample proof of a bona fide intention to
(c) a person can have but one
domicile at a time.

The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of
origin was Quezon city. When he
acquired Australian citizenship, Australia
became his domicile by operation of law
and by choice. On the other hand, when
he came to the Philippines in November
2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, gave
up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country
and reacquired his old citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up
his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established
a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay
despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice
and by operation of law (Australia)
would violate the settled maxim that a
man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
Neither can COMELEC conclude that
Jalosjos did not come to settle his
domicile in Ipil since he has merely been
staying at his brother's house. A Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her
candidate is not required to have a house
in order to establish his residence or
domicile in that place. It is enough that
he should live there even if it be in a
17
rented house or in the house of a friend or
relative. To insist that the candidate own
the house where he lives would make
property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved
two things: actual physical presence in
Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-
door neighbors who testified that he was
physically present in Ipil, he presented
correspondence with political leaders and
local and national party mates,
furthermore, he is a registered voter by
final judgement of the RTC. The court
also noted that Jalosjos has since
acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in
San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.
This, without a doubt is sufficient to
establish his intent to set his domicile in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution
of the COMELEC Second Division dated
February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4,
2010 that disqualified petitioner Rommel
Jalosjos from seeking election as
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
--------------------------------------------------
QUIMIGUING VS ICAO
Facts:
parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin,
sought an appeal from the orders of
Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her

complaint for support and damages and
request for amendment of complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already
married Felix Icao succeeded in having
sexual relations with her through force
and intimidation. As a result, she became
pregnant despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao and had to stop
studying. She then claimed for monthly
support, damages and attorney’s fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved
to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s
failure to allege the fact that a child had
been born in her complaint. The lower
court dismissed the case and
subsequently denied further amendment
to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of
action.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for
support and damages from defendant
despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-
appellant had right to support of the child
she was carrying and an independent
cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40)
recognizes the provisional personality of
the unborn child, which includes its right
to support from its progenitors, even it is
only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742
18
of the same Code holds that, just as a
conceived child, it may receive donations
through persons that legally represent it.
Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil
Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code
also further strengthen the case for
reversal of order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force
a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
xxx constitutes a clear violation of the
rights of his victim that entitles her to
claim compensation for damage caused”
per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a
provision supported by Article 2219,
which provides moral damages for
victims of seduction, abduction, rape or
other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and
remanded for proceedings conformable to
the decision; with costs against Icao.
------------------------------------------------
Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil 257
FACTS: During the battle of liberation of
Manila on February 6, 1945, the
following sought refuge on the ground
floor of German Club building: Joaquin
Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67);
daughter Pilar (32-33); daughter
Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin
Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela
Conde (--). The building was set on fire
and Japanese started shooting the
daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave
the building. His wife didn’t want to
leave so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.’s
wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez. As
they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the
ground and rest lay flat on the ground to

avoid bullets. German Club collapsed
trapping many people presumably
including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and
Francisco sought refuge in an air aid
shelter where they hid for 3 days. On
February 10, 1945, on their way to St.
Theresa Academy, they met Japanese
patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed.
The trial court ruled that Angela Joaquin
outlived her son while CA ruled that son
outlived his mother.
ISSUE: W/N the son/mother died first
before the other.
[If the son died first, petitioner would
reap the benefits of succession. If mother
died first, respondent Antonio, son of Jr.
by his first marriage, would inherit]
HELD: Based on the story of Francisco
Lopez, Jr. died before his mother did.
This presumption was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by
the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence on which civil cases are to be
decided, this inference should prevail.
Evidence of survivorship may be direct,
indirect, circumstantial or inferential.
-----------------------------------------------
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner,
and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent,
were married on January 7, 1915 and had
a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino
Manila. They stayed together for a
month before petitioner returned to her
parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint
against respondent for support outside the
19
conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs. Petitioner refused to
perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid
cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on
refusing, respondent maltreated her by
word and deed, inflicting injuries upon
her lops, face and different body parts.
The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could
not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is
by virtue of a judicial decree granting her
separation or divorce from respondent.
Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can
compel her husband to support her
outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband
to support his wife is created merely in
the act of marriage. The law provides
that the husband, who is obliged to
support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed
pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, this option
given by law is not absolute. The law
will not permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful
acts. In the case at bar, the wife was
forced to leave the conjugal abode
because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore
claim support from the husband for

separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home.
-------------------------------------------------
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a
petition for the change of his first name
“Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex
from male to female in his birth
certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch
8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is
anatomically male but thinks and acts
like a female. The Regional Trial Court
ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is
consonance with the principle of justice
and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals alleging that there is no law
allowing change of name by reason of
sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth
certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and
not a right. It may be allowed in cases
where the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if
the change will avoid confusion. The
petitioner’s basis of the change of his
20
name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does
not prejudice him at all, and no law
allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the
petition.
--------------------------------------------------
Morigo v. People
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts
for a while but after receiving a card from
Barrete and various exchanges of letters,
they became sweethearts. They got
married in 1990. Barrete went back to
Canada for work and in 1991 she filed
petition for divorce in Ontario Canada,
which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed
a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony. Morigo was then
charged with bigamy and moved for a
suspension of arraignment since the civil
case pending posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not
guilty claiming that his marriage with
Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage
in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether Morigo must have filed
declaration for the nullity of his marriage
 21

with Barrete before his second marriage Aranes vs Judge Occiano

in order to be free from the bigamy case.
AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002
RULING:
FACTS:
No. considering that the first marriage
was void ab initio makes Morigo
acquitted in the Bigamy case. Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes
charged respondent Judge Occiano with
As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the
gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is
Family Code “A marriage ceremony
the presiding judge in Court of Balatan,
which takes place with the appearance of
Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized
the contracting parties before the
the marriage of Aranes and Dominador
solemnizing officer and their personal
Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the
declaration that they take each other as
couple’s residence in Nabua, Camarines
husband and wife in the presence of not
Sur which is outside his territorial
less than two witnesses of legal age”.
jurisdiction and without the requisite of
“The absence of any of the essential or
marriage license.
formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated It appeared in the records that petitioner
in Article 35 (2). and Orobia filed their application of
marriage license on January 5, 2000 and
A defect in any of the essential requisites
was stamped that it will be issued on
shall render the marriage voidable as
January 17, 2000 but neither of them
provided in Article 45.” As provided by
claimed it. In addition, no record also
Art. 4. Given these 2 articles, Morigo’s
appeared with the Office of the Civil
first marriage is considered void ab initio.
Registrar General for the alleged
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void marriage.
ab initio considering that there was no
Before Judge Occiano started the
actual marriage ceremony performed
ceremony, he carefully examined the
between them by a solemnizing officer
documents and first refused to conduct
instead they just merely signed a
the marriage and advised them to reset
marriage contract. The petitioner does not
the date considering the absence of the
need to file declaration of the nullity of
marriage license. However, due to the
his marriage when he contracted his
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
second marriage with Lumbago. Hence,
visitors and fear that the postponement of
he did not commit bigamy and is
the wedding might aggravate the physical
acquitted in the case filed.
condition of Orobia who just suffered
-------------------------------------------------- from stroke, he solemnized the marriage
on the assurance of the couple that they
will provide the license that same
afternoon. Occiano denies that he told
the couple that their marriage is valid.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty
of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and conducting it
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that “the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited
to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage
of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to
law and subjects him to administrative
liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage”.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge
Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos
with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
------------------------------------------------
De castro vs De Castro G.R. No.
160172
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and
became sweethearts in 1991. They
planned to get married, thus they applied
for a marriage license with the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
22
September 1994. They had their first
sexual relation sometime in October
1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to
the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March
1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least
five years. The couple got married on the
same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, administering the
civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went
back to their respective homes and did
not live together as husband and wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid.
HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear
from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted
their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living
together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when
she was asked during cross-examination.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the

formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The
aim of this provision is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for
a marriage license. In the instant case,
there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation
at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab
initio.
-------------------------------------------------
MALLION V. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar
Mallion filed with the regional trial court
seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara
on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition.
Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court
of Appeals.
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After such decision, petitioner filed
another petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with the regional trial court
alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the
fact that it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata
and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court pertains as “bar by prior
judgment” or “estoppels by verdict,”
which is the effect of a judgment as a bar
to the prosecution of the second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule,
it pertains to res judicata in its concept as
“conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule
of auter action pendant which ordains
that issues actually and directly resolved
in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action.
Therefore, having expressly and
impliedly concealed the validity of their
marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects
therein. The Court finds then that the
present action for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license is barred. The petition is
denied for lack of merit.

VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-
LEE
G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which maybe recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid ac-
cording to their national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized
American citizen,allegedly obtained a
divorce in the United States from his first
wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted
a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC
a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate.
While the case was pending, respondent
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first
marriage, filed a similar petition with the
RTC. The two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
petition filed by the respondent on the
ground of litis pendentia. Respondent
alleged that petitioner was not considered
an interested person qualified to file the
petition. Respondent further alleged that
a criminal case for bigamy was filed
against petitioner by Felicitas Amor
contending that petitioner contracted a
second marriage to Orlando despite
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having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of
bigamy and ruled that since the deceased
was a divorced American citizen, and that
divorce was not recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
between him and petitioner was not valid.
The RTC took note of the action for
declaration of nullity then pending filed
by Felicitas Amor against the deceased
and petitioner. It considered the pending
action to be a prejudicial question in
determining the guilt of petition-er for the
crime of bigamy. The RTC also found
that petitioner had never been married to
Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the
Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and
granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case
No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the
marriage between petitioner and Eusebio
Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. The RTC held that
petitioner was not an interested party who
may file said petition. The CA affirmed
the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in
the crim. case for bigamy meant that the
marriage with Bristol was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad
by Orlando may be recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction.
 25

HELD: Moreover, the burden of proof lies with

the “party who alleges the existence of a
It is imperative for the trial court to first
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
determine the validity of the divorce to
or defense of an action.” In civil cases,
ascertain the rightful party to be issued
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
the letters of administration over the
material allegations of the complaint
estate of Orlando. Petition is partially
when those are denied by the answer; and
granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
defendants have the burden of proving
1. No. The RTC in the special the material allegations in their answer
proceedings failed to appreciate the when they introduce new matters. It is
finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that well-settled in our jurisdiction that our
petitioner was never married to Eusebio courts cannot take judicial notice of
Bristol. It concluded that, because foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it must be alleged and proved.
follows that the first marriage with
It appears that the trial court no longer
Bristol still existed and was valid.
required petitioner to prove the validity
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of
Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid the United States and the marriage
divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign between petitioner and the deceased.
nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces Thus, there is a need to remand the
abroad, which may be recognized in the proceedings to the trial court for further
Philippines, provided they are valid reception of evidence to establish the fact
according to their national law. of divorce.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still
first be proven by the divorce decree
itself. The best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.