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RISK ANALYSIS TABLE for {name of the base}

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Last Update:
Likelihoo Impact Reduction of
Rankin Vulnerabilities Contextual Reduction of Threats Level of residual
Threats (1) Risks (3) d from 1 from 1 to Vulnerabilities
g (2) factors (Acceptance Strategy) Risk
to 5 5 (Protection Strategy)

CONFIDENTIAL
RISK ANALYSIS TABLE for BASE

Last Update:
Likelihoo Impact Reduction of
Rankin Vulnerabilities Contextual Reduction of Threats Level of residual
Threats (1) Risks (3) d from 1 from 1 to Vulnerabilities
g (2) factors (Acceptance Strategy) Risk
to 5 5 (Protection Strategy)
Fleet: State of roads • System of regular control (respect of rules
- Large fleet (vehicle and enhance speed on highways and regulation) to be implemented
motorbikes) with unappropriate • Review and update of SOP
- Bad state : 50% of cars are equipment, uneven on • Implement communication strategy, rules
in bad state secondary roads, animals and system between vehicles and bases
- 30% of motorbike are in bad Driving (in general) • Plan of renewing vehicles
state - Bad state of national fleet, • Improve the planning of movement (reduce
- high number of daily especially public transports. number of movement and reduce speed)
movements with a lack of - Poor respect of raods • Maximal driving distances, obligation for
coordination regulation drivers to take a break
RH - wet season and dark hours • Plan coaching of direct line managers and
9- Transport accidents - Lack of leadership of direct are more risky To be subjected to a trainings session for drivers and bikers
(Indirect threat) line managers of drivers transport accident
3 3 •Plan regular team meetings/workshop 6 - Low
Medium •Officialize adherence to rules by drivers and
- No regular team meetings
and refreshing trainings passengers (Review of vehicle policy,
- no respect of drivers' and sensitization, trainings and signing by every
passengers' regulations one)
Communication • implement a strict adherence to use of
- No follow up of movements safety clothing and equipments
of vehicles and motorbikes • plan regular Safety refreshing trainings
- No strategy of (drivers and programs)
communication equipment
(movements)
- no global covering (phone
and radio)

Report major incidents:


. Limitation of movement
. Suspected IED
. Collection of information from locals
discovered on XXX main
before using the road (constant re-
road on 11th November
. Few incident have been assessment of the situation)
occurred on the road . Not to be the 1st car to take the road
EID / RCIED / Anti tank . Movement to our between XX To be subjected to an . Community support & contact . Use of alternative roads
8- . Use of low profile cars
mines intervention area . One RCED attack against EID/RCIED/Anti tak 2 4 with AOG 5 - Low
Medium . Movement with public transportation
(Indirect threat) . Mistaken identity demining organization on mine explosion
2010
. One RCED on the road
from XXX
. 2 RCED attack in XXX in
2009. on 2010 one more
on the road from XXX

. Wrong time in wrong . The most recent suicide . Avoid going to Governmental offices
place related to: attacks was in xx, the before 9am. Official meetings after
. convoys target was XXX convoy 9:30am
. Governmental, UN, district in XX area . UN guest houses, GH and offices
embassies buildings . Attack on XXX in district located close to GOA and UN buildings
8- Suicide attack XXX in July. To be subjected to a and embassies are no go areas.
2 4 4 - Low
Medium (Indirect threat) . In 2009: complex attacks suicide attack . Restricted list of recreative locations.
to XXX . Distance from military convoys
. Most of suicide attacks . Avoid traffic congestions.
are occurring in the . Low profile policy
morning before 9AM. Refer to the current SOPs

. Presence of 8 . Strong presence of low profile policy . Confidentiality & unpredictability of


International staff in KBL Afghan security personnel movement,
. Movements during and in the city . No use of HF and VHF
out of working hours . No kidnapping of NGO To have an international . Group movement & presence of a
8- Kidnapping international staff reported staff victim of a guard in addition of a driver for any
2 4 4 - Low
Medium (Crime related) in 2009/2010 kidnapping or an movement
. 2008: NGO staff hostage taking . Walking restriction.
kidnapped in district 5 CH . Mapping: no go areas clearly identified.
Qambar + kidnapping . Low profile policy
AFRAN in Karte Parwan. Refer to the current SOPs

. Wrong time, wrong place . In 2010, violent . Low profile policy . Good information collection and
during movements. demonstration in district X . To respect the culture of the adapted movement plan
. Population perception of and 5 between XX and XX. people in terms of religion and . Communication with teams during
NGO . Demonstration of election living. movement: alert system
Crowd/mob/riot candidate followers due to To be subjected to a . Only HoM in contact with media
6 - Low result of election. 2 3 . No sign and logo to the office and GH 3 - Very low
(Indirect threat) crowd / mob/riot
. 2010: media reports that Refer to the current SOPs
NGOs are involved in
convertion to chrystianity.
. NGO perception fluctuant

. Perception of expatriates . Criminality is assessed as . low profile policy . 2 guards per shift,
2 - Very Armed Robbery & international being low for the time To be victim of a . good relations with neighbours in . Existing & implemented cash policy
2 1 2 - Very low
low (Crime related) organizations being robbery case of evacuation from ACF Refer to the current SOPs and
. Cash movement premises national security plan
CONFIDENTIAL

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