CONSTITUTIONAL LAW>Rights of the Accused>Bail

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
(En Banc)
FACTS:
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile has been charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
on the purported misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital and his
Motion to Fix Bail on the ground that he was not a flight risk and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered, among others. However, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion since it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of
bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt is not strong.

ISSUE: Whether Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail.

HELD: YES
In now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available
to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of
his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen
as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long
years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court
for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective
of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may
be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already
consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The
Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Post-judgment remedies>Appeals from judgments

or final orders of the NLRC

SUGARSTEEL INDUSTRIAL, INC. and MR. BEN YAPJOCO, Petitioners,

vs.
VICTOR ALBINA, VINCENT UY and ALEX VELASQUEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168749, June 6, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS:
Respondents Albina, Uy, and Velasquez charged the petitioners in the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) with having
illegally dismissed them as kettleman, assistant kettleman and inspector, respectively.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that the dismissal of the respondents was justified. NLRC
affirmed the decision of the LA. Aggrieved, the respondents assailed the result through
their petition for certiorari in the CA.

CA granted the petition for certiorari. It ruled that the NLRC's affirmance of the
LA's decision did not accord with the evidence on record and the applicable law and
jurisprudence.

ISSUE: Whether CA gravely abused its discretion by disregarding the factual findings of
the Labor Arbiter that the NLRC affirmed?

HELD: NO

As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being confined to the correction of acts rendered
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion that
amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is limited in scope and narrow in character. As
such, the judicial inquiry in a special civil action for certiorari in labor litigation
ascertains only whether or not the NLRC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.

We find that the CA did not exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing the evidence and deciding
the case on the merits despite the judgment of the NLRC already being final. We have
frequently expounded on the competence of the CA in a special civil action for certiorari to
review the factual findings of the NLRC. In Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano, for
instance, we have pronounced that the CA is "given the power to pass upon the evidence,
if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues," without contravening the doctrine of
the immutability of judgments. The power of the CA to pass upon the evidence flows from
its original jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari, by which it can grant the
writ of certiorari to correct errors of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC should the
latter's factual findings be not supported by the evidence on record; or when the granting
of the writ of certiorari is necessary to do substantial justice or to prevent a substantial
wrong; or when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; or when the granting
of the writ of certiorari is necessary to arrive at a just decision in the case. The premise is
that any decision by the NLRC that is not supported by substantial evidence is a decision
definitely tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Should the CA annul the decision of the
NLRC upon its finding of jurisdictional error on the part of the latter, then it has the
power to fully lay down whatever the latter ought to have decreed instead as the records
warranted. The judicial function of the CA in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction over
the NLRC extends to the careful review of the NLRC's evaluation of the evidence because
the factual findings of the NLRC are accorded great respect and finality only when they
rest on substantial evidence. Accordingly, the CA is not to be restrained from revising or
correcting such factual findings whenever warranted by the circumstances simply
because the NLRC is not infallible. Indeed, to deny to the CA this power is to diminish its
corrective jurisdiction through the writ of certiorari.

The policy of practicing comity towards the factual findings of the labor tribunals does
not preclude the CA from reviewing the findings, and from disregarding the findings upon
a clear showing of the NLRC's capricious, whimsical or arbitrary disregard of the
evidence or of circumstances of considerable importance crucial or decisive of the
controversy. In such eventuality, the writ of certiorari should issue, and the CA, being
also a court of equity, then enjoys the leeway to make its own independent evaluation of
the evidence of the parties as well as to ascertain whether or not substantial evidence
supported the NLRC's ruling.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS>Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer>attorney’s

fees

NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, vs.

ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
(First Division)
FACTS:
Complainant has charged respondent with misconduct for the latter’s refusal to
return the amount of P70,000 she had paid for his professional services despite not
having performed the contemplated professional services. IBP recommended that
respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000 which he received
because it is excessive.

ISSUE: Whether respondent should return the entire amount received from the client
despite failure to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during his
professional engagement?

HELD: YES

We can easily agree that every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of
his client. As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and
serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such
services.

The attorney’s fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer’s agreement between the
client and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is
not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. The
underlying theory is that the retainer’s agreement between them gives to the client the
reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the
task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on the basis
of what he and the client agreed. In the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer’s
compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means “as much as he
deserved.” The determination of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also
authorized “when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its
conclusion.” Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by
the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary
to the parties’ expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.

Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation
based on the obtaining circumstances, provided that the attorney does not receive more
than what is reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The court’s supervision of the lawyer’s compensation for legal services rendered is not
only for the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s fees
charged, but also for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession.

The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later
revealed, it was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment
of marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney’s fees
from the complainant. He did not even begin to perform the contemplated task he
undertook for the complainant because it was improbable that the agreement with her
was to bring the action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition
for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was either his way
of covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either way did
not entitle him to retain the amount he had already received.
LEGAL ETHICS
SIMPLECIO A. MARSADA, Complainant, vs.
ROMEO M. MONTEROS, Sheriff, IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-10-2793 March 8, 2016
(En Banc)
FACTS:

A complaint for misconduct and dishonesty was filed by petitioner against

respondent in relation to the latter’s conduct in the service of the writ of execution in an
action for the collection of a monetary obligaiton.
ISSUE:

HELD:

The writ of execution should mirror the judgment that it enforces. The form and contents
of the writ of execution are specified in Section 8, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Under this provision of the Rules of Court, Monteroso could enforce the writ of execution
only “according to its terms, in the manner herein after provided.” However, he was
remiss in his duty to enforce the writ by collecting only P25,000.00. Even assuming that
he had only been successful in collecting P25,000.00 from the defendant, he still
exceeded his authority in requesting Marsada to sign the typewritten acknowledgment
receipt reflecting the P25,000.00 as the full and complete satisfaction of the writ of
execution. He had neither basis nor reason to have Marsada sign the receipt in that tenor
because the text and tenor of the writ of execution expressly required the recovery of
P35,000.00 from the losing party.

Also, Marsada claimed that Monteroso had represented to him that the defendant could
no longer pay the balance. The representation, even if true, did not justify Monteroso’s
unilateral decision to discontinue the effort to recover the balance. It clearly devolved
upon him as the sheriff to levy upon the execution debtor’s properties, if any, as well as
to garnish the debts due to the latter and the credits belonging to the latter. The duty to
exhaust all efforts to recover the balance was laid down in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.

Thus, Monteroso was guilty of misconduct, which the Court has defined in Dela Cruz v.
Malunao in the following manner:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his position or office to procure some benefit for himself
or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel states: "Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or
benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their
official actions."

Marsada did not establish that the act complained of was tainted with corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or disregard of established rules. Consequently, Monteroso’s
lability only amounted to simple misconduct1.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS>Adjudicative Responsibilities

SPOUSES CESAR AND THELMA SUSTENTO, Complainants, vs.

JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, March 8, 2016 (En Banc)

FACTS:
On January 26, 2009, complainants filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
the RTC. Almost 6 months had elapsed and only after complainants filed for Early
Resolution before the Respondent dismissed the Petition. On December 1, 2009,
complainants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On December 8, 2009,
complainants filed a Reply on the Comments/Answer submitted by their opposing party.
On December 10, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order deeming the MR submitted for
resolution.

1Section 46, D, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative cases in the Civil Service.
 Complainant then charged the respondent with undue delay in the resolution of
the petition for certiorari and undue delay in the resolution of their MR beyond the 90-
day period in violation of AC No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution.
However, up to the date of the instant administrative matter was filed; respondent judge
has still yet to resolve the MR.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of the less serious offense of undue delay in
rendering an order by not resolving the complainants’ motion for reconsideration within
the prescribed period.

HELD: YES

What is obvious is that the respondent judge took too much time in disposing of the
petition for certiorari and the ensuing motion for reconsideration. The delays were plainly
violative of the injunction to him to act expeditiously on the matters 90 days from their
submission.

The respondent judge sought to justify his delay by citing the voluminous caseload he
had as the presiding judge. The justification does not persuade. Although we are not
insensitive to the heavy caseloads of the trial judges, we have allowed reasonable
extensions of the periods for the trial judges to resolve their cases. If the heavy caseload
of any judge should preclude his disposition of cases within the reglementary period, he
should notify the Court, through the Court Administrator, of the reasons or causes for
the delay, and request in writing a reasonable extension of the time to dispose of the
affected cases. No judge should arrogate unto himself the prerogative to extend the
period for deciding cases beyond the mandatory 90-day period.

The respondent judge insists that that he did not need to act on the resulting motion for
reconsideration because the petition for certiorari, being a prohibited pleading, was a
contravention of the rules of procedure. Such insistence did not justify his inability to act
promptly. The fact that the petition for certiorari was a prohibited pleading furnished him
a better reason to act promptly on the petition for certiorari and the motion for
reconsideration.

We are also not swayed by his other excuses of not having then a legal researcher
assigned to him; and of his branch clerk of court being recently appointed. The court's
business did not stop because of such events; hence, he could not use such excuses to
delay his actions on the pending matters before his court. Verily, the responsibility for
the prompt and expeditious action on the case, which belonged first and foremost to him
as the presiding judge, could not be shifted to others like the legal researcher or the
recently appointed branch clerk of court.

The respondent cannot be spared from the consequences of his undue delays in the case
of the complainants. He did not show that he ever requested the Court for the additional
time within which to dispose of the matters therein. It then becomes inescapable for him
to face the consequences of his inexplicable inaction. He was guilty of gross inefficiency
and neglect of duty. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day period from the
submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial
office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice

LEGAL ETHICS>Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer

ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, vs.

ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507), February 23, 2016 (En Banc)

FACTS:
Complainants Spouses Angelito and Mercedes Ramiscal engaged the legal services
of respondent Atty. Edgar Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants filed
in the Regional Trial Court. RTC decided in their favor. As expected, the plaintiff filed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Later on, respondent did not inform them that the CA reversed the decision of the
RTC which they only learned from their neighbors. After much effort, they finally reached
the respondent. He asked for P7,000 as his fee in filing the motion for reconsideration in
their behalf and then they paid to him the said amount. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision
attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property. Consequently, the
Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent. The IBP
suspended respondent from the practice of law for two years.

ISSUE: Whether respondent did not competently and diligently discharge his duties as a
lawyer.

HELD: YES
Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the
Lawyer’s Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients ." If he should violate
the vow, he contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon
17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, viz.:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. x x x x
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes
imbued with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship
commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to
attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. To accord with this highly
fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former’s
cause and to be diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs. As an essential part of their
highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from
the lawyer on the developments of the case. The lawyer who neglects to perform his
obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the
best of his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By
voluntarily taking up their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and
defend their interest therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the
favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his commitment nonetheless because
he did not file the motion for reconsideration in their behalf despite receiving from them
the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He further neglected to regularly
update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving
them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against their interest.
Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling them
to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in
that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various
omissions manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.