G.R. No. 145982. July 3, 2003.

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FRANK N. LIU, deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse DIANA LIU, and children, namely:
WALTER, MILTON, FRANK, JR., HENRY and JOCKSON, all surnamed LIU, REBECCA LIU SHUI and
PEARL LIU RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO LOY, JR., TERESITA A. LOY and ESTATE OF JOSE
VAÑO, respondents.

FACTS:
On 13 January 1950, Teodoro Vaño, as attorney-in-fact of Jose Vaño, sold seven lots of the
Banilad Estate located in Cebu City to Benito Liu. The lots sold to Benito Liu were for a total
price of P4,900. Benito Liu gave a down payment of P1,000, undertaking to pay the balance of
P3,900 in monthly installments of P100 beginning at the end of January 1950. Meanwhile, Jose
Vaño passed away. Benito Liu subsequently paid installments totaling P2,900, leaving a balance
of P1,000. On 16 December 1969, Teodoro Vaño sold Lot No. 5 to respondent Alfredo Loy for
P3,910.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract to sell between the decedent Vaño and the Lius prevails over the
contract of sale between the Administrator Vaño and the Loys.

RULING:
A prior contract to sell made by the decedent prevails over the subsequent contract of sale
made by the administrator without probate court approval. The administrator cannot
unilaterally cancel a contract to sell made by the decedent in his lifetime.[53] Any cancellation
must observe all legal requisites, like written notice of cancellation based on lawful cause.[54]

It is immaterial if the prior contract is a mere contract to sell and does not immediately convey
ownership.[55] If it is valid, then it binds the estate to convey the property in accordance with
Section 8 of Rule 89 upon full payment of the consideration.

Frank Liu's contract to sell became valid and effective upon its execution.[56] The seller, Jose
Vaño, was then alive and thus there was no need for court approval for the immediate
effectivity of the contract to sell. In contrast, the execution of the contracts of sale of the Loys
took place after the death of the registered owner of the lots. The law requires court approval
for the effectivity of the Loys' contracts of sale against third parties. The probate court did not
validly give this approval since it failed to notify all interested parties of the Loy's motion for
court approval of the sale. Besides, the probate court had lost jurisdiction over the lots after it
approved the earlier sale to Frank Liu. Clearly, Frank Liu's contract to sell prevails over the Loys'
contracts of sale.
 [No. 4275. March 23, 1909.]
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ROMAN ABAYA, defendant and appellant.

FACTS:
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and
Sabina Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of
the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano
Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate
succession; that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the
25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and
Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed
said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the
deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that
on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of
law, the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of
all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take
possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and
that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the
declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the estate.

II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the foregoing
motion of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged
the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right,was
superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the
evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have
preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be
adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof.

That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence and
the court below entered the following judgment: "That the administrator of the
estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural
children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the
hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased
natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the
only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the
administrator, Roman Abaya."

ISSUE:
Whether one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the
deceased.
[Whether or not the mother of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was
his natural father, also deceased, may bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of
such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his
natural father.]
RULING:
The right of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy lasts during the lifetime of
such child, but the right of a natural child to compel acknowledgment of its status continues
only during the life of the alleged parents. The right of action for a declaration of legitimacy is
transmitted to the heirs of the child only when -the latter dies during minority or while insane,
or in case the action has already been instituted. Action by a natural child can only be brought
against the heirs of the parents in the event of the death of the parents during the minority of
the child, or upon the discovery of a document, after the death of the parents, expressly
acknowledging such child. This right of action which the law concedes to this natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.

The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to
that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right
of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may
transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance.

Comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce acknowledgment.

"ART. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its
lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the
action.

"The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not
lapsed before then.

"ART. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following cases :

"1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which, case the latter may
institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its majority.

"2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be
discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.