Beruflich Dokumente
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UNDERSTANDING MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTANTS: THE RATIONALITY
OF SOCIAL ACTION
T. COLWYN JONES
Department of Economics and Social Science, Bristol Polytechnic
Introduction
This paper is concerned with field research into management accounting
practice. In particular, it explores what can be learned from practioners’
personal accounts of practice, and how this can be learned. In doing this the
paper makes two claims. First, that in order to explain accounting practice it
is necessary to understand the meanings that this practice has for manage-
ment accountants. Second, that these meanings may be understood as
rational if we adopt a broad concept of rationality drawn from social theory.
Structure The paper is in four main sections. The first examines accounting
and decisions through models derived from “critical accounting” and “man-
agement science” academic literature. It concludes that these models are an
inadequate basis for understanding management accounting practitioners. In
particular, the narrow or selective treatment of “rationality” poses difficulties.
The second section broadens discussion of rationality through the work of
Max Weber. It concludes that his “action approach” provides a potentially
useful theoretical base, which needs more detailed refinement, for field
research in management accounting. The third section attempts this refine-
ment by constructing a “socio-rational” framework for researching manage-
ment accounting through the personal accounts offered by practitioners. The
fourth section considers the limits, not only of the socio-rational framework,
but of the action approach from which it derives. A study of action-rational
or otherwise-can be only one element in accounting research. In confronting
the issues of the context of accounting, researchers are obliged to consider
their own actions-their means and ends.
Since the mid 1970s accounting has come under increasing scrutiny from
academic accountants who may be collectively identified as adopting a
“critical perspective”. Their project may be summarized as an attempt to:
identify current accounting practice; discover the theoretical base or assump-
tions of this practice; develop alternative theoretical bases; and (in some
cases) to propose alternative practices constructed upon these bases. This has
been an extraordinarily wide-ranging project in which it is difficult to detect
any central defining tendency other than the attempt to generate radically
new perspectives and to contrast these starkly with what are seen as the
currently dominant theories and practices of “conventional” accounting.
Critical accounting has been variously informed by a number of intellectual
sources. Some have drawn on labour process theory or, more broadly, on
political economy in the Marxist tradition (e.g. Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker,
1985; Hopper et a/., 1987). Others have been influenced by interpretative and
interactionist microsociology (e.g. Colville, 1981; Tomkins & Groves, 1983).
Yet others have been inspired by Foucault’s discussion of discourse (e.g. Loft,
1986; Knights & Collinson, 1987; Roberts & Scapens, 1985) or by Derrida’s
deconstructionism (e.g. Arrington & Francis, 1988; Macintosh, 19881, and
other theoretical approaches continue to emerge.
Such a wide field is clearly difficult to encapsulate and it may be that
whatever coherence does exist in critical accounting rests upon the stress on
distancing it from (and often hostility to) conventional accounting theory and
practice. However, a central theme of these writers is that accounting should
be seen as a social activity. Hopwood (1985, p. 367) identifies this view among
members of a committee of the Social Science Research Council (a UK
government research grant agency) set up to examine social and political
research in accounting, who argued that “the origins of specific accounts
resided in the articulation of particular interests, in the creation of legitimacy
for them and in the construction of a calculative and administrative apparatus
which would further those interests”.
This view is supported by Hopper et al. (1987, p. 438) who see accounting as
“a fully social practice [that is] both the medium and the outcome of the
politico-economic context in which accounting is embedded”. The theme is
echoed by many other critical accounting writers (e.g. Armstrong, 1985, 1987;
Berry et a/., 1985; Burchell et a/., 1980; Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Knights &
Collinson, 1987; Loft, 1986; Tinker, 1985). In identifying accounting as
“social”, stress is variously placed on: subjectivity; the cultural or ideological
nature of knowledge; and the political nature of accounting in relation to
interests.
Despite the critical accounting view that accounting is a social activity, this
perspective is not seen as shaping the meanings that accounting practitioners
attach to accounting. Their views are instead characterized as “technical”. In
Hopwood’s (1985) discussion, “technical” is variously linked with the terms
“calculative”, “neutral”, “professional”, “uncritical” and to belief in “pro-
gress” and “efficiency”. This echoes the views of other accounting academics
in their identification of existing, conventional accounting. Accountants in
Understanding management accountants 229
poses, rather than assuming that practice has a theoretical base. The
conventional/critical model may be more applicable to the theoretical orienta-
tions of academics than to the perspectives of practitioners.
Sociological work in other fields of occupationally organized knowledge
suggests that we are unlikely to find practitioners’ presentation of accounting
as purely technical since this would appear to be a claim to “technician”
rather than “professional” status for the occupation. Jamous and Peloille
(1970) argue that the establishment of an occupation as a profession depends
upon the balance of “technicality” and “indetermination” which exists in
claims made for the occupation. When looking at the creation of a profes-
sional product, technicality is defined as “the part played in the production
process by ‘means’ that can be mastered and communicated in the form of
rules”, whilst indetermination refers to “the ‘means’ that escape rules and, at a
given historical moment, are attributed to the virtualities of producers” (1970,
p. 112). Only those occupations which successfully claim a high level of
individual judgement (indetermination) as well as objective, factual, codified
technique (technicality) are likely to become established as professions. On
this basis we would expect to find professional judgement (subjective and
purposeful) as well as technical skill (objective and neutral) in the presentation
of accounting. A claim by practitioners to be so/e/y involved in applying
objective techniques to factual data would appear to be a fragile basis for
maintaining the occupational position of accountants.
Field research with practitioners gives little support to the conventional
model (Jones, 1990; Dugdale & Jones, 1990, 1991). Management accountants
do not portray their activities as exclusively technical, and nor is technicality
necessarily characterized as objective, factual and neutral.
Subjectivity (“the virtualities of producers”) appears in the form of stress
placed on the qualities of “good management accountants”, which include:
extensive personal experience of business; knowledge of the company’s
products, production methods and markets; understanding other managers;
and broad view of business decision making. These are not seen as attributes
external to accounting, but as central in generating subjective opinions and
estimates. Typically, management accountants do not see accounting as
dealing with, let alone producing, facts- instead they treat data supplied by
managers, and, more-so, shop-floor workers, with considerable scepticism.
Even the question of neutrality is not clear-cut. Practitioners may describe
themselves as “observers” or “scorekeepers” who are aloof from the partisan
machinations of other managers, but there are also comments (sometimes
from the same people) which suggest a fairly blatant cynicism about
“accountants know which side their bread is buttered” and “who pays the
piper calls the tune”. In addition, there is insistence that accounting should
produce information which is useful-not in some abstract, universal sense,
but for the specific purposes of those who are employing the accountant.
Beyond technical aspects of accounting, practitioners stress judgement.
However, instead of seeing this as creating indetermination in accounting
(differing subjectivities resulting in divergent judgements), many practitioners
seem instead to see it as producing convergent solutions. From this view it
is not so much that objective techniques produce “correct answers” in
Understanding management accountants 231
accounting, but rather than these techniques when combined with profes-
sional judgement produce a limited cluster of acceptable answers. The key to
this convergent view seems to be “rationality” (both the techniques and the
judgements of accountants being seen as having a rational basis) which
practitioners believe can be justified to other “reasonable” people through
“reasoned” discussion.
Management accountants include subjectivity, uncertainty/estimation and
purposefulness in their explanations of accounting and, in doing so, come
closer to the critical perspective than to its image of conventional accounting.
This disparity between critical accountants’ views of practitioners and prac-
titioners’ views of themselves may be a result of critical accounting’s concern
with demystifying accounting’s public image rather than with understanding
its practitioners. Or, that its image of practitioners is derived from conven-
tional accounting texts rather than from personal experience or field research.
Whatever its origin, the conventional perspective cannot provide an adequate
conceptual framework for the study of accounting in practice. The conven-
tional perspective captures only one aspect of practitioners’ views, or only
those views expressed in particular contexts at particular moments.
In summary, only a partial interpretation of practitioners’ views is offered by
the conventional/critical model. The work of critical accountants in “de-
bunking” the “myth” of conventional accounting has presented a strong
challenge to the image of accounting as a narrow technical activity. But there
is a danger of creating another myth: that management accountants them-
selves see their activities in this way-as objective, factual and neutral. This
may be one element of their self-image but it does not recognize the elements
of subjectivity, estimation/uncertainty and purposefulness which they recog-
nize in “professional judgement”. Nor does it consider the ways these
elements are combined in practitioners’ reasons and reasonings-their
rationality.
Administrative Political
Rational perspective perspective perspective
.__
Facts Objective Subjective: Subjective:
rule-based interest-based
Information Relevant representational Selective: Selective:
partial purposeful
Purpose Maximization/optimization Satisficing Sectional
Key concepts Technique Perception Interests
values
236 T. C. Jones
Social Action
In order to appreciate how Weber saw accounting as a rational activity it is
important to understand his concept of social action. Weber argued that some
Understanding management accountants 237
Rational Action
Weber presents us with two forms of action which are non-rational. “Tradi-
tional” action (based on custom, convention or habit) and “affective” action
(which springs directly from feelings or emotional states and may be shown
in expressions of “joy” or “rage”). What separates these two non-rational
forms of social action from rational forms is that the latter entails meanings
based on calculation. Here, “calculation” implies deliberation in conscious
attempts to “think through” the action.
“Value-rational” action (“Wertrationalitat”) concerns calculation of the
means appropriate to the achievement of some ultimate goal (or value) which
is itself not amenable to calculation-it is an end in its own right. “Purpose-
rational” action (“Zweckratinalitat”) is concerned with the calculation, through
systematic reasoning, of the appropriateness of both means and ends. In
purpose-rational action the actor not only calculates means for achieving ends
and evaluates those means in terms of their subsequent success or failure,
but also re-evaluates the ends themselves in the light of events.
Rationality
Two forms of rationality are identified which underlie both value-rational and
purpose-rational action’. “Formal” rationality refers to “the extent of quan-
titative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is
actually applied” (Weber, 1968, p. 85) and is concerned with procedures as the
means of achieving ends. “Substantive” rationality (as it applies to economic
238 T. C. Jones
Routinization
action he would appear to offer highly relevant insights into the views of
accounting to be found among accounting paractitioners.
A Socio-Rational Model
The model presented here is a refinement of Weber’s discussion of rationality
and social action which incorporates critical accounting views of accounting
as a social activity, and the various aspects of rationality discussed in
management science perspectives on decision making. It has been developed
in field research with management accountants (Jones, 1990; Dugdale &
Jones, 1990, 1991). The four elements of the model are illustrated by
responses given in semi-structured interviews concerning investment ap-
praisal and its relationship to organizational decision making-see Table 4.
Objective Rationality
Some of the ways accounting practitioners explain their actions seem to
confirm the “technical” viewpoints ascribed to them by critical accountants
Understanding management accountants 241
(a) Objective
“Payback? Its strength is it is simple.”
“DCF is really only relevant if you’re into a large interest rate and it‘s many years
before [benefits arise].”
“From a theoretical point of view the time value of money is important and Payback
doesn’t give you that.”
lb) Subjective
“I think I may have done [DCFj when I was in the Civil Service 15 years ago. If you
asked me to do one now I’d have to go and see if I could find a book.. because I
wouldn’t have much clue now.”
“[Most benefits are] intuitively obvious-you’re buying a new machine because
you’re going to cut down on waste, something like that.”
“The last two months are the first time I’ve done any of this in practice. So a lot of it
is going to be brainwashing from my accounting training . I think I’m the victim
of my training rather than anything else.”
(c) Inter-subjective
“DCF? My managers wouldn’t understand that. I know they wouldn’t understand that
I’m sure I could get into [DCFI if I was in [an academic] environment.”
“You just go round and figure out what [kind of appraisal] you think people will want
to see . Somebody, somewhere is going to ask you for all of them, for each in
turn. Invariably you’ll end up doing them all.”
“Because of the way [The Company] recruits, most of [the senior managers] are all
MBAs anyway. They’re numerate people-they’ve been trained in the use of all the
investment appraisal techniques.”
(d) Positional
“When you’re part of a big group you tend to think sometimes it’s other people’s
problems-the finance side of it-they’re our bankers, they’re worried about that
. I you can get [a project] on a simple method, why complicate it?”
“Decisions are less financial than strategic . We’re driven by all sorts of things that
aren’t financial.”
“Practically we’ll do whatever it takes to get the proposal up the [hierarchy].”
(e.g. Table 4a). Reference is made to the factual basis of accounting where a
“fact” is seen as a universally accepted (or at least potentially acceptable)
statement about the “real world”. Where these statements are ambiguous or
contested more rigorous investigation or exposition will clarify the state-
ments, thus making them “facts“. Information is seen as a matter of
presenting such facts through the use of techniques which are themselves
capable of universalistic validation. The process involved in these techniques
is one of pure calculation (formal rationality) in which the proper carrying out
of procedures ensures a single, correct solution.
The validation of such techniques is concerned with their logic, rigour,
internal consistency, accuracy, reliability, relevance and so on. Hence, a
technique which recognizes the time-value of money is preferred as more
rigorous than one that does not. The development of accounting techniques is
seen as stemming from increasing intellectual knowledge and more refined
analysis, and thus represents a “progress” from less sophisticated (Payback)
to more sophisticated techniques (DCF). The superiority of “advanced”
techniques as means can be demonstrated against the ends they are intended
242 T. C. Jones
to achieve since these are seen as unambiguously specified. The goal (or set
of objectives) of accounting processes is single (or a single set) and
constitutes the problem to which one technique is shown to provide a
solution which is maximal (or optimal). Hence, the process is essentially
closed-ended.
The defining feature of objective rationality as an explanation of action is
that it is directed at the rationality of the accounting technique itself, In
explaining their action accountants call upon others to exercise universal
human reasoning and pure calculation to recognize this rationality.
Subjective Rationality
Not all the ways accountants explain their actions reflect such objective
rationality. Some explanations refer to the particularistic rationality of the
individual actor. Here it is not the technique itself which is emphasized but its
application, especially in relation to the importance of personal competence
and judgement-both “professional” and “commercial” (e.g. Table 4b).
“Facts” are seen to be statements which need not be universally held to be
true but which have been constructed by individuals. Given the virtually
infinite supply of potentially knowable elements in the world, the creation of
facts depends on particularistic identification and selection of elements which
then are held to be “facts”.
A large body of psychological research has shown this particularism to vary
very considerably through individual perception (identification) and values
(selection). Thus, individual perceptions and values are key elements in the
construction of “facts”, and their processing into “information”. Although
perception and values vary between individuals this does not imply that they
are arbitrary or irrational. Their source may be located in the individual’s
personality and experience.
Thus, accountants draw on their accounting experience in perceiving facts
[and in checking statements which they believe to be non-factual (Harper,
1988)] and in evaluating which are the most important of these facts. Practical
reasoning, based on their experience, shapes accountants’ perceptions and
values, and produces skilful actors who assess means against ends as a basis
for action. However, to the extent that the experiences and personalities of
individuals are different, then the means will be different. So too is the
manner of evaluating means against ends. Ends are not seen as “givens” but
are instead “discovered” by actors through their particular perceptions (e.g.
where the company is going) and values (e.g. where the company ought to be
going). Thus, the outcomes of subjective rationality are open-ended-different
accountants identify and select different means to achieve different ends.
The defining feature of subjective rationality in an explanation of action is
that it is directed at the rationality of the accountant as actor. Accountants
recognize that others would act differently, that the practical reasoning they
refer to is pat-ticularistic not universalistic. In explaning actions, the actor calls
upon others to recognize that they are rational in relation to the perception
and values, and the personal skills, of the actor.
Understanding management accountants 243
Inter-subjective Rationality
Positional Rationality
there may be different personal and social perceptions and values in relation
to means and ends these differences may be eliminated in political processes
in which particular interests impose their means-ends on others, or where
interests are combined to produce a compromise outcome. Thus, positional
rationality may lead to relatively closed-ended outcomes where alternative
rationalities are eliminated or merged in political processes of competition
between individuals and groups of unequal power5,
The defining feature of positional rationality as an explanation of action is
that it is directed at the rationality of the pursuit of interests conditioned by
the power of the actor. In explaining their actions, accountants call upon
others to recognize that action is rational in relation to the “realities” of
position, interests and power of themselves and others.
Socio-Rational Model
Rationality
Means
Facts/ Universal Individually Socially Politically
information reality constructed constructed constructed
reality reality reality
Process Pure Individual Social Political
calculation perceptions perceptions interests
and values and values
Source Quasi- Individual Socialization Positions
scientific experience social control power
laws and
personality
Ends
Goals Single Personal Shared Contested
Outcomes Closed Open Intra-group closed/ Politically
inter-group open closed
Rationality
/[T\ j
-----w Inter-subjective
Positional
Wallis and Bruce argue: “No-one will adequately explain social action who
does not understand how individuals interpret their world. But no-one will
understand how individuals interpret their world who is not aware of the
social and historical context within which they do it” (1983, p. 109). However,
there are a number of difficult issues in synthesizing meaning and context in
such explanations.
share important components of their life chances and life styles with
non-accounting managers, this is also a basis for a broader, unifying,
managerial perspective.
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
The early development of this paper was greatly influenced by discussions with Jem
Thomas (on Weber) and Dave Dugdale (on management accounting). Comments on
earlier drafts were made by Shahid Ansari, Peter Armstrong, Trevor Hopper, Paula
Thomas, Tony Tinker and a number of participants at the Management Accounting
Research Conference (University of Aston, September 1989). My thanks to all of them.
Notes
1. Weber’s distinction between “behaviour” and “action” is fairly clear in principle, although
there may be difficulties in application. For example, although “blinking” may be meaningless,
“winking” can have many meanings. The distinction between “action” and “social action” is
more problematic. Weber illustrates his distinction like this-“Social action does not occur
when two cyclists collide unintentionally; however, it does occur when they try to avoid the
collision or sock one another afterwards or negotiate to settle the matter peacefully” (1968, p.
1375). Here, Weber’s emphasis is upon the immediate, other-directedness of social action.
However, it may be argued that if the cyclists, before they meet, perceive their action as (say) a
“leisure pursuit”, and expect others to recognize the meaning of ‘leisure’, then their action is
firmly linked to time and place--to a particular society. Only when and where a shared concept
of “leisure” exists can the actor explain the meaning of cycling in this way. In this sense
perhaps all action is social.
2. Kalberg identifies four types of rationality in Weber’s work, including “practical rationality”
when the actor “accepts given realities and calculates the most expedient means of dealing
with the difficulties they represent” (p. 1152) and theoretical rationality which “involves a
conscious mastery of reality through the construction of increasingly precise abstract concepts
rather than through action” (p. 1152). I have taken the view that these concepts are alternative
formulations of Weber’s core concepts of substantive and formal rationality and hence have
limited my discussion to two types.
3. The emphasis here is on capitalist society. Weber also considered that bureaucratization would
be as, or more, important in socialist society. Indeed, for Weber, the great struggle of the
twentieth century would not be capitalism versus socialism, but bureaucracy versus
democracy.
4. I am not claiming that the processes of socialization and social control are absolute, or
complete. It is not suggested that “actors” should be seen as “social robots” which are
pre-programmed or governed. However, in studying people’s active processes of reasoning,
we do need to investigate the construction and maintenance of social action.
5. Again, I am not proposing that power should be viewed as absolute or its effects as complete.
Although some decisions or some rationalities may be “closed-out” in political processes, this
does not imply that such closure is full or final. Those with less power may still mobilize what
power they have in opposition to past decisions, lack of cooperation with present applications,
and attempts to re-influence future decisions.
6. For example, representations of investment appraisal as an “important” accounting activity
contain criteria of importance held by the individual accountant, supported by the accountancy
profession and expected to convince the listener.
7. For example, claims that accountants pursue investment appraisal “rigorous/y” need to be
backed by the action of checking data and calculations if this claim is to withstand the scrutiny
of managers affected by accounting information.
8. The problem is vividly highlighted by Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) discussion of the Azande
people. The context of their action, as they perceive it, is a world of witchcraft. In dealing with
this world the Azande have developed a systematic body of ideas (“magic”) and a set of
decision techniques (“oracles”). These techniques are hierarchically ordered so that the lowest
Understanding management accountants 255
level (“termite oracle”) can be validated against a higher level (“rubbing-board oracle”), which
in turn can be evaluated by the highest level technique (“poison oracle”). When the outcome
of the highest technique is challenged then it may be repeated by another expert practitioner.
Where results fail to match, the “witchcraft” may be used in explaining a “distortion”. The
central problem is that the Azande’s repeated experiments lead to the reinforcing of their
underlying ideas system. If we accept the Azande’s perception of the context of action, then
their “oracle” experiments may seem as rational as our society’s use of “scientific”
experiments to confirm or refute previous scientific experiments, which simultaneously
reinforces the ideas system of “science”.
9. In the UK accountancy is organized by a number of professional bodies. The Institutes of
Chartered Accountants (England and Wales/Scotland) are mainly concerned with financial
accounting; the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants with management account-
ing; and the Chartered Association of Certified Accountants has both kinds of members.
However, there is no requirement for this to be reflected in recruitment to positions in
corporations. Thus, the position of “management accountant” in industry may be occupied by
a member of any of the professional accounting bodies, a member of a non-accounting body
(e.g. Chartered Institute of Secretaries) or a “non-professional”. Thus, the difference between
“management” and “financial” accountants in corporations may be as much a matter of
career experience as of training and qualification.
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