FAILURE OF AEROCRAFT STRUCTURES

SUBMITTED BY:

NAME: I.D NUMBER

V. Bhargav 170070216

Y. Divij 170070233

Y. Yajnesh 170070236

L. Ravi Karthik 170070242

UNDER THE ESTEEMED GUIDANCE OF

Dr. S S RAO

Course Coordinator

DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

KLEF
Green fields, Vaddeswaram – 522 502
Guntur Dt., AP, India.
 DEPARTMENT
CERTIFICATE OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

This is to certify that the project based laboratory report entitled “FAILURE OF
AEROCRAFT STRUCTURE” submitted by 170070216,170070233,170070236,
170070242, to the DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, K L E
F in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the completion of a project based
Laboratory in “MECHANICS OF MATERIALS-2 ” course in II B Tech 2
Semester, is a bonafide record of the work carried out by him/her under my
supervision during the academic year 2018.

UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT

Dr. SS RAO Dr. A.SRINATH

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is great pleasure for me to express my gratitude to Our Honorable

President Sri. KONERU SATYANARAYANA, for giving the opportunity and
platform with facilities in accomplishing the project based laboratory report.

I express the sincere gratitude to our Principal Dr. K. SUBBARAO for

his administration towards our academic growth.

I express sincere gratitude to our Coordinator and HOD-MECHANICAL

Dr. A. SRINATH for her leadership and constant motivation provided in
successful completion of our academic semester. I record it as my privilege to
deeply thank for providing us the efficient faculty and facilities to make our ideas
into reality.

I express my sincere thanks to our project supervisor for his novel

association of ideas, encouragement, appreciation and intellectual zeal which
motivated us to venture this project successfully.

Finally, it is pleased to acknowledge the indebtedness to all those who

devoted themselves directly or indirectly to make this project report success.

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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an overview of the changing role played by failure
analysis in ensuring the safe operation of aircraft. These changes are occurring
as a result of the different pressures and constraints being imposed on
manufacturers and on operators and are having the effect of bringing the failure
analyst out of the back room, into a far more challenging role as part of a problem-
solving team. In this new role, providing effective assistance to the aircraft
operator often involves not only determining the cause of failure (failure
analysis), but drawing upon a wider range of expertise including an ability to
analyse the whole problem (defect assessment) and an ability to assist with the
development of affordable and realistic solutions to that problem. It is the overall
performance of the investigation team, its speed of response, and the availability
of a wide range of skills, which is rapidly becoming the measure of efficiency,
and while the use of new technology can be crucial in improving capability and
efficiency, the increasing demands on the individual failure analyst make the
acquisition of wide experience — and the development of a pool of experienced
analysts—all the more important, if we are to avoid repeating yesterday's
mistakes.

The paper will draw upon examples of defect assessment, in some cases
associated with aircraft accidents, to illustrate the points raised above.

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Introduction
The Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation's
Aeronautical Research Laboratory has provided failure analysis support for the
Royal Australian Air Force for more than fifty years. This history has provided
the laboratory with what is undoubtedly its most important resource in this area
— the experience of its staff — and has allowed the development of a wide range
of methods for failure analysis. In recent years, for example, the quantitative
fractography of fracture surfaces (some of the pioneering applications of which
were undertaken at ARL) has been applied widely in support of RAAF accident
and failure investigations. This technology has been extremely successful in
providing information on crack growth rates, and hence assisting in developing
fracture and fatigue control measures appropriate to each instance of cracking.
Other major developments include the wider use of image processing to assist
with fracture analysis, culminating recently in the development of a deep-focus
capability allowing easier viewing and interpretation of rough fracture surfaces,
a capability for analysis of failed composites and adhesives, and the identification
of the significance of overload tearing in failure processes. Some of these
capabilities will be illustrated briefly in the examples discussed later.

The importance of timely and reliable failure analysis in the aerospace

industry cannot be overstated. In civil aviation, it is unlikely that the public would
tolerate several aviation accidents much higher than the current figures. Since
military aviation, with its higher risk rates, could easily be presented as
unacceptably dangerous, it is arguable that military failures and accidents require
even more attention than those in the civil field. In both forms of aviation,
however, the rapid and thorough investigation of failures is an essential part of
learning from experience and ensuring that accidents do not recur. This paper
will focus on some of the changing roles of the failure analyst/failure investigator
in recent years.
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Failure Analyst and Client
Failure analysis can only assist with ensuring the continued safe operation
of aircraft if the information acquired in the analysis is translated into real
engineering; in this regard, the interaction between the client and the analyst is
supremely important. Traditionally, the role of the individual failure analyst has
been very much that of the specialist. The analyst would normally be asked by
the client—usually an engineer charged with recovering the situation—to identify
the cause of a failure in the operations area. The answer, of course, would almost
always reflect the analyst's academic discipline or training. The response from
a metallurgist, for example, would focus more attention on modes of fracture and
their relationship to microstructure, while the mechanical engineer would tend to
focus more on the nature of the loading. The report would usually, by being
cautious, include a lot of correct, although not always relevant, detail, and
hopefully a correct diagnosis. The analyst's final involvement was usually to
present the report to the client, in the hope that it would assist the client to modify
his operations to prevent recurrence of the failure.

While it has been ARL's experience in its relationship with its major client,
the RAAF, that this result has been achieved, there have been many instances,
worldwide where the problem has continued to occur. Why? At what stage did
the process go astray? Referring to the traditional role of the failure analyst
shown in Fig. 1, a number of possibilities suggest themselves:

Errors by Operations - data not acquired - incorrect data Errors by Client

- data not passed to analyst - report not assessed correctly - inappropriate action
Errors by analyst - incomplete/misleading report

These factors can be broken down into two main areas; firstly and
obviously, there are those errors in which inexperience or poor training prevent

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operations, the client or the analyst from dealing correctly with their own areas
of expertise. Secondly, and of more interest here, there are the problems
associated with the communication between the three parties involved —
incomplete data concerning the

failure, action based on a misunderstood report, etcetera. Clearly, the more

experience the individuals have, the more likely it is that they will recognise what
is important amongst confusing detail and communicate more clearly the
appropriate information— this provides one of the best arguments for building a
broad base of experience. Above all, however, the linear approach shown in
Fig. 1 does not allow the analyst to interact with the operations/client area, and
cuts operations out of the client/analyst interaction.

In this paper, the author argues that in the traditional role, only the client
sees the whole picture, and it is this which allows the communications problems
to occur. Instead, it is essential that the failure analyst be able to interact with the
client and the operator to solve the problem. In effect, the days of the failure
analyst as a back-room worker are ending, and failure analysis is of necessity
becoming a team effort which focuses on the problem. The urgency of the need
for this change is being compounded by two other changes in recent years:

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Legal liability
The responsibilities of aircraft manufacturers and operators are now very
closely scrutinised by the media, by injured passengers and crew, and by the
families of those killed in air accidents, to the extent that the legal ramifications
of an accident (using the word in its most general sense) are almost always an
influence on anyone reporting on the causes of the accident. There is nothing
intrinsically wrong with this — indeed, the knowledge that many interested
parties will be reviewing any statement or finding could ensure that the
investigations are performed more thoroughly than they otherwise might have
been. There are however, two potential problems.

Sometimes the client or operator finds that acknowledging the nature of

the problem is not in his commercial or legal interest. This problem is
distressingly common, and while one might expect major aerospace
manufacturers to respond responsibly and openly to potential problems with their
product, the reality is sometimes far different. Most people involved with failure
analysis would be familiar with manufacturers who (a) will not acknowledge that
a part failed, or (b) propose failure hypotheses which always seem to include
failures by some other party, such as in the maintenance program, or (c) propose
failure scenarios which never seem to home in on what is sometimes obvious to
all of the other interested parties.

The second, and perhaps more important, problem is that the threat of legal
proceedings tends to restrict discussion; it inhibits communication between
operator, client and analyst, and tends to limit useful speculation about causes.
Written reports can become cautious to the point of being meaningless.

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Complexity of Investigations
Probably the most important changes, however, are occurring as a result of
increasing technical demands; in aerospace failure analysis, at least, the simple
identification of a mode of failure is seldom enough to satisfy the demands of the
engineer who needs to ensure that the problem does not recur. In military aviation
in particular, where the existence of cracking in service aircraft is often accepted
as part of a structural integrity philosophy, the engineer needs to know, for
example, how long a crack has been present, how fast it has been growing, what
environmental species was important, and any other factor which might have
influenced crack growth. The changes which are important in driving these
developments include:

• More efficient designs, which feature higher stresses in large areas of

airframe components. These high stresses cause cracks to become critical at
shorter lengths, so that a failure investigation may involve detailed analysis of
very limited fracture surfaces. An example is shown in Figure 2 in which the
crack growth rate from a highly stressed aircraft component has been determined
by quantitative fractography. Of note is the extremely small crack size at failure
(some 6mm in depth) and the fact that even at half the test life, the crack was only
some 0.1mm deep — well below the smallest crack size detectable using non-
destructive inspection.

• Clearly, even small metallurgical and service factors such as surface-

breaking inclusions, surface treatments, corrosion pits, and service damage can
all reduce component fatigue life dramatically. The need for an improved
maintenance philosophy has not usually been uppermost in the mind of the
designer, and it is the aircraft operator who will often be the first to encounter
problems from this source.

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 • Since small defects are more significant, environmental influences,
which are less predictable than fatigue, can pose a particularly significant threat
to the economic and safe operational lives of aircraft.

• Assessment of crack growth rates from fracture surfaces requires a good

understanding of the load history of the individual aircraft. Since the latter is
often incomplete or uncertain, the analyst often needs to be able to interpret
complex and sometimes incomplete loads data.

• An increased focus on small cracks means that non-destructive inspection

methods will often be crucial in solving the problem, and a team approach which
integrates NDI and failure analysis specialists is desirable.

• The wider use of composites and adhesives in aircraft requires that the
team includes specialist analysts with experience in these materials, and with a
good knowledge of the types of defects likely to occur in manufacturing and
service. Recent work at ARL is focusing on developing a sound knowledge base
on the failure characteristics of composite and adhesive systems in ADF service.
• High-speed accidents in which there is extensive damage to the aircraft require
the use of a wide range of capabilities, including - trajectory/wreckage pattern
analysis to determine the events involved in mid-air pats separation.

Reconstruction and damage analysis to assess overall impact event - fracture

analysis on all surfaces which are not clearly secondary damage. - instrument
analysis to establish systems condition at impact - filament analysis - actuator
analysis, to establish control surface deflections - human factors assessments -
simulation of the flight history; recent accident investigations in Australia have
benefited substantially from reconstruction of flights from flight data recording
systems - fire analysis - an occupational health and safety role in protecting
recovery workers.

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• The need to maximise the service lives of extremely expensive aircraft means
that every opportunity must be taken to examine parts for hitherto undetected
damage, and in the RAAF, at least, this takes the form of a growing awareness of
the need for opportunity-based teardown of used or damaged components.

The experience of staff of DSTO working in this failure analysis field is

that gradually, the need for team effort, and day-to-day interaction with the client
and operator is increasing, and what I would like this paper to convey is the
increasing need for development of teams which feature the wide range of
capability that is required to address all of the aspects of failure analysis discussed
above. The following brief examples are provided to illustrate the breadth and
depth of the analysis which can be required.

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Example 1: Crash of Macchi aircraft

In the early 1980s, the RAAF conducted a Life Of Type EXtension

(LOTEX) program on its Aermacchi MB326H jet trainers, in which, amongst
other things, the wing spars and centre sections were replaced. The centre section
was replaced by an improved model with a safe life estimated to be greater than
that of the wing spar.

In November 1990, aircraft A7-076 crashed as a result of the separation of

the port wing during an air combat manoeuvre. The pilot was killed, and the fleet
was temporarily grounded. ARL assisted with the recovery of parts, paying
attention to the immediate protection of critical fracture surfaces which indicated
a severe fatigue cracking problem in the lower wing spar cap (Figure 3). The
cracking was associated with a manufacturing anomaly at a fastener hole. While
laboratory analysis of the fracture surface [3,4] was made particularly complex
by the presence of large amounts of stable tearing on the fracture surface, and a
poorly defined aircraft load history, this analysis led to determination of a fatigue
crack growth rate which was crucial in allowing continued operation.

At this stage, the problem was attributed to the presence of "rogue flaws",
and the introduction of wing spar non-destructive inspections, based on the crack
growth rate, allowed normal operations to be resumed. Crucially, however, the
investigation continued with the examination of additional recovered parts;
detailed investigation of the starboard wing of A7-076 revealed more cracks
growing from manufacturing flaws, and thus supported the working hypothesis
that the cracking problem was associated with a population of manufacturing
anomalies. However, the examination of the starboard wing spar also revealed a
number of cracks initiating from normal build quality structural details. It was
estimated that one of these cracks would have become critical at a life only 6%
beyond the promulgated safe life. The significance of this observation was
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apparent to the failure analysis team, who were able to advise the RAAF
immediately that the promulgated safe life of the Macchi fleet was in question,
leading to the immediate application of a reduced aircraft safe life.

In this case, the importance of a close working relationship between client

and analyst has become very evident, as did the enormous value of the failure
analysis team having detailed knowledge of the aircraft and its living philosophy.

Some three years later, the original investigation has expanded to cover
teardown investigation of approximately fifteen wings or part wings, two
fuselages, and several tail planes, to support the retention in RAAF service of a
viable fleet of aircraft. Failure analysis, NDI, structural analysis and fatigue
testing expertise has been an integral part of the team working on this
investigation.

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Example 2: Cracking in F-111 aircraft

More than two decades ago, fatigue cracking in F-111 high-strength steel
components highlighted the way very small cracks can threaten the structural
integrity of an aircraft if they are in high-strength critical parts. The need to fly
high-performance aircraft in which it was known that cracks were present led in
the US to a revolution in the approaches used to design and operate these aircraft.
It also introduced a growing reliance on regular inspection of critical parts, based
for the F-111 on a cold proof testing of the whole aircraft at regular intervals —
the cold conditions of the test increased the susceptibility of small cracks to
failure; any cracks which survived were known to be unable to cause failure in
the next period of scheduled service.

Australian F-111 aircraft are still maintained on this basis, although with
time, cracking has been observed in other locations, and a major role for ARL has
been to determine crack growth rates from these service fracture surfaces [5].
Figure 4 shows the fatigue crack which caused failure of a wing under test; the
crack was only 3mm deep but provided enough crack growth information for an
assessment of an appropriate inspection interval for the remainder of the fleet.

This included cracks which caused failure during regular cold proof
testing; the use of quantitative fractography has provided growth rate information
which is essential to the maintenance of an appropriate inspection interval. More
recently, cracks occurring in other locations have been subjected to the same kind

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of investigation in order to monitor whether cracking is occurring at the expected

Example 3: F/A-18 Trailing Edge Flap Failure

Recently, a RAAF F/A-18 aircraft lost its righthand trailing edge flap
during an exercise [6]; the flap caused substantial damage during its departure,
which occurred as a result of the failure of a lug on the flap which contained one
of the hinge bearings. (Fig 5 illustrates the geometry). This investigation is
somewhat unusual, in that the failed part was missing. Remarkably, however, the
careful examination of the bearing surface (the bearing was retained on the
aircraft when the flap lug separated) revealed markings which were considered to
correspond to the crack location (Figure 6).

A non-destructive inspection of the fleet revealed other cracks, which

allowed the failure analysis team to confirm that the tentative identification of the
crack location and size from the bearing surface was reasonable. In addition,
crack growth rates could be estimated from the fracture surfaces of these
additional cracks, although only on the basis of major assumptions concerning

15
the load history of the aircraft — since the loading events which caused fracture
surface markings were not known, and it was therefore assumed that the most
distinct markings were uniformly distributed throughout the life. The crack
growth rates appeared to be high and showed some evidence of having grown in
an aggressive environment. This, in turn, suggested that the inspection method
in use for the lugs could be inadequate. In conjunction with RAAF, therefore,
ARL developed a supplementary ultrasonic inspection method with improved
capability.

This investigation provides an outstanding example of making

assessments from minimal information — a missing crack, uncertainty about the
loading events, and the possible contribution of an aggressive environment.
Above all, however, the extent of the data exchange between the operator and the
investigator highlighted the value of close contact with the RAAF engineers
involved.

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Example 4: TF30 Engine failure

In 1990, a RAAF F-111C aircraft suffered an engine failure in flight; the

engine suffered substantial damage during the incident, leading to a protracted
investigation of severely damaged parts. The examination revealed that the No
41/2 bearing (between the N1 and N2 shafts) had failed, allowing the two
concentric shafts to come into contact, causing overheating and partial welding
of the shafts. The shafts then failed, causing further secondary damage. Figure
7 shows a section of the engine, including the location of the failed bearing, and
Figure 8 shows parts of the recovered bearing.

The investigation involved substantial contributions from ARL, and RAAF

personnel from RAAF Amberley and Headquarters Logistics Command. For a
period of several months, however, the manufacturer would not accept the
Australian findings, proposing alternative explanations which focused on failures
of ancillary equipment, rather than on the rotating core of the engine. The 41/2
bearing was repeatedly declared to have a history of few problems. At this stage,
the corporate experience of ARL became a major factor in this case; ARL had
investigated a similar 41/2 bearing failure in 1978, in which the secondary
damage to the engine was far more limited, allowing positive identification of the
41/2 bearing as the initiating failure, and it was only when this additional
information was tabled that the manufacturer acknowledged a history of bearing
problems, and the Australian findings were supported.

The lessons learned from this case are clear; an unwillingness on the
manufacturer's part to acknowledge a problem until forced to do so, the enormous
value of corporate and individual failure analysis experience, and, again, close
cooperation between the failure analyst and the client and operator.

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WING LOADING
In aerodynamics, wing loading is the total weight of an aircraft divided by
the area of its wing. The stalling speed of an aircraft in straight, level flight is
partly determined by its wing loading. An aircraft with a low wing loading has a
larger wing area relative to its mass, as compared to an aircraft with a high wing
loading.

The faster an aircraft flies, the more lift can be produced by each unit of wing
area, so a smaller wing can carry the same mass in level flight. Consequently,
faster aircraft generally have higher wing loadings than slower aircraft. This
increased wing loading also increases takeoff and landing distances. A higher
wing loading also decreases maneuverability. The same constraints apply to
winged biological organisms.

WING CONSTRUCTION

Naval aircraft are built to meet certain specified requirements. These

requirements must be selected so they can be built into one aircraft. It is not
possible for one aircraft to possess all characteristics; just as it isn't possible for
an aircraft to have the comfort of a passenger transport and the maneuverability
of a fighter. The type and class of the aircraft determine how strong it must be
built. A Navy fighter must be fast, maneuverable, and equipped for attack and
defense. To meet these requirements, the aircraft is highly powered and has a very
strong structure.
Intended to be the “best of both worlds in terms of greater structural strength
due to inclusion of steel, and lower cost, ease of manufacture, and ease of
maintenance due to fabric covering.
Ended up being worst of both worlds mix of steel and wood not as strong as
steel alone fabric unable to withstand higher speeds permitted by strong
structure

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Static Load Testing
Static Load Tests can be performed to validate foundation design
assumptions regarding the axial compression or axial tension resistance provided
by a deep foundation element, or its deflected shape under a lateral load.
GRL performs both highly instrumented static load tests to meet the need of
project design tests as well as basic load tests, for construction quality assurance.
Depending on the project requirements, loading condition, and deep foundation
type, GRL can attach or embed vibrating wire strain gages, resistance strain
gages, vibrating wire piezometers, pressure cells, in-place inclinometer strings or
Shape Accel Arrays. The readings from these devices are collected and stored on
a multi-channel data logger.

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A major conceptual breakthrough: most of the structural load is carried by the
external structure

Semi-Monocoque construction the thin skin can easily handle tension to handle
compression without buckling, the skin is attached to the spars and stringers

Stressing the skin results in an even higher load carrying capability

total result is a structure very stiff in bending

requires mechanical fasteners (rivets).

permits higher speeds / lower drag.

Discovered in 1925 by Dr. H. Wagner, termed the ‘Wagner Theory of the

Diagonal-Tension Field Beam,’

Wing construction is basically the same in all types of aircraft. Most modern
aircraft have all metal wings, but many older aircraft had wood and fabric wings.
Ailerons and flaps will be studied later in this chapter.

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To maintain its all-important aerodynamic shape, a wing must be designed and
built to hold its shape even under extreme stress. Basically, the wing is a
framework composed chiefly of spars, ribs, and (possibly) stringers (see figure 1-
5). Spars are the main members of the wing. They extend lengthwise of the wing
(crosswise of the fuselage). All the load carried by the wing is ultimately taken
by the spars. In flight, the force of the air acts against the skin. From the skin, this
force is transmitted to the ribs and then to the spars.

Most wing structures have two spars, the front spar and the rear spar. The front
spar is found near the leading edge while the rear spar is about two-thirds the
distance to the trailing edge. Depending on the design of the flight loads, some of
the all-metal wings have as many as five spars. In addition to the main spars, there
is a short structural member which is called an aileron spar.

The ribs are the parts of a wing which support the covering and provide the airfoil
shape. These ribs are called forming ribs. and their primary purpose is to provide
shape. Some may have an additional purpose of bearing flight stress, and these
are called compression ribs.

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W I N G WEIGHT
Normalized to P-51 baseline span

Modern jet wings are much lighter than 1940’s prop wings

P-51 14.5% WTO

F-15A 3% WTO

If modern wings had to be built using 1940’s technology, they would virtually be
solid alloys or steel.

Structural efficiency has improved greatly with time

High transonic and supersonic flight speeds mandated wings with

 very low thickness ratios

 large bending strength
 sweepback torsion
 thicker skins
 and therefore, more structural material
Solid wings were one answer
The quest to save weight while still retaining good mechanical properties.
Concept: reduce structural mass by reducing material density, instead of
increasing mechanical properties strength, stiffness, toughness.
Several empirical and semi‐empirical formulae exist for predicting wing
weights, and it is the purpose of this note to summarize the results of a study
of accuracy associated with some of these methods, with a view to establishing
their comparative reliability. The modus operandi for effecting this has been
to collect together the weights of wing structures which have actually been

22
weighed, thus giving values of true wing weight, and to use each formula or
method to ‘predict’ the weights of the same wings, and then to compare the
estimated results with the true wing weights. Deviations between the true and
estimated values have been tabulated and subjected to statistical analysis and
the comparative measures of accuracy derived from that analysis.

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Conclusion
This case study has presented several examples which serve to highlight the
changes which have occurred in the aerospace failure analysis field in recent
years. These changes have generated

(a) the need for a problem-solving approach based on teamwork with the
operator, the client and with other specialists

(b) the need for individuals to have as wide an experience as possible

(c) the need for the analysis organisation to acquire and maintain the broadest
possible corporate experience.

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References:

 http://home.iitk.ac.in/~mohite/Basic_construction.pdf
 https://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K-
12/DLN/descriptions/presentations/Spacecraft%20Accidents%20Videocon/WhySpacecraftFa
ilwordsandimages4.01.ppt
 http://www.dviaviation.com/accident-case-studies.html\
 https://www.aopa.org/training-and-safety/online-learning/accident-case-studies

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