LABOR LAW 1 ART. 12 – 42 et al.

LABOR CODE ART. 12 - 42 ......................................................................................................................................1

PEOPLE V. PANIS (G.R. NOS. L-58674-77, JULY 11, 1986) .......................................................................................2
PEOPLE V. LAPIS (G.R. NOS. 145734-35, OCTOBER 15, 2002)...................................................................................2
PEOPLE V. CHUA (G.R. NO. 184058, MARCH 10, 2010).............................................................................................3
MILLARES V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (G.R. NO. 110524, MARCH 14, 2000; JULY 29, 2002) ...4
GU-MIRO V. ADORABLE (G.R. NO. 160952. AUGUST 20, 2004)................................................................................6
RAVAGO V. ESSO EASTERN MARITIME (G.R. NO. 158324. MARCH 14, 2005) .........................................................7
PEOPLE V. MERIS (G.R. NOS. 117145-50 & 117447, MARCH 28, 2000) ....................................................................8
DARVIN V COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 125044, JULY 13, 1998) ...........................................................................9
ACCESS V. NLRC (G.R. NO. 131656, OCTOBER 12, 1998) ................................................................................... 10
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA (G.R. NO. 77828 FEBRUARY 8, 1989) ............................................................. 10
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. V. SURIO (G.R. NO. 154213 AUGUST 23, 2012) ................................ 11
DE JESUS V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (G.R. NO. 151158, AUGUST 17, 2007) .......................... 12
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY V. CABILES (G.R. NO. 170139, AUGUST 05, 2014) ............................... 13
SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. (G.R. NO. 167614, MARCH 24, 2009) ..................................... 17
CHAVEZ VS. BONTO-PEREZ (G.R. NO. 109808, MARCH 01, 1995) .......................................................................... 20
DAGASDAS V. GRAND PLACEMENT (G.R. NO. 205727, JANUARY 18, 2017) ........................................................... 22
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS V. NLRC (G.R. NO. 116629, JANUARY 16, 1998) ................................. 23

Labor Code Art. 12 - 42

LABOR LAW 1
People v. Panis (G.R. Nos. L-58674-77, July 11, 1986)
1. Labor; Recruitment and
placement; Interpretation; Article 13(b) of P.D. 442,
interpreted; Presumption that the individual or entity is
engaged in recruitment and placement whenever two or
more persons are involved; Number of persons, not an
essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and
placement of workers.- As we see it, the proviso was
intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor
to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or
entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he
or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is
made in the course of the “canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers.” The number of persons dealt with is not an
essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement
of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in
Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even
if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso
merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is
collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be
engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words
“shall be deemed” create that presumption.
2. Labor; Recruitment and
placement; Interpretation; Article 13(b) of P.D. 442,
interpreted; Words “shall be deemed” in Art. 13(b) of
P.D. 442, meaning of.- In the instant case, the word “shall
be deemed” should by the same token be given the force of
a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of
engaging in recruitment and placement. (Klepp v. Odin Tp.,
McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
FACTS: On January 9, 1981, four information were filed
in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and
Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent
Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the
Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-
charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging
employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from)
and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four
separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash
contending that he cannot be charged for illegal
recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only
"whenever two or more persons are in any manner
promised or offered any employment for a fee.” Denied at
first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by
the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and
September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the
private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and
placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should
involve dealings with two or more persons as an
indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the
petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more
persons is imposed only where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment
to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code
provides for the innocence or guilt of the private
respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s Orders and
reinstated all four information filed against private
respondent. The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose
a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception
thereto. Where a fee is collected in consideration of a
promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective
workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be
deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said
presumption.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24,
1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the four
informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.
People v. Lapis (G.R. Nos. 145734-35, October 15,
2002)
1. Criminal Law; Labor Law; Illegal
Recruitment; Elements.—Illegal recruitment is
committed when these two elements concur: (1) the
offenders have no valid license or authority required by
law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the
offenders undertake any activity within the meaning
of recruitment and placementdefined in Article 13(b) or
any prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the
Labor Code.
2. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In the
simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by
persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the
power to send workers abroad for employment
purposes.—Under Article 13(b), recruitment and
placement refers to “any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers[;] and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not.” In the simplest terms,
illegal recruitment is committed by persons who,
without authority from the government, give the
impression that they have the power to send workers
abroad for employment purposes.
3. Same; Same; Same; Illegal recruiters need not even
expressly represent themselves to the victims as
persons who have the ability to send workers
abroad—it is enough that they give the impression
that they have the ability to enlist workers for job
placement abroad in order to induce the latter to
tender payment of fees.—Where appellants made
misrepresentations concerning their purported power
and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and
in the process, collected from complainants various
amounts in the guise of placement fees, the former
clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment. In fact, this Court held that illegal
recruiters need not even expressly represent themselves
to the victims as persons who have the ability to send
workers abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give
the impression that they have the ability to enlist
workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the
latter to tender payment of fees.
4. Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042);
Under RA 8042, illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage
when it is committed by a syndicate or carried out
by a group of three or more persons conspiring and
confederating with one another.—Section 6 of RA
8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, provides that illegal
recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage when it is committed by a syndicate
or carried out by a group of three or more persons
conspiring and confederating with one another. In
LABOR LAW 1
several cases, illegal recruitment has been deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating
with each other in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under Article
38(b) of the Labor Code.
5. Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual
proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in
every act—it is sufficient that they acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective.—In People v.
Gamboa, the Court had occasion to discuss the nature
of conspiracy in the context of illegal recruitment as
follows: “Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas
Contract workers was evident from the acts of the
malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the
commission of the crime clearly indicated that they
were one in purpose and united in execution. Direct
proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interest. All the accused, including accused-
appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of illegal
recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all.” (Emphasis supplied) To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof
that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act.
It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective. Conspiracy is present when one
concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated
by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime
committed.
6. Same; Same; Same; Interests; Victims of illegal
recruitment are entitled to legal interest on the
amount to be recovered as indemnity, from the time
of the filing of the information until fully paid.—The
OSG avers, as an incident to this issue, and in line
with People y. Yabut, that complainants are entitled to
recover interest on the amount of P118,000, which the
trial court awarded from the time of the filing of the
Information until fully paid. We agree with the OSG’s
observation and hereby grant the legal interest on the
amount prayed for. In a number of cases, this Courthas
affirmed the trial court’s finding that victims of illegal
recruitment are entitled to legal interest on the amount
to be recovered as indemnity, from the time of the filing
of the information until fully paid.
7. Same; Estafa; Words and Phrases; Estafa under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, is
committed by any person who defrauds another by
using a fictitious name, or by falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business, or by imaginary
transactions or similar forms of deceit executed
prior to or simultaneous with the fraud.—Under the
cited provision of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is
committed by any person who defrauds another by
using a fictitious name; or by falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business; by imaginary transactions or
similar forms of deceit executed prior to or
simultaneous with the fraud. Moreover, these false
pretenses should have been the very reason that
motivated complainants to deliver property or pay
money to the perpetrators of the fraud. While appellants
insist that these constitutive elements of the crime were
not sufficiently shown by the prosecution, the records
of the case prove otherwise.
8. Same; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Under Sec. 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence shall be the
penalty properly imposed, considering the attending
circumstances, while the minimum term shall be
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.—Although
we agree with the ruling of the RTC convicting
appellants of estafa, we note that it failed to apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalty.
Under Section 1 of that law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty properly
imposed, considering the attending circumstances;
while the minimum term shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code.
Hence, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
trial court should have fixed the minimum and the
maximum penalties.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, appellants are ordered
to pay legal interest on the amount of P118,000 from
the time of the filing of the Information until fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, appellants are
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
People v. Chua (G.R. No. 184058, March 10, 2010)
1. Criminal Law; Labor Law; Estafa; Illegal
Recruitment; Recruitment and Placement Defined.-
—The term “recruitment and placement” is defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines
as follows: (b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Intent is
immaterial in illegal recruitment in large scale.-—
Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the
illegal nature of the recruitment business of Golden
Gate, that does not free her of liability either. Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic
Act No. 8042, or “The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995,” is a special law, a violation of
which is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is
thus immaterial.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essential
Elements for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale to
Prosper.-—Thus for illegal recruitment in large scale
to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential
elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) the accused did not have the license or the authority
to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal
activity against three or more persons individually or as
a group.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale; Any recruitment activities to be
undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of
contracts, or as in the present case, an agency with
an expired license, shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines; Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three
or more persons individually or as a group.-—From
the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment
activities to be undertaken by non-licensee ornon-
holder of contracts, or as in the present case, an agency
with an expired license, shall be deemed illegal and
LABOR LAW 1
punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. And illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three or
more persons individually or as a group.
FACTS: Private complainants Alberto A. Aglanao, Rey P.
Tajadao, Billy R. Danan and Roylan Ursulum filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal in large scale against
Melissa Chua alleging that the latter offered them a job as
factory workers in Taiwan for deployment within a month.
She required each of them on separate occasions to
undergo medical examination and pay a placement fee
of P 80,000 each. Chua assured each of them that whoever
pays the application fee the earliest can leave sooner. After
completing payment, they followed-up their applications.
However, they learned that Chua was not licensed to
recruit workers for overseas employment. Chua denied
having recruited private complainants for overseas
employment and interposed the defense that she was only
a cashier at Golden Gate Office and that she has no
knowledge of whether the agency was licensed to recruit
workers during her tenure as it has been delisted.The RTC
of Manila found Chua guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Is Melissa Chua liable for illegal recruitment in
large scale? LAW: Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act R.A.
No. 8042.
HELD: Yes. Melissa Chua is liable for illegal recruitment
in large scale.
In order to hold a person liable for illegal
recruitment, the following elements must concur:
(1) the offender undertakes any of the activities
within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code
(now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and
(2) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers.
In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a
third element is added: that the offender commits any of
the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.
All three elements are present in the case at bar.
Chua engaged in recruitment when she represented to
private complainants that she could send them to Taiwan
as factory workers upon submission of the required
documents and payment of the placement fee. The four
private complainants positively identified appellant as the
person who promised them employment as factory workers
in Taiwan. Chua cannot escape liability by conveniently
limiting her participation as a cashier of Golden Gate. The
provisions of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section
6 of R.A. No. 8042 are unequivocal that illegal recruitment
may or may not be for profit. It is immaterial, therefore,
whether Chua remitted the placement fees to "the agency’s
treasurer" or appropriated them. The same provision
likewise provides that the persons criminally liable for
illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. Just the same, therefore, appellant can be held
liable as a principal by direct participation since she
personally undertook the recruitment of private
complainants without a license or authority to do so.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby
DENIED.
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission
(G.R. No. 110524, March 14, 2000; July 29, 2002)
1. Labor Law; Classification of Employment; Primary
Standard to Determine a Regular Employment.- The
primary standard to determine a regular employment is
the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the
usual business or trade of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer.
2. Labor Law; Classification of Employment; The
connection can be determined by considering the
nature of the work performed and its relation to the
scheme of the particular business or trade in its
entirety.-The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its
relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade
in its entirety. Also, if the employee has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous or merely intermittent,
the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if
not indispensability of that activity to the business.
Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but
only with respect to such activity and while such
activity exists.
3. Labor Law; Classification of Employment;
Petitioners are considered regular employees.-As
petitioners had rendered 20 years of service, performing
activities which were necessary and desirable in the
business or trade of private respondents, they are, by
express provision of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
considered regular employees.
4. Labor Law; Classification of Employment; Being
regular employees, petitioners may not be dismissed
except for a valid or just cause under Article 282 of
the Labor Code.-Being regular employees, petitioners
may not be dismissed except for a valid or just cause
under Article 282 of the Labor Code. In the instant case,
clearly, there was no valid cause for the termination of
petitioners. It will be recalled, that petitioner Millares
was dismissed for allegedly having “abandoned” his
post; and petitioner Lagda, for his alleged
“unavailability for contractual sea service.” However,
that petitioners did not abandon their jobs such as to
justify the unlawful termination of their employment is
borne out by the records.
5. Labor Law; Dismissals; Abandonment; Two
Elements to Constitute Abandonment; It is the
employer who has the burden of proof to show a
deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment without any intention of
returning.-To constitute abandonment, two elements
must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some
overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. It is the
employer who has the burden of proof to show a
deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment without any intention of
returning.
6. Labor Law; Dismissals; Abandonment; Two
Elements to Constitute Abandonment; The filing by
an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal is
proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus
negating the employer’s charge of abandonment.-In
this case, private respondents failed to discharge this
burden. They did not adduce any proof of some overt
act of the petitioners that clearly and unequivocally
show their intention to abandon their posts. On the
contrary, the petitioners lost no time in filing the case
LABOR LAW 1
for illegal dismissal against private respondents, taking
them only about a month from the time their
termination became effective on September 1, 1989 to
the filing of their complaint on October 5, 1989. They
cannot, by any reasoning, be said to have abandoned
their work, for as we have also previously ruled, the
filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal
dismissal is proof enough of his desire to return to work,
thus negating the employer’s charge of abandonment.
7. Labor Law; Classification of Employment;
Seafarers are considered contractual employees;
They can not be considered as regular employees
under Article 280 of the Labor Code.-From the
foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered
contractual employees. They can not be considered as
regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Their employment is governed by the contracts they
sign every time they are rehired and their employment
is terminated when the contract expires. Their
employment is contractually fixed for a certain period
of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season. We need not depart from
the rulings of the Court in the two aforementioned cases
which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to the
employment status of seafarers.
8. Labor Law; Classification of Employment;
Seafarers are considered contractual employees;
There are certain forms of employment which also
require the performance of usual and desirable
functions and which exceed one year but do not
necessarily attain regular employment status under
Article 280.-Petitioners insist that they should be
considered regular employees, since they have rendered
services which are usually necessary and desirable to
the business of their employer, and that they have
rendered more than twenty (20) years of service. While
this may be true, the Brent case has, however, held that
there are certain forms of employment which also
require the performance of usual and desirable
functions and which exceed one year but do not
necessarily attain regular employment status under
Article 280. Overseas workers including seafarers fall
under this type of employment which are governed by
the mutual agreements of the parties.
9. Labor Law; Classification of Employment;
Seafarers are considered contractual employees;
Filipino seamen are governed by the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA; Contract of seamen shall
be for a fixed period, not longer than 12 months.- In
this jurisdiction and as clearly stated in the Coyoca case,
Filipino seamen are governed by the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA. The Standard Employment
Contract governing the Employment of All Filipino
Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the POEA,
particularly in Part I, Sec. C specifically provides that
the contract of seamen shall be for a fixed period. And
in no case should the contract of seamen be longer than
12 months.
FACTS: Douglas Millares was employed by ESSO
International Shipping Company through its local manning
agency,Trans-Global Maritime Agency, as a machinist he
was promoted as Chief Engineer which position Millares
applied for a leave of absence for almost 1mon.the Trans-
Global, approved the request for leave of absence. Millares
wrote to the Operations Manager of Exxon International
Co.informing him of his intention to avail of the optional
retirement plan under the Consecutive Enlistment
Incentive Plan (CEIP) considering that he had already
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
rendered more than twenty (20) years of continuous
service. Esso International, denied the request for optional
retirement on the following grounds, to wit: (1) he was
employed on a contractual basis; (2) his contract of
enlistment (COE) did not provide for retirement before the
age of sixty (60) years; and (3) he did not comply with the
requirement for claiming benefits under the CEIP, i.e., to
submit a written advice to the company of his intention to
terminate his employment within thirty (30) days from his
last disembarkation date Millares requested for an
extension of his leave of absence for another 15 days. The
Crewing Manager, Ship Group A, Trans-Global, wrote
petitioner Millares advising him that respondent Esso
International "has corrected the deficiency in its manpower
requirements specifically in the Chief Engineer rank by
promoting a First Assistant Engineer to this position as a
result of (his) previous leave of absence which expired last
August 8, 1989. The adjustment in said rank was required
in order to meet manpower schedules as a result of (his)
inability.Esso International advised Millares that his
absence without leave, which is equivalent to
abandonment of his position,
On the other hand Lagda was employed by Esso
International as wiper/oiler He was promoted as Chief
Engineer in 1980, a position he continued to occupy until
his last COE expired on April 10, 1989.Lagda applied for
a leave of absence from June 19,1989 up to the whole
month of August 1989. Then the Trans-Global’s approved
petitioner Lagda’s leave of absence from June 22, 1989 to
July 20, 1989[7] and advised him to report for re-
assignment on July 21, 1989. Lagda wrote a letter to
Operations Manager of Esso International, through Trans-
Global’s President informing him of his intention to avail
of the optional early retirement plan in view of his twenty
(20) years continuous service in the company Trans-Global
denied petitioner Lagda’s request for availment of the
optional early retirement scheme on the same grounds
upon which petitioner Millares’ request was denied.he
requested for an extension of his leave of absence up to
August 26, 1989 and the same was approved. However
Esso International through Personnel Administrator,
advised petitioner Lagda that in view of his "unavailability
for contractual sea service," he had been dropped from the
roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989.
Millares and Lagda filed a complaint-affidavit, for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of employee benefits against
private respondents Esso International and Trans-Global,
before the POEA. POEA: dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit. NLRC dismissing petitioners’ appeal and
denying their motion for new trial for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE REGULAR
EMPLOYEES.
HELD: SC: Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. -
The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the
parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration
of the season.
LABOR LAW 1
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it
is not covered by the preceding paragraph. Provided, That,
any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exists. The primary standard
to determine a regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by
the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of
the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer
The connection can be determined by considering
the nature of the work performed and its relation to the
scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.
Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at
least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or
merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence
of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is also considered
regular, but only with respect to such activity and while
such activity exists.[
That it is undisputed that petitioners were
employees of private respondents until their services were
terminated on September 1, 1989. They served in their
capacity as Chief Engineers, performing activities which
were necessary and desirable in the business of private
respondents Esso International, a shipping company; and
Trans-Global, its local manning agency which supplies the
manpower and crew requirements of Esso International’s
vessels.It is, likewise, clear that petitioners had been in the
employ of private respondents for 20 years. The records
reveal that petitioners were repeatedly re-hired by private
respondents even after the expiration of their respective
eight-month contracts. Such repeated re-hiring which
continued for 20 years, cannot but be appreciated as
sufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability of
petitioners’ service to the private respondents’ business or
trade. Verily, as petitioners are by express provision of
Article 280 of the Labor Code, considered regular
employees.
That there was no valid cause for the termination of
petitioners. It will be recalled, that petitioner Millares was
dismissed for allegedly having "abandoned" his post; and
petitioner Lagda, for his alleged "unavailability for
contractual sea service." However, that petitioners did not
abandon their jobs such as to justify the unlawful
termination of their employment is borne out by the
records.To constitute abandonment, two elements must
concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship.Furthermore, the
absence of petitioners was justified by the fact that they
secured the approval of respondents to take a leave of
absence after the termination of their last contracts of
enlistment. Clearly, petitioners’ termination is illegal.
Dispositive Portion (2000): WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the assailed Decision, dated June 1, 1993, of the
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the private respondents to:
1. Reinstate petitioners Millares and Lagda to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights, and to
pay full backwages computed from the time of illegal
dismissal to the time of actual reinstatement;
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
2. Alternatively, if reinstatement is not possible, pay
petitioners Millares and Lagda separation pay
equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of
service; and,
3. Jointly and severally pay petitioners One Hundred
Percent (100%) of their total credited contributions as
provided under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive
Plan.
Dispositive Portion (2002): IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the Court Resolved to Partially GRANT Private Respondent’s
Second Motion for Reconsideration and Intervenor FAMES’
Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention. The Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated June 1, 1993 is
hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The Private
Respondents, Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and Esso
International Shipping Co., Ltd. are hereby jointly and severally
ORDERED to pay petitioners One Hundred Percent (100%) of
their total credited contributions as provided under the
Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP).
Gu-Miro v. Adorable (G.R. No. 160952. August 20,
2004)
1. Criminal Law; Labor Law; Estafa; Illegal
Recruitment; Recruitment and Placement
Defined.—The term “recruitment and placement” is
defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines as follows: (b) “Recruitment and
placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale; Any recruitment activities to be
undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of
contracts, or as in the present case, an agency with
an expired license, shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines; Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three
or more persons individually or as a group.—From
the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment
activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-
holder of contracts, or as in the present case, an agency
with an expired license, shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. And illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three or
more persons individually or as a group.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essential
Elements for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale to
Prosper.—Thus for illegal recruitment in large scale to
prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential
elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) the accused did not have the license or the authority
to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal
activity against three or more persons individually or as
a group.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Intent is
immaterial in illegal recruitment in large scale.—
Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the
illegal nature of the recruitment business of Golden
Gate, that does not free her of liability either. Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic
Act No. 8042, or “The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995,” is a special law, a violation of
LABOR LAW 1
which is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is
thus immaterial.
FACTS: Petitioner services as radio officer on board
respondent’s different vessels were terminated due to the
installation of labor saving devices which made his
services redundant. Petitioner argued that aside from the
incentive bonus and additional allowances that he is
entitled, he should be considered as a regular employee of
respondent company, having been employed onboard the
latter’s different vessels for the span of 10 years and thus,
entitled to back wages and separation pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not seafarers are considered regular
employees.
HELD: No. Petitioner cannot be considered as a regular
employee notwithstanding that the work he performs is
necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent
company. The exigencies of the work of seafarers
necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis.
Thus, even with the continued re-hiring by respondent
company of petitioner to serve as radio officer onboard the
former’s different vessels, this should be interpreted not as
a basis for regularization but rather a series of contract
renewals.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66131 dated May 29, 2003 is
MODIFIED in that the award of incentive bonus is increased
from US$1189.12 to US$1,486.40. Petitioners claim that he be
declared a regular employee and awarded backwages and
separation pay is DENIED for lack of merit.
Ravago v. ESSO Eastern Maritime (G.R. No. 158324.
March 14, 2005)
1. Labor Law; Injunctions; Article 254 of the Labor
Code proscribes the issuance of injunctive relief only
in those cases involving or growing out of a labor
dispute; Article 254 of the Labor Code specifically
provides that the NLRC may grant injunctive relief
under Article 218 thereof.-The petitioner’s reliance on
Article 254 of the Labor Code is misplaced. The law
proscribes the issuance of injunctive relief only in those
cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute. The
case before the NLRC neither involves nor grows out
of a labor dispute. It did not involve the fixing of terms
or conditions of employment or representation of
persons with respect thereto. In fact, the petitioner’s
complaint revolves around the issue of his alleged
dismissal from service and his claim for backwages,
damages and attorney’s fees. Moreover, Article 254 of
the Labor Code specifically provides that the NLRC
may grant injunctive relief under Article 218 thereof.
2. Labor Law; Injunctions; The application of an
injunctive writ rests upon the presence of an
exigency or of an exceptional reason before the main
case can be regularly heard; Indispensable
Conditions for Granting Temporary Injunctive
Relief.- Generally, an injunction is a preservative
remedy for the protection of a person’s substantive
rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but
a mere provisional remedy, an appendage to the main
suit. Pressing necessity requires that it should be
resorted to only to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any measure of
consideration. The application of an injunctive writ
rests upon the presence of an exigency or of an
exceptional reason before the main case can be
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
regularly heard. The indispensable conditions for
granting such temporary injunctive relief are: (a) that
the complaint alleges facts which appear to be
satisfactory to establish a proper basis for injunction,
and (b) that on the entire showing from the contending
parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect
the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation.
3. Labor Law; Nature of Employment; Seamen and
overseas contract workers are not covered by the
term “regular employment” as defined in Article
280 of the Labor Code.- In a catena of cases, this Court
has consistently ruled that seafarers are contractual, not
regular, employees. In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, the
Court ruled that seamen and overseas contract workers
are not covered by the term “regular employment” as
defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code.
4. Labor Law; Nature of Employment; A seafarer, not
being a regular employee, is not entitled to
separation or termination pay.-The Court made the
same ruling in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
Commission and declared that a seafarer, not being a
regular employee, is not entitled to separation or
termination pay.
FACTS: The respondent Esso is a foreign company based
in Singapore and engaged in maritime commerce. It is
represented in the Philippines by its manning agent and co-
respondent Trans-Global, a corporation organized under
the Philippine laws. Roberto Ravago was hired by Trans-
Global to work as a seaman on board various Esso vessels.
On February 13, 1970, Ravago commenced his duty as S/N
wiper on board the Esso Bataan under a contract that lasted
until February 10, 1971. Thereafter, he was assigned to
work in different Esso vessels where he was designated
diverse tasks, such as oiler, then assistant engineer. He was
employed under a total of 34 separate and unconnected
contracts, each for a fixed period, by three different
companies, namely, Esso Tankers, Inc. (ETI), EEM and
Esso International Shipping (Bahamas) Co., Ltd. (EIS),
Singapore Branch. Ravago worked with Esso vessels until
August 22, 1992, a period spanning more than 22 years.
Shortly after completing his latest contract with
Esso, Ravago was granted a vacation leave with pay.
Preparatory to his embarkation under a new contract, he
was ordered to report for a Medical Pre-Employment
Examination, which, according to the records, he passed.
He, likewise, attended a Pre-Departure Orientation
Seminar conducted by the Capt. I.P. Estaniel Training
Center, a division of Trans-Global.
One night, a stray bullet hit Ravago on the left leg
while he was waiting for a bus ride in Cubao, Quezon City.
He fractured his left proximal tibia and was hospitalized at
the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital. Ravago’s wife, Lolita,
informed the petitioners of the incident for purposes of
availing medical benefits. As a result of his injury,
Ravago’s doctor opined that he would not be able to cope
with the job of a seaman and suggested that he be given a
desk job. For this reason, the company physician found
him to have lost his dexterity, making him unfit to work
once again as a seaman. Consequently, instead of rehiring
Ravago, Esso paid him his Career Employment Incentive
Plan (CEIP) as of and his final tax refund. However,
Ravago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer
for reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney’s fees
against Trans-Global and Esso with the POEA
Adjudication Office.
Respondents denied that Ravago was dismissed
without notice and just cause. Rather, his services were no
longer engaged in view of the disability he suffered which
rendered him unfit to work as a seafarer. This fact was
LABOR LAW 1
further validated by the company doctor and Ravago’s
attending physician. They averred that Ravago was a
contractual employee and was hired under 34 separate
contracts by different companies.
Ravago insisted that he was fit to resume pre-
injury activities and that he was not a mere contractual
employee because the respondents regularly and
continuously rehired him for 23 years and, for his
continuous service, was awarded a CEIP payment upon his
termination from employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Ravago is a regular
employee of respondent Esso.
HELD: The SC held that seafarers are contractual, not
regular, employees. Seamen and overseas contract workers
are not covered by the term “regular employment” as
defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Dispositive Portion: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated August 28, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Dispositive Portion: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated August
28, 2002 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Meris (G.R. Nos. 117145-50 & 117447, March
28, 2000)
1. Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale;
Illegal recruitment is conducted in a large scale if
perpetrated against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.-Illegal recruitment is
conducted in a large scale if perpetrated against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group. This
crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the
recruitment and placement of workers defined under
Article 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a
license or authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3)
committed the infraction against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.
2. Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale;
Estafa; Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or
falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar
deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud.-We find that accused-
appellant committed the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. This is
committed by any person who defrauds another by
using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The
offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-
appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damages.
3. Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale;
Estafa; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of
the penalty shall be “that which, in view of the
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed” under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be “within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed” for the offense.-Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of
the penalty shall be “that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed” under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be “within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed”
for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based
on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to
the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence.
FACTS: Leonida Meris was convicted of six (6) counts of
estafa and one count of illegal recruitment for defrauding
the six (6) complainants, Meris’ townmates in Pampanga
and relatives in large scale in the amount of P30,000.00
each for five complainants and one complainant for
P20,000.00 for alleged overseas employment which did
not materialize.
Meris, who voluntarily appeared in court, pleaded
not guilty to the charges and actively participated in her
defense. She interposed the defense of denial claiming that
she merely introduced complainants to Julie Micua, her
recruiter in Manila, with whom complainants transacted
with for their employment abroad upon payment of
placement fees denied having represented herself as having
the capacity to deploy workers abroad.
Evidence for the prosecution, however, disclosed,
that complainants would not have known Julie Micua were
if not for appellant who even accompanied them to Manila
to see Julie Micua. It was appellant and her husband who
received almost all the payments of complainants and who
issued receipts signed by Julie Micua. Certification from
the POEA showed that Meris and Julie Micua were not
licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.
In this appeal, appellant assailed the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over his person because of the
warrantless arrest and its findings of fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not Meris committed the crimes large-
scale illegal recruitment and estafa.
HELD: Yes. The prosecution undoubtedly proved that
Meris, without license or authority, engaged in recruitment
and placement activities. This was done in collaboration
with Julie Micua, when they promised complainants’
employment in Hong Kong. Art. 13, par. (b) of the Labor
Code defines recruitment and placement as “any act of
canvassing enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not;
Provided that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.” Although Meris was not an employee of the
alleged illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence show
that she was the one who approached complainants and
prodded them to seek employment abroad. It was through
her that they met Julia Micua. This is clearly an act of
referral. Worse, accused-appellant declared that she was
LABOR LAW 1
capable of placing them in jobs overseas. Suffice it to say
that complainants’ recruitment would not have been
consummated were it not for the direct participation of
accused-appellant in the recruitment process.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision in question is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that in each of
the six (6) estafa cases, the indeterminate sentence that appellant
Leonida Meris y Padilla must serve is two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum. Costs against appellant.
Darvin v Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 125044, July 13,
1998)
1. Criminal Law; Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment;
Elements.—Applied to the present case, to uphold the
conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to
be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must
have undertaken recruitment activities; and (2) the said
person does not have a license or authority to do so.
2. Same; Same; Same; To prove that the accused was
engaged in recruitment activities as to commit the
crime of illegal recruitment, it must be shown that
the accused gave the victim the impression that she
had the power or ability to send the latter abroad for
work such that the latter was convinced to part with
her money in order to be so employed.—It is not
disputed that accused-appellant does not have a license
or authority to engage in recruitment activities. The
pivotal issue to be determined, therefore, is whether the
accused-appellant indeed engaged in recruitment
activities, as defined under the Labor Code. Applying
the rule laid down in the case of People v. Goce, to
prove that accused-appellant was engaged in
recruitment activities as to commit the crime of illegal
recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-
appellant gave private respondent the distinct
impression that she had the power or ability to send the
private respondent abroad for work such that the latter
was convinced to part with her money in order to be so
employed.
3. Same; Same; Same; The claim of the accused that
the P150,000.00 was for payment of the
complainant’s air fare and US visa and other
expenses cannot be ignored where the receipt for the
P150,000.00, which was presented by both parties
during the trial of the case, stated that it was “f or
Air Fare and Visa to USA.”—In this case, we find no
sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant
offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that
accused gave the impression that she was capable of
providing the private respondent work abroad. What is
established, however, is that the private respondent
gave accused-appellant P150,000.00. The claim of the
accused that the P150,000.00 was for payment of
private respondent’s air fare and US visa and other
expenses cannot be ignored because the receipt for the
P150,000.00, which was presented by both parties
during the trial of the case, stated that it was “for Air
Fare and Visa to USA.” Had the amount been for
something else in addition to air fare and visa expenses,
such as work placement abroad, the receipt should have
so stated.
4. Same; Same; Same; By themselves, procuring a
passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another
individual, without more, can hardly qualify as
recruitment activities.—By themselves, procuring a
passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another
individual, without more, can hardly qualify as
recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of
private respondent, there is nothing to show that
accused-appellant engaged in recruitment activities.
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
We also note that the prosecution did not present the
testimonies of witnesses who could have corroborated
the charge of illegal recruitment, such as Florencio
Rivera, and Leonila Rivera, when it had the opportunity
to do so. As it stands, the claim of private respondent
that accused-appellant promised her employment
abroad is uncorroborated. All these, taken collectively,
cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
5. Same; Presumption of Innocence; Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty—moral certainty only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind, but suspicion alone is
insufficient.—In criminal cases, the burden is on the
prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the
essential elements of the offense with which the
accused is charged; and if the proof fails to establish
any of the essential elements necessary to constitute a
crime, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. At best, the evidence proffered by
the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion
that accused-appellant probably perpetrated the crime
charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the
required quantum of evidence being proof beyond
reasonable doubt. When the People’s evidence fail to
indubitably prove the accused’s authorship of the crime
of which he stands accused, then it is the Court’s duty,
and the accused’s right, to proclaim his innocence.
Acquittal, therefore, is in order.
FACTS: Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed
from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was
convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to
recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary
papers in connection thereof. In view of this promise,
Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US
Visa and air fare. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.
Held: Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of
recruitment and placement as:
...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor Code,
to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Applied to the present case, to uphold the
conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be
shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person
does not have a license or authority to do so.
LABOR LAW 1
In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence
to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private
respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression
that she was capable of providing the private respondent
work abroad. What is established, however, is that the
private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline
tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without
more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside
from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing
to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution
only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant
probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion
alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence
being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the People’s
evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused’s authorship
of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the
Court’s duty, and the accused’s right, to proclaim his
innocence.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby
granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of
reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately released
from her confinement.
ACCESS v. NLRC (G.R. No. 131656, October 12, 1998)
1. Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; As a rule,
jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the
commencement of the action; RA 8042 which took effect
in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.—As a rule,
jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the
commencement of the action. In the case at bar, private
respondent’s cause of action did not accrue on the date of
his employment or on February 28, 1995. His cause of
action arose only from the time he was illegally dismissed
by petitioner from service in June 1996, after his vacation
leave expired. It is thus clear that R.A. 8042 which took
effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.
2. Same; Judgment; Where there is a conflict between the
dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the
decision, the fallo controls; Where the inevitable
conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to
show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion,
the body of the decision will prevail.—The general rule is
that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion
or the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls.
This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order
while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering
nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the
body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a
mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision
will prevail.
3. Civil Law; Attorney’s Fees; Private respondent was
compelled to file an action for illegal dismissal with the
labor arbiter and hence entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees.—In the case at bar, petitioner’s bad faith
in dismissing private respondent is manifest. Respondent
was made to believe that he would be temporarily leaving
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation
leave with pay. However, while on board the plane back to
the Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been
dismissed from his job as he was given only a one-way
plane ticket by petitioner. True enough, private respondent
was not allowed to return to his jobsite in Jeddah after his
vacation leave. Thus, private respondent was compelled to
file an action for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter and
hence entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
FACTS: Petitioner (Asian Center for Career and
Employment System and Services or ACCES) hired
respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a mason in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with a monthly salary of 1,200 Saudi
Riyals (SR). The term of his contract was two (2) years,
from February 28, 1995 until February 28, 1997. On May
26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation
leave with pay and was granted. While en route to the
Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been
dismissed. respondent filed a complaint with the labor
arbiter for illegal dismissal. And found guilty and to pay
the unexpired portion of the respondent ‘s contract which
is 1,200 multiplied by 8 months representing the unexpired
portion. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC but the latter
affirmed the decision of labor arbiter but modified the
appealed decision by deleting the order of refund of
excessive placement fee for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor
arbiter’s award by invoking Section 10 RA 8042 that a
worker dismissed from overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less that is why it should be three years should be used
for the unexpired portion. NLRC denied the motion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the monetary awards granted by
the NLRC to private respondent is correct?
HELD: The SC affirmed the decisions of NLRC with
modifications regarding the basis of amount that the
petitioner will pay to the respondent for the unexpired
portion of employment contract. In the case at bar,
petitioner’s illegal dismissal from service is no longer
disputed. Petitioner merely impugns the monetary awards
granted by the NLRC to private respondent. The effectivity
of Section 10 RA 8042 took effect a year earlier from his
vacation leave. Hence, it applies to the case. The
respondent should be paid by petitioner the 3 months
unexpired portion of the contract.
Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
decision of the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is AFFIRMED with
modifications: petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent
IBNO MEDIALES the peso equivalent of the amounts of SR3,600
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, and SR360
for attorney’s fees. No costs.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA (G.R. No. 77828
February 8, 1989)
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies; Certiorari; Since the instant
petition involves essentially questions of legal nature, it
cannot be considered to have been prematurely filed
with the Supreme Court despite failure of petitioner to
appeal to the N.L.R.C.- A preliminary point was raised by
the Solicitor General in his Comment on the Petition, that
Eastern had failed to exhaust administrative remedies in this
case—i.e., that petitioner Company did not interpose an
appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission
before coming to this Court on certiorari. Inasmuch,
however, as the petition at bar raises questions essentially
legal in nature, we do not consider the same as having been
prematurely filed with this Court.
2. Remedial Law; Labor Law; POEA, Jurisdiction Of;
The statute creating the POEA and the regulations
LABOR LAW 1
governing Filipino workers for overseas employment do
not limit their coverage to non-Filipino employers.- We
address first the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner Company
does not deny that Manuel Zaragoza was its employee at the
time of his death on 18 September 1983. Petitioner would
contend, however, that the company had neither been nor
acted as an “overseas employer” of Manuel Zaragoza, and
that the latter had never been its “overseas employee.”
Hence, petitioner concludes, private respondent’s claim for
death benefits should have been filed with the Social
Security System, not with the POEA. The argument does not
persuade. Applicable here—and petitioner admits this in its
Petition—is Executive Order No. 797 (promulgated 1 May
1982), which abolished the former National Seamen Board
and created in its place the present Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. Section 4 (a) of Executive
Order No. 797 expressly provides that the POEA “shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment, including
seamen.” This provision is clarified substantially in the
Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by
the POEA, Section 1 (d), Rule I, Book VI of which provides
that “claims for death, disability and other benefits arising
out of [overseas] employment” fall within the POEA’s
original and exclusive jurisdiction. x x x We note that the
statute and the relevant regulations refer to employment of
Filipino workers overseas. i.e., outside the Philippines. The
statute and regulations do not limit their coverage to non-
Filipino employers. Filipinos working overseas share the
same risks and burdens whether their employers be Filipino
or foreign.
FACTS: A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident
in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against
the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which
stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of
overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.
RULING: No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of
powers. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly
provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ...
"The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may
be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This
is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by
their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari
is DISMISSED and the Decision of the POEA in POEA Case No.
L-86-01-026 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining
Order of 8 April 1987 is hereby LIFTED.
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. v. Surio (G.R.
No. 154213 August 23, 2012)
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Prospectivity of Laws;
As a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless
the contrary is expressly provided or unless the law is
procedural or curative in nature―Petitioners’ position
that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied
retroactively to the review of the POEA’s decision
dismissing their complaint against respondents has no
support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are
prospective in application unless the contrary is expressly
provided, or unless the law is procedural or curative in
nature, there is no serious question about the retroactive
applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the appeal of the
POEA’s decision on petitioners’ disciplinary action against
respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a
procedural law due to its providing or omitting guidelines
on appeal.
2. Same; Same; Appeals; A statute that eliminates the right
to appeal and considers the judgment rendered final and
unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not
the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected
prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal
has already vested and cannot be impaired.―Republic
Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners’ complaint by virtue of
the case being then still pending or undetermined at the time
of the law’s passage, there being no vested rights in rules of
procedure. They could not validly insist that the reckoning
period to ascertain which law or rule should apply was the
time when the disciplinary complaint was originally filed in
the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and
its implementing rules and regulations were already in effect
when petitioners took their appeal. A statute that eliminates
the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered final
and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not
the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior
LABOR LAW 1
to its passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal has
already vested and cannot be impaired.
3. Same; Same; Same; When Republic Act No. 8042
withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in respect of cases
decided by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), the appellate jurisdiction was
vested in the Secretary of Labor in accordance with his
power of supervision and control.―When Republic Act
No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in
respect of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate
jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in
accordance with his power of supervision and control under
Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, to wit: Section 38. Definition
of Administrative Relationship.―Unless otherwise
expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the
special relationships of particular agencies, administrative
relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:
Supervision and Control.―Supervision and control
shallinclude authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions
of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs. Unless a different
meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing
the relationship of particular agencies, the word “control”
shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this
paragraph. xxx.
Facts: MT Seadance is a vessel owned by Eastern
Mediterranean Maritime Ltd and manned and operated by
Agemar Manning Agency. The same was not in a good
working condition and the payment of wages, remittance
of allotments, as well as the payment for extra work and
extra overtime work were delayed. As MT Seadance
docked at a port in Sweden, representatives of International
Transport Federation boarded the same. They have found
out that wages of its crew members were below the
prevailing rates. As a result, they have moved to increase
the wages of the said crewmembers. On Dec 23, 1993, the
petitioners filed a complaint against the crew members and
claimed reimbursement for the increase of wages received.
Issue: Whether or not it is under the jurisdiction of NLRC
to review cases on appeal decided by POEA.
Held: No, the NLRC has no jurisdiction to review an
appeal case decided by POEA. According to Section 28 (b)
of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the
POEA shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide disciplinary action cases and other special
cases, which are administrative in character, involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino
migrant workers. Since RA No 8042 has been passed into
a law after the filing of charges by the petitioner to the
respondents, the rule on retroactivity of the laws shall be
observed. As a rule, all laws are prospective in application
unless the contrary is expressly provided, or unless the law
is procedural or curative in nature. Thus, such law stating
that the POEA has the jurisdiction to decide on disciplinary
cases shall be observed in the case at bar.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision
promulgated on December 21, 2001 by the Court of Appeals;
and ORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
De Jesus v. National Labor Relations
Commission (G.R. No. 151158, August 17, 2007)
1. Labor Law; Appeals; Judicial review by this Court does
not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based
its determination—firm is the doctrine that this Court is
not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in
labor cases.-It is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised before
this Court. Judicial review by this Court does not extend to
a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.
Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and
this applies with greater force in labor cases. However,
factual issues may be considered and resolved when the
findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter
are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, as in this case.
2. Labor Law; Disease; The rule is that an ailment
contracted by a worker even prior to his employment,
does not detract from the compensability of the disease.-
The evidence shows that De Jesus previously suffered from
ulcer but he ticked “NO” in his medical history. De Jesus,
therefore, committed misrepresentation. Nonetheless, he
passed the pre-employment medical examination, was
reported fit to work, and was suffered to work on board M/V
Author for more than two (2) months, until his repatriation
on June 19, 1997. The rule is that an ailment contracted even
prior to his employment, does not detract from the
compensability of the disease. It is not required that the
employment be the sole factor in the growth, development
or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the
benefits incident thereto. It is enough that the employment
had contributed, even in a small measure, to the
development of the disease.
3. Labor Law; Disease; A worker’s misrepresentation
cannot be made the basis by his employer for the denial
of his claims under the contract where he passed the
required pre-medical examination and was declared fit
to work.- In OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,
449 SCRA 525 (2005), this Court, in granting similar
claims, held: Labor contracts are impressed with public
interest and the provisions of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract must be construed fairly, reasonably
and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of
their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Despite his
misrepresentation, Arbit underwent and passed the required
pre-medical examination, was declared fit to work, and was
suffered to work by petitioner. Upon repatriation, he
complied with the required post-employment medical
examination. Under the beneficent provisions of the
Contract, it is enough that the work has contributed, even in
a small degree, to the development of the disease and in
bringing about his death. Strict proof of causation is not
required. De Jesus’ misrepresentation cannot, therefore, be
made basis by POMI for the denial of his claims under the
contract.
4. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; Burden of Proof; Settled
is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for
a just and valid cause.- Settled is the rule that in
termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid
cause. The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own
merits and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense.
In this case, no convincing proof was offered to prove
POMI’s allegation. All that we have is its self-serving
assertion that De Jesus violated his employment contract.
There is no proof that the prescribed disciplinary procedure
was followed. We, therefore, agree with the Labor Arbiter’s
finding that POMI utterly failed to establish its claim of
valid dismissal. Accordingly, the NLRC and Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the said finding.
LABOR LAW 1
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 58241, and its Resolution dated December 21, 2001,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August
28, 1998 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. SO
ORDERED.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Cabiles (G.R.
No. 170139, August 05, 2014)
1. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Employers
cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee
who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of
the employer.—Indeed, employers have the prerogative to
impose productivity and quality standards at work. They
may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the
employees comply with these standards. Failure to comply
may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly, employers
cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee
who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the
employer. While the law acknowledges the plight and
vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the
oppression or self-destruction of the employer.”
Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our
jurisprudence. This prerogative, however, should not be
abused. It is “tempered with the employee’s right to security
of tenure.” Workers are entitled to substantive and
procedural due process before termination. They may not be
removed from employment without a valid or just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper
procedure.
2. Same; Same; Inefficiency; To show that dismissal
resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be
shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct
and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship
must have been communicated to the employee; and 3)
the communication was made at a reasonable time prior
to the employee’s performance assessment.—The burden
of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the
employer. “The employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause.” Failure to show that there was valid or
just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal. To show that dismissal resulting from
inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship
against which the employee willbe judged; 2) the standards
of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated
to the employee; and 3) the communication was made at a
reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance
assessment.
3. Same; Probationary Employees; Due Process; Due
process requires that the probationary employee be
informed of such standards at the time of his or her
engagement so he or she can adjust his or her character
or workmanship accordingly.—The predetermined
standards that the employer sets are the bases for
determining the probationary employee’s fitness, propriety,
efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due
process requires that the probationary employee be
informed of such standards at the time of his or her
engagement so he or she can adjust his or her character or
workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the
standards upon which the employee’s qualifications will be
evaluated will increase one’s chances of being positively
assessed for regularization by his or her employer.
4. Same; Termination of Employment; Two-Notice Rule;
The employer is required to give the charged employee
at least two written notices before termination; Aside
from the notice requirement, the employee must also be
given “an opportunity to be heard.”—A valid dismissal
requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
procedure of dismissal. The employer is required to give the
charged employee at least two written notices before
termination. One of the written notices must inform the
employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her
dismissal. The other notice must “[inform] the employee of
the employer’s decision.” Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must also be given “an
opportunity to be heard.” Petitioner failed to comply with
the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent
started working on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was
terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and
barely a month from her first workday. She was also
repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her
termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any
finding that she was properly notified and given the
opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due
process of law was violated.
5. Same; Same; Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 8042); Section 10 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states that
overseas workers who were terminated without just,
valid, or authorized cause “shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.”—Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been
illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired
portion of the employment contract that was violated
together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts
withheld from her salary. Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states that overseas workers
who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause
“shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement
fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.”
6. Same; Same; Same; Repatriation; Section 15 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 states that “repatriation of
the worker and the transport of his [or her] personal
belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the
agency which recruited or deployed the worker
overseas.”—Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states
that “repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or
her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility
of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker
overseas.” The exception is when “termination of
employment is due solely to the fault of the worker,” which
as we have established, is not the case. It reads: SEC. 15.
REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY
REPATRIATION FUND.—The repatriation of the worker
and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the
primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or
deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to
repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency
concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of
remains and transport of the personal belongings of a
deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be
borne by the principal and/or local agency. However, in
cases where the termination of employment is due solely to
the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency
shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of
the former and/or his belongings.
7. Same; Same; Attorneys Fees; The Labor Code also
entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld
wages as attorney’s fees when the withholding is
unlawful.—The Labor Code also entitles the employee to
10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorney’s fees
when the withholding is unlawful. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s
decision to award respondent NT$46,080.00 or the three-
month equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of
LABOR LAW 1
NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld
NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of
these awards. The award of the three-month equivalent of
respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the
amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract.
8. Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of
the Laws; Due Process; In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., 582
SCRA 254 (2009), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the
clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional
for violating the equal protection clause and substantive
due process.—In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., 582 SCRA 254 (2009),
this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause
and substantive due process. A statute or provision which
was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed
at all.” We are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was
reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
9. Statutory Construction; Statutes; When a law or a
provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar
law or provision.—In the hierarchy of laws, the
Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner
inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the
existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a
provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation
or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A
law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have
so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
10. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; Due
Process; Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that
persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.”—We observe that the
reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection
and due process. Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General
have failed to show any compelling change in the
circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that
limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally
dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a
violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of
the Constitution. Equal protection of the law is a guarantee
that persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.” It is a guarantee against
“undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”
11. Same; Same; There is no violation of the equal
protection clause if the law applies equally to persons
within the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distinguishing between those falling within
the class and those who do not fall within the class.—In
creating laws, the legislature has the power “to make
distinctions and classifications.” In exercising such power,
it has a wide discretion. The equal protection clause does not
infringe on this legislative power. A law is void on this basis,
only if classifications are made arbitrarily. There is no
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies
equally to persons within the same class and if there are
reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling
within the class and those who do not fall within the class.
A law that does not violate the equal protection clause
prescribes a reasonable classification. A reasonable
classification “(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.” The reinstated
clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable
classification.
12. Same; Same; There can never be a justification for any
form of government action that alleviates the burden of
one sector, but imposes the same burden on another
sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of
private businesses such as placement agencies, while the
disadvantaged sector is composed of Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands.—[T]here can never be a
justification for any form of government action that
alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same
burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector
is composed of private businesses such as placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of
OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution
commands. The idea that private business interest can be
elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.”
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause
violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives
overseas workers of their monetary claims without any
discernable valid purpose. Respondent Joy Cabiles is
entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of
respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she
started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on
July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July
15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. “To rule otherwise would be
iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in
effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s
security of tenure which an employment contract embodies
and actually profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law.”
13. Interest Rates; Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No.
799; The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No.
799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the interest rate for
loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of
stipulation, applies in this case.—On the interest rate, the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21,
2013, which revised the interest rate for loan or forbearance
from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation, applies in this
case. The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of
2013, read: The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796
dated 16 May 2013, approved the following revisions
governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in
loan contracts, thereby amending Section 2 of Circular No.
905, Series of 1982: Section 1. The rate of interest for the
loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express
contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%)
per annum. Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection
X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are hereby
amended accordingly. This Circular shall take effect on 1
July 2013.
14. Same; Same; Loans; Circular No. 799 is applicable only
in loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and
in judgments when there is no stipulation on the
applicable interest rate; Circular No. 799 is not
applicable when there is a law that states otherwise.—
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance
of money, goods, or credits, and in judgments when there is
LABOR LAW 1
no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is
only applicable if the judgment did not become final and
executory before July 1, 2013. We add that Circular No. 799
is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise.
While the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set
or limit interest rates, these interest rates do not apply when
the law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied.
“[A] Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law
can repeal another law.”
15. Same; Same; Labor Law; Placement Fees; There is an
implied stipulation in contracts between the placement
agency and the overseas worker that in case the overseas
worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his
or her placement fees, the amount shall be subject to a
12% interest per annum. This implied stipulation has
the effect of removing awards for reimbursement of
placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage.—Laws
are deemed incorporated in contracts. “The contracting
parties need not repeat them. They do not even have to be
referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has
been explicitly stipulated, but the statutory provisions that
have any bearing on the matter.” There is, therefore, an
implied stipulation in contracts between the placement
agency and the overseas worker that in case the overseas
worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her
placement fees, the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest
per annum. This implied stipulation has the effect of
removing awards for reimbursement of placement fees from
Circular No. 799’s coverage.
16. Same; Same; Same; Awards of salary for the unexpired
portion of the employment contract under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042 are covered by Circular No. 799 because
the law does not provide for a specific interest rate that
should apply.—The same cannot be said for awards of
salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract
under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by
Circular No. 799 because the law does not provide for a
specific interest rate that should apply. In sum, if judgment
did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013 and
there was no stipulation in the contract providing for a
different interest rate, other money claims under Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest
per annum in accordance with Circular No. 799. This means
that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per
annum on her money claims from the finality of this
judgment.
17. Labor Law; Overseas Filipino Workers; Solidary
Obligations; Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 (Republic Act [R.A.] No. 8042); Section 10 of
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
provides that the foreign employer and the local
employment agency are jointly and severally liable for
money claims including claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship and/or damages.—
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer and the local
employment agency are jointly and severally liable for
money claims including claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship and/or damages. This section also
provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency
shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if
they were awarded to the employee. This provision is in line
with the state’s policy of affording protection to labor and
alleviating workers’ plight. In overseas employment, the
filing of money claims against the foreign employer is
attended by practical and legal complications. The distance
of the foreign employer alone makes it difficult for an
overseas worker to reach it and make it liable for violations
of the Labor Code. There are also possible conflict of laws,
jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may be raised
to frustrate an overseas worker’s attempt to advance his or
her claims.
18. Same; Same; Same; In the case of overseas employment,
either the local agency or the foreign employer may be
sued for all claims arising from the foreign employer’s
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
labor law violations.—The fundamental effect of joint and
several liability is that “each of the debtors is liable for the
entire obligation.” A final determination may, therefore, be
achieved even if only one of the joint and several debtors are
impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of overseas
employment, either the local agency or the foreign employer
may be sued for all claims arising from the foreign
employer’s labor law violations. This way, the overseas
workers are assured that someone — the foreign employer’s
local agent — may be made to answer for violations that the
foreign employer may have committed. The Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that
overseas workers have recourse in law despite the
circumstances of their employment. By providing that the
liability of the foreign employer may be “enforced to the full
extent” against the local agent, the overseas worker is
assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due
them.
19. Same; Same; Same; It must be emphasized that the local
agency that is held to answer for the overseas worker’s
money claims is not left without remedy. The law does
not preclude it from going after the foreign employer for
reimbursement of whatever payment it has made to the
employee to answer for the money claims against the
foreign employer.—Corollary to the assurance of
immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and
several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the
foreign employer from the overseas worker to the local
employment agency. However, it must be emphasized that
the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas
worker’s money claims is not left without remedy. The law
does not preclude it from going after the foreign employer
for reimbursement of whatever payment it has made to the
employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign
employer. A further implication of making local agencies
jointly and severally liable with the foreign employer is that
an additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas
workers. Local agencies, which are businesses by nature, are
inoculated with interest in being always on the lookout
against foreign employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest
they risk their reputation or finances, local agencies must
already have mechanisms for guarding against unscrupulous
foreign employers even at the level prior to overseas
employment applications.
20. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; View
that take exception to the ponencia’s full adoption of the
ruling in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et
al., 582 SCRA 254 (2009), to the extent that it applies the
strict scrutiny standard in invoking the equal protection
guarantee.—I take exception to the ponencia’s full
adoption of the ruling in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc., et al., 582 SCRA 254 (2009), to the extent
that it applies the strict scrutiny standard in invoking the
equal protection guarantee. To my mind, the circumstances
of this case do not justify the ponencia’s approach of
extending and expanding the use of the strict scrutiny
standard in invalidating the subject clause (as reinstated in
R.A. No. 8042 by R.A. No. 10022). The conclusion that the
subject clause created a “suspect” classification is simply
misplaced. The approach, sadly, only unnecessarily shifted
the burden to the government, to prove: (1) a compelling
state interest; and (2) that the legislation is narrowly tailored
to achieve the intended result. It also unnecessarily
undermines the presumed constitutionality of statutes and of
the respect that the Court accords to the acts of a co-equal
branch. The differential or rational basis scrutiny, i.e., where
the challenged classification needs only be shown to be
rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest, would
have undoubtedly served the purpose without bringing these
unnecessary implications.
21. Labor Law; Overseas Filipino Workers; Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (R.A. No.
8042); View that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 is
discernibly a piece of social legislation that the State
LABOR LAW 1
enacted in the exercise of its police power, precisely to
give teeth and arms to the constitutional provisions on
labor under its aim to “establish a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant
worker, their families and of overseas Filipinos in
distress.”—R.A. No. 8042 is discernibly a piece of social
legislation that the State enacted in the exercise of its police
power, precisely to give teeth and arms to the constitutional
provisions on labor under its aim to “establish a higher
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of
migrant worker, their families and of overseas Filipinos in
distress.” Otherwise stated, it draws power and life from the
constitutional provisions that it seeks to concretize and
implement. As I pointed out in my Serrano Opinion, “the
express policy declarations of R.A. No. 8042 show that its
purposes are reiterations of the very same policies enshrined
in the Constitution x x x [They] patently characterize R.A.
No. 8042 as a direct implementation of the constitutional
objectives on Filipino overseas work so that it must be read
and understood in terms of these policy objectives. Under
this interpretative guide, any provision in R.A. No. 8042
inimical to the interest of an overseas Filipino worker
(OFW) cannot have any place in the law.” [Underscoring
supplied] Note also (again, as I reflected in my Serrano
Opinion) that while R.A. No. 8042 acknowledges that the
State shall “promote full employment,” it likewise provides
that “the State does not promote overseas employment as a
means to sustain economic growth and national
development. The existence of overseas employment
program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and
fundamental human rights and freedom of Filipino citizens
shall not, at any time, be compromised and violated.” The
Act, however, concludes its Declaration of Policies by
stating that “[n]onetheless, the deployment of Filipino
overseas workers, whether land-based or sea-based, by local
service contractors and manning agencies employing them
shall be encouraged. Appropriate incentives may be
extended to them.”
22. Same; Same; Same; View that Section 10 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8042 obviously protects the Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs) as against the employer and
the recruitment agency in cases of unlawful termination
of service. Unfortunately, it limits the liability to the
“reimbursement of the placement fee and interest, and
the payment of his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”—
Of particular importance to the present case is Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 which governs the OFWs’ money claims.
Pursuant to its terms, the Act obviously protects the OFW
as against the employer and the recruitment agency in cases
of unlawful termination of service. Unfortunately, it limits
the liability to the “reimbursement of the placement fee and
interest, and the payment of his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”
This limitation is a step backward as it imposes a cap on the
liability of the foreign principal/employer and the
contractor/recruitment agency even as it earlier declared
their liability joint and solidary. To be an “appropriate
incentive,” this limitation of liability can only be justified
under the terms of the law, i.e., “the incentive must
necessarily relate to the law’s purpose with reasonable
expectation that it would serve this purpose; it must also
accrue to its intended beneficiaries (the
recruitment/placement agencies), and not to parties to whom
the reason for the grant does not apply.”
23. Same; Same; Same; View that Section 10 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8042 actually limits what is otherwise the
foreign principal/employer’s full liability under the Act
and exceeds what the Act intended — to grant incentives
to recruitment/manning agencies.—As I pointed out in
my Serrano Opinion, Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 provides
measures that collectively protect OFWs, i.e., by ensuring
the integrity of their contracts; by establishing the
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
responsible parties; and by providing the mechanisms for
their enforcement that imposes direct and primary liability
to the foreign principal employer. Yet, Section 10 presents
a hidden twist affecting the principal/employer’s liability.
As worded, the Act “simply limits the OFWs’ recovery in
wrongful dismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the
benefit of whoever may be liable, including the
principal/employer — the direct employer primarily liable
for the wrongful dismissal.” From this perspective, Section
10 actually limits what is otherwise the foreign
principal/employer’s full liability under the Act and exceeds
what the Act intended — to grant incentives to
recruitment/manning agencies. “Section 10, in short, really
operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party,
without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for
wrongful dismissals.” [Emphasis supplied] “Because of this
hidden twist, the limitation of liability under Section 10
cannot be an “appropriate” incentive.”
24. Same; Same; Same; View that the liability limitation for
wrongful dismissals of already deployed Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs) is really part of a scheme to
sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes
solely of attracting the market, a scheme that sadly
reduces our OFWs to mere cash cows.—The chosen mode
of granting the incentive, i.e., the liability limitation for
wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs, effectively
imposed, with legal sanction, a partial condonation of the
foreign principal/employer’s liability to OFWs. The
incentive, therefore, “from a more practical and realistic
view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas
labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the
market,” a scheme that sadly reduces our OFWs to mere
cash cows.
25. Same; Same; Same; View that the “incentive scheme”
effectively benefits the recruitment/manning agencies
and foreign principal/employer at the expense of the
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) from whom the
salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract are
taken and to whom these salaries rightfully belong.—The
“incentive scheme” effectively benefits the
recruitment/manning agencies and foreign
principal/employer at the expense of the OFWs from whom
the salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract are
taken and to whom these salaries rightfully belong. In effect,
“the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning
agencies profit from their violation of the security of tenure
that an employment contract embodies.” The OFWs, on the
other hand, are afforded lesser protection because: (1) they
are afforded reduced recovery by operation of law; (2) the
reduced recovery renders wrongful dismissal situations
more alluring, easier to facilitate and less onerous to
undertake which foreign employers will most certainly
consider in termination of employment decisions. These
inimical effects obviously will remain as long as the subject
clause remains in Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, this time as
reinstated by R.A. No. 10022. The “inherently oppressive,
arbitrary, confiscatory and inimical provision [under
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 should, therefore,] be struck
down for its conflict with the substantive aspect of the
constitutional due process guarantee. Thus, I vote to declare
as unconstitutional the phrase “for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired terms, whichever is less” in the
fifth and final paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042.”
FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Respondent
Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment
contractfor a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was
deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal)
on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment
contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.
In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr.
Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice,
LABOR LAW 1
that she was terminated and that “she should immediately
report to their office to get her salary and passport.” She
was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy
claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997,
she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her,
Wacoal deductedNT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to
Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and
Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed
LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National
Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally
dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary,
the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and
attorney’s fees
ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the
unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.
HELD: YES. The Court held that the award of the three-
month equivalent of respondent’s salary should be
increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term
of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the
clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process.
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”
The Court said that they are aware that the clause
“or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” was reinstated in
Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is
supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with
the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that
supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be
trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of
the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a
nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity
cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the
same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of
law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as
such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a
reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause,
this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates
the constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have
failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances
that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022
amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is
ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount
equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to
reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay
respondent attorney’s fees of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this judgment. The clause, “or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void.
Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. (G.R. No.
167614, March 24, 2009)
1. Constitutional Law; Non-impairment of Contracts; The
non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II of
the Constitution is limited in application to laws about to
be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.-—
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that
laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and
cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however,
as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into
contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-
impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in
application to laws about to be enacted that would in any
way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties thereto.
2. Same; Same; Same; View that the expansion of the
Philippine overseas development program and the need
for incentives to achieve results are simply not valid
reasons to justify a classification, particularly when the
incentive is in the form of oppressive and confiscatory
limitation of liability detrimental to labor. No valid basis
for classification thus exists to justify the differential
treatment that resulted from the disputed Section 10.-—
The OSG could not even point to any reason other than the
protection of recruitment agencies and the expansion of the
Philippine overseas program as justification for the
limitation of liability that has effectively distinguished
OFWs from locally-based workers. These reasons,
unfortunately, are not on the same plane as protection to
labor in our constitutional hierarchy of values. Even RA
8042 repeats that “the State does not promote overseas
employment as a means to sustain economic growth and
national development.” Under RA 8042’s own terms, the
overseas employment program exists only for OFW
protection. Thus viewed, the expansion of the Philippine
overseas deployment program and the need for incentives to
achieve results are simply not valid reasons to justify a
classification, particularly when the incentive is in the form
of oppressive and confiscatory limitation of liability
detrimental to labor. No valid basis for classification thus
exists to justify the differential treatment that resulted from
the disputed Section 10.
3. Same; Same; Same; View that the difference in work
locations and working conditions that the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) pointed out are not valid
grounds for distinctions that should matter in the
enforcement of employment contracts.-—The difference
in work locations and working conditions that the OSG
pointed out are notvalid grounds for distinctions that should
matter in the enforcement of employment contracts.
Whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, the integrity of
contracts—be they labor, commercial or political—is a
zealously guarded value that we in the Philippines should
not demean by allowing a breach of OFW contracts easy to
undertake. This is true whatever may be the duration or
character of employment; employment contracts, whatever
their term and conditions may be subject only to their
LABOR LAW 1
consistency with the law, must be respected during the
whole contracted term and under the conditions agreed
upon.
4. Same; Same; Same; View that the disputed portion of
Section 10 is one that goes against the interests of labor,
based on R.A. No. 8042’s own declared purposes and,
more importantly, on constitutional standards, Section
10 diminished rather than enhanced the protection the
Constitution envisions for Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs).-—The situation of illegally dismissed OFWs
changed for the worse after R.A. No. 8042. In this sense, the
disputed portion of Section 10 is one that goes against the
interests of labor, based on R.A. No. 8042’s own declared
purposes and, more importantly, on constitutional standards.
Section 10 diminished rather than enhanced the protection
the Constitution envisions for OFWs.
5. Constitutional Law; Labor Law; Due Process; View
that the provision should be struck down for violations
of the constitutional provisions in favor of labor and of
the substantive aspect of the due process clause.-—My
conclusion, however, proceeds from a different reason and
constitutional basis. I believe that this provision should be
struck down for violations of the constitutional provisions in
favor of labor and of the substantive aspect of the due
process clause. Given these bases, I see no necessity in
invoking the equal protection clause. Underlying this
restraint in invoking the equal protection clause is my
hesitation to join the ponencia in declaring a classification
as “suspect” and in using the strict scrutiny standard without
clearly defined parameters on when this approach applies.
6. Same; Same; Same; The assailed provision is unduly
oppressive, unreasonable, and repugnant to the
Constitution. It undermines the mandate of the
Constitution to protect the rights of overseas workers
and to promote their welfare.-—The assailed provision is
unduly oppressive, unreasonable, and repugnant to the
Constitution. It undermines the mandate of the Constitution
to protect the rights of overseas workers and to promote their
welfare. Section 3, Article XIII, of the Constitution states
that the State shall (1) afford full protection to overseas
labor, (2) promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all, and (3) guarantee the
rights of all workers to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. Section 18, Article
II, of the Constitution states that, “The State affirms labor as
a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights
of workers and promote their welfare.”
7. Same; Same; Same; The exercise of police power, to be
valid, must be reasonable and not repugnant to the
Constitution.-—The exercise of police power, to be valid,
must be reasonable and not repugnant to the Constitution. In
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,
163 SCRA 386 (1988), the Court held that: Notwithstanding
its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own
limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that
event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is,
to advance the public good.
8. Same; Same; Same; Substantive due process requires
that the means employed in depriving persons of
property must not be unduly oppressive.-—The right to
property is not absolute—the prohibition against deprivation
of property is qualified by the phrase “without due process
of law.” Thus, the State may deprive persons of property
through the exercise of police power. However, the
deprivation must be done with due process. Substantive due
process requires that the means employed in depriving
persons of property must not be unduly oppressive.
9. Same; Same; Same; Right to Work; The right to work
and the right to earn a living necessarily includes the
right to bargain for better terms in an employment
contract and the right to enforce those terms.-—The right
to work and the right to earn a living necessarily includes
the right to bargain for better terms in an employment
contract and the right to enforce those terms. If protected
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
property does not include these rights, then the right to work
and the right to earn a living would become empty civil
liberties—the State can deprive persons of their right to
work and their right to earn a living by depriving them of
the right to negotiate for better terms and the right to enforce
those terms.
10. Constitutional Law; Labor Law; Due Process; Right to
Property; View that the provision “or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less” in Section 10, paragraph 5, of Republic Act (RA)
No. 8042 is unconstitutional-—it violates the prohibition
against deprivation of property without due process of
law.—I concur that the provision “or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in
Section 10, paragraph 5, of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 is
unconstitutional, but on a differentground. The provision
violates the prohibition against deprivation of property
without due process of law. It is an invalid exercise of police
power
11. Same; Same; Same; The subject clause being
unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for
the entire enexpired period of nine months and 23 days
of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of Republic Act
(RA) 8042.-—The subject clause does not state or imply any
definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to
equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. The
subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled
to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months
and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
12. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court further holds
that the subject clause violates petitioner’s right to
substantive due process, for it deprives him of property,
consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing
valid governmental purpose.-—The view that the
concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny
formulated in Central Bank Employee Association
exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a
groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII
in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article XIII,
by itself, without the application of the equal protection
clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in
Agabon. Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further
holds that the subject clause violates petitioner’s right to
substantive due process, for it deprives him of property,
consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid
governmental purpose.
13. Same; Same; Same; Section 3, Article XIII of the
Constitution does not directly bestow on the working
class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it
with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution
urges protection through executive or legislative action
and judicial recognition; Its utility is best limited to
being an impetus not just for the executive and
legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to
protect the welfare of the working class.-—It must be
stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow
on the working class any actual enforceable right, but
merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the
Constitution urges protection through executive or
legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best
limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and
legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to
protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact
consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court in
Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA
299 (2004), penned by then Associate Justice now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept that
when the challenge to a statute is premised on the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection—such as the working
LABOR LAW 1
class or a section thereof—the Court may recognize the
existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to
strict judicial scrutiny.
14. Same; Same; Same; While all the provisions of the 1987
Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are
some which this Court has declared not judicially
enforceable, Article XIII, being one.-—While all the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-
executing, there are some which this Court has declared not
judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one, particularly
Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573
(2004), has described to be not self-actuating: Thus, the
constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security
of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that
these are automatically acknowledged and observed without
need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that
the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full
exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization
of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not
unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the
dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated.
The guarantees of “full protection to labor” and “security of
tenure,” when examined in isolation, are facially
unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible
suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form
of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation
implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment—
a utopian notion, doubtless—but still hardly within the
contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still
needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights
to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights
of the labor sector, but of the employers’ as well. Without
specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a
loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at
least the aims of the Constitution.
15. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court concludes that
the subject clause contains a suspect classification in
that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of
fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it
imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs), with an unexpired portion of one year
or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of
other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.-—The Court
concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect
classification in that, in the computation of the monetary
benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs
with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with
a peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect classification
involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution,
the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial
scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling
state interest through the least restrictive means.
16. Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of Republic Act
8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause,
illegally dismissed Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs),
with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
employment contract have since been differently treated
in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap,
whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers
with fixed-term employment.-—Prior to R.A. No. 8042,
OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who
were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their money claims: they were uniformly
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of
their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
more in their employment contract have since been
differently treated in that their money claims are subject to
a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on
local workers with fixed-term employment.
17. Same; Same; Republic Act No. 8042; Prior to Republic
Act 8042, all Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs),
regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions
thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation
of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal.
Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire
unexpired portion of their employment contracts.-—It is
plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all Overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs), regardless of contract periods or the
unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal
dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire
unexpired portion of their employment contracts. The
enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced
a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of
illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose
contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and
subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their
monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for
the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the
while sparing the other category from such prejudice,
simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of
one year.
18. Same; Labor Law; Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full
protection of their rights and welfare.-—Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of
the labor sector, without distinction as to place of
deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare. To
Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and
parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by
workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations
should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be
denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or
spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
19. Same; Same; Police Power; Police power legislations
adopted by the State to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the people are generally applicable not only to the
future contracts but even to those already in existence,
for all private contracts must yield to the superior and
legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public
welfare.-—But even if the Court were to disregard the
timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise
of the police power of the State to regulate a business,
profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and
deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of
ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs
wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations
adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the
people are generally applicable not only to future contracts
but even to those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures
taken by the State to promote public welfare.
FACTS: Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of
Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his
departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00,
LABOR LAW 1
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that
he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April.
However, respondents did not deliver on their promise to
make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to
stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to
the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period
of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19,
1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998,
he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of
his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a
Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the
dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary
benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question
the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to
the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that
in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their
salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole
issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the
Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal,
OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the
applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA
computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly
rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months
out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject
clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is
entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23,
equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23
days left of his employment contract, computed at the
monthly rate of US$2,590.00
ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which
is the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of
his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a
period of three months?
Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form
part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary
award, because these are fixed benefits that have been
stipulated into his contract?
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the
entire unexpired portion of his employment contract
consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate
of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause “or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 is declared unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local
workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally
discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation
of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their employment contract have since been
differently treated in that their money claims are subject to
a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on
local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause
contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term
employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-
month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none
on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-
term employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause
violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it
deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits,
without any existing valid governmental purpose. The
subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled
to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant
to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042.
2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does
not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like
petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in
which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of
overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime
pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of
the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation
for any work “performed” on designated rest days and
holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis
for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in
the computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless
there is evidence that he performed work during those
periods.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
Petition. The subject clause “or for three months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision
and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his
salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment
contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the
rate of US$1,400.00 per month. No costs.
Chavez vs. Bonto-Perez (G.R. No. 109808, March 01,
1995)
LABOR LAW 1
1. Labor Law; Court holds that the managerial
commission agreement executed by petitioner to
authorize her Japanese employer to deduct Two
Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars from her monthly basic
salary is void because it is against our existing laws,
morals and public policy.—Firstly, we hold that the
managerial commission agreement executed by petitioner to
authorize her Japanese employer to deduct Two Hundred
Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00) from her monthly basic
salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals
and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard
employment contract of December 1, 1988 approved by the
POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto: “It
is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this
Employment Contract are in conformance with the Standard
Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the
POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this
contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null
and void”; (Emphasis supplied.)
2. Same; The basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred
U.S. Dollars guaranteed to petitioner under the parties’
standard employment contract is in accordance with the
minimum employment standards with respect to wages
set by the POEA.—Clearly, the basic salary of One
Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00)
guaranteed to petitioner under the parties’ standard
employment contract is in accordance with
the minimum employment standards with respect to wages
set by the POEA. Thus, the side agreement which reduced
petitioner’s basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars
(US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA’s
minimum employment standards, and for not having been
approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a
scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous
employers against our helpless overseas workers who are
compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs.
3. Civil Law; Laches; Definition of Laches.—Laches has
been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it. It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the fact of
delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches.
4. Same; Same; There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches.—The doctrine of laches is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There
is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is
to be determined according to its particular circumstances.
The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It
cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and
injustice.
5. Same; Same; Court holds that the doctrine of laches is
inapplicable to petitioner.—In the case at bench, petitioner
filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period
for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the
Labor Code. For this reason, we hold the doctrine of laches
inapplicable to petitioner.
FACTS: Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by
Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation to perform
in Japan for 6 months. The contract was for $1.5k a month,
which was approved by POEA. After the approval of said
contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her
salary with her Japanese employer through her local
manager-agency (Jaz Talents Promotion). The salary was
reduced to $500 and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents. In
February 1991 (two years after the expiration of her
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
contract), Chavez sued Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents
for underpayment of wages before the POEA.
The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side
agreement entered into by Chavez with her Japanese
employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract;
that POEA had no knowledge of such side agreement being
entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for sleeping
on her right for two years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial
commission agreement executed by Chavez to authorize
her Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void because
it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. It
cannot supersede the standard employment contract
approved by the POEA with the following stipulation
appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions
stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance
with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers
prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No.
2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any
part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA
shall be null and void;
The side agreement which reduced Chavez’s basic
wage is null and void for violating the POEA’s minimum
employment standards, and for not having been approved
by the POEA. Here, both Centrum Placement and Jaz
Talents are solidarily liable.
Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this
case, Chavez filed her claim well within the three-year
prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth
in Article 291 of the Labor Code. For this reason, laches
is not applicable.
Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent POEA Administrator
and NLRC Commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 91-02-199
(ER), respectively dated February 17 and December 29, 1992,
and the Resolution of the NLRC, dated March 23, 1993, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held
jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment of SIX
THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages.
Costs against private respondents.
Sunace International Management Services, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No.
161757, January 25, 2006)
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Finding of the Court of
Appeals solely on the basis of the above-quoted
telefax message, that Sunace continually
communicated with the foreign “principal” and
therefore was aware of and had consented to the
execution of the extension of the contract is
misplaced.-The finding of the Court of Appeals solely
on the basis of the above-quoted telefax message, that
Sunace continually communicated with the foreign
“principal” (sic) and therefore was aware of and had
consented to the execution of the extension of the
contract is misplaced. The message does not provide
evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract
executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the
original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese
broker communicated regarding Divina’s allegedly
withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace
ratified the extension of the contract.
LABOR LAW 1
2. Civil Law; Contracts; The theory of imputed
knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent,
Sunace, to the principal, employer Xiong, not the
other way around.-The theory of imputed knowledge
ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the
principal, employer Xiong, not the other way around.
The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer
cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
FACTS: Petitioner, Sunace International Management
Services deployed to Taiwan Divina A. Montehermozo as
a domestic helper under a 12-month contract. The
deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker,
Edmund Wang, President of Jet Crown International Co.,
Ltd. After her 12-month contract expired, Divina
continued working for her Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui
Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the
Philippines. Shortly after her return, Divina filed a
complaint before the NLRC against Sunace, one Adelaide
Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign
principal alleging that she was jailed for three months and
that she was underpaid.
Labor Arbitration Associate Regina T. Gavin issued
Summons to the Manager of Sunace. Divina was claiming
the refund of the deduction for income tax and savings
under the one-year and 2-year extended contract. Sunace
says she was not entitled to refund for 24 months savings
because employer did not deduct any from her salary from
there. There is also no basis for her claim of tax refund
because as the she finished her one year contract and
hence, was not illegally dismissed by her employer.
Sunace then filed an answer alleging that Divina’s 2-year
extension of her contract was without its knowledge and
consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim
arising therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a
Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of Responsibility and an
Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document was
annexed to said ". . . answer to complainant’s position
paper." The Labor Arbiter rejected Sunace’s claim that the
extension of Divina’s contract for two more years was
without its knowledge. Labor Arbiter also says that any
agreement for settlement should be reduced to writing and
signed by parties and counsel before Labor Arbiter. It was
held that Sunace and its owner, Perge, both in their
personal capacities and as an agent of Hang Rui Xiong
should jointly and severally pay Divina.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sunace is liable as an agent of
Hong Rui Xiong
HELD: No, Sunace and its owner cannot be held liable for
Divina as there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal. Under Article 1924
of the New Civil Code, 'The agency is revoked if the
principal directly manages the business entrusted to the
agent, dealing directly with third persons'. In the present
case, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with
Divina and entered into a new and separate employment
contract in Taiwan. Thus, making Sunace no longer liable
to Divina.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent
Divina A. Montehermozo against petitioner is DISMISSED.
Dagasdas v. Grand Placement (G.R. No. 205727,
January 18, 2017)
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
1. Same; Quitclaims; Generally, the employee’s waiver or
quitclaim cannot prevent the employee from demanding
benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from filing an
illegal dismissal case.-—Generally, the employee’s waiver
or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee from demanding
benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from filing an
illegal dismissal case. This is because waiver or quitclaim is
looked upon with disfavor, and is frowned upon for being
contrary to public policy. Unless it can be established that
the person executing the waiver voluntarily did so, with full
understanding of its contents, and with reasonable and
credible consideration, the same is not a valid and binding
undertaking. Moreover, the burden to prove that the waiver
or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the employer.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for
Review on Certiorari; As a rule, only questions of law
may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. However, this rule allows certain exceptions,
including a situation where the findings of fact of the
courts or tribunals below are conflicting.-—As a rule,
only questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. However, this rule allows certain
exceptions, including a situation where the findings of fact
of the courts or tribunals below are conflicting. In this case,
the CA and the NLRC arrived at divergent factual findings
anent Dagasdas’ termination. As such, the Court deems it
necessary to reexamine these findings and determine
whether the CA has sufficient basis to annul the NLRC
Decision, and set aside its finding that Dagasdas was
illegally dismissed from work.
3. Labor Law; Management Prerogative; It is well-settled
that employers have the prerogative to impose standards
on the work quantity and quality of their employees and
provide measures to ensure compliance therewith.-—It
is well-settled that employers have the prerogative to impose
standards on the work quantity and quality of their
employees and provide measures to ensure compliance
therewith. Noncompliance with work standards may thus be
a valid cause for dismissing an employee. Nonetheless, to
ensure that employers will not abuse their prerogatives, the
same is tempered by security of tenure whereby the
employees are guaranteed substantive and procedural due
process before they are dismissed from work.
4. Same; Security of Tenure; Lex Loci Contractus; Since
the employment contracts of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs) are perfected in the Philippines, and following
the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made), these contracts are
governed by our laws, primarily the Labor Code of the
Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR); Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad, he or
she is entitled to security of tenure, among other
constitutional rights.-—Security of tenure remains even if
employees, particularly the Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs), work in a different jurisdiction. Since the
employment contracts of OFWs are perfected in the
Philippines, and following the principle of lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made),
these contracts are governed by our laws, primarily the
Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules
and regulations. At the same time, our laws generally apply
even to employment contracts of OFWs as our Constitution
explicitly provides that the State shall afford full protection
to labor, whether local or overseas. Thus, even if a Filipino
is employed abroad, he or she is entitled to security of
tenure, among other constitutional rights.
5. Same; Probationary Employees; As regards a
probationary employee, his or her dismissal may be
allowed only if there is just cause or such reason to
conclude that the employee fails to qualify as regular
employee pursuant to reasonable standards made
known to the employee at the time of engagement.-—
Even assuming that Dagasdas was still a probationary
employee when he was terminated, his dismissal must still
LABOR LAW 1
be with a valid cause. As regards a probationary employee,
his or her dismissal may be allowed only if there is just cause
or such reason to conclude that the employee fails to qualify
as regular employee pursuant to reasonable standards made
known to the employee at the time of engagement. Here,
ITM failed to prove that it informed Dagasdas of any
predetermined standards from which his work will be
gauged. In the contract he signed while still in the
Philippines, Dagasdas was employed as Network
Technician; on the other hand, his new contract indicated
that he was employed as Superintendent. However, no job
description — or such duties and responsibilities attached to
either position — was adduced in evidence. It thus means
that the job for which Dagasdas was hired was not definite
from the beginning. Indeed, Dagasdas was not sufficiently
informed of the work standards for which his performance
will be measured. Even his position based on the job title
given him was not fully explained by his employer. Simply
put, ITM failed to show that it set and communicated work
standards for Dagasdas to follow, and on which his
efficiency (or the lack thereof) may be determined.
6. Same; Employment Contracts; Overseas Filipino
Workers; Unless the employment contract of an
Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) is processed through
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA), the same does not bind the concerned OFW
because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA,
certainly the State has no means of determining the
suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers.-—
The new contract was not shown to have been processed
through the POEA. Under our Labor Code, employers hiring
OFWs may only do so through entities authorized by the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment.
Unless the employment contract of an OFW is processed
through the POEA, the same does not bind the concerned
OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA,
certainly the State has no means of determining the
suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers.
7. Same; Termination of Employment; Overseas Filipino
Workers; The employer must inform the employee of the
cause or causes for his or her termination, and
thereafter, the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Aside
from the notice requirement, the employee must be
accorded the opportunity to be heard.-—A valid
dismissal requires substantive and procedural due process.
As regards the latter, the employer must give the concerned
employee at least two notices before his or her termination.
Specifically, the employer must inform the employee of the
cause or causes for his or her termination, and thereafter, the
employer’s decision to dismiss him. Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must be accorded the
opportunity to be heard. Here, no prior notice of purported
infraction, and such opportunity to explain on any
accusation against him was given to Dagasdas. He was
simply given a notice of termination. In fact, it appears that
ITM intended not to comply with the twin notice
requirement. As above quoted, under the new contract, ITM
reserved in its favor the right to terminate the contract
without serving any notice to Dagasdas in specified cases,
which included such situation where the employer decides
to dismiss the employee within the probationary period.
Without doubt, ITM violated the due process requirement in
dismissing an employee.
FACTS: Grand Placement, a licensed recruitment agency,
employed Dagasdas as a network technician on behalf of
Industrial Management Technology Methods (ITM),
whereby he is to be deployed to in Saudi Arabia under a 1-
year contract. Dagasdas contended that while the contract
specified that he was employed as a network technician, he
was actually engaged as a civil engineer and said former
position was only for the purpose of securing a visa. When
he arrived in Saudi Arabia, he signed a new employment
contract with ITM which stipulated that the latter
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
contracted him as a Superintendent and he was placed
under a 3-month probationary period. He reported to the
worksite but was given tasks suited for a Mechanical
Engineer which were foreign to the job applied for. He was
then temporarily given the position of Civil Construction
Engineer. ITM gave him a termination notice indicating
that he was dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his
contract, which provided that ITM reserved the right to
terminate any employee within the three-month
probationary period without need of any notice to the
employee. Thus, he returned to the PH and filed a case for
illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dagasdas was validly dismissed
from work?
HELD: No, Dagasdas was not validly dismissed. Security
of tenure remains even if employees, particularly OFWs,
work in a different jurisdiction. Thus, even if a Filipino is
employed abroad, he or she is entitled to security of tenure.
In this case, prior to his deployment and while still in the
PH, Dagasdas was made to sign a POEA-approved
contract with GPGS, on behalf of ITM; and, upon arrival
in Saudi Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment
contract. Nonetheless, this new contract, which was used
as basis for dismissing Dagasdas, is void for being in
violation of his right to security of tenure. Article 297 of
the Labor Code provides for the just causes for dismissing
an employee but ITM terminated Dagasdas for violating a
clause in the new contract. The clause is contrary to law
because to allow employers to reserve a right to terminate
employees without cause is violative of the guarantee of
security of tenure. Moreover, even if Dagasdas was a
probationary employee, his termination must still be with
a valid clause. Furthermore, the new contract was not
shown to have been processed through the POEA. It also
breached Dagasdas' original contract as it was entered into
even before the expiration of the original contract
approved by the POEA.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated September 26, 2012 and Resolution dated
January 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
115396 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
March 29, 2010 and June 2, 2010 Resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC OFW-L-02-000071-
10 are REINSTATED.
NFD International Manning Agents v. NLRC (G.R. No.
116629, January 16, 1998)
1. Labor Law; Appeals; National Labor Relations
Commission; Evidence; The submission of
additional evidence before the NLRC is not
prohibited by the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, such submission not being prejudicial to the
other party for the latter could submit counter-
evidence.-The submission of additional evidence
before the respondent Commission is not prohibited by
the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. After all,
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity
are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor
arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In
keeping with this directive, it has been held that the
NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and
affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on
appeal. The submission of additional evidence on
LABOR LAW 1
appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter
could submit counter-evidence.
2. Labor Law; Appeals; Due Process; It is not the
denial of the right to be heard but denial of the
opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of
due process of law.-The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one’s side. It is also an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. It is not the denial of the right to
be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that
constitutes violation of due process of law.
3. Labor Law; Seamen; The death of a seaman during
the term of his employment makes the employer
liable to the former’s heirs for death compensation
benefits unless the employer can successfully prove
that the seaman’s death was caused by an injury
directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.-
The death of a seaman during the term of his
employment makes the employer liable to the former’s
heirs for death compensation benefits. The POEA
Standard Employment Contract fixes the amount at
U.S.$50,000.00 and an additional amount of
U.S.$7,000.00 for each child, not exceeding four, under
twenty-one years of age. The employer becomes liable
once it is established that the seaman died during the
effectivity of his employment contract. This rule,
however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt
from liability if he can successfully prove that the
seaman’s death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act.
4. Labor Law; Seamen; Evidence; The testimonies of
ship officers who merely observed and narrated the
circumstances surrounding the deaths of the two
seamen and the illness of another are insufficient to
prove the fact that the deaths were caused by self-
inflicted injuries.- The testimonies of the officers are
insufficient to prove the fact that Misada’s and
Envidiado’s deaths were caused by self-inflicted
injuries. The testimonies were given by people who
merely observed and narrated the circumstances
surrounding the deaths of the two seamen and the
illness of Fajardo. Fajardo himself did not submit any
testimony regarding the implantation. The testimonies
of the officers are, at best, hearsay. Moreover, the
officers did not have the competence to make a medical
finding as to the actual cause of the deaths. No autopsy
report was presented to corroborate their testimonies.
On the contrary, Eduardo Misada was medically
diagnosed to have died of “acute laryngo-trachea
bronchitis with pneumonia probably due to viral
cause.” This was declared in his “Cause of Death Form”
after his dead body was examined on June 29, 1991 by
Dr. Sydney Prematirat, a Judicial Medical Officer at
Colombo, Sri Lanka.
5. Labor Law; Seamen; Evidence; “Certificate for
Removal of a Dead Body” and “Certificate of
Embalming” are not proofs of the real cause of
death.-Enrico Envidiado was not issued a “Cause of
Death Form.” While still alive, he was examined in
Galle, Sri Lanka by Consultant Physician Chandima de
Mel who found a wound in his penis and diagnosed his
illness as “severe tetanus.” His “Certificate for
Removal of A Dead Body” dated July 8, 1991 issued by
Dr. T.L. Seneviratne, Chief Medical Officer of Health,
Municipal Council, Colombo, Sri Lanka, and
“Certificate of Embalming” dated July 8, 1991 issued
by Keith Anthony Raymond stated that Envidiado died
of “viral myocarditis—natural causes.” The
“Certificate for Removal of a Dead Body” and
“Certificate of Embalming” are not proofs of the real
cause of death. Their probative value is confined only
to the fact of death. These documentary evidence,
however, did not at all indicate that Envidiado died of
ART. 12 – 42 et al.
tetanus as previously diagnosed by Dr. de Mel. And
despite Dr. de Mel’s allegedly correct diagnosis,
Envidiado died a few days later.
FACTS: The private respondents (wives of the two
deceased husbands) filed for death compensation benefits
under the POEA Standard Contract of employment before
the petitioners but were denied on the ground that the
seaman’s deaths were due to their own wilful act who
implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their respective
sexual organs that due to the lack of sanitary conditions at
the time and place of implantation, all three seamen
suffered "severe tetanus" and "massive viral infections;"
that Misada and Envidiado died within days of the other;
that the third seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly missed
death only because the vessel was at port in Penang,
Malaysia at the time the tetanus became critical. Private
respondents filed separate complaints before the POEA
Adjudication Office. POEA Administrator dismissed the
case for lack of merit. Private respondents appealed to
respondent Commission. During the pendency of the
appeal, private respondents submitted additional
documentary evidence in support of their Memorandum on
Appeal. Respondent Commission reversed the POEA
Administrator and ordered petitioners to pay private
respondents. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Commission gravely erred in
finding that the deaths of the two seamen did not come as
a result of their wilful and deliberate act.
HELD: The SC dismissed the petition and affirmed the
decision of NLRC. According to Part II, Section C, no. 6
of POEA “Standard Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-
Going Vessels” No compensation shall be payable in
respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death
resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman,
provided, however, that the employer can prove that such
injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable
to him. In this case, the testimonies of the officers are
insufficient to prove the fact that death of two seamen were
caused by self-inflicted injuries and in fact Fajardo, one
who did the same, did not submit any testimony regarding
the implantation. No autopsy report was presented to
corroborate their testimonies. Based on medical reports
cause of death of Misada was due to viral infection, while
Envidiado was due to viral myocarditis. Hence,
petitioner’s evidence insufficiently proves the fact that the
deaths of the two seamen were caused by their own wilful
and deliberate act.
Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
dismissed and the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. 006490-94 is affirmed.