Magallona vs Executive Secretary

GR No. 187167 July 16, 2011

Facts:

In the instant case, petitioners question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522,
adjusting the baselines of the Philippines, on two grounds;

1. That RA9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
states sovereignty power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.

2. That RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine sources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.

Petitioners also contend that treatment of the Kalayaan Island Group (Spratlys) as
regime of islands results in the loss of a large maritime area and prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen. Petitioners also attack RA9522s failure to reference either the Treaty of
Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOSIIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the
maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Respondents question;

1. the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review
grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi
2. the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of
RA9522

On the merits, respondents defended RA9522 as the country compliance with the terms
of UNCLOSIII, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment, and
economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah

Issues:

1. Whether petitioner possess locus standi to bring the suit

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA9522
3. On the merits, whether RA9522 is unconstitutional

Held:

1. Yes. Petitioners, as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the
merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating
urgent resolution and not as legislators and taxpayers as petitioners claim.

2. Yes. These are the proper remedies as courts traditionally decide upon cases which test the
constitutionality of statutes.

3. No. RA9522 is not unconstitutional.

 RA9522 is a baseline law which marks-out specific basepoints along the
coast from which baselines are drawn to serve as geographic starting points measuring the
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Baseline laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOSIII States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves. UNCLOSIII and its ancilliary baseline laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of territory. Though the KIG and Scarborough Shoal fall
outside the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago, said baselines actually
increased the Philippines total maritime space by 145,216 square nautical miles.

RA9522 itself continues the claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and
Scarborough Shoal in Sec. 2 of RA9522 as well as in retaining Sec. 2 of RA5446 pertaining to the
baselines of Sabah. If the KIG and Scarborough Shoals were to be enclosed in the baselines
created by RA9522 there would be a breach of Sec. 2 & Sec. 3 of Art 47 of UNCLOSIII.

Lastly, whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Art. 1 of the 1987
Constitution or as archipelagic waters under Art. 49 UNCLOSIII, the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the airspace over
it and the submarine areas underneath. Legislation may be passed designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage being that the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law.

The petition is dismissed.

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed

for a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners
allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt,
smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the
air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on
health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition,
they allege that with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the
energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney
drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised
pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these
are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

PET- invoking their right to clean air Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents’ functions
and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs
to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the function of the DOTC is
limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the
emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel.
He recommended that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to
come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

ISSUES

1. Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the

suggested alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use
compressed natural gas (cng)
2. Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility
vehicles to use compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus

RULING

1. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically

enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par.
4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of
Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on
the results of the DOTC surveys.”

In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the
emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As
far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line
agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action
plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the
LTFRB.

2. No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an

indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ
of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any
judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order
No. 290, which implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
The court was assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is
being addressed.
Oposa vs Factoran
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked
CASE: MATEO CARINO, Plff. in Error v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT . February 23,
1909.
Ponente: Willard, J

FACTS:
 Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application
of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error.
 Carino’s ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts
for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is
also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom.
 Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was
issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and
the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title.
 Then, that the lower court granted the application of land registration on March 4, 1904 )
 An appeal was filed in behalf of Government of the Philippines and as US having taken
 possession of property for military and public purposes. Thus the application of
registration was dismissed
 Respondents argues:
- Given that
- Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines
except to permit private lands to be acquired
- No prescription against the Spanish Crown
- Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make
the title good
-And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris)
- Plaintiff’s land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser
- Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain
whether registration granted was under Spanish
laws
- Plaintiff argues:
- Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important Island of Luzon
ISSUE- W/N CARINO OWN DA LAND

HELD: YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of
what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
 The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of Prescription as mentioned in
the royal cedula of 1754 states: “Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription.”
 Moreover, the Decree of June 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain times shall be
deemed owners; if a cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years.
- Here, plaintiff’s father was the owner of the land by the very terms of this decree.-
By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the
United States are to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”
Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court
(Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.
 Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.
 The court said that the reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to
occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for
private gain.
 The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian
Doctrine
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there
is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same

sjs v atienza
Facts

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila

reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan
Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they
agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to
remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the
creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil
companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals
of the oil companies.

Issue

Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their
duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines
(CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the
care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of
all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens,
subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are
the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

ETO TALAGA TOPIC AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can
invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional
stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several
legislations. RIGHT TO INFO ART 3 SEC 7 AND ART 28 SEC 2 FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GENERAL SUPERVISION OF PRE ART 10 SEC 4??

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January
1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said
ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted
them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily
includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the
municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in
the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise
of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise
of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing
and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the
DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production-
sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos.
57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.” and
Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining,
quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining
prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their
validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all
other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been
disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said
constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or
lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the
governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of
mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining
laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases
or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No.
211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the
police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all
the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive
Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate
of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ALCANTARA V COSLAP
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming the decision of COSLAP and denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Facts:
In 1993, petitioner was granted the lease of 923 hectares of public forest land in Sitio
Lanton, General Santos City through Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542
(FLGLA No. 542) for 25 years.
Before the lease was granted, private respondent Paglangan along with Sabel Esmael and
Lasid Acop filed a letter of complaint with COSLAP to cancel FLGLA No. 542.
Petitioner questioned COSLAP’s jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands.
COSLAP went on with the hearing and petitioner alleged that he was not given the
opportunity to be present and participate in the field investigations conducted.
On August 3, 1998 COSLAP cancelled FLGLA No. 542 and petitioner appealed to CA
for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Based on the records, the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs
to the B’laan indigenous cultural community since they have been in possession
of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a
fact has not been disputed by petitioner.

Issue:
1) Whether or not CA erred in ruling that petitioner has recognized COSLAP’s
jurisdiction over the case by participating actively in the proceedings.
2) Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio Decidendi:
1) Active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or
a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to recognizing its jurisdiction and therefore
cannot question it later after the decision.
2) COSLAP has jurisdiction to resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and
explosive in nature, for instance, between occupants and lease agreement holders.
3) It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to
petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410[13] which states that all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part
of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these
lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively
among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.
Petition is denied.

cheesman v iac

Thomas and Criselda Cheesman married in December 1970. In June 1974, a Deed of Sale
covering a parcel of unregistered land and house thereon was executed by Armando Altares in
favor of Criselda. Aware of the deed, Thomas did not object to the transfer being made only to
his wife. Also without objection from his end, tax declarations for the property were issued in the
name of Criselda only, while she assumed exclusive management and administration thereon.
However, in February 1981, Thomas and Criselda separated. In July 1981, Criselda sold the
property to Estelita Padilla without the knowledge or consent of Thomas.

In July 1981, Thomas filed a complaint against Criselda before CFI Olongapo for the annulment
of the sale on the ground that it was executed without his knowledge and consent. In her answer,
Criselda alleged that property was parapheral having purchased the same with Funds exclusively
belonging to her; that Thomas, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right
of ownership in the land; and that Estelita was a buyer in good faith. The CFI declared the sale
void ab initio, and ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of the
conjugal partnership property. However, Estelita filed a petition for relief on the ground of fraud,
mistake or excusable negligence which had seriously impared her right to present her case
adequately. Thus, judgement was set aside, petition for relief was given due course, and a new
judge presided over the case. Thereafter, a Summary Judgement declared the sale to be valid
having satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption that all property of the marriage
belong to the conjugal property, and that the property was Criselda’s paraphernal property; and
said presumption cannot apply to Thomas being an American citizen, thus disqualified under the
Constitution to acquire and own real properties. Thomas appealed before the IAC but to no avail.
Hence, this petition.

Whether or not the property in dispute form part of the conjugal property of Thomas and
Criselda.

The Court ruled against Thomas. The Court is settled with the facts as determined the lower and
appellate courts that the funds used by Criselda to purchase the property was money she had
earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas, and that Estelita did believe in good faith that
Criselda was the sole owner of the property. Consequently, these determinations of facts will not
be here disturbed since the Court is not a trier of facts and has not reason to disturb them.

In this regard, the Constituiton prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Thomas was
charged with the knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the
property be purchased by him and Criselda, he acquired no right whatever over the property by
virtue of the purchase; and in attempting to acquire right or interest in land, vicariously or
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him is void. In any event,
Thomas had no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property.

To sustain such a theory would permit indirect violation of the Constitution. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over
the land, as he would have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right which
the Constitution does not permit Thomas to have. As already observed, the finding that that his
wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition of conjugal funds is not now
inquired into, for the same is purely academic.

RULING

The decision of the IAC is affirmed

 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
(G.R. NO. 122156, FEB. 3, 1997)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program under Proclamation No. 50 decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual ―strategic partner,‖ is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price tendered
by Renong Berhad.
Apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to
this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disposition of 51% of Manila Hotel falls under the application of Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution.
Whether or not Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
HELD:

Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has

practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC
is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies. Hence, since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after
it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of

a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers
who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
 Magallona vs Executive Secretary
GR No. 187167 July 16, 2011

Facts:

In the instant case, petitioners question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522,
adjusting the baselines of the Philippines, on two grounds;

1. That RA9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
states sovereignty power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.

2. That RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine sources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.

Petitioners also contend that treatment of the Kalayaan Island Group (Spratlys) as
regime of islands results in the loss of a large maritime area and prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen. Petitioners also attack RA9522s failure to reference either the Treaty of
Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOSIIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the
maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
 Respondents question;

3. the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review
grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi
4. the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of
RA9522

On the merits, respondents defended RA9522 as the country compliance with the terms
of UNCLOSIII, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment, and
economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah

Issues:

4. Whether petitioner possess locus standi to bring the suit

5. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA9522
6. On the merits, whether RA9522 is unconstitutional

Held:

4. Yes. Petitioners, as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the
merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating
urgent resolution and not as legislators and taxpayers as petitioners claim.

5. Yes. These are the proper remedies as courts traditionally decide upon cases which test the
constitutionality of statutes.

6. No. RA9522 is not unconstitutional.

RA9522 is a baseline law which marks-out specific basepoints along the

coast from which baselines are drawn to serve as geographic starting points measuring the
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Baseline laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOSIII States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves. UNCLOSIII and its ancilliary baseline laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of territory. Though the KIG and Scarborough Shoal fall
outside the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago, said baselines actually
increased the Philippines total maritime space by 145,216 square nautical miles.

RA9522 itself continues the claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and
Scarborough Shoal in Sec. 2 of RA9522 as well as in retaining Sec. 2 of RA5446 pertaining to the
baselines of Sabah. If the KIG and Scarborough Shoals were to be enclosed in the baselines
created by RA9522 there would be a breach of Sec. 2 & Sec. 3 of Art 47 of UNCLOSIII.

Lastly, whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Art. 1 of the 1987
Constitution or as archipelagic waters under Art. 49 UNCLOSIII, the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the airspace over
it and the submarine areas underneath. Legislation may be passed designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage being that the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law.

The petition is dismissed.

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed

for a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners
allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt,
smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the
air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on
health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition,
they allege that with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the
energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney
drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised
pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these
are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

PET- invoking their right to clean air Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents’ functions
and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs
to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the function of the DOTC is
limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the
emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel.
He recommended that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to
come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

ISSUES

3. Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the

suggested alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use
compressed natural gas (cng)
4. Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility
vehicles to use compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus
RULING

2. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically

enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par.
4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of
Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on
the results of the DOTC surveys.”

In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the
emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As
far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line
agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action
plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the
LTFRB.

3. No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an

indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ
of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any
judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order
No. 290, which implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
The court was assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is
being addressed.

Oposa vs Factoran
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked

CASE: MATEO CARINO, Plff. in Error v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT . February 23,

1909.
Ponente: Willard, J

FACTS:
 Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application
of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error.
 Carino’s ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts
for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is
also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom.
 Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was
issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and
the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title.
 Then, that the lower court granted the application of land registration on March 4, 1904 )
 An appeal was filed in behalf of Government of the Philippines and as US having taken
 possession of property for military and public purposes. Thus the application of
registration was dismissed
 Respondents argues:
- Given that
- Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines
except to permit private lands to be acquired
- No prescription against the Spanish Crown
- Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make
the title good
-And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris)
- Plaintiff’s land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser
- Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain
whether registration granted was under Spanish
laws
- Plaintiff argues:
- Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important Island of Luzon
ISSUE- W/N CARINO OWN DA LAND

HELD: YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of
what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
 The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of Prescription as mentioned in
the royal cedula of 1754 states: “Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription.”
 Moreover, the Decree of June 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain times shall be
deemed owners; if a cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years.
- Here, plaintiff’s father was the owner of the land by the very terms of this decree.-
By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the
United States are to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”
Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court
(Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.
 Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.
 The court said that the reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to
occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for
private gain.
 The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian
Doctrine
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there
is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same

sjs v atienza
Facts

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila

reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan
Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they
agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to
remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the
creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil
companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to

enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals
of the oil companies.

Issue

Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their
duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines
(CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the
care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of
all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens,
subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are
the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

ETO TALAGA TOPIC AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can
invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional
stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several
legislations. RIGHT TO INFO ART 3 SEC 7 AND ART 28 SEC 2 FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GENERAL SUPERVISION OF PRE ART 10 SEC 4??

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January
1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said
ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted
them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily
includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the
municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in
the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise
of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise
of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing
and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the
DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production-
sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos.
57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.” and
Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining,
quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining
prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their
validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all
other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been
disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said
constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or
lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the
governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of
mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining
laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases
or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No.
211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the
police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all
the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive
Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate
of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ALCANTARA V COSLAP
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming the decision of COSLAP and denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Facts:
In 1993, petitioner was granted the lease of 923 hectares of public forest land in Sitio
Lanton, General Santos City through Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542
(FLGLA No. 542) for 25 years.
Before the lease was granted, private respondent Paglangan along with Sabel Esmael and
Lasid Acop filed a letter of complaint with COSLAP to cancel FLGLA No. 542.
Petitioner questioned COSLAP’s jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands.
COSLAP went on with the hearing and petitioner alleged that he was not given the
opportunity to be present and participate in the field investigations conducted.
On August 3, 1998 COSLAP cancelled FLGLA No. 542 and petitioner appealed to CA
for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Based on the records, the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs
to the B’laan indigenous cultural community since they have been in possession
of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a
fact has not been disputed by petitioner.

Issue:
3) Whether or not CA erred in ruling that petitioner has recognized COSLAP’s
jurisdiction over the case by participating actively in the proceedings.
4) Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio Decidendi:
4) Active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or
a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to recognizing its jurisdiction and therefore
cannot question it later after the decision.
5) COSLAP has jurisdiction to resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and
explosive in nature, for instance, between occupants and lease agreement holders.
6) It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to
petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410[13] which states that all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part
of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these
lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively
among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.
Petition is denied.

cheesman v iac

Thomas and Criselda Cheesman married in December 1970. In June 1974, a Deed of Sale
covering a parcel of unregistered land and house thereon was executed by Armando Altares in
favor of Criselda. Aware of the deed, Thomas did not object to the transfer being made only to
his wife. Also without objection from his end, tax declarations for the property were issued in the
name of Criselda only, while she assumed exclusive management and administration thereon.
However, in February 1981, Thomas and Criselda separated. In July 1981, Criselda sold the
property to Estelita Padilla without the knowledge or consent of Thomas.

In July 1981, Thomas filed a complaint against Criselda before CFI Olongapo for the annulment
of the sale on the ground that it was executed without his knowledge and consent. In her answer,
Criselda alleged that property was parapheral having purchased the same with Funds exclusively
belonging to her; that Thomas, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right
of ownership in the land; and that Estelita was a buyer in good faith. The CFI declared the sale
void ab initio, and ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of the
conjugal partnership property. However, Estelita filed a petition for relief on the ground of fraud,
mistake or excusable negligence which had seriously impared her right to present her case
adequately. Thus, judgement was set aside, petition for relief was given due course, and a new
judge presided over the case. Thereafter, a Summary Judgement declared the sale to be valid
having satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption that all property of the marriage
belong to the conjugal property, and that the property was Criselda’s paraphernal property; and
said presumption cannot apply to Thomas being an American citizen, thus disqualified under the
Constitution to acquire and own real properties. Thomas appealed before the IAC but to no avail.
Hence, this petition.

Whether or not the property in dispute form part of the conjugal property of Thomas and
Criselda.

The Court ruled against Thomas. The Court is settled with the facts as determined the lower and
appellate courts that the funds used by Criselda to purchase the property was money she had
earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas, and that Estelita did believe in good faith that
Criselda was the sole owner of the property. Consequently, these determinations of facts will not
be here disturbed since the Court is not a trier of facts and has not reason to disturb them.

In this regard, the Constituiton prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Thomas was
charged with the knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the
property be purchased by him and Criselda, he acquired no right whatever over the property by
virtue of the purchase; and in attempting to acquire right or interest in land, vicariously or
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him is void. In any event,
Thomas had no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property.

To sustain such a theory would permit indirect violation of the Constitution. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over
the land, as he would have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right which
the Constitution does not permit Thomas to have. As already observed, the finding that that his
wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition of conjugal funds is not now
inquired into, for the same is purely academic.

RULING

The decision of the IAC is affirmed

 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
(G.R. NO. 122156, FEB. 3, 1997)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program under Proclamation No. 50 decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual ―strategic partner,‖ is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price tendered
by Renong Berhad.
Apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to
this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disposition of 51% of Manila Hotel falls under the application of Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution.
Whether or not Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
HELD:

Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has

practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC
is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies. Hence, since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after
it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of

a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers
who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
 Magallona vs Executive Secretary
GR No. 187167 July 16, 2011

Facts:

In the instant case, petitioners question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522,
adjusting the baselines of the Philippines, on two grounds;

1. That RA9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
states sovereignty power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.

2. That RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine sources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.

Petitioners also contend that treatment of the Kalayaan Island Group (Spratlys) as
regime of islands results in the loss of a large maritime area and prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen. Petitioners also attack RA9522s failure to reference either the Treaty of
Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOSIIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the
maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
 Respondents question;

5. the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review
grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi
6. the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of
RA9522

On the merits, respondents defended RA9522 as the country compliance with the terms
of UNCLOSIII, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment, and
economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah

Issues:

7. Whether petitioner possess locus standi to bring the suit

8. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA9522
9. On the merits, whether RA9522 is unconstitutional

Held:

7. Yes. Petitioners, as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the
merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating
urgent resolution and not as legislators and taxpayers as petitioners claim.

8. Yes. These are the proper remedies as courts traditionally decide upon cases which test the
constitutionality of statutes.

9. No. RA9522 is not unconstitutional.

RA9522 is a baseline law which marks-out specific basepoints along the

coast from which baselines are drawn to serve as geographic starting points measuring the
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Baseline laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOSIII States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves. UNCLOSIII and its ancilliary baseline laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of territory. Though the KIG and Scarborough Shoal fall
outside the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago, said baselines actually
increased the Philippines total maritime space by 145,216 square nautical miles.

RA9522 itself continues the claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and
Scarborough Shoal in Sec. 2 of RA9522 as well as in retaining Sec. 2 of RA5446 pertaining to the
baselines of Sabah. If the KIG and Scarborough Shoals were to be enclosed in the baselines
created by RA9522 there would be a breach of Sec. 2 & Sec. 3 of Art 47 of UNCLOSIII.

Lastly, whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Art. 1 of the 1987
Constitution or as archipelagic waters under Art. 49 UNCLOSIII, the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the airspace over
it and the submarine areas underneath. Legislation may be passed designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage being that the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law.

The petition is dismissed.

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed

for a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners
allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt,
smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the
air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on
health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition,
they allege that with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the
energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney
drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised
pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these
are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

PET- invoking their right to clean air Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents’ functions
and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs
to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the function of the DOTC is
limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the
emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel.
He recommended that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to
come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

ISSUES

5. Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the

suggested alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use
compressed natural gas (cng)
6. Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility
vehicles to use compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus
RULING

3. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically

enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par.
4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of
Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on
the results of the DOTC surveys.”

In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the
emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As
far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line
agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action
plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the
LTFRB.

4. No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an

indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ
of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any
judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order
No. 290, which implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
The court was assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is
being addressed.

Oposa vs Factoran
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked

CASE: MATEO CARINO, Plff. in Error v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT . February 23,

1909.
Ponente: Willard, J

FACTS:
 Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application
of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error.
 Carino’s ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts
for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is
also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom.
 Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was
issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and
the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title.
 Then, that the lower court granted the application of land registration on March 4, 1904 )
 An appeal was filed in behalf of Government of the Philippines and as US having taken
 possession of property for military and public purposes. Thus the application of
registration was dismissed
 Respondents argues:
- Given that
- Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines
except to permit private lands to be acquired
- No prescription against the Spanish Crown
- Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make
the title good
-And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris)
- Plaintiff’s land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser
- Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain
whether registration granted was under Spanish
laws
- Plaintiff argues:
- Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important Island of Luzon
ISSUE- W/N CARINO OWN DA LAND

HELD: YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of
what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
 The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of Prescription as mentioned in
the royal cedula of 1754 states: “Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription.”
 Moreover, the Decree of June 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain times shall be
deemed owners; if a cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years.
- Here, plaintiff’s father was the owner of the land by the very terms of this decree.-
By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the
United States are to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”
Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court
(Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.
 Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.
 The court said that the reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to
occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for
private gain.
 The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian
Doctrine
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there
is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same

sjs v atienza
Facts

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila

reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan
Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they
agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to
remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the
creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil
companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to

enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals
of the oil companies.

Issue

Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their
duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines
(CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the
care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of
all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens,
subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are
the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

ETO TALAGA TOPIC AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can
invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional
stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several
legislations. RIGHT TO INFO ART 3 SEC 7 AND ART 28 SEC 2 FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GENERAL SUPERVISION OF PRE ART 10 SEC 4??

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January
1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said
ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted
them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily
includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the
municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in
the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise
of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise
of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing
and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the
DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production-
sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos.
57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.” and
Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining,
quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining
prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their
validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all
other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been
disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said
constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or
lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the
governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of
mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining
laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases
or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No.
211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the
police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all
the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive
Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate
of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ALCANTARA V COSLAP
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming the decision of COSLAP and denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Facts:
In 1993, petitioner was granted the lease of 923 hectares of public forest land in Sitio
Lanton, General Santos City through Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542
(FLGLA No. 542) for 25 years.
Before the lease was granted, private respondent Paglangan along with Sabel Esmael and
Lasid Acop filed a letter of complaint with COSLAP to cancel FLGLA No. 542.
Petitioner questioned COSLAP’s jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands.
COSLAP went on with the hearing and petitioner alleged that he was not given the
opportunity to be present and participate in the field investigations conducted.
On August 3, 1998 COSLAP cancelled FLGLA No. 542 and petitioner appealed to CA
for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Based on the records, the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs
to the B’laan indigenous cultural community since they have been in possession
of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a
fact has not been disputed by petitioner.

Issue:
5) Whether or not CA erred in ruling that petitioner has recognized COSLAP’s
jurisdiction over the case by participating actively in the proceedings.
6) Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio Decidendi:
7) Active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or
a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to recognizing its jurisdiction and therefore
cannot question it later after the decision.
8) COSLAP has jurisdiction to resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and
explosive in nature, for instance, between occupants and lease agreement holders.
9) It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to
petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410[13] which states that all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part
of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these
lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively
among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.
Petition is denied.

cheesman v iac

Thomas and Criselda Cheesman married in December 1970. In June 1974, a Deed of Sale
covering a parcel of unregistered land and house thereon was executed by Armando Altares in
favor of Criselda. Aware of the deed, Thomas did not object to the transfer being made only to
his wife. Also without objection from his end, tax declarations for the property were issued in the
name of Criselda only, while she assumed exclusive management and administration thereon.
However, in February 1981, Thomas and Criselda separated. In July 1981, Criselda sold the
property to Estelita Padilla without the knowledge or consent of Thomas.

In July 1981, Thomas filed a complaint against Criselda before CFI Olongapo for the annulment
of the sale on the ground that it was executed without his knowledge and consent. In her answer,
Criselda alleged that property was parapheral having purchased the same with Funds exclusively
belonging to her; that Thomas, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right
of ownership in the land; and that Estelita was a buyer in good faith. The CFI declared the sale
void ab initio, and ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of the
conjugal partnership property. However, Estelita filed a petition for relief on the ground of fraud,
mistake or excusable negligence which had seriously impared her right to present her case
adequately. Thus, judgement was set aside, petition for relief was given due course, and a new
judge presided over the case. Thereafter, a Summary Judgement declared the sale to be valid
having satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption that all property of the marriage
belong to the conjugal property, and that the property was Criselda’s paraphernal property; and
said presumption cannot apply to Thomas being an American citizen, thus disqualified under the
Constitution to acquire and own real properties. Thomas appealed before the IAC but to no avail.
Hence, this petition.

Whether or not the property in dispute form part of the conjugal property of Thomas and
Criselda.

The Court ruled against Thomas. The Court is settled with the facts as determined the lower and
appellate courts that the funds used by Criselda to purchase the property was money she had
earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas, and that Estelita did believe in good faith that
Criselda was the sole owner of the property. Consequently, these determinations of facts will not
be here disturbed since the Court is not a trier of facts and has not reason to disturb them.

In this regard, the Constituiton prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Thomas was
charged with the knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the
property be purchased by him and Criselda, he acquired no right whatever over the property by
virtue of the purchase; and in attempting to acquire right or interest in land, vicariously or
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him is void. In any event,
Thomas had no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property.

To sustain such a theory would permit indirect violation of the Constitution. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over
the land, as he would have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right which
the Constitution does not permit Thomas to have. As already observed, the finding that that his
wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition of conjugal funds is not now
inquired into, for the same is purely academic.

RULING

The decision of the IAC is affirmed

 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
(G.R. NO. 122156, FEB. 3, 1997)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program under Proclamation No. 50 decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual ―strategic partner,‖ is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price tendered
by Renong Berhad.
Apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to
this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disposition of 51% of Manila Hotel falls under the application of Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution.
Whether or not Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
HELD:

Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has

practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC
is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies. Hence, since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after
it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of

a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers
who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.