Department of Health and Applied Social Sciences

UNDERGRADUATE MODULE HANDBOOK 2017-18

UZRSTU-15-3

Philosophy of Nature and Science

Module Leader: Dr. Iain Grant (Iain.Grant@uwe.ac.uk)

Office: 3C013 Office Hour: Thursday, 11.00

Lectures: Thursday 13.00 3B11 Seminars: Thursday 15.00 3B050

Contents

1. Introduction to the Module……………………………………………………………2

2. Organization of the Module…………………………………………………………...3

3. Aims and Objectives…………………………………………………………………..3

4. Lecture Programme……………………………………………………………………4

5. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………...4

6. Referencing...………………………………………………………………………….6

7. Assessment..…………………………………………………………………………...9

1. Introduction to the Module

Does the attempt to achieve a philosophical conception of nature entail in turn a scientific
conception of philosophy?
This module is premised on a negative answer to the above question. The philosophy
of science, as practiced since its explosion in the 1960s, in the work of Imre Lakatos, Thomas
Kuhn, Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend, itself answered this question in different ways,
varying from the epistemological to the sociological to the political, yet the philosophy of
science in its contemporary form follows philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans
Reichenbach in construing the philosophy of science as entailing a scientific philosophy. This
has, indeed, been the dominant paradigm for the self-understanding of philosophy following
Quine, and still has a substantive base in contemporary philosophy. But it is not the only
model.
In recent years there has emerged a conflict within this consensus, such that rather
than the open scientism associated with Carnap, who edited the International Encyclopaedia
of Unified Science, and his followers, philosophers have begun to re-examine the prospects
for a philosophy of nature, whose modern form we owe to the German Idealists in the
nineteenth century. From this nineteenth century base, philosophers of nature draw close to
the orbit of the French epistemologists of the twentieth century, such as Gaston Bachelard,
Georges Canguilhem, and Alexandre Koyré, or to the process philosophy pioneered by
Schelling and Peirce, and inherited by Alfred North Whitehead, which has become important,
for example, to the Process Philosophy and Biology research programme currently running
under John Dupré in the University of Exeter.
In this, moreover, they rejoin also the philosophically minded scientists such as
D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson and E. S. Russell in the early twentieth century, to René
Thom, Gilles Châtelet and Alain Prochiantz in the later twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.
If a philosophical conception of nature does not therefore entail a scientific
conception of philosophy, how is a philosophy of nature to proceed? At stake in this question
is the possibility of a genuinely philosophical philosophy of nature, or of a philosophy of
nature that is philosophical about philosophy. Such a philosophy does not abandon the
revelations of the natural sciences, but rather considers them contributory to the philosophical
project of understanding the universe, rather than exhaustive of it.
Since we cannot sanely hope to complete the understanding of all that is in twelve
weeks, this year’s module will revolve around ideas of form in natural science and in the
philosophy of nature.

2. Organization of the Module

The module takes the standard lecture-seminar form, with key and background readings
supplied for each week. These, obviously need to be read in order to achieve the overall aim
of the module, which is to provide you with the materials necessary to approach nature
philosophically. If the philosophical problem of nature is a living one, then being informed by
philosophers’ attempts to do this in recent years will not entail our being determined by them.

3. Aims and Objectives

This course aims to introduce students to some of the fundamental philosophical issues
encountered in philosophy of science and philosophy of nature. These two topics are
surprisingly not usually studied together, the assumption being that philosophy of science or
science itself has replaced philosophy of nature. This course will examine to what extent this
may or may not be the case. The course will also pay greater attention to developments in
philosophy of science occurring outside of the dominant Anglo-American tradition.

On successful completion of this module students will be able to:

I. Demonstrate a good knowledge of the basics issues in philosophy of nature and

philosophy of science and the relation (if any) between these two fields. Topics
can include: realism and anti-realism, what is causation, induction and its
problems, situating mind in nature and nature in mind (the hard problem), change
in science and also specific issues in the branches of philosophy of science, e.g.
the species problem, evolution and philosophy, modularity of mind, emergence,
relativity, autopoiesis
II. Demonstrate an ability to critically the relevant historical and contemporary texts
in philosophy of science and philosophy of nature using a range of logical and
analytical skills (assessed at all assessment points). Be able to discuss in-depth the
topics and issues covered in the module and understand their relation to other
areas of philosophy
III. Demonstrate appropriate transferable skills (assessed at assessment points A and
B respectively)
 4. Lecture Programme

Week Lecture Readings

10 Introduction: Philosophy of Nature ‘Science and Philosophy’, Putnam 2012: 39-50;

and Philosophy of Science Ellis (2002): 9-20

11 Nature and Naturalism ‘The Context and appeal of naturalism’, Putnam

2012: 109-125; Dupré 1993: 87-120

12 Ancient Ideas of Nature I Hadot, chs. 1 and 2; Schrödinger, Nature & the
Greeks
13 Ancient Ideas of Nature II Hadot chs. 11-12

14 Ancient Ideas of Nature III Hadot chs. 13, 18

15 An Idealist Nature? Westphal in Beiser, ed. (2008) 281-310; Beiser

(2002), 506-528

16 Contemporary Ideas of Nature Whitehead (1926) 172-94; Rescher (2000) 51-72

17 Nature and Fundamentality Sider, Writing the Book of the World, 7.9-7.11.2;
Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 218-9;
Mumford, ‘The Ungrounded argument’,
Synthèse 149 (2006): 471-489

18 Nature and Mathematics Thompson (1961) 1-15, 268-325

19 The Development of Forms Thom (1975) 1-20

20 Form vs Finality Minelli (2009) 94-116

21 No Lecture
 5. Bibliography
I. Recommended Topic Introductions

I.i. Philosophy of Science

ESPECIALLY RECOMMENDED:
Hacking, Ian (1983) Representing and Intervening. Topics in the Philosophy of Science
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

OTHER INTRODUCTIONS
Ladyman, James (2002) Understanding Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge
Okasha, Samir (2002) Philosophy of Science. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford
University Press

IMPORTANT WORKS
Cartwright, Nancy (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Feyerabend, Paul (1975) Against Method. London: Verso
Harré, Rom and E. H. Madden (1975) Causal Powers. Oxford: Blackwell
Kuhn, Thomas (2012) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 50th Anniversary Edition.
Chicago: Chicago University Press
Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave, eds. (1970) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Popper, Karl R. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.
London: Routledge

ANTHOLOGIES
Cover, J. A., Martin Curd and Christopher Pincock, eds. (2012) Philosophy of Science. The
Central Issues. 2nd International Student Edition. New York: W. W. Norton
Gutting, Gary (2004) Continental Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell

I.ii Philosophy of Nature

INTRODUCTIONS
Ellis, Brian (2002) The Philosophy of Nature. A Guide to the New Essentialism. Stocksfield:
Acumen
Feyerabend, Paul (2016) Philosophy of Nature. Cambridge: Polity
Grant, Iain Hamilton (2014) ‘The Hypothesis of Nature’s Logic in Schelling’s
Naturphilosophie’, in The Palgrave Handbook to German Idealism, ed. Matthew C. Altman.
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 478-498
Hadot, Pierre (2006) The Veil of Isis. An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press
Koyré, Alexandre (1957) From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins
Whitehead, Alfred North (1926) Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press

IMPORTANT WORKS
Collingwood, R. G. (1945) The Idea of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Esposito, Joseph (1977) Schelling’s Idealism and the Philosophy of Nature. Lewisburg:
Bucknell University Press
Grant, Iain Hamilton (2006) Philosophies of Nature after Schelling. London: Continuum
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (2003) Nature. Evanston: Northwestern University Press
Stengers, Isabelle (2010) Cosmopolitics I, Cosmopolitics II. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press
Thom, René (1975) Structural Stability and Morphogenesis. New York: Advanced Book
Program
Whitehead, A. N. (1920) The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

II REFERENCES
Beiser, Frederick (2002) German Idealism. Cambridge: Harvard
Beiser, ed. (2008) The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth Century Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Dupré, John (1993) The Disorder Of Things. Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of
Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
Ellis, Brian (2002) Philosophy of Nature. Stocksfield: Acumen
Guyer, Paul (2001) ‘Organisms and the Unity of Science’, in Watkins, ed. (2001), 259-281
Hacking, Ian (1983) Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Hadot, Pierre (2006) The Veil of Isis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
Kant, Immanuel (1987) Critique of Judgment, tr. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett
Kant, Immanuel () Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Leslie, John (1996) The End of the World. London: Routledge
McFarland, John (1970) Kant’s Concept of Teleology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press
Minelli, Alessandro (2009) Forms of Becoming. The Evolutionary Biology of Development.
Princeton: Princeton University Press
Mumford, Stephen (2006) ‘The Ungrounded Argument’, Synthèse 149: 471-489
Omnès, Roland (1999) Quantum Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Putnam, Hilary (2012) Philosophy in an Age of Science. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press
Rescher, Nicholas (2000) Nature and Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Schrödinger, Erwin (1954) Nature and the Greeks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Sider, Theodore (2011) Writing the Book of The World. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Thom, René (1975) Structural Stability and Morphogenesis. New York: Advanced Book
Program
Thompson, D’Arcy Wentworth (1961) On Growth and Form. Abridged Edition, ed. J. T.
Bonner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Watkins, Eric, ed. (2001) Kant and the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Westphal, Kenneth R. (2008) ‘Philosophizing about Nature: Hegel’s Philosophical Project’,
in Beiser, ed. (2008), 281-310
Whitehead, Alfred North (1926) Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
 6. Referencing

WRITING IN YOUR OWN WORDS

The great majority of the assignment should be written in your own words.

This is important for three principal reasons. First, it is important for you to demonstrate your
command of written English, and also to develop your own writing style. Second, using your
own words enables you to show that you have understood the sources that you have read.
Third, it enables you to show that you can construct an argument which is your own because it is
expressed in your words.

When you do use others’ words – whether from books, articles or web-sites – this should be:

i. Infrequent (no more than a few times in an essay)

ii. Brief (a maximum of a couple of sentences at a time)
iii. Properly referenced (see the detailed guidance on referencing in this handbook)

We cannot give you marks unless you show understanding by using your own words and
producing your own arguments. Using large quantities of the words of others is poor scholarship
(even when properly referenced) and will be penalised.

REFERENCING
What is referencing?
Referencing involves noting the sources (e.g. books, articles, websites etc) you use in writing a
piece of coursework.

Why reference?
1. It is convenient for the writer and the reader
If you go back to your work at a later date (say, to revise for exams) you may want a reminder of
your sources so you can re-read them. Your referencing tells you where to go back to look.
In reading the work of others, you discover their sources and where to find additional material.
Even if you do not go on to look at these sources you are adding to your knowledge in
discovering what is worth reading on a particular subject.

2. It is a hallmark of academic writing

You will find it in the books and articles you read for your course.

3. It avoids any suggestion of plagiarism

Referencing shows that you are not attempting to claim the work of others as your own.

 REFERENCING IS REQUIRED FOR ALL WRITTEN COURSEWORK

 FAILURE TO REFERENCE-- OR SERIOUSLY INADEQUATE REFERENCING--
WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT YOUR MARK

What to reference
1. When you use the exact words of another person.
2. When you use the ideas, thoughts, opinions, interpretations of others.

How to reference
There are several different formats. We use the Harvard Method. There is an extensive guide to
this (and other formats) on the UWE library webpages, ‘Guide to Referencing’. Below we
provide a very brief guide to the Harvard Method. Much more can be found at
http://www.uwe.ac.uk/library/resources/general/info_study_skills/refs.htm

Where to reference
In the Harvard Method a reference is made in two different places:

1. At the place where you quote the words of another person or refer to their ideas.
You put the reference in brackets at the end of the sentence before the full stop. You note the
author’s surname, the date of publication, and the page(s) you refer to.

In the example below exact words are quoted so inverted commas are used. Note that p. is short
for page number:

‘States of affairs, if they are indeed necessary beings, would appear to be abstract entities’ (Lowe,
2002, p.129).

In the next example the author’s exact words are not quoted so there are no inverted commas.
Note that pp. is short for page numbers:

Berkeley argued that what appears is all there is. (Berkeley, 2008, pp.119-121).

2. At the end. This is called a bibliography – a list of all the sources you have referred to. The list
is organised in alphabetical order by the surname of the author. The bibliography gives more
information than the reference within the text.

An example of a bibliography is:

Berkeley, G., 2008. Philosophical Writings, ed. Desmond M. Clarke. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Kyrre, J., B. Olsen, E. Selinger and S. Riis, eds., 2009. New Waves in Philosophy of Technology.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hansard (2005) House of Commons Debates,

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmse0405.htm [accessed 14 July 2007]

Blanchowicz, J., 2010, ‘The incompletability of metaphysics’, Idealistic Studies 40 (3), pp.257-273.

Dunham, J., I. H. Grant and S. Watson, 2011, Idealism. The History of a Philosophy. Stocksfield:
Acumen.

The bibliography shows:

 The surname of the author(s) (or name of organisation)
 Their first initial
 The year of publication.
 The title of the book or article (for an article, the title appears in inverted commas)
 Where it was published.
i. For a book this is a place—a town or city (not the county, state or country).
 and the name of the publisher. An example in the bibliography above is
London: Palgrave Macmillan.

ii. For an article

This is either

The name of the journal, the volume and issue number, and the page numbers. An example
in the bibliography above is
Idealistic Studies 40 (3), pp.257-273.
[The first figure is the volume number. Usually each year of a journal has an individual
volume number. There are usually several separate issues each year. They have a separate
issue number and this is the figure in brackets]

or the book within which the article appeared and who edited it. An example in the
bibliography above is

Kyrre, J., B. Olsen, E. Selinger and S. Riis, eds., 2009. New Waves in Philosophy of Technology.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
[Note that eds. is short for editors, ed. is short for editor]

iii. For a website this is the URL and the date you looked at it. An example in the
bibliography above

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmse0405.htm [accessed 14 July 2007]

7. Assessment

First Assessment Opportunity

Component A (Controlled Conditions)
1. Practical (Oral) Examination 50%

Component B (Coursework)
1. Essay (2500 words) 50%

4.1. Assessment Content

Coursework essays have been chosen as a means for assessing your ability to engage with a
particular thinker, series of texts, or problem, in some depth.
Unseen examinations have been chosen as a means to assess the students’ engagement
with a slightly wider range of texts, thinkers and problems under controlled conditions.
Coursework essays and oral examinations will form the basis for summative assessment.
Verbal feedback on student presentations, seminar participation, and through one to one
discussions will form the basis for additional formative assessment.

Component A (Controlled Conditions)

Practical (Oral) Examination (50%)
Students give presentations on a module topic of their choosing throughout the term, which will
be followed by an oral examination to take place on the module’s conclusion (dates will be
published nearer the time). The purpose of such practice is to ensure students are conversant to
a high level with the module topics, and are able to present cogently on complex matters
regarding elements of the philosophy of nature and philosophy of science. Detailed guidance will
be provided verbally, through direct one-to-one feedback you will receive in regard to your
presentations. The criteria for this assessment are as follows:

 Level of engagement with particular philosophical positions and problems

 Ability to present philosophical argument
 Ability to critically assess philosophical argument
 Clarity of presentation including referencing etc
 Levels and adequacy of research

The exam will last for 30 minutes

Component B (Coursework)
2500 word ESSAY (50%)
The essay assesses your ability to go into considerable argumentative and conceptual depth in
assessing for yourself the problems of philosophy of nature and philosophy of science. You will
be expected, as per the criteria above, to select a topic from a list to be published by the
beginning of November at the latest, and to address it in such a way as to

The submission deadline for this Essay is before 2pm Thursday, January 11, 2018. A set of
questions will be circulated through Blackboard and the module mailing list. Students are free to
submit proposals and, once it has been accepted, to work on a subject of their choice.

The marked essays will be returned by February 1, 2018.