G.R. No.

L-33284 April 20, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO CENTENO, ET AL., defendants. ROLANDO CENTENO
CRUZ, J.:
It all started, innocuously enough, with a drinking spree. On that afternoon of December 1, 1968, Rolando Santos was enjoying
himself with some friends and plenty of beer that he eventually could not carry. Within the hour, he would be dead of a massive
brain hemorrhage. The venue would be the municipal building itself. And the police chief himself, together with one of his
policemen, would be accused of murdering him.
How Santos died is the question we have to settle. The prosecution says he was killed with karate blows dealt by the accused-
appellant. The defense denies this. It says Santos drunkenly staggered and fell and hit his head and bled to death.
The trial court believed the prosecution and convicted the police chief while absolving his co-accused. 1 Rolando Centeno is now
before us on appeal of his conviction.
The medical evidence is not disputed. It is accepted that Santos died as a result of internal bleeding in the brain due to trauma.
The victim's head showed various contusions and abrasions but not in the nape of the neck where the karate blows were
allegedly delivered. 2
Besides Dr. Plaridel F. Vidal, the NBI medico-legal officer who testified on the autopsy of Santos, two important witnesses who
gave a first-hand version of how Santos was allegedly killed by the accused-appellant were presented by the prosecution. These
were Dionisio Violago and Eulogio Villanueva, who were both friends of the victim.
According to Violago, he and Santos, together with their other companions, were in the store of one Aling Goreng when
Patrolman Valeriano Reyes approached Santos and told the young man to come with him. Santos demurred, protesting that he
had done nothing wrong, whereupon Reyes boxed him in the chest and forcibly brought him to the police station. There Santos
loudly objected to his detention, prompting Police Chief Centeno to say, "Matigas ka yatang talaga," although he relented later
and allowed him to go home. But as Santos was leaving, Centeno had a change of mind and asked Reyes to bring Santos back.
Reyes was holding Santos's arm when Centeno administered the first karate blow on the nape of Santos's neck that made the
victim fall forward on the backrest of a bench. This was followed by two more karate blows that crumpled him to the cement
floor where he lay prostrate and motionless. On Centeno's order, two policemen then picked up Santos and took him inside the
locker room adjacent to the municipal jail. 3
Villanueva corroborated Violago and said he cried out, "Why are you doing this to my friend?" when he saw Santos being mauled
by Centeno. He also declared that Santos was felled with three karate blows from Centeno. This witness claimed he got a glass of
water and gave it to Santos, who could not drink it any more as he was already dying then. He felt Santos's pulse but there was
none. He opened Santos's shirt and put his ear to his chest but could hear no heartbeat. He said that the other persons who
witnessed the killing, besides the policemen, were Violago, Romy Salao and Serafin Punzalan. 4
The theory of the defense was that Santos was so intoxicated that he reeled and fell and hit his head and suffered the internal
brain hemorrhage that killed him. To support this claim, it introduced Mercedes Bautista, chief forensic chemist of the NBI, who
testified that at the time of Santos's death he had 0.21% of alcohol in his blood. She declared on cross-examination that the
effect of such quantity would vary according to the person's physical condition although there would surely be emotional
instability in every case. 5
The defense conjectured that as a result of his inebriation, Santos must have crashed down and hurt his head, resulting in
internal bleeding. Valeriano Reyes, the other accused, testified that after they had brought Santos to the locker room, they heard
a noise ("kalabog") suggesting that Santos had hit something; and sure enough they found him dying on the floor when they
went in to investigate. 6 It is doubtful though how they could have heard the alleged sound, considering the thick concrete walls
of the room and the fact that they were then some ten meters away. 7
There is also the argument that no external injuries were found on the nape of the neck, where the karate blows were
administered although there were abrasions and contusions elsewhere in the victim's head. As Dr. Vidal explained, however,
even if no marks were left on the neck, karate blows thereon could cause the generalized and extensive bleedings that caused
the victim's death. Thus:
Q Will you please explain, if a karate blow delivered on the nape of a person without
necessarily producing contusions or abrasions will cause brain hemorrhage?
A Depending on the position of the fist that one will apply on the person. A karate blow will
produce inner injury but without any outside injury especially this portion of the hand,
(witness pointing to the hypothenar) unlike this portion (witness pointing to the knuckles)
and especially when the karate blows delivered with the hypothenar on a muscular portion of
the body like the nape, there will be no external injuries but the injury is internal. To further
explain, I will cite to you an example. The boxers who use gloves on their hands and when
they will deliver blows on a person, that person will not sustain external injuries but there is
severe injury inside the brain and that could justify that karate blows will not produce
external injuries but internal injuries. 8
The defense itself submitted that Santos shouted drunkenly within hearing distance of Centeno and Reyes, "Putang inang mga
pulis iyan! Walang kuwenta sa akin iyan!" 9 They claimed to be tolerant and simply admonished him to go home, but
subsequent events showed they were really annoyed by his remarks. This was the motive that prompted Reyes to drag Santos to
the municipal building and led Centeno later to kill him.
We are satisfied that Violago and Villanueva were telling the truth about the killing of their friend although there were indeed
inconsistencies in their statements. These were minor lapses only and did not impair the essential truthfulness of their
narrations. As for the defense, its explanation of the death of Santos while he was in the custody of the police is hardly plausible
and mainly speculative. Murder cannot be excused on such improbable conjectures
Murder it was indeed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There was alevosia because Santos was suddenly attacked
from behind when in his weakened and intoxicated condition, coupled with the fact that his arm was then being held by Reyes,
he could not defend himself. The accused-appellant had employed means aimed at achieving his purpose without risk to himself
from any defense the victim could have made.
Even assuming there was abuse of superior strength, on which issue we do not have to rule here, this aggravating circumstance is
deemed absorbed by treachery. As for the mitigating circumstances claimed by the defense, the Court holds that they cannot be
allowed. The derogatory statement made by Santos which so irritated Centeno did not constitute such a grave provocation as to
warrant the lessening of his penalty for reacting as he did in punishing the victim to death. Neither can Centeno argue now that
he had not intended to commit so grave a wrong as the actual killing of Santos as he knew, or should have known, that the karate
chops on the nape of the neck would have a lethal effect upon the defenseless and drunken victim.
There being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the term of imprisonment was correctly fixed at reclusion
perpetua, the medium penalty for murder. The civil indemnity is, however, increased to P30,000.00 consistent with present
policy.
It was not only Rolando Santos who was intoxicated when he died at 22 on December 1, 1968. There was another kind of
drunkenness that afflicted the chief of police, who misused his power and lawlessly took a life.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED except as to the civil indemnity, which is increased to P30,000.00. Costs
against the accused-appellant. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the
vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very
little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he
says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance
to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it
a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies.
In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades
and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of
the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when
individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that
it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for
this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of
the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree
of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c)
Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack
of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause
for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to
the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether
Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach
upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is
fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force
of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of
course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight
lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing,
there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome
the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused
to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
 2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity
or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking
advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel,
in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in
Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together
with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined
and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF
FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00),
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie
'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN
DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON
OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
 HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME
'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series"
in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in
Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; 6 much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in
an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in
a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident
from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a
series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the
same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more,
di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is
only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a
big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder"
there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series,"
it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation
to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards
a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly,
there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the
term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and
others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or
where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain
a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The
doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct
to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 12It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible
as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would
be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."15 The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a
statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." 21 Consequently, there is
no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts
and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the
law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to
overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware
that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible
of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actfor being vague. Petitioners posited, among others,
that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their
official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because
they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"
merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the
use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act
3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is
unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par.
(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in
that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such
exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in
the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100
million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public
document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an
enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say,
instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can
we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove
that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be ₱110 or ₱120
million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which
were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a
crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient
to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is
no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution
need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00. 31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth.
Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element
of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the
Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying
Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive
element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you
do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that
cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of
Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the
sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest
of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec.
4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and
every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as
well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative
by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other
heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this
Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well
as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three
days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery
with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and
in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions
of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees
or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in
a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of
an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it
to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now
as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the
amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution
and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a
long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION: KAPUNAN, J.:
The primary duty of the Court is to render justice. The resolution of the issues brought before it must be grounded on law, justice and the basic
tenets of due process, unswayed by the passions of the day or the clamor of the multitudes, guided only by its members’ honest conscience,
clean hearts and their unsullied conviction to do what is right under the law.
The issues posed by the instant petition are quite difficult. The task of the Court to resolve the same is made more daunting because the case
involves a former President of the Republic who, in the eyes of certain sectors of society, deserves to be punished. But the mandate of the
Court is to decide these issues solely on the basis of law and due process, and regardless of the personalities involved. For indeed, the rule of
law and the right to due process are immutable principles that should apply to all, even to those we hate. As Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a noted
constitutionalist, aptly puts it--
x x x the greater disaster would be if the Supreme Court should heed the clamor for conviction and convict Estrada even under an
unconstitutional law but of the belief that Estrada deserves to be punished. That would be tantamount to a rule of men and not of law. 1
The Basic Facts
The petition before us questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7080 (R.A. No. 7080 or Plunder Law), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,2 entitled "An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder." 3 This original petition for certiorari and prohibition against Respondent
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan filed by petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails Respondent court’s Resolution, dated July 9, 2001,
denying his Motion to Quash the information against him in Criminal Case No. 26558 for Plunder. Petitioner likewise prays that the
Sandiganbayan be prohibited and enjoined from proceeding with his arraignment and trial in Criminal Case No. 26558 due to the
unconstitutionality of R. A. No. 7080.
On the heels of the finality of the joint decision of this Court in G.R. No. 146710 (Estrada vs. Desierto, et al.) and in G.R. No. 146738 (Estrada vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo), promulgated on April 3, 2001, upholding the constitutionality of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s assumption of office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines and declaring that the former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada no longer enjoyed immunity
from suit, the Ombudsman filed eight (8) Informations against Estrada. These cases were Criminal Case No. 26558 (for Plunder); Criminal Case
No. 26559 (for Violation of Sec. 3[a] of Republic Act No. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26560 (for Violation of Sec. 3[a] of R.A. No. 3019); Criminal
Case No. 26561 (for Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26562 (for Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. No. 3019); Criminal Case No.
26563 (for Violation of Sec. 7[d] of R.A. No. 6713); Criminal Case No. 26564 (for Perjury); and Criminal Case No. 26565 (for Illegal Use of Alias).
The aforementioned informations were raffled to the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan. Criminal Case No. 26558 was raffled to the Third
Division of said court. The amended information against petitioner charging violations of Section 2, in relation to Section (d) (1) (2) of the
statute reads:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in conspiracy with his co-accused, business associates and persons heretofore named, by taking advantage of
his official position, authority, connection or influence as President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and unjustly enrich himself in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17,
more or less, through a combination and series of overt and criminal acts, described as follows:
(a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so-called "jueteng money" from gambling operators in
connivance with co-accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’
Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000.000.00), more or
less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers in their illegal "jueteng" activities; and
(b) by misappropriating, converting and misusing for his gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00)
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’
Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as witnessed by Gov. Luis
‘Chavit’ Singson, among other witnesses; and
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to
purchase and buy a combined total of 681,733,000 shares of stock of the Belle Corporation in the aggregate gross value of One Billion
Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Pesos and Fifty Centavos(P1,847,578,057.50), for the
purpose of collecting for his personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect and receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS (P189,700,000.00) as commission for said stock purchase; and
(d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained
wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his account name "Jose Velarde" with Equitable PCI Bank:
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On April 16 and 17, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case Nos. 26559, 26560,
26561, 26562 and 26563. Petitioner registered his objection to the Ombudsman’s motion to withdraw. The divisions of the Sandiganbayan to
which said cases were assigned granted the withdrawal of the informations, save for that in Criminal Case No. 26561. At present, the Order of
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan denying the Ombudsman’s motion to withdraw in Criminal Case No. 26561 is still under reconsideration.
In Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner filed on April 11, 2001 an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman
for: (1) the conduct of a preliminary investigation as regards specification "d" of the accusations in the information in said case; and (2)
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses in specifications "a," "b" and "c" to enable petitioner to file his counter-affidavits as well as
other necessary documents.
On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that:
(p)robable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio
Ramon Tan or Mr. Uy and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.
Subsequently, on May 31, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion.
On June 15, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution but the same was denied in a Resolution of June 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on June 14, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the information in Criminal Case No. 26558, invoking the following grounds:
(1) the facts charged do not constitute an indictable offense as R.A. No. 7080, the statute on which it is based, is unconstitutional; and (2) the
information charges more than one offense.
The People of the Philippines filed an Opposition thereto on June 21, 2001. Petitioner filed his Reply to the Opposition on June 28, 2001.
On July 9, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner argues that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM
OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO
ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SECRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.5
The provisions of law involved
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 provides:
Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million
pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided
by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
(As amended by Sec. 12, RA No. 7659.)
Section 1(d) of the same law defines "ill-gotten wealth" as "any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2)" hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. 6
On the other hand, Section 4 states:
Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Petitioner’s theory
Petitioner asserts that R.A. No. 7080 is vague and overbroad on its face, and suffers from structural deficiency and ambiguity.7 In sum, he
maintains that the law does not afford an ordinary person reasonable notice that his actuation will constitute a criminal offense. More
particularly, petitioner argues that the terms "combination" and "series" are not clearly defined, citing that in a number of cases, the United
States (U.S.) federal courts in deciding cases under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO law), after which the Plunder
Law was patterned, have given different interpretations to "series of acts or transactions." 8 In addition, he terms "raid on the public treasury,"
"receiving or accepting a gift," "commission," "kickbacks," "illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets," "monopolies or other
combinations," "special interests," "taking undue advantage of official position," "unjustly enrich" all suffer from overbreadth which is a form of
vagueness.9
In arguing that the law on plunder is vague and impermissibly broad, petitioner points out that the terms "combination" and ‘series" used in
the phrase "any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes" are not defined under the statute. The use of these terms in
the law allegedly raises several questions as to their meaning and import.
Petitioner posits the following queries: "Does it (referring to the term "series") mean two, three, four, of the overt or criminal acts listed in
Section 1(d)? Would it mean two or more related enterprises falling under at least two of the means or ‘similar schemes’ listed in the law, or
just a joint criminal enterprise? Would it require substantial identity of facts and participants, or merely a common pattern of action? Would it
imply close connection between acts, or a direct relationship between the charges? Does the term mean a factual relationship between
acts or merely a common plan among conspirators?"10
The term "combination" is allegedly equally equivocal. According to petitioner, it is not clear from the law if said term covers time, place,
manner of commission, or the principal characters. Thus petitioner asks: "Does it (referring to the term "combination") include any two or
more acts, whether legal or illegal, or does the law require that the combination must include at least two of the ‘means or similar schemes’
laid down in R.A. 7080? Does it cover transactions that have occurred in the same place or area, or in different places, no matter how far
apart? Does ‘combination’ include any two or more overt acts, no matter how far apart in time, or does it contemplate acts committed within
a short period of time? Does the ‘combination’ cover the modus operandi of the crimes, or merely the evidence to be used at the trial?"11
It is also argued that the phrase "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy" adds to the vagueness of the
law because "pattern" is not defined therein and is not included in the definition of the crime of plunder even though it is an essential element
of said crime.12
Petitioner also maintains that the Plunder Law violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence by lowering the
quantum of evidence necessary for proving the component elements of plunder because Section 4 does not require that each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy be proved, "it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy." 13
Finally, petitioner alleges that it is beyond the power of Congress to delimit the reasonable doubt standard and to abolish the element of mens
rea in mala in se crimes by converting these to mala prohibita, thereby making it easier for the prosecution to prove malversation, bribery,
estafa and other crimes committed by public officers since criminal intent need not be established. 14
Considering the infringement to the constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of an accused, petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080
cannot be accorded any presumption of constitutional validity.
Respondents’ theory
On the other hand, Respondents argue that the "particular elements constituting the crime of plunder" are stated with "definiteness and
certainty," as follows:
(1) There is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons;
(2) There is an amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth;
(3) The total amount of ill-gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00); and
(4) The ill-gotten wealth, which is defined as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) of R.A. No. 7080, was acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates, and/or business associates by any combination or series of the means or similar schemes enumerated in Section 1(d). 15
Moreover, Respondents maintain that assuming that there is some vagueness in the law, it need not be declared unconstitutional but may be
clarified by judicial construction. 16 Respondents further add that the ordinary import of the terms combination" and "series" should prevail, as
can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Congress in the course of its passage of the law. According to respondents, "series of overt
criminal acts" simply mean a repetition of at least two of any of those enumerated acts found in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080. And "combination"
means a product of combining of at least one of any of those enumerated acts described in Section 1(d) with at least one of any of the other
acts so enumerated. Respondents score petitioner for arguing on the basis of federal courts’ decisions on the RICO law, citing that the U.S.
courts have consistently rejected the contention that said law is void for being vague. 17
Respondents deny that the Plunder Law dispenses with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. While there may be no necessity
to prove each and every other act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme to acquire ill-gotten wealth, it is still necessary for the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well as all
the other elements of the offense of plunder. 18 Respondents also point out that conspiracy itself is not punishable under the Plunder Law,
which deals with conspiracy as a means of incurring criminal liability. 19
Respondents likewise contend that it is within the inherent powers and wisdom of the legislature to determine which acts are mala prohibita in
the same way that it can declare punishable an act which is inherently not criminal in nature. 20
In conclusion, Respondents assert that petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.
Petitioner’s Reply
Petitioner, in his Reply to Comment, draws attention to Section 4, arguing that the provision states the "most important element, which is the
common thread that ties the component acts together: "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy21 and raises the following questions:
(a) Reference is made to a "pattern of overt or criminal acts." The disjunctive "or" is used. Will a pattern of acts, which are overt but
not criminal in themselves, be indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy?
(b) Under what specific facts or circumstances will a "pattern" be "indicative" of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy?
(c) Under what specific facts or circumstances will the required "pattern" or "scheme" even be said to be present or to exist?
(d) When is there an "unlawful scheme or conspiracy?" 22
Issues raised in the oral arguments
Oral arguments were heard on September 18, 2001. At said hearing, the Court defined the issues for resolution as follows:
1.) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VAGUE;
2) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 REQUIRES LESS EVIDENCE FOR PROVING THE PREDICATE CRIMES OF PLUNDER AND THEREFORE VIOLATES
THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS; and
3) WHETHER PLUNDER AS DEFINED IN R.A. NO. 7080 IS A MALUM PROHIBITUM AND IF SO, WHETHER IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF
CONGRESS TO SO CLASSIFY THE SAME.23
Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda in which they discussed the points which they raised in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
I believe that there is merit in the petition.
A penal statute which violates constitutional
guarantees of individual rights is void.
Every law enacted by Congress enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, 24 and the presumption prevails in the absence of contrary
evidence.25 A criminal statute is generally valid if it does not violate constitutional guarantees of individual rights. 26 Conversely, when a
constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of being trampled upon by a criminal statute, such law must be struck down for
being void.27
One of the fundamental requirements imposed by the Constitution upon criminal statutes is that pertaining to clarity and definiteness.
Statutes, particularly penal laws, that fall short of this requirement have been declared unconstitutional for being vague. This "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine is rooted in the basic concept of fairness as well as the due process clause of the Constitution.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process 28 as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.29 A criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. 30
There are three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that individuals are properly
warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss:31
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. 32
Second, and viewed as more important, the doctrine is intended to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. 33 Vague laws are
invariably "standardless" and as such, they afford too great an opportunity for criminal enforcement to be left to the unfettered discretion of
police officers and prosecutors.34 Third, vague laws fail to provide sufficient guidance to judges who are charged with interpreting statutes.
Where a statute is too vague to provide sufficient guidance, the judiciary is arguably placed in the position of usurping the proper function of
the legislature by "making the law" rather than interpreting it. 35
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty the standards to which an
individual must conform his conduct, 36 it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective conduct. 37 And where a
statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher. 38 The penalty imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A.
No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to death.39 Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably
higher than that of other laws.40
Void-for-vagueness doctrine
applies to criminal laws.
A view has been proffered that "vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to penal laws." 41 These two concepts, while related,
are distinct from each other.42 On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of
speech.43 On the other hand, the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other
fundamental constitutional rights.44 The fact that a particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech does not mean that a facial
challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed. 45
As earlier intimated, the "vagueness doctrine" is anchored on the constitutionally-enshrined right to due process of law. Thus, as in this case
that the "life, liberty and property" of petitioner is involved, the Court should not hesitate to look into whether a criminal statute has
sufficiently complied with the elementary requirements of definiteness and clarity. It is an erroneous argument that the Court cannot apply the
vagueness doctrine to penal laws. Such stance is tantamount to saying that no criminal law can be challenged however repugnant it is to the
constitutional right to due process.
While admittedly, penal statutes are worded in reasonably general terms to accomplish the legislature’s objective of protecting the public from
socially harmful conduct, this should not prevent a vagueness challenge in cases where a penal statute is so indeterminate as to cause the
average person to guess at its meaning and application. For if a statute infringing upon freedom of speech may be challenged for being vague
because such right is considered as fundamental, with more reason should a vagueness challenge with respect to a penal statute be allowed
since the latter involve deprivation of liberty, and even of life which, inarguably, are rights as important as, if not more than, free speech.
It has been incorrectly suggested 46 that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its face"
challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. 47 Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,48 it is also opined that "claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and that "overbreadth claims, if entertained
at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it is
argued further that "on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as ‘manifestly strong medicine,’ to be employed ‘sparingly and only
as a last resort.’" A reading of Broadrick, however, shows that the doctrine involved therein was the doctrine of overbreadth. Its application to
the present case is thus doubtful considering that the thrust at hand is to determine whether the Plunder Law can survive the vagueness
challenge mounted by petitioner. A noted authority on constitutional law, Professor Lockhart, explained that "the Court will resolve them
(vagueness challenges) in ways different from the approaches it has fashioned in the law of overbreadth." 49 Thus, in at least two cases,50 the
U.S. courts allowed the facial challenges to vague criminal statutes even if these did not implicate free speech
In Kolender v. Lawson,51 petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a California criminal statute which required persons who loiter or wander
on the streets to provide a credible and reasonable identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under
circumstances that would justify a valid stop. The U.S. Supreme Court held that said statute was unconstitutionally vague on its face within the
meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to clarify what is
contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reasonable identification." Springfield vs. Oklahoma52 on the other
hand involved a challenge to a Columbus city ordinance banning certain assault weapons. The court therein stated that a criminal statute may
be facially invalid even if it has some conceivable application. It went on to rule that the assailed ordinance’s definition of "assault weapon" was
unconstitutionally vague, because it was "fundamentally irrational and impossible to apply consistently by the buying public, the sportsman,
the law enforcement officer, the prosecutor or the judge." 53
It is incorrect to state that petitioner has made "little effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as applied to him, as he allegedly
"attacks ‘on their face’ not only §§ 1(d)(1) and (2) of R.A. 7080 under which he is charged, but also its other provisions which deal with plunder
committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of government assets (§1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest in business (§1(d)(4)), and establishment
of monopolies and combinations or implementation of decrees intended to benefit particular persons or special interests (§ 1(d)
(5))."54 Notably, much of petitioner’s arguments dealt with the vagueness of the key phrases "combination or series" and "pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" which go into the very nature of the crime for which he is charged.
Taking into consideration that the Plunder Law is a penal statute that imposes the supreme penalty of death, and that petitioner in this case
clearly has standing to question its validity inasmuch as he has been charged thereunder and that he has been for sometime now painfully
deprived of his liberty, it behooves this Court to address the challenge on the validity of R.A. No. 7080.
Men steeped in law find
difficulty in understanding plunder.
The basic question that arises, therefore, is whether the clauses in Section 2--
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof
and Section 1(d), which provides--
x x x by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxx
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
as qualified by Section 4 which also speaks of the "scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth" and of
"a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," are clear enough that a person "of common
intelligence" need not guess at their meaning and differ as to their application.
The above raise several difficult questions of meaning which go to the very essence of the offense, such as:
a. How many acts would constitute a "combination or series?"
b. Must the acts alleged to constitute the "combination or series" be similar in nature? Note that Section 1(d) speaks of "similar
schemes" while Section 4 speaks of "the scheme" and of "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy."
c. Must the "combination or series" of "overt or criminal acts" involving the aggregate amount of at least P50 million be conceived as
such a scheme or a "pattern of overt or criminal acts" from inception by the accused?
 d. What would constitute a "pattern"? What linkage must there be between and among the acts to constitute a "pattern"? Need
there be a linkage as to the persons who conspire with one another, and a linkage as to all the acts between and among them?
e. When Section 4 speaks of "indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," would this mean that the "scheme" or
"conspiracy" should have been conceived or decided upon in its entirety, and by all of the participants?
f. When committed in connivance "with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons" or through "dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates", would such fact
be part of the "pattern of overt or criminal acts" and of the "overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" such that all of those who are
alleged to have participated in the crime of plunder must have participated in each and every act allegedly constituting the crime of
plunder? And as in conspiracy, conspired together from inception to commit the offense?
g. Within what time frame must the acts be committed so as to constitute a "combination or series"?
I respectfully disagree with the majority that "ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters" are provided in the law 55 to resolve these
basic questions.
Even men steeped in the knowledge of the law are in a quandary as to what constitutes plunder. The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
Justice Francis Garchitorena, admitted that the justices of said court "have been quarrelling with each other in finding ways to determine
what [they] understand by plunder."56 Senator Neptali Gonzales also noted during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 733 that the definition
of plunder under the law is vague. He bluntly declared: "I am afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due process clause and
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation of an accused. 57 Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical
portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?"58
The meanings of "combination" and "series"
as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.
Although the law has no statutory definition of "combination" or "series", the majority is of the view that resort can be had to the ordinary
meaning of these terms. Thus, Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives the meaning of "combination": "the result or product or
product of combining: a union or aggregate made of combining one thing with another." 59
In the context of R.A. No. 7080, "combination" as suggested by the Solicitor General means that at least two of the enumerated acts found in
Section 1(d), i.e., one of any of the enumerated acts, combined with another act falling under any other of the enumerated means may
constitute the crime of plunder. With respect to the term "series," the majority states that it has been understood as pertaining to "two or
more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category" 60 as gleaned from the deliberations on the law in the House of Representatives
and the Senate.
Further, the import of "combination" or "series" can be ascertained, the majority insists, 61 from the following deliberations in the Bicameral
Conference Committee on May 7, 1991:
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS
AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean
to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, because we say series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that-
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes. Combination is not twice—but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean two different acts. It can not be a repetition of the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes, This distinguishes it, really, from the ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion
because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So…
HON. ISIDRO: I know what you are talking about. For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds
who raids the public treasury, now, for example, misappropriation, if there are a series of misappropriations?
xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series. One after the other eh di…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN TAÑADA): So that would fall under term "series"?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations…
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): It’s not… two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say "combination", two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA): Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha…
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition… 62
The following deliberations in the Senate are pointed to by the majority 63 to show that the words "combination" and "series" are given their
ordinary meaning:
Senator Maceda. In line of our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line
25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or". To read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such
as". Remove the idea of necessitating "a series". Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
Senator Tañada. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
The President. Probably, two or more would be….
Senator Maceda. Yes, because ‘a series’ implies several or many’ two or more.
Senator Tañada. Accepted, Mr. President.
xxx
The President. If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say ‘acts of plunder’ there should be,
at least, two or more.
Senator Romulo. In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President. 64
To my mind, resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms "combination" and "series" as well as recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers
only serve to prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the Constitution on clarity and definiteness. Note that the key
element to the crime of plunder is that the public officer, by himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses, accumulates, or acquires "ill-gotten
wealth" through a "combination or series of overt or criminal acts" as described in Section 1(d) of the law. Senator Gonzales, during the
deliberations in the Senate, already raised serious concern over the lack of a statutory definition of what constitutes "combination" or "series",
consequently, expressing his fears that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 might be violative of due process:
Senator Gonzales. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act and while constituting a single offense, it must consist of a series of
overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and
like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think, this provision, by itself will be vague. I am afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due
process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by "series of overt or
criminal acts"? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt acts like,
for example, robbery in band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of participants therein. In this particular case probably,
we can statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for example, would that be already a series? Or, three, what would be the
basis for such determination?65(Emphasis supplied.)
The point raised by Senator Gonzales is crucial and well-taken. I share petitioner’s observation that when penal laws enacted by Congress make
reference to a term or concept requiring a quantitative definition, these laws are so crafted as to specifically state the exact number or
percentage necessary to constitute the elements of a crime. To cite a few:
"Band" – "Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have
been committed by a band." (Article 14[6], Revised Penal Code) 66
"Conspiracy" – "A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it." (Article 8, Revised Penal Code)67
"Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate" – "Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme x x x."
(Section 38, Labor Code)
"Large-scale Illegal Recruitment" – "Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group." (Section 38, Labor Code)
"Organized/Syndicated Crime Group" – "[M]eans a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Article 62 (1)(1a), Revised Penal Code) 68
"Swindling by a Syndicate" – "x x x if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme x x x ." (Section 1, P.D. No. 1689) 69
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee and of the Senate cited by the majority, consisting mostly of unfinished sentences,
offer very little help in clarifying the nebulous concept of plunder. All that they indicate is that Congress seemingly intended to hold liable for
plunder a person who: (1) commits at least two counts of any one of the acts mentioned in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080, in which case, such
person commits plunder by a series of overt criminal acts; or (2) commits at least one count of at least two of the acts mentioned in Section
1(d), in which case, such person commits plunder by a combination of overt criminal acts. Said discussions hardly provide a window as to the
exact nature of this crime.
A closer look at the exchange between Representatives Garcia and Isidro and Senator Tañada would imply that initially, combination was
intended to mean "two or more means,"70 i.e., "number one and two or number one and something else x x x," 71 "two of the enumerated
means not twice of one enumeration," 72 "two different acts."73Series would refer to "a repetition of the same act."74 However, the distinction
was again lost as can be gleaned from the following:
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) Yes. Combination is not twice – but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO. So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a repetition of the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO. No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). A series.
REP. ISIDRO. That’s not series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. This distinguishes it really the ordinary --- That’s why I said, that’s a very good suggestion, because if its’
only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime. But we have here a combination or series, of overt or criminal acts" (Emphasis supplied). 75
xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Series. One after the other eh di…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) So, that would fall under the term "series"?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P) Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO. Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations…
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) It’s not… two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO. So, it is not a combination?
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. When we say "combination", two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Two different.
REP. ISIDRO. Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) For example, ha…
REP. ISIDRO. Now a series, meaning, repetition…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. With that…
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) So, it could be a series of any of the acts mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 of Section 2 (d), or… 1 (d) rather, or
a combination of any of the acts mentioned in paragraph 1 alone, or paragraph 2 alone or paragraph 3 or paragraph 4.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) I think combination maybe…which one? Series?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Series or combination.
REP. ISIDRO. Which one, combination or series or series or combination?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) Okay. Ngayon doon sa definition, ano, Section 2, definition, doon sa portion ng… Saan iyon? As mentioned, as
described…
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Described. I think that is…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA) … better than "mentioned". Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Okay?
REP. ISIDRO. Very good.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAÑADA) Oo, marami pong salamat.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Maraming salamat po.
The meeting was adjourned at 1:33 p.m."76 (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforequoted deliberations, especially the latter part thereof, would show a dearth of focus to render precise the definition of the terms.
Phrases were uttered but were left unfinished. The examples cited were not very definite. Unfortunately, the deliberations were apparently
adjourned without the Committee members themselves being clear on the concept of series and combination.
Moreover, if "combination" as used in the law simply refers to the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least P50 Million through at least two of the means enumerated in Section 1(d), and "series," to at least two counts of one of the modes under
said section, the accused could be meted out the death penalty for acts which, if taken separately, i.e., not considered as part of the
combination or series, would ordinarily result in the imposition of correctional penalties only. If such interpretation would be adopted, the
Plunder law would be so oppressive and arbitrary as to violate due process and the constitutional guarantees against cruel or inhuman
punishment.77 The penalty would be blatantly disproportionate to the offense. Petitioner’s examples illustrate this absurdity:
a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods),
combined with -
one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium period
to prision mayor in its minimum period).
equals –
Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets under R. A. 7080)
b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both).
combined with –
one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum or a
fine ranging from P200 to P6,00, or both.
equals –
Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080).
c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine of P200 to
P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code).
combined with –
one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art. 186 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both),
equals –
plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets). 78
The argument that higher penalties may be imposed where two or more distinct criminal acts are combined and are regarded as special
complex crimes, i.e., rape with homicide, does not justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death in case plunder is
committed. Taken singly, rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua;79and homicide, by reclusion temporal. 80 Hence, the increase in the penalty
imposed when these two are considered together as a special complex crime is not too far from the penalties imposed for each of the single
offenses. In contrast, as shown by the examples above, there are instances where the component crimes of plunder, if taken separately, would
result in the imposition of correctional penalties only; but when considered as forming part of a series or combination of acts constituting
plunder, could be punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The disproportionate increase in the penalty is certainly violative of substantive
due process and constitute a cruel and inhuman punishment.
It may also be pointed out that the definition of "ill-gotten wealth" in Section 1(d) has reference to the acquisition of property (by the accused
himself or in connivance with others) "by any combination or series" of the "means" or "similar schemes" enumerated therein, which include
the following:
xxx
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other forms of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment or any business enterprise or undertakings;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
xxx
The above-mentioned acts are not, by any stretch of the imagination, criminal or illegal acts. They involve the exercise of the right to liberty and
property guaranteed by Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." Receiving or accepting any shares of stock is
not per se objectionable. It is in pursuance of civil liberty, which includes "the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways;
x x x to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and/or that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. 81 Nor is there any impropriety, immorality or illegality in
establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and orders even if they
are intended to benefit particular persons or special interests. The phrases "particular persons" and "special interests" may well refer to the
poor,82the indigenous cultural communities, 83 labor,84 farmers,85 fisherfolk,86 women,87 or those connected with education, science and
technology, arts, culture and sports.88
In contrast, the monopolies and combinations described in Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code are punishable because, as specifically
defined therein, they are "on restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial means of free competition in the market, or the object is
"to alter the price" of any merchandise "by spreading false rumors," or to manipulate market prices in restraint of trade. There are no similar
elements of monopolies or combinations as described in the Plunder Law to make the acts wrongful.
If, as interpreted by the Solicitor General, "series" means a "repetition" or pertains to "two or more" acts, and "combination as defined in the
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary is "the result or product of combining one thing with another," 89 then, the commission of two or
more acts falling under paragraphs (4) and (5) of Section 1(d) would make innocent acts protected by the Constitution as criminal, and
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
R.A. No. 7080 does not define "pattern,"
an essential element of the crime of plunder.
Granting arguendo that, as asserted by the majority, "combination" and "series" simplistically mean the commission of two or more of the acts
enumerated in Section 1(d),90 still, this interpretation does not cure the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080. In construing the definition of "plunder,"
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 must not be read in isolation but rather, must be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of said law. It is a
basic rule of statutory construction that to ascertain the meaning of a law, the same must be read in its entirety. 91 Section 1 taken in relation to
Section 4 suggests that there is something to plunder beyond simply the number of acts involved and that a grand scheme to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A. No. 7080. Sections 1 and 2 pertain only to the nature and quantitative means
or acts by which a public officer, by himself or in connivance with other persons, "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth." Section
4, on the other hand, requires the presence of elements other than those enumerated in Section 2 to establish that the crime of plunder has
been committed because it speaks of the necessity to establish beyond reasonable doubt a "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
Clearly, it will not suffice that the "illegal wealth" amassed is at least Fifty Million Pesos and that this was acquired by any two or more of the
acts described in Section 1(d); it is necessary that these acts constitute a "combination or series" of acts done in furtherance of "the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth", and which constitute "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
scheme or conspiracy."
That pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is evident from a reading of the assailed law in its entirety. It is that which would
distinguish plunder from isolated criminal acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws, for without the existence a "pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy" to acquire ill-gotten wealth, a person committing several or even all of the
acts enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be convicted for plunder, but may be convicted only for the specific crimes committed under the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws.
For this reason, I do not agree that Section 4 is merely a rule of evidence or a rule of procedure. It does not become such simply because its
caption states that it is, although its wording indicates otherwise. On the contrary, it is of substantive character because it spells out a
distinctive element of the crime which has to be established, i.e., an overall unlawful "scheme or conspiracy" indicated by a "pattern of overt or
criminal acts" or means or similar schemes "to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth."
The meaning of the phrase "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," however, escapes me. As
in "combination" and "series," R.A. No. 7080 does not provide a definition of "pattern" as well as "overall unlawful scheme." Reference to the
legislative history of R.A. No. 7080 for guidance as to the meanings of these concepts would be unavailing, since the records of the
deliberations in Congress are silent as to what the lawmakers mean by these terms.
Resort to the dictionary meanings of "pattern" and "scheme" is, in this case, wholly inadequate. These words are defined as:
pattern: an arrangement or order of things or activity.92
scheme: design; project; plot.93
At most, what the use of these terms signifies is that while multiplicity of the acts (at least two or more) is necessary, this is not sufficient to
constitute plunder. As stated earlier, without the element of "pattern" indicative of an "overall unlawful scheme," the acts merely constitute
isolated or disconnected criminal offenses punishable by the Revised Penal Code or other special laws.
The commission of two or more of the acts falling under Section 1(d) is no guarantee that they fall into a "pattern" or "any arrangement or
order." It is not the number of acts but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing principle that renders them
"ordered" or "arranged":
A pattern is an arrangement or order of things, or activity, and the mere fact that there are a number of predicates is no guarantee that they fall
into an arrangement or order. It is not the number of predicates but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some external
organizing principle that renders them ‘ordered’ or ‘arranged.’ 94
In any event, it is hardly possible that two predicate acts can form a pattern:
The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance, two of anything will not generally
form a ‘pattern.’95
In H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. et al.96 (hereinafter referred to as Northwestern), the U.S. Court reiterated the foregoing
doctrine:
xxx Nor can we agree with those courts that have suggested that a pattern is established merely by proving two predicate acts. 97
Respondents’ metaphorical illustration of "pattern" as a wheel with spokes (the overt or criminal acts of the accused) meeting at a common
center (the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth) and with a rim (the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy) of the wheel enclosing the spokes, is off
tangent. Their position that two spokes suffice to make a wheel, even without regard to the relationship the spokes bear to each other clearly
demonstrates the absurdity of their view, for how can a wheel with only two spokes which are disjointed function properly?
That "pattern" is an amorphous concept even in U.S. jurisprudence where the term is reasonably defined is precisely the point of the incisive
concurring opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in Northwestern where he invited a constitutional challenge to the RICO law on "void-for-
vagueness" ground.98 The RICO law is a federal statute in the United States that provides for both civil and criminal penalties for violation
therefor. It incorporates by reference twenty-four separate federal crimes and eight types of state felonies. 99 One of the key elements of a RICO
violation is that the offender is engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity." 100 The RICO law defines the phrase "pattern of racketeering
activity" as requiring "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of 18 USCS § 1961, and within ten
years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 101 Incidentally, the Solicitor General
claims that R.A. No. 7080 is an entirely different law from the RICO law. The deliberations in Congress reveal otherwise. As observed by Rep.
Pablo Garcia, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, R.A. No. 7080 was patterned after the RICO law. 102
In Northwestern, conceding that "[the U.S. Congress] has done nothing . . . further to illuminate RICO’s key requirement of a pattern of
racketeering," the U.S. Supreme Court, through Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., undertook the task of developing a meaningful concept of
"pattern" within the existing statutory framework. 103Relying heavily on legislative history, the US Supreme Court in that case construed
"pattern" as requiring "continuity plus relationship." 104 The US Supreme Court formulated the "relationship requirement" in this wise: "Criminal
conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 105 Continuity is clarified as "both a
closed and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the
future with a threat of repetition." 106
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the majority’s formulation. The "talismanic phrase" of "continuity plus relationship"
is, as put by Justice Scalia, about as helpful as advising the courts that "life is a fountain." He writes:
x x x Thus, when §1961(5) says that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity" it is describing what is needful but not
sufficient. (If that were not the case, the concept of "pattern" would have been unnecessary, and the statute could simply have attached
liability to "multiple acts of racketeering activity"). But what that something more is, is beyond me. As I have suggested, it is also beyond the
Court. Today’s opinion has added nothing to improve our prior guidance, which has created a kaleidoscope of Circuit positions, except to clarify
that RICO may in addition be violated when there is a "threat of continuity." It seems to me this increases rather than removes the vagueness.
There is no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals will be any more unified in the future, than they have in the past, regarding the content
of this law.
That situation is bad enough with respect to any statute, but it is intolerable with respect to RICO. For it is not only true, as Justice Marshall
commented in Sedima, S.P.R.L. vs. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 x x x, that our interpretation of RICO has "quite simply revolutionize[d] private
litigation" and "validate[d] the federalization of broad areas of state common law of frauds," x x x so that clarity and predictability in RICO’s civil
applications are particularly important; but it is also true that RICO, since it has criminal applications as well, must, even in its civil applications,
possess the degree of certainty required for criminal laws x x x. No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case, and
so that issue is not before us. That the highest court in the land has been unable to derive from this statute anything more than today’s meager
guidance bodes ill for the day when that challenge is presented. 107
It bears noting that in Northwestern the constitutionality of the RICO law was not challenged. 108 After Northwestern,the U.S. Supreme Court has
so far declined the opportunity to hear cases in which the void-for-vagueness challenge to the pattern requirement was raised. 109
Admittedly, at the district courts level, the state statutes (referred to as Little RICOS) 110 have so far successfully survived constitutional challenge
on void-for-vagueness ground. However, it must be underscored that, unlike R.A. No. 7080, these state anti-racketeering laws have invariably
provided for a reasonably clear, comprehensive and understandable definition of "pattern." 111 For instance, in one state, the pattern
requirement specifies that the related predicate acts must have, among others, the same or similar purpose, result, principal, victims or
methods of commission and must be connected with "organized crime. 112 In four others, their pattern requirement provides that two or more
predicate acts should be related to the affairs of the enterprise, are not isolated, are not closely related to each other and connected in point of
time and place, and if they are too closely related, they will be treated as a single act. 113 In two other states, pattern requirements provide that
if the acts are not related to a common scheme, plan or purpose, a pattern may still exist if the participants have the mental capacity required
for the predicate acts and are associated with the criminal enterprise. 114
All the foregoing state statutes require that the predicate acts be related and that the acts occur within a specified time frame.
Clearly, "pattern" has been statutorily defined and interpreted in countless ways by circuit courts in the United States. Their divergent
conclusions have functioned effectively to create variant criminal offenses. 115 This confusion has come about notwithstanding that almost all
these state laws have respectively statutorily defined "pattern". In sharp contrast, R.A. No. 7080, as earlier pointed out, lacks such crucial
definition. As to what constitutes pattern within the meaning of R.A. No. 7080 is left to the ad hoc interpretation of prosecutors and judges.
Neither the text of R.A. No. 7080 nor legislative history afford any guidance as to what factors may be considered in order to prove beyond
reasonable doubt "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
Be that as it may, it is glaringly fallacious to argue that "series" simply means a "repetition" or "pertaining to two or more" and "combination" is
the "result or product or product of combining." Whether two or more or at least three acts are involved, the majority would interpret the
phrase "combinations' or "series" only in terms of number of acts committed. They entirely overlook or ignore Section 4 which requires "a
pattern of overt of criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" to convict.
If the elements of the offense are as what the majority has suggested, the crime of plunder could have been defined in the following manner:
Where a public official, by himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses or acquires money or property by committing two or more acts in
violation of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019), or Articles 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216 and 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, he shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
The above would be a straightforward and objective definition of the crime of plunder. However, this would render meaningless the core
phrases "a combination or series of" "overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy," or the phrase "any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes" or "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy."
But that obviously is not the definition of the crime of plunder under R.A. 7080. There is something more. A careful reading of the law would
unavoidably compel a conclusion that there should be a connecting link among the "means or schemes" comprising a "series or combination"
for the purpose of acquiring or amassing "ill-gotten wealth." The bond or link is an "overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy mentioned in
Section 4. The law contemplates a combination or series of criminal acts in plunder done by the accused "in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth." It does not postulate acts committed randomly, separately or independently or
sporadically. Otherwise stated, if the legislature intended to define plunder as the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the manner espoused by
the majority, the use in R.A. 7080 of such words and phrases as "combination" and "series of overt or criminal acts" xxx "in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy" is absolutely pointless and meaningless.
R.A. No. 7080 makes it possible for a person
conspiring with the accused in committing
one of the acts constituting the charge
of plunder to be convicted for the same crime.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states that "[a]ny person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court." Both parties
share the view that the law as it is worded makes it possible for a person who participates in the commission of only one of the component
crimes constituting plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for plunder, not merely the component crime in which he participated. 116 While
petitioner concedes that it is easy to ascertain the penalty for an accomplice or accessory under R.A. No. 7080, such is not the case with
respect to a co-principal of the accused. 117 In other words, a person who conspires with the accused in the commission of only one of the
component crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for the component crime, or as co-principal for the crime of plunder, depending on the
interpretation of the prosecutor. The unfettered discretion effectively bestowed on law enforcers by the aforequoted clause in determining the
liability of the participants in the commission of one or more of the component crimes of a charge for plunder undeniably poses the danger of
arbitrary enforcement of the law. 118
R.A. No. 7080 does not clearly state
the prescriptive period of the crime of plunder.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7080 provides that the crime punishable under said Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Considering that the law was
designed to cover a "combination or series of overt or criminal acts," or "a pattern of overt or criminal acts," from what time shall the period of
prescription be reckoned? From the first, second, third or last act of the series or pattern? What shall be the time gap between two succeeding
acts? If the last act of a series or combination was committed twenty or more years after the next preceding one, would not the crime have
prescribed, thereby resulting in the total extinction of criminal liability under Article 89(b) of the Revised Penal Code? In antithesis, the RICO
law affords more clarity and definiteness in describing "pattern of racketeering activity" as "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 119119 119
The U.S. state statutes similarly provide specific time frames within which racketeering acts are committed.
The Solicitor General enjoins the Court to rectify the deficiencies in the law by judicial construction. However, it certainly would not be feasible
for the Court to interpret each and every ambiguous provision without falling into the trap of judicial legislation. A statute should be
construed to avoid constitutional question only when an alternative interpretation is possible from its language. 120 Borrowing from the opinion
of the court121 in Northwestern,122 the law "may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it so inclined, and not for
this Court." But where the law as the one in question is void on its face for its patent ambiguity in that it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, the Court cannot breathe life to it through
the guise of construction.
R.A. No. 7080 effectively eliminates mens rea
or criminal intent as an element of the crime of plunder.
Section 4 provides that for the purpose of establishing the crime of plunder, "it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
The majority would interpret this section to mean that the prosecution has the burden of "showing a combination or series resulting in the
crime of plunder." And, once the minimum requirements for a combination or a series of acts are met, there is no necessity for the prosecution
to prove each and every other act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.123
By its language, Section 4 eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing
just the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The law, in effect, penalizes the accused on the basis of a
proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable doubt each and every criminal act
done by the accused in the crime of plunder. To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a ‘series’ of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" 124
Moreover, by doing away with proof beyond reasonable doubt of each and every criminal act done by the accused in the furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient just to prove a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy, the Plunder Law effectively eliminated the mens rea or criminal intent as an element of the crime. Because of
this, it is easier to convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
Plunder is a malum in se.
The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, e.g. malversation, estafa, bribery and other
crimes committed by public officers. As such, they are by nature mala in secrimes. Since intent is an essential element of these crimes, then,
with more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder which, under R.A. No. 7659, is one of the heinous crimes 125 as pronounced in
one of its whereas clauses.126
The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by special law does not necessarily make the same mala
prohibita where criminal intent is not essential, although the term refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. For there is a marked
difference between the two. According to a well-known author on criminal law:
There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that
are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members; while
crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s 3rd Revision)
(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibit the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? (People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y.,
321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132)
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, as in illegal possession of firearms. (People vs.
Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code. When the acts are inherently immoral,
they are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On the other hand, there are crimes in the Revised Penal Code which were originally
defined and penalized by special laws. Among them are possession and use of opium, malversation, brigandage, and libel. 127
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently mala in se, even if punished by
a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts
constituting plunder and imposes a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paving the way for the imposition of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Evidently,
the authority of the legislature to omit the element of scienter in the proof of a crime refers to regulatory measures in the exercise of police
power, where the emphasis of the law is to secure a more orderly regulations of the offense of society, rather than the punishment of the
crimes. So that in mala prohibita prosecutions, the element of criminal intent is a requirement for conviction and must be provided in the
special law penalizing what are traditionally mala in se crimes. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, 128 citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the
Smith Act was ruled to require "intent" to advocate 129 and held to require knowledge of illegal advocacy. 130 And in another case,131 and
ordinance making illegal the possession of obscene books was declared unconstitutional for lack of scienter requirement.
Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution, and this is a limitation on police power. Additionally, lack of mens
rea or a clarifying scienter requirement aggravates the vagueness of a statute.
In Morisette v. U.S.132 the U.S. Supreme Court underscored the stultifying effect of eliminating mens rea, thus:
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious
effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s party to conviction, to strip the defendant of such
benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries. Such a
manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common law crimes on judicial initiative.
In the same breath, Justice Florenz Regalado expreses serious doubts as to the authority of the legislature to complex mala in se crimes
with mala prohibita, saying:
x x x although there has been a tendency to penalize crimes under special laws with penalties "borrowed" from the Code, there is still the
question of legislative authority to consolidate crimes punished under different statutes. Worse, where one is punished under the Code and the
other by the special law, both of these contingencies had not been contemplated when the concept of a delito complejo was engrafted into the
Code.133
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.
The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner’s
counsels134 was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law135 and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put
him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. 136 Moreover, estoppel should be
resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice.137 To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because
he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.
In People vs. Vera,138 citing the U.S. case of Attorney General v. Perkins, the Court held:
x x x The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that to an
accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation upon their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate statute
relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is a statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action
under it it had never been enacted. the constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow.
x x x139
The Court should not sanction the use of an equitable remedy to defeat the ends of justice by permitting a person to be deprived of his life and
liberty under an invalid law.
Undoubtedly, the reason behind the enactment of R.A. 7080 is commendable. It was a response to the felt need at the time that existing laws
were inadequate to penalize the nature and magnitude of corruption that characterized a "previous regime." 140 However, where the law, such
as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guesswork, the indefiniteness runs
afoul of due process concepts which require that persons be given full notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion of law enforcement
officials, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, be limited by explicit legislative standards. 141 It obfuscates the
mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the
resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the
levers of power.
I submit that the charge against petitioner in the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 does not constitute "plunder" under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. If at all, the acts charged may constitute offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) or the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the information charging petitioner with plunder must be quashed. Such
quashal, however, should be without prejudice to the filing of new informations for acts under R.A. No. 3019, of the Revised Penal Code and
other laws. Double jeopardy would not bar the filing of the same because the dismissal of the case is made with the express consent of the
petitioner-accused.142
In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.

G.R. No. L-9206 November 25, 1914

THE UNITED STATES vs. JOAQUIN CATANGAY
ARAULLO, J.:
On March 6, 1913, the following complaint was filed against the defendant in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas by the fiscal of that province:
The undersigned charges Joaquin Catangay with the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, committed as
follows:
On or about December 4, 1912, in the pueblo of Candelaria, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, the said Joaquin
Catangay did, without any precaution whatever, fire from his shotgun a charge that lodged in the left parietal region of
Mauricio Ramos, thereby instantly killing him; an act committed in violation of law.
After due trial the said Court of First Instance, on June 21, 1913, rendered judgment whereby the defendant, who was found
guilty of the crime charged in the complaint was sentenced to the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, to the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased or to suffer, in case of insolvency, forty
days of subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs of the case; and, finally it was therein ordered that the shotgun mentioned
in the complaint should be confiscated and disposed of in accordance with the law.
The trial court, setting forth in the said judgment the facts which he held to have been proven and the grounds upon which he
rendered his decision in the manner aforementioned, said:
"From the evidence introduced at the trial, it has been fully proven that on the night of the crime the deceased, Mauricio Ramos,
taking his shotgun with him went to hunt deer in the barrio of Quinatijan, municipality of Candelaria, Tayabas, first passing by the
house of Santiago Abandia, whom he took along with him and in his company also passed by the house of the defendant,
Joaquin Catangay, whom they both invited to bring his shotgun and go with them for a hunt; that while the three men were
passing along in the middle of a field of talahib (high grass), the deceased in front of the carrying lighted lantern fastened to his
forehead, behind him the defendant, and lastly Santiago Abandia, the first two men saw a deer were all mounted; that
thereupon Santiago Abandia stopped his horse and also dismounted in order that the deer might not become aware of the
presence of the hunters by the noise; that few moments afterwards. two shots were heard in quick succession and then the light
the deceased carried went out; that Santiago Abandia, upon noticing that the said light was extinguished, approached the
deceased; and he found the defendant alongside of him, raising him up, saying: "What can have happened to my godfather?';
that, as the deceased could not get up, Santiago Abandia asked the defendant for matches and lit a little stick, by which light
witness saw the wound in the back of the head of the deceased, who was already dead; and that the said wound consisted of a
fracture of the left parietal region, the brain being exposed. It has also been proved that there had been no previous trouble
between the defendant and the deceased, but that on the contrary they had always been on intimate terms of friendship.
The defendant testifying in his own defense stated that upon seeing that the deer, which the deceased had also noticed,
might escape, he made haste to approach the latter, who had his back toward him and was on his left, and that, in
taking hurried steps for that purpose, the defendant stumbled against an embankment orpilapil that lay between him
and the deceased; that thereupon he fell on one knee, an accident which caused the shotgun, which he had already
loaded, cocked, and aimed at the deer, the half of whose body was now lost from sight, to be discharged, this one
charge striking the deceased in the head.
The crime charged in the present case should be qualified as one of homicide occasioned by reckless negligence — a
crime provided for and punished by article 568, in connection with article 404, of the Penal Code — for the reason that
there was no malice or criminal intention on the part of the defendant in the discharge of his shotgun which resulted in
wounding and causing the instantaneous death of the deceased, Mauricio Ramos; but that was, however, reckless
negligence on the part of defendant, for, as the deceased whom he was approaching, was almost directly in front of
him, he should have taken the precaution — an elemental one in handling firearms so likely to be discharged by the
slightest accident — not to have carried his shotgun cocked and aimed, as he did on the occasion in question.
The defendant having appealed from said judgment, his counsel accepts the finding therein made of the proved facts, but
contends that the court erred in holding that such facts constitute reckless negligence and, therefore, in applying article 568 of
the Penal Code.
According to the trial judge, the reckless negligence on the part of the defendant consists in that latter did not take the necessary
precaution, which the court considered elemental on that occasion in view of the circumstances, not to carry his shotgun cocked
and aimed; but the court also took into account the fact that, as testified by the defendant, the discharge of his firearm (the shot
from which wounded and killed the deceased) was caused by his stumbling against an enbankment or pilapil that law between
him and the victim, causing him to fall to one of his knees.
The accidental cause, then, of the discharge of the arm was not due to the fact of the defendant's having it cocked and aimed,
but to the accident of his stumbling against an embankment in the way. The occurrence was entirely accidental and involuntary.
Consequently, the crime charged in this prosecution lacks the necessary element to allow of its being considered as reckless
negligence under article 568 of the Penal Code, as would have been the case if though through no malice on the part of the
defendant, the damage had been produced, nevertheless, by some voluntary act of his. (U.S. vs. Barnes, 12 Phil. Rep., 93; and
decision of the supreme court of Spain, of June 28, 1881.)
The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation
in which he is placed and with the importance of the act which he is to perform. (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. Rep., 375.)
In the case of United States vs. Barias (23 Phil. Rep., 434) this court, citing the case of Ahern vs. Oregon Telephone Co., (24 Oreg.,
276, 294; 35 Pac., 549), said: "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a
want of ordinary care under the circumstances."
In order to determine, therefore, whether there was imprudence or negligence on the part of the defendant, or whether or not
he took the necessary precautions to avoid the unfortunate accident that occurred, the surrounding circumstances, the nature of
the act that he was about to perform or was performing and the situation in which he found himself, must be taken into account.
In the judgment appealed from the statement is made that the defendant, according to his testimony, when he stumbled against
the enbankment or pilapil and fell to the ground on one knee already had his shotgun cocked and aimed at the deer, the half of
whose body was then lost to sight.
It is shown by the testimony of the defendant himself that when he perceived that there was a deer in sight he was three or four
meters away from the deceased and, with respect to the relative position of the latter and the defendant, at the point marked
No. 3 on the rough sketch (Exhibit 1), that is, behind the deceased, who was at a point a little aside and to the right of a straight
line in the direction of the deer, so that, as appear from the said sketch, the defendant, from where he was, could have
discharged his gun at the animal without serious danger to the deceased, because the latter was not in the direct line of fire, but
some distance away.lawph!1.net
The defendant, explaining what occurred and what he did as soon as he became aware of the presence of the deer, testified as
follows, in answer to various questions:
Q. Tell how the accident that is the subject matter of the information filed against you before this court occurred. — A.
One afternoon of the month of December, one night of the month of December, Mauricio Ramos and Santiago Abandia
came to my house and told me to get ready. I followed them and on my replying "yes," they added "quickly." I hastened
to saddle my horse and when it was saddled mounted it and we rode toward the north. When he arrived at the barrio
of Quinatihan and the irrigated land there, we loaded our shotguns and headed for the north, through this irrigated
land, in quest of deer, and we had not traveled long before he stopped his horse.
Q. Who was "he"? — A. The deceased, Mauricio Ramos. And my horse came up to his horse, behind his horse. On
seeing that he was disamounting, I checked my horse, backed it up, tied it and went to the place where he was; but, on
making a turn to pass around behind his horse, I saw him in the act of leaning forward, taking aim, and, owing to my
haste, for I saw that the deer was about to run, I stumbled against something and slipped, which caused the shotgun I
was carrying to go off.
Q. Is this the shotgun you were carrying? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you were hurrying to the place where he was, after you had tied your horse, how was your shotgun? — A. I
was going toward him with the shotgun, pointed upwards and held in both hands, and was pushing the safety catch to
release it, when I saw the deceased in a stooping position, almost on his knees, aiming at the deer.
Q. So that the shotgun of yours was at safety or had the safety catch when you were going toward him? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. and why did you go to him, for what purpose? — A. Because he was stooping and was aiming, and I saw that deer.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And for what purpose and why did you run toward the deceased? — A. I saw almost kneeling down on the ground
and aiming, but he had been in this position for some little time and had not fired. I saw the deer, or half of its body. It
was about to escape. I, too, wanted to shoot, and went in his direction so I could shoot the deer.
Q. What did you stumble against? — A. An embankment of earth, for it was in high place.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you say that upon your stumbling against something the shotgun went off? — A. Yes sir.
The court:
Q. When your gun was discharged was the safety catch still closed? — A. No, sir. just at the moment I raised the safety
catch I slipped and did not know how the gun went off, for it was discharged at the moment I stumbled.
The fiscal:
Q. How were you carrying the shotgun when, as you said, you pressed the safety catch to lock it? — A. I had my shotgun
with me. The other man had his shotgun in a horizontal position, almost in aim. He had stopped to fire. I was walking
pretty fast and was pushing up the safety catch when I stimbled and the barrel of the shotgun rose up at the same time I
fell.
Q. So that you fell? — A. I did not fall to the ground, but bent toward it so much that I nearly fell down.
 Q. Did the shotgun touch the ground? — A. No sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you saw the deer you got excited, aimed at it, and fired at it, did you not? — A. No sir. My intention was to get
nearer to it or alongside the deceased to take aim afterwards and shoot from there.
The court:
Q. When you were approaching the deceased, did you see where the deer was standing? A. — I saw only a half of the
deer's body and I made haste.
Q. Did you believe that the deer would get away from you without firing at it? — A. I feared that, for he had been aiming
some time and had not fired.
The fiscal:
Q. Immediately after you alighted from your horse and saw the deer, did you aim at it? — A. No, Sir.
Q. At what moment did you aim at it; when you were approaching the deceased? — A. I aimed at the deer when I saw
the deceased kneeling, in a kneeling posture, and when only half of the deers body was in sight.
Q. And you were going along — that is to say, you were aiming at the deer while you were walking? — A. Yes, sir. The
muzzle of the gun was pointing toward the deer.
From the foregoing questions and answers, it is seen that when the defendant became aware of the presence of the deer he saw
the deceased squatting down, almost kneeling on the ground and aiming at the animal; that he had been in this posture for
some little time without shooting, and as the defendant could see only half of the deer's body and the animal was about to run
away, the defendant tried to approach or get beside the deceased, in order to aim and shoot thence; that he did in fact go
toward the decease, holding the shotgun in both hands with the barrel pointing upwards, though in the direction of the deer,
and with the safety catch closed; and that, at the moment he pushed up the safety catch to open it, he stumbled against an
embankment, slipped and fell, and the gun he was holding in his hands was discharged.
Under the circumstances in which the defendant found himself, it was not necessary for him the employ extraordinary caution,
because the danger in which the deceased, who was at one side though some distance ahead of him, might then have been was
not great; it was enough that he should have taken the precaution that he did, and which was that which the circumstances
required in attempting to approach the deceased, to point upwards the gun he was carrying and to take advantage of the
occasion when the deceased was squatting and almost kneeling in this position the latter could not be in danger of being hit if
the gun was fired, while, on the other hand, he would have been free from all danger, had the defendant succeeded in getting
beside him, as he intended to do, in order to shoot thence, as being a point from which he could see the whole of the deer.
Neither can it be held that there was negligence or lack of care in the fact that the defendant tried to open the safety catch of
the gun while he was going toward the deceased and when he was but a short distance from him, for, in view of the nature of
the act which he was about to perform, it was natural that he should have the gun prepared to fire at the game, at once, or as
soon as he should have succeeded in placing himself beside his companion. So, if the gun was discharged through the
defendant's having stumbled against an embankment there, the shot causing the death of his companion, and this embankment
cannot be attributed to a want of caution or precaution on the part of the defendant (he did not see it, for, as he himself
testified, he was going along with his eyes fixed on the deer, and it is also understood that he would not have been looking down,
as he had his companion near at hand), the death of the deceased can only be attributed to an unforeseen and unfortunate
accident, for which the defendant can not be held criminally liable.
The Attorney-General, however, states in his brief that the defendant's liability may reasonable be inferred from his testimony
given in the criminal investigation held before the justice of the peace of Candelaria, Tayabas.
That testimony, which is shown in Exhibit B presented in evidence at the trial, in the part thereof pertinent to the matter in
question, reads as follows: "We were hunting on horseback and had agreed that if the man who was well ahead, that is,
Mauricio, should alight fro his horse, it would be a sign that he had found an animal; and it happened in fact that Mauricio did
alight from his horse. Then I also disamounted and on seeing that there was a deer immediately fired at it, but, owing to the
confusion existing at the time, I am unable to say positively whether or not he fired before I did, or whether I shot the deer or
the deceased."
According to the justice of the peace himself, who testified at the trial, the said testimony was taken down by him in Spanish, he
having translated it from Tagalog, in which language the defendant testified before him. Counsel for the defense, on the other
hand, tried to prove by means of cross-questions addressed to the justice of the peace at the hearing, that the latter, in taking
down the said testimony in Spanish, after translating it from Tagalog — the language used by the defendant — must have
omitted therefrom that part of the statement he made at the trial, relative to the cause of the discharge of the shotgun on that
occasion.
From the aforementioned testimony it merely appears indeed that an agreement had been made between the deceased,
Mauricio Ramos, his other companion and the defendant, that when the man who was well ahead, that is, the deceased, should
alight from his horse, it would be a sign that there was game in sight; and that the defendant, on seeing that Mauricio, the
deceased, had alighted from his horse, also disamounted from his and, on seeing that in fact there was a deer, immediately fired
his shotgun at it.
The lower court described very little importance to this testimony, for it is not mentioned in the decision, but took due account
of that given by the defendant at the trial; he found him guilty upon the ground that, as aforesaid, he did not take the proper
precaution, in view of the circumstances, not to carry his shotgun at that time cocked and aimed. But even though the first
testimony had been taken into account, it could not serve to prove that the defendant acted with negligence or want of diligence
in firing the shot, for the simple reason that there is not a single in the testimony in question as to the positions of the defendant
and the deceased with relation to each other, nor to that of the deceased in relation to the deer, which in sight of the defendant.
Neither can it be affirmed, upon examination of the rough sketch Exhibit 1, that the deceased was in the line of fire, for, on
drawing a straight line from the deer to the defendant, as shown in the sketch, it is seen that the deceased was not on the line,
but at one side of it and at such a distance away from it as to preclude the idea that he would be in such danger as to have made
it necessary for the defendant to have adopted precautions other than those the actual circumstances of the case required
before he fired his gun from that position.
After due consideration, then, of the said testimony, either separately or in relation with the merits of the case, and of that given
by the defendant himself at the trial, also in connection with the same merits, it cannot be held that the defendant is guilty of
the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, as charged in the complaint.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, we freely absolve the defendant, with the costs of both instances de officio.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80747-48 October 17, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLO RAMIREZ
NARVASA, J.:
In the late afternoon of June 23, 1981, at Tayug, Pangasinan Merlo Ramirez, a sergeant of the 151st PC Company headquartered
at that place, fired his pistol at former Vice Mayor Aureo ("Alo") Zaragoza III four (4) times. All four shots found their mark in
various parts of the latter's body and resulted in his death within two (2) hours. The autopsy report of the Senior Resident
Physician of the Eastern Pangasinan General Hospital, Dr. Felipe Cantor, 1set out the cause of death as, "Massive intra-thoracic
and intra abdominal hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds, right side chest macerating the right lobe of the liver and penetrating
the right kidney," and included the following remarks, "Patient arrived at the hospital in shock and with marked pallor pulseless,
BP-0/0 Patient expired one hour 15 mins. after arrival in the hospital inspite of all heroic an remedial measures done." On the
same occasion, Ramirez also allegedly shot at another person, Rogelio Robosa, but failed t hit him.
Ramirez was thereafter charged with consummated and attempted murder in the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, 2 under
separate indictments. 3 On arraignment, he entered pleas of not guilty to both offenses. The cases were consolidated, and tried
and decided jointly. 4 The Trial Court's judgment, dated August 12, 1987, 5rejected Merlo Ramirez's claim of self-defense,
pronounced him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both the crimes ascribed to him, and declared him to be criminally and civilly
liable therefor as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the accused Merlo Ramirez is proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder committed against the victim defined and penalized by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and taking into consideration the concurrence of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset the same the imposable penalty should be death.
HOWEVER, with the abolition of capital punishment under the new constitution (Sec. 19, Article III), the Court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P57,700.00 and to pay the costs.
Likewise, the Court finds accused proven GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder against
Rogelio Robosa, penalized by Art. 284 in relation to Art. 6, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code (and) applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby SENTENCES said accused to suffer an Indeterminate
penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision mayor as maximum.
From this joint judgment, Ramirez has appealed to this Court; and here, he attributes to the Trial Court the following errors:
1) disregarding his evidence of self-defense, and in the process;
2) imposing its own surmises and conjectures;
3) not considering his testimony in relation to his sworn statement executed immediately after the incident, relating exactly what
happened;
4) giving credence to the palpably perjured testimonies of prosecution witnesses Arestado and Robosa;
5) finding him guilty of attempted murder on the basis of the perjured testimonies of Arestado and Robosa.
The basic issue, in fine, is whether or not the evidence of the prosecution, in relation to that of the defense, does indeed prove
the guilt of Merlo Ramirez of the felonies with which he is charged, or show that his acts are justified, having been done in
legitimate self-defense. Stated otherwise, the ultimate question is which set of witnesses is more deserving of credit, that of the
prosecution, or the defense.
It is not disputed that the shooting was preceded by a conversation between Sgt. Ramirez and Alo Zaragoza at the "Express
Lounge and Restaurant" in Tayug. The conversation took place at a table in an interior room of the restaurant. Also seated at the
same table were Ramirez's companion, PC Sgt. Espero, "Boy" Mamenta, a court employee, and two local police officers,
Patrolmen Carbonel and Castulo. At another table in the main dining area outside the room were two other acquaintances,
Rogelio Robosa and Antonio Arestado, who both could see the group through the doorway. 6 Apparently, the conversation dealt
with the setting up of a "jueteng" gambling operation in the town, although it is not clear who precisely was making the
proposal. What is certain is that Alo Zaragoza very shortly became agitated and stood up, angrily uttering some words and
pounding the table with his hand. Ramirez also stood up and walked away from the table, towards the comfort room. A few
minutes afterwards Zaragoza also walked out of the room. From this point, there is disagreement between the prosecution and
the defense as to the ensuing events.
The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that after leaving the room, Zaragoza stopped between two tables in the main
eating area and there paused to drink beer from the mug he was holding; that it was at this point, while he was standing, head
up, pouring beer down his throat, that Ramirez suddenly reappeared and fired three (3) successive shots at Zaragoza with a hand
gun; that Rogelio Robosa grabbed Ramirez from behind to stop him from firing more shots, but Ramirez was able to squeeze off
one more shot at Zaragoza; that Ramirez wrenched himself free of Robosa's embrace and this somehow caused Robosa to be
thrown to the floor, and the pistol to slip from Ramirez's hand; that, however, Ramirez quickly retrieved his gun and fired at
Robosa as Robosa was rising from the floor; and that Ramirez thereupon fled from the restaurant, followed by Sgt. Espero.
Zaragoza, who had been hit by all four (4) shots discharged at him, managed to walk to the restaurant's kitchen where Robosa
found him moments later, on the floor, being assisted by Castulo. He was rushed to the hospital, but expired an hour or so after
arriving there.
Ramirez's version is different. It was Zaragoza who suggested the setting up of the jueteng operation. When the suggestion was
made, Ramirez simply said that he was a mere NCO operation officer, and that the proposal should be made to people higher up.
For some reason the remark incensed Zaragoza. In a loud voice, he said, "No more jueteng, jueteng," slapping the table with the
palm of his hand. Pointing a finger at Ramirez, he added, "Okinnam, ado ti basol mon ditoy Tayug, ket no kayat ko nga mapukaw,
ka, mapukaw ka" (which the Trial Court translated as follows: "Vulva of your mother, you have so many faults already here in
Tayug and If I want you to disappear, you will disappear"). Then, turning to his companion, Pat. Castulo, and extending his hand
to him, Zaragoza said "Man ta paltog mo, Condring, ta paltogak" (meaning, according to the Court: "Give me your gun, Condring,
as I will shoot him"). To avoid trouble, Ramirez abruptly bade the group goodbye and went to the counter to pay his bill, but
seeing no one there, moved towards the toilet. On his way out, Pat. Carbonel held him by the waist and asked him to go home
directly as "Don Alo" (Zaragoza) was very angry. Ramirez shoved Carbonel away, causing him to fall. As he was walking towards
the door, he saw Zaragoza emerge from the inner room, cursing him and saving, "I am going to kill you." Because of Zaragoza's
earlier threat to shoot him, and fearing that he had indeed succeeded in getting Pat. Castulo's firearm, Ramirez drew his gun and
started shooting at Zaragoza while making his way towards the exit.
Upon the foregoing set of facts, Ramirez's lawyer, Atty. Bernardo Ligsay, argues that Ramirez should be exonerated because he
had acted under a mistake of fact — in the not unreasonable belief that Zaragoza was going to shoot him. 7 Atty. Ligsay adds that
Ramirez had acted reflexively, in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation, and in his brief invokes "People v. Tarlit, ('76 O.G.
4490, p. 821')" allegedly to the effect that: "In emergencies where the person or life of another is imperilled, human nature does
not act upon formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation." 8 Atty. Ligsay omits to mention, however,
that Tarlit — whose citation should correctly read, "76 O.G. No. 26, pp. 4490" — is a decision of the Court of Appeals, not of this
Court; that the facts of that case are quite different from those of the present case; and the legal principle predicated on those
facts quite inimical to his cause, as would have been immediately disclosed had he but reproduce in full the paragraph from
which he had taken the statement quoted by him. The paragraph reads in full as follows. 9
In emergencies where the person or life of another is imperilled, human nature does not act upon formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. In a situation, like the

one at bar, where the deceased was taller, bigger and stronger than the accused, the latter had to act fast or otherwise the aggression on his person would have continued and his life ended.

There being no other means by which accused-appellant could prevent or repel the unlawful aggression, he, Tarlit, had to use the very same weapon which wounded him (accused). There

was reasonable necessity for the accused to use the said weapon because he was already losing strength and could not run due to loss of blood.

Even conceding that Tarlit (a Court of Appeals decision) is binding on this Court, it is at once evident that the ruling therein is inapplicable to the case at bar. In Tarlit, the accused was (1) actually attacked

by the deceased; (2) said deceased was taller, bigger and stronger than the accused; (3) the accused had been wounded and was in fact already losing strength and could no longer run due to loss of

blood; and (4) he could no longer repel the aggression and would surely have lost his life had he not used on the aggressor the very same weapon by which he had been wounded by the latter. Not one of

these circumstances is present in the present case. Indeed, as shown the proofs of both the prosecution and the defense, the victim, Zaragoza, had no gun or weapon of any other sort when he emerged

from the interior room. The State's evidence is that at this time he was holding nothing more intimidating than a glass of beer, and doing nothing more belligerent than gulping down the beer while

standing in the middle of the dining area.

It is contended by the defense that as Zaragoza emerged from the innder room he was swearing at Ramirez and repeating the threat to kill him. However, there is nothing but Ramirez's uncorroborated

testimony to establish this; and it is belied by the evidence of the prosecution. But even conceding this, Ramirez would quickly have seen that Zaragoza bore no arms and was launching nothing more

perilous than a verbal onslaught.

In either case Zaragoza's acts could not be deemed to constitute unlawful aggression on his part, or to have placed Ramirez in an emergency situation analogous to that in the Tarlitcase cited by him. More

to the point, to be sure, is the precedent cited by the Trial Judge, People v. Macaso, 10
from which the following is quoted:
. . . A review of the evidence fails to lend credence to the accused-appellant's claim that the deceased was the unlawful
aggressor. He was not even armed at the time, while the man he was up against was a policeman who was in possession
of his service pistol. . . . True, the deceased acted rather belligerently, arrogantly and menacingly at the accused-
appellant, but such behavior did not give rise to a situation that posed a real threat to the life or safety of the accused-
appellant. The peril to the latter's life was not imminent and actual. To constitute unlawful aggression, it is necessary
that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause injury,
shall have been made. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient . . . there must be a real danger to life
or personal safety.
Ramirez however invokes, as above stated, 11 the familiar mistake-of-fact doctrine enunciated by this Court in U.S. v. Ah
Chong 12 to exempt himself from criminal liability. Here again he relies on inapplicable precedent. In Ah Chong,it will be recalled
the accused stabbed dead his friend and roommate in the mistaken belief that the latter was a ladron, or burglar, attempting to
force entry into the room they commonly shared. The door of the room was secured only by a small hook or catch in lieu of a
permanent lock, a flimsy expedient which it was the occupants' habit to reinforce by putting a chair against the door. On the
night in question the accused was awakened by the sound of someone trying to force the door open. He called out twice to the
person to identify himself. Receiving no answer, he uttered the warning, "if you enter the room, I will kill you." It was at that
moment that he was hit above the knee by the chair that had been placed against the door. It could well be that the chair had
merely been pushed back by the opening of the door against which it rested; but thinking that he was being attacked by the
unknown intruder, the accused seized a kitchen knife kept under his pillow and struck out blindly, hitting the latter who turned
out to be his roommate, and who later expired from his wounds. Now, the two had understanding that whoever returned at
night should knock at the door and identify himself, and the Court found nothing to explain — except as probably a practical joke
— the victim's failure to do so on that occasion. It was upon these facts that the Court reversed on appeal the conviction of the
accused, holding that he had acted . . . in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, in the belief that he was no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self defense."
There is however no semblance of any similarity or parallel between the facts in Ah Chong and those of the present case, nothing
here that would have caused the accused-appellant, Ramirez, to entertain any well-grounded fear of imminent danger to his life
by reason of any real or perceived unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Zaragoza. Upon the evidence, at the time he
was shot and killed, the latter was doing nothing more hostile than drinking a bottle of beer; if he had earlier cursed or
threatened Ramirez, it was unaccompanied by any overt act of bodily assault. There was no unlawful aggression.
Absent this essential element of unlawful aggression on the part of Zaragoza or, at the least, of circumstances that would
engender a reasonable belief thereof in the mind of Ramirez, any consideration of self-defense, complete or incomplete, is of
course entirely out of the question. 13
By and large, the Court is persuaded that the Trial Courts basic conclusion that Merlo Ramirez is criminally liable for the death of Aureo Zaragoza is correct and that the defense has not demonstrated any

serious or reversible error threin.

The Court finds itself unable to agree, however, with the conclusion that alevosia, as a circumstance qualifying the killing of Zaragoza to murder, and evident premedition, as a generic aggravating

circumstance, should be appreciated against Ramirez.

While Ramirez's shooting of Zaragoza was, as regards, the latter, sudden and unexpected and gave him no opportunity whatever to undertake any form of defense or evasion, this does not necessarily

justify a finding of treachery or alevosia, absent any evidence that this mode of assault was consciously and deliberately adopted to insure execution of the crime without risk to the offender. Ramirez

acted on the umpulse of the moment, rashly and not improbably, out of resentment at having been publicly cursed, insulted and treatened. Thus, on seeing Zaragoza come out of the room, Ramirez had

forthwith drawn his service pistol and begun to shoot at Zaragoza. As recently observed by this Court: 14

Well settled is the rule that the circumstances which would qualify a killing to murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself. There must be a showing, first and foremost, that the

offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution without risk to himself.

It does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should be deemed attended with treachery.

Neither may the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation be appreciated against the appellant in connection with either of the two felonies with which he stands charged, because, as the

Solicitor General correctly points out, "the determination to commit the crime was . . . almost on the spur of the moment where the appellant had no opportunity to reflect on his action." In People v.

Molato, 15
this Court made the following relevant observation:
As held in People v. Fernandez (154 SCRA 30 [1987]) citing People v. Jardiniano (103 SCRA [1981]) and People v. Guiapar
(129 SCRA 539 [1984]), to properly appreciate evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish proof, as clear as the
evidence of the crime itself, about — (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect. . . . The element of sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution of the criminal act to afford the culprit full opportunity for calm reflection on the
consequences of the crime was not established in this case.
It follows that Ramirez may properly be convicted only of the felony of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. T-470 ([G.R. No. 80747]) as regards Alo Zaragoza), and of attempted homicide in
Criminal Case No. T-471 ([G.R. No. 80748]) as regards Rodolfo Robosa) and should be sentenced to the medium period of the
penalty prescribed by law for each of said offenses, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance modifying his criminal
responsibility. Moreover, in addition to the actual damages for which he was adjudged liable by the Trial Court, he should also be
made to pay to the heirs of the Zaragoza the additional sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the latter's death.
WHEREFORE, subject only to the modifications just indicated, the Decision of the Trial Court in said Criminal Cases No. T-470 and
T-471, dated August 12, 1987, is AFFIRMED and the appellant Merlo Ramirez is hereby SENTENCED as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. T-470, G.R. No. 80747, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties
thereto appertaining, and to pay to the heirs of the deceased, Aureo "Alo" Zaragoza, the sum of Fifty Seven Thousand Pesos
(P57,000.00) as actual or compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death; and
2. In Criminal Case No. T-471, G.R. No. 80748, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from two (2) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years and three (3) months of prision correccional.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were
charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
 That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of
their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body
of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the
whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to weaken the
defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another
wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision
finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani
Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a
prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories
of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following errors committed by the
court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION
OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL
DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME
EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION
WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and
at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.
There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his
friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as
they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the
deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the
engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was
already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also
poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police
Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought Gabion, the two
accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the
written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision
of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written statements to the police. The
accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents
thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his
statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact
that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that they were extracted
by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted
effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the decision of the
court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said
court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing
testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p.
247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident. They
claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness
during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their
testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there appears on record
(pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and
imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by
Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies
would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs.
Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested by the
mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony
that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth about the
incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first
time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the
other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to
testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and then
Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling
Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body
was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics when
you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you
possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned
later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing
so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter
of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is
true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come to
know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
 Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you to
ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he
was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline that is
why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was
gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a
can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour
gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of
pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the
group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the
ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion
warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the
deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the
accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay
and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable
only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the
engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same.
Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the
accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful,
and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results
as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all
manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the
Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on
fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to
defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident.
On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the
circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline
and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him
the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on
fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very
least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver
offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code
provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of
the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in
his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence
of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were
stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his hospitalization,
wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is
increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00
as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants. AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
DE JOYA, J.:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which
Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days
of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in
the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of preventive
imprisonment suffered by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and in her
brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —
(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and
that she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;
(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating circumstances that (a) she did not
have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to
the agents of the authorities; and
(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place.
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the following facts:
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of
San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the
evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been courting the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month
before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was
being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and spoke to her of his love,
which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts, on account of which
Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself,
until the following morning when she informed her mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife,
whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and surreptitiously entered
the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed
for help, which awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in
Avelina's room and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an
attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not realize what he was
doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning. Amado's
parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then
angry, he told them to end the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.
In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighborhood
of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her,
she would take poison; and that Avelina again received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of
that same day.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day
Adventists of which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from his house, to attend religious
services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar with the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant,
Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was quite bright as there were electric lights.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the purpose of
attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado Capina was seated on the other
side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was
sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the
upper part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina, Avelina Jaurigue,
conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a
pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly
grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a
wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front benches,
saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he
approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering him Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore."
Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel,
approached Avelina and asked her why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa aquin,"
meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives
might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately,
to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. That father and
daughter went home and locked themselves up, following instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the
municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them
about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said
policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as already
stated above, and went with said policemen to the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which
were presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is universal. It has been entertained
and has existed in all civilized communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman represents the only true nobility.
And they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally
attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable means available within their reach, under the circumstances.
Criminologists and courts of justice have entertained and upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the days of chivalry. There is a
country where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public gardens, they always receive the
protection of all. That country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own person, we have the right
to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed.,
pp. 172, 173).
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch
as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a
woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such
killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great
an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the defense of her honor. Thus,
where the deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly from
behind, without warning and without revealing his identity, and, in the struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and
that she was unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife
in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since she had no other means of
defending herself, and consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a bolo which she
happened to be carrying at the time, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby, when the
deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place, while she was going from her house to a certain tienda, for the
purpose of making purchases (United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil., 249).
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her arm, and, believing that some
person was attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said person
with a pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient
provocation or aggression to justify her completely in using deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the beginning
of an attempt against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the injured person, who turned
out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his wife, did not do any other act which could be considered as an
attempt against her honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her house late at night on
September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his
previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by
the authorities cited above..
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case, when the deceased sat by the
side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion
of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people,
about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the
organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave
Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his
death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts
and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability..
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant
in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly
thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs.
Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of
reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People
vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending
hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is another mitigating
circumstance which should be considered in her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil.,
123).
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by the defendant and
appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally
sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the
chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-
fearing young woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world where so many
others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not where.
The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well taken; and so is the first
assignment of error to a certain degree.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and
form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no
aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered
in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one
or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and
appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391;
United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the
penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No.
4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium
degree. Consequently, with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four
months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed
1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit
of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered..
Ozaeta, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions: HILADO, J., concurring:

In past dissenting and concurring opinions my view regarding the validity or nullity of judicial proceedings in the Japanese-
sponsored courts which functioned in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation has been consistent. I am not abandoning
it. But in deference to the majority who sustain the opposite view, and because no party litigant herein has raised the question, I
have taken part in the consideration of this case on the merits. And, voting on the merits, I concur in the foregoing decision
penned by Justice De Joya.

G.R. Nos. 86883-85 January 29, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO LINES, RUDY
LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO, ROGER BEDAÑO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused.
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO and ROGER BENDAÑO, accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A hapless foreign religious minister was riddled with
bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces amidst the revelling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around their
quarry, chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing at his prostrate, miserable,
spiritless figure that was gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader picked up
pieces of the splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators. Some accounts swear that acts of
cannibalism ensued, although they were not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their outrageous feat, the gangleader
already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali 1 was senselessly killed for no
apparent reason than that he was one of the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in heir vineyard in the hinterlands of
Mindanao.2
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt which resulted in the capture of the perpetrators
except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two unidentified persons who eluded arrest and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder,3 Attempted Murder4 and Arson5 were accordingly filed against those responsible for the frenzied orgy of
violence that fateful day of 11 April 1985. As these cases arose from the same occasion, they were all consolidated in Branch 17
of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato. 6
After trial, the court a quo held —
WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay, Edilberto Manero
alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger
Bedaño GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, and with the aggravating circumstances of
superior strength and treachery, hereby sentences each of them to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua; to pay the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation to which Father
Tulio Favali belonged, a civil indemnity of P12,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 for each of the
eight (8) accused or a total sum of P400,000.00; court appearance fee of P10,000.00 for every day the case was
set for trial; moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00; and to pay proportionately the costs.
Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Arson and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences
him to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the
Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged,
the sum of P19,000.00 representing the value of the motorcycle and to pay the costs.
Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr., alias Commander Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil,
Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Attempted Murder and with the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of not less than
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, and minimum, to eight (8) years and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the complainant Rufino Robles the sum of
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as court appearance fee for every day of trial and to pay
proportionately the costs.
The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused successively in the order of their respective severity
in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 7
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño appealed with
respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did
Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final.
Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr.,
Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the
eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr.,
private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a
number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the
following "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr.
Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic
lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are
simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill
Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead. 8
At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified companions nailed a placard on a street-post
beside the eatery of Deocades. The placard bore the same inscriptions as those found on the cigarette wrapper except for the
additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo." Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard bearing the same
message on a street cross-sign close to the eatery. 9
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded
to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. They were met by
"Bantil" who confronted them why his name was included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query; instead, he asked
"Bantil" if he had any qualms about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of
"Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were hit. Then they
grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was again fired
upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo
Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr., ordered his men to surround the house and not to allow any one to get out so that "Bantil" would die of
hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him on the face and accused him of
being a communist coddler, while appellants and their cohorts relished the unfolding drama. 11
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite.
Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and
ridicule from the dreaded desperados.
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside,
Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the
gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. 12
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a
thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo,
Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of
the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the
only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it
twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As
Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of
their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. 13
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño contend
that the trial court erred in disregarding their respective defenses of alibi which, if properly appreciated, would tend to establish
that there was no prior agreement to kill; that the intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that there was only
one (1) gunman, Edilberto; and, that there was absolutely no showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting of the victim
despite their proximity at the time to Edilberto.
But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-appellants.
On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were harvesting palay the whole day of 11
April 1985 some one kilometer away from the crime scene. Accused Roger Bedaño alleges that he was on an errand for the
church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato, that morning of 11 April 1985, taking along his wife and sick child for medical
treatment and arrived in La Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.
Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard gunshots that they rushed to the house of
Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza, where they were joined by their fellow CHDF members and co-accused,
and that it was only then that they proceeded together to where the crime took place at Km. 125.
It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but that it must also be
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 14
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of being present at the crime scene, as can be
readily deduced from the proximity between the places where accused-appellants were allegedly situated at the time of the
commission of the offenses and the locus criminis, 15 the defense of alibi is definitely feeble. 16After all, it has been the consistent
ruling of this Court that no physical impossibility exists in instances where it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty
minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the place where he allegedly
was at the time of commission of the offense and the scene of the crime. 17 Recently, we ruled that there can be no physical
impossibility even if the distance between two places is merely two (2) hours by bus. 18 More important, it is well-settled that the
defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. 19
In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo, testified that they were both inside the
eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 when the Manero brothers, together with appellants, first
discussed their plan to kill some communist sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants in the
company of the Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock that
same afternoon, appellants were very much at the scene of the crime, along with the Manero brothers, when Fr. Favali was
brutally murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of such positive declarations that appellants were at the locus criminis from 10:00
o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the alibi of appellants that they were somewhere else, which is
negative in nature, cannot prevail. 21 The presence of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been positively established, all
doubts that they were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are therefore removed. There was direct
proof to link them to the conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. 22It is not
essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. 23 It is enough that an accused
participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as evidenced by the concerted
acts of all the accused. Thus —
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were positively identified with Norberto
Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at
10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the window
near the table where Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified
members of the airborne from Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning, they all went to the
cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and drink tuba. They were seen again with Edilberto Manero and
Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day near the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil) when
Edilberto Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but
later left when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as Robles would die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr.
Favali to Domingo Gomez' house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later
stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when Edilberto Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they
joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the death of the
priest. 26
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact
vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and
their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance
to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that
the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of the
crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the
attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective
action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group targetted
for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. On this, the
conspirators expressly agreed. As witness Manuel Bantolo explained 28 —
Q Aside from those persons listed in that paper to be killed, were there other persons who
were to be liquidated?
A There were some others.
Q Who were they?
A They said that if they could not kill those persons listed in that paper then they will (sic) kill
anyone so long as he is (sic) an Italian and if they could not kill the persons they like to kill
they will (sic) make Reynaldo Deocades as their sample.
That appellants and their co-accused reached a common understanding to kill another Italian priest in the event that Fr. Peter
Geremias could not be spotted was elucidated by Bantolo thus 29 —
Q Who suggested that Fr. Peter be the first to be killed?
A All of them in the group.
Q What was the reaction of Norberto Manero with respect to the plan to kill Fr. Peter?
A He laughed and even said, "amo ina" meaning "yes, we will kill him ahead."
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Severino Lines? What was his reaction?
A He also laughed and so conformed and agreed to it.
Q Rudy Lines.
A He also said "yes".
Q What do you mean "yes"?
A He also agreed and he was happy and said "yes" we will kill him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Efren Pleñago?
 A He also agreed and even commented laughing "go ahead".
Q Roger Bedaño, what was his reaction to that suggestion that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter,
they will (sic) kill anybody provided he is an Italian and if not, they will (sic) make Reynaldo
Deocades an example?
A He also agreed laughing.
Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the act of one is the act of all the other
conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. 30
The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME)
Brothers, is not proper. There is nothing on record which indicates that the deceased effectively severed his civil relations with
his family, or that he disinherited any member thereof, when he joined his religious congregation. As a matter of fact, Fr. Peter
Geremias of the same congregation, who was then a parish priest of Kidapawan, testified that "the religious family belongs to
the natural family of origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because, not
being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental
anguish or moral shock. It is only when a juridical person has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation,
that moral damages may be awarded.
Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may otherwise be lawfully entitled thereto pursuant to
par. (3), Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, 33 for the reason that the heirs never presented any evidence showing that they suffered
mental anguish; much less did they take the witness stand. It has been held 34 that moral damages and their causal relation to
the defendant's acts should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is elementary that in order that moral damages may be
awarded there must be proof of moral suffering. 35 However, considering that the brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali was attended
with abuse of superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the pain and anguish of the
victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, exemplary damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not
proved nor expressly pleaded in the complaint, 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.
With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali, the amount is increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with existing jurisprudence, which should be paid to the lawful heirs, not the PIME as the trial court ruled.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
civil indemnity which is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased plus exemplary
damages of P100,000.00; however, the award of moral damages is deleted.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and
furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and
other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial
court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00
p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa
States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na
kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka
sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think
that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na
kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit
alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka
papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha
ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito.
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi
ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
"An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez
not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder
secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of
the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to
Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3,
1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing
the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge
acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in
its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply
to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to
the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this,
petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts
charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200
our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications
taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be
material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases
or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in
an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even
subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording,
would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used
in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one without his
knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to
record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape
recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose
remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever
you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that
warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if
you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is
being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it
is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between
one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even
those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a
secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning
of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this
statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized
people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare often characterized
by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been
assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the
unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion
by whatever means.17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use
of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note,
because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute
itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the
acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101215 July 30, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO SALVADOR, ET AL., * accused, ALFREDO SALVADOR
BIDIN, J.:
Appellant Alfredo Salvador an co-accused Joey Adap, Augusto Alimurong, Jimmy Agustin and Armin Aladdin were charged before
the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 23, Trece Martires City with the crime of Murder in an information
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about October 14, 1984, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid accused, conspiring together, acting jointly and assisting
one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault and attack Orlando Grepo with the use of a piece of wood commonly known
as "dos por dos", hallow (sic) block, fist and foot blows causing the victim to suffer injuries on his head and
other parts of his body, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Orlando Grepo.
The aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of superior strength were present in the commission of
the offense.
CONTARY TO LAW.
Only Alfredo Salvador was apprehended by the Cavite INP Command while his co-accused have remained at large (Ibid., p. 34).
Upon arraignment, Salvador pleaded not quilty to the offense charged. After trial, judgment was rendered convicting appellant
Salvador, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Alfredo Salvador GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life imprisonment; to indemnify the heirs of Orlando Grepo
in the amount of P30.000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Records disclose that at around 9:30 in the evening of October 14, 1984, prosecution witness Joel Duran was walking with
Alberto Villablanca on their way home from Bahay-Kubo in the town plaza of Gen. Trias, Cavite. Along Prinza Street, they saw
from a distance of about six meters, Orlando Grepo being mauled by five persons. Through the light of the electric lamp post and
the vehicles passing by, Joel recognized these assailants as Joey Adap, Alfredo Salvador, Jimmy Agustin, Augusto Alimurong and
Armin Aladdin.
The sheer number of assailants deterred Joel and Alberto from helping their childhood friend Orlando. The five attackers were
boxing Orlando and when he fell with his face to the ground, they kicked him. Then Joey Adap hit Orlando with a "dos por dos"
(piece of wood ) and Alfredo Salvador dropped a hollow block on his back. Joel and Alberto shouted for help and upon seeing
them, the assailants ran away. Councilor Leonardo Gozo, who responded to Joel's shouts for help, assisted Joel and Alberto in
bringing Orlando to the hospital in Pinagkatipunan (TSN, August 25, 1984, pp. 4-9; 21-23).
Orlando was brought to the Medicare Community Hospital in Gen. Trias where Dr. Charito Maldos Gozo attended to him. Dr.
Gozo found him to be a "walking patient" but aside from his bruises and contusions, Orlando was complaining of a headache
(TSN, January 29, 1987, pp. 4; 8-13). In the medical certificate she issued on October 15, 1984, Dr. Gozo stated that 17-year-old
Orlando Grepo had contusion, hematoma and abrasion on the 4th intercostal lateral side left, another contusion on the right
temporal parietal area and a third contusion and hematoma on the occipital region. Dr. Gozo diagnosed that the healing period
for these injuries would last from nine to fourteen days "barring complications" (Exh. F). A neighbor of Orlando, Dr. Gozo knew
that during the two-week period after she treated him Orlando was complaining of severe headache and "off and on" fever (TSN.
January 29, 1987, p.13).
On November 4, 1984, Grepo was brought to the clinic of Dr. Jocelyn Tirol Dignos in Rosario, Cavite. Grepo was perspiring a lot
and had
cold, clammy skin specially on his left extremities. He had rolling eyeballs and was in an unconcious shock-like state. Since he had
high-grade fever running to 42.2 degrees Centigrade, he stayed in Dr. Dignos' clinic for only two hours (TSN, September 26, 1986,
p.5). In the medical certificate she issued, Dr. Dignos also stated that Grepo had convulsive seizures and that he had "meningo-
encephalities of undetermined origin" (Exh. D).
According to Dr. Dignos, said diagnosis was actually made by Dr. Ovillo, a specialist to whom she referred as the victim was
showing signs and symptoms of brain damage. Because they were not aware that Orlando had been a victim of a mauling
incident two weeks ago and there was then an epidemic of typhoid fever, they entertained typhoid as Grepo's possible ailment
(TSN September 26, 1986, pp. 7-9). But upon learning of the mauling incident, they diagnosed Grepo's ailment as "meningo
encephalitis secondary to trauma" (Ibid., p. 16). Moreover, they learned that Dr. Apostol of Gen. Trias, Cavite had given Grepo
two grams of chloro ampenicol per day and therefore, if the ailment was really typhoid. Grepo's fever would have then subsided
(Ibid., pp. 15-17). They would have conducted more tests but since Grepo had become bluish and had difficulty in breathing, they
decide to have him transferred to the Manila Medical Center (Ibid., p.17) where the victim finally expired on November 5, 1984
(TSN, April 23, 1987 p.3).
As aforesaid, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction against Salvador specifically finding him to be "one of those
instrumental in inflicting the fatal wounds which resulted in the death of Orlando Grepo."
Appellant claims that he was with his family at home watching television at the time the mauling incident took place. His alibi
was corroborated by his sister, Edita Santores, who testified that appellant watched TV until 10:00 p.m. and immediately went to
bed thereafter.
Previous to his testimony in open court, however, appellant executed an affidavit stating that at around 9:00 o'clock in the
evening of October 14, 1984, he was walking from the school with his friend Willy Buclatin when they saw Orlando Grepo
walking with three persons and when they reached Prinza St., there was a melee ("bigla na lamang nagkagulo").
The Court is therefore presented with two contradictory statements of the accused. One involving alibi and the other which is
practically denial.
Aggrieved by the decision, Salvador interposed this appeal making the following assignments of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION. (Appellant's Brief, p.1)
A finding of sufficiency of the evidence to establish guilt by proof beyond reasonable doubt is one fact. As such, its review by the
appellate court must be guided by the principle that, unless arbitrary or without sufficient basis, the findings of the trial court on
question of fact are accorded the highest respect on appeal if not regarded as conclusive (People vs. Alitao, 194 SCRA 120 [1991];
People vs. Millarpe, 134 SCRA 555 [1985]; People vs. Lopez, 132 SCRA 188 [1984]. In the same manner, the credibility of
witnesses is the province of the trial court who is in a better position to examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor
of the witnesses (People vs. Lardizabal, 204 SCRA 320 [1991]; People vs. Vinas, 202 SCRA 720 [1991]). After a review of the
records, We find no reason to depart from these principles in the instant appeal.
Anchored on denial and alibi, the defense had not overcome the prosecution's solid proof beyond reasonable doubt of
appellant's complicity in the fatal mauling of Orlando Grepo. In the first place, the defense had not shown that it was physically
impossible for Salvador to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed (People vs. Bicog. 187 SCRA 556 [1990];
People vs. Pio Cantuba, 183 SCRA 289 [1990]; People vs. Tamayo, 183 SCRA 375 [1990]; People vs. Andres, 155 SCRA 290 [1987];
People vs. Ornoza, 151 SCRA 495 [1987]; People vs. Tuando, 150 SCRA 8 [1987]); People vs. Petil, 149 SCRA 92 [1987]. While
Salvador was on the witness stand, the defense counsel understandably did not ask him about the distance of the scene of the
crime from the Salvador residence where he was allegedly watching TV. Neither had the prosecution ferreted this information
from Salvador on cross-examination. For her part, all that Editha Santores could say was that the scene of the crime was "far
from us" when asked by the prosecution if the distance between the two places was about fifty meters (TSN, September 30,
1987, p.12). Considering, however, that appellant Salvador was himself a resident of Prinza St. (TSN, August 28, 1987, p.2) where
the crime occurred, his alibi must fail. Alibi is unconvincing when the distance from the place where the accused was and the
scene of the crime can be negotiated within minutes (People vs. Marmita, Jr., 180 SCRA 723 [1989]).
But what sealed appellant's conviction is the fact that he was recognized by Joel Duran as one of the five persons who ganged up
on Grepo. Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the prosecution witness' positive identification of the accused as a perpetrator of
the crime (Collado vs. IAC, 206 SCRA 207 [1992]; People vs. Bocatcat, SR., 188 SCRA 175 [1990]; People vs. Cirilo, Jr., 156 SCRA
397 [1987]; People vs. Danes, 131 SCRA 286 [1984]; People vs. Cortez, 57 SCRA 308 [1974]; People vs. Esmael, 37 SCRA 601
[1971]). Worth nothing is the fact that the defense did not even try to discredit prosecution witness Joel Duran whose damaging
testimony was the principal foundation of the prosecution theory. Unsullied, Duran's testimony must therefore be given its due
weight and credit.
However, one other aspect of the crime which the defense, even in the instant appeal, has failed to argue in favor of appellant is
the fact that the appellant had been charged with and convicted of, the crime of murder for the killing of Orlando Grepo. Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code provides that to be liable for murder, an accused must be proven to have committed the killing of
another person under the attendant circumstances specified therein. Of these circumstances, the information alleges treachery
and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder.
It is unfortunate that the trial court failed to discuss the presence or absence of these qualifying circumstances. However, from
the evidence on record, treachery cannot be appreciated. Sole eyewitness Joel Duran testified that while he and Alberto
Villablanca were walking along Prinza Street, they saw Grepo being mauled by five persons. While Duran may have witnessed the
incident in progress, he did not testify as to how it began. As the Court held in People vs. Tiozon (198 SCRA 368 [1991]), treachery
cannot be considered where the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault. The importance of such testimony
cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor established from mere suppositions.
In the same manner, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder in the absence of direct
evidenct of the planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived (People vs. Wenceslao, 212 SCRA 560 [1992]).
Thus, in the absence of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is homicide under Art 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and not murder.
As to aggravating circumstances, the information alleges nighttime and abuse of superior strength. To be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, there must be a convincing showing that the accused had purposely sought nighttime in order to
facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent its discovery or to evade the culprit's capture (People vs. Rodriguez, 193
SCRA 231 [1991]). There is, however, no proof at all, much more a convincing one, to warrant appreciation of nighttime as an
aggravating circumstance.
Abuse of superior strength, a qualifying circumstance in murder, was alleged in the information as an aggravating circumstance
only. ** Mere numerical superiority does not always mean abuse of superiority to qualify the killing to murder.
Appellant is liable for the crime even if he had not intended to kill Orlando Grepo. This is because he participated in the
concerted effort of mauling the victim, which was proven beyond reasonable doubt, in furtherance of a common design to inflict
physical harm on Grepo. But where the attack commenced, the fact there are four assailants would constitute abuse of
superiority (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 377, citing, among others, U.S. vs. Banagale, 24 Phil. 69 [1913]).
Thus, the homicide committed in this case is attended by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority as five persons
mauled the unarmed and defenseless victim Orlando Grepo (People vs. Ocimar, 212 SCRA 646 [1992]).
Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites of Art. 4 are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender (People vs. Iligan, 191 SCRA 643, 651 [1990] citing People vs. Mananquil,
132 SCRA 196, 207 [1984]). All these requisites are present in this case. The intentional felony was the mauling of Grepo and, in
the case of appellant, his dropping of the hollow block on the fallen and hapless victim. The latter's death had been the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony as shown by the evidence provided by the doctors who testified for the
prosecution.
Under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. In view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period (Art. 64 (3), Revised Penal Code). Parenthetically, the lower court erroneously imposed the
penalty of "life imprisonment" for murder. The proper penalty for murder under Art. 248 is reclusion perpetua and not "life
imprisonment." The need to apply the correct penalty is dictated by the fact that in appropriate cases, a penalty under the
Revised Penal Code carries with it accessory penalties (See: People vs. Cruda, 212 SCRA 125 [1992]).
Hence, the appropriate penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide in the case at bar is the maximum period
of reclusion temporal which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
imposable penalty is ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED to the extent that appellant Alfredo Salvador is hereby declared
guilty of the crime of homicide and is hereby ordered to suffer the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The
civil indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because
from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no
other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be
said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially
correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same
place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house
situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No
one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of
which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part
of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window,
there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by
some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and
was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due
to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder
was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck
just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck
out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took
place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal
incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with
his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and
Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from
their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27
found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that
Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit
of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing
to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects
of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck
the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
 4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal
liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a
dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of
the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him
despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an
assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor
any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such
"unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was
no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of
a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them
to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the
time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent
which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in
crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances
demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article
1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by
him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited;
McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice
or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in
the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein
defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice
or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various
definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or
other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general
rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely
contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of
all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those
touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime
or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful
thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the
affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of
the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it,
and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the
guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less
harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act
committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary
act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal
intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were
expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco,
Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility
when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence,
nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention
there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more
apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . . .
in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which
must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in
which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of
the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the
inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by
law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an
act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and
decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and
misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall
be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if
it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the
rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those
contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which
they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference
from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent),
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in
English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes
means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate
the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to
mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to
believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad
purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference
between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and
cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed
"voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a
criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous
citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies
between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime
proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness,
without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any
people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our
legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can
not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently
has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless
his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and
others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate
others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be
what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent."
The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the
place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that
where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve
punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to
suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates
him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has
the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good.
Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law,
superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished
as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from
the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which
justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have
recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient
here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real
departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need
not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt
with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti
excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d
ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault
or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y.,
509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.)
That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon
which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a
killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life
of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and
the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
 notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting
on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large
array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked
and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol
demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol
leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will
doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and
wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would
undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the
facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the
"act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1
of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him, and
under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be
murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of
the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his
hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude,
A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound
B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any
reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who
hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the
pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is
considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full
because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without
other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there
suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on
the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly
been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow
on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his
father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in
consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always
sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over
the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid
found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for
the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by
the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been
proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal
intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when
the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick
with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not
rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally
resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower
court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did
 not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving
at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand
over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing
immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed
me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's
sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his
friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of
this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal
Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the
requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on
his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to
the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the
means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his
window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all
of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next
morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having
acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned
the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court
acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote
spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family.
(Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow
alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from
whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in
view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense;
that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his
person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the
crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

Separate Opinions: TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the case, the
crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as
the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however,
executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under
the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore
incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable
motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the
penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an
indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed
from.

G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIO GUILLEN
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the
of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable
Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as
above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused
moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of
the accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any
mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who should
report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by
Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading
"Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment during his
whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis
proved not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to
be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is
equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations
and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only
in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout
Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran
after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman
Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila,
after hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in relation to
rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a
personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was
asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was
tired, for the offenses he committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their
respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts
which caused the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political group, has
voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed
the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According
to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made
by him during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President
Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity"
measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself
on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila
attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and
gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech
expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the
constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly
licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of
Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by
going to Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon)
where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the
pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit
B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila
Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to
quote hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It
took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my
conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have
hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are
millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people,
he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage
of our future generations. For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as
compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the good of those
eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t
matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of
patriotism in my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.

JULIO C. GUILLEN

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only
at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a
hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained
peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to
carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he
hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo
and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked
it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to
do the least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade
fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued,
and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or
Barrela ) — who died on the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and
F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel
Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the
platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting
that person was the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but
Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives,
mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the
City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the
information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted
with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his
home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person
who hurled towards the platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the same time he tried to
justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so
called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit
D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to question propounded to him by
Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary
statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the trial of
this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court,
namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty
of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised
Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; andfourth, "in considering the concurrence of the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of
doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived
plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at
President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim
from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil
purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our
conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make
any difference to him if there were some people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those
who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the
President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill
the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the
President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless
imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio,
Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies
committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable
for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is
necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified
by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that
produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a
darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose
el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando
muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la
muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada
lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional
por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por
haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el
procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la
misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo
hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de
lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia,
aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy
principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th
Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed
by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the
accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted
murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra,
this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was
not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any
manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance
of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was
different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the
intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him
"by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries
caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of
the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for
in fact his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to
redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand
grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall
refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand
grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any
mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event
article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its
maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and
circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote.
The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of
Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so
ordered.

G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of
Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of
homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months
to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked
that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D.
Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the
above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if
overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis
who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina,
he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police
tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see
anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants
Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living.
When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and
asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her
paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still
firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector,
informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and
to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo
de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his
death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene
Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of
police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room
thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards
the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are
Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued
firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the
supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a
natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired
at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the
other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was
awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But
Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when
each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual
incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that,
according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is
confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the
latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson,
the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her
demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that
her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading
questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under
these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and
Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made
previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the
honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is
murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15
Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the
door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed
and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded
the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who
was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded
his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head
was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to
make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances
cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then
asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect
a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were
instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by
him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm
(People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in
the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer
cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753;
U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from
justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in
effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by
such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does
something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere
fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a
basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as
here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant
action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule;
otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without
malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no
haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha
producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo
7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16),
and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is,
however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of
the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury
or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second
requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their
duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the
person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

Separate Opinions: PARAS, J., dissenting:

Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form Manila to the provinces. Receiving
information to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the Constabulary in Manila
ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive".
Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and
Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of
Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather
information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered, to follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded
to the place where the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then
gathering banana stalks in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked by
Oanis to tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping with Irene. Upon
reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting
the man who was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but Balagtas was still alive, for it
turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
however, convicted them only of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs
of Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta have appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly followed the order issued by the
Constabulary authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or alive, in the honest
belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a
record that made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities were justified in ordering his arrest,
whether dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have
acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas
would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence.
On the contrary, they should be commended for their bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing
or ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without hesitation and thereby
exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their revolvers only after being
overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in violation of
the express order given by the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the appellants. In the second place, it
would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to have waited until they have been
overpowered before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the
instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and proper, because the facts exist that the appellants acted in
conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein
questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological or sentimental, in view only of the fact
that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep." Anybody's heart will be
profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not vainly
sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas
that in due time the duly constituted authorities will, upon proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the
reason that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose
(Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not
Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith.
(U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable since the killing of the
person who was believed to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point, inasmuch as the defendant therein,
who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake, would not be exempted from
criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious design on his part. The other case involved
by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one
Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and allowed himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have
lawful instructions from superior authorities to capture Almasan dead or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with
costs de oficio.

HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:

According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm without
regard to his life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers resistance or does something
which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which confronted the accused-appellants Antonio
Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both
officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive" and according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also
of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis
to the first part; namely, to take him dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case,
Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned
honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had escaped from his guards and was
supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met upon arriving at the house of
Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a
man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his
intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion of
persons in the room where he was peacefully lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on
the part of the appellants to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person
who, according to their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into
consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down in the
case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an innocent mistake of fact committed
without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative
but to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case which favored the accused-appellants,
arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. This
incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I believe that the application of this circumstance is not
proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some
of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in
articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the
period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking.
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, and which was also
taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of
Justice for the drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying circumstances and
circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense of
relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5
of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its
scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is
the source of Article 69 of our Code says:
 Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por una fuerza
inrresistible o impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o en el
ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision
hallandose impedido por causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es
obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad de requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion.
Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve años; existe o no violencia material o
moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o
inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que
se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que falten algunos requisitos de los que
la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los casos
referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones.
It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required by the law to justify
the same or exempt from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not be confused with the word "requisites". In dealing
with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There are two requisites in order that this circumstance may be taken
into account: (a) That the offender acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury
or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is
evident that these two requisites concur in the present case if we consider the intimate connection between the order given to
the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a bailarina
named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the supposed criminal when
both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are more reasons in favor of the acquittal of
appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was
armed in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and was corroborated by the
unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness, since Galanta was made a
corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been
constantly used by Galanta, and, according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it from his
trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24, 1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was
given to the witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by
Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of December 24, 1938,
when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession of the non-commissioned officers and
privates of the constabulary post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed. This testimony is
corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets exhibits F and O, — the first being extracted from the head of
the deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the shooting, — had not
been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from any other revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for
the accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted
that the deceased was none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no reason
why Galanta should carry along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from wound No.
3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives
the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the
conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of the wound's
entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because according to the medico-legal expert who testified in
this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other wounds found
by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can
be stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he should be
declared criminally responsible for said death
G.R. No. L-24084 November 3, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. PEDRO RAMIREZ
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, for the crime of homicide, to the penalty of fourteen
years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the mother of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay
the costs.
On the night of February 18, 1923, one Bartolome Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez, the accused herein, Victoriano Ranga, the
deceased, and Agustin Menor to hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three
last named proceeded to hunt, leaving Bartolome Quiaoit in a hut approximately 1 kilometer from the place where the act
complained of took place. Upon the hunters having arrived at a place in mount Balitok, Pedro Ramirez, who was carrying the
shotgun of Bartolome Quiaoit with a lantern, happened to hunt a deer, and then he told his companions to stay there and watch
over the prey while he entered the forest to get it. Thus Victoriano Ranga and Agusto Menor were waiting when suddenly the
report of the shotgun was heard hitting Victoriano Ranga in the eye and the right temple, who thereafter died on that night as a
result of the wounds.
It does not appear that the matter was judicially investigated until the month of October, 1924, when the complaint was filed
which initiated this proceedings.
The only witness who could testify upon the act complained of is naturally Agustin Menor who was near the deceased when the
latter was shot. According to Agustin Menor, the defendant, after having gotten the first prey, told his companions to stay there,
while he (Pedro Ramirez) was leaving them to go on hunting , and "when he was far away, he fired the shotgun," hitting the
deceased Victoriano Ranga. It must be noted that the witness Agustin Menor changed his first testimony that "when he was far
away, he fired the shotgun," by saying afterwards, "When Pedro Ramirez was a little away, he turned toward us and fired." And to
make it more specific, the defense moved that the translation of the testimony of the witness be corrected and the interpreter of
the court caused it to be stated in the record that the true testimony of the witness was as follows: "Pedro Ramirez caused me
and Victoriano Ranga to stay in the mount , telling us: 'Brothers, you stay here and I am going up to hunt with the lamp' and then
after he has gone ways, he (Pedro Ramirez) turned toward us and fired."
On the other hand the defendant, testifying as witness in his behalf, admits being the author of the shot which caused the death
of Victoriano Ranga; that on that night after getting the first prey, he told his companions to stay there, watching over the prey,
while he was going away looking for another; and so he did, because otherwise it would have been hard for them to find the
prey, if no one would have been left there; that being far away from his companions, he seemed to have seen with his lantern
something like the eyes of a deer about fifty meters from him and then he shot it; but much to his surprise, on approaching what
he thought was a deer, it proved to be his companion Victoriano Ranga. The same witness says that he did not expect to find his
companions in that spot, for he had warned them not to leave, but they left, the place.lawph!1.net
The testimony of the two witnesses as to the distance of the accused from them when he fired the gun for the second time is
contradictory. On the other hand, there is not in the record any circumstances as to whether or not the deceased and the
witness Agustin Menor were in the same place where they were left by the defendant, when the latter fired. The night being
dark like that when the event took place, the hunter in the midst of a forest without paths is likely to get confused as to his
relative situation; and after walking around, he may think having gone very far, when in fact he has not, from the point of
departure. and so, judging the case from what the two witnesses Agustin Menor and Pedro Ramirez have testified to, and taking
into account that there existed no motive whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant against the offended party, we
are compelled to conclude that the act complained of constitutes homicide through reckless imprudence. The defendant, who
was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the aid of a lantern, knowing that he had two companions, should have
exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident, such as the one that unfortunately occurred on the
person of Victoriano Ranga.
While the fact that the defendant, a few days after the event, has offered to the mother of the deceased a carabao and a horse
by way of indemnity, indicates on the one hand that the defendant admitted the commission of the crime, on the other it shows
that he performed that act without criminal intent and only through a real imprudence.
The defense alleges that the trial court must have solved the reasonable doubt in favor of the defendant. After considering
carefully the evidence and all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion and so hold that the defendant is guilty of the
crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, and must be punished under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code.
Wherefore the penalty of one year and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by the law, must be
imposed upon him, and with modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

Separate Opinions: ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting in part:

I believe that the guilt of the defendant is only under paragraph 2 of article 568 of the Penal Code.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with
firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions,
Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his
family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the
premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you
were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by
holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citingArticle 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with
bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were
sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further,
in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his
accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time.
Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea
should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a
reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these
conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School,
recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or
carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of
Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)
ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the
focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible
of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
 Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality,
the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill,
aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a
different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It
held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and where the
bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this
country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in
the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the
criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not
pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of the
extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from
committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit
the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by
outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails
to materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts
not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In
disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can
seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether
in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The community
suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is
done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out,
the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside.
However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of
attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a
difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable.
Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for
were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the
offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility
defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality
the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S.
vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter
made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter
without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved
with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed.
It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as
suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In
disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the
principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of
attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this
court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the
offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements
of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit
a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any
crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such
thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is
found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally
liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined
and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and
degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of
Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of
MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the
aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in
their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made
by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount
of ₱10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the events that transpired to be
as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check
Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases
from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land
Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing,
merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle of July from
one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega
Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to
make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle
that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform
Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call
and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia,
a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace
the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca,
petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the
owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO
check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. 4 Baby Aquino further testified that,
sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. 5 Verification from
company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she
had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check. 6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account, but explained
that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to
have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the
identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as
he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment
operation with its agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder
by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's
plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced BDO
check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check
replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her
husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she
decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and
went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending
that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00
marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave
₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been
watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar and
dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of
Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had
stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the company. She further
testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where she was staying at that time, and asked
that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese
General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place
in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house
of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her
job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the
phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to
do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been
to said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to
Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After
ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then,
the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y
Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads,
thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the
same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The
issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of qualified theft
defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as
shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and,
instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her
payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain – this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking
and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done
without the owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by
not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor
of force upon things – the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the
company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of
payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the
theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen.This is further bolstered by Article
309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without
value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually
produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person,
peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The
trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of
an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code,
because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are
impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but
nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by
him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2)
that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2)
of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)
ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the
focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible
of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the
coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value
of said dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash
replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the definition of
theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the
taking of personal property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of
the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter’s consent."
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when
there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or
unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of
execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. x x x 13
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for
Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment
in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was
no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give
cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of
theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of
the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and
separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information,
the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If
at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its
Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as
defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA
TINGA, J.:
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively concedes having
performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated
theft only, not the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted. The proposition rests on a common theory
expounded in two well-known decisions1 rendered decades ago by the Court of Appeals, upholding the existence of frustrated
theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty. However, the rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed by
this Court.
As far as can be told,2 the last time this Court extensively considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or
consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao.3 A more cursory
treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla, 4 and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC.5 This petition now gives
occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under the Revised Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Information 6 charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela
(petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon
were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago
(Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who
was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent
of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting.
Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and
again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. 7
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts
were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a
receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow
security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered.8 The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and
three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00. 9
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred on the same day to the Baler
Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police investigation records that
apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security guards at the scene and delivered
to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the incident. However, after the matter was referred to the Office of
the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in
Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the incident. 10
After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent bystanders
within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security
guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of the incident, he was
at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. 11 As the queue for the
ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. It was while they were eating that they
heard the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head out of the building to check what was
transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly "grabbed" by a security guard, thus commencing their
detention.12 Meanwhile, petitioner testified during trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, 13 had been at the parking
lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard
Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start running, at which point he was apprehended
by Lago and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at the security office until around 9:00 p.m., at
which time he and the others were brought to the Baler Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons
of detergent, but he was detained overnight, and eventually brought to the prosecutor’s office where he was charged with
theft.14 During petitioner’s cross-examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a "bundler" of GMS Marketing,
"assigned at the supermarket" though not at SM.15
In a Decision16 promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both
petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2)
years of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum. 17 The RTC found credible the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on the positive identification of the accused as
perpetrators of the crime.
Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal, 18 but only petitioner filed a brief19 with the Court of Appeals, causing the
appellate court to deem Calderon’s appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.20 However, in its Decision dated 19 June 2003,21 the Court of Appeals rejected this
contention and affirmed petitioner’s conviction.22 Hence the present Petition for Review, 23 which expressly seeks that petitioner’s
conviction "be modified to only of Frustrated Theft."24
Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both his felonious intent and his actual
participation in the theft of several cases of detergent with a total value of ₱12,090.00 of which he was charged. 25 As such, there
is no cause for the Court to consider a factual scenario other than that presented by the prosecution, as affirmed by the RTC and
the Court of Appeals. The only question to consider is whether under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as
consummated or merely frustrated.
II.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites 26 two decisions rendered many years ago by the
Court of Appeals: People v. Diño27 and People v. Flores.28 Both decisions elicit the interest of this Court, as they modified trial
court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present case.
Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the appellate court did not expressly consider the
import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the Diño and Flores rulings since they have not yet been
expressly adopted as precedents by this Court. For whatever reasons,
the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass before us. Yet despite the silence on our
part, Diño and Flores have attained a level of renown reached by very few other appellate court rulings. They are
comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our criminal law annotations, 29 and studied in criminal law classes as textbook
examples of frustrated crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.
More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful scenarios that populate criminal law exams more
than they actually occur in real life. Indeed, if we finally say that Diño and Flores are doctrinal, such conclusion could profoundly
influence a multitude of routine theft prosecutions, including commonplace shoplifting. Any scenario that involves the thief
having to exit with the stolen property through a supervised egress, such as a supermarket checkout counter or a parking area
pay booth, may easily call for the application of Diño and Flores. The fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay down
convictions for frustrated theft further validates that Diño and Flores and the theories offered therein on frustrated theft have
borne some weight in our jurisprudential system. The time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those theories are correct and
should continue to influence prosecutors and judges in the future.
III.
To delve into any extended analysis of Diño and Flores, as well as the specific issues relative to "frustrated theft," it is necessary
to first refer to the basic rules on the three stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code. 30
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is consummated
"when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present." It is frustrated "when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." Finally, it is attempted "when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a "subjective phase," or that portion of the acts constituting the crime included
between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime.31 After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective
phase begins.32 It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely
attempted.33 On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances,
"[s]ubjectively the crime is complete."34
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted felonies on the other.
So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the crime is
undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the Revised Penal Code are
generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the
acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts that constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the
acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually
produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution had
been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes
the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of
execution and accompanying criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an important characteristic of a crime, that
"ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime," and accordingly, there can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting.35 Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se, 36mens rea has been defined before as "a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent," 37 and "essential for criminal liability." 38 It follows that the statutory
definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court
has comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected
rights."39 The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it
is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus. 40
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As a
postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly
provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question
whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary
is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From
the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the
acts of execution. For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase "shall kill another," thus
making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are spelled out as
follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of
the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without
the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be
committed.41 In the present discussion, we need to concern ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it that
the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only one operative act of
execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in
order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was
with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of
the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft, which under early Roman law as defined by
Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass "any kind of physical handling of property belonging to another against the will of
the owner,"43 a definition similar to that by Paulus that a thief "handles (touches, moves) the property of another." 44 However,
with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more than mere physical handling, there must further be an intent
of acquiring gain from the object, thus: "[f]urtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus
ejus possessinisve."45 This requirement of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both the Spanish and Filipino
penal laws, even as it has since been abandoned in Great Britain. 46
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or "unlawful taking," to characterize theft. Justice
Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law had
already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with
"the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive the lawful
owner of the thing."47 However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be
permanency in the taking48 or an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property; 49 or that there was no need for
permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary
rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento. 50 Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter
thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. 51
So long as the "descriptive" circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the
completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression
went beyond the attempted stage. As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the
cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict
violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales
Club, petitioner forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by
petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not
"produced," and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately
depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to
the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code 52 as to when a particular felony is "not produced," despite the commission of all
the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony
of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in
the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the
latter’s consent."
U.S. v. Adiao53 apparently supports that notion. Therein, a customs inspector was charged with theft after he abstracted a leather
belt from the baggage of a foreign national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom House. At no time was the accused
able to "get the merchandise out of the Custom House," and it appears that he "was under observation during the entire
transaction."54 Based apparently on those two circumstances, the trial court had found him guilty, instead, of frustrated theft.
The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance was decisive, and holding instead that the accused was guilty of
consummated theft, finding that "all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present." 55 In support of its conclusion
that the theft was consummated, the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the discussion of which we
replicate below:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the fruit[,] he
was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but sometime later. The
court said: "[x x x] The trial court did not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated
theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the
adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking full possession of the thing stolen and even its
utilization by him for an interval of time." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on account of the
solemnity of the act, although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently, however, while the defendant
was still inside the church, the offended party got back the money from the defendant. The court said that the defendant had
performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as consummated. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain,
December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the case took a
small box, which was also opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales and 20 centimos, and
then he placed the money over the cover of the case; just at this moment he was caught by two guards who were stationed in
another room near-by. The court considered this as consummated robbery, and said: "[x x x] The accused [x x x] having materially
taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from the place where it had been, and having taken it with his hands
with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced;
only the act of making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the elements of the
consummated crime." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, June 13, 1882.) 56
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited therein, that the criminal actors in all these cases
had been able to obtain full possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension. The interval between the
commission of the acts of theft and the apprehension of the thieves did vary, from "sometime later" in the 1898 decision; to the
very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a purse which had been stored as it was in the 1882 decision; and before
the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the building where the theft took place, as had happened in Adiao and the
1897 decision. Still, such intervals proved of no consequence in those cases, as it was ruled that the thefts in each of those cases
was consummated by the actual possession of the property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than consummated theft.
The case is People v. Sobrevilla,57 where the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in a public market, was already able to
abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the latter, perceiving the theft, "caught hold of the [accused]’s shirt-
front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a struggle, he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who
was afterwards caught by a policeman."58 In rejecting the contention that only frustrated theft was established, the Court simply
said, without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The [accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that determines the
crime of theft. If the pocket-book was afterwards recovered, such recovery does not affect the [accused’s] criminal liability, which
arose from the [accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book. 59
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court cases cited in the latter, in that the fact that the
offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical possession of the stolen item, no matter how momentary, was able to
consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein contradict the position of petitioner in this case. Yet to
simply affirm without further comment would be disingenuous, as there is another school of thought on when theft is
consummated, as reflected in the Diño and Flores decisions.
Diño was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The accused therein, a
driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck into the port area of the South Harbor, to unload a truckload of
materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had finished unloading, accused drove away his truck from the Port, but as he
was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein three
boxes of army rifles. The accused later contended that he had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the
agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve the rifles after he had passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted
accused of consummated theft, but the Court of Appeals modified the conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft had
been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles "pass through the
checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would be allowed to pass
through the check point without further investigation or checking." 60 This point was deemed material and indicative that the
theft had not been fully produced, for the Court of Appeals pronounced that "the fact determinative of consummation is the
ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or less momentary." 61 Support for this proposition
was drawn from a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 24 January 1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:
Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito de hurto es
preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos
momentaneamente, pues de otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no puede decirse en realidad que se haya
producido en toda su extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la cosa ajena. 62
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then concluded:
This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order to make the booty subject to the control and disposal of the culprits,
the articles stolen must first be passed through the M.P. check point, but since the offense was opportunely discovered and the
articles seized after all the acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot came under the final control and disposal
of the looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely intervention of the
guard. The offense committed, therefore, is that of frustrated theft. 63
Diño thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of apprehension is
determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or frustrated. This theory was applied again by the Court of Appeals some
15 years later, in Flores, a case which according to the division of the court that decided it, bore "no substantial variance between
the circumstances [herein] and in [Diño]." 64 Such conclusion is borne out by the facts in Flores. The accused therein, a checker
employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded
the purportedly empty sea van onto his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to show
the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on inspecting the van, and
discovered that the "empty" sea van had actually contained other merchandise as well. 65 The accused was prosecuted for theft
qualified by abuse of confidence, and found himself convicted of the consummated crime. Before the Court of Appeals, accused
argued in the alternative that he was guilty only of attempted theft, but the appellate court pointed out that there was no
intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the part of the accused that "literally frustrated the theft." However, the Court of
Appeals, explicitly relying on Diño, did find that the accused was guilty only of frustrated, and not consummated, theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found "no substantial variance" between Diño and Flores then before it. The
prosecution in Flores had sought to distinguish that case from Diño, citing a "traditional ruling" which unfortunately was not
identified in the decision itself. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the said "traditional ruling" was qualified by the
words "is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of its contents at once." 66 Pouncing on this qualification, the
appellate court noted that "[o]bviously, while the truck and the van were still within the compound, the petitioner could not
have disposed of the goods ‘at once’." At the same time, the Court of Appeals conceded that "[t]his is entirely different from the
case where a much less bulk and more common thing as money was the object of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or
make use of it is palpably less restricted," 67 though no further qualification was offered what the effect would have been had that
alternative circumstance been present instead.
Synthesis of the Diño and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was
produced is the ability of the actor "to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary." Such conclusion was
drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in determining whether theft had been
consummated, "es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos
momentaneamente." The qualifier "siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente" proves another important consideration, as
it implies that if the actor was in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen items before apprehension, then the theft could be
deemed consummated. Such circumstance was not present in either Diño or Flores, as the stolen items in both cases were
retrieved from the actor before they could be physically extracted from the guarded compounds from which the items were
filched. However, as implied in Flores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there
could have been "free disposition," as in the case where the chattel involved was of "much less bulk and more common x x x,
[such] as money x x x."68
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed observation on the import of the Diño ruling:
There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the thief is able to freely dispose of the stolen articles
even if it were more or less momentary. Or as stated in another case[ 69 ], theft is consummated upon the voluntary and malicious
taking of property belonging to another which is realized by the material occupation of the thing whereby the thief places it
under his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of it at once. This ruling seems to have been based on Viada’s
opinion that in order the theft may be consummated, "es preciso que se haga en circumstancias x x x [70 ]"71
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and other cases, also states that "[i]n theft or robbery
the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although
his act of making use of the thing was frustrated." 72
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming variance with the Diño and Flores rulings. People v.
Batoon73 involved an accused who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view of a police detective, who
followed the accused onto a passenger truck where the arrest was made. While the trial court found the accused guilty of
frustrated qualified theft, the Court of Appeals held that the accused was guilty of consummated qualified theft, finding that
"[t]he facts of the cases of U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla x x x indicate that actual taking with intent to gain is enough
to consummate the crime of theft."74
In People v. Espiritu,75 the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded them onto a truck.
However, as the truck passed through the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by the Military Police running the
checkpoint. Even though those facts clearly admit to similarity with those in Diño, the Court of Appeals held that the accused
were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused "were able to take or get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that
was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft, is the use or benefit that the thieves expected from the
commission of the offense."76
In pointing out the distinction between Diño and Espiritu, Reyes wryly observes that "[w]hen the meaning of an element of a
felony is controversial, there is bound to arise different rulings as to the stage of execution of that felony." 77 Indeed, we can
discern from this survey of jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as frustrated theft is concerned is muddled. It fact,
given the disputed foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft itself, the question can even be asked whether there is
really such a crime in the first place.
IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As we undertake
this inquiry, we have to reckon with the import of this Court’s 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC. 78
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4) persons in the premises of his plantation, in the act
of gathering and tying some coconuts. The accused were surprised by the owner within the plantation as they were carrying with
them the coconuts they had gathered. The accused fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized, and were
subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to the police. After trial, the accused were convicted of qualified
theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were guilty only of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was
qualified, following Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, 79 but further held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated
qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft was consummated or frustrated was raised by
any of the parties. What does appear, though, is that the disposition of that issue was contained in only two sentences, which we
reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not able to carry the coconuts away from the
plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner. 80
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Diño, Flores or the Spanish authorities who may have
bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors "were not able to perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the felon as a consequence."81 However, per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is frustrated
"when the offender performs all the acts of execution," though not producing the felony as a result. If the offender was not able
to perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted, provided that the non-performance was by reason of some cause or
accident other than spontaneous desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was
frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely arrival of the owner. However, following
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, these facts should elicit the conclusion that the crime was only attempted, especially given
that the acts were not performed because of the timely arrival of the owner, and not because of spontaneous desistance by the
offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present petition. Even if the two sentences we had
cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, such passage bears no reflection that it
is the product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal or jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if it
were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it required no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited as authority on theft. Indeed, we cannot see how
Empelis can contribute to our present debate, except for the bare fact that it proves that the Court had once deliberately found
an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were considered as a precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value is
extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that inform it, and also by the fact that it has not been entrenched by
subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated theft is viable in this jurisdiction. Considering
the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious argument to persuade us in this
case. Insofar as Empelis may imply that convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this jurisdiction, that decision is
subject to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo Penal de España was then in place. The definition of
the crime of theft, as provided then, read as follows:
Son reos de hurto:
1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas muebles
ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño.
2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la apropriaren co intención de lucro.
3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño causado, salvo los casos previstos en los artίculos 606,
núm. 1.0; 607, núms, 1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, núm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo párrafo del 617 y 618.
It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were handed down.
However, the said code would be revised again in 1932, and several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo Penal Español de
1995, the crime of theft is now simply defined as "[e]l que, con ánimo de lucro,
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño será castigado" 82
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain, "la libre disposicion" of the property is not an
element or a statutory characteristic of the crime. It does appear that the principle originated and perhaps was fostered in the
realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de España.
Therein, he raised at least three questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or consummated theft had occurred.
The passage cited in Diño was actually utilized by Viada to answer the question whether frustrated or consummated theft was
committed "[e]l que en el momento mismo de apoderarse de la cosa ajena, viéndose sorprendido, la arroja al suelo." 83 Even as
the answer was as stated in Diño, and was indeed derived from the 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decision’s
factual predicate occasioning the statement was apparently very different from Diño, for it appears that the 1888 decision
involved an accused who was surprised by the employees of a haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off a
mannequin, and who then proceeded to throw away the garment as he fled. 84
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and willingly recites decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
that have held to that effect.85 A few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Calón pointed out the inconsistent application
by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to frustrated theft.
Hay frustración cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro que los
conducia a otro que tenían preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la intervención de la policia
situada en el local donde se realizó la sustracción que impidió pudieran los reos disponer de lo sustraído, 30 de octubre 1950.
Hay "por lo menos" frustración, si existe apoderamiento, pero el culpale no llega a disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay
frustración "muy próxima" cuando el culpable es detenido por el perjudicado acto seguido de cometer la sustracción, 28 febrero
1931. Algunos fallos han considerado la existencia de frustración cuando, perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento
de llevar los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889, 22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina no es admissible,
éstos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son hurtos consumados.86
Ultimately, Cuello Calón attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually possible:
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la disposición del
agente. Con este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada últimamente porla jurisprudencia española que generalmente considera
consumado el hurto cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y ésta quede por tiempo más o menos duradero bajo su poder.
El hecho de que éste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es indiferente. El delito no pierde su carácter de consumado
aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere recuperada. No se concibe la frustración, pues es muy dificil que el
que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente, los raros casos que nuestra
jurisprudencia, muy vacilante, declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos consumados. 87 (Emphasis supplied)
Cuello Calón’s submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was content with replicating the Spanish Supreme Court
decisions on the matter, Cuello Calón actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether theft could truly be frustrated,
since "pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente."
Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of the crime would
not produce the effect of theft.
This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted force in scholarly thought that obliges us to accept
frustrated theft, as proposed in Diño and Flores. A final ruling by the Court that there is no crime of frustrated theft in this
jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic pariah, for such a submission is hardly heretical in light of Cuello Calón’s position.
Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective, as we are
not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that theft is capable of
commission in its frustrated stage. Further, if we ask the question whether there is a mandate of statute or precedent that must
compel us to adopt the Diño and Flores doctrines, the answer has to be in the negative. If we did so, it would arise not out of
obeisance to an inexorably higher command, but from the exercise of the function of statutory interpretation that comes as part
and parcel of judicial review, and a function that allows breathing room for a variety of theorems in competition until one is
ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in the province of the legislature, through statute, to
define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as representatives of the sovereign people,
which determines which acts or combination of acts are criminal in nature. Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned
with what was the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the language of the law as it defines the crime. It is
Congress, not the courts, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. 88 The courts cannot arrogate the power to
introduce a new element of a crime which was unintended by the legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew
to the statutory language. Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain
from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow interpretation" is appropriate. "The Court must take heed of
language, legislative history and purpose, in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids." 89
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Diño/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the
property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a
descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this Court has repeatedly
held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking
be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.90
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property of
another without the latter’s consent. While the Diño/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory
definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of
property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is
the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This
conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of
making use of the thing was frustrated." 91
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of "taking"
itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this
were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not
all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been accomplished." Perhaps this point could serve as
fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such
consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular
case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain,
he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these
off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 92 And long ago, we asserted in People v.
Avila:93
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of
the thief, which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the
consent of the owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the taking should be effected against the
will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction of no slight importance. 94
Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the
deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time,
without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained possession
over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of property. The presumed
inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been
deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule —that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen
property frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated
intent,95 since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances
that do not admit of easy classification. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to
free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the psychological belief of the offender at the time of the commission of the
crime, as implied in Diño?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and weight of the property, the
location of the property, the number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of people
whom the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in which the stolen item had
been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into
account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is capable of free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has
been consummated.
All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was indeed deprived of
property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed fact if
frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking, have been completed. If the facts
establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to
the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been performed. But once all these acts have been executed, the
taking has been completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the consummation of the theft.
Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet they do not align with the legislated
framework of the crime of theft. The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as to
accommodate said rulings. Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the "free disposition
of the items stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. Diño itself did not rely on
Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later Flores was ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for
legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law
on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since found
favor from this Court.
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success
of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in
our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal
Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code
in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166326 January 25, 2006
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27215 affirming, with modification,
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of the
Philippines. v. Esmeraldo Rivera, et al.
On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed
Rivera, of attempted murder. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and hit with a piece of hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal injury on his head and on
the different parts of his body, the accused thus commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, but failed to
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some causes other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran (sic) away and the timely response of the policemen, to his
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in April 1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his
life. He was even given a citation as a Bayaning Pilipino by the television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His
wife eked out a living as a manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro Labrador II, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his
wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look for his wife. His three-year-old
daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and
ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position,
Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People
who saw the incident shouted: "Awatin sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at
him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto Cagingin, Jr., signed a medical certificate in which he
declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal area, cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left
upper buttocks, multiple abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma periorbital left. 4 The doctor declared that the lacerated
wound in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from one to seven days. 5 The doctor prescribed medicine for
Ruben’s back pain, which he had to take for one month. 6
Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his house and banged the gate. Ruben challenged
him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he went out of the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They
wrestled with each other. He fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife arrived, and he was pulled
away and brought to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother Esmeraldo, but Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He
managed to free himself from Ruben and the latter fled. He went home afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the
scene.
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in front of their house. Ruben arrived and he
went inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even
threatened to shoot him. His brother Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the problem was. A fist fight
ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to the ground. When he stood up, he pulled at
Edgardo’s shirt and hair, and, in the process, Ruben’s head hit the lamp post. 7
On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and are sentenced to an
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt the culpability of the accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay, jointly and severally, civil indemnity to the
private complainant in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the accused and their witnesses. The accused appealed to the
CA, which rendered judgment on June 8, 2004 affirming, with modification, the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the
CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is MODIFIED in that the appellants are convicted
of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and
1 day of prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the CA erred in affirming the RTC
decision. They insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him
with a hollow block. Petitioners aver that, based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound in
the parietal area; hence, they should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if petitioners had the intent to kill
Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove treachery; hence, they should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.
On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners’ intent to kill Ruben:
On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound inflicted and the kind of weapon used.
Intent to kill was established by victim Ruben Rodil in his testimony as follows:
Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a piece of hollow block xxx and hit me thrice on the head,
Sir.
Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit with a hollow block by Dagol?
A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while Dagol was hitting, Sir.
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block directly hit his head, and had the
police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent
to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3) brothers helped each other maul the
defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them even picked up a cement hollow block
and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the
appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil. 10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the decision of the CA is correct, thus:
The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the presumption of innocence raised by petitioners. The crime
has been clearly established with petitioners as the perpetrators. Their intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and categorically declared that the victim Ruben Rodil was
walking along St. Peter Avenue when he was suddenly boxed by Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera. They further narrated that, soon
thereafter, his two brothers Ismael and Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera, coming from St. Peter II, ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia
Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo recounted that they saw Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera pick up a hollow block and hit Ruben Rodil with it
three (3) times. A careful review of their testimonies revealed the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of petitioners. In
this case, the victim did not even have the slightest warning of the danger that lay ahead as he was carrying his three-year old
daughter. He was caught off-guard by the assault of Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera and the simultaneous attack of the two other
petitioners. It was also established that the victim was hit by Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera, while he was lying on the ground and being
mauled by the other petitioners. Petitioners could have killed the victim had he not managed to escape and had the police not
promptly intervened.
Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the victim was superficial and, thus, not life threatening.
The nature of the injury does not negate the intent to kill. The Court of Appeals held:
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block directly hit his head, and had the
police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent
to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three (3) brothers helped each other maul
the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them picked up a cement hollow block
and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the
appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil. 11
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the
offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent
which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.
In People v. Delim,12 the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in
the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben.
Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against
the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on
the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral
contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death does not negate
petitioners’ criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are
still criminally liable for attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. 13
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed. 14
The Court in People v. Lizada15 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more
than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense. The raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his
declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed,
and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that
the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.16
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling the victim and hitting him
three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben
would surely have died.
We reject petitioners’ contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the commission of the felony. Petitioners
attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of
the imminent peril to his life. He had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized
assault of the three siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim. 17 Even if the attack is
frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself, there would be
treachery.18 Obviously, petitioners assaulted the victim because of the altercation between him and petitioner Edgardo Rivera a
day before. There being conspiracy by and among petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them. 19
The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision correccionalin its
minimum period, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor in its maximum period, as maximum. This is erroneous.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since petitioners are guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by two degrees,
conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2 of Article 61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the felony (other
than the qualifying circumstance of treachery), the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a
range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its
minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138874-75. February 3, 2004
People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Juan Larranaga alias Paco, et al.
For most of the Cebuanos, the proceedings in these cases will always be remembered as the "trial of the century." A reading of
the voluminous records readily explains why the unraveling of the facts during the hearing before the court below proved
transfixing and horrifying and why it resulted in unusual media coverage.

These cases involve the kidnapping and illegal detention of a college beauty queen along with her comely and courageous sister.
An intriguing tale of ribaldry and gang-rape was followed by the murder of the beauty queen. She was thrown off a cliff into a
deep forested ravine where she was left to die. Her sister was subjected to heartless indignities before she was also gang-raped.
In the aftermath of the kidnapping and rape, the sister was made to disappear. Where she is and what further crimes were
inflicted upon her remain unknown and unsolved up to the present.

Before us in an appeal from the Decision[1] dated May 5, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU 45303-45304, finding Rowen Adlawan alias "Wesley," Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Alberto Caño alias "Allan Pahak,"
Francisco Juan Larrañaga alias "Paco," James Andrew Uy alias "MM," and James Anthony Uy alias "Wang Wang," appellants
herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentencing each of them to
suffer the penalties of "two (2)reclusiones perpetua" and to indemnify the heirs of the victims, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline
Chiong, jointly and severally, the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages and P5,000,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.

The Fourth Amended Informations[2] for kidnapping and illegal detention dated May 12, 1998 filed against appellants and
Davidson Rusia alias "Tisoy Tagalog," the discharged state witness, read as follows:

1) For Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.[3]

"xxx

"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock more or less in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, all private individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually helping
with one another, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or deprive one Marijoy
Chiong, of her liberty and on the occasion thereof, and in connection, accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have
carnal knowledge of said Marijoy against her will with the use of force and intimidation and subsequent thereto and on the
occasion thereof, accused with intent to kill, did then and there inflict physical injuries on said Marijoy Chiong throwing her into a
deep ravine and as a consequence of which, Marijoy Chiong died.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

2) For Criminal Case CBU-45304:[4]

"xxx

"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock more or less in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, all private individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with one another, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or deprive
one Jacqueline Chiong of her liberty, thereby detaining her until the present.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."
On separate arraignments, state witness Davison Rusia and appellants Rowen Adlawan, Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Alberto
Caño, James Andrew and James Anthony Uy pleaded not guilty. [5] Appellant Francisco Juan Larrañaga refused to plead, hence,
the trial court entered for him the plea of "not guilty." [6] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

In the main, the prosecution evidence centered on the testimony of Rusia. [7] Twenty-one witnesses[8] corroborated his testimony
on major points. For the defense, appellants James Anthony Uy and Alberto Caño took the witness stand. Appellant Francisco
Juan Larrañaga was supposed to testify on his defense of alibi but the prosecution and the defense, through a stipulation
approved by the trial court, dispensed with his testimony. Nineteen witnesses testified for the appellants, corroborating their
respective defenses of alibi.

The version of the prosecution is narrated as follows:

On the night of July 16, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, who lived in Cebu City, failed to come home on the expected
time. It was raining hard and Mrs. Thelma Chiong thought her daughters were simply having difficulty getting a ride. Thus, she
instructed her sons, Bruce and Dennis, to fetch their sisters. They returned home without Marijoy and Jacqueline. Mrs. Chiong
was not able to sleep that night. Immediately, at 5:00 o'clock in the morning, her entire family started the search for her
daughters, but there was no trace of them. Thus, the family sought the assistance of the police who continued the search. But
still, they could not find Marijoy and Jacqueline.[9]

Meanwhile, in the morning of July 18, 1997, a certain Rudy Lasaga reported to the police that a young woman was found dead at
the foot of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu.[10] Officer-in-Charge Arturo Unabia and three other policemen proceeded to Tan-
awan and there, they found a dead woman lying on the ground. Attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. [11] Her pants were torn,
her orange t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape.
[12]

On July 19, 1996, upon hearing the news about the dead woman, Mrs. Chiong's son Dennis and other relatives proceeded to the
Tupaz Funeral Parlor at Carcar, Cebu to see the body. It was Marijoy dressed in the same orange shirt and maong pants she wore
when she left home on July 16, 1997. Upon learning of the tragic reality, Mrs. Chiong became frantic and hysterical. She could
not accept that her daughter would meet such a gruesome fate. [13]

On May 8, 1998, or after almost ten months, the mystery that engulfed the disappearance of Marijoy and Jacqueline was
resolved. Rusia, bothered by his conscience and recurrent nightmares, [14] admitted before the police having participated in the
abduction of the sisters.[15] He agreed to re-enact the commission of the crimes. [16]

On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how the crimes were committed and identified all the appellants as the
perpetrators. He declared that his conduit to Francisco Juan Larrañaga was Rowen Adlawan whom he met together with brothers
James Anthony and James Andrew Uy five months before the commission of the crimes charged. [17] He has known Josman Aznar
since 1991. He met Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag only in the evening of July 16, 1997.

Or, July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu Plaza Hotel, Cebu City, Rowen approached him and arranged that
they meet the following day at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [18] When they saw each other the next day, Rowen told him
to stay put at the Ayala Mall because they would have a "big happening" in the evening. All the while, he thought that Rowen's
"big happening" meant group partying or scrounging. He thus lingered at the Ayala Mall until the appointed time came. [19]

At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They met Rusia at the back exit of the Ayala Mall and told him to ride
with them in a white car. Rusia noticed that a red car was following them. Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes Avenue, same city,
he saw two women standing at the waiting shed.[20] Rusia did not know yet that their names were Marijoy and Jacqueline.

Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and he and Rowen approached and invited Marijoy and Jacqueline to
join them.[21] But the sisters declined. Irked by the rejection, Rowen grabbed Marijoy while Josman held Jacqueline and forced
both girls to ride in the car. [22] Marijoy was the first one to get inside, followed by Rowen. Meanwhile, Josman pushed Jacqueline
inside and immediately drove the white car. Rusia sat on the front seat beside Josman.

Fourteen (14) meters from the waiting shed, Jacqueline managed to get out of the car. Josman chased her and brought her back
into the car. Not taking anymore chances, Rowen elbowed Jacqueline on the chest and punched Marijoy on the stomach, causing
both girls to faint.[23] Rowen asked Rusia for the packaging tape under the latter's seat and placed it on the girls' mouths. Rowen
also handcuffed them jointly. The white and red cars then proceeded to Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City.

At Fuente Osmeña, Josman parked the car near a Mercury Drug Store and urged Rusia to inquire if a van that was parked nearby
was for hire. A man who was around replied "no" so the group immediately left. The two cars stopped again near Park Place
Hotel where Rusia negotiated to hire a van. But no van was available. Thus, the cars sped to a house in Guadalupe, Cebu City
known as the safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group" Thereupon, Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew got out of the
red car.

Larrañaga, James Anthony and Rowen brought Marijoy to one of the rooms, while Rusia and Josman led Jacqueline to another
room. Josman then told Rusia to step out so Rusia stayed at the living room with James Andrew. They remained in the house for
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes. At that time, Rusia could hear Larrañaga, James Anthony, and Rowen giggling inside the
room.

Thereafter, the group brought Marijoy and Jacqueline back to the white car. Then the two cars headed to the South Bus Terminal
where they were able to hire a white van driven by Alberto. Ariel was the conductor. James Andrew drove the white car, while
the rest of the group boarded the van. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.

Inside the van, Marijoy and Jacqueline were slowly gaining strength. James Anthony taped their mouths anew and Rowen
handcuffed them-together. Along the way, the van and the white car stopped by a barbeque store. Rowen got off the van and
bought barbeque and Tanduay rhum. They proceeded to Tan-awan. [24] Then they parked their vehicles near a precipice [25] where
they drank and had a pot session. Later, they pulled Jacqueline out of the van and told her to dance as they encircled her. She
was pushed from one end of the circle to the other, ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Josman told Larrañaga to start
raping Marijoy who was left inside the van. The latter did as told and after fifteen minutes emerged from the van saying, "who
wants next?" Rowen went in, followed by James Anthony, Alberto, the driver, and Ariel, the conductor. Each spent a few minutes
inside the van and afterwards came out smiling.[26]

Then they carried Marijoy out of the van, after which Josman brought Jacqueline inside the vehicle. Josman came out from the
van after ten minutes, saying, "whoever wants next go ahead and hurry up." Rusia went inside the van and raped Jacqueline,
followed by James Andrew. At this instance, Marijoy was to breathe her last for upon Josman's instruction, Rowen and Ariel led
her to the cliff and mercilessly pushed her into the ravine [27] which was almost 150 meters deep.[28]

As for Jacqueline, she was pulled out of the van and thrown to the ground. Able to gather a bit of strength, she tried to run
towards the road. The group boarded the van, followed her and made fun of her by screaming, "run some more" There was a
tricycle passing by. The group brought Jacqueline inside the van. Rowen beat her until she passed out. The group then headed
back to Cebu City with James Andrew driving the white car. Rusia got off from the van somewhere near the Ayala Center. [29]

There were other people who saw snippets of what Rusia had witnessed. Sheila Singson, [30] Analie Konahap[31] and Williard
Redobles[32] testified that Marijoy and Jacqueline were talking to Larrañaga and Josman before they were abducted. Roland
Dacillo[33]saw Jacqueline alighting and running away from a white car and that Josman went after her and grabbed her back to
the car. Alfredo Duarte[34] testified that he was at the barbeque stand when Rowen bought barbeque; that Rowen asked where
he could buy Tanduay; that he saw a white van and he heard therefrom voices of a male and female who seemed to be
quarreling; that he also heard a cry of a woman which he could not understand because "it was as if the voice was being
controlled;" and that after Rowen got his order, he boarded the white van which he recognized to be previously driven by Alberto
Caño. Meanwhile, Mario Miñoza,[35] a tricycle driver plying the route of Carcar-Mantalongon, saw Jacqueline running towards
Mantalongon. Her blouse was torn and her hair was disheveled. Trailing her was a white van where a very loud rock music could
be heard. Manuel Camingao[36] recounted that on July 17, 1997, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw a white van near a
cliff at Tan-awan. Thinking that the passenger of the white van was throwing garbage at the cliff, he wrote its plate number (GGC-
491) on the side of his tricycle. [37]

Still, there were other witnesses[38] presented by the prosecution who gave details which, when pieced together, corroborated
well Rusia's testimony on what transpired at the Ayala Center all the way to Carcar.

Against the foregoing facts and circumstances, the appellants raised the defense of alibi, thus:

Larrañaga, through his witnesses, sought to establish that on July 16, 1997, he was in Quezon City taking his mid-term
examinations at the Center for Culinary Arts. In the evening of that day until 3:00 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997, he was
with his friends at the R & R Bar and Restaurant, same city. Fifteen witnesses testified that they were either with Larrañaga or
saw him in Quezon City at the time the crimes were committed. His friends, Lourdes Montalvan, [39] Charmaine Flores,[40] Richard
Antonio,[41] Jheanessa Fonacier,[42]Maharlika Shulze,[43] Sebastian Seno,[44] Francisco Jarque,[45] Raymond Garcia,[46] Cristina Del
Gallego,[47] Mona Lisa Del Gallego,[48] Paolo Celso[49] and Paolo Manguerra[50] testified that they were with him at the R & R Bar on
the night of July 16, 1997. The celebration was a "despedida" for him as he was leaving the next day for Cebu and a "bienvenida"
for another friend. Larrañaga's classmate Carmina Esguerra [51] testified that he was in school on July 16, 1997 taking his mid-term
examinations. His teacher Rowena Bautista, [52] on the other hand, testified that he attended her lecture in Applied Mathematics.
Also, some of his neighbors at the Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the security guard, Salvador Boton,
testified that he was in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997. Representatives of the four airline companies plying the
route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented proofs showing that the name Francisco Juan Larrañaga does not appear in the list of
pre-flight and post-flight manifests from July 15, 1997 to about noontime of July 17, 1997.
Meanwhile, James Anthony Uy testified that on July 16, 1997, he and his brother James Andrew were at home in Cebu City
because it was their father's 50th birthday and they were celebrating the occasion with a small party which ended at 11:30 in the
evening.[53] He only left his house the next day, July 17, 1997 at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning to go to school. [54] The boys'
mother, Marlyn Uy, corroborated his testimony and declared that when she woke up at 2:00 o'clock in the morning to check on
her sons, she found them sleeping in their bedrooms. They went to school the next day at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. [55]

Clotilde Soterol testified for Alberto and Ariel. She narrated that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Alberto
brought the white Toyota van with Plate No. GGC-491 to her shop to have its aircon repaired. Alberto was accompanied by his
wife Gina Caño, co-appellant Ariel, and spouses Catalina and Simplicio Paghinayan, owners of the vehicle. Since her (Clotildes')
husband was not yet around, Alberto just left the vehicle and promised to return the next morning. Her husband arrived at 8:30
in the evening and started to repair the aircon at 9:00 o'clock of the same evening. He finished the work at 10:00 o'clock the
following morning. At 11:00 o'clock, Alberto and his wife Gina, Ariel and Catalina returned to the shop to retrieve the vehicle.
[56]
Alberto,[57] Gina[58] and Catalina[59] corroborated Clotilde's testimony.
To lend support to Josman's alibi, Michael Dizon recounted, that on July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he and
several friends were at Josman's house in Cebu. They ate their dinner there and afterwards drank "Blue Label." They stayed at
Josman's house until 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Thereafter, they proceeded to BAI Disco where they drank beer and socialized
with old friends. They stayed there until 1:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. Thereafter, they transferred to DTM Bar. They
went home together at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning. Their friend, Jonas Dy Pico, dropped Josman at his house. [60]

Concerning state witness Rusia, on August 7, 1998, when the prosecution moved that he be discharged as an accused for the
purpose of utilizing him as a state witness,[61] Larrañaga and brothers James Anthony and James Andrew opposed the motion on
the ground that he does not qualify as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure.[62] On August 12, 1998, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present Rusia as its witness but deferred resolving
its motion to discharge until it has completely presented its evidence. [63] On the same date, the prosecution finished conducting
Rusia's direct examination.[64] The defense lawyers cross-examined him on August 13, 17, and 20, 1998. [65] On the last date, Judge
Ocampo provisionally terminated the cross-examination due to the report that there was an attempt to bribe him and because of
his deteriorating health.[66]

Resenting the trial court's termination of Rusia's cross-examination, the defense lawyers moved for the inhibition of Judge
Ocampo.[67]When he informed the defense lawyers that he would not inhibit himself since he found no "just and valid reasons"
therefor, the defense lawyers withdrew en masse as counsel for the appellants declaring that they would no longer attend the
trial. Judge Ocampo held them-guilty-of direct contempt of court. Thus, defense lawyers Raymundo Armovit, Edgar Gica, Fidel
Gonzales, Ramon Teleron, Alfonso de la Cerna and Lorenzo Paylado were ordered jailed.

In the Order dated August 25, 1998, the trial court denied the motion for inhibition of the defense lawyers and ordered them to
continue representing their respective clients so that the cases may undergo the mandatory continuous trial. The trial court
likewise denied their motion to withdraw as appellants' counsel because of their failure to secure a prior written consent from
their clients. On August 26, 1998, appellants filed their written consent to the withdrawal of their counsel.

Thereafter, Larrañaga, Josman and brothers James Anthony and James Andrew moved for the postponement of the hearing for
several weeks to enable them to hire the services of new counsel. [68] On August 31, 1998, the trial court denied appellants'
motions on the ground that it could no longer delay the hearing of the cases. On September 2, 1998, the trial court directed the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to act as counsel de oficio for all the appellants.[69]

Trial resumed on September 3, 1998 with a team of PAO lawyers assisting appellants. Larrañaga objected to the continuation of
the direct examination of the prosecution witnesses as he was not represented by his counsel de parte. The trial court overruled
his objection. The prosecution witnesses testified continuously from September 3, 1998 to September 24, 1998. Meanwhile, the
cross-examination of said witnesses was deferred until the appellants were able to secure counsel of their choice. On the same
date, September 24, 1998, Atty. Eric C. Villarmia entered his appearance as counsel for Larrañaga, while Atty. Eric S. Carin
appeared as counsel for brothers James Anthony and James Andrew.

Thereafter, or on October 1, 1998, the defense lawyers started cross-examining Rusia. The cross-examination continued on
October 5, 6, 12 and 13, 1998.

Eventually, acting on the prosecution's motion to discharge Rusia to be a state witness, the trial court required the "opposing
parties to submit their respective memoranda. On November 12, 1998, the trial court issued an omnibus order granting the
prosecution's motion discharging Rusia as an accused and according him the status of a state witness.

On May 5, 1999, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, all the accused Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, James Andrew Uy, James Anthony Uy, Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Caño, and Ariel Balansag are hereby found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention and are hereby sentenced to imprisonment of Two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua each which penalties, however,
may be served by them simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal Code). Further, said accused are hereby ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the two (2) victims in these cases, jointly and severally, in the amount of P200,000.00 in actual damages and
P5,000,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages.

"SO ORDERED."
Hence, the instant separate appeals. Appellants Rowen, Alberto and Ariel ascribe to the trial court the following errors:

"I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNTRUSTWORTHY, INCONSISTENT, CONTRADICTORY AND
INCREDULOUS TESTIMONY OF (DAVIDSON) VALIENTE RUSIA.
"II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT DULY REPRESENTED BY COUNSELS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE DURING THE TIME THESE
WITNESSES WERE PRESENTED.
"III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
"IV. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
"V. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISPLAYING MANIFEST ANIMOSITY TOWARDS THE DEFENSE'S WITNESSES WHICH CLEARLY
SHOWED ITS PREJUDICE AND BIAS IN DECIDING THE CASE.
"VI. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING SOME DEFENSE WITNESSES TO TESTIFY.
"VII. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING ROWEN ADLAWAN TO HAVE WAIVED PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN HIS
BEHALF."
For his part, Josman raises the following assignments of error:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCHARGING DAVID VALIENTE RUSIA AS STATE WITNESS IN GROSS AND BLATANT
DISREGARD OF THE RULES ON DISCHARGE OF STATE WITNESS.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S TESTIMONY DESPITE CLEAR SHOWING THAT HIS
CRIMINAL RECORD AS AN EX-CONVlCT, DRUG ADDICT AND GANGSTER AND HIS SUICIDAL TENDENCIES SERIOUSLY IMPAIR HIS
CREDIBILITY AND INNATE CAPACITY FOR TRUTH, HONESTY AND INTEGRITY.
"III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S TESTIMONY REPLETE AS IT WAS WITH
INCONSISTENCIES, FALSEHOODS AND LIES.
"IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
"V. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT AZNAR HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND IN DEPRIVING HIM OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED.
"VI. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED AZNAR'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE REFUSED TO INHIBIT HIMSELF AND
PROCEEDED WITH THE TRIAL DESPITE GLARING BADGES OF HIS PARTIALITY AND BIAS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
"VII. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCREDITING AND DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.
"VIII. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT AZNAR ON THE BASIS OF PROSECUTING EVIDENCE MAINLY
ANCHORED ON RUSIA'S TESTIMONY WHICH FAILED TO EVINCE PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF APPELLANT AZNAR'S
CRIMINAL LIABILITY."
In his 145-page appellant's brief, Larrañaga alleges that the trial court committed the following errors:
"6.1 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING AND VIOLATING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
6.2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED DAVIDSON RUSIA.
6.3 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING PARTIAL CREDIBILITY TO THE TESTIMONY OF DAVIDSON RUSIA.
6.4 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHER WITNESSES.
6.5 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF OTHER WITNESSES.
6.6 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE.
6.7 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING AND REJECTING, EVEN AT DIRECT TESTIMONY STAGE, THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI."
For their part, brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, in their 147-page appellants' brief, bid for an acquittal on the
following grounds:
"A) THE TRIAL COURT BELOW GRIEVOUSLY FAILED TO OBSERVE, AND THUS DENIED ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY AND
JAMES ANDREW S. UY THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, TO HAVE
COUNSEL OF THEIR OWN CHOICE, TO HAVE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE, TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE, AND TO PRODUCE
EVIDENCE ON THEIR BEHALF;
B) THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S.
UY AND JAMES ANDREW S. UY IN THESE CASES THUS THE TRIAL COURT BELOW SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
RENDERED THE 5 MAY 1999 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AGAINST THEM." [70]
Appellants' assignments of error converge on four points, thus: (1) violation of their right to due process; (2) the improper
discharge of Rusia as an accused to be a state witness; (3) the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution; and (4) the trial
court's disregard and rejection of the evidence for the defense.
The appeal is bereft of merit.

I. Violation of Appellants' Right to Due Process

Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedoms; it is the basic and essential term in the
social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the State may exercise. [71] In evaluating a
due process claim, the court must determine whether life, liberty or property interest exists, and if so, what procedures are
constitutionally required to protect that right. [72] Otherwise stated, the due process clause calls for two separate inquiries in
evaluating an alleged violation: did the plaintiff lose something that fits into one of the three protected categories of life, liberty,
or property?; and, if so, did the plaintiff receive the minimum measure of procedural protection warranted under the
circumstances?[73]
For our determination, therefore, is whether the minimum requirements of due process were accorded to appellants during the
trial of these cases.
Section 14, Article III of our Constitution catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal prosecution, thus:
"SEC. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy,impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure casts the foregoing provision in a more detailed manner, thus:
"SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation
of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail,
unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without
justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an
accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until
custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears
to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His
silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the
testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law."
Of the foregoing rights, what appellants obviously claim as having been trampled upon by the trial court are their: (a) right to be
assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; (c) right
to produce evidence on their behalf; and (d) right to an impartial trial.

A. Right to Counsel
Anent the right to counsel, appellants fault the trial court: first, for appointing counsel de oficio despite their insistence to be
assisted by counsel of their own choice; and second, for refusing to suspend trial until they shall have secured the services of new
counsel.
Appellants cannot feign denial of their right to counsel. We have held that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a
counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the
case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. [74]
Indisputably, it was the strategic machinations of appellants and their counsel de parte which prompted the trial court to appoint
counsel de oficio. The unceremonious withdrawal of appellants' counsel de parte during the proceedings of August 24, 1998, as
well as their stubborn refusal to return to the court for trial undermines the continuity of the proceedings. Considering that the
case had already been dragging on a lethargic course, it behooved the trial court to prevent any further dilatory maneuvers on
the part of the defense counsel. Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to appoint counsel de oficio to represent appellants
during the remaining phases of the proceedings.

At any rate, the appointment of counsel de oficio under such circumstances is not proscribed by the Constitution. An examination
of its provisions concerning the right to counsel shows that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation[75] rather than an accused in a criminal prosecution.[76] And even if we are to extend
the "application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential
discretion is not absolute as would enable him to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of others equally capable. We
stated the reason for this ruling in an earlier case:

"Withal, the word 'preferably' under Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in
the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who
for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by
the framers of the charter."[77]
In the same breath, the choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel
deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel whom it considers
competent and independent to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the
pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case. [78]

Neither is there a violation of appellants' right to counsel just because the trial court did not grant their request for suspension of
the hearing pending their search for new counsel. An application for a continuance in order to secure the services of counsel is
ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and the denial thereof is not ordinarily an infringement of the accused's right
to counsel.[79] The right of the accused to select his own counsel must be exercised in a reasonable time and in a reasonable
manner.[80]

In the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month or three (3) weeks to look for new counsel. Such periods are
unreasonable. Appellants could have hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they wanted to. They should have been diligent in
procuring new counsel.[81] Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel does not mean that accused may avoid
trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to participate in his trial. [82] It has been held that
where the accused declined the court's offer to appoint counsel and elected to defend himself, the denial of his motion made
toward the end of the trial for a continuance so that he could obtain counsel of his own choice was not an infringement of his
constitutional rights.[83] While the accused has the right to discharge or change his counsel at any time, this right is to some
extent subject to supervision by the trial court, particularly after the trial has commenced. The court may deny accused's
application to discharge his counsel where it appears that such application is not made in good faith but is made for purposes
of delay.[84]

Significantly, parallel to the hearing at the trial court were also petitions and motions involving several incidents in these cases
filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court. The appellants, particularly Larrañaga, were represented there by the same
counsel de parte.[85]Certainly, it is wrong for these lawyers to abandon appellants in the proceeding before the trial court and
unceasingly represent them in the appellate courts. Indeed, in doing so, they made a mockery of judicial process and certainly
delayed the hearing before the court below. In Lacambra vs. Ramos, [86] we ruled:

"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted to and repeated importunings of the accused or his
counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of the judicial process, not to mention the
injustice caused by the delay to the victim's family."
Furthermore, appellants' counsel de parte ought to know that until their withdrawal shall have been approved by the appellants,
they still remain the counsel of record and as such, they must do what is expected of them, that is, to protect their interests.
[87]
They cannot walk out from a case simply because they do not agree with the ruling of the judge. Being officers of the court
whose duty is to assist in administering justice, they may not withdraw or be permitted to withdraw as counsel in a case if such
withdrawal will work injustice to a client or frustrate the ends of justice. [88]

B. Right to Confront and Cross-

Examine the Prosecution
Witnesses.

Appellants also fault the trial court for depriving them of the right to cross-examine Rusia and the other prosecution witnesses.
Appellants' assertion has no factual and legal anchorage. For one, it is not true that they were not given sufficient opportunity to
cross-examine Rusia. All of appellants' counsel de parte had a fair share of time in grilling Rusia concerning his background to the
kidnapping of Marijoy and Jacqueline. The records reveal the following dates of his cross-examination:

Lawyers Dates of Cross-examination

1. Armovit (for Larrañaga) August 13 and 17, 1998
2. Gonzales (for Larrañaga) August 20, 1998
3. Gica (for Josman) August 20, 1998
4. Paylado (for James Anthony and James Andrew) August 20, 1998
5. De la Cerna (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel) August 20, 1998
October 1, 1998
6. Villarmia (for Larrañaga)
7. Andales (for Josman) October 5 and 6, 1998
8. Carin (for James Andrew and James Anthony) October, 5, 1998
9 Debalucos (for Rowen, Caño and Balansag) October 12, 1998
10. De Jesus (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel) October 12, 1998
11. Ypil (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel) October 12, 1998[89]
That the trial court imposed limitation on the length of time counsel for appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot be labeled
as a violation of the latter's constitutional right. Considering that appellants had several lawyers, it was just imperative for the
trial court to impose a time limit on their cross-examination so as not to waste its time on repetitive and prolix questioning.

Indeed, it is the right and duty of the trial court to control the cross-examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of conserving
its time and protecting the witnesses from prolonged and needless examination. [90] Where several accused are being tried jointly
for the same offense, the order in which counsel for the several defendants shall cross-examine the state's witnesses may be
regulated by the court[91]and one of them may even be denied the right to cross-examine separately where he had arranged with
the others that counsel of one of them should cross-examine for all. [92] In People vs. Gorospe,[93] we ruled:

"While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner could
determine for himself the length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion to limit
the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice."
The transcript of stenographic notes covering Rusia's cross-examination shows that appellants' counsel had ample chance to test
his credibility.

Records show that the failure of the PAO lawyers to cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses was due to appellants'
obstinate refusal. In its Order[94] dated September 8, 1998, the trial court deferred the cross-examination in view of appellants'
insistence that their new counsel de parte will conduct the cross-examination. So as not to unduly delay the hearing, the trial
court warned the appellants that if by September 24, 1998, they are not yet represented by their new counsel de parte, then it
will order their counsel de oficio to conduct the cross-examination. Lamentably, on September 24, 1998, appellants' counsel de
parte entered their appearances merely to seek another postponement of the trial. Thus, in exasperation, Judge Ocampo
remarked:

"Every time a defense counsel decides to withdraw, must an accused be granted one (1) month suspension of trial to look for
such new counsel to study the records and transcripts? Shall the pace of the trial of these cases be thus left to the will or
dictation of the accused - whose defense counsels would just suddenly withdraw and cause such long suspensions of the trial
while accused allegedly shop around for new counsels and upon hiring new counsels ask for another one month trial suspension
for their new lawyers to study the records? While all the time such defense counsels (who allegedly have already withdrawn)
openly continue to 'advise' their accused-clients and even file 'Manifestations' before this Court and Petitions for Certiorari,
Injunction and Inhibition on behalf of accused before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court?

"What inanity is this that the accused and their lawyers are foisting upon this Court? In open defiance of the provisions of SC A.O.
No. 104-96 that these heinous crimes cases shall undergo 'mandatory continuous trial and shall be terminated within sixty (60)
days'?"
Still, in its Order dated October 8, 1998, the trial court gave appellants' new counsel de parte a period until October 12, 1998 to
manifest whether they are refusing to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses concerned; if so, then the court shall consider
them to have waived their right to cross-examine those witnesses. During the hearing on October 12, 1998, Larrañaga's new
counsel de parte, Atty. Villarmia, manifested that he would not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses who testified on direct
examination when Larrañaga was assisted by counsel de officio only. The next day, the counsel de parte of Josman, and brothers
James Anthony and James Andrew adopted Atty. Villarmia's manifestation. Counsel for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel likewise refused
to cross-examine the same witnesses. Thus, in its Order dated October 14, 1998, the trial court deemed appellants to have
waived their right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.

It appears therefore, that if some of the prosecution witnesses were not subjected to cross-examination, it was not because
appellants were not given the opportunity to do so. The fact remains that their new counsel de parte refused to cross-examine
them. Thus, appellants waived their right "to confront and cross examine the witnesses" against them.
C. Right to Impartial Trial
Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he asked questions and made comments when the defense
witnesses were testifying.

Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may properly intervene during trial to promote expeditious
proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. The test is whether the
intervention of the judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the ascertainment of the truth in the matter
where he interposes his questions or comments.

Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate but was
necessary. One good illustration is his explanation on alibi. Seeing that the appellants' counsel were about to present additional
witnesses whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility of appellants' presence in the scene of the crime, Judge
Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel of the requisites of alibi, thus:

"Well, I'm not saying that there is positive identification. I'm only saying that in proving your alibi you must stick by what the
Supreme Court said that it was impossible if they are telling the truth, di ba? Now with these other witnesses na hindi naman
ganoon to that effect it does not prove that it was impossible, e, what is the relevance on that? What is the materiality? lyon ang
point ko. We are wasting our time with that testimony. Ilang witnesses and epe-present to that effect. Wala rin namang epekto.
It will not prove that it was not impossible for him to go to Cebu at 10:30 P.M., of July 16, e, papano yan? We are being criticized
by the public already for taking so long a time of the trial of these cases which is supposed to be finished within 60 days. Now
from August, September, October, November, December and January, magse-six months na, wala pa and you want to present so
many immaterial witnesses."
Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure that
there will be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be no time wasted by dispensing
with the testimonies of witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest a desire to confine the proceedings
to the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel. [95]

Appellants also decry the supposed harshness of Judge Ocampo towards the witnesses for the defense, namely: Lourdes
Montalvan, Michael Dizon, Rebecca Seno, Clotilde Soterol, Salvador Boton, Catalina Paghinayan and Paolo Celso.

With respect to Lourdes Montalvan, Judge Ocampo expressed surprise on "how a 17-year-old girl could go to a man's apartment
all alone." He said that such conduct "does not seem to be a reasonable or a proper behavior for a 17-year-old girl to do." These
statements do not really indicate bias or prejudice against the defense witnesses. The transcript of stenographic notes reveals
that Judge Ocampo uttered them, not to cast doubt on the moral character of Lourdes Montalvan, but merely to determine the
credibility of her story, thus:

"x x x But what I wanted to point out is the question of credibility. That is what we are here for. We want to determine if it is
credible for a 17-year-old college student of the Ateneo who belongs to a good family, whose father is a lawyer and who could
afford to live by herself in a Condominium Unit in Quezon City and that she would go to the Condominium Unit of a man whom
he just met the previous month, all alone by herself, at night and specifically on the very night July 16, 1997. x x x That is the
question that I would like you to consider, x x x I assure you I have no doubts at all about her moral character and I have the
highest respect for Miss Montalvan. x x x."
Strong indication of Judge Ocampo's lack of predilection was his acquiescence for Lourdes Montalvan to clarify during redirect
examination why she found nothing wrong with being alone at Larrañaga's unit. We quote the proceedings of November 19,
1998, thus:

ATTY. VILLARMIA:
When you went up you said you were alone. What was your feeling of going up to that room alone or that unit
Q
alone?

PROS. GALANIDA
We object, not proper for re-direct. That was not touched during the cross. That should have been asked during
the direct-examination of this witness, Your Honor.

ATTY. VILLARMIA:
We want to clarify why she went there alone.

COURT:
Precisely, I made that observation that does not affect or may affect the credibility of witness the fact that she
 went there alone. And so, it is proper to ask her, di ba?

xxx

COURT:
What was your purpose? Ask her now - what was your purpose?

/to the witness:

Will you answer the question of the Court/ What was your purpose or intention in going in Paco's room that night
Q
alone?

WTNESS:
My purpose for going there was to meet Richard, sir, and to follow-up whether we will go out later that night or
A
not. The purpose as to going there alone, sir, I felt, I trusted Paco.

PROS. DUYONGCO:
May we ask the witness not to elaborate, Your Honor.

ATTY. VILLARMIA:
That is her feeling.

COURT:
That was her purpose. It is proper."[96]
Appellants consider as violation of their right to due process Judge Ocampo's remarks labeling Rebecca Seno's and Catalina
Paghinayan's testimony as "incredible"[97] Clotilde Soterol as a "totally confused person who appears to be mentally
imbalanced;"[98] and Salvador Boton and Paulo Celso as "liars."[99]

Suffice it to state that after going over the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes, we are convinced that Judge Ocampo's
comments were just honest observations intended to warn the witnesses to be candid to the court. He made it clear that he
merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their testimonies in order to determine the truth of the matter in controversy. [100] That
such was his purpose is evident from his probing questions which gave them the chance to correct or clarify their contradictory
statements. Even appellants' counsel de parte acknowledged that Judge Ocampo's statements were mere "honest
observations"[101] If Judge Ocampo uttered harsh words against those defense witnesses, it was because they made a mockery of
the court's proceedings by their deliberate lies. The frequency with which they changed their answers to Judge Ocampo's
clarificatory questions was indeed a challenge to his patience.

A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to caution and admonish witnesses when necessary and he may
rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper conduct.[102] This is because he is called upon to ascertain the truth of the
controversy before him.[103]

It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did not at all prevent the
defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases.

D. Right to Produce Evidence

Appellants assail the trial court's exclusion of the testimonies of four (4) airlines personnel [104] which were intended to prove that
Larrañaga did not travel to Cebu from Manila or from Cebu to Manila on July 16, 1997. The trial court's exclusion of the
testimonies is justified. By an alibi, Larrañaga attempted to prove that he was at a place (Quezon City) so distant that his
participation in the crime was impossible. To prove that he was not in the pre-flight and post-flight of the four (4) major airlines
flying the route of Cebu to Manila and Manila to Cebu on July 15 and 16, 1997 would not prove the legal requirement of
"physical impossibility" because he could have taken the flight from Manila to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997.
According to Judge Ocampo, it was imperative for appellants' counsel to prove that Larrañaga did not take a flight to Cebu before
July 16, 1997.

In the same way, we cannot fault the trial court for not allowing the defense to continue with the" tedious process of presenting
additional witnesses to prove Larrañaga's enrollment at the Center for Culinary Arts, located at Quezon City, from June 18, 1997
to July 30, 1997 considering that it would not also prove that he was not in Cebu on July 16 to 17, 1997. It is a known practice of
students who are temporarily residing in Metro Manila to return to their provinces once in a while to spend time with their
families. To prove that Larrañaga was enrolled during a certain period of time does not negate the possibility that he went home
to Cebu City sometime in July 1997 and stayed there for a while.

Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness.[105] It is not error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for
the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it. [106]

To repeat, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy.[107] In the present case, there is no showing of violation of due process which justifies the reversal or
setting aside of the trial court's findings.

II. The Improper Discharge of Rusia as an Accused

to be a State Witness

Appellants argue that Rusia is not qualified to be a state witness under paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:

"Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any
offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witness for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:

xxx

(d) Said accused does not appear to be most guilty;

(e) Said accused has not at anytime been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

xxx"
Appellants claim that Rusia was the "most guilty of both the charges of rape and kidnapping" having admitted in open court that
he raped Jacqueline. Furthermore, Rusia admitted having been previously convicted in the United States of third degree burglary.

It bears stressing that appellants were charged with kidnapping and illegal detention, Thus, Rusia's admission that
he raped Jacqueline does not make him the "most guilty" of the crimes charged. Moreover, far from being the mastermind, his
participation, as shown by the chronology of events, was limited to that of an oblivious follower who simply "joined the ride" as
the commission of the crimes progressed. It may be recalled that he joined the group upon Rowen's promise that there would be
a "big happening" on the night of July 16, 1997. All along, he thought the "big happening" was just another "group partying or
scrounging." In other words, he had no inkling then of appellants' plan to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rusia retained his
passive stance as Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline at the waiting shed of Ayala Center. He just remained
seated beside the driver's seat, not aiding Rowen and Josman in abducting the Chiong sisters. When Jacqueline attempted to
escape 14 meters away from the waiting shed, it was Josman who chased her and not Rusia. Inside the car, it was Rowen who
punched and handcuffed the Chiong sisters. At the safehouse of the "Josman Aznar Group," Rusia stayed at the living room while
Larrañaga, James Anthony, Rowen, and Josman molested Marijoy and Jacqueline on separate rooms. At Tan-awan, it was Josman
who ordered Rowen and Ariel to pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine. And Rusia did not even know what ultimately happened
to Jacqueline as he was the first to leave the group. Clearly, the extent of Rusia's participation in the crimes charged does not
make him the "most guilty."

The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in Minessotta does not render his testimony inadmissible. [108] In People
vs. De Guzman[109] we held that although the trial court may have erred in discharging the accused, such error would not affect
the competency and the quality of the testimony of the defendant. In Mangubat vs. Sandiganbayan,[110] we ruled:

"Anent the contention that Delia Preagido should not have been discharged as a state witness because of a 'previous final
conviction' of crimes involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say that 'this Court has time and again declared that even if the
discharged state witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his
testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded. In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may
reasonably be expected to err; but such error in discharging an accused has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon
the principle that such error of the court does not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged
defendant."
Furthermore, it may be recalled that Rusia was extremely bothered by his conscience and was having nightmares about the
Chiong sisters, hence, he decided to come out in the open. [111] Such fact alone is a badge of truth of his testimony.
But, more importantly, what makes Rusia's testimony worthy of belief is the marked compatibility between such testimony and
the physical evidence. Physical evidence is an evidence of the highest order. It speaks eloquently than a hundred witnesses.
[112]
The presence of Marijoy's ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her
wrists certainly bolstered Rusia's testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he
supplied to the trial court were of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes
could furnish. What is more, his testimony was corroborated by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated,
thus: (1) Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza saw Jacqueline's two failed attempts to escape from appellants; (2) Alfredo Duarte
saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene's Store while the white van, driven by Alfredo Caño, was waiting on
the side of the road and he heard voices of "quarreling male and female" emanating from the van; (3) Manuel Camingao testified
on the presence of Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997; and lastly, (4) Benjamin Molina and
Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire, on the evening
of July 16, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia's narration. With such strong anchorage on the testimonies
of disinterested witnesses, how can we brush aside Rusia's testimony?

Rusia's discharge has the effect of an acquittal. [113] We are not inclined to recall such discharge lest he will be placed in double
jeopardy. Parenthetically, the order for his discharge may only be recalled in one instance, which is when he subsequently failed
to testify against his co-accused. The fact that not all the requisites for his discharge are present is not a ground to recall the
discharge order. Unless and until it is shown that the he failed or refused to testify against his co-accused, subsequent proof
showing that any or all of the conditions listed in Sec. 9 of Rule 119 were not fulfilled would not wipe away the resulting
acquittal.[114]

III. Appreciation of the Evidence for the Prosecution and the Defense

Settled is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its opportunity,
not available to the appellate court, to see the witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor whether they are
testifying truthfully or lying through their teeth. Its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is well-nigh conclusive on this Court,
barring arbitrariness in arriving at his conclusions.[115]

We reviewed the records exhaustively and found no compelling reason why we should deviate from the findings of fact and
conclusion of law of the trial court. Rusia's detailed narration of the circumstances leading to the horrible death and
disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted by the defense counsel,
Rusia remained steadfast in his testimony. The other witnesses presented by the prosecution corroborated his narration as to its
material points which reinforced its veracity.

Appellants proffered the defense of denial and alibi. As between their mere denial and the positive identification and testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, we are convinced that the trial court did not err in according weight to the latter. For the defense
of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in another place at such a period of time that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. [116] These requirements of time
and place must be strictly met.[117] A thorough examination of the evidence for the defense shows that the appellants failed to
meet these settled requirements. They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen,
Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.

Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it
was established that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline
companies plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each
morning, afternoon and evening. Taking into account the mode and speed of transportation, it is therefore within the realm of
possibility for Larrañaga to be in Cebu City prior to or exactly on July 16, 1997. Larrañaga's mother, Margarita Gonzales-
Larrañaga, testified that his son was scheduled to take a flight from Manila to Cebu on July 17, 1997 at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, but he was able to take an earlier flight at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Margarita therefore claimed that his son was in
Cebu City at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of July 17, 1997 or the day after the commission of the crime. However, while
Larrañaga endeavored to prove that he went home to Cebu City from Manila only in the afternoon of July 17, 1997, he did not
produce any evidence to show the last time he went to Manila from Cebu prior to such crucial date. If he has a ticket of his
flight to Cebu City on July 17, 1997, certainly, he should also have a ticket of his last flight to Manila prior thereto. If it was lost,
evidence to that effect should have been presented before the trial court.

Indeed, Larrañaga's presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. No less than four (4)
witnesses for the prosecution identified him as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16,
1997. Shiela Singsontestified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga approach Marijoy and
Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of Jacqueline's prior story that he was Marijoy's
admirer. She (Shiela) confirmed that she knows Larrañaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also
testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2)
men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized them as Larrañaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos,
a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at
Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon,
Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against
the hood of a white van.[118]

Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses and that of Rusia, it is reasonable to conclude that Larrañaga was
indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal perpetrators.

Of course, we have also weighed the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by appellants in support of their
respective alibi. However, they proved to be wanting and incredible.

Salvador Boton, the security guard assigned at the lobby of Loyola Heights Condominium, testified on the entry of Larrañaga's
name in the Condominium's logbook to prove that he was in Quezon City on the night of July 16, 1997. However, a cursory
glance of the entry readily shows that it was written at the uppermost portion of the logbook and was not following the
chronological order of the entries. Larrañaga's 10:15 entry was written before the 10:05 entry which, in turn, was followed by a
10:25 entry. Not only that, the last entry at the prior page was 10:05. This renders the authenticity of the entries doubtful. It
gives rise to the possibility that the 10:15 entry was written on a later date when all the spaces in the logbook were already filled
up and thus, the only remaining spot was the uppermost portion. Surprisingly, the alleged arrival of Larrañaga and his friend
Richard Antonio at the Loyola Heights Condominium in the early evening of July 16, 1997 was not recorded in the logbook.

Rowena Bautista, a teacher at the Center for Culinary Arts, Quezon City, testified that Larrañaga attended her lecture on Applied
Mathematics on July 16, 1997 from 8:00 o'clock to 11:30 in the morning. [119] This runs counter to Larrañaga's affidavit[120] stating
that on the said date, he took his mid-term examinations in the subject Fundamentals of Cookery from 8:00 o'clock in the
morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

With respect to Larrañaga's friends, the contradictions in their testimonies, painstakingly outlined by the Solicitor General in the
appellee's brief, reveal their unreliability. To our mind, while it may be possible that Larrañaga took the mid-term examinations in
Fundamentals of Cookery and that he and his friends attended a party at the R and R Bar and Restaurant, also in Quezon City,
however it could be that those events occurred on a date other than July 16, 1997.

Clotilde Soterol, in defense of Ariel and Alberto (the driver and the conductor of the van) attempted to discredit Rusia's
testimony by testifying that the white van with plate no. GGC-491 could not have been used in the commission of the crimes on
the night of July 16, 1997 because it was parked in her shop from 7:00 o'clock in the evening of the same date until 11:00 o'clock
in the morning of July 17, 1997. What makes Soterol's testimony doubtful is her contradicting affidavits. In the first affidavit
dated July 28, 1997, or twelve (12) days from the occurrence of the crime, she stated that Alberto took the van from her shop at
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 16, 1997 and returned it for repair only on July 22, 1997.[121] But in her second affidavit
dated October 1, 1997, she declared that Alberto left the van in her shop at 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1997 until
11:00 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997. [122]Surely, we cannot simply brush aside the discrepancy and accept the second
affidavit as gospel truth.

Appellants attempted to establish their defense of alibi through the testimonies of relatives and friends who obviously wanted
them exculpated of the crimes charged. Naturally, we cannot but cast an eye of suspicion on their testimonies. In People vs.
Ching,[123] we ruled that it is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close relative to give weight to blood ties and close
relationship in times of dire needs especially when a criminal case is involved.

Rusia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is that positive identification of an accused by credible witnesses as the
perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi, the much abused sanctuary of felons.[124] Rusia's testimony was corroborated by
several disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither friends, relatives nor acquaintances
of the victims' family. As we reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic notes, we could not discern any motive on their part
why they should testify falsely against the appellants. In the same vein, it is improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go
through the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives.

Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan,
Carcar was that of Marijoy. We are not convinced. Rusia testified that Josman instructed Rowen "to get rid" of Marijoy and that
following such instruction, Rowen and Ariel pushed her into the deep ravine. Furthermore, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, [125] a
fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse matched those of Marijoy. [126] The packaging tape and the handcuff
found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained. [127] The body
had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted. [128] The members of the Chiong family personally identified
the corpse to be that of Marijoy[129] which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery
and every place which mattered to Marijoy. Indeed, there is overwhelming and convincing evidence that it was the body of
Marijoy that was found in the ravine.
Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in two (2) Informations and were convicted
thereof. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, reads:

"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed
The elements of the crime defined in Art. 267 above are: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another,
or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four (4) circumstances
mentioned above is present.[130]

There is clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly dragged Marijoy and Jacqueline
into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist, and held them captive against their will. In fact, Jacqueline
attempted to free herself twice from the clutches of appellants the first was near the Ayala Center and the second was in Tan-
awan, Carcar but both attempts failed. Marijoy was thrown to a deep ravine, resulting to her death. Jacqueline, on the other
hand, has remained missing until now.

Article 267 states that if the victim is killed or died as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People vs. Ramos,[131] citing Parulan vs. Rodas,[132] and People vs.
Mercado,[133] we held that this provision given rise to a special complex crime, thus:

"Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the kidnapped victim was
subsequently killed by his abductor, the crime committed would either be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art
48 of the Revised Penal Code, or two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the
victim for the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of
committing the murder. On the other hand, where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was
subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed.

However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last paragraph which provides
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or
homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped
victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was
merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special
complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659."
The prosecution was able to prove that Marijoy was pushed to a ravine and died. Both girls were raped by the gang. In
committing the crimes, appellants subjected them to dehumanizing acts. Dehumanization means deprivation of human qualities,
such as compassion.[134] From our review of the evidence presented, we found the following dehumanizing acts committed by
appellants: (1) Marijoy and Jacqueline were handcuffed and their mouths mercilessly taped; (2) they were beaten to severe
weakness during their detention; (3)Jacqueline was made to dance amidst the rough manners and lewd suggestions of the
appellants; (4) she was taunted to run and forcibly dragged to the van; and 5) until now, Jacqueline remains missing which
aggravates the Chiong family's pain. All told, considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both
victims were subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the appellants is in order.

Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 wherein Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim.

A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised
Penal Code are (1)robbery with homicide,[135] (2) robbery with rape,[136] (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,
[137]
(4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,[138] and (5) rape with homicide.[139] In a special complex crime, the prosecution
must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made
the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy
was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion
thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate connection"[140] between the kidnapping,
killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense
forming part of the herein special complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos, [141] and People vs. Mercado,
[142]
interpreting Article 267, we ruled that "where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Article 267." The same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be
complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate,
the technical designation of the crime is of no consequence in the imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and
serious illegal detention if complexed with either homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.

Anent Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
appellants considering that the above-mentioned component offenses were not alleged in the Information as required under
Sections 8 and 9,[143]Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consistent with appellants' right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, these attendant circumstances or component offenses must be specifically
pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial. Otherwise, they cannot give rise to a special
complex crime, as in this case. Hence, the crime committed is only simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants conspired in the commission of the crimes
charged. Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose and community of intent. Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy,
direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint design and
community of interest.[144]Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime.[145] Appellants' actions showed that they have the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong
sisters. Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline from the vicinity of Ayala Center. Larrañaga, James Andrew and
James Anthony who were riding a red car served as back-up of Rowen and Josman. Together in a convoy, they proceeded to
Fuente Osmeña to hire a van, and thereafter, to the safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group" in Guadalupe, Cebu where they
initially molested Marijoy and Jacqueline. They headed to the South Bus Terminal where they hired the white van driven by
Alberto, with Ariel as the conductor. Except for James Andrew who drove the white car, all appellants boarded the white van
where they held Marijoy and Jacqueline captive. In the van, James Anthony taped their mouths and Rowen handcuffed them
together. They drank and had a pot session at Tan-awan. They encircled Jacqueline and ordered her to dance, pushing her and
ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Larrañaga raped Marijoy, followed by Rowen, James Anthony, Alberto, and Ariel.
On other hand, Josman and James Andrew raped Jacqueline. Upon Josman's order, Rowen and Ariel led Marijoy to the cliff and
pushed her. After leaving Tan-awan, they taunted Jacqueline to run for her life. And when Rusia got off from the van near Ayala
Center, the appellants jointly headed back to Cebu City.

Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely present
during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.[146] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.[147] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but
extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. [148] As shown by the evidence for the
prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the crime.

Indeed, all appellants, except James Anthony who was 16 years old when the crimes charged were committed, share the same
degree of responsibility for their criminal acts. Under Article 68 [149] of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty on James
Anthony, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. This means that he stands to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 and twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304.
The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death, one
degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua.[150] On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal.[151] There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Anthony is reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
[152]

As for the rest of the appellants, the foregoing established facts call for the imposition on them of the death penalty in Criminal
Case No. CBU-45303 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304. It is therefore clear that the trial court erred in
merely imposing "two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua," rationalizing that justice must be tempered with mercy. We must be reminded
that justice is not ours to give according to our sentiments or emotions. It is in the law which we must faithfully implement.

At times we may show compassion and mercy but not at the expense of the broader interest of fair play and justice. While we
also find it difficult to mete out the penalty of death especially on young men who could have led productive and promising lives
if only they were given enough guidance, however, we can never go against what is laid down in our statute books and
established jurisprudence.

In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline are entitled to the amount of P100,000.00 in each
case by way of civil indemnity ex delicto.[153] As regards the actual damages, it appears that the award of P200,000.00 is not
supported by evidence. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.[154] Thus, in light
of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo,[155] we grant the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in each case, in lieu of
actual damages. There being proofs that the victims' heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury,
we award an equitable amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages, also in each case. Exemplary damages is pegged at
P100,000.00 in each case[156] to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton invasion of the rights of the victims and as punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRA×AGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CA×O alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UYalias "MM," are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide
and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRA×AGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CA×O alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM," are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he
is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
MAXIMUM.

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts
of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this
Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her
Excellency's pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125688 April 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IGNACIO CUPINO, 1 VINCENT DEJORAS and RAMON GALOS a.k.a. Jun, accused, IGNACIO
CUPINO and VINCENT DEJORAS
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present appeal, the prosecution eyewitness testified
that one of the appellants had joined the other accused in approaching the victim, but subsequently tried to prevent them from
stabbing this same victim. Such dubious participation is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the said appellant
conspired with the others in committing the offense. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of innocence must be upheld.
He must be acquitted.
The Case
Vincent Dejoras and Ignacio Cupino appeal the March 6, 1995 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City
2

(Branch 25). Dejoras and Cupino, together with one Ramon Galos, 4 were convicted of robbery with murder and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.
On October 19, 1989, an Information 5 was filed by Fourth Assistant City Fiscal Petronio P. Pilien, charging the three as follows:
That on or about August 16, 1989, at more or less 9:45 in the evening . . ., at Patag Crossing, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill[;] armed with a knife [with] which one of them was then
conveniently provided[;] with treachery, evident premeditation, superior strength, did then and ther[e] wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously [through] accused (Ramon Galos alias Jun), . . . [stab] one Gromyco 6 Valliente 7 [hitting him]
at the left/right portion of his arm and abdomen, thus inflicting mortal wounds upon [the] offended party's person
which directly caused his instantaneous death.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Arraigned on January 22, 1990, 8 both appellants entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. Thereafter, the lower court rendered
its assailed Decision, 9 the dispositive part of which we quote thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds all the three accused in conspiracy with each other, GUILTY beyon[d]
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery as principal by direct participation as punished under
the Revised Penal Code. This Court hereby sentences the two accused, Vincent Dejoras and Ignacio Copino, the third
accused being at large, to individually suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA without the attendance of any
mitigating circumstance and to jointly and severally pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 for
the death of Gromyko Valliente, P40,000.00 as actual damages and burial expenses, P20,000.00 moral damages, and to
pay the costs. 10
In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal was filed directly with this Court. 11
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, 12 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
At around 9:45 in the evening of August 16, 1989, during the celebration of the town fiesta of Patag, Cagayan de Oro
City, accused Ramon Galos and Gromyko Valiente (herein victim) were having a heated argument in front of Dod's Store,
which was owned by a certain Piloton, located at the crossing of Patag (Testimony of Silverio Bahian, TSN, September 6,
1990, pp. 4-5; Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan, TSN, July 2, 1990, pp. 5-6).
Then, appellants Ignacio Cupino and Vincent Dejoras arrived, and a fistfight erupted. Cupino, Dejoras and Galos ganged
up on Valiente who also fought back (Testimony of Silverio Bahian at pp. 6-7, supra; Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan at
p. 7, supra.). Beaten and outnumbered, Valiente ran away towards the direction of a small pathway leading to the store
of a certain Major Grio, which was beside Dod's Store. The trio chased . . . him (Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan at p.
10, id.). Galos caught up with Valiente and then stabbed him twice in the stomach with a small bolo (Testimony of
Silverio Bahian at pp. 9-10, supra.).
 With the bolo still embedded on his stomach, Valiente crawled along the pathway. Cupino also caught up with Valiente
(pp. 11-12, id.). Then Cupino pulled the bolo from the victim's body and was about to stab the victim again when
Dejoras tried to grab Cupino's hands, but instead Dejoras got hold of the blade of the bolo and was injured in the
process. Dejoras left, coming out of the pathway with his wounded right hand (pp. 12-13, id.).
Meanwhile, Cupino proceeded to stab the victim twice in the stomach. Afterward, Cupino and Galos fled from the scene
of the crime (p. 14, id.). Valiente, who was seriously wounded and soaked in his own blood, cried for help. He was
brought to a hospital but later died (p. 19, id.; Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan at pp. 12-13, supra.).
The autopsy conducted on the victim's body revealed that he sustained four (4) stab wounds: one on the left subpostal
margin, another wound on the right subpostal margin, and two (2) sutured wounds on the left cocital area. The wound
that was inflicted on the pancreas of the victim was considered fatal since it caused the massive hemorrhage. The cause
of death was attributed to massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds (Testimony of Dr. Apolinar
Vacalares, TSN, February 13, 1991, pp. 6-7). 13
Version of the Defense
For their part, appellants submit the following as the facts of the case:
On August 16, 1999, Ignacio Copino celebrated the town fiesta of Patag, Cagayan de Oro City at home with his family
and friends, one of whom was Vincent Dejoras. After eating dinner at around 7:00 p.m., Dejoras, together with his co-
workers, headed for home. Copino decided to accompany the group and at the Patag crossing, he was able to convince
Dejoras to go to the "perya" and gamble, as he had P30 with him.
The pair lost all of the P30 in the "pula-puti" game and decided to call it quits. On their way home, they saw Ramon
Galos "alias Panit" and Grom[yk]o Valiente "alyas Bobong", two of their acquaintances, apparently having an
altercation.
They were about two meters from Galos and Valiente when Galos suddenly said: "Nasi is here (referring to Copino), you
hit him." (Transcript of Stenographic Notes, VINCENT DEJORAS, Hearing April 4, 1991, page 7). Galos then kicked
Valiente and the latter fell down. Valiente was able to get up and run towards an alley at the back of Dod's store with
Galos in close pursuit. Copino and Dejoras ran after the two with the intention to pacify the fighters. Galos was able to
corner Valiente and once again, the two traded blows. When Copino and Dejoras were finally able to catch up with the
two, they noticed that Valiente was already bleeding. Eyewitness Silverio Bahian later recounted that he saw Panit pull
out a bolo and stab Bobong.1âwphi1.nêt
Dejoras, on his part, tried to stop Galos from inflicting more wounds and he too was wounded in the process. What
happened was that instead of holding Galos' hand, he was able to hold the blade of the knife, thereby injuring himself.
Galos then ran away. Upon the realization that his right hand was bloodied, and fearing that more harm would fall upon
them, Copino and Dejoras too ran away.
Dejoras went to City Hospital to have his wound treated and then they went home. At midnight of the same day, a
policeman went to his house and brought him to the OKK Police Station where he was booked into the police blotter.
The following day, Copino and Dejoras learned that Gromyko Valiente had died. Together with their parents the[y] went
to the Tourism Hall to have their statements taken by the police. 14
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that (1) appellants were guilty of murder, as the killing was qualified by treachery; (2) conspiracy was proven
by the chain of circumstantial evidence submitted; and (3) the aggravating circumstance of superior strength was absorbed by
treachery and may no longer be used to increase the penalty to its maximum period.
The Issues
Appellants aver that the court a quo committed the following errors:
I. In failing to appreciate the testimony of accused-appellants and in giving full weight and credit to the version of
prosecution witnesses.
II. In holding that there was conspiracy between accused-appellants.
III. In holding that accused-appellants herein [were] guilty as charged. 15
We shall discuss the foregoing issues in the following sequence: (1) credibility of the prosecution evidence, (2) conspiracy and (3)
proper penalty.
The Court's Ruling
This appeal is partly meritorious. We affirm the challenged Decision in regard to Ignacio Cupino, but reverse it in regard to
Vincent Dejoras.
First Issue
 Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellants challenge the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They argue that there are
contradictions patent in their testimonies. We disagree. As we have repeatedly said, the trial court's assessment of the credibility
of witnesses is generally binding upon us. 16 Alter a thorough review of the records before us, we find no reason to disagree with
the trial court in finding no material inconsistency in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.
Neither are we impressed with appellants' assertion that the evidence for the prosecution is weak. The claims of the defense are
belied by the clear, credible and straightforward testimony of Prosecution Eyewitness Silverio Bahian, which we quote:
Q At this time, August 16, 1989, at more or less 9:45 p.m., what particular place in the store of Piloton?
A [In front] of the store.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What where you doing there?
A I was reading komiks.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were there at Piloton store, reading komiks, what happened if any?
A There was an argument between Bobong Valiente 17 and Panit. 18
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said that there was an argument, where did this altercation [take] place?
A [In front] of me.
Q How far away from you? From where you are sitting, point to any object within the court room to indicate what you
[meant by "in front"] of you?
A Less than a meter.
Q From where you are sitting, point to any object[.]
A This chair. This table or this chair I am sitting on. [In front] of me. Just very near me.
Q From what direction was this Bobong coming . . .?
A Going to the checkpoint.
Q What about the other person [with] whom he had an altercation?
A Going to the crossing.
Q What happened after they had an altercation?
A After their altercation, this Nasi 19 and Beni 20 were walking from the road.
Q Who is this Nasi?
A Nasi Copino.
Q Who is this Beni?
A Dejoras.
Q When these two came, Beni and Nasi, where were the two who were having an argument?
A Mr. Bahian approached the two who were having an altercation.
Q What about the person [with] whom he had an altercation? Where was he at that time?
A He followed him.
Q So, what happened after Bobong went to Nasi and Beni and the other person Panit?
A They ganged up [on] Bobong.
Q When you said they ganged up on Bobong, to whom are you referring . . .?
A Panit, Nasi and Beni.
Q From your place in relation to the place where they ganged up on Bobong, how far away was that?
A About three meters.
xxx xxx xxx
 Q Where [was] this place in relation to you whe[n] they ganged up on Bobong?
A In the middle of the road.
Q And what was the condition of the road on that night of August 16, 1989 at 9:45 p.m.?
A It was bright.
Q Why do you say that it [was] "hayag"?
A Because there was a lamppost.
Q Where [was] this lamppost located in relation to you?
A [In front] of me.
Q So, what happened after they ganged up . . . this Nasi, Beni and Panit, as you said, they ganged up on Bobong? What
happened?
A Since Bobong [could] not keep up a fight with the three, Bobong ran towards me.
Q What happened after Bobong ran towards you as you said?
A He was being held by Panit.
Q Will you demonstrate how he was h[e]ld by Panit?
A (Witness demonstrating by stretching his left arm and closing hi[s] fist and twisting it to his left side).
Q So, what happened after that? After he was held up and as you said twisted?
A Panit stabbed Bobong.
Q Will you please demonstrate again how Panit stabbed Bobong after he held him and[;] pulling him[,] he thrust the
knife forward?
A (Witness demonstrating his right arm forward).
Q How many times was he stabbed by Panit? This Bobong?
A I think twice.
Q And where was this Bobong hit if he was hit?
A In the stomach.
Q What was used in the stabbing of Bobong by Panit?
A A small bolo.
Q Will you please describe the small bolo or what appears to be a bolo to you? How long was this?
A About 12 inches including the handle.
Q What about the blade? Was this double bladed or not?
A Single bladed.
ACP CABALLERO, JR.: (resuming).
Q Now, what happened after Bobong was held up by this Panit and stabbed twice as you said? What happened to
Bobong?
A Bobong crawled going to a small alley.
Q You mentioned this alley. Now, from where you are situated then while reading komiks [on] this alley, how far was this
from you?
A Just here.
(Witness stretching his left arm going to his left side)
Q What happened to the small bolo which was used in the stabbing? Do you know where was it at the time Bobong
crawled?
A The small bolo was still embedded on the left portion just below the breast, solar plexus.
Q So, what happened after Bobong crawled[;] who was going to the area which you testified was just near you?
A Nasi caught up with him.
Q You mentioned, of course, . . . Nasi. Nasi who?
 A Copino.
Q What happened after he was overtaken by Nasi Copino?
A Nasi pulled the small bolo.
Q What happened next after Nasi pulled the small bolo?
A When he was about to thrust the small bolo to the body of Bobong, his friend held his hand.
Q Who [was] this companion of Nasi that you are referring to who held up his hand?
A Beni.
Q Do you know the real name of Beni?
A It is only his nickname that I know.
Q Beni what?
A Dejoras.
Q What happened after the hand of Nasi was held up by Beni?
A It was the small bolo which was held by Beni.
Q Which part of the knife was held by Beni Dejoras?
A The blade.
Q So, what happened after he held the blade?
A Nasi pulled the small bolo, and that [was] why Beni was wounded.
Q What happened after Beni was injured?
A Beni went out.
Q And where was Nasi then at this time when Beni, as you said, went out?
A Nasi was still [in front] of Bobong.
Q Was he motionless [in front] of Bobong or what?
A He continued to stab Bobong.
Q Where was Bobong hit when he was stabbed by Nasi?
A At first, he was able to parry the thrust of Nasi.
Q So, what happened to Bobong after he parried the stab of Nasi?
A Bobong fell down.
Q What happened after that?
A Nasi again stabbed Bobong.
Q And where was Bobong hit at this particular time?
A In the stomach.
Q So, what happened after that?
A Nasi ran away. 21
The above testimony clearly demonstrates the conspiracy between Ramon Galos and Appellant Ignacio Cupino. Both of them
showed their common intent to kill Valliente. On the part of Galos, conspiracy was shown by his act of grabbing the fleeing
victim, simultaneously drawing his small bolo or pisaw, and stabbing the latter twice. By running after the wounded victim,
Cupino showed unity of purpose with Galos. When he eventually caught up with the victim, Cupino pulled out the bolo that was
embedded in the body of the latter and used it to stab him again. Clearly, by the consonance of their deeds, both assailants
conspired to kill Valliente. 22
We agree with the court a quo that treachery qualified the slaying to murder. By diverting the attention of Valliente to the
approaching Dejoras and Cupino, Galos was obviously making sure that the victim could not defend himself. When Valliente
turned his back, Galos began his attack, which eventually led to the stabbing of the former. Treachery was not necessarily
precluded by either the occurrence of a tussle before the victim was killed 23 or by the frontal nature of the attack. 24 We also
agree with the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed by alevosia. 25
Second Issue
 Conspiracy: Dejoras' Liability
Though we uphold the findings of the trial court with regard to Appellant Cupino, we differ with its conclusion that Appellant
Dejoras was guilty.
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. 26 Conspiracy is not a
harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific
circumstances. 27 As such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied
is, we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt. 28
In People v. Elijorde, 29 a case with similar facts, we said:
Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is guilty of
murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely
by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy, exists in a situation where at the time the
malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted
effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts
done in concert, i.e., acts which yielded the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common
intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite
quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference. (Footnotes omitted)
Thus, in Elijorde we found one of the accused, a certain Punzalan, innocent under the circumstances. 30 Similarly, in the present
case, we find Appellant Vincent Dejoras not guilty.
Unlike the trial court, we are quite mindful of the testimony of Prosecution Eyewitness Bahian regarding Appellant Dejoras'
participation in that bloody incident on the eve of the fiesta. His answers to the propounded questions merely established that
Dejoras joined Galos and Cupino when they approached the victim. The prosecution filled, however, to show, what Dejoras
specifically did that proved his participation in the conspiracy. Rather, what the said eyewitness said was that Dejoras tried to
prevent Cupino from stabbing the victim, clearly showing that he did not support the criminal intent and conspiracy of the other
two accused. 31 These incontrovertible data lead to one conclusion: there is reasonable doubt on whether Dejoras conspired with
Galos and Cupino in killing Valliente. We are therefore constrained to exonerate him. Indeed, guilt must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, there is reasonable doubt on the culpability of Appellant Dejoras as a principal.1âwphi1
Dejoras cannot be held liable as an accomplice, either. 32 In Elijorde, 33 we said:
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without
previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a
principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation.
The acts of Appellant Dejoras showed that he was not aware of his companions' intent to kill Valliente; at the very least, there is
reasonable doubt as to his knowledge thereof. In any event, community of design, the first of the requisite elements that must
be present before a person may be held liable as an accomplice, is lacking. 34
On the prosecution's theory that Dejoras may have inflicted injury on the victim when he joined in the fray, we have combed the
records and found no basis for this speculation. We note that the eyewitness could not recount the details of the brawl, but
merely provided a general picture, saying that everything happened so fast. 35 Hence, we find no basis for Appellant Dejoras'
liability even for physical injuries. 36
Additional Questions
Penalty and Damages
When the crime was committed, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal (maximum) to death. 37 Since no generic
modifying circumstance was proven, the trial court correctly sentenced Cupino to reclusion perpetua. 38
We increase to P50,000 the award for moral damages, in consonance with current jurisprudence. 39 The facts showing moral
damages were proven during the trial. However, the established actual damages amount to only P30,000, not P40,000 as found
by the lower court. 40 The award of P50,000 civil indemnity for the death of Gromyko Valliente is affirmed. 41
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision insofar as it found Appellant Ignacio Cupino GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua. Appellant Cupino is solely responsible for paying the heirs of the victim, Gromyko Valliente, the
amounts of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, P30,000 as actual damages and P50,000 as moral damages. Appellant Vincent
Dejoras is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from custody IMMEDIATELY, unless he is being legally held for another cause. In
this regard, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report his compliance, within five (5) days from receipt
hereof. Costs against Appellant Cupino.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. Nos. 148145-46 July 5, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA
On automatic appeal1 before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 50, finding
appellants Felix Ventura (Ventura) and Arante Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-
20692 and Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693.
The accusatory portion of the Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in concert, without any justifiable cause or
motive, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with
a .38 Caliber Home-made Revolver and Arante V. Flores armed with a bladed weapon, and by taking advantage of their
superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with bladed weapon
one Aileen Bocateja y Peruelo, thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
- Cardio respiratory arrest
- Hemothorax
- stab wounds
which wounds were the direct and immediate cause of the death of said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the latter.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time and with the use of an
unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The accusatory portion of the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, without any
justifiable cause or motive, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Homemade Revolver and Arante Flores y
Ventura armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and
abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with said
bladed weapon one Jaime Bocateja, thereby causing upon of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
- multiple stab wounds
- #1 Posterior axillary area right
- #2 Posterior axillary area left with minimal hemothorax
- lacerated wound right parietal area
OPERATION PERFORMED:
- Exploration of wound right parietal for removal of foreign body
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or accident independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is,
due to the timely and able medical assistance, which saved the life of the victim and the victim was able to escape.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time, and with the use of an
unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.3 (Emphasis supplied)
When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to both charges. 4 The two criminal cases were consolidated following which they
were jointly tried.5
The spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were, in the early hours of February 23, 2000, fast asleep in their room on the ground
floor of their two-storey house at Alunan-Yulo in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. The room had a glass wall with a glass sliding
door which was closed but not locked. The kitchen light was open, as was the light in the adjoining room where the couple's
young children, Jummylin and Janine, were sleeping. Their niece, Aireen Bocateja, and Jaime's elder daughter, Rizza Mae, were
asleep in their rooms on the second floor. 6
At around 2:00 a.m.,7 Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant Ventura who, together with his nephew appellant Flores, had
stealthily entered the couple's room after they gained entry into the house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door.
As established by the testimonial and object evidence for the prosecution, the following transpired thereafter:
Appellant Ventura pointed a revolver at Jaime's face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on the head with the gun and asked him for
his keys. 8
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help and tried to grab the revolver. The two men then struggled
for possession of the gun. As Jaime almost succeeded in wresting possession of the gun from him, appellant Flores shouted to
appellant Ventura to stab Jaime. Using the knife he
was carrying, appellant Flores stabbed Jaime three times. Jaime thereupon released the gun, threw a nearby plastic stool at the
jalousy glass window causing it to break and cried out for help. 9
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for help as she saw her husband in mortal danger. Appellant
Flores stabbed her, however, with his knife, and although Aileen tried to defend herself with an electric cord, appellant Flores
continued stabbing her.10
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw the knife wielding appellant Flores whom she recognized as a
former employee of the butcher shop of the Bocataje spouses. Pleading with appellant Flores not to harm her, Aireen ran back
upstairs into Rizza Mae's room, and the two called to their neighbors for help. 11
Appellants Ventura and Flores thereupon fled the Bocateja house, 12 bringing nothing with them.13
Soon members of the Central Investigation Unit (CIU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) arrived in response to a flash
report.14 Some of the police officers took the spouses to the Western Visayas Regional Hospital, 15 while other elements of the CIU
team intercepted appellants Ventura and Flores who were being pursued by neighbors of the spouses at the corner of Araneta-
Yulo. Recovered from appellant Ventura was a .38 caliber revolver with five (5) live bullets, and from appellant Flores a blood
stained knife16 measuring 14½ inches from tip to handle with a 10-inch blade. 17
Shortly after their arrest, appellants were interviewed by reporters from Bombo Radio to whom they admitted responsibility for
stabbing Jaime and Aileen. In response to questions from the reporters, appellant Ventura explained that he suspected his wife
was carrying on an affair with Jaime.18
In the ocular inspection of the Bocateja residence, the CIU team found the spouses' room in disarray, with some cabinets opened
and blood splattered all over the floor, the bed and the ceiling. 19
Aileen eventually died in the hospital on the same day of the commission of the crime. 20 Dr. Luis Gamboa, City Health Officer of
Bacolod City who conducted the autopsy of her body, found that she suffered a hack wound on her face and four stab wounds on
her body, three at the chest and one at the back of the right shoulder, all caused by a sharp bladed instrument, such as the knife
recovered from appellant Flores. One of the stab wounds penetrated Aileen's chest near the left nipple, the intercoastal space
and the middle of her right lung causing internal hemorrhage and ultimately resulting in her death. 21
Jaime who was hospitalized for a total of six days, was treated by Dr. Jose Jocson, 22 who certified that he sustained the following
non-lethal injuries: 23
Multiple Stab Wounds
#1 Posterior Axillary Area Right
#2 Posterior Axillary Area Left with Minimal Hemothorax
Lacerated Wound Right Parietal Area24
From the evidence for the defense consisting of the testimonies of appellants Ventura and Flores and Primitiva Empirado, the
following version is culled:
Four days after February 13, 2000 when appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental from Manila where he had been working
as a security guard,25 he noticed that his wife, Johanna, who had previously been employed as a house helper of the Bocateja
spouses, was wearing a new ring. When he confronted her, she said that it came from Jaime who was courting her, and that it
was because Jaime's wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit relationship that she had been dismissed from the Bocateja
household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife whereupon she left the conjugal home. 26
On February 22, 2000, Johanna returned to the conjugal home in Barangay Alegria, Municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental to
get her things. After a verbal confrontation with her husband, she left to find work in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. This was
the last time that Johanna and appellant Ventura saw each other. 27
That same day, appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two spoke at length and appellant Flores, who had
previously worked for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja spouses, confirmed that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair. 28
Since appellant Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant Ventura asked him to go with him to their residence so
he could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna. 29
Appellants, armed with an unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja residence still on the same day,
February 22, 2000, arriving there at around 11:00 p.m. They were not able to immediately enter the premises, however. After
boring a hole through the kitchen door with the knife, appellants entered the Bocateja residence at 2:00 a.m. of the next day,
February 23, 2000.30
Once inside, appellants entered the room of the Bocateja spouses through the unlocked sliding door. Appellant Ventura woke
Jaime up, confronted him and told him to stop his relationship with Johanna. Jaime fought back, and he and appellant Ventura
grappled for possession of the latter's gun.31
Soon after, Aileen woke up, screamed for help, and began throwing things at appellant Flores whom she attempted to strangle
with an electrical extension cord. Unable to breathe, appellant Ventura stabbed Aileen twice with his knife. And seeing that
Jaime had wrested control of the gun from appellant Ventura, appellant Flores also stabbed Jaime. 32
Since appellants had not intended to kill Aileen or stab Jaime, they fled in the course of which Jaime began shooting at them with
a 9 mm pistol. Appellants were eventually intercepted by policemen who placed them under arrest. 33
Interviewed by the media after his arrest, appellant Ventura stressed that he just wanted to confront Jaime about the latter's
relationship with appellant's wife, Johanna.34
By the appealed Decision of December 15, 2000, the trial court disposed as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principals by Direct Participation of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER as alleged
in Criminal Information No. 00-20693 with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling,
nighttime and the breaking of door to gain entrance to the house and with no mitigating circumstance. Accordingly,
they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, they shall serve a prison term of from Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as Minimum to Eighteen (18) years
of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum.
The Court also finds the two (2) above-named accused GUILTY as Principal[s] by Direct participation for the crime
of Murder as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20692 qualified by abuse of superior strength. The aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and by the breaking of a door are present in the commission of the crime. There
is no mitigating circumstance. The accused, therefore, are meted the Supreme penalty of DEATH.
By way of civil liability, the accused are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocoteja the sum of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity. The accused are likewise held solidarily liable to pay Jaime Bocateja the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages and the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Brief,36 appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) in convicting them despite the failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) in considering abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case
No. 00-20892; (3) in considering
evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20893; and (4) in considering the aggravating
circumstances of breaking of door and nocturnity in both cases. 37
Appellants argue that, at most, they can only be convicted of attempted homicide for the stabbing of Jaime and homicide for the
fatal stabbing of Aileen.38
From a considered review of the records and applicable jurisprudence, the instant appeal fails.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 39 For it to be
appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. 40
By appellants' argument, even if appellant Ventura became jealous when he learned of the illicit affair between his wife and
Jaime, it is not, by itself, sufficient proof that he determined to kill the latter; that with Jaime's testimony that appellant had
announced a "hold-up," they, at most, intended to rob, but not kill the spouses; that their only purpose was to confront Jaime
regarding his supposed affair with appellant Ventura's wife, Johanna; and that if they had truly intended to kill Jaime, then
appellant Ventura would not have bothered to awaken him, but would just have shot him in his sleep.
These assertions run counter to the established facts and are debunked by appellants' own admissions.
Appellants admittedly arrived at the Bocateja residence at 11:00 p.m. and surreptitiously entered therein at 2:00 a.m. At that
time, the surrounding premises were decidedly dark, and all the members of the household were fast asleep. Armed with a gun
and a knife, they proceeded directly to the bedroom of the spouses, where appellant Ventura woke up Jaime. These actuations
are not of those seeking parley, but instead betray an unmistakable intention to kill, not merely confront, Jaime.
Indeed, when pressed during cross-examination to explain why he chose to "confront" Jaime under the foregoing circumstances,
appellant Ventura became evasive and did not give a clear answer:
Q Mr. Witness, you said that your purpose in going to the house of Jaime was only to confront him. My question
is, why is it that you went there at 11:00 o'clock in the evening and not in the morning so that you will have all the
opportunity to confront him?
A Because at that time, I was not on my proper frame of mind.
Q Why, is it not a fact that as early as February 17, 2000, you were already told by your wife that there was that
relationship with Jaime Bocateja and your wife?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did you not immediately confront Mr, Bocateja after that day or February 17?
WITNESS:
A On that day, I don't know Jaime Bocateja.
xxx
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q On February 22. So that you did not ask your wife where the place of Jaime Bocateja was at that time you were
by him on February 22, 2000?
A Johanna did not tell me the place of Jaime Bocateja.
Q Why did you not ask her where the house is, at that time?
A What she told me was that, she is working in Bacolod City.
Q Mr. Witness, you had from February 17 to 22, a number of days to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja. Did you not
confront your wife or perhaps ask her about the place or where this Jaime Bocateja was at that time and have the
intention to confront him, if that was really your intention to confront him?
WITNESS:
A No, I did not ask her because we had a confrontation and the next day, February 17, she left.
Q Of course, when you arrived at the house of the Bocateja [spouses] at 11:00 o'clock in the evening, you were
armed at that time, is that right, you and your companion, Arante Flores?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that weapon at that time?
A .38 caliber revolver.
xxx
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Mr. Witness, if your intention was only to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja, why is it that you did not wait or you did
not come to that place earlier so that at that time, Jaime Bocateja was still awake or perhaps waited until the next
day?
COURT:
Already answered. He said that he was not at the proper frame of his mind.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Cross-examined on the same point, appellant Flores was equally evasive, but eventually revealed that the timing and method of
entry were purposely chosen to avoid detection by either the Bocateja family or their neighbors:
Q You arrived in the house of Bocateja at about 11:00 o'clock is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And your purpose in going to the house of Bocateja was only to confront Jaime Bocateja about his relationship
with Johanna is that right?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Why did you wait Mr. Witness why did you and the other accused Felix Ventura wait for three (3) hours for you
to confront him in his house?
 WITNESS:
A Because we were not able to enter the door right away because the door could not be opened.
Q My question Mr. Witness, is this you ate your supper at Libertad market at about 8:00 o'clock why did you not
go to the house of Jaime Bocateja at 9:00 o'clock immediately after supper? At that time when the members of the
family were yet awake?A We stayed at Burgos market and then from Burgos to Libertad we only walk and from
Libertad to the house of Bocateja.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q You will admit Mr. Witness at the time you left your place at Brgy. Alegria you were already armed, is that right?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Your uncle Felix Ventura was armed with [a] .38 caliber revolver, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were also armed with a bladed weapon is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you have to bring this weapon Mr. Witness?
A We brought this weapon just to frighten Jaime Bocateja during [the] confrontation.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Are you saying Mr. Witness if your purpose was only to confront him you have to bring this [sic] weapons?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime Bocateja about 11:00 o'clock. . . by the way when did you arrive at the
house of Jaime Bocateja?
A 11:00 in the evening.
Q Of course you did not anymore knock at the door Mr. Witness?
A No, sir.
Q Or you did not also call any member of the family to open [the door for] you, is that right?
WITNESS:
A No, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q As a matter of fact you only broke the gate Mr. Witness in order to enter the compound of the Bocateja family?
A We scaled over the gate.
Q And why do you have Mr. Witness to go over the fence and open a hole at the kitchen for you to confront Mr.
Jaime Bocateja if that was your purpose?
A The purpose of my uncle was just to confront Jaime.
Q And when you confront, are you saying that you cannot any more knock at the door, perhaps call any member
of the family inside the house?
WITNESS:
A No, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Why Mr. Witness, Why?
A We did not call or knock at the person inside the house because it will make noise or calls and alarm to the
neighbors.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To be sure, all the elements of evident premeditation were clearly established from the lips of appellants themselves. Thus, on
clarificatory questioning by the trial court, appellant Ventura testified:
COURT:
Q I recall that you left Murcia [at] 4:00 o'clock. Is that morning or afternoon?
A I left Murcia at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Q 4:00 o'clock from Alegria then to Alangilan, then to Bacolod, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From Alangilan to Bacolod, what mode of transportation did you make?
A From Alegria to Alangilan, we only hiked and then from Alangilan to Bacolod we took the passenger jeepney.
Q From Alegria to Alangilan, how long did it take you to walk? How many kilometers?
A Four (4) kilometers.
Q And, I assume that while you were walking, you were talking with Arante Flores, your nephew, about the plans
to go to the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q By the way, what did you do at Alangilan?
A I went there because my clothes were at my sister's house.
Q So, what time did you arrive in [Bacolod]?
A We arrived here in [Bacolod] late in the evening.
Q I assume that you disembarked at Burgos Market?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you just walked from Burgos Market to Libertad Baybay to the house of Jaime Bocateja?
A Yes, sir.
Q It took you about thirty (30) [minutes] to one (1) hour, more or less?
A More than one (1) hour.
Q And during this time, you were talking again with Arante Flores [about] the course of action that you will take
once a confrontation takes place with Jaime Bocateja?
WITNESS:
A Yes, I asked him the location of 3rd Road since I do not know the house of Jaime Bocateja.
COURT:
Q I assume that the front main door of the house was close[d] at that time, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You scaled that door, the front main door of the gate?
A Yes, sir, we scaled the gate.
Q You were not able to open it but you simply scaled, you went over?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said yet, you destroyed the main door of the house. Can you tell the Court, how did you destroy the
main door of the house?
A No, the kitchen door, sir.
COURT:
Q How were you able to destroy it?
WITNESS:
A We used the knife in unlocking the door. We made a hole.
Q You made a hole and with the use of your hand, you were able to unlock the inside lock because of the hole?
A Yes, sir.
Q And I assume that it took you twenty (20) – thirty (30) minutes to make that hole?
 A Yes, sir.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The immediately foregoing narration was echoed by appellant Flores who gave the following testimony on direct examination:
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q So from Brgy. Alegria where did you proceed?
WITNESS:
A We proceeded to Brgy. Alangilan.
Q This Brgy. Alegria how far is it from Brgy. Alangilan?
A The distance between Brgy. Alegria to Brgy. Alangilan is about three (3) kilometers.
Q So, what means of transportation did you used in going to Alangilan?
A We walked in going to Alangilan.
Q When you arrived at Brgy. Alangilan what did you do?
WITNESS:
A We went to our aunt's house.
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q From Alangilan where did you proceed?
A In Alangilan, we stayed at the house of my aunt and then we proceeded to Bacolod.
Q So what time did you arrived [sic] in Bacolod?
A 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q When you arrived in Bacolod, what did you do?
A We ate our supper at Libertad Market.
Q After eating your dinner at Libertad, what did you do?
A After eating our supper, we proceeded to the house of Jaime Bocateja.
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q What time did you arrived [sic] at the house of Jaime?
WITNESS:
A 11:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime, what did you do?
A We enter[ed] the gate of their house.
Q Please continue?
A Then, we opened the door.
Q And then?
A We reach[ed] [the Bocateja residence] at around 11:00 o'clock and we tried to open the door but we could not
open the door immediately. We made a hole so that we can get in the house. We entered the house at about 2:00
o'clock in the morning the following day.44 (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm and methodical manner by
which they sought to carry out his murder. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, unless shown to be customary, 45 appellants'
act of arming themselves with a gun and a knife constitutes direct evidence of a careful and deliberate plan to carry out a killing.
Consider the following ruling of this Court in People v. Samolde:46
As stated earlier, accused-appellant and Armando Andres tried to borrow Cabalin's tear gas gun. This attempt by the
accused-appellant and his co-accused to arm themselves prior to the commission of the crime constitutes direct
evidence that the killing of Feliciano Nepomuceno had been planned with care and executed with utmost
deliberation. From the time the two agreed to commit the crime to the time of the killing itself, sufficient time had
lapsed for them to desist from their criminal plan had they wanted to. Instead, they clung to their determination and
went ahead with their nefarious plan. x x 47 (Emphasis supplied)
From the time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, after they had resolved to go to confront Jaime, to the time they
entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City, ten hours had elapsed – sufficient for appellants to dispassionately reflect on the
consequences of their actions and allow for their conscience and better judgment to overcome the resolution of their will and
desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if only they had desired to hearken to such warnings. In spite of this, appellants
evidently clung to their determination to kill Jaime.
That evident premeditation was established through the testimonies of appellants and not by those of the prosecution witnesses
is of no moment. While appellants could not have been compelled to be witnesses against themselves, 48 they waived this right by
voluntarily taking the witness stand. Consequently, they were subject to cross-examination on matters covered by their direct
examination.49 Their admissions before the trial court constitute relevant and competent evidence which the trial court correctly
appreciated against them. 50
Although he admitted stabbing Jaime, appellant Flores sought to justify his actions by claiming that he was impelled by the need
to prevent Jaime from shooting his uncle, appellant Ventura. This pretense does not impress.
To successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any
provocation have been given by the relative attacked. 51 Of these, the requisite of "unlawful aggression" is primary and
indispensable without which defense of relative, whether complete or otherwise, cannot be validly invoked. 52
Not one of the foregoing requisites of defense of a relative is present. From all accounts, it was appellants who initiated the
unlawful aggression, and it was the victim Jaime who acted in self defense. Hence, neither the justifying circumstance of defense
of a relative53 nor the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative 54may be appreciated in appellant Flores'
favor.
While appellant Ventura did not directly participate in the stabbing of Jaime, the trial court correctly held both appellants
collectively liable for the attempt on the latter's life since they were shown to have acted in conspiracy with each other.
There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.55 Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in these cases, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 56
By stabbing Jaime Bocateja pursuant to their pre-conceived plot, appellants commenced the commission of murder directly by
overt acts. Despite their efforts, however, they failed to inflict a mortal wound on Jaime, hence, their liability only for attempted
murder.57
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both appellants guilty of murder qualified not by evident premeditation
but by taking advantage of superior strength, 58 to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The accused
Arante Flores who delivered the stabbing blow is big and strong, standing about five feet and six (5'6") inches tall. His
weapon was a 14 inch dagger. Aileen Bocateja [stood] only about five (5'0") feet tall. The disparity of their strength is
enormous.59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked.60 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the
parties, and is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous to the aggressor, which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime.61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant Arante Flores is taller, and probably stronger than the victim Aileen
Bocateja because of their difference in sex as well as the fact that the accused appellant Flores was armed at that time x x
x."62 Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's death was not attended by abuse of superior strength since: (1) though ultimately
unsuccessful, she was able to put up a defense against appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show that appellant
Flores deliberately took advantage of the disparity in their size and sex in order to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, 63 taking advantage of
superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of
the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of
means weakening the defense, although not annulling it.64 Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on her
and her husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does not automatically negate the
possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of his superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon
upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. 65 Thus, in People v.
Molas,66 where the accused was convicted of murder for stabbing to death two women and an eight year old boy, this Court
discoursed:
While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing of the three victims was
raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.There was abuse of
 superior strength when Molas inflicted several mortal wounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and
stronger, was armed with a weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was also present
when he hacked eight-year old Abelaro and also Dulcesima who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was
unarmed.67 (Emphasis supplied)
And in the more recent case of People v.Loreto,68 this Court opined:
The contention of accused-appellant is barren of merit. Article 14, paragraph 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a crime
against persons is aggravated by the accused taking advantage of superior strength. There are no fixed and invariable rules
regarding abuse of superior strength or employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Superiority does not always mean
numerical superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim. There is
abuse of superior strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess
of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both and the employment of means to
weaken the defense, although not annulling it. The aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to insure the
commission of the crime. In this case, accused-appellant was armed with a knife and used the same in repeatedly stabbing
Leah, a young wisp of a girl, no less than eighteen times after overtaking her in the sala of Dan's house. Irrefragably, then,
accused-appellant abused his superior strength in stabbing Leah. In a case of early vintage [People v. Guzman, supra. at 1127],
the Court held that:
There is nothing to the argument that the accused was erroneously convicted of murder. An attack made by a man with
a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself (U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446). The
circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore, correctly appreciated by the trial court, as qualifying the
offense as murder.69 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took advantage of the superiority which his
strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
As for appellant Flores' claim of self-defense, it cannot be sustained. As in defense of a relative, one claiming self defense must
prove by clear and convincing evidence70 both unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured and reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. As a third requisite, he must also prove lack of
sufficient provocation on his part.71 None of these requisites was shown to be present. As expounded by the trial court:
Arante declared that Aileen panicked and screamed and was hitting him with an extension cord so he stabbed her.
Arante was suggesting that had Ai[l]een remained cool, composed and friendly, she would not have died.
This perverted reasoning need not detain the Court. There was an on-going aggression being committed inside her
house and within the confines of her room, hence, Aileen's actuations were perfectly just and legitimate. 72
As adverted to earlier, the trial court, citing People v. Dueno,73 did not consider evident premeditation as having aggravated the
killing of Aileen since she was not the intended victim of appellants' conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this Court finds
that this aggravating circumstance should have been appreciated in connection with Aileen's murder. Jurisprudence is to the
effect that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is
shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a
violent resistance.74
Here, it was established that upon seeing her husband being attacked by appellants, Aileen immediately called for help and
hurled objects at appellant Flores. And it was because of this passionate defense of her husband that appellant Flores hacked at
her face and stabbed her four times. These factual circumstances are analogous to those in People v. Belga,75 where this Court
had occasion to state that:
While it would seem that the main target of the malefactors were Alberto and Arlene Rose, this does not negative the
presence of evident premeditation on the physical assault on the person of Raymundo Roque. We have established
jurisprudence to the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the
intended victim was killed (or wounded, as in this case), if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill
not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance. Here, Raymundo Roque
provided such violent resistance against the conspirators, giving the latter no choice but to eliminate him from their
path.76 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, while appellants' original objective may have only been the killing of Jaime, the trial court correctly held both of them
responsible for the murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators are liable for such other crimes which could be foreseen and are the
natural and logical consequences of the conspiracy. 77 In Pring, et al. v. Court of Appeals,78 this Court held:
While the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused, there is no question that they were
all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and retaliate against the group of Loreto Navarro. Thus, they
must share equal liability for all the acts done by the participants in such a felonious undertaking. While petitioners
herein, Rogelio Pring and Alberto (Roberto) Roxas, on their part, had ganged up Jesus Yumol who belonged to the group
of their adversaries by hitting the latter with a bench and a piece of wood, and that it was a certain David Ravago who
 stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro, nevertheless, it is a rule that conspirators would necessarily be liable also for
the acts of the other conspirators unless such acts differ radically or substantially from that which they intended to
commit (People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536; People vs. Rosario, 68 Phil. 720).
The pronouncements made by this Court in the aforecited case of People vs. Enriquez, still serve as the governing rule
that should be applied to the case at bar. In the said case, this Court stated:
"x x x x x x x x x
'We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had undoubtedly conspired to do grave
personal injury to the deceased, and now that the injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot
escape from the legal effect of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a different way
from that which had been intended. x x x x x x x x x.
'As has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'If a number of persons agree to commit, and
enter upon the commission of the crime which will probably endanger human life such as robbery, all of them
are responsible for the death of a person that ensues as a consequence.' (Boyd vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 450; 35 Law.
ed. 1077). In United States vs. Patten, the court said: 'Conspirators who join in a criminal attack on a
defenseless man with dangerous weapons, knock him down, and when he tries to escape, pursue him with
increased numbers, and continue the assault, are liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife
wound inflicted by one of the them during the beating, although in the beginning they did not contemplate the
use of a knife.' (42 Appeals, D.C., 239)"
Although during the incident in question the aggression committed by the petitioners herein was directed against the
other members of the group of Loreto Navarro and not on the deceased, this would not relieve them from the
consequence of the acts jointly done by another member of the petitioners' group who stabbed the deceased Loreto
Navarro.79 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
And in the more recent case of People v. Bisda, et al.,80 this Court held:
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of
a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the
original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of
conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which
necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that
result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and
substantively from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,
"when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and
membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them." (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where his wife Aileen was also sleeping,
appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent resistance was an unforeseen circumstance. Hence, neither of them can
escape accountability for the tragic consequences of their actions.
In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstances of
dwelling,81 nighttime82 and breaking of door83 in connection with both crimes.
Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode. 84
Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and
produces greater alarm.85 Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated since the crimes were committed in the place of abode of the
victims who had not given immediate provocation.86
Upon the other hand, as pointed out by both appellants and the Solicitor General, the breaking of a door was not alleged in
either of the two informations. Thus, the same cannot be appreciated against appellants. On this point, this Court's discussion
in People v. Legaspi,87 quoted in the Solicitor General's Brief, is instructive:
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information, resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death upon accused-appellant. In People v. Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, 338 SCRA 21, August 15, 2000), We had occasion
to rule thus:
"In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136, 1995), we admonished courts to proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form – death – because the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable.
Any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of
the Court to exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence. Safeguards designed to reduce to a
minimum, if not eliminate the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored in a case involving the imposition
of capital punishment for an erroneous conviction 'will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.' The
 accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance
that would spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly 'exercise extreme
caution in reviewing the parties' evidence.' This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating
circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be
alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable,
we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in
predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him.
xxx
The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that due to their non-allegation
in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling
cannot be considered in raising the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now been formalized in the Revised
Rules of Criminal procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 now provides that:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment.88 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants and the Solicitor General also argue that nocturnity should not have been considered since Jaime himself testified
that their bedroom was well-lit and there was light coming from the kitchen and the adjoining bedroom of their children. 89
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test, under which nighttime is aggravating
because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense; and (2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating
because the darkness was purposely sought by the offender. 90 Applying these tests to the established factual circumstances, this
Court concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in furtherance of their murderous intent,
appellants deliberately took advantage of nighttime, as well as the fact that the household members were asleep, in order to
gain entry into the Bocateja residence. Indeed, their own testimony indicates that while they were already outside the Bocateja
house at around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before breaking into the residence so as not to call the
attention of the Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear that appellants deliberately took advantage of the darkness of
the night, not to mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep, to conceal their actions and to facilitate and insure that
their entry into the victims' home would be undetected.
No mitigating circumstances are present to offset the foregoing aggravating circumstances. While the trial Court noted that
appellants were apparently motivated by their belief that Johanna and Jaime were carrying on an illicit relationship, to wit:
The accused presented evidence to prove that Jaime Bocateja and Johanna Ventura, wife of the accused Felix Ventura,
were maintaining an illicit relationship. The evidence on this point is principally hearsay – the alleged admissions made
by Johanna of the relationship. There is no doubt, however, that the accused Ventura believes that [his] wife and Jaime
Bocateja are clandestine lovers. It is fairly reasonable, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is Ventura's
belief of this illicit relationship which prompted him to confront Jaime Bocateja, 91
it nevertheless ruled out passion or obfuscation92 or immediate vindication of a grave offense93 as mitigating circumstances.
While jealousy may give rise to passion or obfuscation, 94 for the appreciation of this mitigating circumstance it is necessary that
the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. 95 In the same vein, while "immediate" vindication should be
construed as "proximate" vindication in accordance with the controlling Spanish text 96 of the Revised Penal Code, still this
mitigating circumstance cannot be considered where sufficient time elapsed for the accused to regain his composure. 97
In these cases, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February 17, almost a week before the stabbing incidents
on February 23, when he first confronted his wife about her ring. Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the
time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod
City. Within that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change his clothes at a relatives' house in a neighboring barangay
and both appellants were able to take their dinner at the Burgos Market in Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside
the Bocateja residence before carrying out their plan. Without question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to
cool and for them to recover their equanimity.
In fine, for stabbing Jaime, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder qualified by evident
premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. However, as pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the trial court erred in imposing the sentence of Eight (8) Years of prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18) Years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated
penalty shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempted felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision
mayor.98 Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,99 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances, the proper imposable penalty falls within the range of prision
mayor in its maximum period (from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years) as maximum and prision
correccional (from Six (6) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years) as minimum. Accordingly, this Court hereby sentences
appellants to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of prision correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of prision
mayor as maximum.
For fatally stabbing Aileen, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength with
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and nighttime. As already noted, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible
penalties, the greater penalty shall be imposed when, in the commission of the deed, one aggravating circumstance is present.
Consequently, the trial court's imposition of the supreme penalty of death must be sustained.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray 100 that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of
the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
As regards the civil liability of the appellants, the award of the trial court is hereby modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Aileen as civil indemnity for her death is sustained, the
commission of the crime by appellants having been duly proven. 101 The award of moral damages to her heirs is likewise proper
considering that the prosecution presented adequate proof that they suffered mental anguish and wounded feelings. 102 However,
the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court is hereby reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.103 It should be borne in mind that the purpose for such award is to compensate the heirs of the victim for the
injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them. 104
The award of exemplary damages should be increased from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such award is proper in view of the
presence of aggravating circumstances.105 Furthermore, considering that counsel for appellants admitted that the heirs of Aileen
incurred funeral expenses of P100,000.00106 and such admission has not been shown to have been made through palpable
mistake, the same should be awarded as actual damages. 107
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the trial court did not grant Jaime's claim for P20,000.00 in actual damages for hospitalization
expenses since he failed to present any receipts to substantiate the same. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Jaime was actually
hospitalized and operated upon, this Court deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as temperate damages. 108 Moreover, Jaime is
also entitled to moral damages in accordance with Article 2219, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, which this Court hereby awards in
the amount of P25,000.00.109 Finally, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are also in order considering that the crime was attended
by two aggravating circumstances.110
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix Ventura
and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder qualified by evident
premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime and are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor as maximum.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the victim, Jaime Bocateja, the amounts of: (a) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as
temperate damages; (b) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as moral damages; and (c) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 is likewise AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante
Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and nighttime and are SENTENCED to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocateja the amounts of: (a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
civil indemnity; (b) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; (c) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages; and (d) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Upon the finality of this Decision, and pursuant to Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 7659, let
the records of the cases be immediately forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the exercise, at her discretion, of her
power to pardon appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125966 January 13, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN FACTAO alias "BOYET," ALBERT FRANCIS LABRODA alias " ABET," and TIRSO SERVIDAD,
TINGA, J.:
The defense of alibi is by nature weak but it assumes significance and strength where the evidence for the prosecution is also
intrinsically weak.1 The contrasting weight of the prosecution evidence against appellants Juan Factao and Albert Francis Labroda,
on the one hand, and appellant Tirso Servidad, on the other, accounts for the difference that the Court accords their respective
alibis.
In the evening of August 23, 1991, Vicente Manolos was in a kamalig near the seashore in Barangay Sirawagan, San Joaquin,
Iloilo with Eduardo Sardoma, Rolando Nierves, Noel Serrano and the hut's owner, Fernando Sardoma. 2 Sometime past 8:00 p.m.,
Vicente felt the urge to defecate so he went beside a boat about four or five meters from the hut. 3 As Vicente relieved himself, he
saw Juan Factao and Albert Francis Labroda approach the hut. 4 Factao was armed with a garand rifle.5
As the two men neared the kamalig, Labroda looked around as if to see if there was anyone else about. 6 Factao peeped into the
hut, which was illuminated by an electric light bulb, aimed his gun at a hole in the hut's bamboo wall and fired. 7
Factao and Labroda then sped towards the Sirawagan River. 8 In his haste, Factao tripped on the outrigger of the boat beside
which Vicente was defecating.9 Fortunately, Factao did not notice Vicente, who tried to hide himself. 10Vicente quickly pulled up
his pants and ran towards the hut.11
From about five arms' length away, 12 Jose Manuel Sermona also witnessed the shooting. Jose Manuel saw Juan Factao, Albert
Francis Labroda and Tirso Servidad pass the hut where he was staying as they walked towards the kamalig of Fernando
Sardoma.13 Factao was carrying a garand, although the other two were unarmed. 14 Labrado looked on as Factao peeped into
the kamalig, aimed and fired.15 Factao and Labrado then ran towards the river while Servidad separated from the two. 16
Inside the kamalig, Eduardo Sardoma was conversing with Rolando Nierves, Noel Serrano and Fernando Sardoma. 17 The latter
was on the floor lying on his side.18 Suddenly, Eduardo heard an explosion.19 Immediately, he went outside and saw Tirso Servidad
bending his body forward and moving his head sideways. 20 Eduardo quickly wrapped his arms around Tirso. Eduardo also espied
Juan Factao, who was carrying a garand, and Albert Francis Labroda running from the scene. 21
Eduardo then heard Fernando Sardoma pleading for help. 22 Fernando said he had been shot and asked to be brought to the
hospital.23 Eduardo went back inside the hut, where he found Fernando bathing in his own blood. 24
The same bloody sight greeted Vicente Manolos when he reached the hut. 25 He cuddled Fernando and pushed inside the victim's
protruding intestines.26 Vicente, Eduardo, Jose Manuel and Rolando Nierves loaded Fernando into a jeep and rushed him to the
hospital.27 Their efforts were for naught, however, as Fernando was already dead upon arrival at the Pedro Trono Memorial
Hospital in Guimbal, Iloilo.28
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Irene Escanlar, Medical Officer III of said hospital, revealed that the victim sustained a gunshot
wound at the eleventh left intercostal space with exit at the right hypochondriac area. 29 The bullet perforated the left lower lobe
of the lung, the pancreas, the whole lobe of the liver and the right diaphragm. 30 The bullet also caused a fracture on the right
tenth and eleventh ribs.31 Hypovolemic shock or massive blood loss, secondary to the rupture of the liver, was the victim's
immediate cause of death.32 According to Dr. Escanlar, Fernando probably had his side towards the assailant when he was
shot.33 Dr. Escanlar reduced her findings in a Post Mortem Report. 34
The police investigation resulted in the apprehension of Juan Factao, Albert Francis Labroda and Tirso Servidad. The three were
subsequently charged with Murder in an Information reading:
That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1991, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another to better realize their purpose, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with Garand, US
Rifle Caliber .30 M1, with treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one FERNANDO SARDOMA with the weapon
they were then provided, inflicting upon their said victim gunshot wound on the vital part of his body which caused the
immediately (sic) and instantaneous death of said Fernando Sardoma.
CONTRARY TO LAW.35
When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. 36 Trial ensued, during which the prosecution offered the testimonies of
Jose Manuel Sermona, Eduardo Sardoma, Vicente Manolos and Dr. Irene Escanlar. The prosecution witnesses testified to the
foregoing narration.
The accused denied any participation in the killing of Fernando Sardoma. They invoked alibi as their defense.
Factao and Labrado, both members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), claimed that at the time of the
incident they, along with Noel Lupase and Carlos Garcia, were celebrating the birthday of Labroda in the latter's house. 37 The
party ended at around 10:00 p.m.38 Thereafter, Carlos Garcia repaired to his home while Juan Factao returned to camp. 39 Noel
Lupase, who corroborated Labroda and Factao's presence at the party, 40 spent the night at Labroda's house.41 They learned about
the tragedy only the following day.42
Factao and Labrado, suspected that the victim's companions, the principal prosecution witnesses, were sympathizers of the New
People's Army (NPA).43 Factao also imputed ill motive on prosecution witness Vicente Manolos with whom he had a quarrel
during a basketball game five days before the killing of Fernando Sardoma. 44
Accused Servidad, also a CAFGU member,45 presented a different account of his whereabouts. Servidad was on his way home
when he met Sirawagan Barangay Captain Faustino Nierves at about 8:30 in the evening of 23 August 1991. 46 The two then heard
an explosion from the direction of the seashore.47 Barangay Captain Nierves instructed Servidad to investigate the explosion. 48
Some ten meters from Fernando's hut, Servidad came upon Rolando Nierves and Vicente Manalos, 49 and inquired about the
explosion.50 Rolando and Vicente replied that Fernando had been shot. 51 Servidad asked them to call for other people to help
bring Fernando to the hospital.52 Servidad then proceeded to the kamalig and peeped through the door.53 Inside, he saw a
bleeding Fernando.54 Servidad asked people to help him lift Fernando to the jeep. 55Thereafter, he headed back home.56
Servidad denied being with Factao and Labroda on that fateful evening or that Eduardo Sardoma grabbed him right after the
explosion.57 Servidad said he was not in good terms with prosecution witnesses Eduardo Sardoma and Jose Manuel Sermona,
whom he suspected were NPA sympathizers.58 He denied harboring a grudge against the victim, who he claimed was a good
friend.59
Servidad's alibi was corroborated by Barangay Captain Nierves, who testified having met Servidad right before the explosion, and
instructing the latter to investigate the incident. 60 Later that evening, Servidad informed him that Fernando Sardoma had been
shot61
The defense also presented Juan Roweno Secuban, likewise a CAFGU member, whose testimony was offered to disprove that the
killing of Fernando Sardoma was in retaliation for Secuban's hacking. 62 According to Secuban, he was hacked by a certain Ronaldo
San Miguel over a girl they were both courting.63 Fernando, allegedly a witness to the incident, even executed an affidavit in favor
of Secuban.64
On July 14, 1995, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 25, rendered judgment finding all three accused guilty of
Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused, Juan Factao alias "Boyet," Albert Francis Labroda alias
"Abet" and Tirso Servidad, guilty of murder as charged beyond the shadow of doubt, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the invisible (sic) penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, plus the accessory penalties as provided under Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, and moreover, they are ordered to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 to
reimburse the family the amount of P10,000.00 for the coffin and another P10,000.00 as expenses for the funeral and
wake, and to pay the attorney's fee of P9,000.00 and the cost. At the time the crime was committed the death penalty
was not yet restored, hence it cannot be imposed in this case.
SO ORDERED.65
From this Decision, the accused have appealed.
The Court entertains no doubt that appellants Juan Factao and Albert Francis Labroda are guilty of the slaying of Fernando
Sardoma. Prosecution witness Vicente Manolos unerringly pointed to the two as the perpetrators of the crime:
Q: At around that time while you were defecating beside the boat can you tell the Court if there was any unusual
incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q; Will you please tell the Court what was the incident about?
A: I saw two men approaching the hut of Fernando Sardoma.
Q: Now, can you identify these two persons which you said were approaching the hut of Fernando Sardoma?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell the court the names.
A: Juan Factao alias Boyet and Albert Francis Labroda.
….
Q: At that time that you saw Juan Factao was he carrying something?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you please tell the court was he was carrying?
A: A long firearm.
 Q: Can you identify that firearm?
A: Yes, it was agaran (sic).
Q: Now, thereafter, what did Juan Factao and Albert Labroda do?
A: They went nearer the hut of Fernando Sardoma. When they were near already I saw Albert Francis Labroda looking
around seemingly trying to find out if there are people around.
Q: What about Juan Factao, what did he do?
A: Looking stilthelly (sic), towards the hut of Fernando Sardoma.
….
Q: Was Juan Factao able to reach the hut of Fernando Sardoma?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When he arrived to the hut of Fernando Sardoma do you know what he did?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell the court.
A: He first peep (sic) or took a look inside and afterwards aimed the firearm at a hole because the hut is filled with holes,
and then fired the shot.
Q: After firing the shot, what did Jun Factao do, if any?
A: They ran away.
….
Q: What about Albert Francis Labroda did (sic) know where he went?
A: They escaped together.66
Vicente's foregoing testimony was corroborated by Jose Manuel Sermona.
Conspiracy between appellants Factao and Labrado was adequately established. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 67 It is not necessary, however, that
conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which show a joint or common
purpose and design, a concerted action and a community of interest among the accused. 68
While there is no direct evidence to show that Factao and Labroda agreed to commit the crime, the acts of Factao and Labroda
immediately before and after the shooting evince a commonality in design sufficient to make them co-principals to the killing.
Vicente Manolos testified that as Factao prepared to shoot Fernando, Labrado was looking around to see if anyone else was
about.69 Thereafter, the two fled together, running in the same direction, a fact to which Jose Manuel Sermona 70 and Eduardo
Sardoma71 also testified.
The alibi of appellants Factao and Labroda cannot prosper in the face of the positive identification by prosecution witnesses
Vicente Manolos and Jose Manuel Sermona, who were both familiar with the two appellants. Alibi, which is easy to concoct,
cannot prevail over positive identification.72
Moreover, for their alibi to prosper, the accused must not only prove that they were somewhere else when the offense was
committed, but also that they were so far away that they could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 73 Appellants Factao and Labroda utterly failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for them to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Factao and Labroda themselves
testified that they were at the house of Labroda to celebrate the latter's birthday on 23 August 1991 at approximately the same
time that Fernando Sardoma was killed. 74 Labroda's house was just more than a kilometer away from the place where the crime
was committed, or approximately thirty (30) minutes on foot. 75 Evidently, the accused-appellants were in a place near the crime
scene.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to establish appellant Tirso Servidad's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Vicente Manolos
testified that he saw only Juan Factao and Albert Labroda at the scene of the crime. On direct examination, he did not mention
appellant Servidad at all.
Q- Now, can you identify these two person[s] which you said were approaching the hut of Fernando Sardoma?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Please tell the Court their names?
A- Juan Factao alias Boyet and Albert Francis Labroda.76
On cross-examination, the witness adverted to appellant Tirso Servidad but only because the private prosecutor mentioned his
name. Moreover, he confirmed the fact that he did not see the appellant Servidad at the same time that he saw the other two
appellants.
Q- You mean to say that you have not seen or meet (sic) this Tirso Servidad in the evening of August 23, 1991?
….
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Where?
A- Outside the hut, I heard his voice.
Q- You mean to say that you only heard the voice of this Tirso Servidad, is that what you mean?
A- Yes, sir. But when we were carrying Fernando Sardoma, I noticed him. Later, I lost sight of him.
….
Q- But at the time you were then relieving yourself at the seashore near the fishing boat you have not seen Tirso
Servidad with Juan Factao and Francis Albert Labroda, is that correct?
A- No. I saw only both of them.77 (Underscoring supplied.)
Vicente's testimony contradicts that of Jose Manuel Sermona, who allegedly saw Servidad with Factao and Labroda going to
Fernando's hut. Jose Manuel claimed that Servidad allegedly separated from the other two and went to the front door, which
was facing the seashore:
Q: Have you gone to the hut of Fernando Sardoma before 23 August 1991?
A: Yes, sir.
….
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court, if you were familiar of (sic) that hut of Hernando (sic) Sardoma where you went
inside on August 23, 1991?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court how many doors this "kamalig" of Hernando (sic) Sardoma has?
A: Only one door.
Q: And this door of the "kamalig" of Hernando (sic) Sardoma, is it facing the seashore or not?
A: Facing the seashore.78
The front of the door where Jose Manuel allegedly saw Servidad, however, was only about four to five meters away from where
Vicente Manolos was defecating. Yet Vicente categorically stated that he did not see Servidad as Factao fired the fatal shot. 79
These irreconcilable discrepancies in the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the culpability of appellant
Servidad.
Eduardo Sardoma's claim that he caught Servidad peeping into the hut as Factao and Labroda were fleeing defies human nature.
If Servidad were at all present at the time of the shooting and conspired with his co-appellants to kill Fernando Sardoma, he
would have immediately fled from the scene with his cohorts once the criminal deed was done. But as the defense would have it,
Servidad separated form the other appellants and worst, even linger at the crime scene and risked arrest.
Senior Inspector Bonifacio Servano also said that he saw Tirso sometime after the killing, some distance from the crime scene:
Q- When you arrived at the place of the incident at around 9:25 in the evening on August 23, 1991 together with two (2)
policemen, you saw Tirso Servidad in the place of the incident?
A- Yes, sir.
….
Witness: Correction please, your honor, I saw or met him but outside the place of the incident about 200 meters from
the national highway of Brgy. Siwaragan.
Q- Was he running or walking?
A- He was walking and he stop (sic) when he saw me and saluted
me.80
Servidad's behavior in nonchalantly greeting no less than the Chief of Police is unusual for one who had just killed a fellow
human being. Again, as correctly pointed out by the defense, it is contrary to human experience for a guilty person, right after
the commission of a crime, to roam the streets within the vicinity of the crime scene where police authorities could easily
apprehend him.81
Even if Servidad were indeed present at the scene during the shooting, such fact by itself would not render him criminally liable.
The mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-conspirator. 82The prosecution did not offer any
evidence that Servidad performed any act from which his conspiracy to the crime may be deduced.
In the face of the contradicting and unbelievable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the alibi of appellant Servidad
assumes strength and significance. According to appellant, he was on his way home when he met Sirawagan Barangay Captain
Faustino Nierves at the precise time of the explosion, 83 a fact corroborated by the Barangay Captain himself.84 No ill motive has
been attributed for this witness, a public officer, to testify falsely.
The crime committed by appellants Factao and Labroda is Murder, the killing being qualified by treachery. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.85 Treachery attended the killing of the victim Fernando Sardoma, where his assailant Factao first peeped into the
bamboo wall, inserted the rifle through the bamboo wall and shot Fernando, who was then lying on his side in the relative
security of his hut, utterly defenseless and completely unaware of the impending attack.
Evident premeditation, although alleged in the information, was not adequately proven. The essence of evident premeditation is
that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 86 The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his resolve; and
(3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination or conception and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
upon the consequence of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will if he desired to hearken to its
warning.87 Where, as in this case, there is no evidence as to how and when the plan to kill was decided and what time had
elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance. 88
The trial court ruled that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling attended the killing. Nighttime, as a rule, is
absorbed in treachery, and should not have been appreciated. 89 The killing, however, was committed in the dwelling of the
victim, who did not give any provocation therefor. 90 This aggravating circumstance was, therefore, correctly appreciated.
At the time of the commission of the offense, Murder was punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to death.91 As there is no
mitigating circumstance, and one aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty should be imposed, 92 but as the death
penalty was then suspended. At the time of the commission of the offense, only the penalty of reclusion perpetua may be meted
upon appellants.93
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,94 appellants Factao and Labrado are each liable to pay the heirs of the victim
Fernando Sardoma P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should also be awarded to
said heirs because of the presence of aggravating circumstances. 95
While Fernando Sardoma's widow Virgilia testified that she incurred P30,000.00 in expenses for her late husband's two-week
wake,96 apart from the coffin, which cost P10,000.00, including the service, 97 such testimony was not supported by a single
receipt. Accordingly, the award of P10,000.00 for the coffin and another P10,000.00 for the wake and funeral expenses by the
RTC is deleted.98 However, they may be awarded temperate damage of P25,000.00 from each guilty appellant 99
The widow Virgilia also said she spent P9,500.00 for a private prosecutor, to whom she still owes another P1,500.00. 100 Again, this
amount is not borne by any receipt or agreement in evidence. Nevertheless, the Court, in light of the award of exemplary
damages, sustains the grant by the RTC of P9,000.00 as attorney's fees. 101
WHEREFORE, appellants Juan Factao and Albert Francis Labroda are found GUILTY of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are each ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Fernando Sardoma the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P9,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
For failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant Tirso Servidad is ACQUITTED. The Director
of Prisons is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to inform this
Court of such action within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153875 August 16, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO DAGANI y REYES and OTELLO SANTIANO Y LEONIDA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision dated June 20, 2002 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, Branch 12 (RTC), dated February 18, 1993, in Criminal Case No. 89-77467, finding the
accused-appellants Otello Santiano y Leonida (Santiano) and Rolando Dagani y Reyes (Dagani) guilty of the crime of Murder.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and use of personal violence upon one ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX by then and there
shooting him with a .38 caliber revolver, thereby inflicting upon the said ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX mortal gunshot wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued where the prosecution adduced evidence to establish the
following:
At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln Miran (Miran), and
two other individuals had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound of the Philippine National Railways (PNR)
along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden, appellants, who were security officers of the PNR and covered by the
Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the canteen and approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran, causing the
latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
The defense proceeded to prove their version of the facts:
Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to investigate a commotion at the canteen. Upon reaching the
place, Santiano ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to enter, while the former waited outside.
Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber revolver and
attempted to fire at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside the canteen, Santiano heard gunfire and,
from his vantage point, he saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun which belonged to Javier. During the course of
the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a warning shot. He heard Javier’s gun fire again, so he decided to rush into
the canteen. Santiano then shot Javier from a distance of less than four meters.
Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of official duty as PNR security officers.
They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish treachery and conspiracy.
The RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused Otello Santiano y Leonida and Rolando Dagani y Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder defined and punished under Art. 248, RPC, with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and granting them the benefit of [the] Indeterminate Sentence Law, both accused are hereby sentenced to each suffer
an Indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal x x x.
Both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, the sum
of P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses, the sum of
P30,000.00 as and for [sic] attorney’s fees and the further sum of P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel.
Both accused shall be credited with the full extent of their preventive imprisonment. Both accused are hereby committed to the
Director, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila for service of Sentence.
SO ORDERED.3
In brief, the RTC held that appellants failed to prove that Javier attempted to squeeze the trigger of the .22 caliber gun when he
pointed it at Dagani; that during the course of the struggle for the possession of the .22 caliber gun, the danger to the life of the
accused ceased to be imminent; that in grappling for the weapon, Dagani "controlled" the hands of Javier and pushed them away
from his body; that the appellants failed to produce the two empty shells as physical evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by
Javier; that no points of entry or bullet markings on the walls of the canteen were shown; that, in light of these findings, no
unlawful aggression was present on the part of the victim; that the appellants failed to prove that they were on official duty at
the time of the incidence; that, since it was not established that Javier actually fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot
be regarded as a necessary consequence of the due performance of an official duty; that the appellants were acting in
conspiracy; that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing, considering that Javier had been shot while his
hands were being held by Dagani and as his body was out of balance and about to fall; and that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of the appellants.
The appellants appealed to the CA and assigned the following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING SELF DEFENSE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE IN LAWFUL
PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFICIAL DUTY.
II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY.
III. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF MURDER. 4
The CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is MODIFIED. Appellants are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
award for attorney’s fees and appearance fees for counsel are hereby deleted. In all the other aspects, the appealed decision is
maintained.
Let the entire records of the case be elevated to the Supreme Court for the mandated review.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA affirmed the findings of fact as well as the salient portions of the RTC Decision, but deleted the award of attorney’s fees
and the per appearance fees of counsel since, the
CA reasoned, the instant case is criminal in nature which is under the control of the public prosecutor, and, additionally, the RTC
failed to justify this award in the body of its Decision. And last, the CA found that the RTC erroneously applied the Indeterminate
Sentence Law since the penalty for Murder, at the time of the incident, was reclusion perpetua which is an indivisible penalty to
be imposed in its entirety, regardless of the attending mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Appellants are now before this Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the CA. Through their
Manifestation dated February 11, 2003,6 appellants prayed to dispense with the filing of additional briefs.
As of date, the records show that despite the efforts exerted by the surety and the responsible law officers to locate the
appellants, the latter could not be found and have jumped bail. 7
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Appellants argue that the courts a quo misappreciated the facts and erred in finding that there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. They insist that the victim, Javier, had been armed with a revolver at the time he was struggling with
appellant Dagani; that the former "could have easily killed the latter;" that, given the fact that Javier had been drinking, "it is
quite probable for Javier to act harshly and aggressively towards
peace officers such as the accused;"8 and that Javier actually fired three shots from his .22 caliber gun. 9
We are not convinced.
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally justified. Having
owned the killing of the victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court the elements of self-defense
in order to avail of this extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this burden by clear and convincing evidence. When
successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. Self-
defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. All these conditions must concur. 10
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude 11 – but most importantly, at
the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. 12 To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. 13
In the instant case, the assertions that it was "quite probable" that Javier, during the course of the struggle for the firearm,
"could have easily killed" the appellants are uncertain and speculative. There is aggression in contemplation of the law only when
the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
just speculative.14
To sum up the matter, we quote the findings of the CA:
The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable to present evidence
that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and no bullets were recovered from
the scene of the incident. Javier also tested negative for gunpowder residue. Moreover, the trial court found appellant Dagani’s
account of the incident to be incredible and self-serving. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without any
proof of the existence of its requisites.15
Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger to their lives had
already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter. After the victim had been
thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression
that would have necessitated the act of killing.16 When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who
resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. 17 When Javier had been caught in the struggle
for the possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to fire
at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable extent,18 and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation
when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had already
ceased.19
The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful aggression are reasonable and
necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the
means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence. 20 The circumstances in their entirety which surround
the grappling of the firearm by Dagani and Javier, such as the nature and number of gunshot wounds sustained by the
victim21 which amounted to two fatal wounds,22 that Dagani was able to restrain the hands of Javier and push
them away from his body,23 that Dagani was larger than Javier and had finished Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) hand-to-
hand combat training,24 and Javier, as admitted by the appellants, was inebriated at the time of the incident, 25 do not justify
appellant Santiano’s act of fatally shooting the victim twice. 26
All things considered, the appellants’ plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of self-defense
cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself
extremely doubtful.27 Whether the accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact. Like alibi, the affirmative defense of self-
defense is inherently weak because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. 28 This Court,
therefore, finds no reversible error on the part of the courts a quo in rejecting the claim of self-defense.
Appellants set up the defense that they were in the lawful performance of their official duties. They specifically aver that they
had been ordered by their desk officer to proceed to the canteen in response to a telephone call stating that there was a group
"creating trouble;" that they were in the call of duty and exercising their functions and responsibilities as members of the PNR
Civil Security Office to preserve peace and order and
protect the lives and property in the PNR Compound; 29 and that, invoking jurisprudence, as security officers in the performance
of duty, like the police, they must stand their ground and overcome the opponent, and the force that may be exerted must differ
from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense. 30
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must
have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense
committed should have been the necessary consequence of such lawful exercise. 31 These requisites are absent in the instant
case.
As found by the CA:
The defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on duty at the time they were at the canteen. The trial court
gave weight to the fact that the appellants were unable to submit their daily time records to show that they were on duty at the
time. Appellants’ assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied by PNR Security Investigator Rolando
Marinay’s testimony that PNR security officers work in two 12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m.
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as a necessary
consequence of appellants’ due performance of an official duty. 32
As stated, considering that the imminent or actual danger to the life of the appellants had been neutralized when Dagani
grappled with Javier and restrained his hands; that Javier had been thrown off-balance; that Dagani had been specially trained
for these purposes; and that Javier had been drinking immediately prior to the scuffle, this Court holds that the fatal injuries that
appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim cannot be deemed to be necessary consequences of the performance of his duty as a
PNR security officer.33 While it is recognized that police officers – if indeed the appellants can be likened to them – must stand
their ground and overwhelm their opponents, in People v. Ulep, 34 this Court counseled:
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the
offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge
the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation
where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of
police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable
limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound
discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in mind that
although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human
beings with human rights.35
But this Court cannot agree with the findings of the courts a quo that the appellants were in conspiracy.
The RTC simply held:
The Information cited conspiracy of the accused. Since it can also be committed thru simultaneous/concerted action and
considering that Javier was shot by Santiano while being held by Dagani, under jurisprudence, conspiracy is present. 36
The tenor of the factual findings of the CA is equally unsatisfactory:
Moreover, the facts show that Javier was shot by appellant Santiano as he was being subdued by appellant Dagani. The trial
court held that the manner of the attack was indicative of a joint purpose and design by the appellants. 37
Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or
suspicions.38 Other than the plain fact that the victim had been shot by one of the accused while being held by a co-accused,
there is no other evidence that the appellants were animated by the same purpose or were moved by a previous common
accord. It follows that the liability of the accused must be determined on an individual basis. While no formal agreement is
necessary to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of the
crime, yet, conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 39
This Court has held that even if all the malefactors joined in the killing, such circumstance alone does not satisfy the requirement
of conspiracy because the rule is that
neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. Conspiracy must be shown to exist
as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. 40 Thus, even assuming that Javier was simultaneously
attacked, this does not prove conspiracy. No evidence was presented to show that the appellants planned to kill Javier or that
Dagani’s overt acts facilitated that alleged plan. The prosecution did not establish that the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the
gun from Javier and in the process, held the latter’s hands, was for the purpose of enabling Santiano to shoot at Javier. The
prosecution had the burden to show Dagani’s intentional participation to the furtherance of a common design and purpose 41 or
that his action was all part of a scheme to kill Javier. That Dagani did not expect Santiano to shoot the victim is established when
Santiano testified that Dagani "seem[ed] to be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim" as Javier gradually fell to the
ground.42 And since Dagani’s conviction can only be sustained if the crime had been carried out through a conspiracy duly
proven, in view of the failure of the prosecution to discharge that burden, this Court is constrained to acquit him.
And this Court cannot say that treachery attended the attack. The RTC declared:
[T]he Court believes that Javier was shot while his body was out-balanced and about to fall to the right side and while his hands
were being held by Dagani. Javier, therefore, was shot at when he has no means to defend himself, hence, the killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. 43
which the CA affirmed as follows:
The findings of the court a quo clearly showed that Javier was being held down and could not effectively use his weapon. As
such, the trial court held that Javier could not be considered to be an armed man as he was being held down and was virtually
helpless.
It has been held that when an assault is made with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who [was] given
no immediate provocation for the attack and under conditions which made it impossible for him to evade the attack, flee or
make [a] defense, the act is properly qualified as treachery, and the homicide resulting therefrom is classified as murder. 44 x x x
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods or
forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. Treachery is present when two conditions concur,
namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by
the accused without danger to his person.45
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position
of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves render the
attack as treacherous.46 This is of particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he
gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless. 47 The means
employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or deliberately
adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation
from the intended victim.48 For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused,
unexpected by the victim, and without provocation on the part of the latter. 49 Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on
conspiracy, it is required that the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the
crime itself.50
The prosecution failed to convincingly prove that the assault by the appellants had been deliberately adopted as a mode of
attack intended to insure the killing of Javier and without the latter having the opportunity to defend himself. Other than the
bare fact that Santiano shot Javier while the latter had been struggling with Dagani over the possession of the .22 caliber gun, no
other fact had been adduced to show that the appellants consciously planned or predetermined the methods to insure the
commission of the crime, nor had the risk of the victim to
retaliate been eliminated during the course of the struggle over the weapon, as the latter, though struggling, had not been
completely subdued. As already stated, this Court must emphasize that the mere suddenness of the attack, or the vulnerable
position of the victim at the time of the attack, or yet even the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves make the
attack treacherous.51 It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the means employed gave the victim no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate, and that such means had been deliberately or consciously adopted without danger to the life of the
accused.52
For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the helpless position of Javier as merely incidental to the attack, and that
the decision to shoot Javier was made in an instant. 53
Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the crime itself, any doubt
as to its existence must be resolved in favor of Santiano. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify
the killing to Murder, appellant Santiano may only be convicted of Homicide. 54 The penalty, therefore, under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion temporal.
The Office of the Solicitor General is correct in that the courts a quo failed to consider the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of official position under Article 14 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, since the accused, a PNR security officer
covered by the Civil Service, committed the crime with the aid of a gun he had been authorized to carry as such. 55Considering
that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as duly appreciated by the courts a quo, shall be offset against the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, pursuant
to Article 64 (4) of the aforesaid Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence of appellant Santiano will consist of a minimum that is anywhere within
the full range of prision mayor, and a maximum which is anywhere within reclusion temporal in its medium period. This Court
hereby fixes it to be from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to the award of damages, prevailing jurisprudence entitles the heirs of the deceased to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages. 56
The CA erred in deleting the attorney’s fees and per appearance fees for lack of factual basis. Although the CA is correct in noting
that the RTC failed to justify these awards in the body of its Decision, this appeal opens the entire case for review and,
accordingly, the records show that the foregoing
amounts had been stipulated by the parties,57 thereby dispensing with the need to prove the same.58
As to moral damages, however, the widow of the victim, Erlinda Javier, is not entitled to the same. She did not testify on any
mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her husband’s death. No other heirs of Javier testified in
the same manner.59
Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position attended the killing, the Court awards
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in accordance with Articles 2230 and 2234 of the Civil Code and prevailing
jurisprudence.60
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15304 dated June 20, 2002 is MODIFIED. Appellant Otello
Santiano y Leonida is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of an
indeterminate sentence from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant Santiano is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00
per appearance of counsel. Appellant Santiano shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment.
Appellant Rolando Dagani y Reyes is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127962 April 14, 2004

KINGSTON(E) LI Y NUNEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
TINGA, J.:
On 19 April 1993, the relative early morning calm in General Luna Street, Barangay Bangkal, Makati, was shattered when a petty
argument evolved into a street brawl. After the dust had settled, eighteen (18) -year old Christopher Arugay ("Arugay") lay dying
from multiple stab wounds, while his neighbor, twenty-four (24)-year old Kingstone 1 Li ("Li"), staggered injured, with hack
wounds on his head.
Li was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 148, 2 with the crime of Homicide.3 On 5 January 1994,
after trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Fifteenth
Division in a Decision4 dated 6 September 1996.
The version presented by the prosecution as to the antecedent facts leading to Arugay’s death differs sharply from the version
offered by Li. The accused claims that the dispute stemmed from a spurned offer to drink, while the prosecution traces the root
of the fight to an indecorous bath in public.
The story of the prosecution was told by the witnesses Aubrey dela Camara ("dela Camara") and Ronaldo Tan ("Tan"). 5
Shortly before his death, Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara
and Baby Jane’s boyfriend, Tan. At around 1:15 in the early morning, dela Camara and Tan suddenly heard a noise outside.
Peering through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo "Eddie Boy" Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two
were facing the house of the Arugays.6
Enraged, Arugay yelled, "Pare bastos kayo, ba’t kayo nakahubad?"7
Li shouted back, "Putang Ina!" and threw something at the Arugays’ house. Sangalang also yelled, "Putang Ina mo, lumabas ka,
papatayin kita!"8
An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by Li, now wearing briefs and carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay
on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to
drag him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once. 9
Immediately thereafter, dela Camara was confronted by Li’s sister, Kristine, who proceeded to pull her hair and slap her around.
Kristine also wielded a bolo, with which she hacked dela Camara in the arm. Although preoccupied under the circumstances, dela
Camara was able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once, so she claimed. 10
Tan saw Arugay run towards the street after he was stabbed, with Li and Sangalang chasing him. He saw nothing further of the
incident, according to him.11
In their respective testimonies, dela Camara and Tan are unable to account for the fact that before the fight ended, Li also lay
wounded with multiple hack wounds on his head and body. This fact lies at the crux of the petitioner’s defense.
On the other hand, Li presents a different version.
Li encountered Arugay out on the street on the night of 18 April 1993, a few hours before the brawl. Arugay was carrying
a bayong containing various liquors. He invited Li to a drinking session which the latter refused as he had work the following
day.12
Early the next morning, around one o’clock a.m., Li was watching television at his home with his friend Ricky Amerol when they
heard objects being thrown at the house. Peeping through the window, they saw Arugay and dela Camara in front of the gate
throwing stones and bottles at the direction of Li’s house. The stones broke window jalousies and also struck Amerol. At the
same time, Arugay was also hurling invectives at Li.13
Annoyed, Li opened the door asking, "Pare, ano ba problema mo? Wala naman kaming kasalanan sa ’yo." Arugay and his
girlfriend just kept on stoning the house and hurling invectives at petitioner. Arugay kicked the gate but Li prevented him from
opening it. Arugay then ran towards his house across the street. 14
Li tried to fix the gate, which had become misaligned and its lock destroyed as a result of the kicking. Reacting, he saw Arugay
coming out of the house armed with two kitchen knives. In response, Li went inside his house and got a baseball bat. When he
returned to the street, Arugay attacked him with a knife. Li managed to avoid Arugay’s thrusts and hit Arugay with the baseball
bat on the right shoulder. Arugay ran back to his house shouting, "The long one! The long one!" Li also dashed back to his house
but before he was able to enter the door, he saw Arugay carrying a two-foot long bolo, running towards him. On Arugay’s heels
were Ronaldo Tan and Aubrey dela Camara. 15
Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo. Li raised his right hand to protect himself but Arugay was able to hit him on his right temple
and right wrist. Not content, Arugay hit Li on the right shoulder. Li passed out. 16
Upon regaining consciousness, Li tried to crawl back to his house but Ronald Tan hit him at the back of his left ear with a baseball
bat. Eventually, Li managed to get back to the house and was brought to the Makati Medical Center by Amerol and Barangay
Tanod Eduardo Reyes.17
On cross-examination, Li admitted that Eduardo Sangalang was also in his house at the time the incident started. Sangalang was
the boyfriend of Li’s half-sister, Cristy. 18
Dr. Alberto Reyes of the Medico Legal Section of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted the post-mortem examination
on the body of Arugay. He noted the following injuries:
Pallor, lips and nailbeds.
Contusion, arm, right, poster-lateral, 5.0 x 3.0 cm.
Wounds, incised, scalp, parieto-occipital, right, 6.0 cm.; anterior sheet, left side, suprammary 6.0 cm., inframmary 4.0
cm.
Wounds stab:
1. 3.0 cm., long, spindle[-]shaped edges, irregular, oriented, horizontally, with a sharp, medial and a blunt
lateral extremeties, located at the anterior chest wall, left side, 15.0 cm. from the anterior median line,
directed upwards, backwards and medially, involving the skin and soft tissues only with an approximate depth
of 4.0 cm.
2. 4.0 cm., long, spindle shaped edges irregular, with a sharp inferolateral and blunt supero-medial extremeties,
located at the anterior abdominal wall, right side, 0.5 cm. from the anterior median line, directed upwards ,
backwards and medially involving the skin and soft tissues, laceration of the diaphragm and the right lobe of
the liver, with an approximate depth of 10.0 cm.
3. 1.5 cm. long, spindle shape[d] edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with a sharp lateral and blunt
medial extremeties, located at the anterior abdominal wall, left side, 9.0 cm. from the anterior median line,
directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and soft tissues, penetrating the transverse colon
with an approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
4. 1.5 cm. long, spindle, edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with a sharp poster-lateral a blunt antero
medial extremities located at the anterior chest wall right side, 21.0 cm. from the anterior median line,
directed backward, upwards and medially involving the skin and soft tissues penetrating the 8th intercostals
space, into the diaphragm and right lobe of the liver, with an approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
Hemoperitoneum – 1,500 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach, half-full with rice and brownish fluid.
Cause of death – stab wounds of the chest and abdomen.19
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Li guilty as charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding accused KINGSTONE LI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) years, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessories of the law.
The accused is further ordered to pay to the heirs of the late Christopher Arugay the sum of ₱50,000.00 for and as
indemnity for causing the death of said victim.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.20
Li appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied.21
Li filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of homicide.
Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that the RTC erred in holding that he was the instigator of the events leading to Arugay’s
death; in not basing its Decision on the evidence on record; in holding that he was guilty of homicide by reason of conspiracy;
and in not ruling that the evidence of the prosecution does not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 22
There is a difference in the factual findings of the RTC and those of the Court of Appeals. The variance warrants the close review
of the findings of the two courts. While both courts argue that Li was guilty of homicide, their respective rationales are different.
Neither court disputes that the proximate cause of the death of Arugay was the stab wounds he received. The RTC concluded
though that it was Sangalang, and not Li, who stabbed Arugay:
From all these conflicting versions, this court after piecing out the evidence presented and from what can be deduced in
the circumstances obtaining finds that because of the altercation between Christopher Arugay and Kingstone Li,
Christopher Arugay armed himself with a bolo and Kingstone Li armed himself with a baseball bat.
 From the evidence presented, it became clear to the court that it was Kingstone Li who hit first with a baseball bat
Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is near the shoulder. 23
xxx
Now, after Kingstone Li has hit the deceased with a baseball bat, the deceased who is armed with a bolo, retaliated by
hacking Kingstone Li on the head and indeed he was hit on the head and right wrist causing Kingstone Li to lose his hold
on the baseball bat and fell (sic) semi-unconscious or unconscious.
At this point in time, Eduardo Sangalang, who was then also present stabbed the deceased several times at least six
times.
This is explained by the findings of Dr. Alberto Reyes that Christopher Arugay sustained an incise[d] wound on scalp, on
the left chest, and four stab wounds that are fatal.
When Christopher Arugay sustained the fatal wounds, two (2) of them piercing his liver xxx 24
While the RTC concluded that Li had not stabbed Arugay, it nevertheless held him guilty, predicated on a finding of conspiracy
with Sangalang. This issue shall be explored in greater detail later.
In contrast, the Court of Appeals did not rule out the possibility that Li had stabbed Arugay, and rendered unnecessary a finding
of conspiracy to attach guilt to the accused. It held:
The deceased suffered four fatal wounds, then (sic) the accused might have inflicted at least one fatal stab wound and
so with his friend Eddie Boy, who remains at large. Since it has not been established which wound was inflicted by either
one of them, they should both be held liable and each one is guilty of homicide, whether or not a conspiracy
exists.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court’s formulation is wrong as the converse is the correct rule: with the existence of conspiracy, it is no longer
necessary to determine who among the malefactors rendered the fatal blow; 26 whereas in the absence of conspiracy, each of the
accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. 27 Thus, it is necessary to determine whether a conspiracy
existed between Li and Sangalang, and if there was none, to ascertain the particular acts performed by Li.
The Court of Appeals also cited the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Tan and dela Camara, to the effect that they saw Li
stab Arugay at the left portion of the body.28 These testimonies are vital as they constitute the only evidence that Li actually
stabbed Arugay. A careful examination of the case however cautions us from giving full faith and credence to the supposed
eyewitnesses for the prosecution. The RTC itself cast doubt on the veracity of all the eyewitness testimony, whether for the
prosecution or for the accused. The RTC noted, thus:
At the outset, the court has to state that it has noted that the witnesses for the prosecution and that of the defense
either held back on material facts or have deliberately withheld some facts or added some matters to the real facts for
these are not only gaps but holes in the versions of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense. What this court
can do is to cull from the evidence presented what could be the approximate or near the truth. The prosecution did not
help this court any to have a good view of the facts and neither the defense. 29
The relationships of the witnesses dela Camara and Tan to Arugay or the latter’s family cannot be easily discounted. Dela Camara
was the boyfriend of Arugay, while Tan was the boyfriend of Arugay’s sister, Baby Jane. As such, they are not wholly neutral or
disinterested witnesses. Both of them actually asserted in open court that they were not willing to say anything derogatory
against Arugay. Tan testified as follows:
Q: Since Jane Arugay is your girlfriend, and Christopher Arugay was your friend, you did not like to say anything
derogatory against Christopher Arugay, did you?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Neither did you want to say anything also derogatory against the family of Christopher Arugay, did you?
A: Yes, maam.30
Similarly, dela Camara testified as follows:
Q: As the girlfriend of Christopher Arugay, you did not say anything derogatory [about] the said Christopher Arugay, am I
correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You do not like to besmirch his memory, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: So that if Christopher Arugay assaulted Kingstone Li on April 19, 1993, you did not like this, do you know that, did you
Ms. Dela Camara.
A: Yes, maam.31
The revelations serve caution against accepting the testimonies of Tan and dela Camara as gospel truth. They cast doubt as to
whether these witnesses would be capable to attest to an unbiased narration of facts, especially if by doing so, they would be
forced to impute culpability on Arugay, thereby staining the sainted memory of their deceased friend.
Moreover, the respective testimonies of dela Camara and Tan are inconsistent with each other with respect to material points.
Dela Camara claimed that she and Tan together assisted Arugay after the latter had been struck down with the baseball bat. 32 Yet
while Tan admitted that he had pulled Arugay away from the scene of the melee, he made no mention of the assistance of dela
Camara.33 In fact, Tan stated that dela Camara remained inside the house. 34 This assertion contradicts dela Camara’s claim that
she was outside the house during the whole time the incident transpired. 35 Nor did Tan advert to the scene painted by dela
Camara of Kristine Li wielding a bolo while pulling on the hair of Arugay’s girlfriend. That is an unusual enough occurrence that
would stick to the mind of anybody who would witness such.
Indeed, the tale weaved by Tan arouses more curiousity upon examination of his sworn statement, executed the night after the
incident. Therein, Tan referred to some existing bad blood between Arugay and Li over a borrowed tape, a fact which
subsequently none of the parties would call attention to.36 Curioser, Tan never mentioned any baseball bat having been used by
Li during the incident. Nor did he mention any participation of Sangalang in the actual brawl. On the other hand, dela Camara in
her own sworn statement, asserted that both Li and Sangalang had stabbed Arugay and that she herself was hacked on the arm
by Kristine Li.37
Both Tan and dela Camara testified that Li stabbed Arugay on the left side of the body as the latter was being pulled towards his
house after having been struck with the baseball bat.38 However, Tan testified that Li came from behind Arugay to inflict the stab
wound,39 while dela Camara stated that Arugay was facing Li when he was stabbed. 40
Most importantly, the testimonies of dela Camara and Tan both contradict the physical evidence. As consistently held:
Time and again, we have upheld the primacy of physical evidence over biased and uncorroborated testimony of
witnesses. We have held:
…Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if
found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the
truth…[W]here the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. 41
It is undisputed that Li had armed himself with a baseball bat as he prepared to face Arugay. It also appears that the baseball bat
remained at the scene of the fight, as the same weapon was used to strike Li on the head after he lay injured. 42 In order to
sustain the claim of Tan and dela Camara that Li had stabbed Arugay, we would have to postulate that Li was armed with both a
knife and a baseball bat. This scenario is severely flawed.
First. Tan and dela Camara would have us believe that Li faced off Arugay with a baseball bat, then after having struck Arugay, he
ran off to his home to get a knife, returned to the melee, then stabbed Arugay. 43 This projected sequence is simply incredulous. Li
was already armed with a weapon that could incapacitate or kill. He had already struck a blow that apparently forced the victim
down. There is no logical reason for Li to suddenly run off to get a knife, considering he already had a weapon capable of
inflicting damage and was at an advantageous position vis-à-vis the prostrate Arugay.
There is of course the possibility that Li was already carrying the knife when he emerged with the baseball bat, but that was not
established by the prosecution. Moreover, the scenario of Li brandishing a knife with one hand and wielding a bat with the other
is highly improbable. It would require unusual physical dexterity for a person to wield both weapons simultaneously and still
utilize them with adequate proficiency. Nor is it likely that Li concealed the knife in his clothing. According to Tan, Li was only
wearing briefs when he attacked Arugay with the baseball bat. 44
Second. The pathological findings likewise cast severe doubt on the possibility that Li had stabbed Arugay. The trial court
concluded that only one knife was used in killing Arugay, and probably only one wielder thereof. The RTC decision said:
The court noted also with particular interest the description of the four wounds as found by Dr. Reyes. The first wound
has been described by Dr. Reyes as 3.0 cm. long, spindle[-]shaped edges, irregular, etc; the No. 2 wound has also been
described as 4.0 cm. long, spindle[-] shaped, edges irregular, etc.; No. 3 wound is 1.5 cm. long, spindle-shaped, edges,
irregular, etc.; and the fourth wound is 1.5 cm. long, spindle shaped edges irregular;
Thus there are two (2) outstanding characteristics of the four (4) stab wounds sustained by Christopher Arugay. All of
them are spindle[-]shaped and irregular in their edges. This is significant because it would appear to the court that only
one weapon was used because all the characteristics of the four wounds were the same. Thus, to the mind of the court
there is only one person who inflicted these wounds, not two (2) or three (3). It could be possible that there were two
who inflicted the stab wound[s] if the weapon used was given to another after using the same and the other one to
whom it was transferred used it also. But in this case there is no showing that such incident did happen. 45
It must be qualified that Dr. Reyes, the NBI Medico-Legal, refused to definitively conclude that only one knife was used in
stabbing Arugay though he conceded that such was possible. 46 Nevertheless, the fact that Arugay sustained the same kind of stab
wounds tends to support the conclusion that only one knife was used on him.
Third. Dela Camara testified that she saw both Li and Sangalang stab Arugay. Considering that there was only one knife used, her
version would hold water only if we were to assume that the same knife passed from the hands of Li to Sangalang or that they
held identical or similar knives. As the RTC ruled, nothing of the sort was established. The more logical assumption would be that
there was only one stabber using one knife. The question now arises, was it Li or Sangalang who stabbed Arugay?
There is the dubious claim of Tan and dela Camara that they did see Li stab Arugay once. Assuming this were true, this blow
would not have been the fatal stab wound, as it did not prevent Arugay from further participating in the rumble and, as
subsequently established, inflicting damaging blows on Li. However, the physical evidence belies any conclusion that Li inflicted
any of the several fatal wounds on Arugay.
Dr. Pedro P. Solis, the medico-legal consultant of Makati Medical Center who also happens to be one of the country’s leading
experts in Legal Medicine47, examined Li’s injuries on the same day of the incident, and subsequently testified on his findings. He
concluded that Li suffered three types of wounds on his body. The first type consisted of abrasions, consistent with forcible
contact accompanied by a hard object. The two other types of injuries were considerably more serious: incised wounds and a
contusion. As found by the RTC:
According to (sic) Dr. Pedro Solis, who examined the accused at the Makati Medical Center on the very night after the incident
and (sic) found the following injuries on Kingstone Li, to wit:
1. xxx
2. Wound, incised, 12 cm., scalp, fronto-parietal area, right, 9 cm., right; 9 cm. posterior aspect, shoulder, right; 1.5 cm.,
postero-medial aspect, distal third, forearm, right.
3. Contusion, 4 x 5 cm., scalp, parieto-occipital area (post suricular) left.
From the expert testimony and opinion of Dr. Pedro Solis, the injuries suffered by Kingstone Li were defense wounds,
and that there were two (2) weapons used in inflicting injuries on Kingstone Li. One is a sharp edge[d] instrument such
as a bolo and the other one is [a] blunt instrument.48
The physical evidence of Li’s injuries are consistent with his version that Arugay had hacked him, and as he struggled to recover
from the blow, he was struck with his own baseball bat by Tan, thus explaining the contusion on his head. More importantly
though, the injuries were serious enough to incapacitate Li at the scene, calling into question his ability to inflict the fatal blows
on Arugay. As Dr. Solis testified:
A: [I] noticed in this particular case that there are incise[d] wound[s] on the right hand and right shoulder. These are
injuries brought about, as I said, brought about by [a] sharp edged instrument. This I presumed to have been brought
about by the inherent self defensive (sic) mechanism of the victim. In so far as the injury on the head is concerned, it
must be a hit, now, I am referring to the incise wound on the head, incise[d] wound on the head will also cause pressure
on the skull thereby producing some effect on the brain, this has been aggravated by a blunt instrument applied on the
left side of his neck and joining as together the two injuries the incise[d] wounds and that of contusion which is brought
about by blunt instrument it might have cause[d] him some degree of loss of consciousness.
Q: Would that person have been able to stab somebody one time, two times, three times or four times after sustaining
those injuries?
A: In that condition he has no complete power to perform volitional acts because he must have lost partially or totally
his consciousness primarily the hit on the left side of the head because the brain is a vital organ and slight jarring will
cause los[s] of consciousness and what we call in ordinary parlance, you saw shooting stars as a consequence.
Q: Aside from los[s] of consciousness, would that person who sustained that injury have been able to walk without the
assistance of anybody?
A: In all [likelihood], he might have lost I said of his volitional movement, he [may be] able to walk but as I have
observe[d] it must be with assistance more particularly in this case whereby the incise wound on the head is measured
12 cm., the head is a bloody organ in a way that if a person is erect, blood will flow on that area and it might cause even
modification of his visual perception.49
Li was slashed on the head with a bolo, causing a twelve centimeter (12 cm.)-wound, among other wounds. In such a condition,
it is highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay. Moreover, it could not be established
that Li was ever armed with a knife. Difficult as it is already to believe that the wounded Li could have stabbed Arugay several
times, the incredulity is compounded by imagining that Li would have also groped around for a knife, dazed and severely
wounded as he was. Simply put, Li could not have stabbed Arugay. The assertions to the contrary of Tan and dela Camara are
inherently flawed.
Fourth. In all, the factual determination made by the RTC is wholly believable up to a point. There were four participants in the
brawl, namely Li, Sangalang, Arugay and Tan. The first blow was struck by Li, who had armed himself with a baseball bat and used
the same to hit Arugay on the left upper arm. This unprovoked assault by Li establishes at least some degree of criminal
culpability on his part. Arugay then armed himself with a bolo which he used to inflict an incised wound on the head of Li. After
Li had fallen, Sangalang, himself armed with a knife, fatally stabbed Arugay at least four times. Tan had picked up the baseball bat
dropped by the wounded Li and struck Li on the head with the bat. These findings are consistent with the physical evidence,
reliance on which should be given greater primacy over the unreliable eyewitness testimony of Tan and dela Camara.
Thus, Sangalang alone had stabbed Christopher Arugay. Yet the RTC still found Li guilty on the tenuous determination that a
conspiracy between Li and Sangalang existed. The RTC held:
From the evidence presented, the court believes and it so holds that there was conspiracy.
It must be pointed out that Kingstone Li and Eduardo Sangalang were then in the same house at the same
time. Eduardo Sangalang is the boyfriend of the half-sister of Kingtone Li.
The act of Kingstone Li [in] getting a baseball bat and using it as a weapon and the act of Eduardo Sangalang alias
Eddie Boy in arming himself with a sharp pointed weapon and both going out to meet Christopher Arugay whose only
sin is to point to the accused his scandalous and indecent act in bathing nude not in the bathroom but in a place
which is crowded by people who can see him especially the ladies and is provocative to others are patent and
conclusive presumption of conspiracy for their acts were concerted and so close to each other that there is no way
but to conclude a conspiracy. 50 (Emphasis not ours)
Proving conspiracy is a dicey matter, especially difficult in cases such as the present wherein the criminal acts arose
spontaneously, as opposed to instances wherein the participants would have the opportunity to orchestrate a more deliberate
plan. Spontaneity alone does not preclude the establishment of conspiracy, which after all, can be consummated in a moment’s
notice – through a single word of assent to a proposal or an unambiguous handshake. Yet it is more difficult to presume
conspiracy in extemporaneous outbursts of violence; hence, the demand that it be established by positive evidence. A conviction
premised on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and presumption. 51
It is worth noting that while conspiracy was alleged in the Information against Li, the prosecution devoted its efforts to prove that
Li had actually inflicted the stab wounds on Sangalang, tagging him as a direct participant in the crime. Thus, there seems to be
no evidence that would directly establish the fact that Li and Sangalang had come into an agreement to commit a common
felony. Any conclusion that there was a conspiracy will have to be drawn inferentially, as the RTC did.
It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof that the malefactors have acted in concert
and in pursuance of the common objectives. Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy since it is by its nature often
planned in utmost secrecy and it can seldom be proved by direct evidence. 52 Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design. 53 Complicity may be determined by concert of action at the
moment of consummating the crime and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal
wound.54
However, caution dictates a careful examination of the established facts before concluding, as the RTC did, that an implied
conspiracy had been established. An implied conspiracy must still be based on facts established by positive and conclusive
evidence.55 Even if conspiracy per se is not criminal, as it rarely is in this jurisdiction, 56 the weight of factual evidence necessary to
prove conspiracy is the same as required to establish criminal liability – proof beyond reasonable doubt. 57 Suppositions based on
mere presumptions and not on solid facts do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. 58
The RTC’s conclusion that there was a conspiracy was drawn from these circumstances, namely: that Li and Sangalang were in
the same house at the same time; and that they both armed themselves before going out to meet Arugay. The fact that they
were in the same house at the same time is not in itself sufficient to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy transcends
companionship,59 and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 60
The other circumstance that Li and Sangalang had emerged from Li’s house, both armed, to face Arugay has to be weighed
against other facts also relied upon by the RTC. As the RTC held, Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after petitioner had become
unconscious. Before that point, even as Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was not proven that Li had asked for, or received,
any assistance from Sangalang. Based on these circumstances, the Court is hard put to conclude that Sangalang and Li had acted
in concert to commit the offense. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction
by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was struck on the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous reaction, a finding of
conspiracy cannot arise.61
Moreover, it appears that the fight involved two distinct phases. The first phase commenced when Li, without sufficient
provocation, assaulted Arugay with the baseball bat. Li’s participation in this phase, albeit as a solitary actor, was indubitably
established. Sangalang’s participation, much less his physical presence during this phase, was not established at all. In the second
phase, Sangalang was the main actor. Li was incapacitated by then. Clearly, the existence of conspiracy should be ruled out.
After Arugay had been struck down, it appears that there would have been a lapse of at least a few minutes, affording him time
to procure the bolo. The second phase in the brawl then commenced. No further blows appear to have been inflicted by Li. On
the other hand, Li himself became the victim of the hack wounds on the head inflicted
by Arugay. As Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he had any further participation in
the brawl. At that point, Sangalang, whose previous participation was not conclusively established, emerged into the fray.
Sangalang stabbed Arugay to death. Verily, it cannot be assumed that Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of
Li, much more in coordination with each other.
The scenario as established by the RTC still leaves many open-ended questions and admits to a myriad of possibilities. This very
uncertainty indicates that Li’s liability as a conspirator was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The general principle in
criminal law is that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, when confronted with variant though
equally plausible versions of events, the version that is in accord with the acquittal or the least liability of the accused should be
favored.
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victim’s right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay with a baseball
bat. In view of the victim’s supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the
effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence
of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries, penalized as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
….
2. By aresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which
do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance; 62
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor is from one day to thirty days.63 The felony of slight physical injuries is necessarily
included in the homicide charge. Since the Information against Li states that among the means employed to commit the
felonious act was the use of the baseball bat, conviction on the lesser offense of slight physical injuries is proper. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances established, the imposition of the penalty in its medium period is warranted. 64 Li was
convicted by the RTC on January 5, 1994. Having long served more than the imposable penalty, Li is entitled to immediate
release unless, of course, he is being lawfully detained for another cause.
What transpired during the dawn hours of 19 April 1993 was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any methodical plan
for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, but because the
actors were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious
examination of the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the
criminal culpability of Kingstone Li in the death of Christopher Arugay was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently remains at large. Yet absent any clear showing of
conspiracy, as in this case, Kingstone Li cannot answer for the crime of Eduardo Sangalang.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide
for lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, he is found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, as
defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto
menor in the medium period of ten (10) to twenty (20) days. Considering that petitioner has been incarcerated well-beyond the
period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause petitioner’s IMMEDIATE RELEASE,
unless petitioner is being lawfully held for another cause, and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of
this Decision, of the compliance with such order.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 134823-25 January 14, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO HAMTON a.k.a. "BOY NEGRO," ANTONIO RAMIREZ alias "TONG" or "CHITO,"
ARTHUR PANGILINAN y DE GUZMAN a.k.a. "TORING," ARNOLD LOPEZ y SERRANO a.k.a. "ADAN MANALO," REYNALDO
YAMBOT y MASAGAYA, and JUN NOTARTE (at large), accused,
ARTHUR PANGILINAN y DE GUZMAN a.k.a. "TORING," ARNOLD LOPEZ y SERRANO a.k.a. "ADAN MANALO" and REYNALDO
YAMBOT y MASAGAYA, appellants.
Before this Court for automatic review is the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 70, penned by Judge
Pablito M. Rojas in Criminal Cases Nos. 105326, 106115 and 106116, finding Arthur Pangilinan, Arnold Lopez and Reynaldo
Yambot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping for ransom and illegal possession of firearms and imposing
upon each of them the supreme penalty of death and a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years.
Antonio Hamton, who was found guilty of robbery and sentenced to an "indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years of prision
correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor" in Criminal Case No. 105326, filed an appeal with this Court, but later withdrew
the same. 1
The Solicitor General narrates the antecedent facts of the case as follows:
"Teofilo Garcia, and his wife, Leonida, were the sole distributors of the Singer Sewing Machines under the business
name 'Garmer Industrial Sewing Machines'. On March 8, 1994, around eleven o'clock in the morning, two armed men,
later identified as Jun Notarte and Reynaldo Yambot, entered the Garcias' office and showroom at 322 Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong City and announced a hold-up. After emptying Teofilo's drawer of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) in
cash, they took him with them outside to a waiting light gray Mitsubishi Lancer. Inside the car were two other men, later
identified as herein appellant Arnold Lopez and Arthur Pangilinan. Teofilo was shoved into the backseat of the car and
blindfolded with black sunglasses covered with adhesive tapes. One of the men told him, 'Pera lang ang kailangan
namin sa iyo'. His abductors then divested him of his gold ring worth Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), his
gold bracelet worth Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), his gold necklace worth Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and
his wallet containing, among others, Two Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P2,300.00) in cash.
"About the time Teofilo was being led out of the office, Leonida arrived. Seeing her husband's plight, she immediately
approached the Mitsubishi Lancer and asked the men inside why they were taking her husband. In response, appellant
hit her on the nose with a gun and pushed her away. The Mitsubishi Lancer then sped away.
"After traveling for about two hours, the Mitsubishi Lancer stopped. Teofilo's abductors transferred him to a trimobile
where, accompanied by appellant, he traveled for thirty minutes more before finally stopping. Teofilo was brought to a
house where he was confined in a room with no windows. To prevent him from escaping, his left wrist was chained to
an iron grill. Three or four persons guarded him.
"On March 10, 1994, around eleven o'clock in the morning, appellant, who identified himself as 'Adan Manalo,' called
up Leonida, telling her to prepare the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as ransom money for her husband's
release. When Leonida pleaded for the amount to be lowered since she could not afford it, appellant put the phone
down.
"On March 12, 1994, appellant called up Leonida to inquire if she had already raised the ransom amount. Leonida
replied that she had raised only Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) and would be needing more time to raise
the rest of the amount.
"Appellant called again around twelve noon of March 14, 1994. Asked how much money she had already raised, Leonida
answered that she was still trying to raise the needed amount. She also requested appellant to get for her the key to
their office vault from her husband, so that she could get the money inside and add it to the money to be paid as
ransom.
"Accordingly, appellant, on March 15, 1994, told Teofilo to give him the key to their office vault and to write a note for
his family so that they would know that he was still alive. Teofilo did as he was instructed.
"Around eight o'clock in the morning of March 16, 1994, appellant called up Leonida to inform her that the key to their
office vault as well as a note from her husband was ready for her pick-up at Andok's Litson located at EDSA corner
Estrella Street. By ten o'clock of the same morning, Leonida was in possession of the key and the note. She was able to
confirm that the note was in her husband's handwriting. When appellant called her again later that day, Leonida
informed him that she had gotten the key and the note, and that she had raised One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
already. Unimpressed, appellant told her that this was not enough and that he would call her again the next day.
"True to his word, appellant called around noontime the following day. Informed by Leonida that she now had One
Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00), appellant seemed finally satisfied. He then gave Leonida
instructions for the pay-off. At a little before four o'clock that afternoon, she should be at the Magallanes flyover and
open the hood of her car to make it appear that it developed engine trouble. Appellant would then drive by and stop his
car beside hers. After he identifies himself as 'Adan,' Leonida should immediately hand over the ransom money to him.
"All this time, Leonida had been coordinating with the Task Force Habagat of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC). Alerted of these latest developments, Col. Michael Ray Aquino, Chief of Special Operations, PACC, planned for
the delivery of the ransom money and Teofilo's rescue. Eight teams were formed to monitor the pay-off and conduct
 rescue operations. The ransom money was placed in a light blue Dunlop bag (Exhibit G) and Leonida was instructed to
wear a green dress for easy identification at the pay-off site.
"About 3:45 in the afternoon of the same day, Leonida, accompanied by her driver, arrived at the pay-off site on board
her Pajero. Pursuant to appellant's instructions, Leonida's driver opened the hood of the Pajero. A red Toyota Corolla
with Plate No. PFW 688 then approached and stopped just beside the Pajero. Leonida saw her husband seated between
two men at the back of the red car. Meanwhile, appellant, who was seated in front at the passenger side, got down
from the car. After identifying himself as 'Adan,' Leonida gave the Dunlop bag containing the ransom money to him. The
Toyota Corolla then sped away.
"Inside the Toyota Corolla, appellant gave Teofilo Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) for taxi, assuring him that they would
drop him off a short distance away. Before they could do so, however, they noticed a speeding white Nissan Sentra
behind them. Appellant warned his companions, 'Puwesto kayo, delikado tayo mga kasama, alert kayo, puwesto kayo'.
Without stopping to release Teofilo anymore, the Toyota Corolla raced along EDSA towards Cubao, with the Nissan
Sentra in hot pursuit. The chase continued until the Toyota Corolla stopped near the intersection of Guadix Drive and
ADB Avenue. Using an armalite, Jun Notarte, the driver of the Toyota Corolla, opened fire at the Nissan Sentra,
shattering its windshield. Col. Raymundo Padua and his team members, the occupants of the Nissan Sentra, returned
fire. During the exchange of gunfire, Jun Notarte managed to escape. However, his companions, namely appellant,
Arthur Pangilinan, and Reynaldo Yambot, were not as lucky. After about ten minutes of intermittent firing, they were
finally subdued and taken into custody. Teofilo was successfully rescued, shaken but unharmed.
"Among the items recovered from Teofilo's kidnappers were the following: the Dunlop bag containing the ransom
money in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00); additional cash in the amount of
Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Forty Seven Pesos (P32,647.00); an M-16 armalite rifle with Serial No. 164881 (Exhibit
CC); and a .45-caliber pistol with Serial No. 1163568 (Exhibit A). Subsequent verification revealed that the M-16 armalite
rifle and the .45-caliber pistol were not registered with the Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
and that no license to possess these firearms had ever been issued in the names of any of Teofilo's kidnappers.
"Separately apprehended in connection with his kidnapping incident was Antonio Hamton. Having somehow learned
about Teofilo's abduction, Antonio, at the same time that appellant was negotiating with [Leonida] for the ransom
money, was also calling up Leonida, pretending to be her husband's kidnapper. Antonio's ruse was eventually
discovered, but not before he was already able to extort Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) from Leonida." 2
An Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 106114, was filed on April 14, 1994. It charged appellants in this manner:
"That [on] or about March 8, 1994 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning at Shaw Boulevard, corner Aquino Lane in
Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being all private persons conspiring, confederating and mutually helping/aiding each other and by means of
force, threats or intimidation and with the use of arms and vehicles, for the purpose of demanding money or ransom,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully. and feloniously abduct and kidnap TEOFILO M. GARCIA while at his office; and
that once in their physical custody and control detain and deprive him of his liberty against his will, and demand TEN
(P10,000,000) Million from his wife Leonida Garcia, in exchange for her husband's life, safety and freedom, but which
amount through sheer patient appeals/negotiation was later reduced to P1.2 Million, which accused finally agreed and
accepted which said Mrs. Leonida Garcia, did in fact give, pay and deliver the said amount or ransom money to accused
to her loss, damage and prejudice." 3
A second Information, docketed. as Criminal Case No. 106116, was filed against appellants thus:
"That, on or about March 8 & 17, 1994 in the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in their possession, custody and control, a Caliber 45 Pistol, bearing Serial No. SN-1163568, and one (1) M-16 Rifle
with Serial No. RP 164881, without first having secured the necessary license and/or permit, from the corresponding
office/agency of government." 4
During their arraignment on May 2, 1994, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not guilty to the twin charges
of kidnapping for ransom and illegal possession of firearms. 5 After a joint trial, they were found guilty via the automatically
appealed Decision, which reads in part:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Arthur Pangilinan y de Guzman, a.k.a. 'Toring'; Arnold Lopez y Serrano,
a.k.a. 'Adan Manalo'; and Reynaldo Yambot y Masagaya, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of Kidnapping
for ransom and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in Criminal Case No.
106115 and of the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms as charged in Criminal Case No. 106116. For the offense of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, said accused are hereby meted out the death penalty. For the
offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms, said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and one
day to eight years and to pay a fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 30,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
 "Accused Pangilinan, Lopez and Yambot are further ordered to return to the private complainant, Teofilo Garcia, the
sum of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (PHP 4,300.00) representing the total amount of cash taken from the
latter's office and his person during the abduction, as well as to return or restore to said private complainant the gold
bracelet and the gold necklace or if the same is no longer possible, to pay the value of the same which is PHP 50,000.00
each. In addition, said accused are hereby ordered to indemnify, in solidum, the private complainant, Teofilo Garcia, the
amount of TWO MILLION PESOS (PHP 2,000,000.00) and to the wife of the complainant, Leonida Garcia, the amount of
ONE MILLION PESOS (PHP 1,000,000.00), by way of moral damages." 6
Appellants submitted individual appeal briefs assailing the RTC Decision. They aver that the trial court failed to establish clearly
that they had all committed conspiracy to commit kidnapping for ransom. The lower court should have imposed individual
penalties upon them depending on their degree of participation in the crime.
Appellants also question their conviction for illegal possession of firearms, arguing that the prosecution failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing their physical or constructive possession of the subject firearms. Further, they contend that their
conviction for the said offense cannot be made on the basis of the testimony of a prosecution witness of questionable credibility
and competence.
Specifically, appellant Reynaldo Yambot assigns the following errors:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT REYNALDO YAMBOT AS CO-CONSPIRATOR IN COMMITTING
THE OFFENSE OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED REYNALDO YAMBOT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT CREDIBLE ENOUGH TO
TESTIFY." 7
This assignment of errors has been adopted by appellant Arnold Lopez with the following addition:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED ARNOLD LOPEZ GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY REPRESENTED DURING THE PRESENTATION OF
CO-ACCUSED ARTHUR PANGILINAN AS HOSTILE WITNESS." 8
On the other hand, appellant Arthur Pangilinan ascribes the following errors to the trial court:
"3.1 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT AS A CONSPIRATOR IN THE OFFENSE OF
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION.
"3.2 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS IN PHYSICAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE
POSSESSION OF ANY OF THE SUBJECT FIREARMS AND THAT HE HAD ANIMUS POSSIDENDI AS REGARDS THESE
FIREARMS." 9
After a careful review of the records and the arguments of both the prosecution and the defense, this Court agrees with the trial
court that all three appellants are guilty of kidnapping for ransom, but not of illegal possession of firearm.
Appellants all rely on the defense of denial and alibi. They point to Jun Notarte, who is still at large, as the mastermind of the
kidnapping. They maintain that they merely accepted his offer of jobs with higher pay, and that they were not privy to his plans
to kidnap Garcia. Plainly, they want this Court to believe that they were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time with the
wrong companion and for the wrong reason.
Appellant Arnold Lopez claims that Notarte offered him a job to train as a soldier, with better pay. 10 He says that because of his
meager earnings as a construction worker, he was easily enticed by Notarte's promise. 11 He alleges, however, that he was not
present during the abduction of the victim, because he was working in Parañaque, installing doors and windows from March 8 to
15, 1994. 12 It was only because of the job offer that he was present during the pay-off. He argues further that his participation in
the kidnapping incident was very minimal, if any, so he could not have been a co-conspirator in the crime. 13
On the other hand, Reynaldo Yambot alleges that Notarte promised to help him apply as a driver of the latter's superior
officer. 14 Yambot maintains that, because he was driving his jeepney in Caloocan from March 8 to 16, 1994, 15 he was not present
during the abduction of the victim. The only reason he was present during the pay-off was that Notarte had actually engaged him
as a driver, but without his knowing anything about the abduction that had already taken place. 16
Finally, Arthur Pangilinan claims that he was offered a job to watch Notarte's car at five hundred pesos a day. 17 He maintains that
there were no overt acts that would link him to the kidnapping other than his "being merely an ill-fated passenger of the car
used by his co-accused in two occasions, i.e., in kidnapping Mr. Garcia and in receiving the ransom from the victim's
wife." 18 Further, his wife was presented in court to corroborate his claim that he had not taken part in the plan to commit the
kidnapping.
At the outset, we emphasize that the identities of all the accused were adequately established by the clear and convincing
testimonies of the victim and his wife. Particularly persuasive was the narration by Garcia of the events that led to his abduction,
his captivity, the ransom payment and his eventual release and rescue. He never wavered in his story, even when he was
subjected to an exhausting cross-examination by the defense counsels. He testified thus:
"JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On March 8, 1994 at about 11:00 in the morning do you remember where were you?
A Yes, sir. I was in my office at about 11:00 in the morning at Shaw Blvd.
Q Were you alone in your office?
A I was with my three employees, sir.
Q What are their names?
A They are Grace Munda, Aurora Mckinley and Dado Mercado, sir.
COURT:
Q How is he related to your wife?
A He is the cousin of my wife, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On that occa[s]ion, do you recall having received a visitor in your office?
A Yes, sir. Two men arrived.
Q What questions, if any, did they ask you upon entering your showroom?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
No basis, Your Honor.
COURT:
He said he had two visitors. Witness may answer.
WITNESS
A When the two men entered in our office, one pretended to be a customer and the other one approach[ed] my
three employees, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Why do you say that one of them pretended to be a customer?
A Because he was the one who asked me about the price of the sewing machine, sir.
Q Was there anything unusual that happened afterwards?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We will object, Your Honor. The question is leading.
COURT:
How can it be leading? Objection overruled. Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A Yes, there was, sir.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What is it?
A The one who pretended as a customer pulled out the gun and pointed it at me and said, 'hold-up', sir.
Q What kind of firearm did you see?
A It's a 45 caliber, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
All right. You said that, there were two male visitors who entered your showroom that day, what was the other
one doing?
A The other one poked a gun on my three employees, sir.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Can you identify the man who pointed the gun at your three employees if you see him again?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around the courtroom and point to the man who pointed a gun at your three employees?
COURT:
Why don't you ask him the guy who poked the gun at him.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
He was the one who got away, Your Honor. There were four kidnappers, one of them escape. He is at large.
COURT:
All right. Let him identify.
Q Yung nagtutok sa iyo [ng] baril nandito ba?
A Wala po.
Q Yung nagtutok ng baril sa tatlo nandito ba?
A Opo. He is here, your Honor.
Q Yung nagtutok ng baril sa tatlong empleyado mo, ituro mo, bumababa ka at ituro mo.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a man whom when asked identify himself as Reynaldo Yambot.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You stated that the man [who] pretended to be a customer poked a gun at you, what did he want?
COURT:
He already said, 'hold-up.'
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What did he do afterwards, if he did anything?
A After he said, 'hold-up', he opened the drawer of my table and g[o]t some P2,000.00 cash, sir.
Q Having taken the money, what did he do afterwards?
A Then he told me, you go with us, sir. After taking the money he said, 'sama ka sa amin.'
Q What was your reaction?
A I went along with him, sir.
Q Why did you go with him?
A I went with him because it was a 'hold-up' and I was afraid so I went with him, sir.
Q At the time he made those statements, what was he doing to the gun?
A He tucked it in his waist, sir.
Q Did you go with him willingly?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A 'Baka patayin po ako kaya sumama ako.' Perhaps they would kill me so I went along with him, sir.
Q Where did he take you?
A They b[r]ought me outside the door and outside was a car waiting, sir.
[A] I am showing you pictures of a car . . . (discontinued)
COURT:
Excuse me. Why don't you ask him first to describe the car.
Q Anong itsura ng kotse?
A It was a lancer with a color which looks like a silver green with tinted windows and partially tinted front glass,
Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q How did you enter the vehicle that was waiting for you?
A The car was opened by accused Jun Notarte and I was pushed inside, sir.
FISCAL VILLA-IGNACIO:
Your Honor please, actually the witness said tinuhod meaning a person used his knee to shove him inside the
vehicle. It's more of a kick, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
A The car was opened by accused Ju[n] Notarte and he used his knee to shove me inside, sir.
ATTY. DE LEON:
We adopt the tagalog translation also, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
A Tinuhod niya ako papasok sa kotse.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you enter the front seat or the back seat?
A The back seat, sir.
Q Once you were inside the vehicle, will you tell the Court what happened?
A I was sand[w]iched by two men, sir.
COURT:
Q Who was the one to your right?
A Arthur Pangilinan was on my right, Your Honor.
Q And who was on your left?
 A Yambot was on my left, Your Honor.
JUSTICE. CONCEPCION:
Q Is the man whom you mentioned, Arthur Pangilinan, can you identify him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is he in the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Bumaba ka at ituro nyo po.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a man inside the courtroom whom when asked identify himself as Arthur Pangilinan.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q After you were seated sandwiched between two men, do you recall if there were any persons seated on the front
of the vehicle?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the driver's seat who was seated?
A Ju[n] Notarte was in the driver's seat, sir.
Q And on the seat beside the driver?
A Beside the driver was Arnold Lopez, sir.
Q Can you identify the man whom you said as Arnold Lopez?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to him.
FISCAL VILLA-IGNACIO:
For the record, Your Honor, witness is stepping down from the witness stand and appearing to [point] to a man
whom when asked answered by the name of Arnold Lopez.
ATTY. MACATANGAY:
For the record, Your Honor, Arnold Lopez is [the] man who is walking with c[r]utches.
COURT:
Make it of record that the man is using c[r]utches.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q After you were seated in the car, will you please state what transpired, if any?
A Yung sunglass na sinasabing piring, piniringan po ako rito.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you not ask these men what they wanted from you?
A I a[sk]ed them what they want from me, sir.
ATTY. MACATANGAY:
Very leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
I will allow that.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q And what is the answer, if any?
A 'Pera lang ang kailangan namin sa iyo', that was what they told me, sir.
Q After you were already in the car, what did you try to do in the car?
A None, sir. We were on the road." 19
Thereafter, Garcia further recounted his ordeal, replete with details that he could not have simply concocted. He narrated how
he had been brought to a house where he was chained to an iron grill 20 and detained for ten days. 21His testimony included
details of how he had been fed, how he had relieved himself during his detention, and how he had been asked by appellant
Lopez to write a letter to his family to assure them that he was still alive. 22 The testimony of the victim regarding the ransom
payment was likewise credible and convincing. He detailed the events leading to the pay-off, from the time he was awakened to
the time of the actual shoot-out that eventually led to the arrest of appellants. 23
His wife, who was also present during the abduction; corroborated his testimony as follows:
"FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court, Mrs. Garcia, if on March 8, 1994 you reported for work in your office?
A Yes, I reported for work about 11 o'clock.
Q Were you able to reach your office that morning of March 8, 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall of any unusual incident that took place that morning?
A I saw my husband being led by the arm by a man and another man was just behind my husband and closely
following.
COURT:
Q Where were they going?
A I saw them going to board a blue grey vehicle.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q Would you know the model or make of the car?
A I did not notice but I know it was colored blue grey.
Q What else happened when you saw that your husband was being led inside the car?
A I saw that my husband as if he was shoved inside (tinuhod).
Q Who of the two, if you saw, 'tumuhod sa asawa mo'?
A He's a tall man with fair complexion.
Q The one who shoved, would you kindly look around if he is in the courtroom?
A He is not around.
Q What about the other one who closely followed your husband?
A He is here.
Q Will you kindly go down and identify him by lightly tapping his shoulder?
INTERPRETER:
The witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom who when asked identified himself as Reynaldo Yambot.
[FISCAL DAÑOSOS:]
Q After your husband was shoved inside that grey car, what else happened, if you know?
A I alighted from my car and opened the front door of the blue grey vehicle. I saw my husband with a blindfold and
a gun pointed to him.
Q You said when you opened the car, you saw your husband already wearing a black blindfold sunglass. If you are
shown that sunglass or black blindfold would you be able to recognize it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I'm showing to you a plastic sunglass which was previously marked, Your Honor, as exh. 'C'. Will you kindly go
over and tell this Honorable Court what is the relation of that black sunglass to the blindfold you were referring to [a]
while ago?
A Parang ganito po.
Q You also said that someone pointed a gun at your husband. What particular part of the head or the face was the
gun pointed?
A The gun was pointed to my husband's neck.
Q Would you be able to recognize the person who was pointing a gun at your husband?
A I would not know who was the person who pointed a gun to my husband.
Q What kind of gun was pointed, was it a long firearm or a short firearm?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We object to that question, Your Honor. He is suggesting to the witness her answer . . .
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
If she knows.
COURT:
Q What kind of gun was that?
A It was a short gun.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q If you are shown a gun of that description, as you said 'short' [,w]ould you be able to recall whether the gun that
we are going to show you will be similar to that pointed to your husband's neck?
COURT:
Excuse me. Before you show that particular gun to the witness, [d]o you know what sort of hand gun was
pointed to your husband?
A No, Your Honor. Basta baril. Para pong pagalingan lang yung baril na yan, eh. Ngunit kung pakikitaan ako
puwede k[o]ng ituro pero hind ko alam kung anong klaseng baril yon.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q I'm showing to you a [hand]gun. Will you be able to tell this Honorable Court if the gun pointed to the neck of
your husband would be similar to this?
A Para pong kamukha.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
This was already marked as Exh. 'A', Your Honor.
Q Now, where was your husband seated, madam witness?
A Nasa gitna po siya ng dalawang lalake.
Q Where? [In f]ront or at the rear?
A He was seated at the rear of the car sandwiched by two persons.
Q Now, you said that your husband was seated between two persons. Would you be able to tell this Honorable
Court which of the two pointed a gun at your husband. Was it the person sitting at the left of your husband or the right
side of your husband?
A I did not see clearly which of the two men was pointing a gun at my husband.
Q You said, Mrs. Garcia, that your husband was seated between two persons at the rear seat of the car, [is] that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you be able to recognize any of the two that sandwiched your husband?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
Your Honor, the witness is incompetent to answer that.
COURT:
Let her answer if she knows.
A Yung pong isa sa kaliwa ng mister ko.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q Will you kindly look around this courtroom and point to the person identified, the person sitting at the left of
your husband?
A At my husband's left was Reynaldo Yambot.
Q We go back to that portion where you said you immediately opened the door of the front seat of the car . . .
COURT:
You would not know or you would not recall the face of the man who was seated to your husband's right?
A I cannot recall, Your Honor.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q You said that you opened the front seat of the car. Which side of the door of the car that you opened?
A I opened the right side door of the vehicle.
Q Were you able to open the car?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do, if any, when you opened the car?
A I asked them why they are taking my husband. What wrong has he done.
Q What was their reply, if any?
A I did not hear any answer. . .
COURT:
Q Bakit wala kang narinig na sagot. Ano ang sinabi mo sa kanila?
A Ang sinabi ko po, 'ano ang kasalanan ng mister ko, bakit ninyo siya kinuha.' I did not hear any answer but instead I
was whipped with a gun.
Q Were you hit by this gun? Where were you hit?
A The gun hit my nose and my nose even bled on that day.
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court briefly what kind of gun was used to whip you?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
The witness already answered she does not know what kind of a gun was that.
[FISCAL DAÑOSOS:]
Q All right. The next question is, is it a long gun or a short gun?
A It was also a short gun.
Q Would you be able to say if the gun looks similar to the one that was pointed to the neck of your husband?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We interpose objection to that question, Your Honor. For the reason that it is not only leading but the witness
is incompetent to testify on what kind of gun was she able to see.
 FISCAL ASDALA:
The testimony refers to the husband not to the gun used in whipping her.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q Would it be similar?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
She's not in a position to testify. . .
COURT:
Just ask her to describe it.
A Parang pareho duon sa ipinakita sa akin. (it looks like the one I was shown earlier).
COURT:
Witness referring to a caliber 45 marked as exhibit 'A'.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q You said you asked them, 'why are you taking my husband, what wrong has he done'. Now, did you notice if there
were people in the front seat of the car?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would [you] be able to recognize the person who whipped you with the gun?
A Nakilala ko po.
Q If he is in this courtroom would [you] be able to identify him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please step down and identify this person by lightly tapping his shoulder?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom who identified himself as Arnold Lopez.
[FISCAL DAÑOSOS:]
Q Where was this Arnold Lopez seated?
A He was seated in [f]ront beside the driver.
COURT:
Q Where was he at the time when he whipped you with the gun?
A He was seated beside the driver's seat.
FISCAL DAÑOSOS:
Q How about the driver's seat[,] was somebody there?
A Meron po.
Q Would you tell this Honorable Court if that man occupying the driver's seat is inside this courtroom?
A He is not present.
Q Now, after you were whipped and you received no reply, what happened, if any?
A Tinulak niya po ako palabas.
Q Who?
A Arnold Lopez pushed me out.
Q Now, after you were pushed out, what else happened?
A They sped away.
Q Were you able to observe to what direction they sped away?
A They were going towards the direction of Acacia Lane." 24
These testimonies constitute persuasive and unassailable proof that all the appellants committed the crime of kidnapping.
Certainly, the positive identification of them by the victim and his wife, who had ample opportunity to see and remember their
faces, more than satisfies the judicial mind and conscience. It is natural for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of
their assailants and the manner in which they committed the crime. 25 Hence, there is usually no reason for us to doubt their
testimonies or to suspect their motives. The present witnesses had close contact with the kidnappers when the victim was
abducted and his wife was hit with a gun. Further, the victim was held for ten (10) days, which was more than ample time for him
to be familiar with them. His wife, on the other hand, was in constant communication with one of the appellants during the
ransom payment negotiations. She again saw them during the actual ransom payment.
Moreover, the appellants did not even deny their presence during the abduction or the ransom payment. This fact bolsters the
credibility of the spouses and confirms that they did not simply make up their narration of the kidnapping.
As to the demand for and the actual payment of the ransom money, the victim's wife testified thus:
"JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On March 17, 1994 you recall having received a telephone call?
A Opo.
Q At about what time did you receive the call?
A Banda pong mag-aalas dose ng umaga po.
Q And who was the one who called you?
A Si Adan po.
Q Was there any conversation?
A Ang sabi niya po sa akin 'nadagdagan na ba 'yong pera?' 'Opo, nadagdagan na ng dalawang daan.'
COURT:
Dalawang daang piso? Dalawang daan? O two hundred thousand?
A Two hundred thousand (P200,000.00).
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
.Q And what did Adan say?
A x x x sabi niya 'ito na dahil ang sabi mo gusto mong makausap ang mister mo, ito na ang mister mo, kausapin mo
na siya.'
Q Were you able to talk to your husband?
A Opo, kinausap niya ako. Ang sabi niya po sa akin 'lumipat ka ng bahay.'
Q What else?
A Yon po ang sabi niya lumipat ako ng bahay. Pa[g]katapos ko daw pong makipagusap.
COURT:
Just quote what he said. You quote what he actually said to you.
PROS. DAÑOSOS:
Ano ang sinabi?
A Opo. Ang sabi niya lumipat ako ng bahay.
COURT:
Hindi lumipat. 'Yong mismong sinabi niya. I-quote mo 'yong sinabi niya mismo.
A Yon nga lumipat daw ako ng bahay.
COURT:
Hindi. Kung ano ang sinabi niya mismo.
A 'Lumipat ka ng bahay.''
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q To what house?
A 'Lumipat ka ng bahay. Pumunta ka doon kila nanay.'
COURT:
'Yon lang ba ang sinabi sa iyo sa telepono?
A Oho. Tapos ang sagot ko 'bakit?'
Q And what was the answer?
A Wala na po. Ang sumagot si Adan na po.
Q And what did Adan say?
A Ang sabi niya 'O, iready mo ang pera' tatawag uli ako bago mag-ala una.'
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What else did he say? Is that all?
A Opo. Binaba na niya ang telepono.
Q Do you recall if on that day Adan Manalo called you up?
A Opo, tumawag po siya mga ala-una.
Q What was your conversation?
A Tinanong niya po sa akin kung magkano na ang pera. Ang sabi ko po 1.2 na.
Q 1.2 what?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00) lang ang naiipon ko. Nagalit po siya sa akin. Ang sabi
niya 'bakit 1.2 lang?' Di ba sabi mo 2 million na. Akala ko two million na.' Hindi sabi ko. 1.2. tang ang naipon ko sa
ngayon. Baka puwede na iyon kapalit ng mister ko.
Q And what did Adan say?
A Na cut na naman[. [T]atawag uli ako[,] sabi niya.
Q Did he in fact call up again?
A Opo.
Q At about what time.
A Mag-aalas dos na po iyon.
Q Ng hapon?
A Ng hapon po.
Q And what was your conversation with him?
A Pumayag na po siya sa 1.2 na ibibigay ko sa kanya kapalit ng mister ko.
Q When you said 1.2, what do you mean?
A Ransom money.
Q 1.2 what is that?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).
Q So you said he agreed already to the amount of one million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00)?
A Opo.
Q In exchange [for] your husband?
A Opo.
Q And what else did you talk about?
A Binigyan niya po ako ng instruction kung saan ko ibibigay 'yong 1.2 million.
Q Could you tell us what is the instruction?
A Ang sabi niya po sa akin magkikita kami ng bago mag-alas kuwatro ng hapon sa fly-over.
Q Fly-over where?
A Doon po sa Magallanes papuntang Alabang doon po sa ibabaw tapat po daw ng Mercedes Benz Service. Doon po
daw ako tatapat at buksan ko daw iyong hood para po daw sira . . . sira 'yong sasakyan ko at saka buksan ko po daw
lahat ang bintana ng sasakyan ko.
Q Was there any other instructions?
A Ang sabi po niya ipaparada po daw niya sa tabi ng sasakyan ko at saka bubuksan niya sasabihin niya 'ako si
Adan.' Doon ko po daw ibibigay ang pera. Pag sinabi niyang siya si Adan doon ko po daw ibibigay ang pera. At saka
tinanong din po niya sa akin kung anong sasakyan ang gagamitin ko.
Q Did you tell him?
A Opo, sinabi ko po Pajero ang gagamitin kong sasakyan. Ibinigay ko po lahat 'yung plate number.
Q What plate number did you give?
A 'T' as in Task, 'F' as in Force and 'H' as in Habagat. Number 808.
Q What else did you talk about?
A ['Y]on po. Sabi niya bago mag-alas kuwatro nandon na ako. Binaba na po niya.
Q Now what happened after your phone conversation?
A I called up PACC.
Q Whom did you call?
A Si Major Aquino po at saka si Tinyente Mendoza. Nagpunta po sila sa bahay.
Q Were you able to talk with them?
A Opo.
Q What was your conversation with them?
A Sinabi ko po sa kanila magbabayaran na kami dito sa lugar na ito bago mag-alas kuwatro magkikita kami sa
ibabaw ng fly-over.
Q Did you tell them what fly-over?
A Opo. 'Yon pong sa Magallanes papuntang Alabang doon po ako pupuwesto.
Q What time you should go there?
A Bago mag-alas kuwatro nandoon na ako sa ibabaw.
Q What did Major Aquino and his companion tell you?
A Wala na po. Umalis na po sila. Ako naman po papunta na sa luga[r] na ibibigay ko 'yong pera.
COURT:
Q Are you saying that Major Aquino did not give you any instruction?
A Wala na po. Basta ang sabi niya 'O sige pumunta ka na doon.' Hindi ko na po alam kung ano ang gagawin nila.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you in fact go to the fly-over on the corner of Magallanes?
A Opo, pumunta po ako.
Q In what vehi[cl]e were you riding?
A 'Yon pong Pajero.
Q Who was driving?
COURT:
Q At what time did you leave your house?
A Siguro po mga alas 3:15 po.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Who was the driver?
A May driver po ako.
Q And where were you seated?
A Sa tabi po ng driver.
Q When you went to the place [w]here you bringing anything with you?
A Opo, meron po.
Q What were you bringing?
A 'Yon pong pera na nakalagay sa bag.'
COURT:
Q How much?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).
Q Place in?
A Nakalagay po sa bag na Dunlop na kulay asul.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you arrive at the fly-over in Magallanes?
COURT:
A Were you not going to ask her to identify the bag?
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Later on Your Honor because the money were xeroxed. We will ask her. Nakarating na ba kayo sa Magallanes?
A Opo, nakarating po kami.
Q And what happened upon your arrival in Magallanes?
A 3:45 ng makarating po kami doon.
Q Did your driver comply with the instruction to open the hood?
A Opo. Bumaba po siya at saka binuksan 'yong hood na kunwari nasiraan 'yong sasakyan. Eh, matagal po kami
doon. May lumapit pa pong traffic aide. Ang sabi ko sandali na lang, inaayos pa 'yong sasakyan eh. Ang sabi ko aalis na
rin kami dahil ho tumagal kami doon ng mga ten minutes eh. Tinataboy na kami ng traffic aid. Ngayon ho sinara namin
'yong hood. Lumakad ho kami unti-unti eh kasi nga hindi pa ho sila dumarating. Eh ngayon siguro mga alas-kuwatro na
ho sila dumating biglang meron pumaradang red toyota sa tabi namin.
COURT:
Q Where did they park their car?
A They parked their car parallel to my car.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You mentioned a red toyota. I am showing you Exhibit 'I' on which attached Exhibits 'I-1' and '1-2', can you
identify them?
A Para pong kahawig na ganito. Ganitong kulay.
Q Ang ano?
A Ang sasakyan.
Q Kahawig na paano?
A Para pong ganyan.
Q After this toyota car stopped beside the Pajero, what transpired next?
A Bumukas po 'yong dalawang bintana. Bandang kanan nila. Dalawang bintana.
Q Nang ano? Nang anong kotse?
A Yong red toyota po.
Q And where were you at that time?
A Nandoon po ako sa tabi ng driver.
Q Nang?
A Nang sasakyan ko po, 'yong Pajero.
Q When those two (2) windows on the right side of the car, the toyota car open did you see anything?
A Nakipag-usap po sa akin . . . Nakita ko po ang mister ko at saka 'yong katabi niya.
COURT:
Q Where was he seated? Right or left?
A Parang nasa gitna po. Parang nandito po siya sa tagiliran.
Q When you saw your husband where was he seated?
A Dito po sa tabi ng bintana.
Q Kaya nga, where was he seated?
A Sa likod po.
Q Yes, where was he seated, right, middle or left?
A Right.
Q Extreme right?
A Yes.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Was he alone in the back seat?
A Hindi ho. Nakita ko ho 'yong sa kaliwa niya.
Q Can you identify the man who was seated on his left?
A Opo. (Witness pointing to a man inside the court room, who, when asked, answered by the name of Arthur
Pangilinan.
Q Do I understand from you that there were only two (2) persons seated at the back seat of the toyota?
A Apat po sila. Pang lima ang mister ko. Kaya lang hindi ko nakita 'yong isa doon sa bandang hulihan.
Q 'Yong upuan lang sa likod 'yong katabi ng asawa mo? Ilang tao ang nakita mong naroroon? Isang tao lang o . . .?
A Dalawa lang sila. Kaya lang hindi ko mamukhaan 'yong isa pa dahil 'yong bintana eh, hindi ko na siya makita.
Q What about in the front seat, was there anybody in the front seat?
A Meron po. 'Yon po si Adan.
Q Can you identify them?
A Opo, si Arnold Lopez.
COURT:
Q Saan nakaupo si Arnold Lopez?
A Doon po sa harapan na tabi ng driver.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Can you identify him?
A Opo. (Witness pointing to a man inside the court room, who, when asked, identified himself as Arnold Lopez as
the man seated beside the driver.)
Q Was there anyone seated at the driver's seat of the red toyota?
A Meron po 'yong driver. Kaya lang hindi ko po siya nakita. May tao doon dahil dalawang bukas na bintana.
COURT:
Q Nakita mo 'yong driver?
A Hindi ko po nakita. 'Yong paa lang ang nakita ko.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Have you seen your husband in the car? What transpired next? What happened after you saw your husband?
A After ho? Nakipag-usap po siya sa akin.
Q What did he say?
A Ang sabi niya uuwi na daw po ako magtataksi na lang siya. Magtataksi na lang po daw siya pauwi sa amin. Tapos
po sinarado na po 'yong bintana.
COURT:
Will you please quote it.
A 'Umuwi ka na, uuwi na lang ako. Magtataksi na lang ako.'
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You said . . . You mentioned that you have with you on that day one million two hundred thousand pesos
(P1,200,000.00)?
A Opo.
Q Now, what did you do with that money?
A Bumaba po si Adan.
COURT:
Q Who is Adan?
A Si Arnold Lopez. Sabi niya 'ako si Adan, amin na ang pera.'
 JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Where was Adan Manalo at the time he uttered that words?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We object to the question of distinguished justice Your Honor.
COURT:
Why?
ATTY. LEONARDO.
Because he already stated that Adan went out.
COURT:
He went out of the car.
ATTY. LEONARDO:
Yes, [he] went out Your Honor. The question is where was he seated?
COURT:
Q Where was he if you know in relation to where he was seated? Saan si Adan, ah, si Arnold Lopez?
A Doon po sa unahan ng sasakyan. Binuksan niya bumaba siya pagkatapos kinuha niya ang pera sa akin.
Q Katabi siya ng driver mo?
A Opo. Ito po 'yong driver ko dito niya pinadaan ang pera.
Q Kaya nga saan nakatayo si Adan?
A Doon po sa labas sa tabi ng driver ko. (He was standing beside my driver when I gave the money to him).
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q I am showing you this kind of bag which bag has a word 'Dunlop' on it and previously marked as Exhibit 'G', can
you identify this bag?
A Opo, 'yan po ang pinaglagyan ko ng pera.
Q After you deliver the bag containing one million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00), what happened
next?
A Umalis na po kami. Bumalik na po ako sa bahay namin.
Q When you say 'kami', to whom do you refer? 'Umalis na kami'.
A 'Yong driver ko.
Q 'Yong driver mo at ikaw?
A Opo.
Q And what about the car what happened to it?
A Umalis na rin po siya. Magkaiba kami ng daan. (They left and we went into different directions).
Q You said you went in different directions, the Pajero and the toyota car. To what directions did you go?
A Going to Manila.
Q And what about the toyota car, where was it [heading]?
A Hindi ko na po sila alam kung saan sila lumiko." 26
Clearly, the appellants' denial cannot overcome the positive identification by the complaining witness and his wife.
As a defense, denial is indeed insipid and weak, being easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. 27 Mere denial of involvement in
a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party. 28
Strangely, considering their proven participation in the crime, appellants Lopez and Yambot also proffer the defense of alibi. For
it to prosper, however, it is not enough for them to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed; they
must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. 29 This,
appellants miserably failed to show.
Moreover, other than giving self-serving testimonies, they did not present any evidence to corroborate their denial and alibi. It
cannot be gainsaid that self-serving declarations are inadmissible as evidence of the facts asserted. 30As a general rule, the
reason for the exclusion of such evidence is not that it might never contribute to the ascertainment of the truth. Rather, the
reason is that, if received, it would most likely consist of falsehoods fabricated for the occasion and mislead more than
enlighten. 31
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove. 32 Furthermore, they cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the
offended party. 33 Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, a categorical,
consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over denial and alibi. 34 Unless substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, denial and alibi are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law. 35
In the instant case, there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim or his wife to testify falsely against the
accused or to implicate them falsely in the commission of so heinous a crime. The logical conclusion, then, is that no such
improper motive exists and that the testimonies are worthy of full faith and credence. 36
Likewise, the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the testimonies of all the
witnesses is not a compelling reason to jettison the findings of the court a quo. This circumstance does not ipso facto render the
judgment erroneous, more so when it appears to be fully supported by the evidence on record. 37 While a judge in such a
situation has no way to test the credibility of all the witnesses, since he did not have the unique opportunity of observing their
demeanor and behavior under oath, the trial court's factual findings are nonetheless binding on this Court when these are ably
supported by the evidence on record. 38 Unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the validity of a decision is
not necessarily impaired by the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. 39
Appellants also question the RTC decision finding all of them in conspiracy to commit kidnapping for ransom. They submit that
conspiracy was not established with positive and conclusive evidence. According to them, to be guilty of conspiracy, they must be
shown to have participated in the criminal design and, at the same time, to have committed overt acts necessary or essential to
the perpetration of the offense.
Such postulations are merely feeble attempts to escape liability. We do not subscribe to the tale of appellants that they
associated with Jun Notarte, the alleged mastermind, simply because he had offered them high-paying jobs.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. 40 The agreement need not be proven by direct evidence; 41 it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before,
during and after the commission of the offense, 42 pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interests. 43 Indeed, jurisprudence consistently tells us that conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated. 44
In the case at bar, as the trial court correctly held, conspiracy may be deduced from the appellants' acts that show concerted
action and community of interest. If it can be proven that two (2) or more persons aimed their acts toward the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object — so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment — then conspiracy may be inferred, even though no
actual meeting among them to concert means can be shown. 45Consequently, the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the
crime, because in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 46
Undoubtedly, in perpetrating the kidnapping for ransom, conspiracy existed among herein accused-appellants. Viewed in its
totality, the individual participation of each of them pointed to a joint purpose and criminal design. Notarte and Yambot
snatched the victim from his office in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Pangilinan and Yambot sandwiched him in the car and
transported him, together with the others, to a house where he was detained for ten days. Lopez negotiated with the victim's
wife for the ransom payment. Further, all three appellants set out to the designated place of ransom payment. These acts were
complementary to one another and were geared toward the attainment of a common ultimate objective. That objective was to
extort a ransom of P10 million (which was later reduced to P1.2 million through bargaining by the victim's wife) in exchange for
the victim's freedom.
Moreover, it is difficult to accept the excuse of appellants that they had nothing to do with the kidnapping. We agree with the
following observation of the trial court:
"Pangilinan's pretenses do not jibe well with reality. From his own version of the incident, there was no need for Notarte
to have hired him merely to watch the former[']s car on the day of the abduction. For, it must be emphasized that when
Notarte and Yambot left the car and entered the building for the purpose of abducting Garcia, one of Notarte's
companions, Arnold Lopez, was left in the car. Evidently, Lopez could very well have assumed the role of watching the
car without the need of having to hire an extra hand for the purpose.
"Moreover, it is significant to note that as early as March 08, 1994 when Garcia was forcibly taken from his office whom
Pangilinan thought, as he was made to understand, was a drug pusher, he already entertained some suspicion that it
was not so and that-Notarte and his group were into something illegal when instead of going to Camp Crame to detain
the drug-pushing suspect, they bypassed Camp Crame and proceeded to Baliuag, Bulacan. He was even prompted, by
reason of said unexpected turn of events, to tell his wife right after he was given PHP 500.00 as his compensation for
the day and after he was sent home by Notarte that what he saw was not an arrest of a suspect but a hold-up. Yet,
when Notarte again passed by his house on March 17, 1994, Pangilinan again went with Notarte, although Pangilinan
claims that he was only forced to do so because of alleged threat by Notarte that something would happen to him and
his family if he refuses to go with him. Such threat, assuming it was made, pales into significance in the light of the fact
that Pangilinan accepted from Notarte an additional amount of PHP 1,000.00 which, if anything, clearly demonstrates,
coupled with his earlier participation, his complicity or connivance with Notarte in the abduction of Teofilo Garcia."
xxx xxx xxx
"The accused Pangilinan, Lopez and Yambot uniformly declared that their involvement with Notarte was only on
account of the latter's offer to them of better-paying jobs and not because of his plan to kidnap a person of which they
were not privy to. Only the naive would fall for such a ruse. If their testimonies are to be believed, the jobs being offered
 to them were no better than their jobs at the time the offers were made. Besides, all of them profess to barely know
Notarte when he approached them about the jobs and yet they appear to have readily accepted the offers. On the part
of Notarte, he could not have been stupid enough to have recruited men of dubious loyalty and commitment to a risky
and dangerous undertaking." 47
Verily, it is "inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the performance of an essential and sensitive
phase of their well-planned criminal scheme to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the
details of their nefarious plan." 48
Appellant Lopez also argues that he cannot be convicted, because he was not sufficiently represented during the presentation of
co-appellant Pangilinan as hostile witness.
Such an argument would hold if Lopez's conviction were based on Pangilinan's testimony. But as we have held above, Lopez was
convicted because of the positive identification made not only by the victim, but also by the victim's wife who also pointed to
him as the person who had whipped her with a gun on the day her husband was abducted. 49
When Arthur Pangilinan testified in the absence of Lopez's counsel, the court appointed Atty. Leonardo to represent Lopez for
that day. 50 However, we find that such an appointment did not provide the appellant with adequate representation to safeguard
his rights fully. It was irregular because Pangilinan, whom the lawyer was also representing, gave incriminating statements
against Lopez. As the counsel of Pangilinan, Atty. Leonardo could not have objected either to his questions or to his answers to
safeguard the rights of his other client, Lopez. However, this notwithstanding, the incriminating evidence provided by the victim
and his wife are more than sufficient to convict Lopez even without Pangilinan's testimony.
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code reads:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill
him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female, or a
public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b)
the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping
is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned above is present. 51 Moreover, the
imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. 52 In the
instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty of death, inasmuch as it was sufficiently alleged and indubitably proven that
the kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
As to the conviction of the appellants for illegal possession of firearms, we are constrained to dismiss and set aside this portion
of the judgment. They cannot be held liable for such offense, since there was another crime — kidnapping for ransom — which
they were committing at the same time.
The law governing illegal possession of firearms provides:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments
Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty ofprision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .
380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if
the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and
9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .
357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
 "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'état, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion
or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'état.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any
public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned
by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions
of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without
any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his
residence without legal authority therefor." 53 (Emphasis supplied)
Interpreting this law, this Court has consistently ruled that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any other crime,
there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. 54 Explained the Court:
"Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple
language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new
law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate
offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime
committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance x x x x. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph.
Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we." 55
In sum, we affirm the conviction of the appellants as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention. However, we set aside the judgment convicting them of illegal possession of firearms.
As regards the articles allegedly taken from the victim during the kidnapping, we find that the prosecution failed to prove with
certainty the amount of money or the value of the jewelry taken from him. These cannot be presumed. Moreover, we reduce the
award of moral damages to three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to be paid by the appellants solidarily. The fact that the
victim suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological ordeal constitutes sufficient basis for an award of moral
damages. 56 Meanwhile, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary
damages within the meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 57 There being a demand for ransom in this case, and by way of
example or correction, the offended party shall receive exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00). 58
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC of Pasig City (Branch 70) in Criminal Case No. 106115 sentencing appellants to death for
kidnapping for ransom is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they shall pay the victim in solidum the amount of three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) as moral damages and an additional amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) as exemplary damages. Costs against appellants.
However, the Decision of the court a quo convicting them of illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Case No. 106116 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional, and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this decision, to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135619 January 15, 2004

ADONIS ARADILLOS and ALBINO GALABO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by OSG
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review is the decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17316, 1 affirming the conviction of
petitioners Adonis Aradillos and Albino Galabo of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, with modification as to the penalty and the
award of actual and moral damages.
An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (Branch 10) of Davao City, charging petitioners Aradillos and Galabo with
the crime of Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about February 3, 1992, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, armed with an ax and piece of wood, conspiring, confederating together and helping
one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and hacked with said ax and struck with said piece of wood, one Gloria Alviola thereby inflicting
upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
COMPOUND FRACTURE, (R) AND (L) FRONTAL AREA 2° TO HACKING WOUND GCS 15 RLS 1
which injuries would cause the death of the said Gloria Alviola, thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, by the timely arrival and intervention of complainant’s brother-in-laws and the able
medical assistance rendered to the said Gloria Alviola which prevented her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge3 and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution and the defense differ in their versions of the incident.
The gist of the prosecution evidence is as follows:
At around 5:45 in the afternoon of February 3, 1992, Gloria rebuked herein petitioners Aradillos and Galabo when she
saw them in the act of cutting the bamboo bridge located on the property of her husband. Thereupon, petitioners
chased her and they caught up with her near the house. Galabo then hit her several times with a piece of wood and his
carpentry bag causing her to fall down. While Gloria was staggering face down, Aradillos hacked her twice with a
carpentry ax, hitting her on the right side of the head and on the forehead. She asked for help from the Visto family, her
neighbors, who brought her to the clinic of Dr. Alvarez in Matina, Davao. After Dr. Alvarez gave her first aid treatment,
Gloria was advised to go to Davao Medical Center where she was confined in the ICU for four days. 4
At the time Gloria reproached petitioners, she was within her bamboo-fenced yard, about ten meters away from them. Her
house is located five to six meters away from the place where she was standing. Her children, Rosalito 5and Rodilyn, and her
sister-in-law, Rosa, were also within the premises. Petitioners cut their way through her closed bamboo gate and they overtook
her while she was running towards her house. After she was injured, her children brought her to the Visto family’s house which is
located 200 meters away. Meanwhile, Rosa ran to the Alsa Masa detachment to report the incident. Gloria’s four brothers-in-law,
namely: Roberto, Modesto, Efren and Nilo, and her sister-in-law, Miguela were also within the premises but were not able to help
her because they were nervous.6
On the other hand, petitioners invoke self-defense, contending that the victim’s injuries on the head were the result of the
struggle for the possession of the ax between her and petitioner Aradillos. Petitioners, who are both carpenters, recounted that
on their way home from work in the afternoon of February 3, 1992, they stopped by the wooden bridge where they usually pass
because of an uprooted "idyok" tree that obstructed their passage. Petitioner Galabo started cutting off the roots of the tree
with his carpentry ax. But upon seeing them, Gloria who had been drinking "tuba" with her brothers-in-law, shouted invectives at
them and threw stones at Galabo. When Galabo was hit on his left rib, he ran for cover at a nearby coconut tree. Petitioner
Aradillos took over the cutting of the tree. Gloria continued throwing stones. Then, she approached Aradillos and grabbed the ax
from him. While the two grappled for its possession, Gloria’s brothers-in-law were throwing stones at Galabo. In the course of
the struggle between Aradillos and Gloria, the ax hit the latter. Seeing that Gloria was injured, Aradillos ran away, followed by
Galabo. Aradillos passed by his house, left the ax there, then, went directly to the purok leader, Benjamin Autida, to whom he
surrendered.7
The trial court believed the prosecution’s account, finding that the nature of the injuries sustained by Gloria could not have been
caused during the struggle between her and petitioner Aradillos. Thus, the trial court convicted petitioners of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide and sentenced them, as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the two (2) accused, Adonis Aradillos and Albino Galabo, proven beyond reasonable
doubt of Frustrated Homicide and finding in their favor the provisions of Art. 250 of the Revised Penal Code, they are
hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR each and pay the costs.
For the civil liability, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00 for medical expenses and moral
damages, of the victim.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, in sustaining the trial court’s findings, the Court of Appeals noted that it is "unnatural and contrary to ordinary human
experience for a woman, alone and unarmed, to run towards the two male appellants and grapple for the possession of an
axe."9 The appellate court modified the penalty imposed on petitioners and the damages awarded in favor of the victim, 10 as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1) The accused appellants are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum; and
2) They are ordered to pay the victim jointly and severally, the sum of P1,664.00 for medical expenses as actual
damages, and P6,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.11
In their petition for review on certiorari, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of their conviction with
modification is not in accordance with law, the applicable decisions of this Court and the evidence on record.
It is settled that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review 12 and it becomes the duty of the Court
to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are assigned as errors or not. 13
At the outset, the Court notes that while the memoranda of the parties and their appeal briefs focused on petitioners’ claim of
self-defense, their evidence is actually rooted on the testimony of petitioner Aradillos that the ax accidentally hit Gloria during
the struggle for its possession between them, thus:
Q Before the wounding incident happened, what were you doing?
A I was looking at Albino Galabo who was cutting the roots of the "idyok".
Q Where was that "idyok" located at that time while you were watching Albino Galabo cutting it?
A The "idyok" was along the bridge where it was fallen and which Albino cut.
...
Q And while Galabo was cutting the "idyok", what happened next?
A He was stoned by Gloria Alviola.
...
Q What else transpired aside from the stoning incident?
A She shouted: "Mga baga mo ug nawong. Mga squatter mo. Mga gagmay ra ba mo ug lawas." (You are shameless.
You are squatters. you have small bodies.)
Q How did you come to know that Gloria Alviola threw stones at Albino Galabo?
A Because I saw her.
...
Q Let us go back to the stoning incident. You said Gloria threw stones at Galabo while Galabo was cutting the "idyok"
and Gloria at the same time uttered those words you just have quoted, what happened to Galabo, if any, in result of the
stoning of Gloria?
A Galabo was hit at his right rib cage.
Q And what happened to Galabo?
A He was in pain.
Q What else did he do, if any?
A I got the axe which Galabo used in cutting the "idyok" to continue cutting the said "idyok", but Gloria continuously
threw stones to us and then she grabbed the axe from my hands.
...
Q I will further clarify, Your Honor. How did it happen that Gloria, the one you said threw stones at Galabo was able to
wrestle with you for the possession of the axe?
A She rushed at me.
Q After rushing at you, what did Gloria do?
A She grappled with me for the possession of the axe.
 Q In relation to the wooden bridge, in what particular spot or area were you grappling or possession of the axe?
A At the edge of the bridge.
Q Can you demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the grappling for possession of the axe happened between you and
Gloria?
A (Witness demonstrated that he placed his right hand at the lower portion of the handle of the axe; that Gloria’s right
hand was holding the middle portion; and that his left hand was holding the upper portion; and that Gloria’s other hand
was on top of his hand.)14 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, Aradillos further demonstrated how Gloria sustained her injuries:
Q Now, with that kind of illustration, Mr. Aradillos, how did Gloria sustain the injuries because you said that it was in the
course of grappoing (sic)? Will you please demonstrate to the Court how the injuries of Gloria Alviola was inflicted?
A (Witness makes a demonstration)
…
ASST. CITY PROS. CALIZO:
We would like to make of record that in his earlier demonstration Gloria was holding the middle portion and the upper
portion of the axe. Was that the position of the axe during that time?
A Yes. Sometimes it swung like this - the blade sometimes faced me; sometimes it faced her.
Q How did she sustain the wound?
A She was accidentally injured because of the force of the grappling.
…
Q At that time you pushed the axe, was that the position of your hands?
A No ma’am. Because of the swinging, I was able to push it accidentally towards Gloria.15 (Emphasis Ours)
Accident and self-defense are two incompatible defenses. Accident presupposes lack of intention, while self-defense assumes
voluntariness, but induced only by necessity. 16
In view of the above-quoted assertions of petitioner Aradillos before the trial court, the Court adopts a more liberal stance by
disregarding the apparent conflict in the defense raised by petitioners in their pleadings. After all, court litigations are primarily
for the search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce
proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.17
In People vs. Court of Appeals,18 the Court ruled that when, during the trial of the case, an accused claims that the crime was the
result of an accident, the burden of proving self-defense will not come into play, to wit:
… It is noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-defense but claimed that Generoso was
accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving self-defense, which normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not
come into play. Although Tangan must prove his defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing evidence, the
burden of proving the commission of the crime remained in the prosecution. 19 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, petitioners need not discharge the burden of proving self-defense, although they must prove their defense of
accidental infliction of injuries on the victim, by clear and convincing evidence. On the prosecution remains the burden of
proving the commission of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not disputed that Gloria sustained hacking injuries. The prosecution maintains that these injuries were the result of
intentional blows, while petitioners stand by their claim that Gloria sustained the injuries while she and Aradillos were grappling
for the possession of the ax.
Generally, the rule is that an assessment made by the trial judge of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.
Having heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their demeanor on the witness stand, the judge is in a better position
to determine the issue of credibility.20 But when it is shown that some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which
would affect the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, the Court will not hesitate to make its
own evaluation of the evidence. 21
Records show that aside from the testimony of the victim and petitioners, the evidence for both the prosecution and the defense
as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime is based substantially on the corroborating
testimonies of their respective relatives, who maintained the respective versions of the prosecution and the defense. Each family
has its own ax to grind against the other as they are embroiled in a land dispute. Thus, in order to arrive at a judicious conclusion,
these circumstances should have been taken into consideration by the lower courts in the assessment of the respective probative
weights of the evidence of the parties.
A review of the records discloses that the prosecution’s evidence failed to support Gloria’s account on how she sustained the
injuries on the head. In fact, her version together with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses is replete with incredible
details that necessarily cast serious doubts on the probative weight of the prosecution evidence which the trial and appellate
courts have overlooked.
Gloria testified on direct examination that she was inside her yard while petitioners were at the bridge when the latter chased
her, but they were able to catch up with her near her house. Her testimony was totally demolished by the cross-examination
conducted by the prosecution. Gloria stated that she was inside her yard while petitioners were at the bridge, ten meters away
from her.22 She likewise asserted that her house is located five to six meters away from where she was standing. 23 If her
assertions were true, petitioners had to run ten meters towards her while she had only five to six meters to reach her house.
Given the disparity between the distances that petitioners and Gloria had to run, evidently, she had a good head start for her to
reach her house before petitioners could be near her.
In addition, Gloria testified that petitioners had to destroy the bamboo gate in order to get inside the yard, thus giving her more
time within which to reach her house. Yet, Gloria claims, petitioners were able to overtake her. Unless Gloria leisurely walked
towards her house or that she had no intention of taking refuge in her house, it would have been physically impossible for
petitioners to have caught up with her before she entered her house. As noted by the trial court, "you will not wait for someone
to catch you before [you] ran (sic) away." 24 If at all, Gloria should have already been in the safety of her house by the time
petitioners would have negotiated the distance of ten meters, not to mention the time that petitioners would have spent in
destroying the bamboo gate.
The prosecution also claims that petitioner Galabo hit Gloria several times on the nape with a carpentry bag and a piece of wood
measuring two feet in length and two inches in diameter 25 which caused her to fall face down.26However, aside from the
prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, no other evidence was presented to support such claim. If their testimonies were true, then
Gloria should have suffered injuries, or bruises at the very least, as a result of the blows on her nape with a carpentry bag and a
piece of wood. But interestingly, no medical evidence was presented to confirm that Gloria sustained even a scratch from said
blows.
Such lack of evidence renders incredible the prosecution’s accusation that Galabo inflicted blows on Gloria. Physical evidence is
mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates highly in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 27 It enjoys a far more
superior probative weight than corroborative testimonies.28 In this case, the absence of physical injuries and medical findings
negate Gloria’s claim that she was hit by petitioner Galabo.
Gloria further testified on direct examination that after sustaining injuries, she sought help from her neighbors, the Visto family,
who brought her to the clinic of Dr. Generoso B. Alvarez. On cross-examination, Gloria stated that it was her children, Glodilito
and Rodilyn,29 who managed to help her get to the Visto family’s house, which is located 200 meters away from her house. 30 It
would have been easy to believe such testimony if at the time the fracas occurred, there were no other people within the
immediate vicinity who could have come to Gloria’s aid. But, the corroborating testimonies of the prosecution witnesses’ all
declare, that at that time, Gloria’s four brothers-in-law were in Rosa Alviola’s house, which was merely ten meters away from the
place where the alleged hacking occured. Roberto Alviola testified that he just watched and went inside his house after the
incident while his other brothers ran away when the incident took place. 31 It is claimed that they were not able to help Gloria
because they were nervous. The Court finds this utterly incredible and totally absurd. No amount of stretch of any one’s
imagination can it be believed that four able-bodied men will be so unconcerned so as to just watch and let an injured woman, a
relative at that, and her two young children, walk 200 meters for help, when they were already close by and could have readily
given assistance. They did not even exert any effort to call for their neighbors for assistance or immediately report the incident.
In fact, it had to take two women, Rosa and Miguela Alviola, to run to the Alsa Masa detachment and report the incident.
It is even highly improbable that petitioners would pursue Gloria into her yard to harm her. In the first place, the prosecution
failed to adduce any plausible reason why petitioners would suddenly run after Gloria. Also, at the time of the alleged chase,
Gloria was inside her yard, together with her children, Glodilito and Rodilyn, and her sister-in-law, Rosa Alviola. 32 It is very unlikely
that petitioners will have the audacity to attack Gloria inside her premises and within the sight of her family members who could
be witnesses to their alleged malevolent intent to kill Gloria.
Most telling of the incredibility of the version of the prosecution, is the testimony of Roberto Alviola, the victim’s brother-in-law.
According to Roberto, he heard Gloria shouting for help. 33 He went out of his house and saw petitioners ganging up on her. After
seeing this, he went back inside his house, remained there and did nothing. 34Meanwhile, his brothers, Efren, Nilo and Modesto,
who were with him earlier, had ran away. 35 Such display of apathy or unconcern for a relative goes against ordinary human
behavior, especially for Filipinos who are noted for close-knit familial ties and readiness to help family members at the risk of
their own lives.
Testimonial evidence to be credible should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be credible,
reasonable and in accord with human experience, failing in which, it should be rejected. 36
Moreover, the Court cannot concur with the appellate court’s observation that it is "unnatural and contrary to ordinary human
experience for a woman, alone and unarmed, to run towards the two male appellants and grapple for the possession of an
axe."37 Such observation cannot be accepted as absolute. The lower courts failed to consider the established facts and the
circumstances of the case. It need not be said that there are women who, when provoked, throw caution to the wind and charge
on to fight back. In this case, it is not "unnatural" for Gloria to show aggression against petitioners. It is shown that the
petitioners are smaller than Gloria.38 Moreover, unrebutted defense evidence disclose that on February 2, 1992, a day before the
incident, Lydia Galabo, wife of petitioner Albino Galabo and Aradillos’ older sister, filed with their barangay a complaint for
"harassment, stoning and slight physical injuries" against Gloria. 39 Summons was served on Gloria through Purok Leader
Benjamin Autida in the morning of February 3, 1992. 40 Gloria manifestly harbors an animosity against petitioners and their
family, and this explains her frenzied reaction towards petitioners when the incident occurred.
All these facts and circumstances when taken into account engender the Court to suspect the truthfulness of the prosecution’s
account. To accuse is one thing, to prove is another. In this case, the prosecution’s accusations do not jibe with their proofs. As
such, the Court has no other recourse but to disbelieve the tale as presented by the prosecution.
In contrast, the defense’s account is credible as it is in accord with the natural course of things. As told by petitioner Aradillos, it
was Gloria who went near Aradillos who was then cutting the roots of the "idyok" tree, and grabbed the ax, obviously with the
intention of stopping Aradillos from cutting the tree. Not wanting to let go of the ax, Aradillos held on to it and the two then
struggled for its possession. With both of their hands on the handle, the ax went swaying and swinging, which accidentally hit
Gloria.41 The injuries sustained by Gloria, in fact, confirm that it was not intentional. For if it were so, petitioner Aradillos would
have exerted such force that Gloria would have suffered more than what she had sustained. Worse, she would not have survived
at all.
That Gloria and her brothers-in-law were drinking tuba in the afternoon of February 3, 1992; that Gloria stoned Galabo and that
Aradillos grappled with Gloria for the gun as testified to by petitioners and other defense witnesses are more credible than the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. This is strengthened by the fact that it was not refuted by the prosecution that her
brothers-in-law did not come to her aid, and that after she was injured, she had to seek her neighbor’s assistance who were 200
meters away instead of her relatives who were just nearby. As previously discussed, the Court cannot fathom why her brothers-
in-law did not help Gloria, unless, as testified by petitioners, Gloria’s in-laws were drinking tuba prior to the incident and the
former were already intoxicated and therefore could not have been of any assistance to Gloria.
The Court likewise finds that conspiracy was not established. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 42 Like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.43 Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. 44
In the present case, the defense sufficiently rebutted the accusation that Galabo and Aradillos acted in concert in harming
Alviola. As their evidence shows, it was only Aradillos who struggled with the victim, and Galabo was then fending off the stones
being thrown by the victim’s brothers-in-law. Galabo had nothing to do with the injuries sustained by Gloria. Galabo’s only
participation in the incident was his presence, but mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy. 45
Even assuming that the prosecution’s version is true, and Galabo hit Gloria with a carpentry bag and a piece of wood, and
thereafter, Aradillos hacked Gloria, still, the seemingly concerted and simultaneous acts of petitioners were more of a
spontaneous reaction to what they perceived to be an aggression by Gloria, rather than the result of a common plan to kill the
victim. Hence, their liability is individual and not collective. 46 More specifically, Aradillos is solely liable for the injuries sustained
by Gloria. There is no evidence that Gloria sustained injuries from the acts of Galabo.
Lastly, the Court cannot agree with the lower courts’ finding that the nature of Gloria’s injuries justifies the conclusion that these
were fatal and intentionally inflicted, and cannot be the result of a mere struggle such that petitioners are guilty of Frustrated
Homicide.
Intent to kill is the principal element of attempted or frustrated homicide, or murder. 47 Such intent must be proved in a clear and
evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor. 48 The testimonies of the doctors who
treated Gloria did not establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth and severity of the wounds sustained by her. Such
medical evidence could have shed light as to the relative position of Aradillos and Gloria at the time the blows were inflicted,
whether the wounds sustained by the victim were a result of an intentional infliction or accidental, or whether it was mortal or
superficial. In People vs. Matyaong,49 the Court discussed the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by a
victim, viz.:
In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to the function of the various organs, and
also the danger to life. A division into mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could be made, would be very desirable; but
the unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes which give gravity to the simplest cases, and, on the
other hand, the favorable termination of some injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification
impracticable. The general classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal wounds may be used, but the
possibility of the slight wound terminating with the loss of the person’s life, and the apparently mortal ending with only
a slight impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. . . .
The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent of the injury, the form of the wound,
the region of the body affected, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of disease-producing
bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of the person injured, and the opportunities for
administering proper surgical treatment. . . .50
Dr. Generoso B. Alvarez who initially attended to Gloria and gave her first aid treatment, opined that if the bleeding was left
untreated, the victim could die in six to twelve hours but at the same time, but also stated on the witness stand that Gloria
suffered two lacerations on the head which merely required suturing. Dr. Alvarez testified as follows:
Q How would you describe the bleeding that you saw?
A Profuse, I would say.
Q In your medical studies and experience, what appears to be the most heavy bleeding in the part of the body?
A Generally, wounds on the head, usually profuse, even small wounds.
Q After a patient was on your examining table, and you saw blood on her head and on her body, what did you do?
A I have to examine the patient on the vital signs, whether the pulse rate and state of consciousness was stable, and
because my clinic was very limited, when you feel that there are other colleagues who can do it much better then you,
but at that time I was at a loss knowing that it was a medico-legal case, but at that time I had no other recourse because
it was at that time that there was a jeepney strike, so it took time for her to be transported for the moment, so I had to
control the bleeding and keep the patient stable until she could be transported to the hospital.
...
Q Since you knew that the patient was stable, what did you do next?
A After cleaning up the face with blood, I have to inspect the extent of the wound, I put my finger on the wound.
Q What did you find out on the head of the patient?
A There were 2 wounds, one on the forehead and there was another wound on the right side up on the scalp, about 2.5
inches.
Q In that wound in the forehead, what did you do next?
A I inserted my finger to find out whether there is brain damage or fracture, because you do not close a wound if you
suspect there is a fracture inside because the blood will get inside the brain, and I found out there was a depressed
fracture, I suppose it was a sharp injury based on the history, there was a depressed fracture and the same on the other
wound.
...
ATTY. PALABRICA:
Q Are these kind of wounds painful?
A Painful, for a while.
Q Could that have caused death on the patient?
A If she was unfortunate, she could have died. Fortunately for her, it was in the area of the brain where it is not very
important to us, in fact, you could remove that portion of the brain, and still be alived (sic).
Q You said that the bleeding was profuse, were you able to stop the bleeding?
A Yes.
Q If that bleeding was not stop (sic), would the patient have died?
A Yes, it was at that time the jeepney was on strike, normally, you do not suture wound on the scalp when you know
there is bleeding inside, but under the situation, there was no way to transport her to the hospital, the first thing I did
was to stop the bleeding.
Q If that wound was left to bleed on its own, how many minutes would it have taken to live or die?
A It could depend, 6 to 12 hours.
...
Q Multiple laceration, what do you mean?
A More than one laceration.
Q When you say laceration, what does it mean?
A It is a wound.
Q Laceration could usually be caused by?
A It could be blunt, it could be sharp instrument.
 Q What do you mean by 2 lacerations?
A Forehead and the scalp.
Q Scalp is also the laceration of the other wound?
A Yes.
...
Q There is here exploration and repair done.
A As I said earlier, before you touch anything, you have to explore the head.
Q How about the repair?
A Suture.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Taken in its entirety, it appears that the wounds sustained by Gloria were not so grave so as to sustain the claim of the
prosecution that petitioners had the intention to kill Gloria when she was hit with the ax by Aradillos on the head.
Moreover, another prosecution witness, Dr. Rene Elias Lopez, testified that the fractures on the right and left frontal area of
Gloria’s skull were slight or minimal.52 This weakened the claim of the prosecution that the injuries sustained by Gloria could have
been fatal or were inflicted by Aradillos with such force as to establish the intent to kill.
On direct examination, Dr. Lopez testified that there was no fracture in the skull and that the fracture chip did not present much
of a problem. Further, he was not emphatic on the fatal nature of the injuries sustained by Gloria, thus:
Q "Frontal chip", what do you mean "chip"?
A It means a small fracture.
Q How small was that?
A It’s quite small, maybe a finger nail.
Q What happened to the forehead or frontal bone which was chipped, what happened?
A This means that the frontal bone had a chip fracture on the bone, left and right areas. There was a break in the
continuity of the bone.
Q In other words, the left frontal area of the head was sort of cut and damaged, is that what you want to tell us?
A The outer layer of the skull was indeed violated and resulted in the . . .
ATTY. DE VERA:
Objection, Your Honor, the witness is incompetent, and no basis.
Q Now, as a doctor, what would be the effect of the chip on the left and right frontal area of the head?
COURT:
Lay the basis first.
Q Doctor, are you familiar with the effects of the chip on the frontal area of the head?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what would be the effect since you are familiar with the effects?
...
Q In this case you said there was a chip in the left forehead or right frontal bone, what would be the effect doctor of
that chip which you identified?
A The chip itself does not present much of a surgical problem, however there are several instances wherein the chip
fractured presented in the skull there might be other injuries which necessitates further management.
Q In this case doctor what did you discover or find in this patient after you examined her?
A The patient, as I have said presented with a sutured wound. Further X-ray on the skull showed a fracture on the
frontal bone. So, we were entertaining the possibility of an intra-cranial injury inside the skull, and therefore the patient
must be admitted and observed for any further consequence of the injury sustained.
Q In the same manner the wound on the right, what would have been the effect of that?
A The same, sir.
Q As far as you know the wound was depressed?
 A There was no depression in the skull.
Q Doctor, what medication did you advise the patient after she arrived in the hospital?
A She was under IV, given anti-biotics, anti-tetanus, prophylactic immunization. She was placed in the ICU.
Q What do you mean by IV?
A Intraveinous fluid.
Q Why?
A We were entertaining the possibility of an intra-cranial injury. If there is no IV placed something might develop as a
result of the injury. We might lost time and will not be able to give her medication on an emergency basis.
Q In other words, the patient might die?
ATTY. DE VERA:
Very leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
Reform your question.
Q What would have been the effect doctor if this has not been done?
A The purpose of the IV is more or a precautionary measure of any untowards incident as a result of the injury. That’s
why she was admitted to the ICU.
Q Doctor, how about anti-tetanus, why do you give anti-tetanus?
A Any patient presented with a break in the skin must be administered with anti-tetanus.
Q Doctor, what were the others you said?
A Anti-biotics, penicillin and chloromphenicol.
Q Standard doses? Maximum doses?
A These are maximum doses.
Q Why?
A We have to safeguard the possibility of an intra-cranial injury, therefore maximum dosages are what you call
recommended on the patient.
Q In other words, if you do not give the usual medication as you said and administration, what is the danger to the
patient, please tell us?
A The patient would develop skin infection.
Q And what would happen if there is skin infection?
A The wound will not heal.
Q And what else?
A If it does not heal, then the patient might develop fever later on. 53
On cross-examination, Dr. Lopez further testified:
Q So, as you testified a while ago, you were the one who interpreted the X-ray findings, and according to you, you found
compound fractures where?
A Both right and left frontal area of the skull.
Q Of the forehead?
A Yes, sir.
Q But the fracture was minimal or slight because you said earlier "something like the equivalent of a chip", so it was
minimal or slight?
A Yes, sir.
Q And there was no other surgical operation performed on the patient with respect to the said fracture that you
found?
A None, sir.
 Q In other words, the fracture could heal by itself through natural process without any outside medical intervention?
I am referring to the fracture itself.lawphil.net
A The fracture could heal by itself, yes. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
Dr. Lopez likewise stated that Gloria was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) for further observation as a matter of standard
procedure because they cannot discount the possibility of intra-cranial injury. 55 The victim was then taken out of the ICU after 24
hours of observation and discharged from the hospital on February 6, 1992, 56three days after the alleged hacking incident. In his
Medical Certificate, Dr. Lopez made the following diagnosis:
Compound fracture, (R) and (L) Frontal area 2° to hacking wound GCS 15 RLS 1
Probable healing time will be Fourteen (14) days barring complication. 57
There is therefore, a dearth of medical evidence on record to prove that the nature of injuries inflicted by Aradillos showed any
willful intent to kill Gloria.
Nonetheless, Aradillos must be answerable for the injuries he inflicted on Gloria. He cannot hide behind the defense of accident
to escape the consequences of his act. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a person, who while performing
a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by accident without fault or intention of causing it, is exempt from criminal
liability.58 It cannot be said that Aradillos was performing a lawful act when he struggled with Gloria for the ax as the latter’s act
of taking hold of the ax was equivocal, and it cannot be deduced therefrom that he was under the threat of an unlawful
aggression from her. The defense of accident, therefore, cannot exempt Aradillos from liability.
Although the Information charged petitioners with Frustrated Murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious
physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential
ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder. 59Similarly, an accused may
be convicted of slight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the infliction
of physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses when carried to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential
requisite of the crime of homicide or murder - intent to kill - is not required in a prosecution for physical injuries. 60
In conclusion, absent competent proof, and there being no conspiracy, Aradillos should be held liable only for less serious
physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, 61 as the wounds sustained by Gloria required medical
attendance of fourteen days.62
Galabo must be absolved from any liability as the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that he conspired with Aradillos in the
commission of the crime.
In imposing the proper penalty, the lower courts failed to take into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of petitioner Aradillos. Evidence show that Aradillos spontaneously and unconditionally surrendered to the
authorities immediately after the incident, placing himself at their disposal, and saving them the time and effort attendant to a
search.63 Purok Leader Benjamin Autida testified that Aradillos and Galabo immediately went to him after the incident and
surrendered.64 This was corroborated by SP02 Celso Hernandez who attested that by the time Rosa Alviola reported the incident
to them, Autida had already endorsed petitioners Aradillos and Galabo to their office. 65 Thus, the mitigating circumstance should
lighten the penalty to be imposed on petitioner Aradillos.
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries with arresto mayor, or
imprisonment for a period of one month and one day to six months. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in this
case because the maximum penalty does not exceed one year. 66 Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
and there being no aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its minimum period, or anywhere within a period
of one month and one day to two months.lawphil.net
As regards the damages awarded, the Court finds that the award of P1,664.00 as reimbursement for medical expenses is in order,
it being supported by evidence.67 Likewise, the victim having suffered actual injuries, she is entitled to moral damages. 68 The
award of P5,000.00 is sufficient under the circumstances. 69
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17316 is MODIFIED. Petitioner
Adonis Aradillos is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, and sentenced to suffer
two (2) months of imprisonment, and to pay Gloria Alviola the amount of One Thousand Six Hundred and Sixty-Four Pesos
(P1,664.000) as actual damages, and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages.
Petitioner Albino Galabo is ACQUITTED and the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002

JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OSG
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is the submission
of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder
filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the
Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution 1 finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the
Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to
respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for
petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-
Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed
the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis, petitioner and
his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" 2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial
and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner
prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also
prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. 3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An
Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A
Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why
He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents." 5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s "Motion to Quash and Suspend" and "Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioner’s alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The
court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO QUASH AND
SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26,
2001 filed by accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from
custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby
DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the
petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment
of all the accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion
and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not
guilty" for him.8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying him the
equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with
whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious -
results in the denial of substantive due process;
 4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality." 9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal protection
of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the
case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended Information which charged petitioner, together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder
as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose
‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACYwith his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF
FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00],
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON
OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME
"JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001" 12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the premise that the
Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial
of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided into three (3)
parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in
general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state
the names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Informationwhich is of "receiving
or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling
in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in
conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling
amounting to ₱545 million. Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal
gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in
series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the
phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they appear in R.A. No. 7080.
For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning,
the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act
in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different
predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge
him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is
way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001
Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part
reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also surreptitious collection of
protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact
that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor,
jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan"
of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]." 14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was delivered to
petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is
specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
"x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte,
demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof,
channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x." 15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable cause against
him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued
a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of
probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts in
dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." 16 Thus, he posits the following questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on one who is
clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty? What if another accused
is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty imposable, compared to one who
may have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and
the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is
supposed to have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only one act or
offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended
Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he
bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the
second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from
that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section
2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and with
alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected – contrary to the dictum that criminal
liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of substantive due process." 18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-paragraph (a)
but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator
of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended Information. 19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the provisions of R.A. No.
7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The
first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays
down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the
crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged
in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a)
alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d)
of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in
Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former
President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and
the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from
such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI
Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by
the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the
former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and
deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under
item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d),
thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Informationis worded, however, it is not certain
whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each otherto enable the former President to amass the subject
ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other
accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-
paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as
related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President
whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of
R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder
Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President
Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude
of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. 20 They also found that under the then existing
laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different
transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate
case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple
Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically
the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to address this
procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high
office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a
period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The
acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion,
theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-
described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against
the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb
to the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy" is made
up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a
common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the
former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged
the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each
accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise
tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the
so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or
other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is former President
Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy,
i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the allegation of
conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the
innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in common law. Under Philippine
law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is
punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion
and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense. 24 The
essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful
purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. 25 Its elements are: agreement to
accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent
necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense. 26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of conspiracy 27 – conspiracy to
commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or
to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and
one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or District conspire to
prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust or place of confidence under the
United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the
place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his
lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to
molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States; and (2) conspiracy to
defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any offense against the United States" refers to an
act made a crime by federal laws.29 It refers to an act punished by statute.30Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of
U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or regulatory. 31 These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic,
racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency,
copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of
federal regulation.32Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of
conspiracy is generally separate and distinct from the substantive offense, 33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the
substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy. 34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or money. It also
covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that
are dishonest.35 It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or
not.36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law on howconspiracy should
be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include particularities of time, place, circumstances or
causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the
scope of a bill of particulars.37 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-
object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. 38 To allege
that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their
conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement. 39 The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and
where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in cases
where such object is charged as a substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American courts deal with cases
challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack particularities of time, place, circumstances or
causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it
may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the
offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to meet
the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.41 The information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. 42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.43 No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged.44 Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. 45 What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes.46 The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth
in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is committed when, in time of war,
two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them
aid or comfort, and decide to commit it.48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the
Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person
or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and
comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be
alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it
changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of their participation in the crime. 49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally
responsible for the acts of others,50 for the act of one is the act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the
mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that
have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike
the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of
another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation,
equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated,
the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the
others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the
part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied
upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will
admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally,
that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the
character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the
language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or
that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused.
Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in
conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement
to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by
the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his
plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In
establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may
be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an
offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude, etc;53 or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea
to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or
design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. 55 A statement of this
evidence is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the accused committed
the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these
words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before this Court,
petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that
he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of
detention.1âwphi1 The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail. Dr.
Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose
‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier
filed with respondent Sandiganbayan.56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and requiring said
court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated December 20,
2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." 57 Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio,
the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of
the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail." 58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable
when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution." 59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution
and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the
prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted
by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the
reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show
that evidence on petitioner’s guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the evidence of
petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.