1. CARIŃO VS.
INSULAR GOVT 212 US 449; went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private
This was an application to the Philippine court of land registration for
the registration of certain land. The application was granted by the
court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the court of first
instance of the province of Benguet, on behalf of the
government of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United
States, those governments having taken possession of the
property for public and military purposes. The court of first
instance found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds
of law. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court (7
Philippine, 132 ), and the case then was brought here by writ of error.
The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the province of
Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the
treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899 as far back as the findings go, the
plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His
grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient
for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some
of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His father
had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he
had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as
owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from
his father, in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title,
however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in
1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one
under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to have
come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet
could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a
sanatorium, etc., had been designated,-a purpose that has been
carried out by the Philippine government and the United States.
In 1901 the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under
the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that
process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is
said.
Whether applicant has a valid claim over he land in dispute?
Yes. Petition Granted.
 Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not
always, public land.
 Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to
produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show
that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted,
is enough. For uncultivated, 30.
 Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at
any such proceedings against him or his father ever was
made.
 Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
 There must be a presumption against the government when
a private individual claims property as his or her own. It
their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared
absent contrary proof.
The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain
assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines
except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired;
that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if
there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration
within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's
land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not
always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title
of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the
Philippine government is bound to respect.
The United States government contented that Spain had title to all
the lands in the Philippines, except so far as it saw fit to permit private
titles to be acquired. It maintained that no prescription can be claimed
against Spanish empire and even if that was possible, a decree in
1880 had set a deadline for the registration of these titles. No title
would be recognized as valid beyond that date. Since the land in
question was not registered, the government contended that it had
become public (if it was already public). When the United States
succeeded to the title of Spain, Cariño had no right which it was
bound to respect. The Court disagreed with the United States in a
decision that has remained as obscure as it is significant.
The Court admitted that Spain had embraced the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held by the Crown. However, Justice
Holmes, who spoke for the Court, said that in practice sovereignty
may vary in degree. “How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how
far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The Igorots were never brought under the control of the Spaniards.
The Court quipped that it would be almost certain that Spain would
not have granted registration of the property that would not have
made title valid. Regardless of Spain’s position about technical
subtleties, this did not mean that under the dominion of the United
States, Cariño had lost all his rights. He was not a mere trespasser
when the government succeeded as the new sovereign. A
contrary position, would “amount to denial of native titles throughout
an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least for the want of
ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had
not the power to enforce.”
2. SECRETARY OF THE DENRY VS. YAP
G.R. NO. 167707 & G.R. NO. 173775 (CONSOLIDATED), 2008
G.R. No. 167707
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief
filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered
the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine
reserve. Yap, et al., alleged that said proclamation raised doubts on
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them
from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006,
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 and classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land (protection purposes) and 628.96 hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided
for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the centreline of roads
and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay
landowners in Boracay filed with the Supreme Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands
and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
1. Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore
making these lands alienable. NO.
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of
a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable
is required. In keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive
act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
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purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.
2. Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all
those similarly situated, to acquire title to their
occupied lands in Boracay Island. YES.
The Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an
agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered
State property. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already
alienable and disposable. Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.
It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles,
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered
public forest under PD No. 705.
The private claimants cannot apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with
respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their
lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
3. Republic vs. Naguiat, GR # 134209, Jan. 24, 2006
Celestina Naguiat, an Filipino citizen, resident of Angeles
City Pampanga, applied for registration before the Regional Trial
Court of Zambales, four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan
Zambales. She claims to be the owner of the said parcels of land
having acquired them by purchase from an entity who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years that had not
suffered from any mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the
application assailing the ownership of the respondent on the grounds
of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question by the predecessors-in-interest
that is an ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or
grant that is no longer applicable; the subject properties are part of
the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not
subject to private appropriation.
The trial court adjudicated the land to the respondent and
affirmed by the appellate court, hence the petition for review.
Whether the areas in question still form part of public domain –
YES.
The Court ruled that the areas are still part of the public domain. The
respondent failed to present the required certification from the proper
government agency or proclamation reclassifying the land applied for
as alienable and disposable.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, under the
Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
Anent thereto, under the Section 6 of the Public Land Act,
the prerogative of classifying and reclassifying lands of the public
domain belongs to the Executive Branch and not with the court.
The lower court and the appellate court erred in deciding
in favor of the respondent with subsisting matters that rest in the
powers of the Executive Branch of government.
Unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession unless until determined by the proper
government agency or proclamation reclassifying the land
agricultural thus alienable and disposable. The Court properly
REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decisions of the lower court and
appellate court and the application of the respondent DENIED.
4. Cruz vs. Sec of DENR 135385, Dec 6, 2000;
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within
their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by
the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization
of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of
the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to
the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However,
the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.
5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISANTO S.
RANESES, G.R. No. 189970, June 9, 2014
Respondent Crisanto S. Raneses (respondent) filed an
Application5 for Original Registration of Land Title over two parcels
of land both located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig City, Metro
Manila with a total area of twenty-two thousand six hundred (22,600)
square meters (subject properties). During the initial hearing,
respondent marked several documents to establish compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements.Respondent testified that despite the
fact that the earliest tax declaration on record over the subject
properties was issued only in 1980, his parents had been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same as early as June
1945. The RTC issued its first assailed Order granting respondent’s
application for land registration. The LLDA filed its Opposition to the
application alleging that the subject properties are below the 12.50-
meter elevation, hence, forming part of the bed of Laguna Lake and
are, therefore, inalienable, indisposable and incapable of
registration. The CA upheld the RTC which gave more credence to
the findings contained in the Inter-Office Memorandum than that of
the ECD Memorandum and in granting respondent’s application
Whether the subject properties in this case are alienable or
disposable land of the public domain
No. under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529, a petition may be granted
upon compliance with the following requisites: (a) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b)
that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The
Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State,
it remains part of the inalienable public domain for land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved. And the
applicant bears the burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence,
the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to hurdle this burden.
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6. Rural Bank of Anda Inc. vs. Roman Catholic Arch of Lingayen-
Dagupan gr 155051, May 29, 2007;
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the
Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about
1,300 square meters and is part of “Lot 3”. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot
739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s
Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is
bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by
the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of
Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in
the name of respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen
(respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT
6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot
3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley
In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction
of the fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent
the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was
already bothering the priests living in the seminary. The concrete
fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center
and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the
day
In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary,
discovered that a sawali fence was being constructed enclosing a
portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of
Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the
seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos
agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of
Anda should be stopped.
On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta
to remove the sawali fence and restore the concrete fence. On20
May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the
construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume
but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the
problem concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement
of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Binmaley are valid
The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot 736. The Assistant
Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management
Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot
736 was ever presented to their office. Both respondent and the
Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since
Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or
grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the
public domain and is owned by the state
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds
that the state owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Thus,
under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: “All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.”
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public
or government lands without prior grant from the government. Since
Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley
exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105.
Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the
contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural
Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.
7. Buenaventura vs. Republic GR 166865, March 2, 2007
Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June
2000 before the RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property,
located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Petitioners alleged that they
and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of
land thru inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the
same since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by
law.
The court a quo issued an Order granting the application
for registration of title of the subject property. However, the Republic
appealed to the CA alleging that petitioners failed to prove
continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession by their
predecessors-in-interest and by themselves. The Republic further
argues that petitioners own evidence tends to show that the subject
property is not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed
and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated.
On 23 August 2004, the CA rendered a Decision in favor
of the Republic, thus, overturning the Order of the court a quo, and
the parcel of land subject matter of the application is declared public
land. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Decision, but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition for
Certiorari
Whether the CA erred in nullifying the Decision of the trial court
confirming petitioners title over the subject property for not
being allegedly supported by substantial evidence as required
by law
YES. The DENR of NCR dated October 29, 2001, prove that the
subject property was alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Said certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or
character of the subject property. The certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.
Whether the CA gravely erred in declaring the subject property
as pubic land and ignoring petitioners evidence of over 50 year
possession in the concept of an owner and completely
unmolested by any adverse claim.
YES. Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain
commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of
the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the PRD
which speaks of prescription. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and
disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as
open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the
right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their
possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
In the present case, while petitioners possession over the
subject property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date
when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable
and disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in
their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the PRD. Thus, the court
granted petitioners application for registration of the subject property
and directing the issuance of a decree of registration in petitioners
favor.
8. Alcantara vs. DENR gr 161881 July 31, 2008; DAMILES
Petitioner Nicasio Alcantara, under the Forest Land Grazing Lease
Agreement (FLGLA) No. 542by the DENR, was allowed to lease 923
hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong,
General Santos City. However, such land is being claimed as the
ancestral land of the Indigenous B'laan and Maguindanao people,
who claim that they and their ancestors have been cultivating,
possessing, and occupying it since time immemorial. According to
them, Christian settlers started occupying the area only after WWII.
Due to this, there was a constant friction(violent at times) between
them. The IPs eventually lost physical control of much of the and
Alcantara, a son of one of the settlers, claims that FLGLA No. 542
has been subsisting since1983. The respondents, as representatives
of said tribes, filed a complaint before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of
FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of land to the indigenous
communities. Respondent-intervenors, the Heirs of Datu Abdul
Pendatun and the Heirs of Sabal Mula Gawan, claim that among
those who took the land by force was petitioner's predecessor,
ConradoAlcantara. They narrate that in 1962, some of their tribal
leaders tried to retake the land but failed because the well-armed
settlers repelled them, which led to the killing of 2 of their leaders.
Petitioner filed an answer to the complaint questioning the authority
of the COSLAP and alleged that it was the DENR secretary who
should have jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands.
Also, the COSLAP should suspend the hearing of the case, because
the DENR was then hearing a similar controversy. He was able
to renew FLGLA No. 542 for another 25 years, to expire on Dec 31,
2018, despite the pendedncy f the COSLAP case and the opposition
from private respondents. On Oct. 29, 1997, RA 8371 or the
Indigenous People's Rigths Act (IPRA), which was intended to
recognize and promote all the rights of country's Indigenus Cultural
Communities(ICCs)/IPs within the framework of the Constitution.
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W/N the petitioner may continue his enjoyment of the land up to
the expiration of FLGLA No.542 (Dec. 31, 2018) based on
his alleged residual rights.
No. The Court made the final finding that FLGLA No. 542 was issued
illegally, and it was made in violation of prevailing laws and it was
proper for it to be cancelled. The CA also stated that based on the
records, that subject land belongs to the Blaan ICC since they have
been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the
same since time immemorial, a fact which has not been disputed by
the petitioner. It was also declared that FLGLA No. 542 violated Sec
1 of PD 410 which states that "all unappropriated agricultural lands
forming the part of the public domain are declared part of the
ancestral land of the ICCs/IPs occupying the same, and these lands
are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed
exclusively among the members of ICC concerned.
9. Gordoland Devt. Corp. vs Republic
Petitioner is engaged in the business of real property development.
On November 18, 1996, it filed with the RTC, Branch 55, Mandaue
City, an application for original registration of title over eight parcels
of land totaling 86,298 square meters located in different barangays
within the Municipality of Lilo-an, Cebu. Petitioner avers it obtained
title over said parcels in 1995 by virtue of several deeds of sale and
assignments of appurtenant rights from the alleged owner-
possessors whom petitioner claims had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation as would entitle
them to acquire title by acquisitive prescription, under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, in relation to
Republic Act No. 496 and Presidential Decree No. 1529.
After submitting its formal offer of exhibits, the petitioner filed a
Manifestation with an attached photocopy of a Certification.
However, the list of lot numbers referred to in the certification was
not included in the certification, nor was it attached to the
Manifestation. The list was never submitted to the trial court. The
petitioners Manifestation merely informed the court that it had failed
to include the said certification in its formal offer of exhibits, and that
it was submitting the same in compliance with the requirements of
the application. Petitioner did not move to re-open the proceedings
to present the certification in evidence, have it authenticated and
subjected to cross-examination, or have it marked as an exhibit and
formally offered in evidence. The original was never submitted.
The State, through the Director of Lands, entered its formal
opposition to the application, asserting that registration should be
denied. On January 16, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision
granting the application, and directed the issuance of the respective
decrees of registration for each of the eight parcels of land.
Meanwhile, on February 23, 1998, the trial court received a Report
from the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Office of the Director,
Department on Registration, which declared that LRA was not in a
position to verify whether or not the subject lands were covered by
land patents, or within the area classified as alienable and
disposable. It recommended that the Land Management Bureau
(LMB) in Manila, the CENRO and the Forest Management Bureau
(FMB) in Cebu be ordered to determine and make a finding if the lots
were alienable and disposable. Thereafter, the trial court, acting
upon the LRA report, directed the LMB, Cebu CENRO and FMB to
report on the true status of the lands. It did not, however, recall or
suspend its judgment in the main.
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in finding that
petitioner failed to prove that the subject properties were
alienable and disposable public land.
In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the subject lots
were already classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
government, and when they were so classified, there is no reference
point for counting adverse possession for purposes of an imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of
an imperfect title.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that:
The facts and circumstances in the record render untenable that
Gordoland had performed all the conditions essential to reinforce its
application for registration under the Property Registration Decree.
The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 4221,
Lot No. 4222, Lot No. 4242, Lot No. 7250, Lot No. 7252, Lot No.
7260, Lot No. 7264, and Lot No. 7269 form part of the public domain
not registrable in the name of Gordoland. To reiterate, under the
Regalian doctrine, all lands belong to the State. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as
dominus.
10. Republic vs. Dela Paz | G.R. No. 171631 | 15 November 2010
The RTC granted respondents’ application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Such decision was affirmed by the
CA. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which
is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated
June 18, 1987, executed by their parents, who earlier acquired the
said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz by
virtue of a Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-
aari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979.
In their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of
the subject parcel of land and they have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the same, in
the concept of an owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents
further averred that by way of taking possession, they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, public, adverse,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of
more than 50 years since the filing of the application of registration
with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Petitioner opposed the application for registration on several
grounds, one of which is that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for
a period of not less than 30 years.
Whether the respondents, by them or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have proven that they possessed and
occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier
No. Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax
declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only
in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession
since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous, and
notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945
or earlier. Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject properties
in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945; it was only in
1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same
for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations
and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact
that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their
predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership.
They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
11. Republic vs. Santos, GR No. 180027, July 18, 2012
In October 1997, respondents purchased three parcels of
unregistered land formerly owned by Generosa Asuncion,
Teresita Sernal, and spouses Antona. The three parcels of land
were consolidated into a single lot (Lot 3). Respondents filed with
the RTC an application for original registration over Lot 3. The RTC
directed the DENR to report on the status of Lot 3. DENR submitted
a report saying that Lot 3 is an alienable and disposable land since
March 15, 1982. Respondents submitted a Certification by the
DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) that Lot 3 is classified as alienable and disposable
since March 15, 1982. During the trial, respondents presented the
testimonies of Generosa, Teresita, and spouses Antona all saying
that they have been in pos session of the lots for m ore
than 30 years bef ore the sal e. The Governm ent maintains
that the land in question still forms part of the public domain.
Whether the respondents’ application for registration should be
granted
No. Jura Regalia means that the State is the original proprietor of
all lands and the source of all private titles. Being an unregistered
land, Lot 3 is presumed to belong to the state.
In this connection, original registration of title to land is allowed by
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree. The said section provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper CFI an
4
 application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of
land in any other manner provided for by
law.
It appears that they seek the registration of Lot 3 under either the
first or the second paragraph of the quoted section. However, we
find that neither justifies registration in favor of the respondents.
Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 refers to the original registration of
"imperfect" titles to public land acquired. Its requisites are: (1) That
the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain; (2) That the applicants, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership, and; (3) That
such possession and occupation must be since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
The respondents were not able to satisfy the third requisite, i.e.,
that the respondents failed to establish that they or their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and occupation
of Lot 3 "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." First, the testimonies of
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest and/or their representatives
were patently deficient on this point. None of them testified about
possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land dating
back to 12 June 1945 or earlier. Rather, the said witnesses merely
related that they have been in possession of their lands "for over
thirty years" prior to the purchase thereof by respondents in 1997.
Neither can the affirmation of Generosa of the Joint Affidavit be
considered as sufficient to prove compliance with the third
requisite. The said Joint Affidavit merely contains a general claim
that Valentin had "continuously, openly and peacefully occupied
and tilled as absolute owner" the parcels of Generosa and Teresita
even "before the outbreak of World War 2" — which lacks
specificity and is unsupported by any other evidence.
Second. The supporting tax declarations presented by the
respondents also fall short of proving possession since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest declaration submitted by the
respondents i.e., Tax Declaration No. 9412,43 was issued only in
1948 and merely covers the portion of Lot 3 previously pertaining
to Generosa and Teresita. Much worse, Tax Declaration No. 9412
shows no declared improvements on such portion of Lot 3 as of
1948—posing an apparent contradiction to the claims of Generosa
and Teresita in their Joint Affidavit.
Moreover, they also anchored their claim on prescription
provided under Section 14(2) of PD 1529; for prescription to
run against the state, the land must be proven to be
patrimonial in character. To be patrimonial, there must be an express
declaration by the state that the land is no longer needed for public
service or the development of national wealth, or that the
property has been converted to patrimonial. Until then, the
period of prescription against the state will not commence to run.
The express declaration contemplated is separate and
distinct from mere classification that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondents were not able to prove that prescription
has begun to run against the state
12. Republic of the Philippines, petitioner vs Ludolfo V. Munoz,
respondent
On June 14, 1996, Munoz filed an application for registration of title
of a parcel of residential land before the RTC of Albay. Munoz
allegedly acquired the property through donation from her parents,
and his parents and predecessors in interest have been in
possession of the property since time immemorial for more than 70
years. The residential lot originally owned and possessed by Paulino
Pulvinar and Geronimo Lozada, who subsequently both sold their
share of unregistered land to the parents of Munoz.
The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG opposed the
application, among his contentions were that muniments of title, tax
payments and receipts of applications do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of bonafide acquisition and that the parcel
applied for is part of the public domain and not subject to private
appropriation.The Regional Trial Court rendered decision in favour
of Munoz, noting that the a reportsubmitted by the Director of Lands,
that as per records of the Land Management Bureau in Manila the
subject property is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664
of AnastaciaVitero, mother of Munoz. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
1. Whether or not the failure to present the original tracing cloth
plan is fatal omission whichnecessarily affected the trial court’s
jurisdiction.
As to the first issue, it bears stressing that the constructive seizure of
land accomplished by posting of notices and processes upon all
persons mentioned in notices by means of publication and sending
copies to said persons by registered mail in effect gives the court
jurisdiction over the lands sought to be registered. It is true that the
best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is
the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, in this case
however, the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be
dispensed with since the blue print copy of the survey plan approved
by the Bureau of Lands and the technical descriptions duly verified
and approved by the Director of lands were presented and provide
sufficient identification.
2. Whether or not in proving the alienable and disposable nature
of the property there has to be acertification from the DENR and
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office.
As to the second issue, the CA ruled that Munoz need not adduce
documentary proofs for the property to be declared alienable and
disposable because of the fact that it had once been covered by Free
Patent application in the name of the mother of Munoz, which was
unfortunately not acted upon by the proper authorities. This court
however cannot sustain this argument. As well settled in
jurisprudence, it is indispensable that the person claiming title to
public land should show a positive act of the government such as
presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigations, legislative act
or a statue or certification from the government that the land applied
for is alienable and disposable which the respondent failed to secure.
The court cannot approve the application for registration due to
failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
13. Saad Agro- Industires v Republic
Orcullo applied for a free patent over lot 1434 which was
subsequently approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources causing an Original Certificate of Title to be issued over
the said lot. This lot was subsequently sold to SAAD Agro Industries
by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Several years later, the Solicitor General filed a complaint for
annulment of title and reversion of the lot granted to orcullo stating
that the issuance of the free patent was irregular and erroneous as
the land in question is part of the timberland and forest reserve of
sibonga, Cebu. The RTC denied the petition for annulment and
reversion but was overruled by the CA granting the reversion
W/N the CA is correct? NO.
On reversion: reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a
question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the
government. The state, as the party alleging fraud and
representation bears the burden of proof. The state failed to do so in
this case because the delineation of forest areas of the public domain
was only made 9 years after orcullo was awarded the free patent
over the subject lot through PD 705 which was promulgated in 1980.
While the Government has the right to classify portions of public land,
the primary right of a private individual who possessed and cultivated
the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be
recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could
not have been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government,
in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what
portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless
private interests have intervened before such reservation is made.
5
14. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V.
O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural
Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and
WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA
is a exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. RA 7942
(The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP,
a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to
100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao
del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment
Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23,
which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40,
adopted on December 20, 1996. Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its
implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and
develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining
and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of
which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company.
DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The
latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals. EO 279,
issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the
DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign
owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals which
upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulmentof the FTAA would violate a treaty
between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the
protection of Australian investments.
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional
for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources. YES
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional. RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the
Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The
same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. Conspicuously
absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural
resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of
the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes
a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular
natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts
to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural
resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase
―management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The
present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial
assistance. The management and the operation of the mining
activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service
contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution
sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President
to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in
the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as
the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute
employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that
grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the
law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral
resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the
aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect,
conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral
resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing
but bare title thereto. The same provisions, whether by design or
inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained
60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations
engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources. When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent
and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements
or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional
or connected, must fail with them. Under Article XII Section 2 of the
1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP
is a ―service contract that permits fully foreign owned
companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service
Contract. The FTAA between he WMCP and the
Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a service contract. Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants
WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to
explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products
that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same
agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing,
technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining
Operations. These contractual stipulations and related provisions in
the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended
for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the
1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental
law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently,
the contract from which they spring must be struck down.
15. BARROGA VS. ALBANO, G.R. NO. L-43445, JANUARY 20,
2016
The CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a parcel of land in
favour of Delfina Aquino. One of the oppositors was Ruperta
Pascual, who was declared in default. For unrecorded reasons, the
decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of 14
years or so (October 14, 1955). It was only after 24 years (November
17, 1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina Aquino’s name.
In 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed
down but before title was sued in Delfina Aquino’s favour, the
children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual, appellants Eufemia Barroga
and Saturnina Padaca, brought suit against the children and heirs of
Delfina Aquino and appellees Angel Albano, et al.
Barroga, et al., contended that they had been in
possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof,
and they prayed that Delfina Aquino’s title be voided and cancelled
and that a new title be made out in their names.
Delfina Aquino’s title encroached upon a 4-square meter
portion of an adjoining lot belonging to Cesar Castro. Castro filed a
complaint in intervention for the recovery thereof. (Note: The CFI
dismissed Barroga’s and Padaca’s complaint, and declared
intervenor Castro the owner of the 4-square meter portion
overlapped by Delfina Aquino’s title.)
The familiar doctrine of res judicata operated to blot out
any hope of success of Barroga’s and Padaca’s suit for recovery of
Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment
in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino’s ownership
over the property, and in which proceeding the former’s predecessor-
in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had
been declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was
one against a “specific thing” and therefore conclusive upon the title
to the thing.
On August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an
order granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of
possession as regards Lot No. 9821. The said writ was dated August
28, 1975. Again, Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition
of possession by Angel Albano, et al. Their argument was, as
possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom
by a mere motion for writ of possession.
6

Whether they can be ejected. YES.
The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not
inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of
registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe
pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar
and Lucero vs. Loot. It also declared that the segregation of the 4-
square meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral
part of Lot 9821, had no effect whatever on Albano’s right to the writ
of possession, which was the appropriate process for the
enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case.
Conformably with the established axioms set out in the
opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees Angel Albano, et
al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot
No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication
of the title issued in favour of their predecessor-in-interets, Delfina
Aquino; the writ may be correctly enforced against Barroga and
Padaca as successors-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a
party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration
of Delfina Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof.
The appellees are entitled to said writ of possession,
despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being
imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to
the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The appellants, it
must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long
enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so.
16. Rudolf Lietz Holdings vs. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque
City GR 133240, Nov. 15,2000
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to
change its name from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz
Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a consequence
of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the
transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by them, all of
which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner
instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Parañaque
City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be
amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of
the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in
Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles
are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City.
Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of
Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Parañaque
City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed
the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it
appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of
Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner
filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but was
denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition,
the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it
appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in
Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque
court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have
acted on the motion to admit amended petition.
Whether the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the
ground of improper venue
Venue of real actions - This question has already been answered
in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court held
that it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint
by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain
error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between
jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are
basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is
conferred only by law.[16] It may not be conferred by consent or waiver
upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an
action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the
parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the
failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an
event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the
parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be
waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than
restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue
is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the
venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to
be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted
to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure
outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right- A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after
it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible
be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases
or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. The trial
court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by
petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of
the case to be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities,
and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real
controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary
delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit,
especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was
made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
17. Lozada vs. Bracewell, GR 179155, Apr. 2, 2014;
On 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-
129514, which was granted on 1989 by the RTC of Makati City,
acting as a land registration court. Consequently, on 1997, the LRA
issued Decree in the name of petitioner, who later obtained OCT
covering the said parcel of land.
On 1998, within a year from the issuance of the
aforementioned decree, Bracewell filed a petition for review of a
decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, otherwise known
as the "Property Registration Decree," before the RTC of Las Piñas
City, claiming that a portion of Plan, consisting of 3,097 square
meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598 (subject lot) – of which
he is the absolute owner and possessor – is fraudulently included in
Decree No. N-217036. He allegedly filed in 1963 an application for
registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well as of Lots 1,
2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Piñas City, which
was granted by the RTC of Makati City, on 1989. He further averred
that petitioner deliberately concealed the fact that Bracewell is one
of the adjoining owners, and left him totally ignorant of the
registration proceedings involving the lots covered by Plan PSU-
129514. Instead of impleading him, petitioner listed Bracewell’s
grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an adjoining owner, although she had
already died by that time.
Petitioner called Bracewell a mere interloper with respect
to the subject lot, which the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be
part and parcel his Plan that was approved way back in 1951
whereas Bracewell’s Plan was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that
the latter plan, in fact, contained a footnote that a portion known as
Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a portion of the parcel of land covered
by petitioner’s Plan.
The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Cortez in
a report dated on 1996, which was submitted to the RTC of Makati
City. The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately
preventing respondents from participating and objecting to his
application for registration when the documentary evidence showed
that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes for the
subject lot; and that he Bracewell was recognized as the owner
thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as
well as in the City Assessor's Office.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal before
the CA, arguing mainly that the Las Piñas City-RTC had no
jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of registration under
Section 32 of PD 1529, which should be filed in the same branch of
7
the court that rendered the decision and ordered the issuance of the
decree.
The appellate court affirmed the assailed judgment of the RTC.
Whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the
petition for review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as
a result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134.
No. Under Act No. 496 (Act 496), or the "Land Registration Act," as
amended, – which was the law in force at the time of the
commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings – jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title
was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs)
of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered
is situated.
The land registration laws were updated and codified
under PD 1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979, and under
Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land
registration is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or
city where the land is situated.
Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration only
proceeds from the land registration court’s directive, a petition taken
under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the land
registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for "as long
as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period
of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree,
the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it."
While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati
City, which rendered the decision directing the LRA to issue the
Decree, and should, applying the general rule as above-stated, be
the same court before which a petition for the review of the Decree
is filed, the Court must consider the circumstantial milieu in this case
that, in the interest of orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the said
petition before the Las Piñas City-RTC.
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.— (a) Real actions. —
Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition
or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property,
shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or
any part thereof lies.
As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in
Las Piñas City, the application for its original registration should have
been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for the fact that
the said court had yet to be created at the time the application was
filed.
18. SM Prime Holdings v. Madayag. G.R. No. 164687. February
12, 2009
Madayag filed with the RTC of Pangasinan an application for registr
ation of a parcel of land situated in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. SM
Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM) filed an opposition to the application
alleging that Madayag’s survey plan encroached from their
properties. Meanwhile, SM filed with the DENR a petition for the
cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan. SM filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, alleging that the RTC should await the DENR
resolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey plan. The
RTC issued an Order granting the Motion. Madayag filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA assailing the RTC Order. CA granted the
petition ordering the RTC to continue proceedings. Thus, SM filed
this Petition for Review.
Whether the RTC should suspend the proceedings in the land r
egistration case pending the resolution of the petition for the
cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan filed with the DENR.
There is no need to suspend the proceedings. When the law confer
s jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed
to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to
make it effective. It may, therefore, hear and determine all questions
that arise from a petition for registration. The RTC need not wait for
the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in
order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or
forms part of already titled property. Petition is denied. The RTC is
directed to continue with the proceedings
19. Brgy. Piapi vs. Talip , GR No. 138248
On August 28, 1998, Barangay Piapi, herein petitioners, filed with
RTC Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur, a complaint for
Reconveyance and Damages for a parcel of land consisting of 3.2
hectares situated in Piapi, Davaol del Sur, and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-(3331)-4244 of the Registry of Deeds
issued in the name of Juan Jayag and has a market value of
P15,000. They alleged that they have openly possessed such land
for 30 years in the concept of owner, and that respondent, Talip,
fraudulently obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) under his name.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as
considering that the assessed value of the land is P6,030. Under
Section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court has
exclusive jurisdiction.
Petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC as the total
assessed value of the property is P41,890, as shown by Real
Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet dated August 20,
1996 issued by the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur, Atty.
Marcos D. Risonar, Jr.
On January 12, 1999, RTC Davao dismissed the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction hence this certiorari petition alleging that Section 19 (1)
of BP Bilang 129, as amended, gives the RTC jurisdiction over the
complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
complaint for reconveyance
NO, MCTC has the jurisdiction. This case is analogous to Huguete
vs Embudo; where petitioners argued that a complaint for annulment
of a deed of sale and partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
and thus falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Supreme
Court ruled that the nature of an action is not determined by the
caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and
the reliefs prayed for.
When the ultimate objective of the petitioners, is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the assessed value of the property subject thereof. However, they
failed to alleged therein the assessed value of the subject property.
Instead, what they stated was the market value of the land which was
at P15,000.00.
The Rule requires that the assessed value of the property, or if
there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by
the claimant. It bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is
the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners'
complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that
their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should
have alleged therein its assessed value. However, they only
specified the market value or estimated value, which is
P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 33 (3), it is the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court and not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over the case.
RULES: Section 19 (2) of BP Bilang 129. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest thereon, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise: (3) Exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, that in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value
of the adjacent lots.
8
20. Santiago vs. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), GR
No. 156888
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of
Property, filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and
herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago against SBMA on 12 March
2002, before the RTC of Olongapo City, Zambales. In their Complaint
petitioners, alleged that: Victoria M. Rodriguez is the sole heir and
administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez by virtue of the
Order "In the Matter of the Settlement of the Estate of Hermogenes
Rodriguez y Reyes, etc."; In his lifetime, the late Hermogenes
Rodriguez y Reyes was the owner of parcels of land registered in his
name under that certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de
Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol.
On January 31, 2002, Victoria M. Rodriguez, in her
capacity as heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes
Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, for
a period of 50 years, 2 parcels of land covered by his aforesaid title.
By virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff Santiago is
presently occupying the aforesaid parcel of land consisting of 2.5
hectares. Despite the fact that respondent SBMA is not the owner of
the 2 aforesaid parcels of land leased to plaintiffs Santiago and
Mateo, defendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights
over them. More particularly, defendant is using these parcels of land
for its own commercial and other purposes. Plaintiff Victoria
Rodriguez seeks to recover possession of the property from the
defendant so that she could comply with her contractual
commitments to her co-plaintiffs.
SBMA contends that sometime in 1998, Liwanag
Santiago, wife of herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, by virtue of her
employment with respondent SBMA, availed herself of the housing
privilege accorded to the latter’s employees; that due to said
privilege, she was allowed to lease a housing unit inside the Subic
Bay Freeport Zone; that the lease agreement, however, "shall be
terminated if the lessees are no longer employed with SBMA;" that
on 31 January 2002, Liwanag Santiago’s employment contract
concluded; that since said contract was not renewed, Liwanag
Santiago ceased to be an employee of respondent SBMA; and that
as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the SBMA Housing
Policy, she and her family were asked to vacate and return
possession of the subject housing unit.
On 13 March 2002, the RTC issued a TRO against SBMA
from ousting petitioner Santiago and his family from the premises of
the subject housing unit within 72 hours from receipt. Further, it was
likewise restrained and enjoined from committing any other acts that
would prevent the latter and his family from occupying the premises
they have allegedly leased from Victoria Rodriguez.
The RTC stated that since the alleged right of complainant
Rodriguez stemmed from a Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo de
Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, it cannot be considered a right in
esse. The RTC took judicial notice of P.D. No. 892, which required
all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their
lands under R.A. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six months from effectivity of the decree, or until 16 August
1976. After such time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be
used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings
under the Torrens System.
Whether the Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of
ownership of lands
No. The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had
already expressed in the case of Nemencio C. Evangelista, et al. v.
Carmelino M. Santiago,18 that the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos of 1891, has been
divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real
property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The
successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August
1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject
Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners’ Complaint
that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892,
then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed
to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the
Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in
registration proceedings.
Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a
Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the
occupant who actually possesses the same for the required
prescriptive period. Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish
title, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the
Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual
possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility that
someone else has acquired a better title to the same property by
virtue of prescription.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not
create or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created
and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration
proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from
accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason
therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting
and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of
action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of
title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule
otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892,
and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed
by the courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system
of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system
and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D.
No. 892 intended to eliminate.
21. Mactan-Cebu Int’l Airport Authority vs. Tirol, gr 171535, June
5, 2009; DAMILES
A complaint for quieting of title was filed by respondents,
Spouses Edito and Merian Tirol and Spouses Alejandro and Miranda
Ngo, against petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA). Plaintiffs-appellees and business partners claim to have
purchased a 2,000 square meter parcel of land, Lot No. 4763-D, from
a certain Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins, a Filipino citizen married to a certain
Mr. Scott Edward Jenkins, an American citizen. Plaintiffs-appellees
bought the said property on the strength of the apparent clean title of
vendor Jenkins as evidenced by the Tax Declaration and Transfer
Certificate. After the sale wherein plaintiffs-appellees were
purportedly purchasers for value and in good faith, they succeeded
in titling the said lot under their. It was only in January 1996 that
plaintiffs-appellees discovered a cloud on their title when their
request for a Height Clearance with the Department of
Transportation and Communications was referred to the defendant-
appellant Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA, for
brevity), on account of the latter’s ownership of the said lot by way of
purchase thereof dating far back to 1958.
According to plaintiffs-appellees: Originally, the entire Lot
No. 4763 was decreed in the names of spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef under the provisions of the Land Registration Act on
June 1, 1934. Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold the to Spouses
Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug, who thereafter succeeded
to secure the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title. Thereafter,
the latter sold a portion, denominated as Lot No. 4763-D, to Mrs.
Elma Jenkins on December 15, 1987, who[,] as earlier discussed,
sold the same lot to herein plaintiffs-appellees.
According to the defendant-appellant: The original owners,
spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to the
government, through the [then] Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA, for brevity). The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner MCIAA.
Who is the True Owner of the subject Property?
We rule in favor of the respondents, but on grounds different than
those relied upon by the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Preliminarily, reliance on Article 1544 of the New Civil Code is
misplaced. We enumerated the requisites that must concur for
Article 1544 to apply, viz.: (a) The two (or more) sales transactions
must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions
must pertain to exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or
more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter
must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two (or more)
buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must
each have bought from the very same seller. Obviously, said
provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were
initiated not by just one vendor but by several successive vendors.
In the instant case, respondents and petitioner had
acquired the subject property from different transferors. Petitioner,
through its predecessor-in-interest (CAA), acquired the entire Lot No.
4763 from its original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef, on March 23, 1958. On the other hand, respondents acquired
the subject parcel of land, a portion of Lot No. 4763, from Mrs. Elma
Jenkins, another transferee, some thirty-five years later. The
immediate transferors of Elma Jenkins were the spouses Moises
Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug who, in turn, obtained the subject
property from spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef. Therefore,
the instant controversy cannot be governed by Article 1544 since
petitioner and respondents do not have the same immediate seller.
In this regard, well-settled is the rule that registration of
instruments must be done in the proper registry in order to effect and
bind the land.[19] Prior to the Property Registration Decree of 1978,
Act No. 496 (or the Land Registration Act) governed the recording of
transactions involving registered land, i.e., land with a Torrens title.
On the other hand, Act No. 3344, as amended, provided for the
system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate
9
without prejudice to a third party with a better right.[20] Accordingly,
if a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is
registered under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land Registration
Act, the sale is not considered registered and the registration of the
deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.
22. Melencio vs CA, GR 148846, Sept 25, 2007
The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land
particularly denominated as Lot No. 3368, located at Suba-basbas,
Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of 30,777
square meters covered by TCT No. 20626 in the name of the late
petitioner Go Kim Chuan. The entire property was originally owned
by Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one child, Juana Bonghanoy-
Amodia, mother of the late Leoncia Amodia and petitioners Amodias.
The entire property was brought under the operation of the Torrens
System. However, the title thereto was lost during the Second World
War. On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-
Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale whereby
they extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and
conveyed the subject property to respondent Aznar Brothers Realty
Company for a consideration of P10,200.00. On August 10, 1964,
the said Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale was registered under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at
the Register of Deeds of Lapiu-Lapu City. Thereafter, AZNAR made
some improvements and constructed a beach house theron. On
February 18, 1989, petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Absolute Sale, conveying the subject property in
favor of Go Kim Chuan for and in consideration of P70,000.00. Aznar
then filed a case against petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for
Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 20626 alleging that
the sale to Go Kim Chuan was an invalid second sale.
WON there is a valid certification and verification by only one of
the plaintiffs
Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case of Iglesia ni Cristo,
505 SCRA 828, that Commonality of interest is material and crucial
to relaxation of the Rules. The Rules may be reasonably and liberally
construed to avoid a patent denial of substantial justice, because it
cannot be denied, that the ends of justice are better served when
cases are determined on the merits- after all parties are given full
opportunity to ventile their causes and defenses – rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. The same liberality
should likewise be applied to the certification against forum
shopping. The general rule is that the certification must be signed by
all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of
cases that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.
This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions merely underscored its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.
23. Casimiro Development Corp. vs. Mateo | G.R. No. 175485 |
24 July 2011
In 1988, petitioner purchased from China Bank the land in question
which was previously sold by the mother of Mateo to Rodolfo Pe who
in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China Bank
as security for a loan. China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and
consolidated its ownership of the property after Rodolfo failed to
redeem. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in the name
of China Bank. In 1991, the petitioner brought an action for unlawful
detainer against the respondent’s siblings. Respondent counters that
the petitioner acquired the property from China Bank in bad faith
because it had actual knowledge of the possession of the property
by the respondent and his siblings.
Whether the petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value
One who deals with property registered under the Torrens System
need not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the
certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and
claims as are annotated on the title. China Bank’s TCT was a clean
title, that is, it was free from any lien or encumbrance, the petitioner
had the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the
face of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank. The
respondent’s sibling’s possession did not translate to an adverse
claim of ownership. They even characterized their possession only
as that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession
grounded on tenancy a status that might create a defector inflict a
law in the title of the owner. The petitioner having paid the full and
fair price of the land, was an innocent purchaser for value. The TCT
in the name of the petitioner was declared valid and subsisting.
NB: If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told
later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only
be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public
confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be
attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership.
The Torrens Certificate of Title is merely an evidence of ownership or
title in the particular property described therein. The issuance of the
certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the
possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-
owners of the real property therein described with the person named
therein, or that the registered owner may be holding the property in
trust for another person.
Registration of land under the Torrens System, aside from perfecting
the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period
allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack.
24. Vicente vs. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009
On May 29, 1991, Avera filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage before the RTC and docketed as JDRC Case. Avera
asserted exclusive ownership over the property in dispute. A notice
of lis pendens was inscribed on TCT No. 34351.
Since 1997, petitioners possessed the property in dispute. On July
22, 1998, TCT No. 34351 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the
Registry of Deeds issued petitioners TCT No. 14216 for the property
in dispute, on the basis of the deed of sale executed on October 1,
1987. The notice of lis pendens was carried over to TCT No. 14216.
The RTC of Pasig City, rendered a Decision in the JDRC case,
declaring the marriage of Avera and Domingo void and ordering the
property acquired during their cohabitation to be put in the custody
of Avera, including the property in dispute. Petitioners filed a
Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for a TRO before the RTC of
Mandaluyong City enjoining respondents from enforcing the notice
to vacate.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
Mandaluyong City. The CA held that petitioners are bound by the
outcome of the JDRC case, because the annotation of the notice of
lis pendens (January 23, 1992) was ahead of petitioners’ registration
of the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 (July 22, 1998).
Whether the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint
for injunction despite the fact that petitioners are the registered
owners of the property
Yes. As the registered owners and actual possessors of the property
in question, petitioners have a clear legal right to the property in
dispute. Section 51 of PD 1529 provides that registration is the
operative act that conveys or affects registered land as against third
persons. Thus, a TCT is the best proof of ownership of land. In the
case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners are the registered owners
and actual possessors of the subject property. Moreover, as the
registered owners, petitioners have the right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of ownership.
A petition which, in effect, questioned the validity of a deed of sale
for registered land constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of
title. It was erroneous for respondents to assail the deed of sale
executed on October 1, 1987 in favor of petitioners, because this
constitutes a collateral attack on petitioners’ TCT. Section 48 of P.D.
No. 1529 prohibits a collateral attack on a Torrens title.
The notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor
creates a right or a lien. It serves to protect the real rights of the
registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution.
While the notice of lis pendens remains on a certificate of title, the
registrant could rest secure that he would not lose the property or
any part of it during the litigation. For this reason, the Court has
pronounced that a “purchaser who buys registered land with full
notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third
party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the
incidents and result of the pending litigation.”
25. OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v.
MARIO D.EBIO G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of
land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent
Mario D. Ebio which was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. They assert
that the original occupant and possessor land was their great
10
grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s
daughter, Zenaida. Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor
of Ebio. Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08 seeking for the construction of an access road
along Cut-cut Creek traversing the lot occupied by the respondents
and they proceeded to cut eight coconut trees planted on the said lot
City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically
evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting
their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a
further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.
However, records of the case shows that Rsidential Lot 8 is owned
by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT which appears to have
been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City Government of
Parañaque.
Whether the respondent acquired the property by acquisitive
prescription.
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-
interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot
as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit
from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their
family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit
of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in
his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when
Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL
8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL
8 to the local government of Parañaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty
(30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government
of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register
the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have
acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.
Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have
yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that
the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but
only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed
over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of
acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but
does not confer, ownership.
26. Duque – Rosario vs Banco Filipino savings and Mortgage
Bank
This case involves a lot that was foreclosed by banco filipino. Lot No.
356 – A was a piece of land under the possession of Dr. Rosario who
mortgaged it several times, including respondent Banco Filipino in
this case. For their failure to pay their loan it was foreclosed.
Apparently, the said lot actually belonged to the Torbela siblings who
lent it to Dr. Rosario as an accomodation for them to make loans from
banks with a mortgage on the properties. While the property was
under Dr. Rosario's name, he registered them and acquired
registration titles in his name.
Whether or not the mortgage was valid? No.
Under the civil code, one of the requisites of the contract of mortgage
is that the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the property to
be mortgaged, otherwise the mortgage is considered null and void.
Dr. Rosario was held not to be the owner of the mortgaged property
but merely constituted an implied trust with the Torbela siblings as
they agreed the properties would only be transferred to secure loans.
Even if certificates of title were issued in favor of Rosario, registration
does not vest title to him, but merely evidence of such title. Land
Registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he
actually has.
A trustee who obtains a torrens title over a property held in trust for
him by another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration.
27. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO
G.R. No. 171571, March 24, 2008
2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in
favor of the following in four equal shares:
a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono ¼ share in
the two lots;
b) Tito Dignos ¼ share in the two lots;
c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents ¼ share in
the two lots;
and
d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents ¼ share in
the two lots
It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded ¼
share in the two lots, sold the entire two lots to the then Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument entitled
”Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale” without the knowledge of
respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees
of the rest of the ¾ portion of the two lots.
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA), erected a security fence one of the lot and
relocated a number of families, who had built their dwellings within
the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport
security.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations
of the 2 lots.
Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third
persons permission to occupy the lots but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal
Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City. Respondents further
alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold,
alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have
been in continuous peaceful possession. Respondents furthermore
alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had
given them any written notice of its acquisition of the ¼ share of Tito
Dignos.
The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its Answer with
Counterclaim, maintained that from the time the lots were sold to its
predecessor-in-interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive
prescription, it had acquired valid title to the lots since it was a
purchaser in good faith and for value; and assuming arguendo that it
did not have just title, it had, by possession for over 30 years,
acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. At all
events, petitioner contended that respondents action was barred by
estoppel and laches.
The trial court found for respondents. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of Tito binding
to the respondents
NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision in
Bailon-Casilao v. CA:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells
the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to thesale.This
is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee
gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
thing owned in common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is NOT null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights
pertaining to the sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only ¼
undivided share of the two lots.
2. WON estoppel and laches should work against respondents
11

NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive
prescription. Petitioners’ insistence that it acquired the property
through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then extraordinary,
does not lie. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs the
following material portions thereof validate the claim of respondents
that the two lots were registered: x x x x
That since the OCT of Title of the above-mentioned property/ies
has/have been lost and/or destroyed… and the VENDEE hereby
binds itself to reconstitute said title/s at its own expense and that the
HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, successors and assigns bind
themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so that the said lot/s
may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with
law x x x x
NOTES: As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should
be ¼ of the prevailing market value, not of the actual purchase price,
since, so it claims, (1) the respondents received just compensation
for the property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and,
(2) the property, due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its
vicinity, is now worth several hundreds of millions of pesos, the law
is not on its side.
Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided
they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. The Court may take
judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots.
As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify
respondents about the sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus:
That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors,
undertake and agree to warrant and defend the possession and
ownership of the property/ies herein sold against any and all just
claims of all persons whomsoever and should the VENDEE be
disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the
Courts of Justice.
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore,
without prejudice to petitioners right to seek redress against the
vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest.
28. RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO. VS. PALILEO
G.R. NO. 83432, MAY 20, 1991
In April 1970, defendant spouses Enrique Castro and
Herminio R. Castro (spouse Castro) sold to herein respondent
Manuelito Palileo a parcel of unregistered coconut land in Surigao
del Norte. The sale is evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale, but the deed was not registered in the Registry of Property for
unregistered lands in the province of Surigao del Norte. Since the
execution of the deed of sale, Palileo who was then employed in
Lianga, Surigao del Sur, exercised acts of ownership over the land
through his mother Rafaela Palileo, as administratrix or overseer.
Manuelito Palileo has continuously paid the real estate taxes on said
land from 1971 until the present.
In November 1976, the CFI of Manila rendered a judgment
was rendered against defendant Enrique T. Castro to pay herein
petitioner Radiowealth Finance Company (Radiowealth), the sum of
P22,350.35 with interest rate of 16% per annum from November 2,
1975 until fully paid, and upon the finality of the judgment, a writ of
execution was issued. The Provincial Sheriff Marietta E. Eviota,
through defendant Deputy Provincial Sheriff Leopoldo Risma, levied
upon and finally sold at public auction the subject land that defendant
Enrique Castro had sold to Palileo in 1970. The said Provincial
Sheriff executed a certificate of sale was by the in favor of
Radiowealth as the only bidder, and upon expiration of the
redemption period, she also executed a deed of final sale. Both
documents were registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Learning of what happened to the land, Palileo filed an
action for recovery of the subject property. The court a quo rendered
a decision in favor of Palileo, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Who is the rightful owner of the subject property?
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the appellate court’s
decision on this case. There is no doubt that had the subject property
been a registered land, this case would have been decided in favor
of Radiowealth since it was the company that had its claim first
recorded in the Registry of Deeds for it is the act of registration that
operates to convey and affect registered land. Therefore, a bonafide
purchaser of a registered land at an execution sale acquires a good
title as against a prior transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded.
However, a different set of rules applies in the case at bar
which deals with a parcel of unregistered land. Under Act No. 3344,
registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is "without
prejudice to a third party with a better right." The aforequoted phrase
has been held by the Supreme Court to mean that the mere
registration of a sale in one's favor does not give him any right over
the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having
previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale
was unrecorded. Applying this principle, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the execution sale of the unregistered land in favor
of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to
the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.
29. Talusan v. Tayag, g.r. 133698, Apr. 4, 2001
The case involves auction sale of a condominium unit, covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651 and located in Building IV,
Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City.
Elias imperial, the former owner, sold his condominium
unit to Antonio Talusan and Celia Talusan, as evidenced by an
Absolute Deed of Sale. Juan Hernandez, the City Treasurer of
Baguio City, wrote a letter to Imperial informing him that the property
would be sold at public auction if Imperial failed to satisfy the
delinquent real estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, amounting to
Php4,039.80. Unbeknownst to Hernandez, Imperial and his family
had already migrated to Australia.
The property was sold through auction sale to
Hermenegildo Tayag for Php4,400.00 and a final bill of sale was
issued in his favor. The Talusans, who were still in possession of the
property, offered to pay the same to Tayag were rejected. They filed
for writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC of Baguio, Branch 6, ruled in favor of Tayag, finding
that Tayag is not bound to the Deed of Sale between Imperial and
the Talusans because such was never registered with the Register
of Deeds.
The Talusans sought for the annulment of the auction sale,
but the legality of the sale was upheld. The CA affirmed.
Whether the auction sale was not valid because of non-
publication of delinquent real estate taxes – SC ruled in favor of
the respondents.
Cases involving an auction sale of land for the collection of
delinquent taxes are in personam, unlike land registration
proceedings. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in
proceedings in rem, does not as a rule satisfy the requirement of
proceedings in personam. Mere publication of the notice of
delinquency would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax
sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city
treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the
taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by
registered mail to the permanent address of the registered owner in
Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City directed him
to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest in the
property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by
registered mail adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who
was the registered owner of the condominium unit.
For purposes of the real property tax, the registered
owner of the property is deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the
registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other
proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of
the property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such
notice. In fact, they were not entitled to it.
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that
petitioners brought this misfortune upon themselves. They neither
registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the
consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their name.
Worse, they failed to pay the real property taxes due. Although they
had been in possession of the property since 1981, they did not take
the necessary steps to protect and legitimize their interest.
Indeed, petitioners’ suit is now barred by laches. The law
helps the vigilant, but not those who sleep on their rights, for time is
a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against the slothful
and the condemners of their own rights.
30. Yu v. Pacleb, g.r. 172172, Feb. 24, 2009; FERRER
Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are
registered owners of an 18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio
12
Langcaan, Dasmariñas,Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-
118375 (Langcaan Property).
On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita
Chan sold the property to Rebecca del Rosario.
On May 7, 1992, the lot was thereafter sold to Ruperto
Javier.
On Nov. 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into
between Javier and Spouses Yu wherein petitioner spouses agreed
to pay Javier P200,000 as partial payment and P400,000 to be paid
upon execution of the contract, and Javier undertook to deliver
possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of absolute
sale within 30 days from execution of contract.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for
specific performance and damages against Javier, contending that
Javier represented to them that the Langcaan Property was not
tenanted, but after they already paid P200,000 as initial payment and
entered into the agreement of sale on Sept. 11, 1992, they
discovered that it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar
Pacleb. Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded for the cancellation of
the agreement and for the return of their initial payment.
On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and the latter’s
wife executed a “Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan, where spouses Yu paid
Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights
over the subject property. But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed
a complaint for annulment of the deed of sale to Javier, alleging that
the deed of sale executed between him and his late first wife Angelita
was spurious as their signatures were forgeries. Meanwhile, on Nov.
23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an action for forcible entry against
respondent with the MTC alleging that they had prior physical
possession of the Langcaan Property through their trustee Ramon
until the latter was ousted by respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled
in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the RTC, but set aside by CA.
His first action for annulment of deed of sale having been
dismissed, respondent filed action for removal of cloud from title on
May 29, 1996, contending that the deed of sale between him and his
late first wife and Rebecca del Rosario could not have been executed
on Feb. 27, 1992, because on said date, he was residing in the U.S.
and his late first wife died 20 years ago. During pendency of the case,
respondent died, succeeded by his surviving spouse and
representatives of children with his first wife. RTC held that spouses
Yu are purchasers in good faith, but on appeal, CA reversed and set
aside lower court’s decision and ordered for the cancellation of the
annotation in favor of spouses Yu on the TCT of Langcaan Property.
Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for
value and in good faith.
Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value, and they
are not in good faith. Several facts should have put petitioner
spouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier,
over the Langcaan property.
First, the property remains to be registered in the name of
respondent despite the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale from respondent to
Del Rosario then from the latter to Javier, and both deeds were not
even annotated in the title of the subject property.
Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only
2 months apart containing identical provisions.
Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the
possession of Ramon, son of the registered owners, this should have
made petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged
title of their vendor, Javier. Petitioner spouses could have easily
verified the true status of the subject property from Ramon’s wife,
since the latter is their relative.
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys
from the registered owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher
degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is
not the registered owner, although the land object of the
transaction is registered. While one who buys from the registered
owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who
buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to
examine not only the certificate of title but all factual
circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any
flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer
the land.
Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as
innocent purchasers in good faith, and respondent has a better right
over the Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof.
31. FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN G.R. No.
158407 January 17, 2005
Petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry
against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC. The summons
and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the
latter was apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the summons
and complaint with Oscar Layno (respondent's brother), who
received the same.
The court rendered judgment against the respondent. The
respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of
execution was issued.
The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before
the RTC for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground
that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons
on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired
jurisdiction over her person. Respondent claimed she was a resident
of Oslo, Norway and although she owned the house where Oscar
Layno received the summons and the complaint, she had then
leased it to Eduardo Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar Layno
was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for
and in her behalf.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent. The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which
affirmed the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that
the complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and
complaint on the respondent.
The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry
of the petitioner against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is
erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real
action and one in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a
personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of
the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the
action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay
actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or
occupation of the property.
A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights
and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.
The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant. It has been held that an action in personam
is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action
is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are
concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In
Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal
judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between
the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real
property are in personam.
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of
all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon
the parties who joined in the action.
On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with
the summons and complaint by the Sheriff:
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion
to state:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does
not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service
of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance
with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any
of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted
service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the
country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave
of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before
and after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained
a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering
that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines
on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No.
879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
13
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld.
In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house"
or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service;
hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s
dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be.
Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person
named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made,
even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It
is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that
must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in
the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the
service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process
as of jurisdiction.
As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the
house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s
residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any
showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the
respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of
the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno
was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service
of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not
considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode,
where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which
he intends to return.
Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879
is null and void.
32. DBP vs. COA, G.R. 144516, Feb. 11, 2004
*nothing in the full text of the case relates even remotely to LTD
The DBP is a government financial institution with an original charter.
The COA is a constitutional body with the mandate to examine and
audit all government instrumentalities and investment of public
funds. On February 26, 1980, a Trust Indenture was entered into by
and between the DBP and the Board of Trustees of the Gratuity Plan
Fund, vesting in the latter the control and administration of the Fund.
The trustee, subsequently, appointed the DBP Trust Services
Department (DBP-TSD) as the investment manager thru an
Investment Management Agreement, with the end in view of making
the income and principal of the Fund sufficient to meet the liabilities
of DBP under the Gratuity Plan.
In 1983, the Bank established a Special Loan Program availed thru
the facilities of the DBP Provident Fund and funded by placements
from the Gratuity Plan Fund. This Special Loan Program was
adopted as part of the benefit program of the Bank to
provide financial assistance to qualified members to enhance and
protect the value of their gratuity benefits because Philippine
retirement laws and the Gratuity Plan do not allow partial payment of
retirement benefits. The program was suspended in 1986 but
was revived in 1991 thru DBP Board Resolution No. 066 dated
January 5, 1991.
Under the Special Loan Program, a prospective retiree is allowed the
option to utilize in the form of a loan a portion of his "outstanding
equity" in the gratuity fund and to invest it in a profitable investment
or undertaking. The earnings of the investment shall be applied to
pay for the interest due on the gratuity loan which was initially set at
9% per annum subject to the minimum investment rate resulting from
the updated actuarial study. The excess or balance of the interest
earnings shall then be distributed to the investor-members.
Pursuant to the investment scheme, DBP-TSD paid to the investor-
members a total of ₱11,626,414.25 representing the net earnings of
the investments for the years 1991 and 1992. The payments were
disallowed by the Auditor under Audit Observation Memorandum No.
93-2 dated March 1, 1993, on the ground that the distribution of
income of the Gratuity Plan Fund (GPF) to future retirees of DBP is
irregular and constituted the use of public funds for private purposes
which is specifically proscribed under Section 4 of P.D. 1445.
AOM No. 93-2 did "not question the authority of the Bank to set-up
the [Gratuity Plan] Fund and have it invested in the Trust Services
Department of the Bank."9 Apart from requiring the recipients of the
₱11,626,414.25 to refund their dividends, the Auditor recommended
that the DBP record in its books as miscellaneous income the income
of the Gratuity Plan Fund ("Fund"). The Auditor reasoned that "the
Fund is still owned by the Bank, the Board of Trustees is a mere
administrator of the Fund in the same way that the Trust Services
Department where the fund was invested was a mere investor and
neither can the employees, who have still an inchoate interest [i]n the
Fund be considered as rightful owner of the Fund."10
Former DBP Chairman Antonio requested COA Chairman Gangan
to reconsider AOM No. 93-2. Chairman Antonio alleged that the
express trust created for the benefit of qualified DBP employees
under the Trust Agreement ("Agreement") gave the Fund a separate
legal personality. The Agreement transferred legal title over the Fund
to the Board of Trustees and all earnings of the Fund accrue only to
the Fund. Thus, Chairman Antonio contended that the income of the
Fund is not the income of DBP.
Chairman Antonio also asked COA to lift the disallowance of the
₱11,626,414.25 distributed as dividends under the SLP on the
ground that the latter was simply a normal loan transaction. He
compared the SLP to loans granted by other gratuity and retirement
funds, like the GSIS, SSS and DBP Provident Fund.
Whether DBP has the requisite standing to file the instant
petition for certiorari
YES. Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution does not bar
government instrumentalities from questioning decisions of the COA.
Government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations have long resorted to petitions for certiorari to question
rulings of the COA. These government entities filed their petitions
with this Court pursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution,
which mandates that aggrieved parties may bring decisions of the
COA to the Court on certiorari. As a party to the Agreement and a
trustor of the Fund, DBP has a material interest in the implementation
of the Agreement, and in the operation of the Gratuity Plan and the
Fund as prescribed in the Agreement. The DBP also possesses a
real interest in upholding the legitimacy of the policies and programs
approved by its Board of Directors for the benefit of DBP employees.
This includes the SLP and its implementing rules, which the DBP
Board of Directors confirmed.
Whether the income of the Fund is income of DBP
NO. The Agreement indisputably transferred legal title over the
income and properties of the Fund to the Fund’s trustees. Thus,
COA’s directive to record the income of the Fund in DBP’s books of
account as the miscellaneous income of DBP constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. The income of the Fund does not form part of
the revenues or profits of DBP, and DBP may not use such income
for its own benefit. The principal and income of the Fund together
constitute the res or subject matter of the trust. The Agreement
established the Fund precisely so that it would eventually be
sufficient to pay for the retirement benefits of DBP employees under
RA 1616 without additional outlay from DBP. COA itself
acknowledged the authority of DBP to set up the Fund. However,
COA’s subsequent directive would divest the Fund of income, and
defeat the purpose for the Fund’s creation.
Whether the distribution of dividends under the SLP is valid
NO. As Chairman Zalamea himself noted, neither the Gratuity Plan
nor our laws on retirement allow the partial payment of retirement
benefits ahead of actual retirement. It appears that DBP sought to
circumvent these restrictions through the SLP, which released a
portion of an employee’s retirement benefits to him in the form of a
loan. Certainly, the DBP did this for laudable reasons, to address the
concerns of DBP employees on the devaluation of their retirement
benefits. The remaining question is whether RA 1616 and the
Gratuity Plan allow this scheme.
We rule that it is not allowed. Severance of employment is a
condition sine qua non for the release of retirement benefits.
Retirement benefits are not meant to recompense employees who
are still in the employ of the government. That is the function of
salaries and other emoluments.
In the present case, the Fund allowed the debtor-employee to
"borrow" a portion of his gratuity fund credit solely for the purpose of
investing it in certain instruments specified by DBP. The debtor-
employee could not dispose of or utilize the loan in any other way.
These instruments were, incidentally, some of the same securities
where the Fund placed its investments. At the same time the Fund
obligated the debtor-employee to assign immediately his loan to
DBP-TSD so that the amount could be commingled with the loans of
other employees. The DBP-TSD – the same department which
handled and had custody of the Fund’s accounts – then purchased
or re-allocated existing securities in the portfolio of the Fund to
correspond to the employees’ loans.
14
In sum, the SLP enabled certain DBP employees to utilize and even
earn from their retirement gratuities even before they retired. This
constitutes a partial release of their retirement benefits, which is
contrary to RA 1616 and the Gratuity Plan. As we have discussed,
the latter authorizes the release of gratuities from the earnings and
principal of the Fund only upon retirement.
33. Republic vs. Naguit and CA, G.R. 144057, Jan. 17, 2005
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks
judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in
Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-
interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC
rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon
failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal
opposition to the petition.
The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the
Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must
first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim
of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Whether it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the PRD that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
NO. Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is file. To follow the Solicitor
General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would
render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would
mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as
alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the
government from enforcing the said provision as it decides to
reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.
There are three requirements for registration of title, (1)
that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (2) that the
applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that
the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945.
There must be a positive act of the government through a
statute or proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate
its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land
as alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is
presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property and the possession of the land no matter how long would
not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it
having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The
inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14 (1) of the PRD. Naguit had the right to apply
for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.
34. Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., g.r. 162243, Dec. 3, 2009;
DAMILES
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43convertedinto an IFMA.PICOP filed before
the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec
Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute
the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatter has complied with all
the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43,
as amended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP
Resources, Inc. (PICOP)in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial
court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969Document
signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the
non-impairment clause by which the government may be bound
(for the issuance of the IFMA)
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is
edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked. The
Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a
contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such
an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State
in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise
the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources
in the area.
35. MINDA S. GAERLAN, petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
Petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan filed an application for srcinal
registration of title over a parcel of land situated in Cagayan De Oro
City, alleging that she acquired said property from a certain Mamerta
Tan by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land and
accordingly had the property declared for taxation under her name.
The trial court, finding saidapplication sufficient in form, set the case
for initial hearing. Subsequently, the Republic, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition to said application for
registration on the ground, among others, that neither petitioner nor
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject Land since June 12, 1945or earlier and that the tax
declarations do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the subject land.
The trial court granted petitioner’s application for registration of title.
The OSG appealed from said decision asserting that the trial court
erred in ruling that the subject parcel of land is available for private
appropriation. The CA reversed the trial court’s Decision and
dismissed the application for registration of title, finding that petitioner
failed to present any proof to establish that the subject land is
alienable and disposable. The CA enunciated, among others that the
petitioner must prove that the DENR Secretary has approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable and that the land subject of the application
falls within the approved area per verification through the survey of
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources (PENRO) or
Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO).
Hence, this petition.
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s application for
registration of title.
No, the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner’s application based on
the insufficiency of the evidence presented and the incomplete
requirements.
PD No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree in relation to
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.141, as amended by Section
4 of PD No. 1073 specifies those who are qualified to apply for
registration of land i.e., those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Moreover, under the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership is on the person applying for registration who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable.
To prove that the land is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Land
Investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may
secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for
are alienable and disposable but said certification must likewise
show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the same as alienable and disposable, and that the
same must fall within the approved area per verification of the
PENRO or CENRO.
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