Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Legal Ethics
Preliminary
Legal Ethics, Meaning
Malcom. Legal ethics is the branch of moral science which treats
of the duties which an attorney owes to the (1) court, (2) to his
client (3) to his colleagues in the profession and (4) to the public
as embodied in the (1) Constitution, (2) Rules of Court, (3) the
Code of Professional Responsibility, (4) Canons of Professional
Ethics, (5) jurisprudence, (6) moral law and (7) special laws.
1996 Bar, Q. I(1): Define legal ethics.
Non Omne Quod Licet Honestum (Not everything legal or
permitted is honorable)
1993 Bar, Q. XIX: “What is legal is moral.” State your comment
on the correctness or incorrectness of this proposition.
A: The statement is not necessarily correct. There are several acts
of a lawyer which may be legal but not necessarily moral. This is
precisely the purpose of legal ethics which governs the ethical and
moral behavior of a lawyer.
Legal Ethics, A Prescribed Subject
 Legal ethics is a prescribed subject in law schools because it
provides the needed moral foundation in the study of law
intended to guide the student throughout his life
 It has been a subject of the Bar Exam since 1918
Significance of Legal Ethics
 It provides the sets of governing rules to limit the
parameters and tame the exercise of the profession.
 It will guard against the abuses and ills of the profession
such as dishonesty, deceit, immorality, negligence,
slothness, lack of diligence and the many forms of
malpractice of the members of the Bar.
 It will raise the standard of the legal profession, encourage
and enhance the respect for the law, assure an effective and
efficient administration of justice, assist in the keeping and
maintenance of the law and order in coordination with the
other Departments of the Government
 It also provides the basis for the weeding out of the unfit
and the misfit in the legal profession for the protection of
the public.
1993 Bar, Q. III: What do you understand by Legal Ethics? Discuss
its importance and state its sources.
A: Legal ethics is that branch of moral science which treats of the
duties that an attorney owes to the court, to his client, to his
colleagues, in the profession, and to society.
The sources of legal ethics are the Constitution, the Rules of
Court, some particular provisions of statutes, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Judicial decisions.
Legal ethics is important in order to maintain a high moral
standard for the lawyer in performing his duties as an officer of
the court, his duties to his client, to the members of the legal
profession as well as to society. Lawyers wield so much power and
influence in society. Unless their acts are regulated by high norms
of ethical conduct they are likely to abuse them.
Original Bases of Legal Ethics
1. Canon of Professional Ethics
 Framed by the American Bar Association in 1908
 Adopted in the Philippines in 1917 by the Philippine Bar
when the Philippines was still a colony of the U.S.
 The revised Canons were adopted in the Philippines in 1946
2. SC Decisions
 Many rules on legal ethics were drawn from decisions of the
SC and the U.S. SC
3. Statutes
 Civil Code
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before
the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act
of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object
[1]
of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession;
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation
and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from
a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
 RPC
Art.209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor – Revelation
of secrets – In addition to the proper administrative action, the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine
ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, by any
malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence
or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets
of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or
solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense
of a client or having received confidential information from said
client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party
in the same case, without the consent of his first client.

4. Constitution
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-
privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
1995 Bar, Q. I(2): Does the legislature have the power to
regulate admission to the bar and the practice of law? Discuss
fully.
A: Congress under the 1987 Constitution has no power to regulate
admission to the Bar and the practice of law. Unlike the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution no longer provides for
the power of the legislature to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules promulgated by the SC. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
legislature had the power to repeal, alter the rules promulgated
by the SC although the power and the responsibility to admit
members of the bar resides in the SC. (In Re: Cunanan). Under the
1987 Constitution however, the SC has the exclusive power to
promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights, pleadings
and practice and procedures of all courts and the admission to the
practice of law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. 5).
Alternative: Agpalo has pointed out that the legislature, in the
exercise of police power, may enact laws regulating the practice
of law to protect the public and promote public welfare, but it
may not pass a law that will control the SC in the performance of
its function to decide who may be admitted into the practice of
law (Agpalo, Legal Ethics. 5th Edition, p. 5). Constitutional
Commissioner Joaquin C. Bernas also submits that the matter
stays as if the 1935 and 1973 provisions had been re-enacted
(Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 1992
ed., Vol. II, p. 293).
5. Treatises and Publications
 Works of well-known authors have been used and cited by
courts as standards and guidelines on the right conduct in
the practice of law.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Present Basis of Philippine Legal Ethics
 Main basis: Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
 CPR – is the embodiment into one Code of the various
pertinent and subsisting rules, guidelines and standards on
the rule of conduct of lawyers sourced from the
Constitution, ROC, Canons of Professional Ethics, statutes,
special laws, treatises, and decisions which must be
observed by all members of the Bar in the exercise of their
profession whether in or out of court as well as in their
public and private lives.
 Initially drafted in 1980 by the IBP Committee on
Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarment and was submitted
to the SC more than 7 years to decide on its formal
promulgation as a code of conduct for Members of the Bar.
 Finally promulgated on June 21, 1988 by the SC
 It is a judicial command, not a suggestion, promulgated as it
is by no less than the SC which has supremacy of supervision
over all members of the Bar
Importance of the New Code
 It has provided the legal profession an impression of identity
and sense of independence attuned to the local traditions,
practices and customs in the country.
 This gives the feeling of pride and emancipation from
foreign Canons
Definitions of Terms Commonly Used in Legal Ethics
a. Bar – refers to the whole body of attorneys and counselors,
collectively, the members of the legal profession
Garcia v. De Vera. Bar refers to the “collectivity of persons whose
names appear in the Roll of Attorneys
b. Bench – denote the whole body of judges
c. Bar Admission – the act by which one is licensed to practice
before courts of a particular state or jurisdiction after
satisfying certain requirements such as bar examinations,
period of residency or admission on grounds of reciprocity
after period of years as member of bar of another
jurisdiction
d. Lawyer – the general term for a person trained in the law
and authorized to advise or represent others in legal
matters. A person licensed to practice law.
e. Trial lawyer – a lawyer who personally handles cases in
court, administrative agencies or boards which means
engaging in actual trial work either for the prosecution or for
the defense of cases of clients
[2]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
f. Practicing Lawyer – one engaged in the practice of law
Cayetano v. Monsod. Practice of law means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
“To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
2016 Bar, Q. XIII: Atty. Dennis is the head of the Provincial DILG
Office in Sultan Kudarat. In view of the lack of lawyers and
notaries public in the province and because of numerous
requests that the DILG provide a notary public, Atty. Dennis was
constrained to apply for a commission from the RTC, which was
granted. He was able to notarize thousands of documents and
affidavits until Atty. Antonio, the only notary public in the
province, charged Atty. Dennis with misconduct and violation of
the CPR. Is the charge correct? Explain.
A: The performance of the duties of a notary public constitutes
practice of law.
A lawyer in the government service may either be prohibited from
practicing law during his tenure, or allowed to practice but subject
to some restrictions. There is no law prohibiting a Provincial DILG
Officer from practicing his profession. But as a Civil Service officer,
he can do so only with the consent of his Department Head. (Catu
v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008).
2006 Bar, Q. II(1): Is there a distinction between “practicing
lawyer” and “trial lawyer”?
Practicing Lawyer Trial Lawyer
One engaged in the practice of One who devotes his practice
law, which is not limited to the to handling litigations in court
conduct of cases in court, but (Cayetano v. Monsod, 1991).
includes legal advice and
counseling, and the
preparation of instruments and
contracts by which legal rights
are secured. (Ulep v. Legal
Clinic, Inc., 1993)
g. Client – one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal
advice or for purposes of prosecuting or defending a suit in
his behalf and usually for a fee.
h. Attorney-at-law –

Cui v. Cui. That class of persons who are by license, officers of the
courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
developed by law as a consequence.
Black’s. A person admitted to practice law in his respective state
and authorized to perform both civil and criminal legal functions
for clients, including drafting of legal documents, giving of legal
advice, and representing such before courts, administrative
agencies, boards, etc.
Note: Attorney-at-law is synonymous with counselor-at-law,
lawyer, attorney, counsel, “abogado”, and “boceros”
Alauwi v. Alauya (1997)
Facts:
1. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4 th
Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City
2. A complaint was filed against him by Alawi with the SC
seeking his dismissal from the service based on “malicious
and libelous charges resulting in undue injury to her honor
and reputation, contained in the letters sent to E.B. Villarosa
and Co. and Home Mortgage Finance Corp.
3. In his letter to the Asst. Clerk of Court, Atty. Marasigan,
Alauya signed his name with the prefix “Atty.”
Issue: As an officer of the Shari’a court, is Alauya entitled to the
use the title “Attorney”
Held:
1. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court
has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass
the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts.
2. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney."
3. The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
4. Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law, " because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators.
5. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not
warrant his use of the title of attorney.
In Re: Garcia (1961)
Facts: A Filipino citizen who had finished the law course in Spain
and thereafter allowed to practice the profession in said country,
filed a petition to practice law in the Philippines without passing
the required bar examinations provided for in Sec. 1 of Rule 127
of the ROC
Issue: WON Arturo E. Garcia be admitted to practice law in the
Philippines without passing the Bar?
Held:
1. After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the
petition on the following grounds:
(1) The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by
applicant. Under Art. 11 thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have
obtained recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by
virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their
professions within the territory of the Other,
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was
intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice
their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is
therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to
practice in the Philippines.
(2) Art. I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides:
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or
diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the
Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities, shall
be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory
of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter.
[3]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws
and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is
desired to exercise the legal profession; and Sec. 1 of Rule 127, in
connection with Sec. 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of
law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession
in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar
examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not
have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
for the reason that the Executive Department may not
encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter
or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil.
Constitution).
i. Attorney-in-Fact – an agent whose authority is strictly
limited by the instrument appointing him, although he may
do things not mentioned in his appointment necessary to
the performance of the duties specifically required of him by
the power of attorney appointing him, such authority being
necessarily implied. His authority is provided in the SPA or
GPA or letter of attorney. An attorney-in-fact is not
necessarily a lawyer.
j. Counsel de Oficio – is a counsel, appointed or assigned by
the court, from among such members of the Bar in good
standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, may
adequately defend the accused
Rule 116, Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio — The court,
considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the
questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only
such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their
experience and ability, can competently defend the accused.
But in localities where such members of the bar are not available,
the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of
good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
People v. Daban. A counsel de oficio is a lawyer or attorney
appointed by the court to represent a party, usually an indigent
defendant, in a criminal case.
2015 Bar, Q. I(A): Define the following terms: counsel de officio.

1998 Bar, Q. II(1): Explain the meaning of counsel de officio.
2015 Bar, Q. I(B): Define the following terms: counsel de parte
A: Counsel de parte is a lawyer chosen by a party to represent him
in a case
k. Attorney ad hoc – a person named and appointed by the
court to defend an absentee defendant in the suit in which
the appointment is made.
2014 Bar, Q. XIV: A person named and appointed by the court to
defend an absentee defendant in the suit in which the
appointment is made is an:
(a) attorney-in-fact
(b) attorney ad hoc
(c) attorney de oficio
A: (b)
2009 Bar, Q. I[b], (True or False): An attorney ad hoc is a lawyer
appointed by the court to represent an absentee defendant in a
suit in which the appointment is made.
A: TRUE. This applies when the absentee defendant has no
counsel present in court and delay has to be avoided. Said
counsel, also known as a curator ad hoc, is different from a
counsel de oficio where the party to be represented is present in
court but has no counsel (Bienvenu v. Factor's & Trader’s
Insurance Co., 33 La. Ann. 209, 1881 WL 8922 [La.]).
l. Attorney of Record/Counsel of Record – attorney whose
name must appear somewhere in permanent records or files
of case, or on the pleadings or some instrument filed in the
case, or on appearance docket.
Reynolds v. Reynolds. Person whom the client has named as his
agent upon whom service of appears may be made.
Black’s. An attorney of record is one who has filed a notice of
appearance (e.g. through a praecipe) and who hence is formally
mentioned in court records as the official attorney of the party.
Once an attorney becomes an attorney of record, he often cannot
withdraw from the case without court permission.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
De Leon v. CA. When a party is represented by counsel of record, q. Amicus Curiae Par Excellence – Bar associations who appear
service of orders and notices must be made upon said attorney in court as amicus curiae
and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel
of record, is not notice in law. An amicus curiae has no control over the suit and has no right to
institute any proceedings therein; the amicus curiae cannot
2015 Bar, Q. I(D): Define the following terms: counsel of record. assume functions of a party in an action or proceedings pending
before the court. Ordinarily, the amicus curiae cannot file a
m. Of counsel – to distinguish them from attorneys of record, pleading in a case.
associate attorneys are referred to as “of counsel”
n. Lead counsel – In brief, an amicus curiae acts merely as a consultant to guide the
court in a doubtful question or issue pending before it. The
amicus curiae serve without compensation
Black’s. The counsel on either side of a litigation action who is
charged with the principal management and direction of party’s
2014 Bar, Q. XVIII: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
case, as distinguished from his juniors or subordinates, is said to
may intervene in a case involving a matter of public law or
lead in the cause” and is termed the “leading counsel” on the
side. professional concern as:
It may also refer to the chief or primary attorney in class action or (a) friend of the court
(b) amicus par excellence
multi-district litigation.
(c) amicus curiae
o. House counsel
A: (b)
Black’s. Lawyer who acts as attorney for business though carried
as an employee of that business and not as an independent r. Bar Association – an association of members of the legal
lawyer. Generally, such lawyer advises business on day to day profession like the IBP where membership is integrated or
matters. compulsory.
p. Amicus Curiae Voluntary Bar Association in the Philippines:
Black’s. Literally, it means, a friend of the court. 1. Philippine Bar Association
2. Philippine Lawyers Association
A person with strong interest in or views on the subject matter of 3. Trial Lawyers Association of the Philippines
an action, but not a party to the action, may petition the court for 4. Vanguard of Philippine Constitution
permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but 5. All Asia Bar Association
actually to suggest a rationale consistent with its own views. 6. Catholic Lawyers’ Guild of the Philippines
7. Philippine Society of International Law
Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in appeals 8. WILOCI
concerning matters of a broad public interest. 9. WLAP
10. FIDA
Rule 138, Sec. 36. Amicus Curiae — Experienced and impartial 11. ASEAN (Philippines)
attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to
help in the disposition of issues submitted to it. s. Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) – the National
Grievance Investigation Officer referred to in Rule 139-B,
2015 Bar, Q. I(C): Define the following terms: amicus curiae. Sec. 2 of the ROC.
It is the investigating arm of the SC on administrative matters
1998 Bar, Q. II(2): Explain the meaning of amicus curiae
involving disbarment cases against lawyers.
1993 Bar, Q. IV(a): Define “Amicus Curiae” Its recommendation is subject to the review by the IBP Governors.
[4]

If the resolution of the latter is one of suspension or disbarment,
it is automatically elevated to the SC for final disposition
Nature of the Proceeding in the CBD
Sambajon v. Suing. While the CBD is not a court, the proceeding
therein is nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary
action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.
Other Relevant Terms and Definitions
t. Advocate –general and popular name for a lawyer who
pleads on behalf of someone else
One who is learned in the law and duly admitted to the practice of
law.
Villegas v. Legaspi. An advocate is one who pleads the cause of
another before a tribunal or judicial court; a counselor.
u. Barrister (England) – A person entitled to practice law as an
advocate or counsel in superior courts
Black’s. In England, an advocate; a counselor learned in the law
who has been admitted to plead at the bar, and who is engaged in
conducting the trial or argument of causes
A person called to the bar by the benchers of Inns of Court, giving
exclusive right of audience in the SC.
v. Solicitor (England) – A person prosecuting or defending suits
in Courts of Chancery.
w. Court of Chancery – is a court which administers equity and
proceeding according to the forms and principles of equity
x. Solicitor (Philippines) – a government lawyer attached with
the OSG
y. Proctor (England) – formerly, an attorney in the admiralty
and ecclesiastical courts whose duties and business
correspond exactly to those of an attorney-at-law or solicitor
in Chancery
z. Titulo de Abogado – means not mere possession of the
academic degree of Bachelors of Laws but membership in
the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the
practice of law.
Cui v. Cui. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school
upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not
entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English
equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference
to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law
as a consequence.
aa. Integration of the Bar – the official unification of the entire
lawyer population, and this requires membership and
financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non
to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys to the SC.
Letter of Atty. Arevalo, Jr. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject
to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach
of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar
and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
bb. Integrated Bar of the Philippines – the national organization
of lawyers created on Jan. 16, 1973 under Rule 139-A, and
constituted on May 4, 1973 into a body corporate by P.D.
181
General Objectives of the IBP
IBP, By-Laws. Sec. 2. Objectives and purposes - The following are
the general objectives of the Integrated bar:
(1) To elevate the standards of the legal profession,
(2) To improve the administration of justice; and
(3) To enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibilities
more effectively.
The purposes of the Integrated Bar include, without being limited
to, those specified in the per curiam Resolution of the SC dated
Jan. 9, 1973 ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar, to wit:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain, on the part of its members, high ideals
of integrity, learning, professional competence, public
service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
[5]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law
reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations
of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education; and
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in
substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon.
Membership in the IBP Chapter
Garcia v. De Vera. A lawyer does not automatically become a
member of the IBP chapter where he resides or works after
becoming a full-fledged
He has the discretion to choose the IBP Chapter he wants to join.
Santos, Jr. v. Llamas. Without paying IBP dues, a lawyer cannot
engage in practice of law, no matter how limited is his practice.
The exemption from payment of income tax granted to senior
citizens by R.A. 7432 does not include payment of membership or
association dues of the IBP.
Similarly, as regards due, they are not entitled to 20% discount.
There is No Retirement in the IBP
In re: Atty. Principe. There is no such thing as retirement in the
IBP as understood in labor law.
A lawyer, however, may terminate his bar membership after filing
the required verified notice of termination with the Sec. of the
IBP.
IBP is a Non-Political Bar
Rule 139-A, Sec.13. Non-political Bar — The Integrated Bar shall
be strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this
basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial,
or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election
of appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for
any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

When Constituted as Body Corporate (May 4, 1973 under P.D.
181)
Voluntary Bar Associations
Rule 139-A, Sec. 17. Voluntary Bar Associations – All voluntary
Bar associations now existing or which may hereafter be formed
may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at
cross-purposes therewith.
Position in IBP Are Honorary
Rule 139-A, Sec. 14. Positions honorary — Except as may be
specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no
Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or
committee member shall receive any compensation, allowance or
emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service
rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any
expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.
Membership is Mandatory
In re: Edillon. Membership in the National IBP is mandatory. It is
not violative of a lawyer’s freedom to associate
The IBP is the Investigating Arm of the SC in the Investigation of
Disbarment
Rule 139-B. The IBP is given the power to entertain cases of
disbarment filed before it, or cases filed before the SC and
referred to it for investigation, report, and recommendation.
It does not have the power to suspend or disbar.
Its recommendations are subject to appeal to the SC which alone
has the prerogative to disbar
Admission to Practice of Law
Power to Admit to Practice, Vested in the SC (1987 Constitution,
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5))
In re: Cunanan. The constitutional power to admit candidates to
the legal profession is a judicial function and involves the exercise
of discretion.
Petition to that end is filed with the SC, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
In re: Lanuevo. The SC acts through a Bar Exam Committee in the
exercise of its judicial function to admit candidates to the legal
profession.
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar
Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court
who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act
as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject
assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the
Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual
members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant
who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily,
every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the
Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court
and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court.
Basic Requirements for All Applicants for Admission to the Bar
Rule 138, Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar — Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar:
(a) Must be a citizen of the Philippines,
(b) At least twenty-one years of age,
(c) Of good moral character, and
(d) Resident of the Philippines; and
(e) Must produce before the SC satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and
(f) That no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Academic Requirements for Candidates
Rule 138, Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants —
All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the
two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied
law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed
courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and
recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the
candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or
school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further
evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he
has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school
or university duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation,
medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
[6]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Rule 138, Sec. 6. Pre-Law — No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic,
english, spanish, history and economics.
No Particular Law School Has a Monopoly of Knowledge of the
Law
Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen. An alumnus of a particular law school
has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar
Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer's
oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to
be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia,
an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law
degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a
lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an
engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
Requirements before a Candidate Can Practice Law
Rule 138, Sec. 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants
— An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has
been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall
take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding
oath of office.
Rule 138, Sec. 18. Certificate — The Supreme Court shall
thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the
courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered
to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such
record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall
be his authority to practice.
Disqualification to Take the Bar Exam
In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Meling in
2002 Bar Examinations. The requirement of good moral character
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.
By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to

be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.
While Practice of Law is a Privilege, It has Also the Nature of a
Right
In re: Edillon. The practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap. Private practice of law contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
It is not a natural or constitutional right
In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of
Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, etc. A partnership for the practice of
law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on
accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a
mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. It is not
a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property." Thus, it has been stated that
"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law
practice is improper.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but
is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in
its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the
nature of a public trust.
Ex Parte Garland. While it is unquestionable that the practice of
law is a privilege, it is also in the nature of a right because the
lawyer cannot be prevented from practicing law except for valid
reasons as the practice of law is not a matter of State’s grace or
favor.
Marcos and Concordia v. Chief of Staff. An instance of a valid
reason where a lawyer may be prevented from appearing in court
is the provision of the Constitution prohibiting Senators and
Representatives from appearing before court and Electoral
Tribunals.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
A constitutional provision extending that right to one accused in
any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives
the accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a
court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to
appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts
of the state.
Phil. Lawyers’ Assoc. v. Agrava. The Director of the Philippine
Patent Office cannot restrict lawyers from appearing before the
said Office by requiring them to pass first an examination to cover
patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice in the said
Office.
Any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice
law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial or administrative, in the Philippines without need of
passing another examination. The ruling applies to all quasi-
judicial bodies.
Who are Entitled to Practice Law?
Rule 138, Sec. 1. Who may practice law — Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Practice of Law, Concept
In re: David. Generally, to engage in the practice is to do any of
those acts which are characteristic of the legal profession.
PLA v. Agrava. It covers any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal principles practice or
procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.
People v. Villanueva. The word practice of law implies the
customary or habitual holding of oneself to the public as a lawyer
demanding compensation for his legal services.
Latest Ruling on the Meaning of Practice of Law
Cayetano v. Monsod. Practice of law means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill
[7]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
“Practice of law" particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
People v. Villanueva. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding
payment for such services.
General Coverage of Practice of Law
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc. In the practice of his profession, a
licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity:
(a) Legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of
their rights and obligations,
(b) Preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of
legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and
(c) Appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and
property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law.
Basic Characteristics of the Practice of Law
Tan v. Sabandal. Practice of law is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but whom also known to possess good moral
character.
Canlas v. CA. It is not a money-making venture.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. CA. The practice of law is a
calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal
of freedom from government interference, is impressed with
public interests, for which it is subject to State regulation.
In re: Clifton. Practice of law cannot be assigned or inherited, but
must be earned by hard study and good conduct.

In re: Ellis. It is not a right de jure.
Adez Realty v. CA. Practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions.
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap. Private practice of law contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
People v. Tuanda. It is reserved only to those who are
academically trained in law and possessed of good moral
character not only at the time of his admission to the Bar but even
more so, thereafter, to remain in the practice of law.
Koscoe Pound. The practice of law is a profession and not a
business as it is an essential part in the administration of justice, a
profession in pursuit of which pecuniary reward is considered as
merely incidental; it is a pursuit of learned art in the interest of
public service.
Non-Lawyers Who are Authorized to Appear in Court
GR: Only those who are licensed to practice law can appear and
handle cases in court.
XPN:
1. Rule 138, Sec. 34. By whom litigation conducted — In the
court of a justice of the peace (MTC) a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of (a) an agent or (b) friend
appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an
attorney.
In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or
by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
People v. Sim Ben. He is bound by the same rules in conducting
the trial of his case. He cannot, after judgment, claim he was not
properly represented by counsel
2012 Bar, Q. (9): Atty. Magtanggol of the PAO was assigned to
defend X who is accused of Slight Physical Injury before the MTC
of a far-flung town. During the trial, PO2 Tulco appeared in court
on behalf of the complainant. Atty. Magtanggol objected to his
appearance since the policeman is not a member of the Bar.
(a) The objection is valid. It should be the public prosecutor
who should prosecute the criminal action.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(b) Atty. Magtanggol is just afraid that his client may be
convicted through the efforts of a non-lawyer.
(c) In the courts of a municipality, a party may conduct his
litigation in person or with the aid of an agent or friend.
(d) If a public prosecutor is not available, at least a private
prosecutor who must be a lawyer should be designated.
A: Bonus [The question is vague. Moreover, options B, C and D are
unresponsive to the question]
2012 Bar, Q. (10): Bong Tupak, a second year law student, was
charged in the RTC for Forcible Abduction with Rape. Having
knowledge of criminal law and procedure, he dismissed the
counsel de oficio assigned and appeared for himself. He asserted
that there was lack of force. Eventually, the RTC found him guilty
of Consented Abduction and imposed the penalty. Bong Tupak
now assails the decision, saying that there was a violation of due
process because he was allowed to appear by himself and he did
not know that Consented Abduction is a crime. Decide.
(a) An accused before the RTC may opt to defend himself in
person and he cannot fault others for his decision.
(b) The RTC should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist
the accused even if not sought or requested by the
accused.
(c) There was violation of due process. There is disparity
between the expertise of a public prosecutor and the
inexperience of a 2nd year law student.
(d) A 2nd year law student has sufficient knowledge of criminal
law and procedure, hence, he is competent to defend
himself.
2009 Bar, Q. III(a): May a party appear as his own counsel in a
criminal or in a civil case? Explain.
A: A party may appear as his own counsel in civil cases (Rule 138,
Sec. 34, ROC). However, in criminal cases involving grave and less
grave offenses, he must always appear through counsel.
A party may appear without his own counsel before the MTC,
whether or not for a civil or criminal case. In the RTC or the
Appellate Courts, a party in a civil suit may conduct his litigation
either personally or by attorney unless the party is a juridical
person. However, with respect to criminal proceedings in the said
tribunals, the right to counsel of an accused is absolute or
immutable. It has never been considered subject to waiver (Flores
v. Ruiz, 1979).
[8]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1999 Bar, Q. III: A, a mere high school graduate, with the aid of a
friend who is a college undergraduate, filed a complaint for
recovery of a sum of money in the amount of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos in the Metropolitan Trial Court of his town.
The Clerk of Court told A that his complaint might be dismissed
for insufficiency as to form because neither he nor his friend
who is assisting him is a lawyer.
Is the Clerk of Court correct?
A: The Clerk of Court is not correct. In the justice of the peace
courts (now known as MTC or MCTC or MeTC), a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
(Rule 138, Sec. 34, ROC).
1999 Bar, Q. IV: A, a law graduate but has not passed the bar
examination, filed a Complaint in the Regional Trial Court for
recovery of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos owed him by B. At
the hearing of the case after Answer was filed. A appeared by
himself alone and without counsel to prosecute his case. The
defendant pointed out to the Court that A was not a member of
the bar and suggested that for his own protection, A should
engage the services of a counsel duly accredited as a member of
the Bar. The Judge intimated his willingness to reset the hearing
of the case to another day to enable plaintiff to engage the
services of counsel. Plaintiff replied he could manage to
prosecute his own case, it being but a simple case for collection
of sum of money. If you were the Judge, will you allow A to
continue prosecuting his case by himself alone?
A: Rule 138, Sec. 34, ROC provides that in a RTC, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar. Hence, if I were the Judge, I will allow A to
continue prosecuting his case alone, but I will warn him about the
risks involved in his doing so because of his lack of knowledge of
law and legal procedure.
Alternative:
(1) If I were the Judge, I will not allow A to prosecute his case.
Although he is a law graduate, it does not appear that he is
familiar with procedural law, having filed the case with the
RTC which has no jurisdiction over the case in view of the
amount involved. The judge is duty bound to see to it that
there is no miscarriage of justice.
(2) No. I shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because
the amount of P50,000.00 is within the jurisdictional ambit

of the MTC. Consequently, A could not continue prosecuting
the case.
1995 Bar, Q. VII(1): Is pro se practice allowed in the Philippines?
Explain.
A: Yes, under Rule 138, Sec. 34.
1995 Bar, Q. VII(2): May a lawyer who has been disbarred
appear in court to defend himself in a criminal case? Explain.
A: By virtue of Rule 138, Sec. 34, a lawyer who has been disbarred
may appear in court to defend himself in a criminal case.
1993 Bar, Q. IX: Atty. Santiago was disbarred by a resolution of
the Supreme Court. Five years later, Atty. Santiago filed a
petition for reinstatement, alleging that he had reformed, and
that he had been sufficiently punished and disciplined. However,
no action was taken on the petition. In the meantime, in a
proceeding for the probate of his father’s will, Atty. Santiago
filed a formal opposition on his own behalf and sought to
establish that the will was a forgery and that the deceased died
intestate. His co-heirs questioned his appearance citing his
disbarment.
May the appearance of Atty. Santiago be allowed? State your
reason.
A: Atty. Santiago can properly represent himself as oppositor in
the probate of the will of his father. While he has been disbarred
from practice and has not been reinstated to practice law, he can
properly represent himself because representing himself is not
practice of law.
Rule 138, Sec. 34, ROC allows an individual litigant to conduct his
litigation personally. It means that he can do everything in the
defense of his rights in the said case. The prohibition against the
practice of law by a layman or a disbarred lawyer is not in conflict
with the right of an individual to defend or prosecute a cause in
which he is a party. An individual has long been permitted to
manage, prosecute and defend his own action, but his
representation on his behalf is not considered to be the practice
of law. One does not practice law by acting for himself any more
than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself. For
this reason, an attorney who is otherwise disqualified to practice
law or has been disbarred or suspended from practice, can validly
prosecute or defend his own litigation, he having as much right as
that of a layman in that regard.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2. Student Practice Rule
Rule 138-A: Law Student Practice Rule
Sec. 1. Conditions for Student Practice – A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance – The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
2009 Bar, Q. III(b): What is the student practice rule?
Cruz v. Mina. The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice
Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A, prohibits the petitioner, as a
law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father,
the private complainant in the criminal case without the
supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
However, in Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No.
730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before
an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively
simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Rule 138,
Sec. 34 provides:
Rule 138, Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted - In the court
of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
[9]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of
the bar.
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in B.M. 730 is
subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now
appears in Rule 138, Sec. 34, thus:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted — In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his
Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on Sept. 25, 2000. No real
distinction exists for under Rule 5, Sec., the term "Municipal Trial
Courts" as used in these Rules shall include MeTC, MTCC, MTC,
and MCTC
There is really no problem as to the application of Sec. 34 of Rule
138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-
lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law
student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may
appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Rule 138, Sec.
34. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that
petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts
a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis
for the petitioner’s appearance.
Sec. 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior
courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of WON he is a law
student. As succinctly clarified in B.M. 730, by virtue of Sec. 34,
Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.
2012 Bar, Q. (12): Debbie, topnotcher of their class, is now on
her 4th year law studies and has enrolled in the legal aid clinic of
the law school. She was assigned to handle a domestic violence
and support case filed by their client against her husband.
During the hearing, the clinic's supervising attorney introduced
Debbie to the Branch Clerk of Court and then left to oversee

another intern. In the midst of the proceedings, opposing
counsel objected to the appearance of Debbie because she is not
yet a lawyer. Decide.
(a) Debbie can proceed because the law student practice rule
allows a student who has finished 3rd year of the regular
course to appear without compensation before a trial court.
(b) Debbie can proceed since she is appearing only during the
trial and did not sign the pleadings.
(c) Debbie cannot proceed without the presence of their
clinic's supervising attorney.
(d) Debbie has proven her capability to handle the case and
opposing counsel is objecting only now because he might
lose to a law student.
2006 Bar, Q. II(2): Enumerate the instances when a law student
may appear in court as counsel for a litigant.
A:
(a) Under the Student Practice Rule, a law student who has
successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized
law school’s clinical legal education program approved by
the Supreme court, may appear without compensation in
any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school, under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines if he appears in a Regional Trial Court,
and without such supervision if he appears in an inferior
court (B.M. 730, June 10, 1997);
(b) When he appears as an agent or friend of a litigant in an
inferior court (Rule 138, Sec. 34);
(c) When he is authorized by law to appear for the
“Government of the Philippines” (Rule 138, Sec. 33);
(d) In remote municipalities where members of the bar are not
available, the judge of an inferior court may appoint a non-
lawyer who is a resident the province and of good repute for
probity and ability, to aid the defendant in his defense (Rule
116, Sec. 4);
(e) A law student may appear before the NLRC or any LA: (a) If
he represents himself, as a party to the case, (b) he
represents an organization or its members with written
authorization from them, or (c) he is a duly accredited
member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the DOJ or
the IBP in cases referred to by the latter (Art. 222, LC,
Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 1997);
(f) Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer may represent a
claimant before the Cadastral Court (Sec. 8, Act No. 2250).
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
3. Rule 116, Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio — The
court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as
counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good
standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can
competently defend the accused.
But in localities where such members of the bar are not available,
the court may appoint any person, (a) resident of the province
and (b) of good repute for probity and (c) ability, to defend the
accused.
Paar v. Borromeo. If there are available members of the bar, the
judge cannot appoint a non-lawyer as defense counsel for the
accused.
4. Conditions for student practice (Rule 138-A, Sec. 1)
5. Art. 222, LC. Non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or
any LA, if:
(a) If they represent themselves
(b) If they represent their organization or members thereof with
written authorization of the latter, or
(c) They are duly accredited members of any legal aid office
duly recognized by the DOJ, or the IBP in cases referred to
by the latter.
2011 Bar, Q. 21: Eric, a labor federation president, represented
Luisa, a dismissed WXT employee, before the NLRC. Atty. John
represented Luisa's two co-complainants. In due course, the
NLRC reinstated the three complainants with backwages and
awarded 25% of the backwages as attorney’s fees, 15% for Atty.
John and 10% for Eric, a non-lawyer. When WXT appealed to the
Court of Appeals, Atty. John questioned Eric’s continued
appearance before that court on Luisa’s behalf, he not being a
lawyer. Is Eric's appearance before the Court of Appeals valid?
(a) Yes, for Eric has a personal stake, the fees awarded to him,
in defending the NLRC's decision in the case.
(b) No, since John can very well represent Luisa, she being in
the same situation as his own clients.
(c) No, because the representation of another in courts can be
entrusted only to lawyers.
(d) Yes, since that appeal is a mere continuation of the labor
dispute that began at the NLRC.
2002 Bar, Q. II: Raul Catapang, a law graduate and vice-president
for labor relations of XYZ Labor Union, entered his appearance
as representative of a member of the union before the Labor
[10]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Arbiter in a case for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages and overtime
pay. Counsel for the Company objected to Raul’s appearance
and moved for his disqualification on the ground that he is not a
lawyer. If you were the Labor Arbiter, how would you resolve
the motion? Why?
A: I will deny the motion to disqualify Raul. Art. 222, LC authorizes
non-lawyers to appear before the NLRC or any LA in
representation of their organization or members thereof.
6. Act No. 2259, Sec. 9. A non-lawyer can represent a claimant
before the Cadastral Court.
7. Rule 138, Sec. 33. Standing in court of person authorized to
appear for Government — Any official or other person
appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear
for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the
rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in
any case in which said government has an interest direct or
indirect.
8. DARAB. A non-lawyer may represent a party before the
DARAB
Note: Those mentioned above are allowed to appear only in
certain cases. They do not practice law
Zeta v. Malinao. All members of the Bar may practice law. A non-
lawyer who practices law will be guilty of illegal practice of law.
1996 Bar, Q. II(2): Generally, only those who are members of the
bar can appear in court.
Are there exceptions to this rule? Explain.
Punishment for Persons Who Presented to be a Lawyer
Tan v. Balajadia. The unauthorized practice of law by assuming to
be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes
indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both
A Disbarred or Suspended Lawyer Had No More Authority to
Appear in Court as a Lawyer
In re: David. Balon, Jr., who was disbarred previously but
continued to represent himself as a lawyer was found guilty of
indirect contempt of the SC and fined P30,000 with imprisonment
in case of failure to pay within 5 days.

A suspended lawyer cannot practice law during the period of his
suspension.
2006 Bar, Q. III(1): The Supreme Court suspended indefinitely
Atty. Fernandez from the practice of law for gross immorality.
He asked the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of his town if he
can be appointed counsel de oficio for Tony, a childhood friend
who is accused of theft. The judge refused because Atty.
Fernandez’s name appears in the Supreme Court’s List of
Suspended Lawyers. Atty. Fernandez then inquired if he can
appear as a friend for Tony to defend him.
(1) If you were the judge, will you authorize him to appear in
your court as a friend for Tony?
(2) Supposing Tony is a defendant in a civil case for collection
of sum of money before the same court, can Atty.
Fernandez appear for him to conduct his litigation?
A:
(1) I will not authorize him to appear as a friend of Tony. The
accused in a criminal case is entitled to be represented by
legal counsel, and only a lawyer can be appointed as counsel
de officio. Although a municipal trial court may appoint a
person of good refute to aid the accused as counsel de
officio in his defense, this is applicable only where members
of the bar are not present (Rule 116, Sec. 4, ROC).
Necessarily, the friend referred to one who is not a lawyer.
Atty. Fernandez is a lawyer but under Indefinite suspension.
He should not be allowed to practice law even as a counsel
de officio.
(2) Even if Tony is a defendant in a civil case, Atty. Fernandez
cannot be allowed to appear for him to conduct his
litigation; otherwise, the judge will be violating Canon 9, CPR
which provides that "a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Alternative to (1) and (2): Yes, if Atty. Fernandez was appointed
by Tony. Even if Atty. Fernandez was suspended indefinitely, he
may appear as an agent or friend of Tony, the party litigant in the
MTC, if Tony appoints him to conduct his case (Rule 138, ROC;
Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr., 1983).
Public Officials Who Cannot Practice Law in the Philippines
(1) Rule 138, Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice — (a)
No judge or (b) other official or (c) employee of the (1)
superior courts or of (2) the OSG, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice
to clients.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(2) People v. Villanueva. Government prosecutors.
(3) Art VII, Sec. 13, 1987 Constitution. The (a) President, (b)
Vice-President, (c) the Members of the Cabinet, and (d) their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
(4) Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution. No member of a
Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in the active management or
control of any business which, in any way, may be affected
by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in
any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
(5) Minute Resolution, JBC-003. Members of the JBC
(6) Ombudsman and his deputies.
Art. XI, Sec. 8, par. 2, 1987 Constitution. During their tenure, they
shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
provided for in Sec. 2 of Art. IX-A of this Constitution.
(7) R.A. 7160, Sec. 90. Practice of Profession –
(a) All (a) governors, (b) city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in
any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage
in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also
members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein
a LGU or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office;
[11]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the LGU of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest
of the government.
2012 Bar, Q. 38: Vice-Mayor Ron is a well-loved law practitioner
because he assists his constituents, especially the indigents. Ed,
one of his friends who is employed as Cashier in the Register of
Deeds, sought his assistance because he was charged with
Malversation in court. Can Vice-Mayor Ron appear as counsel of
Ed?
(a) Yes, members of the Sanggunian are allowed to practice
their profession.
(b) No, because Ed is charged with an offense in relation to his
office.
(c) Yes, since the position of Ed does not pertain to the local
government.
(d) No, because all criminal cases are against the government.
2012 Bar, Q. 39: Atty. Noe was elected Vice-Governor and
continued with his law practice. Later, the governor went on sick
leave for one (1) year and Atty. Noe was designated as Acting
Governor. Since hearings have already been set, can Atty. Noe
continue appearing as counsel in the cases handled by him?
(a) Yes, because his election is only as Vice-Governor, and his
delegation as Governor is only temporary.
(b) Yes, but only for the hearings that have already been set.
(c) Yes, provided Atty. Noe seeks the permission of DILG.
(d) No, all governors – even under acting capacity – are
prohibited from exercising their profession.
2011 Bar, Q. 10: Elaine filed a complaint against Fely before their
barangay concerning a contract that they entered into. During
conciliation, Fely came with Sarah, who claimed the right to
represent her minor sister. The barangay captain let Sarah assist
her sister. Eventually, the barangay issued a certificate to file
action after the parties failed to settle their differences. When
Sarah formally appeared as lawyer for her sister, Elaine filed an
administrative complaint against her for taking part in the
barangay conciliation and preventing the parties from taking
meaningful advantage of the same. Is Sarah liable?
(a) No, because she has to represent her sister who was a
minor.
(b) No, because the Court can always dismiss the case without
prejudice to a genuine conciliation.

(c) Yes, because what Sarah did was deceitful and amounts to
fraud.
(d) Yes, because as a lawyer, she is absolutely forbidden to
appear in barangay conciliations.
2011 Bar, Q. 33: Atty. Eliseo represented Allan in a collection suit
against the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). After
his election as sangguniang bayan member, the court rendered a
decision in PCSO’s favor. Still, Atty. Eliseo appeared for Allan in
the latter’s appeal, prompting the PCSO to question his right to
do so. In response, Atty. Eliseo claimed that the Local
Government Code authorizes him to practice law as long it does
not conflict with his duties. Is Atty. Eliseo right?
(a) No, because he cannot appear against a government
instrumentality in a civil case.
(b) Yes, because his official duties do not conflict with his
private practice.
(c) No, because he works on his private case at the sacrifice of
public service.
(d) Yes, because he does not appear in the case as a municipal
official.
2000 Bar, Q. III: A town mayor was indicted for homicide
through reckless imprudence arising from a vehicular accident.
May his father-in-law who is a lawyer and a Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member represent him in court? Reason.
A: Yes, his father-in-law may represent him in court. Under the
LGC (R.A. 7160), members of the Sanggunian may engage in the
practice of law, except in the following:
(1) They shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil
case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency
or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) They shall not appear as counsel in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation
to his office;
(3) They shall not collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings including the local government
unit of which he is an official; and
(4) They shall not use property and personnel of the
Government except when the Sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interests of the government. In
this case, the town mayor was indicted for homicide through
reckless imprudence, an offense that is not related to his
office.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1992 Bar, Q. VII: Atty. Cecilio Hilado, a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bohol, was engaged by Irene
Gemora as counsel in a case for malversation of public funds
which she filed against City Treasurer Paulino Alvarez. When
Hilado accepted the case, City Treasurer Alvarez filed an
administrative case against Hilado for practicing law in violation
of Sec. 7 of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees) which inter alia states that: “(b)
Public officials, during their incumbency shall not: (2) Engage in
the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law.
Hilado then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the Ground that:
(1) He is very selective in accepting cases and appears in court
only outside of session hours of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; and
(2) In any event, it is the Supreme Court alone, under Art. VIII,
Sec. 5 of the Constitution that has the power to
“promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts ..."
How valid are the arguments of Hilado? Resolve the case.
A: The arguments of Atty. Hilado are not valid.
(1) Atty. Hilado should not appear in said case which involves a
criminal prosecution of a city treasurer. Under Sec. 90(b)(2),
LGC
(2) While it is true that it is the SC that promulgates rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the matter in
question involves administrative law governing public
officials prohibiting practicing law while holding a public
office in criminal cases as provided in the aforesaid Sec. 90,
LGC
(8) Those who by special law are prohibited from engaging in
the practice of law
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions - In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. -
Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer,
employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee
[12]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their
office unless expressly allowed by law;
Public Officials with Restrictions in the Practice of Law
(a) Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution. No Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene
in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
Cayetano v. Monsod. Since the practice of law covers a wide
range of legal activities, the Senator or Congressman is allowed to
engage in the other aspects of the law practice such as the (a)
giving of legal advice to clients, (b) negotiating contracts in behalf
of clients which necessitates legal knowledge, (c) preparation of
documents (d) conveyancing and similar others.
2012 Bar, Q. (37): Atty. Fred is a law practitioner and headed a
law firm bearing his name and those of his partners. When Atty.
Fred was elected as Congressman, his client's needs were
handled by the other partners. Later, A, a newly proclaimed
congressman-friend, faced an election protest before the HRET,
and sought the help of Congressman Fred who immediately
directed his law firm to appear for A. B, the protestant, sought
the disqualification of Congressman Fred's law firm from
appearing before the HRET because Congressman Fred is
prohibited from practicing his profession. Decide.
(a) Yes, Congressman Fred's law firm is disqualified because
Congressman Fred may exercise undue influence on his
peers who are members of HRET.
(b) No, the law firm is not disqualified because it is another
partner, and not Congressman Fred who is appearing.
(c) No, the prohibition is on Congressman Fred from
personally appearing, and not to his partners.
(d) Yes, the spirit of the prohibition is clearly to avoid influence
and cannot be indirectly circumvented.
1996 Bar, Q. IV(2): Congresswoman C is a senior partner in a law
firm. Although C no longer appears in court, she advises clients
and corrects the pleadings of her assistants. A political opponent

lodged a complaint with the House Committee on Ethics
contending that Congresswoman C is prohibited by the
Constitution to practice law.
Will the complaint prosper? Explain.
A: The complaint will not prosper. Sec. 14, Art. VI of the
Constitution provides that “No senator or member of the House
of Representatives may personally appears as counsel before any
court of justice or before the electoral tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies.” What is prohibited is “personal
appearance."
Since the practice of law covers a wide range of activities senators
and congressmen are allowed to engage in the other aspects of
legal practice such as the giving of legal advice to clients (Pineda,
Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1995 ed., p. 20). However, he should not
sign any pleading.
1990 Bar, Q. VIII: In a civil case before the RTC between Mercy
Sanchez and Cora Delano, Sanchez engaged the services of the
Reyes Cruz & Santos Law Offices. Delano moved for the
disqualification of the Reyes Cruz & Santos Law Offices on the
ground that Atty. Cruz is an incumbent senator.
Rule on the motion with reasons.
A: As a judge, I will require that the name of Atty. Cruz, an
incumbent Senator, be dropped from any pleading filed in court
or from any oral appearance for the law firm by any other
member of the law firm, and should the law firm refuse, I will
disqualify the law firm. My reasons are as follows:
Art. VI, Sec. 14 ofthe 1987 Constitution provides that “no Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of Justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies." What is prohibited is personal appearance of the
Senator.
Atty. Cruz, and for as long as the Senator does not personally
appear in court for Mercy Sanchez, the prohibition does not
apply. Personal appearance includes not only arguing or
attending a hearing of a case in court but also the signing of a
pleading and filing it in court. Hence, the Senator should not
allow his name to appear in pleadings filed in court by itself or as
part of a law firm name, such as Reyes Cruz and Santos Law
Offices, under the signature of another lawyer in the law firm, nor
should he allow the firm name with his name therein to appear as
counsel through another lawyer, without indirectly violating the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
constitutional restriction, because the signature of an agent
amounts to a signing by the Senator through another lawyer is in
effect his appearance, the office of attorney being originally one
of agency, and because the Senator cannot do indirectly what the
Constitution prohibits directly. The lawyer actually appearing for
Mercy Sanchez should drop the name of Atty. Cruz from any
pleading or from any oral appearance in court, otherwise the law
firm could be disqualified.
Moreover, Rule 6.02, CPR prohibits a lawyer in government from
using his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, and the Senator’s name appearing in pleadings or in
appearances by other lawyers in the law firm may be
misconstrued as indirectly influencing the judge to decide the
case in favor of the law firm’s client, which can only be avoided by
dropping the name of the Senator from the firm name whenever
it appears in court.
Alternative:
(a) The motion to disqualify the Reyes Cruz and Santos Law
Offices may not prosper as Art. VI, Sec. 14 of the
Constitution prohibits a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives to personally appear as counsel in any court
of justice. If Attorney Cruz who is a Senator personally
appears, he may be disqualified.
(b) I will deny the motion. The Constitution prohibits personal
appearance by a member of Congress before the Courts but
does not totally prohibit law practice. As long as the Senator
does not personally or physically appear in court, there is no
disqualification.
(b) See R.A. 7160, Sec. 90(b) on Sanggunian Members
(c) R.A. 910, Sec. 1, as amended. A retired justice or judge
receiving pension from the Government, cannot act as
counsel in any civil case in which the Government or any of
its subdivisions or agencies is adverse party or in a criminal
case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense in relation to his office.
2013 Bar, Q. IX: Graft Investigator Atty. Retirada served the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for eight years before retiring
from the service. While still a Graft Investigator, she investigated
a government contract for office supplies where Mr. Sakim was
the supplier. The transaction was supposedly overpriced. Atty.
Retirada recommended that no charges be filed against the
officials involved and the recommendation benefited Mr. Sakim
as the supplier involved in the transaction.
[13]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
After her retirement from the service, Atty. Retirada’s services
as counsel were engaged by Mr. Sakim as counsel to represent
the Sakim family in a claim against the State arising from a
family property that had been expropriated. Atty. Retirada now
consults you about the ethical permissibility of accepting the
engagement.
What advice would you give Atty. Retirada?
(a) Having been in government service, she cannot now
represent a party with a claim against the State.
(b) Having once handled a case involving her prospective client,
a conflict of interest would exist if she were to accept the
engagement.
(c) Representing the Sakim family would involve the unethical
use of information she obtained while in government
service.
(d) There is no ethical objection to her acceptance of the
engagement because the case is neither criminal nor
administrative in character.
(e) Acceptance of the engagement should be on condition that
Atty. Retirada would withdraw if a conflict of interest
situation arises.
A: (d). There is no conflict of interest since the case involved is an
expropriation case (R.A. 910, Sec. 1)
2011 Bar, Q. 12: Justice Frank, a retired Court of Appeals justice,
appeared before the Supreme Court on behalf of Landbank, a
government bank, in a case involving the compensable value of
the property taken from a landowner under the agrarian reform
law. The landowner questioned Justice Frank's appearance in
the case, pointing out that the same is unethical and smacks of
opportunism since he obviously capitalizes on his judicial
experience. Is Justice Frank's appearance in the case valid?
(a) Yes, because the law allows such appearance as long as the
government is not the adverse party.
(b) No, because he cannot enjoy his retirement pay and at the
same time work for a government institution.
(c) Yes, since Landbank does not perform government function.
(d) No, he should have waited for at least a year to avoid
improprieties.
1996 Bar, Q. X(2): Justice C recently retired. The parents of the
victims of the OZONE Disco tragedy retained him in the case for
damages which they filed against the owners of the Disco,
Quezon City officials and Quezon City.
Can he appear as counsel for the victims' parents? Explain.

A: Sec. 1 of R.A. 910, as amended, provides that “it is a condition
of the pension provided for herein that no retiring justice or judge
of a court of record or city or municipal judge during the time that
he is receiving the said pension shall appear before any court in
any civil case wherein the government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party or in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee
for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain
an interest adverse to the Government, national, provincial or
municipal, or to any of its legally instituted officers."
Inasmuch as the case being offered to Justice C is a civil case
against not only the disco itself, but also against Quezon City and
its officials, he will be violating the aforesaid condition if he
appears as counsel for the victim's parents in the said case.
Resumption of Privilege to Practice of Law by a Filipino Lawyer
Who Lost Philippine Citizenship But Later Acquired Dual
Citizenship
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Dacanay.
B.M. No. 1678, Dec. 17, 2007
Facts:
1. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960.
2. He practiced law in the Philippines until his migration in
Canada in 1998 to seek medical attention for ailments
3. Later, in May 2004, he became a Canadian citizen
4. On July 14, 2006, he acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant
to R.A. 9225.
5. On same day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada.
6. He returned to the Philippines and intends to practice law.
7. Hence, this petition
Issue: WON a person who re-acquired his Filipino citizenship
may practice law in the Philippines
Held:
1. The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions
in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law.
2. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to
the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in
the practice of law.
3. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
4. The XPN is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225.
5. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of RA 9225."
6. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
7. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.
8. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."
9. Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
(a) The updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
(b) The payment of professional tax;
(c) The completion of at least 36 credit hours of MCLE; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Background of CPR
 The CPR is the principal source and basis of the rules of
ethics for members of the Bar who do not belong to the
judiciary
 For judges and justices, it is the Code of Judicial Ethics as
enhanced by the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Avacena v. Liwanag. The CPR applies to lawyers in the
government service except the magistrates.
[14]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
 In revivifying the canons of legal ethics for all lawyers, the SC
has approved and promulgated the CPR on June 21, 1988 –
drafted in 1980 by the IBP Committee on Responsibility,
Discipline and Disbarment and submitted to the SC for
approval.
 Before the promulgation of the Code, the SC had
promulgated Rule 139-B of the ROC granting the IBP the
concurrent power to investigate its members – preserving
however the final authority to suspend and disbar attorneys
to the High Court.
SC not Predisposed to Grant Full Independence to the IBP
Circular No. 3-89, Feb. 9, 1989. The SC, just a few months after it
had approved and promulgated the CPR, clarified (during the
pendency of the investigation of charges against certain Justices
of the CA), that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline has no
authority to investigate incumbent justices and judges by
interpreting Rule 139-B, Sec. 1 as not applicable to them.
CPR is Binding on All Lawyers. Violations Thereof is a Ground for
Disciplinary Action.
 It must be recalled that while the CPE have not been
reduced to statutory rules, nonetheless, they have attained
the level of norms of conduct which every attorney must
obey and respect
 If the said Canons of the American Bar Association adopted
by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917, have received
judicial recognition by being cited and applied by the SC in
its resolutions and decisions and have been considered
sources of Legal Ethics, with more reasons should the
present CPR be accorded greater respect and recognition by
all members of the Bar, promulgated as it was, by no less
than the Highest Court of the land.
Alvero v. Dela Rosa. Considering that the CPR were promulgated
in the exercise of the constitutional authority of the SC concerning
the admission to the practice of law (Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)), it
naturally follows that the Canons like the ROC, when not contrary
to any legal provision, have the force and effect of law and any
breach thereof will make the lawyer liable for disciplinary action
for professional misconduct.
2014 Bar, Q. III: The Code of Professional Responsibility is the
code of conduct for:
(a) members of the Bench
(b) members of the Bar
(c) members of the Bench and the Bar

A: (b)
Alternative: (c)
Duties of Attorneys the Revised Rules of Court
Rule 138, Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself,
the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the
law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of
life or liberty, but by due process of law.
Duties of Attorneys Spread in the CPR
(1) (a) – part of Canon 1
(2) (b) – part of Canon 11
(3) (c) – implied in Rule 15.05
(4) (d) – implied in Canons 3 and 10
(5) (e) – incorporated in Canon 21 and Rule 20.03
(6) (f) – part of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01
(7) (g) – part of 1.03
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(8) (h) – incorporated as Rule 2.01
(9) (i) – part of Rule 14.01
Nature of the Position of an Attorney as an Officer of the Court
National Savings Bank v. Ward. An attorney is not an officer in
the constitutional or statutory meaning of the term.
Langan v. Borkowski. However, in a limited sense, he is
considered a public officer occupying a quasi-judicial office.
 Having been admitted to the practice of law by no less than
the SC which alone has the authority to admit persons to
practice law before all courts in the entire country, the
lawyer is considered an Officer of the Courts – which
incidentally are all created by law.
Nature of Legal Profession
Ledesma v. Climaco. The legal profession is a form of public
service or public trust intimately related to the administration of
justice, in the practice of which pecuniary rewards are considered
as merely incidental.
It must signify for its followers a mental and moral setting apart
from the multitude – it is a priesthood of justice.
Koscoe Pound. The practice of law is a profession and not a
business as it is an essential part in the administration of justice, a
profession in pursuit of which pecuniary reward is considered as
merely incidental; it is a pursuit of learned art in the interest of
public service.
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
Chapter I: The Lawyer and Society
Canon 1: A Lawyer Shall Uphold the Constitution, Obey the Laws
of the Land and Promote Respect for Law and Legal Processes
Lawyer’s Primary Duty to Society or State; Attorney’s Oath
 Canon 1 is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath which every
lawyer in this country has to take before he is allowed to
practice law.
I, ______________ of ____________ do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
[15]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same.
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
And I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God.
Lawyer’s Oath is a Sacred Trust, Not a Mere Ceremony
Ting-Dumali v. Torres. The Lawyer’s Oath is not a mere ceremony
or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it
mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must
uphold and keep inviolable at all times.
In re: Gutierrez. Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of
society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements
of the body politic
2016 Bar, Q. I. State the duties of a lawyer imposed by the
Lawyer's Oath.
A: The following are the duties of a lawyer imposed by the
lawyer’s oath:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) To support its Constitution;
(c) To obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities;
(d) To do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same in
any court;
(e) Not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor to give nor to consent to the doing
of the same;
(f) To delay no man for money or malice;

(g) To conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts
as to his clients;
(h) To impose upon himself that voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion
2015 Bar, Q. IV: The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligation and
its violation is a ground for suspension, disbarment, or other
disciplinary action. State in substance the Lawyer’s Oath
2009 Bar, Q. XII: Write the complete test of the attorney’s oath.
2006 Bar, Q. XIII: What are the primary duties imposed by the
Lawyer’s Oath upon every member of the Bar?
(a) Maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as legal
orders of duly constituted authorities;
(b) Do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court;
(c) Not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit or give aid nor consent to the same;
(d) Delay no man for money or malice;
(e) To conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the court as to his clients (Rule 138, Sec. 3 Rules of Court).
2003 Bar, Q. I: State the significance of the lawyer's oath. What,
in effect, does a lawyer represent to a client when he accepts a
professional employment for his services?
A: “The significance of the oath is that it not only impresses upon
the attorney his responsibilities but it also stamps him as an
officer of the court with rights, powers and duties as important as
those of the judges themselves. It is a source of his obligations
and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action.” (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1992 ed., p. 59)
By accepting a retainer, he impliedly represents that:
(a) He possesses the competence required for the practice of
his profession,
(b) He will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or
defense of his client’s cause;
(c) He will exercise reasonable and ordinary diligence; and
(d) He will take such steps as will adequately guard his client’s
interest.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
In brief, that he will abide by his lawyer’s oath that he will conduct
himself to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his client
1996 Bar, Q. I(2): What is the significance of lawyer's oath?
A: “The significance of the oath is that it not only impresses upon
the attorney his responsibilities but it also stamps him as an
officer of the court with rights, powers and duties as important as
those of the judge themselves. The oath of a lawyer is a
condensed code of legal ethics. It is a source of his obligation and
its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action". (Agpalo. Legal Ethics, 5th ed., p.59)
Lawyers Will be Disciplined for Disobeying Legal Orders or
Processes of Courts
People v. Dalusag. A lawyer was admonished for his failure to
inform the SC of his answer or reaction to his appointment by the
Court as counsel for one of the appellants.
Luzon Mahogany Timber Industries Inc. v. Castro. A lawyer was
reprimanded for failure to file the Comment required by him by
the SC.
Casals v. Cusi, Jr. Suspension was meted out to a lawyer for
failure to file Comment despite the several extensions he asked
for and which were granted by the Court.
Geeslin v. Navarro. And for continuing to practice of law in clear
violation and open defiance of the original resolution of
suspension from the practice of law, the SC ordered the name of
the lawyer stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys
Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr. Graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to
show respect to their processes.
Marcelo v. CA. All lawyers are expected to recognize the authority
of the SC and to obey its lawful processes and orders and if he has
not taken this to heart, he is unfit to engage in the practice of law.
A Lawyer Who Issued Bouncing Checks Violates the Law and is
Subject to Disbarment or Suspension
People v. Tuanda
Facts:
[16]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1. A lawyer was convicted of violation of B.P. 22 which the
Court considered a crime involving moral turpitude as this
mischief creates not only a wrong to the payee or holder,
but also injury to the public
2. The lawyer was suspended by the CA.
3. She went to the SC asking for the lifting of the Order of
suspension arguing that the issuance of bouncing checks
does not relate to the exercise of her legal profession.
Issue: WON A lawyer who issued bouncing checks violate the
law and is subject to disbarment or suspension
Held:
1. We should add that the crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's
oath and the CPR under both of which she was bound to
"obey the laws of the land."
2. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as
in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate
to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person convicted of such offense.
3. In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that:
“The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she
shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.”
Sanchez v. Somoso. When respondent paid, with a personal check
from a bank account which he knew had already been closed, the
person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in
refusing to settle his due obligation despite demand, respondent
exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath
he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in
high esteem.
His conduct deserves nothing less than a severe disciplinary
sanction.
2016 Bar, Q. XIV(a): Sonia, who is engaged in the lending
business, extended to Atty. Roberto a loan of P500,000.00 with
interest of P25,000.00 to be paid not later than May 20, 2016. To
secure the loan, Atty. Roberto signed a promissory note and
issued a postdated check. Before the due date, Atty. Roberto
requested Sonia to defer the deposit of the check. When Atty.
Roberto still failed to pay, Sonia deposited the check which was

dishonored. Atty. Roberto ignored the notice of dishonor and
refused to pay.
Did Atty. Roberto commit any violation of the CPR? Explain.
A: Atty. Roberto committed violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon
7 and Rule 7.03 in issuing a bouncing check.
He should very well know that the issuance of a bouncing check is
an unlawful act, a crime involving moral turpitude (Co v.
Bernardino, A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998)
1992 Bar, Q. X: The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction of Atty. Gancho for violation of B.P 22 and likewise
suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law. Thereupon
Atty. Gancho filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
validity of his suspension from the practice of law contending
that the Court of Appeals acted as offended party, prosecutor
and judge all at the same time.
(1) Resolve this motion.
(2) Despite the order suspending him from the practice of law,
Atty. Gancho still continued, to prosecute the ejectment
cases which he himself filed against his tenants. The
tenants then questioned the authority of Atty. Gancho to
prosecute the cases when he is under suspension. May
Atty. Gancho be allowed to continue appearing in the
ejectment cases?
A:
(1) The motion for reconsideration should be denied. It is now:
a settled rule that a lawyer found guilty of violation of B.P.
22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Check Law is a crime
involving moral turpitude which is a ground for disbarment.
(2) Atty. Gancho may still continue prosecuting the case not as a
lawyer but as a party litigant.
Significance of Lawyer’s Oath
Businos v. Ricafort. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, an attorney
becomes:
(a) A guardian of truth and the rule of law, and
(b) An indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice – a vital function of democracy, a
failure of which is disastrous to society.
Effect of Failure to Take the Attorney’s Oath
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
In re: Abad. A successful bar candidate who was allowed to sign
by the Clerk of the SC to sign the Roll of Attorney’s but was unable
to take his oath before the SC, although he paid his IBP dues and
listed as “qualified voter” in IBP affairs, cannot be admitted to the
Bar without having actually taken his oath of office as an attorney
Oath Alone Will Not Make a Bar Passer a Full Fledged Member of
the Bar
Aguirre v. Rana. A bar passer must not only take his oath as
member of the Bar, but he must also sign the Roll of Attorneys.
This last act makes him a full-fledged lawyer.
2015 Bar, Q. VI(a)(c): Casper Solis graduated with a Bachelor of
Laws degree from Achieve University in 2000 and took and
passed the bar examinations given that same year. Casper
passed the bar examinations and took the Attorney's Oath
together with other successful bar examinees on March 19, 2001
at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC). He was
scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys on May 24, 2001 but he
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys sent by the
Office of the Bar Confidant after he went home to the province
for a vacation. Since taking his oath in 2001, Casper had been
employed by several law firms and private corporations, mainly
doing corporate and taxation work. When attending a seminar
as part of his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education in 2003,
Casper was unable to provide his roll number. Seven years later
in 2010, Casper filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to sign
the Roll of Attorneys. Casper alleged good faith, initially
believing that he had already signed the Roll before entering
PICC for his oath-taking on March 19, 2001.
Can Casper already be considered a member of the Bar and be
allowed to use the title of "attorney"? Explain.
Will you grant Casper's Petition to belatedly sign the Roll of
Attorneys? Why?
A: Casper cannot already be considered a member of the Bar and
be allowed to use the title of attorney. In the case of In re:
Petition to Sign on the Roll of Attorneys. Michael A. Medado,
Petitioner (B.M. No. 2540, September 2003), involving the same
facts, the SC held that it is the act of signing the Roll of Attorneys
that makes a successful Bar examinee a full-fledged member of
the Philippine Bar.
I will grant Casper’s petition to belatedly sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
[17]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
He demonstrated good faith and moral character in voluntarily
filing his petition. He did not wait for a third party to file a
complaint against him for his transgression. However, he should
be allowed to sign the Roll only one year afterwards, which is
tantamount to a suspension, as was done in the Medado case.
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (UDID)
Lawyer Must Constantly be of Good Moral Character
 The moral character he displayed when he applied for
admission to the Bar must be maintained incessantly.
Otherwise, his privilege to practice the legal profession may
be withdrawn from him.
People v. Tuanda. The nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to
the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law
Rule 138, Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme
Court on what grounds — A member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for:
(a) Any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office,
(b) Grossly immoral conduct, or
(c) By reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or
(d) For any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or
(e) For a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or
(f) For corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do.
(g) The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
2010 Bar, Q. XXII: A retired member of the Judiciary is now
engaged in private practice. In attending hearings, he uses his
car bearing his protocol plate which was issued to him while still
in the service.
Pass on the ethical aspect of the judge’s use of the protocol
plate.
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: The judge’s use of his protocol plate after his retirement is The SC added a fourth: (iv) to protect errant lawyers from
unethical. He is no longer entitled to use such protocol plate after themselves. (a) Estafa
his retirement. As a practicing lawyer, he should not engage in (b) Bribery
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His continued Unlawful Acts of Violation of Laws (c) Murder
use of a protocol plate after his retirement is at least dishonest (d) Bigamy
conduct.” In re: Terrell. A lawyer was suspended for promoting an (e) Seduction
organization designed to violate or evade the laws against crime (f) Abduction
with knowledge of its aims. (g) Concubinage
1992 Bar, Q. VIII: A complaint was filed with the Integrated Bar
(h) Smuggling
of the Philippines (IBP) by Mrs. Remy Rozon against Atty.
Piatt v. Abordo. A lawyer who agreed to purchase opium – (i) Falsification of public document
Matapobre asking that the latter be suspended from the practice
prohibited drug – although the sale was not consummated (j) Violation of B.P. 22
of law indefinitely for being a notorious usurer and for filing
because he was robbed of the purchase price by the vendors
groundless suits for various sums of money against his victims.
 See Rule 138, Sec. 27
In re: Quiambao. A lawyer who engineered a scheme through his
Mrs. Rozon described the modus operandi of respondent thus:
brother to defraud another person was disbarred. Honestly, Still The Lawyer’s Best Virtue
Matapobre would require a prospective borrower to execute a
Gonzaga v. Realubin. The transgression of any provision of law by People v. Gilmore. Honesty is essential for every lawyer to retain
promissory note in bank and simultaneously open a checking
a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the court will his standing as member of the bar.
account in a bank, if he has none at the moment. Then
not countenance.
Matapobre would fill up the notes showing the principal, as well
Dishonesty is a ground for disciplinary action
as the interest rate at 10% a month or 120% per annum, plus
Fernandez v. Grecia. A lawyer who after borrowing court records
other charges and attorney’s fees. Before maturity of the checks,
stole exhibits by tearing them off, was disbarred for the second Some Cases of Dishonesty and Deceit Which Merited Discipline
Matapobre would inquire from the debtor whether his deposit is
time. He descended to the level of a common thief. by the SC
already funded. If he answers in the negative, which was more
often than not, Matapobre would magnanimously assure the
Bautista v. Gonzales. The law violated need not be a penal law. (1) Macoco v. Diaz. Misappropriation of client’s funds.
debtor that he would forgo presentment of the checks as long as
The violation of Art. 1491 of the CC by a lawyer is a sufficient (2) In re: Rovero. Act of fraudulently concealing dutiable
the debt is paid. However, the moment the debt falls due,
ground for disciplinary sanction. importation or smuggling
regardless of whether the checking account is funded,
(3) Calo v. Degamo. Giving false statements under oath in an
Matapobre would insist on payment. If none is forthcoming,
Re: 2003 Bar Exams. A lawyer was disbarred for transmitting and Information Sheet in connection with the lawyer’s
Matapobre would file a criminal case against the delinquent
distributing the stolen Bar Exam questions to some members of application for the position of Chief of Police.
debtor for issuance of a bouncing check in violation of Batas
his fraternity to give them undue advantage over the other (4) Agdoma v. Celestino. Wanton falsehood made in an ex
Pambansa Blg. 22.
examinees. parte petition in court wherein the lawyer attached affidavit
of his grandfather and which affidavit he notarized knowing
Mr. Rozon declared that Matapobre, having victimized several
Batac, Jr. v. Cruz. A lawyer was suspended for committing that the supposed affiant is already dead.
persons and pushed them to the brink of penury, has acquired
dishonesty concerning the excuses for his failure to attend (5) Imbuido v. Fidel Sor Mangonon. Maneuvering
the reputation of being a loan shark, it was only she who had the
hearing and lack of respect for legal orders. reconveyance of property in the name of the lawyer instead
courage to file charges against the lawyer/ usurer.
of the client – in a case involving sale with pacto de retro.
Unlawful Conduct (6) Submission or presentation of mutilated copies of certain
A: The issue is not violation of the Usury Law but whether Atty.
documents to courts for the purpose of deceiving and
Matapobre is still fit to continue as a member of the Bar. It is
Lim-Santiago v. Sagucio. Unlawful conduct includes violation of misleading it
grossly immoral for the lawyer to have manipulated the
the statutory prohibition on a government employee to “engage (7) In re: Del Rosario. Falsification of grades in the Bar Exams.
transactions which resulted in charging excessive rates of
in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the (8) Malegrito v. Barba. Collecting several thousand pesos on
interests on loans and later threatening them with violation of the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or the pretense that counsel would allegedly appeal the
Bouncing Check Law. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
tend to conflict with his official functions. complainant’s case to the SC of the US, and that it was
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (CPR, Canon 1, Rule 1.01)
necessary to him to go to Washington, DC which he did,
Conviction for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude knowing that the decision could no longer be appealed
Purpose of Requirement for Good Moral Character
because it is already final.
A number of lawyers have been suspended or disbarred for (9) In re: Quiambao. Inducing someone to buy a piece of land
Dantes v. Dantes. The purposes for the requirement of good
conviction of crimes involving crimes involving moral turpitude knowing that it is not for sale.
moral character are: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the such as:
public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients.
[18]

(10) Licuanan v. Melo. Delayed failure to account money
collected for the client.
(11) Fernandez v. Grecia. Stealing evidence attached to the court
records.
(12) Castillo v. Taquines. Adamant refusal to return money he
received but intended for a party and issuing a bouncing
check in payment therefor.
(13) Roces v. Aportadera. Notarization of a falsified deed of sale
of his client’s property.
(14) Resurrecion v. Sayson. Misappropriating the settlement
amount which he received for the client
(15) Yuson v. Vitan. Evading payment of debt
(16) Afurong v. Aquino. Misrepresenting that he was still
connected with a law firm. Committing falsehood in stating
in his Urgent Motion for Postponement that he had to
appear in another case, when there was none.
(17) Rivera v. Corral. A lawyer who altered a material date to
make it appear that her Notice of Appeal was timely filed
committed an act of dishonesty.
(18) Modejar v. Rubia. Notarizing of documents despite
expiration of notarial commission.
Morality, Concept
Morality is that quality (or property) of a human act whereby it
measures up to what it should be as a step towards the objective
last end of human action, or fails so to measure up.
It consists therefore in the relation existing between human acts
and the norm of morality.
The Norm of Quality
A human act is evil if it fails to conform to the Norm of Morality in
any one of the points or determinants:
(a) The act itself (i.e. the object)
(b) The end of the agent
(c) The circumstances other than the end of the agent.
Morality as Understood in Law
In re: Basa. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, morality or good morals.
Arciga v. Maniwang. Immoral conducthas been defined as “that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
matters of the community.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Alfonso v. Juanson. Immorality is not confined to sexual conduct.
Arciga v. Maniwang. A lawyer should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.
2010 Bar, Q. VII: Atty. Candido commented in a newspaper that
the decision of the Court of Appeals was influenced by a
powerful relative of the prevailing party. The appellate court
found him guilty of indirect contempt. Does this involve moral
turpitude? Explain.
A: Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals, an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
modesty or good morals.” (Soriano v. Dizon, 2006). Based on this
definition, it would appear that the published comment of Atty.
Candido does not constitute “moral turpitude” although
contemptuous.
1993 Bar, Q. I: What is moral turpitude? Mention some crimes
which involve moral turpitude.
A: Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Some crimes which involve moral turpitude are robbery, rape,
estafa and falsification of document.
1996 Bar, Q. IV(a): Atty. Z, a notary public commissioned in
Quezon City, attended a wedding at Makati. B requested Z to
notarize a deed of sale executed between X and Y who were
both in Baguio City. Atty. Z who has a portable notarial seal,
notarized the document. Subsequently, X assailed the document
alleging that his signature thereon was falsified. X filed a case for
disbarment against Atty. Z.
What is the liability of Atty. Z, if any? Explain.
A: Atty. Z may be held criminally liable for violating Art. 171, RPC
(Falsification by Public Officer), by making it appear that X and Y
appeared and acknowledged having executed the deed of sale
before him, when in fact they did not so appear or acknowledged.
He may also be administratively liable for not obeying the laws of
the land (Canon 1, CPR). Moreover, his jurisdiction as notary is
only in Quezon City.
Morality Must be a Lasting Virtue
[19]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Cordon v. Balicanta. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets
of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one’s good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral
character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if
it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong.
Moral Character Distinguished from Good Reputation
Royond v. Oblena. The respondent also maintains that he did not
falsify his petition to take the bar exams in 1954 since according
to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was
a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly
erroneous.
One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral
character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person
really is, and not what he or other people think he is.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license
to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what
he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known.
As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional
integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice
law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to
escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at
the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who
knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render
him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his
immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit
to remain a member of the bar.
Advincula v. Macabata. In B.M. 1154, good moral character was
defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character
has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2)
to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective
clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on
the lips.
This act of kissing was not found as grossly immoral as to justify
the imposition of serious penalty. Case was dismissed but
respondent was reprimanded.
In re: Argosino. All aspects of moral character and behavior may
be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evidence rejection of what
moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible finding that the participant was possessed of good
moral character.
Psychological Incapacity of a Lawyer Does Not Necessarily Make
Him Unfit Member of the Bar
Paras v. Paras. One’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically
mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa.The yardsticks for
such roles are simply different.
This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be
conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
While Rosa’s charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a
lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband.
In the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such."
Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court."
On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the
question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a
grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders
him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.
Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless
marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion,
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Justo’s acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is
psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of
what is expected from a lawyer.
Instances of Gross Immorality
(1) Toledo v. Toledo. Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with
another woman. Disbarred
(2) Villasanta v. Peralta. Bigamy perpetrated by the lawyer.
Disqualified from admission to the Bar.
(3) Quingwa v. Puno. A lawyer who had carnal knowledge with
a woman through a promise of marriage which he did not
fulfill.
(4) Royong v. Oblena. Seduction of a woman who is the niece
of a married woman with whom the respondent lawyer had
adulterous relations
(5) Mortel v. Aspiras. Lawyer arranging the marriage of his son
to a woman with whom the lawyer had illicit relations. After
continued his adulterous relations with her. Disbarred.
(6) Cabrera v. Agustin. Lawyer inveigling a woman into
believing that they had been married civilly to satisfy his
carnal desires. Disbarred
(7) Delos Reyes v.Aznar. Lawyer taking advantage of his
position as chairman of the college of medicine and asked a
lady student to go with him in Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under threat that if she refused, she
would flunk in all her subjects.
(8) Laguitan v. Tinio. Concubinage coupled with failure to
support illegitimate children. Suspended indefinitely.
(9) Cordova v. Cordova. Maintaining adulterous relationship
with a married woman. Suspended indefinitely.
(10) Lee v. Abastillas. Delivering the bribe money to a judge on
request of clients. Sternly warned. But, judge was dismissed.
(11) Barrientos v. Daarol. Seducing a woman thru promise of
marriage by a married lawyer. Disbarred.
Immorality is Not Confined to Sexual Matters
Advincula v. Macabata. Immorality has not been confined to
sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude,
or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and
public welfare.
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or
beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and customary.
[20]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of
complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and
undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
2015 Bar, Q. XVIII: Atty. Javier sold a piece of land in favor of
Gregorio for P2,000,000.00. Atty. Javier drafted the Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase which he and Gregorio signed on
August 12, 2002. Under said Deed, Atty. Javier represented that
he had "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple" the
land and that the land is "free from all liens and encumbrances."
The Deed also stated that Atty. Javier had two years within
which to repurchase the property. Atty. Javier turned over the
owner's copy of his certificate of title, TCT No. 12121, to
Gregorio. Gregorio then immediately took possession of the
land.
Atty. Javier failed to exercise his right to repurchase within two
years. Gregorio sent Atty. Javier a letter dated April 8, 2005
demanding that the latter already repurchase the property.
Despite receipt of Gregorio's letter, Atty. Javier still failed to
repurchase the property. Gregorio remained in peaceful
possession of the land until July 25, 2013, when he received
notice from Trustworthy Bank informing him that the land was
mortgaged to said bank, that the bank already foreclosed on the
land, and that Gregorio should therefore vacate the land. Upon
investigation, Gregorio discovered that Atty. Javier's TCT No.
12121 had already been cancelled when another bank
foreclosed on a previous mortgage on the land, but after a series
of transactions, Atty. Javier was able to reacquire the land and
secure TCT No. 34343 for the same. With TCT No. 34343, Atty.
Javier constituted another mortgage on the land in favor of
Trustworthy Bank on February 22, 2002. Gregorio was
subsequently dispossessed of the property. Gregorio filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Javier. In his defense,
Atty. Javier argued that he could not be held administratively
liable as there was no attorney-client relationship between him
and Gregorio. Moreover, the transaction was not actually one of
sale with right to repurchase, but one of equitable mortgage,
wherein he still had the legal right to mortgage the land to other
persons.
(a) If you are tasked to investigate and report on Gregorio's
administrative complaint against Atty. Javier, what will be
your recommendation and finding?
(b) In the same administrative case, may Atty. Javier be
ordered to return the P2,000,000.00 purchase price to
Gregorio? Explain.
A:

(A) In the case of Saladaga v. Atty. Arturo Astorga (A.C. No.
4697, November 25, 2014), involving the same facts, the SC
found that:
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and
deceit when he entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it
appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his
name, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said
certificate oftitle, when the truth is that the said TCT had already
been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the
name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong
statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new
copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982,21 or barely a month
after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly
committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against
complainant (Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, CPR)
Consequently, the Court held that:
The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall within the
concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They
violate Art. 19, CC. They show a disregard for Sec. 63 of the Land
Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and
deceit on respondent’s part. Thus, respondent deserves to be
sanctioned.
Following the said precedent, I will recommend that Atty. Javier
be likewise be sanctioned.
(B) However, Atty. Javier may not be ordered to return the
P2,000,000.00 to Gregorio in the administrative case. This is
a civil liability which is best determined in a civil case. The
sole issue in an administrative proceeding is whether or not
the respondent deserves to remain a member of the Bar
(Concepcion and Blesilda S. Concepcion v. Atty. Elmer A.
Dela Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, February 3, 2015, J. Perlas-
Bernabe)
1992 Bar, Q. VI(1): Glicerai Magat who works as a clerk typist in
the Dimakali Law Office wrote a letter to the Supreme Court
accusing her employer Atty. Dimakali of violating her honor
several times. He would invite her to go out an official business
only to bring her to Regina Court, a motel in Ermita. There he
would force his desires on her. Whenever she remonstrated and
fought him, he would threaten to dismiss her. She asked the
Supreme Court to disbar that “monster lawyer who thinks
nothing of violating the honor and purity of virgins like me.”
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal
Is there any ground for disciplining Atty. Dimakali? Explain. belief in his client's innocence or in the justice of his cause.
A: Yes, there is a ground for disciplining Atty. Dimakali for his The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client,
immoral behavior and abuse of his authority in his lady clerk- warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
typist. This is a plain sexual harassment. exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
Rule 1.02: A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.
system. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
Defiance of the Law not to be Abetted, Nor Acts Lessening
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
Confidence in the Legal System
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much
Canon 32, CPE. No client corporate or individual, however,
less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
powerful nor any cause, civil or political, however important, is
manner of fraud or chicanery, he must obey his own conscience
entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any service or
and not that of his client.
advice involving disloyalty to the laws whose ministers we are,
or disrespect of the judicial office, which we are bound to
In re: Terrel. A lawyer will be traversing this oath, if he assists an
uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exercising a
organization, the “Centro Bellas Artes” known to him as organized
public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the
for the purpose of evading the law in force in the City of Manila.
public.
American Bar Association Op. 281. Allows himself to be engaged
When rendering any such improper service or advice, the lawyer
by an organization whose members are violating the law and to
invites and merits stern and just condemnation.
defend them when they get caught.
Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the
best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice
Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union v. Lo Bu. Such conduct on
tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact
the part of counsel is far from commendable (attempt to frustrate
compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also
writ of execution). He could, of course, be casuistic and take
observe and advice his client to observe the statute law, though
refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition, which he
until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by
denied, was, in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly
competent adjudication he is free and is entitled to advise as to its
worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter being included
validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just
therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of
meaning and extent. But above all a lawyer will find his highest
grammar.
honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to
public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.
He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special
defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously
Duty to be Performed within the Law
admitted. That is the most that can be said of his performance,
and it is not enough.
Canon 15, CPE. How far a lawyer may go in supporting a client's
cause
For even if such be the case, Atty. Busmente had not exculpated
himself. He was of course expected to defend his client's cause
Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular
with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of
prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession
the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that
of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which
his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of
belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false
the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand-boy
claim often set up by the unscrupulous for the defense of
at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every
questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do
bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts
whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause.
into serious question his good standing in the bar.
[21]

2016 Bar, Q. XI: George, an American citizen doing business in
the Philippines, bought a lot in Manila and secured the services
of Atty. Henry for the execution of the required documents.
Atty. Henry prepared a Deed of Sale of Land using the name of
George's friend, Pete, as the buyer. In order to protect George's
interests and ensure his free and undisturbed use of the
property for an indefinite period of time, Atty. Henry also
prepared a Counter Deed of Sale and Occupancy Agreement
signed by Pete in favor of George. A competitor of George filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Henry on the ground that
he violated the Constitution and the CPR. Rule on the complaint
and explain.
A: I will rule in favor of the complainant.
In the case of Danton v. Tansingco (A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006),
which involves the same facts as in this case, the SC held that in
preparing an Occupancy Agreement, the lawyer in the said case
advised and aided a foreigner in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of land.
Thus, the SC held that the lawyer used his knowledge of the law
to achieve an unlawful end, which amounts to malpractice in his
office, for which he may be suspended. That ruling is equally
applicable in this case.
Respect for Law is Gravely Eroded When Lawyers Themselves
Engage in Unlawful Practices and Brush Aside the Rules of the
IBP Formulated for Their Observance
In re: IBP Elections. The candidates and many of the participants
in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as
a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution
and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal
processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02,
Canon 1, CPR).
Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who
are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful
practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.
Preparation of a Document Contrary to Law and Morals is
Malpractice
In re: Santiago. A lawyer who advised his client that after 7 years
of separation from his spouse, he could remarry and in the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
process prepared a document declaring the spouses to be single
again and could contract subsequent marriages, and after the
spouse signed it, notarized it, is guilty of malpractice. He was
suspended for one year.
1994 Bar, Q. IV(c): Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is your obligation to: the public?
A: CPR, Rule 1.01 and 1.02
1988 Bar, Q. VI(a): A known grafter in the government
approaches you for the purpose of organizing a corporation to
engage in the general construction business—principally to
participate in public bidding for road and bridge constructions.
He requests you and your law partners to be the incorporators
because he does not want his name to appear in the articles of
incorporation.
Will you accept the engagement? Why or why not?
A: I will not accept the engagement for three reasons:
In the first place, the person is a known grafter. He is engaging my
services not as an attorney but for a business transaction. The
legal profession is not a business but a noble mission to assist in
the administration of justice.
In the second place, knowing him to be a grafter, he might be
using my law partnership only as a front for the purpose of
committing graft and corruption.
In the third place, I will be illegally and unethically associating my
legal profession with a business venture which is not proper.
1998 Bar, Q. XIII: Atty. Asilo, a lawyer and a notary public,
notarized a document already prepared by spouses Roger and
Luisa when they approached him. It is stated in the document to
Roger and Luisa formally agreed to live separately from each
other and either one can have a live-in partner with full consent
of the other.
What is the liability of Atty. Asilo, if any?
A: Atty. Asilo may be held administratively liable for violating Rule
1.02, CPR: “a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.” An agreement between two spouses to live separately
from each other and either one could have a live-in partner with
full consent of the other, is contrary to law and morals. The
[22]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
ratification by a notary public who is a lawyer of such illegal or
immoral contract or document constitutes malpractice or gross
misconduct in office. He should at least refrain from its
consummation. (In re: Santiago; Panganiban v. Borromeo; In re:
Bucana).
Rule 1.03: A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Basis: Rule 138, Sec. 120(g)
Obligation not to Encourage Suits
 Lawyers owes it to the court and to society not to stir up
litigations. While the act is not a crime, it is proscribed by
the rules of legal ethics.
Reason: To prevent barratry and ambulance chasing
Barratry and Ambulance Chasing, Prohibited, Meaning
Barratry is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up
quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise.
It is the lawyer’s act of fomenting suits among individuals and
offering his legal services to one of them for monetary motives or
purposes.
Ambulance Chasing, figuratively speaking, is the lawyer’s act of
chasing an ambulance carrying the victim of an accident for the
purpose of talking to the said victim or relatives and offering his
legal services for the filing of a case against the person who
caused the accident.
An ambulance chaser is a lawyer who haunts hospitals and visits
the homes of the afflicted, officiously intruding their presence and
persistently offering his service on the basis of a contingent fee.
Note: The lawyer is guilty of ambulance chasing whether the act is
done by him personally or by person under his employ. The effect
is the same.
1993 Bar, Q. IV(b): Distinguish “Ambulance Chasing" from
“Barratry"
A: Ambulance chasing is any act of improper solicitation of cases
such as fomenting litigation or instigating unnecessary lawsuits.
Barratry is an offense of exciting or stirring up suits and quarrels.
Both are improper and unethical acts of a lawyer.

Ambulance chasing refers more to a lawyer who instigates a
victim in a motor vehicle accident to file a case. Barratry is any
form of fomenting suit.
Evils Spawned by Ambulance Chasing
(a) Fomenting of litigation with resulting burdens on the courts
and the public;
(b) Subornation of perjury;
(c) Mulcting of innocent persons by judgments upon
manufactured causes of action
(d) Defrauding of inured persons having proper causes of action
but ignorant of legal rights and court procedure by means of
contracts which retain exorbitant percentages of recovery
and illegal charges for court costs and expenses and by
settlement made for quick returns of fees and against the
just rights of the injured person.
2011 Bar, Q. 29: Atty. Melissa witnessed the car accident that
resulted in injury to Manny, a friend of hers. While visiting him
at the hospital, she advised him about what action he needed to
take regarding the accident. Is Atty. Melissa subject to
disciplinary action if she eventually handles the case for him?
(a) No, because Melissa did not directly volunteer her services.
(b) No, because Manny happened to be a friend.
(c) Yes, she engaged in typical ambulance chasing.
(d) Yes, because she should have offered her services for free.
1994 Bar, Q. XV: While Atty. Ambo Lancia was on his way to
office in Makati, he chanced upon a vehicular accident involving
a wayward bus and a small Kia whose driver, a Mr. Malas,
suffered serious physical injuries. Coming to the succor of the
badly injured Mr. Malas, Atty. Lancia drove him to the nearest
hospital. On their way to the hospital, Mr. Malas found out that
Atty. Lancia was a practicing lawyer. In gratitude for his help,
Mr. Malas retained Atty. Lancia to file suit against the bus
company and its driver.
If you were Atty. Lancia; would you accept the case?
A: I will not accept the case if I were Atty. Lancia because it is
difficult to dismiss the suspicion that Atty. Lancia had assisted Mr.
Malas for the purpose of soliciting legal business. It is not clear
from the facts how Mr. Malas learned that Atty. Lancia was a
practicing lawyer. This could have happened only if Atty. Lancia
introduced himself as a lawyer. Moreover, Atty. Lancia may be
utilized as a witness.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Alternative: Atty. Lancia should not also accept the case if it will
involve his having to testify as a witness for Mr. Malas.
Volunteer Legal Advice to Bring Lawsuit, Unethical; Exception
CPE, Canon 28. Stirring up litigations, directly or through agents -
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so.
Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be
employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation
by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay
or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen,
court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others
who may succeed under the guise of giving disinterested friendly
advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the
ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the
public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the
bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any
practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end that the
offender may be disbarred.
Tempering Client’s Propensity to Litigate
Cobb-Perez v. Lantin. It is even the lawyer’s duty to resist the
whims and caprices of his client and to temper his client’s
propensity to litigate.
Banogon v. Zerna. Lawyers must not file pointless petitions that
only add to the workload of the judiciary.
Lawyer Should Not be an Instigator of Controversy But a
Mediator for Concord and Conciliator for Compromise
Castanedo v. Ago. It is the duty of a lawyer in his exalted position
as an officer of the court not to be an instigator of any
controversy.
Cobb-Perez v. Lantin. We condemn the attitude of respondents
and their counsel who, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for
those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very
ends of justice.
Delaying Any Man’s Cause for Corrupt Motive, Condemned
[23]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos. It is one of the duties of a lawyer not to
encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an
action or proceeding, or delay any man’s cause from any corrupt
motive or interest.
Jesalva v. Bautista. A lawyer cannot delay the approval of a
compromise agreement entered into between the parties, just
because his attorney’s fees were not provided for in the
agreement.
Appealing a Case for Purposes of Delay is Obstruction of Justice
Samar Mining Co. Inc. v. Arnado. An appeal interposed by
counsel for delay is condemned.
One other point must be stressed. The illness on which Abuyen's
claim is based took place in 1956. Yet, — through the present
case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of the CFI of Manila — petitioner
has succeeded in prolonging the litigation, for the compensation
involved therein, for twelve (12) years.
What is more, petitioner's contention was based upon a theory
that had been rejected by this Court as early as August, 1961.
Then again, the compensability of Abuyen's disability had never
been questioned by petitioner herein.
Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case, like the
previous one, has been merely to delay, a policy "Often resorted
to" — in the language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) — "as a means
of draining the resources of the poorer party" — in this case a
tuberculosis patient — "and of compelling it to submit out of
sheer exhaustion."
Thus, the conduct of petitioner's counsel is hardly compatible
with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice,
not to obstruct or defeat the same.
Vda. de Bacaling v. Laguna. There is something more to be said
about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has its
genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823)
brought before the Iloilo City Court.
What transpired therein presents a glaring example of a summary
proceeding which was deliberately protracted and made to suffer
undue delay in its disposal.
It was originally filed on Sept. 13, 1960; it reached the appellate
courts five (5) times, twice before the CA, Once before the CFI of
Iloilo, and twice before this Court.

The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous
attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt
termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her
counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court,
because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari
which should only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion by an inferior court. Recourse of this
kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply
wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really
meritorious cases.
Significance of an Attorney’s Signature on a Pleading – Not
Interposed for Delay
 A lawyer must always be reminded of the consequences of
his signature in a pleading as explicitly provided under the
Rule 7, Sec. 3
Rule 7, Sec. 3. Signature and address — Every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either
case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied
if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and
not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action.
Roxas v. CA. Thus, the petition to review the assailed resolutions
must fail: Let this serve as warning among members of the
Philippine bar who take their own sweet time with their cases if
not purposely delay its progress for no cogent reason. It does no
credit to their standing in the profession. More so when they do
not file the required brief or pleading until their motion is acted
upon
Not only should they not presume that their motion for extension
of time will be granted by the court much less should they expect
that the extension that may be granted shall be counted from
notice. They should file their briefs or pleadings within the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
extended period requested. Failing in this, they have only
themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed.
2013 Bar, Q. IV: Atty. Doblar represents Eva in a contract suit
against Olga. He is also defending Marla in a substantially
identical contract suit filed by Emma. In behalf of Eva, Atty.
Doblar claims that the statute of limitations runs from the time
of the breach of the contract. In the action against Marla, Atty.
Doblar now argues the reverse position – i.e., that the statute of
limitation does not run until one year after discovery of the
breach.
Both cases are assigned to Judge Elrey. Although not the sole
issue in the two cases, the statute of limitations issue is critical
in both.
Is there an ethical/professional responsibility problem in this
situation? If a problem exists, what are its implications or
potential consequences?
A: Yes. There is an ethical/professional responsibility problem that
results from the actuation of Atty. Doblar in arguing the reverse
positions.
The signatures of Atty. Doblar on the pleadings for Eva and for
Marla, constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleadings; that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support them; and that the
pleadings were not interposed for delay (Rule 7, Sec. 3, par. 2).
Atty. Doblar could not claim he has complied with the foregoing
requirement because he could not take a stand for Eva that is
contrary to that taken for Marla. His theory for Eva clearly
contradicts his theory for Marla. He has violated his professional
responsibility mandated under the ROC.
He has likewise violated the ethical responsibility that his
appearance in court should be deemed equivalent to an assertion
on his honor that in his opinion his client’s case is one proper for
judicial determination (CPE, Canon 30, par. 2, last sentence)
In counseling on the contradictory positions, Atty. Doblar has
likewise counselled or abetted activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system (CPR, Canon 1,
Rule 1.02) because conflicting opinions may result arising from an
interpretation of the same law.
Atty. Doblar could not seek refuge under the umbrella that what
he has done was in protection of his clients. This is so because a
lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His
[24]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of
the law and ethics (Ernesto Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 211,
1999, citing Maglasang vs. People, G.R. No. 90083, October 4,
1990).
Any means not honorable, fair, and honest, which is resorted to
by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
Some Instances of Delay Condemned by the SC
(1) Economic Ins. Co. v. Uy Realty Co. Resort to technicalities as
a means to frustrate justice.
(2) Tanhu v. Ramolete. Befuddling of the issues in the case by
counsel which invariably will be exposed for what they are.
(3) Gabriel v.CA. Filing of multiple or repetitious petitions –
which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment
(4) Macias v. Uy Kim. Filing of several actions covering the same
subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief.
(5) Samar Mining Co. Inc. v. Arnado. Filing frivolous appeals for
purposes of delay – an improper step often taken as a
means of draining the resources of the poorer party and
compelling him to submit out of sheer exhaustion which
waste, as it does, the time that the Courts could well devote
to meritorious cases.
(6) Filing for motions for postponements and other kinds of
motions for dilatory purposes;
(7) Dimagiba v. Montalvo. Indiscriminate filing of suits against a
party clearly intended for harassment
(8) Collantes v. Renomeron. Delaying cases or services for
money.
Rule 1.04: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or
settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
Nature of Compromise
Jesalva v. Bautista. The nature of a compromise agreement is
such that a party must give up some of the rights that he has, in
consideration of the same act on the part of the other side.
Authority of a Lawyer to Bind Clients
Rule 138, Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients —
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they
cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's

litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but
the full amount in cash.
Settlement of Cases Authorized and Encouraged by Law
Republic v. Villarosa. The settlement of cases in court is
authorized and even encouraged by express provision of law (Art.
2028 and 2029)
Jesalva v. Bautista. The law does not limit compromise to cases
about to be filed or cases already pending in courts.
That compromise which may be effected even after final
judgment is impliedly allowed by Art. 2040 of the CC
Lawyers Must Encourage Fair Settlement
Curtis. A compromise is as often the better part of justice as
prudence is the part of valor and a lawyer who encourages
compromise is no less the client’s champion in settlement out of
court than he is the client’s champion in the battle in court.
De Ysasi III v. NLRC. Whenever the controversy will admit of fair
judgment, the client should be advised to avoid or to end the
litigation. This will save the client from additional expenses and
help prevent the clogging of dockets.
Attorney’s Fees Not Ground for Disapproval of Compromise
Jesalva v. Bautista. The right of lawyers to the fees due them for
services in a litigation cannot have a higher standing than the right
of the clients or the parties themselves.
Lawyer’s rights may not be invoked by some of the parties as a
ground for disapproving the compromise.
The lawyer affected can enforce his rights in a proper proceeding
in accordance with the Rules, but said rights may not be used to
prevent the approval of the compromise.
A Lawyer Cannot Compromise Case Without Client’s Consent;
Exception.
Melendrez v. Decena. A lawyer, cannot, without special authority,
compromise his client’s litigation or receive anything in discharge
of the client’s claim but the full amount in cash.
A compromise entered into without authority is unenforceable. It
can be ratified by the client, if he so desires.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Mobil Oil Phil. v. Yabut. However, a lawyer has the exclusive
management of the procedural aspect of the litigation including
the enforcement of rights and remedies of the client.
Thus, when the case was submitted for decision on the evidence
so far presented, the counsel for private respondents acted within
the scope of his authority as agent and lawyer in negotiating for
favorable terms for his client.
Phil. Aluminum Wheels v. FASGI Enterprises Inc. A lawyer cannot
compromise the case of his client without the latter’s consent
even if he believes that the compromise is for the better interest
of the client.
If the client is not agreeable to the compromise he must
immediately repudiate the same, otherwise he cannot be heard
to complain later.
Romero v. Tan. The fact alone that a party was not assisted by
counsel in entering into a compromise agreement does not ipso
facto result in a mistake under the law as to render inutile the
approval of the trial court, besides, it is presumed that a person
would take ordinary care of his concerns, such that said party’s
failure to obtain counsel at that time must be deemed with full
knowledge of the consequences thereof.
Art. 1492. A lawyer cannot receive a property subject of a
pending litigation where he is appearing by way of compromise.
2014 Bar, Q. XXVI:
(a) If an attorney has been granted by his client full authority
to enter into an amicable settlement with the other party,
may the client later on refuse to honor the amicable
settlement forged by his attorney? Explain
(b) In such instance as in (A) above, can the lawyer withdraw
from the case and collect in full his contracted attorney’s
fees? Why or why not?
A:
(a) A compromise agreement effected by a client or by his
attorney with special authority from him has upon the
parties the effect of res judicata. The client cannot refuse to
honor the amicable settlement forged by lawyer unless if
the lawyer has gone beyond the limits of the authority
granted him by his client
(b) The lawyer can withdraw from the case on the ground that
the client is pursuing an immoral or illegal course of action
by not honoring a compromise agreement validly entered
[25]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
into. He may recover his contracted attorney’s fees in full
because, after all, he has performed all the services required
of him. It is his client’s fault for refusing to honor the
amicable settlement forged.
2013 Bar, Q. X: Your client is the plaintiff in a civil case for
damages arising from a car accident where he sustained serious
physical injuries and damages amounting to P1Million. The
counsel for the defendant asks you to give him a proposed
amount for purposes of settlement and you are aware that
whatever amount you tell him would not readily be accepted
and would probably be cut into half.
What is your best legal and ethical course of action?
(a) Inflate your proposal to make allowances for a compromise.
(b) Tell the defendant’s counsel the correct amount of
damages.
(c) Offer him a reasonably low amount so that the case can
immediately be settled.
(d) Ask the defendant’s counsel to first submit his negotiating
figure.
(e) Play hard-to-get and initially refuse all the defendant’s
initiatives to settle.
A: (d). It is the defendant that must submit first the negotiating
figure.
2001 Bar, Q. V: A client refuses to pay Atty. A his contracted
attorney's fees on the ground that counsel did not wish to
intervene in the process of effecting a fair settlement of the
case. Decide.
A: Rule 1.04, CPR provides that "a lawyer shall encourage his
clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement”.
If a lawyer should refuse to intervene in a settlement proceeding,
his entitlement to his attorney’s fees may be affected. However, if
he has already rendered some valuable services to the client, he
must be paid M’s attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit,
even if it is assumed that he is dismissed.
1989 Bar, Q. XI: Huey Company and Dewey Corporation are both
retainer clients of Atty. Alvarez. He is the Corporate Secretary of
Huey Company. He represents Dewey Corporation in three
pending litigation cases. Dewey Corporation wants to file a civil
case against Huey Company and has requested Atty. Alvarez to
handle the case.

(a) What are the options available to Atty. Alvarez? Explain
your answer.
(b) If you were Atty. Alvarez, which option will you take?
Explain your answer.
A:
(a) Considering that both Huey Company and Dewey
Corporation are his retainer clients, Atty. Alvarez should
exert efforts to effect an amicable settlement of the civil
case. The other option is for Atty. Alvarez to inhibit himself
from filing the civil case of the Dewey Corporation against
the Huey Company as he might be appearing for conflicting
interests.
(b) If I were Atty. Alvarez, I shall take as first option the
amicable settlement of the case. This is in compliance with
the obligation of the lawyer to discourage lawsuit. In the
event that an amicable settlement is not concluded, I shall
inhibit myself from filing the civil case in order to avoid
appearing for conflicting interests.
Canon 2: A Lawyer Shall Make His Legal Services Available in an
Efficient and Convenient Manner Compatible with the
Independence, Integrity and Effectiveness of the Profession
Attitude in Practice, Efficiency
 Whenever a lawyer decides to handle a case or to extend his
legal services for a fee or even for free, he must see to it that
he must do so with efficiency and convenience with the end
view of maintaining the independence, integrity and
effectiveness of the legal profession at all times.
Rule 2.01: A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
Cause of the Defenseless or the Oppressed, Not to be Rejected
U.S. v. Deaver. The defenseless are those who are not in a
position to defend themselves due to poverty, weakness,
ignorance or other similar reasons.
The oppressed are the victims of acts of cruelty, unlawful
exaction, domination or excessive use of authority.
XPN: Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept
representation of an indigent client if:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or
competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the
prospective client or between a present client and the
prospective client.
CPE, Canon 4. A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent
prisoner must not ask to be excused for any trivial reason and
should always exert his best efforts in his behalf.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to
pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of
conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person
solely on account of the latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or
because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
 See also Rule 138, Sec. 19(h)
Legal Aid is not a Matter of Charity, But a Public Responsibility
Art. 1, Sec. 1, Guidelines Governing the Establishment of an
Operation of Legal Aid Offices in IBP Chapters. The legal aid
extended to the destitute is a matter of public responsibility.
Thus, in the Legal Aid program of the IBP in the entire country
through its chapter offices, the guiding policy is that “legal aid is
not a matter of charity”
The spirit of public service should, therefore, underlie all legal aid
offices.
2003 Bar, Q. III: State the rationale for the mandated
establishment and operation of legal aid offices in all chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
A: The mandated establishment and operation of legal aid offices
in all chapters of the IBP is rationalized by the lawyer’s social and
public responsibility to provide free legal services to destitute
litigants who cannot hire private lawyers to assist them.
Free legal aid is not a matter of charity but a matter of public
responsibility. It is a means for the correction of social imbalance
that may and often do lead to injustice, for which reason, it is a
public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should,
therefore, underlie all legal aid offices (See: Art. 1, Sec. 1,
Guidelines Governing the Establishment of an Operation of Legal
Aid Offices in IBP Chapters)
[26]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Rule 2.02: In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a
case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights.
In Case of Non-Acceptance of the Case of the Defenseless or
Oppressed, Legal Advice Should Still Be Rendered to Safeguard
Their Rights
 If a lawyer, for reasons of health, could not handle the case
of a detainee or detainees incarcerated in a military camp,
he should advise the latter’s relatives to make
representations with the proper authorities or to file a
petition for habeas corpus with the proper court and even to
recommend a competent lawyer who could render prompt
assistance under the circumstances
2013 Bar, Q. XIV: Wanda finally became pregnant in the 10th
year of her marriage to Horacio. As her pregnancy progressed,
she started having difficulty breathing and was easily fatigued.
The doctors diagnosed that she has a heart congestion problem
due to a valve defect, and that her chances of carrying a baby to
full term are slim. Wanda is scared and contemplates the
possibility of abortion. She thus sought legal advice from Diana,
a lawyer-friend and fellow church member, who has been
informally advising her on legal matters.
What is Diana’s best ethical response?
(a) Beg off from giving any advice because it is a situation that is
not purely legal.
(b) Advise Wanda on the purely legal side of her problem and
assure her that abortion is allowed by law if the pregnancy
endangers the life of the mother.
(c) Advise that it is a religious problem before it is a medical or
legal one, and Wanda should consult and follow the advice
of her religious confessor.
(d) Advise Wanda that abortion, above everything else, is a
moral problem and she should only have an abortion if it is
an act she can live with.
(e) Refrain from giving any kind of advice as abortion is a
serious matter that cannot be resolved through informal
consultations with friends and fellow church members.
A: (b). CPR, Canon 2, Rule 2.01-2.02
Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.

The Practice of Law is a Profession Not a Money Making Trade
Jayme v. Bualan. In the fixing of attorney’s fees, it must not be
forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of
justice and not a mere money-making trade. It is not a business
but a profession.
Ledesma v. Climaco. Counsel of repute and of eminence welcome
opportunities to be appointed counsel de officio for this makes
manifest the principle that the practice of law is dedicated to the
ideal service and not a mere trade.
Albano v. Coloma. The protection of the weak and the powerless
is the highest form of public service that a lawyer could render.
The Primary Characteristics Which Distinguish the Legal
Profession from Business
(1) A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-
product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
(2) A relation as an office of court to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
(3) A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary
(4) A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients.
2015 Bar, Q. VII: Cite some of the characteristics of the legal
profession which distinguish it from business.
Improper Solicitation of Legal Business; Prohibited
Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot
Facts: Respondent is charged with malpractice for having
published an advertisement in Sunday Tribunal of June 13, 1943
which reads as follows –
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the
annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for
the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Issue: WON such advertisement allowed
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Held:
1. It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public.
2. Sec. 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things
that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."
3. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents
or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade.
4. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising
his services or offering them to the public.
5. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled
the temple of Jehovah.
6. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
Advertisement Lowers the Standards of the Profession
In re: Tagorda. The SC condemned the practice of solicitation of
cases.
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly
practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.
Ulep v. The Legal Clinic Inc. The SC enjoined the said corporation
from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same similar tenor and
purpose.
These advertisements are contrary to Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of
the CPR.
The prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of the
Legal Clinic being a member of the Philippine Bar is reprimanded
with a stern warning not to repeat the same or similar act.
[27]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Solicitation of Legal Business, When Permissible
Warvelle. For solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. If made in a modest or
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer or to the
bar.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic. The use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, professional cards bearing the name of the
lawyer or lawyers, the office and residence address and special
lines in law, advertisements in legal periodicals bearing the same
brief data are permissible. Even the use of calling cards with a
formal picture of the lawyer is not acceptable.
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, or brief biographical
and informative data is allowable.
2015 Bar, Q. XII: What are the allowable or permissible forms of
advertising by a lawyer?
A:
(1) Publication in reputable law lists of brief biographical and
honest informative data;
(2) Use of an ordinary professional business card;
(3) Announcement of specialization and availability of service in
a legal journal for lawyers;
(4) Seeking appointment to a public office requiring lawyers;
(5) Advertising to seek full-time position as counsel for a
corporation;
(6) Offering free legal service to indigents through radio
broadcasts or printed matter;
(7) Announcement of opening of a law firm, changes of
personnel, firm name or office address;
(8) Listings in a telephone directory
Advertisements in Newspapers, When Permissible
 Modest announcements in newspapers, periodicals or
magazines about the opening of a law office or law firm
stating the names of the lawyers and the address of the
office or firm is not improper
 Any self-laudatory or self-praising statements in newspaper
advertisements or professional cards disgrace and abase the
lawyer and his profession. Worse, if the advertisement are
effected through radios and TVs

1987 Bar, Q. I: The following notice appeared in the “Classified
Ads” of a Manila newspaper of general circulations:
NARUSU DIVORCE
John Williams
A lawyer in Narusu, is giving free literature on NARUSU divorce
through the undersigned, during office hours Monday thru
Friday.
SUCH DIVORCE CASES, OBTAINABLE IN TWO WEEKS AND VALID
WORLDWIDE, INVOLVE NO TRAVEL TO NARUSU IF BOTH
PARTIES SIGN.
Other information, such as adoption and child custody and
support, and division of conjugal assets will be explained by the
undersigned.
(Atty.) JCR
Bahay Cubo Bldg.
Calle St.
Tel. 10779
(a) Does such a printed notice or ad, constitute permissible
advertisement on the part of Atty. JCR?
(b) Considering the general prohibition against blatant
advertisement/ “touting”, and the restrictions on a
lawyer’s privilege to “attract clients”, may Atty. JCR be
disciplined for a breach of professional ethics?
Answer with reasons.
A:
(a) The printed notice constitutes improper advertising and
solicitation of Attorney JCR on two counts:
On the first count, the notice advertises the skill and connection
with a foreign lawyer on a certain type of service.
On the second count, the service promotes absolute divorce
which is not allowed under Philippine law. It attacks marital
stability which a lawyer is not supposed to promote.
(b) Yes, Atty. JCR may be disciplined for a breach of professional
ethics. Aside from his improper solicitation, Atty. JCR tries to
represent to local clients that he is in association with a
foreign lawyer who is not allowed to practice law in the
Philippines (Dacanay vs. Baker and McKenzie)
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
CPE, Canon 27. Advertising, direct or indirect –
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by
circulars, advertisements, through touters, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal
relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring
his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like-
laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our
profession and are reprehensible; but the customary use of
simple professional cards is not improper.
Barton v. State Bar of California. An advertisement bearing the
name of the lawyer, his address and the remarks “advice free” is
an improper solicitation.
In the same breath, a radio program of a lawyer, advertising his
legal skill and receiving phone questions about law and which he
answers in the form of legal advice is likewise improper and
reprehensible.
However, a legal aid program as a public service is allowable.
2016 Bar, Q. IV(A): A sign was posted at the building where the
law office of Atty. Redentor Walang-Talo is located. The sign
reads:
Atty. Redentor A. Walang-Talo
Chairman, IBP Legal Aid Committee
Makati City IBP Chapter
Free conciliation, mediation and court representation
Suite 210, Galaxy Building, J. P. Rizal Street, Makati City
Does the posting constitute solicitation?
A: There is nothing wrong with the advertisement.
The statement that he is the chairman of the IBP Legal Aid
Committee is factual and true. Canon 27 of the CPE states that
“memberships and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof” may be included in a lawyer’s advertisement. The
statement that he gives free consultation, mediation and court
representation services is for the purpose of promoting the IBP
Legal Aid Committee.
[28]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2016 Bar, Q. IV(B): A sign was posted at the building where the
law office of Atty. Redentor Walang-Talo is located. The sign
reads:
Atty. Redentor A. Walang-Talo
Attorney and Counselor-at-Law
General Practitioner
(Accepts pro bono cases pursuant to the IBP Legal Aid Program)
Does the posting constitute solicitation?
A: This advertisement is for the benefit of the lawyer alone, and
constitutes solicitation.
Alternative: This does not constitute solicitation. The lawyer does
not claim to be a specialist, but only a “general practitioner”. The
statement that he accepts pro bono cases is not for the purpose
of promoting his “business”, as “pro bono” means “for free”.
2013 Bar, Q. VII: Atty. Anunciante is engaged in the practice of
law and has a regular, live, weekly TV program where he gives
advice to and answers questions from the audience and program
viewers concerning U.S. immigration problems. Occasionally,
advertisements inviting viewers to watch his TV program are
shown outside his regular program schedule. Because of the
popularity of his TV program, the number of his law practice
clients increased tremendously.
The TV program of Atty. Anunciante is __________.
(a) permissible because it is public service in nature
(b) objectionable because the work involves indirect advertising
or solicitation of business
(c) improper because it gives him an unfair advantage over
other lawyers
(d) ethically allowable because it does not violate the traditional
standards of the legal profession
(e) None of the above.
2003 Bar, Q. II(1): A Justice of the Supreme Court, while reading
a newspaper one weekend, saw the following advertisement:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Competent Lawyer
Reasonable Fee
Call 221-2221
Mondays-Fridays
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

The following session day, the Justice called the attention of his
colleagues and the Bar Confidant was directed to verify the
advertisement. It turned out that the number belongs to
Attorney X, who was then directed to explain to the Court why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for the improper
advertisement.
Attorney X, in his answer, averred that: The advertisement was
not improper because his name was not mentioned in the ad;
Rule on Attorney X’s contention.
A: The advertisement is improper because it is a solicitation of
legal business and is tantamount to self-praise by claiming to be a
"competent lawyer”. The fact that his name is not mentioned
does not make the advertisement proper. His identity can be
easily determined by calling the telephone number stated. In the
case of Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 1993, the Supreme Court found a
similar advertisement to be improper in spite of the fact that the
name of a lawyer was also not mentioned.
2001 Bar, Q. VI: Facing disciplinary charges for advertising as a
lawyer, Atty. A argues that although the calling card of his
businessman friend indicates his law office and his legal
specialty, the law office is located in his friend is store. Decide.
A: This appears to be a circumvention of the prohibition on
improper advertising. There is no valid reason why the lawyer's
businessman friend should be handling out calling cards which
contains the lawyer's law office and legal specialty, even if his
office is located in his friend's store. What makes it more
objectionable is the statement of his supposed legal, specialty.
1997 Bar, Q. II: Atty. B, C, and D recently inaugurated their law
partnership. Among the invited guests were clients, business
executives and government officials, including a few members of
the judiciary. Photographs were taken during the inaugural affair
which the law firm subsequently caused to be published in
major newspaper dailies. Was there anything ethically wrong in
what the partnership had done?
A: The act of causing photographs of the inaugural affair
published in major newspaper dailies violates the following rules
of the CPR:
Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01: A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undiginified, self-laudatory or
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
unfair statement of claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
Canon 13: A lawyer shall rely on the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.
1997 Bar, Q. III: Atty. E has a daily 10-minule radio program
billed as a "Court of Common Troubles." The program is
advertised by the radio station as a public service feature for
those who seek but cannot afford to pay for legal advice. Its
sponsors include a food processing company and a detergent
manufacturing firm which share with the radio station the
monthly remuneration of Atty. E. Is there any impropriety in
Atty. E's role under the above arrangement?
A: Giving of advice on legal matters through the medium of a
newspaper column or radio or television broadcast is improper. It
would involve indirect advertising and violation of the confidential
relation between lawyer and client. (Agpalo, Legal Ethics. 1992 ed.
p. 82)
Best Advertisement for a Lawyer
 The best advertisement for a lawyer is a well-deserved
reputation for competence, honesty, and fidelity to private
trust and public duty.
2015 Bar, Q. XII: What is the best form of advertising possible for
a lawyer?
A: The best form of advertising is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned
as an outcome of character and conduct (Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.,
B.M. No. 553, June 17, 1993)
Rule 2.04: A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
Rates to be Charged
Valid justifications for charging lower rates:
(1) When a client is a relative or a brother lawyer
(2) Client is too poor that it would be inhumanitarian to charge
him even the customary rates of attorney’s fees
 If the attorney’s fees customarily charged in an area are too
low and petty which affect the respectability of the legal
[29]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
profession, the lawyers may agree to modify and calculate
the rates chargeable within the paying capacity of the
ordinary clients
1997 Bar, Q. XII: You are the managing partner of a law firm. A
new foreign airline company, recently granted rights by the Civil
Aeronautics Board at the NAIA, is scouting for a law firm which
could handle its cases in the Philippines and provide legal
services to the company and its personnel. After discussing with
you the extent of the legal services your law firm is prepared to
render, the general manager gives you a letter-proposal from
another law firm in which its time-billing rates and professional
fees for various legal services are indicated. You are asked to
submit a similar letter-proposal stating your firm's proposed
fees. The airline company's general manager also tells you that,
if your proposed fees would at least be 25 per cent lower than
those proposed by the other firm, you will get the company's
legal business. How would you react to the suggestion?
A: I will emphasize to the General Manager that the practice of
law is a profession and not a trade. Consequently, I will not
propose a lower fee just for the sake of competing with another
firm. Because such practice smacks of commercialism. Moreover,
Rule 2.04, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not charge rates lower
than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so
warrant. I will charge fees that will be reasonable under the
circumstances.
2005 Bar, Q. VI: A business man is looking for a new retainer. He
approached you and asked for your schedule of fees or charges.
He informed you of the professional fees he is presently paying
his retainer, which is actually lower than your rates. He said that
if your rates are lower, he would engage your services.
Will you lower your rates in order to get the client? Explain.
A: No, I would not. Rule 2.04, CPR provides that “a lawyer shall
not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless
circumstances so warrant." This is aimed against the practice of
“cutthroat competition" which is not in keeping with the principle
that the practice of law is a noble profession and not a trade.
Moreover, if he agrees, he would be encroaching on the
employment of a fellow lawyer, which is prohibited by Rule 8.02
of the Code.
Canon 3: A Lawyer in Making Known His Legal Services Shall Use
Only True, Honest, Fair, Dignified, and Objective Information or
Statement of Facts

A Lawyer May Make Known His Legal Services
 A lawyer must not resort to false and misleading information
in making his legal services known.
 And even if the information is true, the manner of making it
known must not be undignified and demeaning to the legal
profession.
1993 Bar, Q. XVII(1): You are a young, brilliant and promising
lawyer. Unfortunately, these qualities do not seem to attract as
many clients as you wish. Your friend suggested that you
advertise. He Just arrived from the United States and had seen
print and television advertisements of lawyers. What kind of
advertising, if any, can you do? Explain your answer.
A: I would not take the advice of my friend suggesting that I
advertise my talent as a lawyer both in print or in the television.
Canon 3, CPR provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair and dignified and
objective information.
1989 Bar, Q. V(1): You are a young, brilliant and promising
lawyer. Unfortunately, these qualities do not seem to attract as
many clients as you wish. Your friend suggested that you
advertise. He just arrived from the States and has seen print and
television advertisements of lawyers. What kind of advertising,
if any, can you do? Explain your answer.
A: There must be a written motion filed by the lawyers with the
consent of the client and approval by the court. The ethics of the
profession forbids a lawyer to solicit professional employment by
circulars, advertisements. Even indirect advertisements for
professional employment offend the traditions and lower the
dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer may make
announcement of true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts (Canon 3).
2002 Bar, Q. III(F): Determine whether the following
advertisements by an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or "Unethical," as the case may be, opposite each letter
and explain.
Ethical - “The rule prescribing advertising or solicitation of
business is aimed at commercialization of the profession and has
to do with the effort to obtain remunerative business. It was
never aimed at a situation in which a group of lawyers announce
that they are willing to devote some of their time and energy to
the interests of indigent citizens.” (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 5th ed., p.
81).
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2002 Bar, Q. III(A): Determine whether the following
advertisements by an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or "Unethical," as the case may be, opposite each letter
and explain.
A Calling card, 2" x 2" in size, bearing his name in bold print,
office, residence and e-mail addresses, telephone and facsimile
numbers.
A: Ethical – A lawyer, in making known his legal services, shall use
only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts (Canon 3, CPR).
2002 Bar, Q. III(B): Determine whether the following
advertisements by an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or "Unethical," as the case may be, opposite each letter
and explain.
A business card, 3" x 4" in size, indicating the aforementioned
data with his photo. 1" x 1” in size.
A: Unethical – The size of the card and the inclusion of the
lawyer’s photo in it smacks of commercialism.
Rule 3.01: A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
Self-Praises or False Claims on Qualifications or Quality of Legal
Services, Unethical
 Rule 3.01 is closely intertwined with Rule 2.03
 A lawyer should not pretend to a prospective client just to
get the latter’s trust and confidence that he is a seasoned
trial lawyer and an expert in particular law or laws when in
truth he is not and had not even prosecuted or defended a
case yet in his lifetime.
ABA Model of CPR. It is deceptive and fraudulent of a lawyer to
claim that he is an associate/partner of big law firm or that he is a
specialist on a certain line when he is not just to attract potential
clients. In the U.S., there misrepresentations are expressly
prohibited.
In re: Atty. Paas. A lawyer who uses as his office address the
office of his wife who is a judge was found guilty of using
fraudulent, misleading and deceptive address that had no purpose
[30]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are
lodged, or his clients that he has close ties to a member of the
judiciary.
In re: Tagorda. Atty. Tagorda contributed cards where he
advertised that:
“As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the
purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew
lost documents of your animals; can make your application and
final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of
affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although
long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or
write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor. He was
suspended.
2002 Bar, Q. III(E): Determine whether the following
advertisements by an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or "Unethical," as the case may be, opposite each letter
and explain.
A small announcement in BALITA, a tabloid in Filipino, that the
attorney is giving free legal advice for September 2002.
A: Unethical - The announcement in a newspaper that he will give
free legal advise to the indigent, is a form of self-praise. (In re:
Tagorda, 1929).
Dir. of Religious Affairs v. Bayot. It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares.
2013 Bar, Q. X: As a new lawyer, Attorney Novato started with a
practice limited to small claims cases, legal counseling, and
notarization of documents. He put up a solo practice law office
and was assisted by his wife who served as his secretary/helper.
He used a makeshift hut in a vacant lot near the local courts and
a local transport regulatory agency. With this strategic location,
he enjoyed heavy patronage assisting walk-in clients in the
preparation and filing of pleadings and in the preparation and
notarization of contracts and documents. He had the foresight of
investing in a good heavy duty copier machine that reproduces
quality documents, and charges a reasonable fee for this service.
He draws electric power from an extension wire connected to an
adjoining small restaurant. He put up a shingle that reads: "Atty.
Novato, Specialist in Small Claims, Fastest in Notarization; the
Best and Cheapest in Copier Services."

Is Attorney Novato’s manner of carrying out his professional
practice – i.e., mixing business with the practice of law,
announcing his activities via a shingle and locating his office as
above-described – in keeping with appropriate ethical and
professional practice?
A: No. Attorney Novato’s manner of carrying out his professional
practice is not in keeping with appropriate ethical and
professional practice. He has degraded the law profession which
may result to loss of respect to lawyers as a whole.
The use of a makeshift hut standing alone would create the
impression that the lawyer does not have a permanent address
which is required to be stated in all pleadings he signs as well as
required to be shown in documents he notarizes.
His shingle shows that he has considered the law profession as a
business. He should have separate shingle for his copier services
business.
When he included in his shingle the phrases “Specialist in Small
Claims” and “Fastest in Notarization” he has transgressed the rule
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
dignified information or statement of facts (CPR, Canon 3). So also
the norm that a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
misleading, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services (Canon 3, Rule
3.01).
The use of the phrases “Specialist in Small Claims” and “Fastest in
Notarization” is misleading advertisement because they are likely
to create an unjustified expectation about the results the lawyer
can achieve or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by
improper means (ABA Model Rule 7.1.b).
2012 Bar, Q. (21): Atty. Nelson recently passed the Bar and
wanted to specialize in marine labor law. He gave out calling
cards with his name, address and telephone number in front,
and the following words at the back: “We provide legal
assistance to overseas seamen who are repatriated due to
accident, illness, injury, or death. We also offer FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE.” Does this constitute ethical misconduct?
(a) No, clients have freedom in the selection of their counsel.
(b) No, use of a professional card is a lawful way of announcing
his services as a professional.
(c) Yes, because the offer of financial assistance is an
undignified way of luring clients.
(d) Yes, because the offer of assistance is stated at the back.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1998 Bar, Q. VII: A lawyer advertised in the newspaper the For this deception, the lawyer was severely reprimanded by the
following: SC.
“Can secure annulment of your marriage promptly. Expert in Name of a Partner in Law Firm Should be Dropped if Appointed
legal separation cases. Consult anytime." as Judge; Other Positions (Rule 3.03)
Is the advertisement proper? Use of the Firm Name of a Foreign Law Firm is Unethical
A: No. A lawyer in making known his legal services should not use Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie. The use by the respondents of the
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified or self- firm name Baker and McKenzie constitutes an unethical practice
laudatory statements regarding his qualification on legal services because that firm is not authorized to practice law in this
(Rule 3.01, CPR, In re: Tagorda). The claim that he can secure jurisdiction.
annulment of marriage promptly is false and misleading and his
claim that he is an expert in legal separation is self-laudatory. The Presumption Regarding Dissolution of a Law Firm
advertisement constitutes improper solicitation and violates the
sanctity of the institution of marriage which the State should Antonio v. CA. It is safe to presume that a law firm which
protect (Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.). registered and represented itself as such, with at least two named
partners, is composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that
this law office was earlier dissolved, the winding up process is
Rule 3.02: In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or
presumed to have been performed in a regular manner, with all
assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of
the obligations properly accounted for. Very concrete evidence
a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm
must be presented in order that these presumptions may be
indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.
rebutted.
 The use of a cross after the name of the deceased partner is Main Law Office and Branch Office Do Not Constitute Two Law
a sufficient indication. It is advisable though that the year of Firms
death be also indicated
Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. v. Aleonar
The Rule in Effect is an Abandonment of the Ruling in Sycip Case
Facts:
 Under Rule 3.02, partnerships are allowed the continued use
of the name of a deceased partner provided that there is an
1. Petitioner’s counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo
indication that said partner is already deceased.
and Associates (and not any particular member or associate
 The purpose of retaining the name of a deceased partner is
of that firm) which firm happens to have a main office in
to maintain clients who have been provided legal services by
Makati and a branch office in Cebu City
the law firm.
2. The Court notes that both the main and branch offices
 While the firm benefits from the goodwill attached to the
operate under one and the same name, Saludo, Ledesma
personality of the deceased partner, the motivation is
and Associates
legitimate.
3. Having represented itself to the public as comprising a single
firm, LSA should not be allowed at this point to pretend that
Name to Use in the Practice of Law
its main office and its branch office in effect constitute
separate law firms with separate and distinct personalities
 A lawyer is not authorized to use in his practice of the
profession a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Issue: WON the main office and branch office of LSA is two
Attorneys.
different juridical entity
Pangan v. Ramos. The respondent has resorted to deception and
Held:
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts in
representing himself as Pedro D. Ramos, instead of Dionisio D.
Ramos, the name inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys.
[31]

1. Petitioner does not deny that Atty. Manalo, a partner in LSA
based in its Makati main office, received the copy of the
decision.
2. Such a receipt binds the LSA law partnership
Death of a Partner Does Not Extinguish the Client-Lawyer
Relationship with the Law Firm
B.R. Sebastian Enterprises Inc v. CA. We find no merit in
petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of
BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin
Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the
lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death
of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to
file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty.
Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained
until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner
provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law
firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial
and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was
designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death
of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have
replaced him. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm
should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could
have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules
of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a
new lawyer.
Negligence of a Member in the Law Firm is Negligence of the
Firm
Antonio v. CA. When the counsel of record is the Law Firm, the
negligence of the lawyer assigned to the case consisting in his
leaving for abroad without notifying his colleagues is negligence
of the Law Firm
2014 Bar, Q. VIII: C and D are law partners using the firm name C
and D – Attorneys-at-Law. In an administrative case filed against
C, the SC found that C was not entitled to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines and ordered his name stricken-
off from the Roll of Attorneys. As a result, C and D changed their
firm name to Law Office of D – Attorney-at-Law, C - Counsellor,
with C handling purely counselling and office work while D is the
law practitioner.
Are C and D liable for contempt of court? Explain your answer.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
A: In adopting the firm name of “Law Office of D – Attorney-at-
Law, C – Counsellor, C and D violated the following provisions of
the CPR:
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or
assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a
deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in
all its communications that said partner is deceased.
Canon 9: “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law”
Attorney D may be suspended for such conduct. C, being a non-
lawyer, may be held liable for indirect contempt of court.
2001 Bar, Q. VII: The shingle of a lone law practitioner Bartolome
D. Carton, who inherited the law office from his deceased father.
Antonio C. Carton, carries these names: "Carton & Carton Law
Office." Is that permissible or objectionable? Explain.
A: Rule 3.02, CPR provides as follows:
"In the choice of Firm name, no false, misleading or assumed
name shall be used, the continued use of the name of deceased
partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that the partner is deceased."
Since Atty. Antonio C. Carton is a solo practitioner, it is improper
for him to use the firm name "Carton & Carton Law Office", which
indicates that he is and/or was in partnership with his father. Even
if he indicates in all his communications that his father is already
dead, the use of the firm name is still misleading because his
father was never his partner before.
1996 Bar, Q. VI(1): May a law firm use the name of a deceased
partner? Qualify.
A: Rule 3.02, CPR provides in part that "The continued use of the
name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm
indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased".
However, several justices of the Supreme Court dissented from
this rule.
1994 Bar, Q. III: The law firm of Rodriguez, Delfin and Zafra had
been in existence for almost 25 years and had built up an
excellent reputation and a well-heeled clientele. Sometime last
year, partner Zafra died of coronary disease but Rodriguez and
Delfin refused to drop his name from the firm name.
[32]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
May Rodriguez and Delfin insist on keeping the name of Zafra as
part of the firm name?
A: Yes, they may continue to use the name of Zafra in the firm
name, provided that they indicate in all communications that he is
deceased. Rule 3.02, Canon 3, CPR provides that the continued
use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided
that the firm indicates in all its communication that the said
partner is deceased.
Alternative: They may keep the name of Zafra provided that the
consent of the heirs is obtained.
1993 Bar, Q. XVII(2): Atty. Thess Tuazon writes a regular column
in a newspaper of general circulation, as well as legal articles in a
leading magazine. Her by-line always Includes the name of her
law firm where she is a name partner. Would you consider this
as improper advertising? Explain.
A: I would consider putting the by-line under the name of her law
firm improper. It is an indirect way of advertising her law firm.
Naming her law firm achieves no other purpose than to inform
the public and possible clientele of the existence of her law firm
and of her being actively engaged in the practice of law.
1989 Bar, Q. V(2): Atty. Dulcinea writes a regular column in a
newspaper of general circulation and articles on unforgettable
legal stories in a leading magazine. Her by-line always includes
the name of her Firm where she is a name partner. Would you
consider this as improper advertising? Explain your answer.
A: Atty. Dulcinea’s by-line including the firm name where she
belongs is improper because it is an indirect way of solicitation or
is an advertisement of the law firm.
Rule 3.03: Where a partner accepts public office, he shall
withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the
firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.
Name of a Partner Should Be Dropped from the Firm Name
When He Accepts Public Office
Report of IBP Committee. The reason for Rule 3.03 is to prevent
the law firm or partners from making use of the name of the
public official to attract legal business and to avoid suspicion of
undue influence.

Canon 33. When a member of the firm, on becoming a judge, is
precluded from practicing law, his name should not be continued
in the firm name.
Dia Anonuevo v. Bercacio. A Judge is among the public officer
who is not allowed to practice law.
Rule 3.04: A lawyer shall not (a) pay or (b) give anything of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business.
Seeking Publicity Prohibited
 A lawyer who seeks publicity to attract legal business is
debasing the legal profession, specially so, if he pays
something of value for it.
Canon 27, CPE. Indirect advertisements for professional
employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments,
or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning
the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our
profession and are reprehensible; but the customary use of
simple professional cards is not improper.
Best Advertisement for a Lawyer
Dir. of Religious Affairs v. Bayot. The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct.
2002 Bar, Q. III(C): Determine whether the following
advertisements by an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or "Unethical," as the case may be, opposite each letter
and explain.
A pictorial press release in a broadsheet newspaper made by the
attorney showing him being congratulated by the president of a
client corporation for winning a multi-million damage suit
against the company in the Supreme Court.
A: Unethical – A lawyer should not resort to indirect
advertisements such as procuring his photograph to be published
in a newspaper in connection with a case he is handling. He
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
should not pay or give something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or return for, publicity to
attract legal business (Rule 3.04, CPR)
2002 Bar, Q. III(D): Determine whether the following
advertisements by an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or "Unethical," as the case may be, opposite each letter
and explain.
Pictorial press release in a broadsheet newspaper made by the
attorney showing him being congratulated by the president of a
client corporation for winning a multi-million damage suit
against the company in the Supreme Court which is made by his
client in a tabloid
A: Ethical -The lawyer can no longer be held responsible for the
action of his client. However, it would be unethical if he knew
about his client’s intention to publish and he did not stop it.
Canon 4: A Lawyer Shall Participate in the Development of the
Legal System by Initiating or Supporting Efforts in Law Reform
and in the Improvement of the Administration of Justice
Improvement of the Legal System
 While the lawyer’s task in contributing to the improvement
of the legal system is not a matter of strict duty, it is a duty
nonetheless which flows from a lawyer’s sense of his public
responsibility.
Cordova v. Labeyan. Lawyers as officers of the court must assist in
the administration of justice
2004 Bar, Q. I(A)(3): Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, what is the principal obligation of a lawyer
towards: The development of the legal system?
A: Canon 4, CPR
Alternative: Canon 5, CPR
Canon 5: A Lawyer Keep Abreast of Legal Developments,
Participate in Continuing Legal Education Programs, Support
Efforts to Achieve High Standards in Law Schools as well as in the
Practical Training of Law Students and Assist in Disseminating
Information Regarding the Law and Jurisprudence
Lawyers Must Update Themselves with the Law and Must
Participate in the Dissemination Thereof
[33]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
In re: Integration of the Bar of the Phil. The bar has been
integrated for the attainment of the following objectives:
(a) Elevate the standards of the legal profession
(b) Improve the administration of justice
(c) To enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
Judges Must Also Keep Abreast of the Laws, Rulings and
Doctrines of the SC
Uy v. Capulong. Judges by the nature of their functions, must
keep abreast with the laws, rulings and decisions of the SC
De Roy v. CA
Facts:
1. This Court finds that the CA did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for extension
of time to file a MR, directed entry of judgment and denied
their MR
2. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises Inc. v. Japzon (1985) that the 15-day period for
appealing or for filing a MR cannot be extended
Issue: WON the 15-day period for appealing or filing a MR can be
extended
Held:
1. Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the
Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at
bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision
in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of
the CA was promulgated.
2. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the
publication of SC decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective.
3. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the SC particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Zualo v. CFI of Cebu. Attorneys should familiarize with the rules
and comply with their requirements.

They are also chargeable with notice of changes in the rules which
have been held as including not only express reglementary
provisions but also a regular practice under the ROC.
Legal Education Does Not Stop with the Lawyer’s Admission to
the Bar
Report of IBP Committee. Once a person becomes a lawyer, he
incurs a 3-fold obligation:
First, he owes it to himself to continue improving his knowledge
of the law
Second, he owes it to his profession to take an active interest in
the maintenance of high standards of legal education
Third, he owes it to the lay public to make the law a part of their
social consciousness.
In decreeing the Integration of the Philippine Bar, the SC has given
renewed significance to the obligations to:
(1) Encourage and foster legal education;
(2) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education
for practicing attorneys in order to elevate the standards of
the profession throughout the country; and
(3) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal
rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal
service, and on the true functions of the Filipino lawyer.
Lawyers Must Take Active Part, and Not Just be Passive
Onlookers or Listeners in the Pursuit for Continuing Legal
Education Program
Rule 138-A. Lawyers must support and encourage efforts for the
achievement of high standards in law schools, in the practical
training of law students such as those involved in the clinical
education program of law schools approved by the SC
MCLE
 To keep the lawyers, specially practicing lawyers, abreast
with the law and jurisprudence, continuing legal education
should be made mandatory by the SC
 On Aug. 22, 2000, the SC promulgated B.M. No. 850, which
implemented the MCLE Program for all members of the IBP
 Lawyers are required to complete every 3-years at least 36-
hours of continuing legal education on specified subjects.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
 Some lawyers exempted from MCLE are justices of: (1) SC,
(2) CA, (3) SB, (4) RTC Judges, (5) Law Deans, (6) some law
professors, (7) members of Congress
B.M. No. 850: Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
August 22, 2000
Considering the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine
Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the
Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby
resolves to adopt, as it hereby adopts, the following rules for
proper implementation:
Rule 1: Purpose
Sec. 1. Purpose of the MCLE – Continuing legal education is
required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with
law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and
enhance the standards of the practice of law.
2015 Bar, Q. XXII(A): Describe briefly the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) for a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the purpose of the same.
A: MCLE is a rule promulgated by the SC requiring all lawyers, with
a few exceptions, to earn 36 units of legal education every three
(3) years. Its purpose is:
(a) To ensure that members of the bar keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence;
(b) To maintain the ethics of the profession, and
(c) enhance the standards of the practice of law.
2012 Bar, Q. (7): What is the purpose of MCLE?
(a) To conform with the requirements of international law.
(b) To provide a venue to improve fraternal relations among
lawyers.
(c) To keep abreast with law and jurisprudence and to
maintain the ethical standards of the profession.
(d) To supplement legal knowledge due to substandard law
schools.
2003 Bar, Q. V: State the aims and objectives sought to be
accomplished by the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE)?
[34]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: B.M. 850, Sec. 1
Rule 2: Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Sec. 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee – Within two (2)
months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court
En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted in accordance
with these Rules.
Sec. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE – Members of the
IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three (3) years,
at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education
activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.
(b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute
resolution.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on
substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and
oral advocacy.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law
and international conventions.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects
as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee.
Rule 3: Compliance Period
Sec. 1. Initial compliance period – The initial compliance period
shall begin not later than three (3) months from the constitution
of the MCLE Committee. Except for the initial compliance period
for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of
the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36)
months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous
compliance period.
Sec. 2. Compliance Group 1 – Members in the National Capital
Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be permanently assigned to
Compliance Group 1.
Sec. 3. Compliance Group 2 – Members in Luzon outside NCR
shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 2.
Sec. 4. Compliance Group 3 – Members in Visayas and Mindanao
shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 3.

Sec. 5. Compliance period for members admitted or readmitted
after establishment of the program – Members admitted or
readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program
shall be permanently assigned to the appropriate Compliance
Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of
admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall
begin on the first day of the month of admission or readmission
and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the
same Compliance Group.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2012 Bar, Q. (3): The term of Dean Rex of X College of Law (d) Yes, since he updated himself in law by engaging in teaching.
expired in the first year of the third compliance period. Does his
exemption extend to the full extent of said compliance period? 2011 Bar, Q. 27: When does the initial MCLE compliance period
of a newly admitted member of the bar begin?
(a) No, he must comply with all the unit requirements.
(b) Yes, to the full extent. (a) On the first day of the month of his admission.
(c) No, but comply proportionately. (b) On the tenth day of the month of his admission.
(d) Yes, but he must apply for exemption. (c) On the third year after his admission as member.
(d) On the first year of the next succeeding compliance period.
2012 Bar, Q. (4): What is the duration of MCLE Compliance
Period? Rule 4: Computation of Credit Units

(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial (a) Twelve (12) months;
compliance period after admission or readmission, the Sec. 1. Guidelines – The following are the guidelines for
(b) Twenty four (24) months; computation of credit units (CU):
member is not required to comply with the program (c) Thirty six (36) months;
requirement for the initial compliance. (d) Eighteen (18) months.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial PROGRAMS CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
compliance period after admission or readmission, the
member shall be required to complete a number of hours of 2012 Bar, Q. (5): When does compliance period begin? 1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-
approved continuing legal education activities equal to the HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES,
(a) When the lawyer actually begins law practice; ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS
number of months remaining in the compliance period in
which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member (b) Upon admission/readmission to the Bar; UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
(c) 01 October 2009;
shall be required to complete a number of hours of
education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of (d) 01 October 2006. 1.1. PARTICIPANT 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE
months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of WITH NUMBER OF HOURS
A: Bonus [A closer perusal of Rule 3, MCLE Rules would show that 1.2. LECTURER 5 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR
hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
there is no accurate answer] SPONSOR'S CERTIFICATION
1.3. RESOURCE 3 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR
2012 Bar, Q. (1): Atty. Galing is a Bar topnotcher. He has been SPONSOR'S SPEAKER CERTIFICATION
teaching major subjects in a law school for eight (8) years and 2012 Bar, Q. (6): Does the MCLE requirement apply at once to a
newly-admitted lawyer? 1.4. ASSIGNED 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM
has mastered the subjects he is handling. Is he exempt from the SPONSORING PENALIST/ ORGANIZATION
MCLE requirement? REACTOR/COMMENTATOR
(a) Yes, if admitted to the Bar and there are four (4) more
months remaining of the compliance period. 1.5. MODERATOR/ 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM
(a) No, eight (8) years experience is not enough. SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION FACILITATOR
(b) No, wait for the next compliance period.
(b) Yes, since he has mastered what he is handling.
(c) Yes, professors of law are exempted. (c) Yes, if he will start law practice immediately.
(d) Yes, if more than one (1) year remains of the compliance 2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
(d) No, since he is not yet a Bar reviewer.
period.
2.1. RESEARCH/ 5-10 CREDIT UNITS DULY CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED
2012 Bar, Q. (2): Atty. Rey has been a professor in the Legal INNOVATIVE TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER
Management Department of Y University for thirty (30) years. 2011 Bar, Q. 1: Atty. Mike started teaching Agrarian Reform and
PROGRAM/CREATIVE PROJECT
Taxation in June 2001 at the Arts and Sciences Department of
He teaches Constitution, Obligation and Contracts, Insurance, 2.2. BOOK 50-100 PP 101+ PUBLISHED BOOK SINGLE AUTHOR
Introduction to Law. Is he exempted from the MCLE the Far Eastern University. In 2005, he moved to San Sebastian 12-16 CU 17-20 CU
Institute of Law where he taught Political Law. Is Atty. Mike
requirement?
exempt from complying with the MCLE for the 4th compliance 2 AUTHORS 10-12 CU 13-16 CU
(a) Yes, because his teaching experience is already more than period in April 2013?
3 OR MORE 5-6 CU 7-11 CU
ten (10) years.
(b) No, because he is not teaching in the College of Law. (a) No, since he has yet to complete the required teaching 2.3. BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK WITH
experience to be exempt.
(c) Yes, because of his field of knowledge and experience. PROOF AUTHORSHIP AS EDITOR CATEGORY
(b) No, because he is not yet a bar reviewer.
(d) No, because Y University is not accredited. 2.4. LEGAL ARTICLE 5-10 PP 11+ PUBLISHED ARTICLE SINGLE
(c) Yes, since by April 2013, he will have been teaching law for
AUTHOR 6 CU 8 CU
more than 10 years.
[35]

2 AUTHORS 4 CU 6 CU
3 OR MORE 2 CU 4 CU
2.5. LEGAL 3-6 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
NEWSLETTER/LAW JOURNAL EDITOR
3. PROFESSIONAL 6 CU PER CHAIR CERTIFICATION OF LAW
DEAN CHAIR/BAR 1 CU PER LECTURE OR BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR REVIEW/ HOUR LECTURE/LAW TEACHING
Sec. 2. Limitation on certain credit units – In numbers 2 and 3 of
the guidelines in the preceding Section, the total maximum credit
units shall not exceed twenty (20) hours per three (3) years.
Rule 5: Categories of Credit
Sec. 1. Classes of credits – The credits are either participatory or
non-participatory.
Sec. 2. Claim for participatory credit – Participatory credit may be
claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars,
conferences, symposia, in-house education programs,
workshops, dialogues or round table discussions.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,
commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or
facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
Sec. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit – Non-participatory
credit may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials
published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an
article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to
the legal education of the author member, which were not
prepared in the ordinary course of the member's practice or
employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6: Computation of Credit Hours
Sec. 1. Computation of credit hours – Credit hours are computed
based on actual time spent in an activity (actual instruction or
speaking time), in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour.
Rule 7: Exemptions
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Sec. 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE – The following
members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and
the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executives
Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary,
incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and
incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial
Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant
Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional
Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the
Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial
functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who
have teaching experience for at least 10 years accredited
law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps
of Professors and Professorial Lectures of the Philippine
Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
Sec. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE – The following
Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval
of the IBP Board of Governors.
2015 Bar, Q. XXII(B): Name three parties exempted from the
MCLE.
A: B.M. 850, Rule 7, Sec. 1 and 2
2011 Bar, Q. 23: Provincial Governors and Municipal Mayors
who are lawyers are MCLE exempt because
(a) they handle cases of their constituents for free.
[36]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(b) the Local Government Code prohibits them from practicing
their profession.
(c) they are rendering public service.
(d) As experts in local governance, it may be assumed that they
are updated on legal developments.
Sec. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of
requirement – A member may file a verified request setting forth
good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post
graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from
compliance with or modification of any of the requirements,
including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with
a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
Sec. 4. Change of status – The compliance period shall begin on
the first day of the month in which a member ceases to be
exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the
same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance
Group.
Sec. 5. Proof of exemption – Applications for exemption from or
modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and
supported by documents.
Rule 8: Standards for Approval of Education Activities
Sec. 1. Approval of MCLE program – Subject to the rules as may
be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education
program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways:
(1) The provider of the activity is an approved provider and
certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 3 of
this Rules; and
(2) The provider is specially mandated by law to provide
continuing legal education.
Sec. 2. Standards for all education activities – All continuing legal
education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or
practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of
learning related to legal subjects and the legal profession,
including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or
medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to
practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.

(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length,
substantive written materials must be distributed to all
participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before
the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time
and location so as to be free from interruption like
telephone calls and other distractions.
Rule 9: Approval of Providers
Sec. 1. Approval of providers – Approval of providers shall be
done by the MCLE Committee.
Sec. 2. Requirements for approval of providers – Any persons or
group may be approved as a provider for a term of two (2) years,
which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of
continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers,
are eligible to be approved providers. Application for approval
shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the IBP;
(b) Contain all information requested on the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the approval fee;
Section 3. Requirements of all providers – All approved providers
shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity
shall be maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years
after the completion date. The provider shall include the
member on the official record of attendance only if the
member's signature was obtained at the time of attendance
at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain
the member's name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and
shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and
length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall
be furnished the IBP.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved for MCLE by the IBP in the
amount of ________ hours of which hours will apply in (legal
ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved
education activities prescribed by these Rules and such
regulations as may be prescribed by the IBP pertaining to
MCLE.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all
participants identifying the time, date, location, subject
matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all
approved continuing legal education activities by members
of the IBP Board of Governors, the MCLE Committee, or
designees of the Committee and IBP staff for purposes of
monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the
nature of the activity, the time devoted to each devoted to
each topic and identify of the instructors. The provider shall
make available to each participant a copy of IBP-approved
Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education
Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one
(1) year after the activity, copy furnished the IBP.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity
under this program or issues a spurious certificate in
violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate
sanctions.
Sec. 4. Renewal of provider approval – The approval of a provider
may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the
provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these
Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the
preceding period.
Sec. 5. Revocation of provider approval – The approval of any
provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote
of the IBP Board of Governors, upon recommendation of the
MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10: Activity and Provider Approval Fee
Sec. 1. Payment of fees – Application for approval of an education
activity or as a provider requires payment of an appropriate fee.
Rule 11: General Compliance Procedures
Sec. 1. Compliance card – Each member shall secure from the
MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under
oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that
he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such
Compliance Card must be returned to the address indicated
therein not later than the day after the end of the member's
compliance period.
[37]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 2. Member record keeping requirement – Each member
shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy
furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be
provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c)
of Rule 9 should be sufficient record of attendance at a
participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall
also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of
Rule 5.
Rule 12: Non-Compliance Procedures
Sec. 1. What constitutes non-compliance – The following shall
constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the
compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance
(including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed
period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish
evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from
receipt of a non-compliance notice;
(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing
or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the
MCLE requirements.
2013 Bar, Q. V: In order to comply with the MCLE requirements,
Atty. Ausente enrolled in a seminar given by an MCLE provider.
Whenever he has court or other professional commitments, he
would send his messenger or a member of his legal staff to
register his attendance at the MCLE sessions so he could be
credited with the required qualifying attendance. He would also
ask them to secure the printed handouts and the lecturers’ CDs,
all of which he studied in his free time.
Atty. Ausente should be __________.
(a) required to make up for his absence by attending lecture
sessions in other MCLE providers
(b) sanctioned because he circumvented or evaded full
compliance with the MCLE requirements
(c) excused because he attended to profession-related tasks,
and fully studied the courses through the materials and CDs
he secured
(d) penalized by forfeiting all his earned MCLE units
(e) excused because attendance by proxy is a widespread and
tolerated MCLE practice

A: (b). MCLE, Rule 12, Sec. 1(e)
Sec. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain
compliance – A member failing to comply will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given
sixty (60) days from the date of notification to explain the
deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall contain, among other things, the following
language in capital letters:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER.
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number
of credit hours for compliance. Credit hours earned during this
period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior
compliance period requirement unless hours in excess of the
requirement are earned, in which case, the excess hours may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
Rule 13: Consequences of Non-Compliance
Sec. 1. Non-compliance fee – A member who, for whatever
reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period
shall pay a non-compliance fee.
Sec. 2. Listing as delinquent member – Any member who fails to
satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be listed as a
delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case, Rule
139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
2014 Bar, Q. XXX(a): Can a lawyer who lacks the number of units
required by the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Board continue to practice his profession?
A: He can, but they will be unable to comply with B.M. 1922 which
requires that every pleading filed in court or a quasi-judicial body
shall contain an annotation of the number and date of their MCLE
compliance, otherwise, their pleadings will be expunged and their
cases dismissed. They will also be listed as delinquent members of
the IBP, and the IBP Board of Governors can recommend their
suspension or disbarment to the SC. Until then, they can continue
to practice law but cannot file pleadings in court or quasi-judicial
bodies.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
This resolution shall take effect in October 2000, following its
Rule 14: Reinstatement publication in two (2) newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Section 1. Process – The involuntary listing as a delinquent
member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000.
compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of
non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit Amendment to Bar Matter No. 850
hours to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance
during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit
(a) APPROVE the proposed amendments to Bar Matter No.
hours may not be counted toward meeting the current
850 and its Implementing Regulations, thus:
compliance period requirement. Credit hours attained during the
period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to
(1) Rule 7, Section 1, Bar Matter No. 850
satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted
toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
Sec. 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process – SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE – The following
The termination of listing as a delinquent member is members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirements:
administrative in nature but it shall be made with notice and
hearing by the MCLE Committee. c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent
Rule 15: Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Committee members of Judicial Bar Council, incumbent members of the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Committee, incumbent
court lawyers who have availed of the Philippine Judicial Academy
Sec. 1. Composition – The MCLE Committee shall be composed of
programs of continuing judicial education
five (5) members, namely: a retired Justice of the Supreme Court,
as Chair, and four (4) members, respectively, nominated by the
(2) Section 5, MCLE Implementing Regulations
IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by
the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law
Section 5. Exemptions – The following are exempted from the
professors.
MCLE requirements:
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and
a. The Executive
integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a
term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as
c. The Judiciary
may be determined by the Court.
The Chief Justice and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
Sec. 2. Duty of the Committee – The MCLE Committee shall Incumbent and retired members of the Judiciary, incumbent
administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be members of the Judicial and Bar Council incumbent members of
necessary subject to the approval by the Supreme Court. It shall, the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Committee,
in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a incumbent court lawyers who have availed of the Philippine
schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court. Judicial Academy programs of continuing judicial education.
Sec. 3. Staff of the IBP – The IBP shall employ such staff as may be (3) Section 12, MCLE Implementing Regulations
necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting,
approval and other necessary functions. Section 12. Compliance Procedures
e. A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the
Sec. 4. Submission of annual budget – The IBP shall submit to the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of P1,000.00
Supreme Court an annual budget for a subsidy to establish,
operate and maintain the MCLE Program. and shall be listed as a delinquent member of IBP Board of
[38]

Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in
which case Rule 139-B of the Court shall apply.
(b) APPROVE the proposed MCLE Forms for the effective
Implementation of the MCLE program, to wit:
(1) MCLE Form No. 08 - Certificate of Exemption
(2) MCLE Form No. 09 - Application for Exemption
(3) MCLE Form No. 10 – Application for Credit Unit/s for
Participating in MCLE Activity/Program as Lecturer/
Resource Speaker or Panelist/ Reactor/ Commentator/
Moderator/ Coordinator/Facilitator
(4) MCLE Form No. 11 – Application for Credit Unit/s for
Teaching at an Accredited Law School
(5) MCLE Form No. 12 – Application for Credit Unit/s for
Publication of a Legal Article or Book
(6) MCLE Form No. 13 – Certificate of Compliance; and
(c) direct the Office of the Clerk of Court to cause the
publication of the aforecited provisions of Bar Matter No.
850 and its Implementing Regulations and the MCLE Forms
for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Canon 6: These Canons Shall Apply to Lawyers in Government
Services in the Discharge of their Tasks
Canons Apply to Lawyers in the Service of the Government
Far Easters Shipping Co. v. CA. The Canons and Rules in the CPR
are not intended for the private practitioners alone. They shall
govern the acts of all lawyers including those in the service of the
Government like the Solicitors in the OSG.
Report of IBP Committee. A lawyer does not shed his
professional obligations upon his assuming public office.
 However, lawyers who are incumbent judges and
magistrates shall be governed in the performance of their
official functions by the Code of Judicial Conduct which
became effective on Oct. 20, 1989
SC Circular No. 3-89. The grounds for disbarment provided in Rule
138, Sec. 27 of the ROC shall be applicable to all. However, since
1989, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline could not investigate
members of the bench
 Incumbent Judges may be suspended or removed by the SC
on grounds other than those enumerated in Rule 138, Sec.
27.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
 Complaints against Judges shall be governed mainly by Rule
140 of the ROC, the Constitution, special laws and other
rules promulgated by the SC
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards Under R.A. 6713
 All public officials and employees, whether lawyers or non-
lawyers are governed by R.A. 6713 which was approved on
Feb. 20, 1989.
R.A. 6713, Sec. 3(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service, including military and
police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation,
regardless of amount.
R.A. 6713, Sec. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and
Employees - (A) Every public official and employee shall observe
the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge
and execution of official duties:
(CPJP-RNCS)
(a) Commitment to public interest - Public officials and
employees shall always uphold the public interest over and
above personal interest. All government resources and
powers of their respective offices must be employed and
used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically,
particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism - Public officials and employees shall
perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree
of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They
shall enter public service with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity - Public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act with
justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against
anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They
shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on
account of their office to their relatives whether by
consanguinity or affinity except with respect to
appointments of such relatives to positions considered
strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff
whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
[39]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(d) Political neutrality - Public officials and employees shall
provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination
and regardless of party affiliation or preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public - Public officials and
employees shall extend prompt, courteous, and adequate
service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or
when required by the public interest, public officials and
employees shall provide information of their policies and
procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure
openness of information, public consultations and hearings
whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and
systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and
develop an understanding and appreciation of the socio-
economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in
the depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism - Public officials and employees
shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino
people, promote the use of locally produced goods,
resources and technology and encourage appreciation and
pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to
maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign
intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy - Public officials and employees
shall commit themselves to the democratic way of life and
values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and
manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian authority over
the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution
and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.
(h) Simple living - Public officials and employees and their
families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions
and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or
ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
R.A. 6713, Sec. 7(b-2). Lawyers in the government service are also
prohibited to engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions.
R.A. 6713, Sec. 7(3). The prohibition will continue for 1 year after
theirseparation from public office, in connection with any matter
pending before the Office they used to be with.
Misconduct in Office as Public Official May be a Ground for
Disciplinary Action
Austria v. Abaya. If the lawyer’s misconduct in the discharge of
his official duties as government official is of such character as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency,
he may be disciplined as a member of the Bar on such ground.

Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig. Government lawyer asked for money for
favorable decision of administrative cases pending before her.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the CPR, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service.
This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government
are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance
of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the
ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
2006 Bar, Q. VII: Provincial Prosecutor Bonifacio refused to
represent the Municipality of San Vicente in a case for collection
of taxes. He explained that he cannot handle the case with
sincerity and industry because he does not believe in the
position taken by the municipality.
Can Prosecutor Bonifacio be sanctioned administratively?
A: Yes, he can be sanctioned administratively. Unlike a practicing
lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a government
lawyer like a provincial prosecutor cannot refuse the performance
of his duties on grounds not provided for by law without violating
his oath of office (Enriquez, Sr. v. Hon. Gimenez, 1960).
Alternative: No, he cannot be sanctioned administratively. A
lawyer may refuse a case which he believes to be unmeritorious,
because it is “his duty to counselor maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just and such defenses
only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law (Sec.
20 [c], Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court). The Canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility are applicable to government
lawyers in the performance of their official tasks (Canon 6, CPR).
2000 Bar, Q. II: D was charged with estafa by C before the
barangay for misappropriating the proceeds of sale of jewelry on
commission. In settlement of the case, D turned over to the
barangay captain, a lawyer, the amount of P2,000.00 with the
request that the barangay captain turn over the money to C.
Several months passed without C being advised of the status of
her complaint. C contacted D who informed her that she (D) had
long before turned over the amount of P2,000.00 to the
barangay captain who undertook to give the money to her (C). C
thus filed a case against the barangay captain who at once
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
remitted the amount of P2,000.00 to C. May the barangay
captain be faulted administratively? Explain.
A: Yes. The CPR applies to lawyers who are in the government
service. As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in
the discharge of his office as a government official. However, if
that misconduct as a government official is of such character as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency,
then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
ground (Dinsay v. Cioco, 1996).
In the case of Penticostes v. Ibanez, (1999), a barangay captain
who failed to remit for several months the amount given to him
for payment of an obligation, was found to have violated the Code
of Professional Conduct.
1993 Bar, Q. XVIII: Atty. Juan de la Cruz, counsel for Genato
Subdivision. Inc. filed a complaint against Atty. Pedro Santos,
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular
actuations with regard to the application of Genato Subdivision.
Inc. for registration of 100 pro forma Deeds of Absolute sale with
Assignment of lots in its subdivision. After investigation of the
complaint, the Secretary of Justice found respondent Register of
Deeds guilty of Grave Misconduct and recommended to the
President of the Philippines that the Register of Deeds be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and
with prejudice to re-employment in any government office.
The President approved the recommendation and dismissed the
Register of Deeds.
Less than two (2) weeks after filing his complaint against the
Register of Deeds. Atty. Juan de la Cruz also filed with the
Supreme Court a disbarment complaint against said respondent.
May the former Register of Deeds, as a lawyer, be also
disciplined by the Supreme Court for his malfeasance as a public
official? Explain.
A: Yes, the SC may disbar the Register of Deeds as a lawyer. The
facts of the question is similar to the case of Collantes vs.
Renomeron, where a Register of Deeds was dismissed by the
Secretary of Justice and was also disbarred for the same offense.
The court said that the lawyer as a public official had
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling
of the law.
1992 Bar, Q. VI(2): Glicerai Magat who works as a clerk typist in
the Dimakali Law Office wrote a letter to the Supreme Court
[40]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
accusing her employer Atty. Dimakali of violating her honor
several times. He would invite her to go out an official business
only to bring her to Regina Court, a motel in Ermita. There he
would force his desires on her. Whenever she remonstrated and
fought him, he would threaten to dismiss her. She asked the
Supreme Court to disbar that “monster lawyer who thinks
nothing of violating the honor and purity of virgins like me.”
Suppose Atty. Dimakali is the Head of the Legal Division of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Under the foregoing set of
facts, would you advice Ms. Magat to take the same action, that
is, ask the Supreme Court to disbar her lawyer boss? Explain
your answer.
A: Yes, I would advise Ms. Magat to take the same action with the
SC. It has been ruled in Collantes vs. Ronomeron. Canon 6, CPR
also applies to lawyers in the government service.
Rule 6.01: The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible
and is cause for disciplinary action.
Primary Duty of a Prosecutor
State v. Platon. A prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer and as
such, he should seek equal and impartial justice. He should be as
much concerned with seeing that no innocement man suffers as
in seeing that no guilty man escapes.
2016 Bar, Q. XVIII: City Prosecutor Phillip prosecuted the
criminal case for the murder of the city mayor against the
accused Reynaldo, the losing mayoralty candidate. There was no
private prosecutor and Phillip personally handled the
prosecution of the case from arraignment up to the presentation
of the evidence for the accused. Before the trial, Alfonso
approached Phillip and confessed that he is the killer of the city
mayor and not Reynaldo. When the case was called for trial,
Phillip manifested before the court that Alfonso approached him
and admitted that he killed the mayor and asked the court for
whatever proper action it may take. The counsel for the accused
took advantage of the presence of Alfonso, who was placed on
the witness stand and elicited testimonial evidence. The court
eventually acquitted Reynaldo. The heirs of the city mayor filed
a disbarment case against Phillip on the ground that it is his duty
to see to it that the criminal is convicted and punished. They
believe Reynaldo is the real killer and Alfonso was only a fall guy
and that Reynaldo could not have been acquitted were it not for
the disclosure of Phillip. Phillip argues that the City Prosecutor is

not for the offended party or the heirs of the victim but it is his
main duty that "justice be done." Did Phillip commit any
violation of the CPR? Explain.
A: Philip did not commit any violation of the CPR.
Rule 6.01 categorically states that “the primary duty of a lawyer
engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is
highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.” A public
prosecutor “is a representative not of an ordinary party in a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all”
(Suarez v. Platon, G.R. No. 46371, February 7, 1990).
U.S. v. Barredo. We agree with the contentions of counsel that a
conscientious prosecuting official, whose investigations have
satisfied him as to the innocence of persons charged with the
commission of crime, should not institute criminal proceedings
against such persons.
But we are of the opinion that in the event that criminal
proceedings have been instituted, and the investigations of the
provincial fiscal have satisfied him that the accused person is
innocent, or that evidence sufficient to secure conviction will not
be forthcoming at the trial despite the exercise of due diligence to
that end, it then becomes his duty to advise the court wherein the
proceedings are pending as to the result of his investigations, and
to move the court to dismiss the proceedings, leaving it to the
court to take such action as may be proper in the premises.
In this jurisdiction provincial fiscals are not clothed with power,
without the consent of court, to dismiss or dicit nolle prosequi
criminal actions actually instituted, and pending further
proceedings. The power to dismiss is vested solely in the court
that is to say in the presiding judge thereof.
Interest of a Prosecutor
U.S. v. Barredo. The interest of a prosecutor in a criminal
prosecution is not to win a case but to see that justice is done
(Rule 6.01)
Costigan. He should present the evidence in their true and proper
significance.
State v. Platon. He should see to it that the accused is given a fair
and impartial trial and not deprived of any of his statutory or
constitutional rights.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2001 Bar, Q. XVI: From the viewpoint of legal ethics, why should
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated it be mandatory that the public prosecutor be present at the trial
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate of a criminal case despite the presence of a private prosecutor?
means to bring about a just one.
A: The public prosecutor must be present at the trial of the
He should not present proofs of the guilt of the accused which is criminal case despite the presence of a private prosecutor in
illegally seized or acquired such as those prohibited under the Bill order to see to it that the interest of the State is well-guarded and
of Rights particularly evidence obtained by torture, force, protected, should the private prosecutor be found lacking in
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate his competence in prosecuting the case. Moreover, the primary duty
free will, including confessions or admissions obtained under the of a public prosecutor is not to convict but to see to it that justice
same circumstances (Art. III, par. 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution) is done (Rule 6.01, CPR). A private prosecutor would be naturally
interested-only in the conviction of the accused.
Facts to be Laid Methodically and Meticulously by Prosecutor
1992 Bar, Q. II: Prosecutor Daniel Marquinez was assigned to
People v. Dramayo. A prosecutor should lay the pertinent facts
handle a case for homicide. After interviewing the witnesses for
with methodical and meticulous attention.
the prosecution and asking them to narrate to him the incident
that caused the death of the victim, he came to the conclusion
Thus: "In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the
that the accused was really guilty. However, the version of one
attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying
eyewitness showed that the accused acted in self-defense.
before the court the pertinent facts as their disposal with
methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions
If you were the prosecutor, would you place said eyewitness on
and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that
the witness stand? Why?
the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent
may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to
A: Under the ordinary rules on trial technique, the prosecutor
all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the
should not place the eyewitness on the witness stand.
accused, and to the state."
However, based on the real mission of a lawyer which is to assist
A Public Prosecutor Should Recommend the Acquittal of the
the court in the administration of justice, the prosecutor is bound
Accused Whose Conviction is on Appeal, If He Finds No Legal
to present the eyewitness in order that the court can properly
Basis to Sustain the Conviction
appreciate the evidence and to decide on the real merit of the
case.
Triente, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan. Considering the correct facts now
brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and
A public prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer. He is the
in view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be
compelling as its obligation to govern at all and whose interest,
rightfully sustained.
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win the case
but Justice shall be done. A prosecutor complies with his mission
The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office
as a lawyer even if the man he is prosecuting is acquitted in
of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its consciousness
accordance with law and Justice.
of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of justice
to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just
Canon 6, Rule 6.01, CPR provides that the primary duty of a
as it has the task of having the guilty punished. This Court will do
lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see
no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation
that Justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment
that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent
of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused
Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice, the
is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.
Alternative: If I were the prosecutor. I would not present this
eyewitness. This does not involve suppression of evidence. It is
true that a public prosecutor’s primary duty is not to convict but
[41]

to do Justice and it is unethical for a prosecutor to conceal
evidence that is favorable to the accused. In the present case,
however, the prosecutor considered the testimony of several
witnesses and came to the conclusion that the accused was really
guilty. Clearly, the prosecutor did not find need of the testimony
of the eyewitness who said that the accused acted in self-defense.
A lawyer or a prosecutor is not duty-bound to present a witness
whose credibility is in doubt.
Rule 6.02: A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The Code is Equally Applicable to Lawyers in the Government
Service (Canon 6)
 Lawyers in the government service have more restrictions
than lawyers in private practice or non-government lawyers.
Macoco v. Diaz. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.
Report of IBP Committee. Government lawyers, who are public
servants, owe utmost fidelity to the public service. For a public
office is a public trust.
They do not shed their professional obligations in assuming public
positions. On the other hand, they should be more sensitive to
their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is
more likely to be magnified in the public eye.
Promotion of Private Interests Prohibited
 If such a lawyer is concurrently allowed to engage in the
practice of law, he should not use his public position to
engage his private practice of law or a private business of his
for that matter.
 It is unethical for a government lawyer to remain secretly
connected with a Law firm and solicit cases for the said firm
with referral fees or monthly retainers for the purpose
Misconduct in the Discharge of Official Duties as Government
Official; Generally Not Disciplinable; Exception
Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya. GR: A lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
XPN: However, if the misconduct of a government official is of
such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or show
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of
the Bar upon such ground.
A Government Lawyer Should Not Refuse to Perform a Duty
 A government lawyer, who under the law, is required to
represent the Government, any of its agencies or offices,
should not refuse to appear for them.
Enriquez, Sr. v. Hon. Gimenez
Facts:
1. Fiscal refused to appear for the Municipality of Bauan,
Batangas in a civil case where he is not disqualified to
appear.
2. The municipality then hired the services of a private counsel.
Issue: WON the prosecutor may be made liable for his act
Held:
1. The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of
the opinion that R.A. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and,
therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case
of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not
justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the
services of a special counsel.
2. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a
fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the
law and the ROC do not constitute a legal and valid excuse
for inhibition or disqualification.
3. And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline
employment, a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his
functions on grounds not provided for by law without
violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others,
"that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his
ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is
about to enter
Rule 6.03: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Restriction Against Government Lawyers Who Left the Service
 R.A. 3019, Sec. 6. A Congressman lawyer, who authored a
bill creating an Office which became a law, cannot accept a
position of employment in that Office.
 R.A. 3019. Sec. 3(d) and R.A. 6713, Sec. 7(b):
[42]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 3(d). Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept
employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year
after its termination.
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions - In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto -
Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer,
employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee
in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their
office unless expressly allowed by law;
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1)
year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the
professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with,
in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
Violation of Restriction is Tantamount to Representing
Conflicting Interests
PNB v. Cedo. A former PNB officer violates the Rule in accepting
engagement or employment against his former employer PNB in
transactions which he formerly handled while still an officer of the
Bank
Adverse-Interest Conflicts; Congruent-Interest Conflict; Concepts
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, et. al. In 1887, Alabama became the first
state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The
1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’
codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a
lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public

respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year,
the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32
of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form
and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the
"revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit
information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service." These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
"Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the
former government lawyer represents a client in private practice
is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with
while employed by the government and the interests of the
current and former are adverse.
On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts"
are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers. For several years, the ABA attempted to
correct and update the canons through new canons, individual
amendments and interpretative opinions.
In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new
canons. To deal with problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for
"adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
representation conflicts." The rationale for disqualification is
rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely
discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to
take action on behalf of the government client that later could be
to the advantage of parties who might later become private
practice clients
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, Lucio Tan
Facts:
1. Atty. Estilito Mendoza was the Solicitor General until 1986.
2. He resumed his private practice of law.
3. He appeared as counsel for Lucio Tan, et. al. before the
Sandiganbayan involving civil cases of sequestration of
properties allegedly ill-goptten
4. When still Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank on
how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK which
became saddled with banking problems.
5. GENBANK was later bought by the ALLIED BANK owned by
Lucio Tan, et. al.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
6. Atty. Mendoza continues defending both the interests of the
Central Bank and Lucio Tan, et.al.
7. PCGG then filed a Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza
anchored on Rule 6.03 of the CPR
Issue: WON Atty. Mendoza is disqualified to appear as counsel
for Lucio Tan under Rule 6.03
Held:
1. Rule 6.03 of the CPR retained the general structure of par. 2,
Canon 36 of the CPE but replaced the expansive phrase
"investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened."
It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
2. The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest"
aspect of Rule 6.03.
3. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in S.P.
No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in
Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the
Sandiganbayan.
4. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et
al.
5. We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on
the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the "matter"
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the CPR.
6. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing
that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope
of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.
7. Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not
unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication.
8. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion
causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has
confidence.
9. The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often
without the benefit of the work done by the latter.
10. The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an
effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process.
11. No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the
former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession.
[43]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
12. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a
former government lawyer may extend to all members of his
law firm.
13. Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming
the lepers of the legal profession.
14. It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be
remedied by Rule 6.03 of the CPR is the possible appearance
of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government.
But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public
perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can
lead to untoward results.
15. No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of
restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any
detrimental effect on that free flow of information between
the government-client and its attorneys which the canons
seek to protect.
16. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and some courts have abandoned per se
disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual
conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the
interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the
case, and the public.
17. Atty, Mendoza was not disqualified by the SC
1991 Bar, Q. V(B): Lawyer U, a retired Tanodbayan prosecutor,
now in the private practice of law, entered his appearance for
and In behalf of an accused in a case before the Sandiganbayan.
The prosecution moved for his disqualification on the ground
that he had earlier appeared for the prosecution in the case and
is knowledgeable about the prosecution's evidence, both
documentary and testimonial. U contended that he merely
appeared at the arraignment on behalf of the prosecutor
assigned to the case who was absent at the time. Decide.
A: Lawyer U should be disqualified from entering his appearance
in this case even only for arraignment of the accused. His
appearance is deemed to be appearing for conflicting interest.
Alternative: Canon 36 provides that a lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in public employ, should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ. The contention of U that he merely appeared at the
arraignment on behalf of the absent prosecutor, is not enough. As
a former Tanodbayan prosecutor, he certainly had occasion to
obtain knowledge about the prosecution’s evidence.
1992 Bar, Q. III: Atty. Herminio de Pano is a former Prosecutor of
the City of Manila who established his own law office after

taking advantage of the Early Retirement Law. He was
approached by Estrella Cabigao to act as private prosecutor in an
estafa case in which she is the complainant. It appears that said
estafa case was investigated by Atty. de Pano when he was still a
Prosecutor.
Should Atty. de Pano accept employment as private prosecutor
in said estafa case? Explain.
A: Atty. de Pano should not accept the employment as private
prosecutor as he will be violating Canon 6, Rule 6.03, CPR which
provides that a lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
The restriction against a public official from using his public
position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests
extends beyond his tenure on certain matters which intervened as
a public official.
Chapter II: The Lawyer and the Legal Profession
Canon 7: A Lawyer Shall at All Times (a) Uphold the Integrity and
Dignity of the Legal Profession and (b) Support the Activities of
the Integrated Bar
2004 Bar, Q. I(A)(1): Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, what is the principal obligation of a lawyer
towards: The legal professional and the Integrated Bar?
A: Canon 7
Rule 7.01: A lawyer shall be answerable for (a) knowingly
making a false statement or (b) suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar
Requirements for All Applicants for Admission to Bar
Rule 138, Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar — Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
must be
(a) A citizen of the Philippines,
(b) At least 21 years of age,
(c) Of good moral character, and
(d) Resident of the Philippines; and
(e) Must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(f) That no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Additional Requirements for Other Applicants
Rule 138, Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants —
All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the
two preceding Sec. shall, before being admitted to the
examination,
(g) satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for
four years, and
(h) successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved and recognized by
the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of
law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further
evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he
has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school
or university duly recognized by the government: (a) civil law, (b)
commercial law, (c) remedial law, (d) criminal law, (e) public and
private international law, (f) political law, (g) labor and social
legislation, (h) medical jurisprudence, (i) taxation and (j) legal
ethics. (CCRPC-PLMTL)
Pre-Law
Rule 138, Sec. 6. Pre-Law — No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic,
english, spanish, history and economics.
Knowingly Making a False Statement or Suppression of a
Material Fact in the Application for Admission to the Bar;
Consequences
 If the false statement or suppression of fact is discovered
before the candidate could take the bar exam, he will be
denied permission to take the examinations.
People v. De Luna. If the false statement or suppression of
material fact was discovered after the candidate had passed the
[44]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
exam but before having taken his oath, he will not be allowed to
take his oath as a lawyer.
It must be stressed that, the oath may only be taken before the SC
by a person authorized by the Court to engage in the practice of
law.
 If the discovery was made after the candidate had taken his
oath as a lawyer, his name will be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In re: Ramon Galang. By 1966, when Galang took the Bar exams
for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court
for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his
criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In par. 4
of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that
"he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal,
Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him". Yet,
respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal
from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which
was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar exams in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is
guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court
his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no
pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent
Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations
seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the
Bar exams of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted
for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to
practice law is well is well-settled.
2011 Bar, Q. 4: Lee became a lawyer in 1988 under a claim that
he is a Filipino like his parents. Efren sought Lee’s disbarment on
the ground that he really is a Chinese. To prove he is a Filipino,
Lee cited an Albay regional trial court’s final judgment in an
action to recover real property which mentioned his citizenship
as Filipino. This final judgment resulted in the correction of his
birth records in a separate special proceeding to show he is a
Filipino, not Chinese as there stated. Is Lee’s claim to Filipino
citizenship valid?

(a) No, since the mention of his citizenship in the land case
was just incidental.
(b) No, since those rulings were not appealed to the Supreme
Court.
(c) Yes, because the rulings in his favor have become final and
executory.
(d) Yes, since his parents are Filipinos based on what he said in
his bar exam petition.
1997 Bar, Q. XVIII(b): Prior to his admission to the freshman year
in a reputable law school. Bar examinee A was charged before
the Municipal Trial Court with damage to property through
reckless imprudence for accidentally sideswiping a parked
passenger jeepney. The case was amicably settled with A
agreeing to pay the claim of the jeepney owner for P1,000.00. In
his application to take the 1997 Bar Examinations, A did not
disclose the above incident. Is he qualified to take the Bar
Examinations?
A: Rule 7.01, CPR provides that "a lawyer shall be answerable fox
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact
in connection with his application for admission to the bar".
In the case of In Re: Ramon Galang, the respondent repeatedly
omitted to make mention of the fact that there was a pending
criminal case for slight physical injuries against him in all of his
four (4) applications for admission to take the bar examinations.
He was found to have fraudulently concealed and withheld such
fact from the SC and committed perjury. The SC cited the rule that
"the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the bar
examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
Indicted for. An alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law."
A's failure to disclose that he had been charged with damage to
property through reckless imprudence in his application for
admission to the bar examinations disqualifies him. It does not
matter that the offense charged does not involve moral turpitude
or has been amicably settled. It is up to the Supreme Court to
determine whether the offense charged involved moral turpitude
or not. What is important is that he concealed such fact from the
Supreme Court or even misrepresented under oath that he had
not been charged. This produces an unfavorable impression on his
moral character.
Alternative: A Is qualified to take the bar examinations. He may
believe in good faith that the crime for which he had been
charged is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Besides, it has
already been terminated by amicable settlement. The case of In
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Re: Galang is not applicable because in that case, the criminal
charge was still pending when he applied for admission, and he
deliberately omitted mention of the same in the four times he
applied for admission. This is only the first time that A has applied.
However, A may be subjected to lesser administrative sanctions
for not disclosing the incident.
Diao v. Martinez. The name of Telesforo A. Diao was stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys for false pretenses on his educational
attainment. He misrepresented that he finished Associate in Arts
Degree when the truth is he had no such degree.
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the
bar exams; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to
take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must
be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential.
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of
attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is
required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days.
Villasanta v. Peralta. Peralta was a successful Bar candidate but
was not admitted to the Bar because of lack of good moral
character he having been finally convicted for violation of Art. 350
of the RPC (marriage contracted against provisions of laws) which
offense involves moral turpitude.
In said case, Peralta was married to Rizalina Valdez when he
courted Lilian Villasanta and to have carnal knowledge with the
latter, he procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract
Effect if What is Concealed is a Crime Not Involving Moral
Turpitude
In re: Galang. When the applicant concealed a charge of a crime
against him but which crime does not involve moral turpitude,
this concealment nevertheless will be taken against him.
It is the fact of concealment and not the commission of the crime
itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer. When he
made a concealment, he perpetrated perjury
Prohibition against Candidates
[45]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Rule 138, Sec. 13. Disciplinary measures — No candidate shall
endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during
examination the candidates shall not communicate with each
other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate
who violates this provision, or any other provision of this rule,
shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a
failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including
permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the
court.
Rule 7.02: A lawyer shall not support the application for
admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant
attribute
Lawyer Shall Not Support the Application for Admission to the
Bar of an Unqualified Candidate
 Rule 138, Sec. 2 and 5 specify the requirements for all
applicants for admission to the bar.
 It is the lawyer’s duty to society to do something to prevent
such applicant from taking the bar exam.
Malcolm. As the public is vitally interested in the rectitude of
attorneys, any person is permitted to oppose an application for
admission by urging the moral disqualification of the applicant.
Public policy also demands that any person seeking admission to
the bar shall possess such degree of learning and proficiency in
law as is necessary for due performance of the duties of the
attorney.
CPE, Canon 29. The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against
admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified
because deficient in either moral character or education.
Rule 138, Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme
Court on what grounds — A member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession
A Lawyer Must at All Times Conduct Himself Properly as not to
Put into Question His Fitness to Practice Law
Quingwa v. Puno. If good moral character is a qualification for the
privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is ALSO essential
during the continuance of the practice and the exercises of the
privilege.
CPE, Canon 37. Thus, he should avoid brushes with the law; he
should not assist anyone, even clients, in the commission of any
crime, or any unprofessional act. In fact, he may properly make
disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect
those against whom it is threatened.
Royong v. Oblena. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may
be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional
or non-professional activities.
In re: Edillon. He is therefore expected to be concerned even with
matters like payment of his membership dues and special
assessments in the IBP and payment of his privilege tax otherwise,
he may be disciplined.
Melendrez v. Decena. This conduct of nobility and uprightness
should stay with him whether in his public or private life. A lawyer
who commits an unlawful act though not related to the discharge
of his professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his
moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in
the practice of law.
Royong v. Oblena. The grounds for disciplinary actions
enumerated under the ROC are not exclusive and are so broad as
to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity.
Investment Management Services Corp. v. Roxas. A lawyer must
constantly conduct himself with great propriety.
Vda. de Espino v. Presquito. The issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral
character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his
professional duties as a member of the bar.
Avoidance of Scandalous Conduct
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Tolosa v. Cargo. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards.
Lawyer Shall Stand “As a Shield” in Defense of Right and in the
Warding Off Wrong
Report of IBP Committee. It is a fair characterization of the
lawyer’s responsibility in our society that he stands ‘as a shield’ in
defense of right to ward off wrong.
From a profession charged with these responsibilities there must
be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of
honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility, that have throughout the centuries, been
compendiously described as ‘moral character’
2005 Bar, Q. III: Atty. Kuripot was one of Town Bank's valued
clients. In recognition of his loyalty to the bank, he was issued a
gold credit card with a credit limit of P250,000.00. After two
months, Atty. Kuripot exceeded his credit limit, and refused to
pay the monthly charges as they fell due. Aside from a collection
suit, Town Bank also filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Kuripot.
In his comment on the disbarment case, Atty. Kuripot insisted
that he did not violate the Code of Professional Responsibility,
since his obligation to the bank was personal in nature and had
no relation to his being a lawyer.
(a) Is Atty. Kuripot correct? Explain your answer.
(b) Explain whether Atty. Kuripot should be held
administratively liable for his refusal to settle his credit
card bill.
A:
(a) Atty. Kuripot is not correct. Rule 7.03, CPR provides that “a
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely affects his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession."
[46]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(b) He may not be held administratively liable. The SC has held
that it does not take original jurisdiction of complaints for
collection of debts. The creditor’s course of action is civil,
not administrative in nature and proper reliefs may be
obtained from the regular courts (Litigio v. Dicon, 1995).
Although lawyers have been held administratively liable for
obstinacy in evading payment of a debt (Constantino v.
Saludares, 1993, Lao vs. Medel, 2003), there is no obstinacy
shown in this case.
2011 Bar, Q. 25: Although not counsel in a particular case, Atty.
Anthony asked Lisa, the RTC clerk of court, if the case records
have already been remanded to the MTC as the Court of Appeals
directed. Lisa said no, saying that the RTC had not yet received a
certified copy of the Court of Appeals’ decision. When Lisa
suggested that Atty. Anthony first secure such a copy, the latter
scolded her. Shamed by this, Lisa filed a disciplinary action
against him for encroaching on the work of the lawyers of
record. Anthony defends his follow-up action by claiming good
faith and the possibility of entering his appearance later. Is
Anthony liable for his record follow up?
(a) Yes, because he did not inform Lisa of the basis of his
interest in the case.
(b) Yes, because none of the parties to the case authorized him
to do such follow-up.
(c) No, because he acted in good faith with a view to a possible
retainer.
(d) No, because following up the records of any case does not
constitute practice of law.
Canon 8: A Lawyer Shall Conduct Himself With Courtesy,
Fairness, and Candor Towards His Professional Colleagues, and
Shall Avoid Harassing Tactics Against Opposing Counsel
Yap-Paras v. Paras. Lawyers should treat each other with
courtesy, fairness, candor and civility.
Bugaring v. Espanol. A lawyer who rudely interrupts his fellow
lawyer while the latter was making representations in behalf of
the other party is violation of Canon 8.
Specific Instances of Lack of Candor
Canon 22, CPE. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and
with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and
fairness.
It is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to

(a) Misquote the (1) contents of a paper, (2) the testimony of a
witness, (3) the language or the argument of opposing
counsel, of (4) the language of a decision or a textbook; or
(b) With knowledge of its invalidity, (1) to cite as authority a
decision that has been overruled or (2) a statute that has
been repealed, or (3) in argument to assert as a fact that
which has not been proved, or (4) in those jurisdictions
where a side has the opening and closing arguments to
mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions
in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to
rely.
It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly
with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses, in drawing
affidavits and other documents, and in the presentation of causes.
A lawyer should not offer evidence which he knows the court
should reject, in order to get the same before the jury by
arguments for its admissibility, nor should he address to the judge
arguments upon any points not properly calling for determination
by him. Neither should he introduce into an argument, addressed
to the court, remarks or statements intended to influence the
bystanders.
2004 Bar, Q. I(A)(2): Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, what is the principal obligation of a lawyer
towards: His professional colleagues?
A: Canon 8, CPR
Rule 8.01: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Abusive and Offensive Language Has No Place in Pleadings;
Contemptuous
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel. Disrespectful,
abusive and abrasive language, offensive personalities, unfounded
accusations or intemperate words tending to obstruct, embarrass
or influence the court in administering justice or to bring it into
disrepute have no place in a pleading.
Their employment serves no useful purpose and on the contrary
constitutes direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae.
A lawyer who uses intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening
language betrays disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and
invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power.
Language to be used
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel. A lawyer’s
language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful
as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession.
National Surety Co. v. Jarvis. The lawyer’s argument whether
written or oral, should be gracious to both the court and opposing
counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by
one gentleman to another
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel. A lawyer shall
refrain from all offensive personality and advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged
Court May Expunge Improper Language from the Records
Report of IBP Committee. Any kind of language which attacks
without foundation the integrity of opposing counsel or the
dignity of the court may be stricken off the records or may
subject a lawyer to disciplinary action.
Cases are not unknown where courts have expunged improper
language from the records, removed offending briefs from the
files or administered disciplinary action on lawyers for using
offensive language.
Instances of Disrespectful Language
(1) Surigao v. Cloribel. The lawyer’s referral to the SC as a
“civilized, democratic tribunal” but the innuendo would
suggest that it is not; categorizing the SC decision as “false,
erroneous and illegal”
(2) Montecilla v. Gica. Lawyer’s veiled threat that he would
prosecute those concerned for “knowingly rendering unjust
judgment” and “judgment rendered through negligence”
with the innuendo that the CA allowed itself to be deceived
(3) In re: Velasquez. A lawyer’s statement in his appeal brief
that, “The decision of the lower court if allowed to stand,
affirmed by this Honorable Court, means only one thing –
that before our courts of justice a man of the reputation of
Atty. Claro M. Recto can do no wrong, cannot commit an
error.
He has but to allow his name and signature to be used in a case,
make inexcusable excuses of his failure to attend anyway, - we
repeat, he has but to allow his name and signature to be used in
this case, and the case is won”
[47]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(4) Cornejo v. Judge Tan. A lawyer’s protest in his
Memorandum describing the Judge’s attitude as “unjust,
hostile, vindictive and dangerous”
(5) Lim Se v. Argel. A lawyer’s characterization of the SC’s
mandatory injunction as “unjust and a miscarriage of
justice”
(6) Andres v. Cabrera. A lawyer’s reference to a resolution of
the SC as “sadistic resolution en banc”. “Court not honoring
its own resolution”
(7) Salcedo v. Hernandez. Calling a decision an “outrage” and
“mockery” of the popular will expressed in the polls.
(8) Ceniza v. Sebastian. Labeling a judge as “corrupt” in a
Motion for Inhibition.
(9) Castillo v. Padilla, Jr. Calling an adverse counsel as “bobo” or
using the words “Ay, que bobo” in reference to the manner
of offering evidence
(10) In re: Almacen. A lawyer stating that “justice is blind” and
also “deaf and dumb”
(11) Zaldivar v. Gonzalez. Attributing to the SC acts of dismissing
judges “without rhyme and reason” and disbarring lawyers
“without due process”
(12) Lubiano v. Gordiola. Calling the award of separation pay as
“ill-gotten wealth”, the administrative body which granted
the award as an “unknowing” one, and the sheriff’s office as
a “partner in crime”
(13) Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Phil. Corp. The use of the
adjective “insufficiently informed” is disrespectful, abusive
and slanderous
Want of Intention Not an Excuse for the Disrespectful Language
Used
Rheem of the Phil. v. Ferrer. Lack or want of intention is no
excuse for the disrespectful language employed. Counsel cannot
escape responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean
what any reader must have understood them as meaning. At best
it extenuates liability.
When Strong Language Used is justified
When the use of strong language has been impelled by the same
language used by the Judge, the lawyer cannot be blamed.
Fernandez v. Hon. Bello. In this Court the judge below desires
that portions of petitioner's MR be stricken out for employing
strong language. We believe the said strong language must have
been impelled by the same language used by the judge below in
characterizing the act of the petitioner as "anomalous and
unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee
"through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner."

If any one is to blame for the language used by the petitioner, it is
the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders,
which must have provoked petitioner, and the judge below has
nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted
he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows
the wind will reap a storm.
2010 Bar, Q. III: Atty. Y, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision rendered by the NLRC, alleged that there was
connivance of the NLRC Commissioners with Atty. X for
monetary considerations in arriving at the questioned Decision.
He insulted the Commissioners for their ineptness in
appreciating the facts as borne by the evidence presented.
Atty. X files an administrative complaint against Atty. Y for using
abusive language.
Atty. Y posits that as lawyer for the down-trodden laborers, he is
entitled to express his righteous anger against the
Commissioners for having cheated them; that his allegations in
the Motion for Reconsideration are absolutely privileged; and
that proscription against the use of abusive language does not
cover pleadings filed with the NLRC, as it is not a court, nor are
any of its Commissioners Justice or Judges.
Is Atty. Y administratively liable under the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Explain.
A: Atty. Y “has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11, CPR and is
administratively liable. A lawyer shall not in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offense or otherwise
improper” (Rule 8.01, CPR). A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the courts (Rule 11.03, CPR).
In the case of Johnny Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (2006), which
involves the same facts, the Supreme Court held that the
argument that the NLRC is not a court, is unavailing. The lawyers
remain a member of the Bar, an “oath-bound servant of the law,
whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics.”
The Supreme Court also held that the argument that labor
practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is
unavailing. It does not deter the Court from exercising its
supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live
up to that standard expected of them as members of the bar.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1989 Bar, Q. II: Gretel’s residence in Makati village was
foreclosed by Joli Bank. Armed with a writ of possession issued
by the lower court, the sheriff and Joli Bank’s lawyers evicted
Gretel and padlocked the house. A restraining order issued by
the Court of Appeals which Gretel showed the sheriff was
disregarded. Gretel requested Hansel, an attorney who lives in
the same village, to assist her in explaining the restraining order,
since Gretel’s counsel of record was out of town. The discussion
on the restraining order was conducted on the sidewalk along
Gretel’s house. The village security guards were attracted by the
commotion brought about by the discussion, so they called the
Makati Police and the CAPCOM who responded immediately.
The CAPCOM colonel, who arrived at the scene with his troop
took it upon himself to open the house and declare Gretel as the
rightful possessor. The colonel invited Gretel and Hansel to enter
the house. Five days later, Hansel was made a co-respondent
(together with Gretel) in a complaint for trespass to dwelling
filed by Joli Bank’s lawyers before the Makati Fiscal’s office.
Discuss the propriety of the act of Joli Bank’s lawyers,
considering that all lawyers are mandated to conduct them-
selves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their
professional colleagues and to avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
A: Considering that there was a restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals, it was proper for Gretel to take steps to
maintain possession of his residence with the assistance of Hansel
as lawyer.
It was not proper for the Joli Bank’s lawyers to file an action of
trespass to dwelling against Gretel and lawyer Hansel. Canon 8,
CPR provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.02: A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer, however,
it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel.
Lawyer Should NOT Steal Another’s Client
Canon 7, CPE. A client's proffer of assistance of additional counsel
should not be regarded as evidence of want of confidence, but
the matter should be left to the determination of the client. A
lawyer should decline association as colleague if it is objectionable
to the original counsel, but if the lawyer first retained is relieved,
another may come into the case.
[48]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
When lawyers jointly associated in a cause cannot agree as to any
matter vital to the interest of the client, the conflict of opinion
should frankly stated to him for his final determination. His
decision should be accepted unless the nature of the difference
makes it impracticable for the lawyer whose judgment has been
overruled to cooperate effectivity. In this event it is his duty to ask
the client to relieve him.
Efforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer are unworthy of
those who should be brethren at the bar; but, nevertheless, it is
the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel, generally after communication with the lawyer against
whom the complaint is made.
Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro. By constantly checking the
transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent
lawyer deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the
counsel of record of that case.
2001 Bar, Q. VIII: May a lawyer give proper advice and assistance
to a client of another lawyer? Support your answer.
A: There is nothing wrong with giving proper advice and
assistance to a client of another lawyer, as long as no conflict of
interest is involved and he does not encroach, directly or
indirectly, on the employment of the said lawyer. However, Rule
8.02, CPR allows a lawyer, "without fear or favor, to give proper
advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
and neglectful counsel."
2001 Bar, Q. III: Atty. A objects to the collaboration of Atty. B as
proposed by Client C in a pending case. How would A, B and C
handle the situation?
A:
(1) A, B, and C may handle the situation in the following manner
—
(a) "A" can offer to withdraw his services. Rule 22.01(c), CPR
allows a lawyer to withdraw his services if his inability to
work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of
his client. Here, by objecting to the collaboration of Atty. B,
Atty. A foresees his inability to work with the former. “A”
may with withdraw to give his client a free hand in
protecting his interest.

(b) "B" should refuse to accept the case, otherwise, he may be
encroaching on the professional employment of another
lawyer. A lawyer should decline association as colleague if it
is objectionable to the original counsel, but if the lawyer first
retained is relieved, another may come into the case. (Canon
7, CPE).
(c) "C" the client must choose only one of the lawyers. If he
wants Atty. B as his lawyer, he should formally terminate the
services of "A" so "B" can formally enter his appearance in
the case.
Alternative: Atty. B is ethically prohibited from acting as co-
counsel of Atty. A if Atty. A objects. However, final decision rests
on the client. If the client insists on the collaboration of Atty. B,
even if Atty. A's recourse is to withdraw from the case. (Canon 8,
CPR)
2006 Bar, Q. V: Myrna, petitioner in a case for custody of
children against her husband, sought advice from Atty. Mendoza
whom she met at a party. She informed Atty. Mendoza that her
lawyer, Atty. Khan, has been charging her exorbitant appearance
fees when all he does is move for postponements which have
unduly delayed the proceedings; and that recently, she learned
that Atty. Khan approached her husband asking for a huge
amount in exchange for the withdrawal of her Motion for
Issuance of Hold Departure Order so that he and his children can
leave for abroad.
(1) Is it ethical for Atty. Mendoza to advise Myrna to terminate
the services of Atty. Khan and hire him instead for a
reasonable attorney's fees?
(2) What should Atty. Mendoza do about the information
relayed to him by Myrna that Atty. Khan approached her
husband with an indecent proposal?
(1) Such advice would be unethical. A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues (Canon 8, CPR). Specifically, he
should not directly or indirectly encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer (Rule 8.02, CPR)
(2) Atty. Mendoza can advise her to terminate the services of
Atty. Khan and/or file an administrative case against Atty.
Khan. It is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel (Rule 8.02, CPR).
No Encroachment When Previous Lawyer Was Already
Dismissed
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Laput v. Romantique. When the first lawyer was already
dismissed or dispensed with by the client, the entry of the
appearance of another lawyer in the case is not encroachment
upon the business of another lawyer.
Lawyer shall not Negotiate with the Opposite Party Who is
Represented by Counsel
Canon 9, CPE. A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon
the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and
he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
ABA Op. 75, 1932. Neither should the lawyer attempt to interview
the opposite party and question him as to the facts of the case
even if the adverse party is willing to do so.
Likong v. Lim. There is no showing that respondent even tried to
inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither
is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of
the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
1995 Bar, Q. XI: After the pre-trial Atty. Hans Hilado, counsel for
plaintiff Jennifer Ng, persuaded defendant Doris Dy to enter into
a compromise agreement with the plaintiff without the
knowledge and participation of defendant’s counsel, Atty. Jess
de Jose. Doris acceded and executed the agreement. Therein
Doris admitted her obligation in full and bound herself to pay
her obligation to Jennifer at 40% interest per annum in ten (10)
equal monthly installments. The compromise agreement was
approved by the court.
Realizing that she was prejudiced, Doris Dy filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Hilado alleging that the
latter prevented her from consulting her lawyer Atty. de Jose
when she entered into the compromise agreement, thereby
violating the rules of professional conduct. Atty. Hilado
countered that Doris Dy freely and voluntarily entered into the
compromise agreement which in fact was approved by the
court.
(1) Did Atty. Hans Hilado commit malpractice and grave
misconduct as a lawyer? Explain.
(2) Was it proper for the judge to approve the compromise
agreement since the terms thereof were Just and fair even
if counsel for one of the parties was not consulted or did
not participate therein? Explain.
[49]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A:
(1) Atty. Hilado committed an act of malpractice. Rule 8.02, CPR
provides that “a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly
encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer". Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states
that a lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the
subject of a controversy with a party represented by a
counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with
his counsel. Under similar facts, the lawyer concerned was
suspended for committing acts constituting malpractice and
grave misconduct (Likong v. Lim).
(2) It was not proper for the Judge to approve the compromise
agreement without the participation of the lawyer of one of
the parties, even if the agreement was Just and fair. Even if a
client has exclusive control of the cause of action and may
compromise the same, such right is not absolute. He may
not, for example, enter into a compromise to defeat the
lawyer’s right to a just compensation. Such right is entitled
to protection from the court.
1997 Bar, Q. IX: You are the counsel of K in his action for specific
performance against DEV. Inc., a subdivision developer which is
represented by Atty. L. Your client believes that the president of
DEV, Inc., would be willing to consider an amicable settlement
and your client urges you to discuss the matter with DEV. Inc.,
without the presence of Atty. L whom he considered to be an
impediment to an early compromise. Would it be all right for
you to negotiate the terms of the compromise as so suggested
above by your client?
A: No. Rule 8.02, Canon 8, CPR provides that "a lawyer shall not.
directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer." Canon 9 of the CPE is more particular. "A
lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
the controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him but should deal only with his counsel." In the case of Likong
vs. Lim, a lawyer was suspended for negotiating a compromise
agreement directly with the adverse party without the presence
and participation of her counsels.
2002 Bar, Q. XII: Atty. A's client filed a case against Atty. B’s
client for pirating the book of A's client. A's client is a friend of B.
A filed a disbarment complaint against B for convincing A is
client to settle the case. Decide.

A: The complaint shall prosper. A lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal
only with his counsel. (Canon 9, CPE, Likong v. Atty. Lim, A.C. No.
3149, August 17, 1994)
Lawyer May However Interview Any Witness or Prospective
Witness for the Opposing Side
Canon 39, CPE. A lawyer may properly interview any witness or
prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal
action without the consent of opposing counsel or party. In
doing so, however, he should scrupulously avoid any suggestion
calculated to induce the witness to suppress or deviate from the
truth, or in any degree to affect his free and untrammeled
conduct when appearing at the trial or on the witness stand.
2009 Bar, Q. VII: Atty. Manuel is counsel for the defendant in a
civil case pending before the RTC. After receiving the plaintiffs
Pre-Trial Brief containing the list of witnesses, Atty. Manuel
interviewed some of the witnesses for the plaintiff without the
consent of plaintiffs’ counsel.
(a) Did Atty. Manuel violate any ethical standard for lawyers?
Explain.
(b) Will your answer be the same if it was the plaintiff who
was interviewed by Atty. Manuel without the consent of
plaintiffs’ counsel? Explain.
(a) No, because Canon 39, CPE provides that “a lawyer may
interview any witness or prospective witness from the
opposing side in any civil or criminal action without the
consent of opposing counsel or party.” This is because a
witness is supposed to be a neutral person whose role is to
tell the truth when called upon to testify.
(b) My answer will not be the same. Canon 9, CPE provides that
“a lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon a subject
of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much
less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel.” If
he communicates with the adverse party directly, he will be
encroaching into the employment of the adverse party’s
lawyer.
Advice and Assistance to Victims of Unfaithful and Neglectful
Counsel, Proper
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
 Any person who seeks relief against an unfaithful or
neglectful lawyer may approach another lawyer for proper
advice and assistance.
 XPN to Rule 8.02: Any advice or assistance extended after
proper verification is not encroaching upon the business of
another lawyer for such act is justified under the
circumstances.
Canon 29, CPE. Lawyers should expose without fear or favor
before the proper tribunal corrupt or dishonest conduct in the
profession, and should accept without hesitation employment
against a member of the bar who has wronged his client. The
counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been
committed owe it to the profession and to the public to bring the
matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. The
lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in
either moral character or education. He should strive at all times
to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession
and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
Canon 9: A Lawyer Shall Not, Directly or Indirectly, Assist in the
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Unauthorized practice of law is committed when a person not a
lawyer pretends to be one and performs acts which are exclusive
to members of the Bar.
Tan v. Balajadia. The unauthorized practice of law by assuming to
be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes
indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both
Rule 138, Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear — An attorney
is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any
issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney
wilfully appearing in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
[50]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Assistance to Unauthorized Practice of Law, Prohibited
 A lawyer must not take as partner or associate in his law
firm a person who is not a lawyer, a lawyer who has been
disbarred, a lawyer who has been suspended from the
practice of law, or a foreign lawyer although knowledgeable
in the law, unless licensed by the SC
2014 Bar, Q. XV: Will a lawyer violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility if he forms a partnership with professionals of
other disciplines like doctors, engineers, architects or
accountants? Explain your answer.
A: He may form a partnership with other professionals as long as
it is not for the practice of law. Canon 9, CPR provides that “a
lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized
practice of law” Canon 33, par. 3 of the CPE which is suppletory to
the CPR expressly provides that “partnership between lawyers
and members of other professions or non-professional persons
should not be formed or permitted where any part of the
partnership’s employment consists of the practice of law.
People v. De Luna. Notarizing the oaths of office as lawyers of
person who failed in the Bar Exam and announcing that they will
practice law in all parts of the Philippines is a gross misconduct
and is contemptuous.
Rule 71, Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
2014 Bar, Q. XVI: A person who has been refused admission to
the bar by order of the Supreme Court but nonetheless attempts
to practice law is guilty of:
(a) direct contempt
(b) indirect contempt
(c) criminal contempt
A: (b)
Ethical Consideration for the Canon

Report of IBP Committee. The prohibition against the practice of
law by a layman is grounded in the need of the public for integrity
and competence of those who undertake to render legal services.
Because of the fiduciary and personal character of the lawyer-
client relationship and the inherently complex nature of our legal
system, the public can better be assured of the requisite
responsibility and competence if the practice of law is confined to
those who are subject to the requirements and regulations
imposed upon members of the legal profession.
2015 Bar, Q. VI(b): Casper Solis graduated with a Bachelor of
Laws degree from Achieve University in 2000 and took and
passed the bar examinations given that same year. Casper
passed the bar examinations and took the Attorney's Oath
together with other successful bar examinees on March 19, 2001
at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC). He was
scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys on May 24, 2001 but he
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys sent by the
Office of the Bar Confidant after he went home to the province
for a vacation. Since taking his oath in 2001, Casper had been
employed by several law firms and private corporations, mainly
doing corporate and taxation work. When attending a seminar
as part of his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education in 2003,
Casper was unable to provide his roll number. Seven years later
in 2010, Casper filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to sign
the Roll of Attorneys. Casper alleged good faith, initially
believing that he had already signed the Roll before entering
PICC for his oath-taking on March 19, 2001.
Did Casper commit any professional or ethical transgression for
which he could be held administratively liable?
A: He can be held liable for unauthorized practice of law.
Canon 9, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly
assist in the unauthorized practice of law. In the Medado case, the
SC held that “while a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely
prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of
law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is
the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law.”
2011 Bar, Q. 47: Atty. Alfredo Prado appeared in a case as legal
officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA). His opponent,
Atty. Armando, knew an Atty. Alfredo Prado from his province
who had been dead for years. When Atty. Armando checked
with the Supreme Court, only one Alfredo Prado was in the roll
of attorneys. What action can Atty. Armado take against Vicente
who had taken a dead lawyer’s identity?
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) File direct contempt action against Vicente for deceiving the
court.
(b) Criminally prosecute Vicente for estafa for making money
upon false pretense.
(c) Criminally prosecute Vicente for theft of Alfredo's identity
and law practice.
(d) Institute a disbarment case against Vicente for
misrepresenting himself as lawyer.
Rule 9.01: A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the bar in good standing.
Delegation of Legal Work to an Unqualified Person is
Misbehavior
PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co. Public policy demands that
legal work in the representation of party-litigants should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualification and who
are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as
well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the
protection of the courts, clients and the public.
Guballa v. Caguiao. A lawyer is prohibited from taking as partner
or associate any person who is not authorized to practice law – to
appear in court or to sign pleadings.
U.S. v. Ney Bosque. The repeated irregular signature of pleadings
by an attorney in the name of a firm improperly constituted, with
one partner, who, by an order of this court, had been denied the
right to practice, and the participation by him in an act of
contempt committed by such partner, is misbehavior which
renders him guilty of contempt
Beltran, Jr. v. Abad. Finally, Atty. Jacobe is required to explain
within 10 days from notice why he should be disciplined for
collaborating and associating in the practice of law with the
respondent who is not a member of the bar.
A Lawyer Shall Not Allow a Non-Member of the Bar to
Misrepresent Himself as a Lawyer
Cambaliza v. Cristal Tenorio. A lawyer who allows a non-member
of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice is
guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the CPR
Lawyer Cannot Delegate His Authority Without Client’s Consent
Even to a Qualified Person
[51]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
 The rule is absolute that the authority of a lawyer to
represent a client in a case cannot be delegated to an
unqualified person. The reason for this rule is public policy.
Lamport v. Aetna Life Insurance. It does not follow however that
the retained lawyer is automatically authorized to make such
delegation to a qualified person. A client-lawyer relationship is a
personal one. The retained counsel cannot just get another lawyer
to represent the client without the latter’s consent.
“The reason is that attorneys are selected on account of their
special fitness through their learning or probity for the work in
hand”
An associate or assistant in a law firm may appear for the client,
unless the client has contracted otherwise.
1988 Bar, Q. IV(b): Abad and de los Reyes, both lawyers, and
Salazar, a certified public accountant, in order to enhance their
respective practice, desire to pool their resources together and
establish a partnership for the combined purposes of law and
accounting practice under the firm name of Abad, de los Reyes,
Salazar & Associates.
Is the proposed partnership allowed? Reasons.
A: The partnership is improper. Lawyers should not associate with
non-lawyers in the practice of their profession. The mission of an
attorney is to assist courts in the administration of justice while
accounting practice is mainly based on business. Moreover, the
accountants are not bound by with canons of legal ethics.
2008 Bar, Q. VIII(c): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
lawyer concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: A suspended lawyer allowing his non-lawyer staff to
actively operate his law' office and conduct business on behalf of
clients during the period of suspension.
A: The lawyer may be sanctioned. A lawyer shall not delegate to
any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing
(Rule 9.01, CPR)
2010 Bar, Q. VI: Atty. Monica Santos-Cruz registered the firm
name “Santos-Cruz Law Office” with the Department of Trade
and Industry as a single proprietorship. In her stationery, she
printed the names of her husband and a friend who are both
non-lawyers as her senior partners in light of their investments
in the firm. She allowed her husband to give out calling cards

bearing his name as senior partner of the firm and to appear in
courts to move for postponements.
Did Atty. Santos-Cruz violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Why?
A: Yes, she did. In the case of Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio
(2004), which involves the same facts, the Supreme Court held
that a lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law, is guilty of
violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01, CPR which provide as follows:
“Canon 9. A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.”
“Rule 9.01. A lawyer shall not delegate to any unauthorized
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the bar in good standing.”
1988 Bar, Q. IV(a): Hessy Prado is a successful law practitioner in
Metro Manila with clients all over the country. He has a cousin
who practices law in Davao where he (Atty. Prado), likewise, has
some clients. Meeting each other in a national convention of
lawyers, Atty. Prado proposed to his cousin referrals of cases
from time to time in exchange for a certain percentage of the
fees.
(1) Is the proposal proper? Explain.
(2) If your answer is in the negative, under what type of
arrangement can the proposal be considered proper?
Explain.
A:
(1) The proposal of Hessy Prado is improper. A lawyer may not
delegate his duties to other lawyers without the consent of
his client. The attorney and client relationship is personal
based on trust and confidence. Moreover, the canons
prohibit division of attorney’s fees without division of work.
(2) Under the exceptions under Rule 9.02
1990 Bar, Q. VII: Atty. Chito Sobretodo was retained by Buddy
Capilla to handle his case in the Securities and Exchange
Commission. There is a tax angle so Sobretodo consulted Atty.
Romy Collado, a tax expert, and for his assistance shared 50% of
the retainer fees with Collado.
Is this proper? Explain your answer.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
A: There is no impropriety in the sharing of attorney’s fees with
tax expert Atty. Romy Collado. This is delegation of work and not
delegation of a case. As long as Atty. Sobretodo is responsible to
his client, Buddy Capilla, even if he delegated the research work
to Atty. Collado, there is no impropriety in said arrangement.
What is prohibited by the CPR is splitting of Attorney’s fees with a
non-lawyer.
Alternative:
(a) The propriety of Atty. Chito Sobretodo consulting Atty.
Romy Collado on the tax aspect of the case depends on the
circumstances obtaining.
The attorney-client relationship existed between Atty. Chito
Sobretodo and Buddy Capilla only, and not with Atty. Romy
Collado. If Atty. Romy Collado is an assistant, associate or law
partner of Atty. Chito Sobretodo and if the client. Buddy Capilla.
has not prohibited Atty. Chito Sobretodo from consulting his
assistant or law partner, then Atty. Chito Sobretodo can properly
seek the services of Atty. Romy Collado on the tax angle of the
case. For the general rule is that the employment of Atty. Chito
Sobretodo as lawyer for Buddy Capilla is deemed a retainer of any
member of Atty. Sobretodo’s law firm. However, if Atty. Romy
Collado is an independent lawyer. Atty. Chito Sobretodo cannot
properly consult Atty. Romy Collado on the tax angle of the case
without the consent of his client. Buddy Capilla, because the
consultation will involve revelation of the client’s secrets,
privileged communications or affairs to a lawyer with whom he
has no attorney-client relationship. To do so without the client’s
consent will be to violate the lawyer's duty to keep his client's
confidences or affairs, secret or undisclosed. Moreover, Rule
18.01, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not undertake a legal
service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render, but he may render such service if. with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Since Atty. Collado has rendered services. Atty. Sobretodo can
very well share 50% of his fees with Atty. Collado, the matter of
fee division being between the two lawyers only because the
client is not asked to pay additional amount for Collado’s services
as tax expert.
(b) Division of fees among lawyers is allowed provided there is
division of labor and the client consents (Rule 20.02, Canon
20). Hence the sharing between Sobretodo and Collado is
proper provided the client's consent is obtained.
[52]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Rule 9.02: A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee
for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or
associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid
over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons
specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal
business of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees
in a retirement plan even if the plan is based in whole or in
part, on a profit sharing agreement.
Division of Attorney’s Fees With Non-Lawyers Prohibited;
Exceptions
PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co. A lawyer can only divide or
stipulate to divide fees for legal services with another lawyer who
had rendered legal services with him in a case or legal work.
An agreement providing for the division of attorney’s fees,
whereby a non-lawyer (union president) is allowed to share in
said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of CPE and is
immoral and cannot be justified.
Rationale of the Prohibition
PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co. If attorney’s fees were
allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also to
leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-
lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
Exceptions 9.02 (Rule 9.02 (a)(b) and (c)
Observation: Letter (b) should not be an exception because the
person who undertakes to complete the unfinished legal business
of a deceased lawyer is a lawyer himself who is licensed to
practice law.
Non-Lawyers Are Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees
Five J Taxi v. NLRC. While it may be true that Pulia was the
authorized representative of private respondents in appearing
before the NLRC, he is not entitled to attorney’s fees under Art.
222 of the LC for not being a lawyer
2015 Bar, Q. VIII: Engr. Gilbert referred his friends, spouses
Richard and Cindy Maylupa, to Atty. Jane for the institution of

an action for partition of the estate of Richard's deceased father.
In a letter, Atty. Jane promised to give Engr. Gilbert a
commission equivalent to 15% of the attorney's fees she would
receive from the spouses Maylupa. Atty. Jane, however, failed to
pay Engr. Gilbert the promised commission despite already
terminating the action for partition and receiving attorney's fees
amounting to about P600,000.00. Engr. Gilbert repeatedly
demanded payment of his commission but Atty. Jane ignored
him. May Atty. Jane professionally or ethically promise a
commission to Engr. Gilbert? Explain.
A: Atty. Jane may not professionally or ethically promise a
commission to Engr. Gilbert.
Rule 9.02 of the CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not divide or
stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
authorized to practice law.”
2005 Bar, Q. IV: You had just taken your oath as a lawyer. The
secretary to the president of a big university offered to get you
as the official notary public of the school. She explained that a
lot of students lose their Identification Cards and are required to
secure an affidavit of loss before they can be issued a new one.
She claimed that this would be very lucrative for you, as more
than 30 students lose their Identification Cards every month.
However, the secretary wants you to give her one-half of your
earnings therefrom.
Will you agree to the arrangement? Explain.
A: No, I will not agree. Rule 9.02, CPR provides that “a lawyer shall
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal service with
persons not licensed to practice law". The secretary is not licensed
to practice law and is not entitled to a share of the fees for
notarizing affidavits, which is a legal service.
Chapter III: The Lawyer and the Courts
Canon 10: A Lawyer Owes Candor, Fairness and Good Faith to
the Court
Reason for Provision on Candor and Fairness
Munoz v. People. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined.
Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause, it must never be at
the expense of deviation from the truth
Lawyer is an “Officer of the Court”
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel. A lawyer is an
officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and
to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been
said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice."
2015 Bar, Q. XVI(b): Describe the relationship between a lawyer
and the courts.
A: A lawyer is an officer of the court. As such, he is as much a part
of the machinery of justice as a judge is. The judge depends on
the lawyer for the proper performance of his judicial duties. Thus
Canon 10 enjoins a lawyer to be candid with the courts; Canon 11
requires him to show respect to judicial officers; and Canon 12
urges him to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
1996 Bar, Q. II(1): The Code of Professional Responsibility is to
lawyers, as the Code of Judicial Conduct is to members of the
bench.
How would you characterize the relationship between the Judge
and a lawyer? Explain.
A: The CPR requires lawyers to observe and maintain respect for
judicial officers (Cannon 11). On the other hand, the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires judge to be patient, attentive and
courteous to lawyers (Rule 3). In a word, lawyers and judges owe
each other mutual respect and courtesy.
Alternative:
(a) The relationship between a judge and a lawyer must be
based on independence and self-respect. He must neither
be a mindless fawning slave of the judge, nor must he take
an attitude of hostility towards the Judge. The lawyer must
maintain toward the court a respectful attitude and to
uphold and protect the dignity of the court.
[53]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(b) Being an officer of the court, the first and foremost duty of
the lawyer is to the court. He is bound to obey lawful orders
and decisions of the court. Like the court itself, the lawyer is
an instrument to advance the ends of justice. Should there
be a conflict between the duty to his client and that of the
court, he should resolve the conflict against his client and
obey the lawful orders of the court. On the other hand,
judges should be courteous and impartial to counsel. To
maintain impartiality, the judge should not associate too
much with lawyers.
Example of Lawyer’s Display of Candor
Dir. of Lands v. Adorable. In this case, the attorney for the
claimants and appellees, acting under the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes a deserving
member of the bar, instead of taking advantage of claimant-
appellant's ignorance of what really happened in the Court of
Appeals, informed this court that the case had been decided in
favor of said claimant and appellant by the CA, filing to said effect
the copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent
to him by said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting
for the reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble of
deciding again a case already decided.
This is an example worth remembering by all members of the bar
Refiling a case which was Already Litigated Before is not Forum
Shopping But Nevertheless a Violation of Canon 10
Carlet v. CA. With respect to the issue of forum-shopping for
which the trial court ordered counsel for petitioners, Atty.
Modesto Jimenez, to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt, this applies only when the two (or more) cases are still
pending.
Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case No. B-
1656, CA-G.R. CV No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well as in
G.R. No. 94382 (the ejectment case), counsel persisted in filing
the case at bar for reconveyance. Since this case is barred by the
judgment in Civil Case No. B-1656, there was no other pending
case to speak of when it was filed in July 1991. Thus, the "non-
forum shopping rule" is not violated.
What counsel for petitioners did, however, in filing this present
action to relitigate the title to and partition over Lot No. 981,
violates Canon 10 of the CPR for lawyers which states that a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule
10.01 of the same Canon states that "(a) lawyer shall not do any
falsehood . . . nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled

by any artifice." Counsel's act of filing a new case involving
essentially the same cause of action is likewise abusive of the
courts' processes and may be viewed as "improper conduct
tending to directly impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice."
1987 Bar, Q. III: Mr. CD was the son of a deceased person who
originally owned vast properties in Manila. CD approached Atty.
EF and asked the latter to help him recover what he felt was his
legal share in the estate, of which he had been allegedly
deprived by his elder brother. It turned out, however, after a
review of the papers submitted by the client, that the following
had already transpired:
(a) The estate of the father was settled and distributed
pursuant to administration proceedings terminated five
years before; and
(b) The client CD had actually field cases against his brother to
recover his alleged share, namely, a case for reconveyance,
and a case of unlawful detainer, both of which had also
been closed and terminated.
The client, however, told Atty. EF that he had documentary
evidence showing that his brother had executed to the court in
the administration proceedings, all of which showed that the
client CD had been defrauded of his share in the estate. On the
promise of a big fee for just filing any action that Atty. EF might
decide on, the latter filed a complaint for annulment of
judgment on the ground of fraud This complaint was dismissed
by the trial court and CD, through Atty. EF, appealed. Pending
this appeal, Atty. EF also filed actions for ejectment against the
brother of CD and another case to recover possession of his
client’s alleged share of the property. The brother, through
counsel, filed a petition to discipline Atty. EF for malpractice,
citing the foregoing circumstances
(c) Under the given facts, may Atty. EF be disciplined for
unprofessional conduct? Explain.
(d) May he set up the defense that he was merely exerting this
best effort to protect his client’s interest? Explain.
A: Atty. EF is guilty of unprofessional conduct on two counts.
In the first place, it was the duty of Atty. EF to properly advise his
client not to enter into a litigation knowing that the cause of
action was already finally decided by courts in previous cases. In
fact, the estate of his father from whom he claims inheritance was
already settled. Moreover, a case for reconveyance from his
client’s brother was also decided by a court wherein the decision
had already become final.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and
it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that one a judgment has become final the winning party be not,
through subterfuge, deprive of that verdict (Likim Tho v. Sanchez,
1949; Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 30362, Nov. 26, 1970). For this reason,
a lawyer should not file several actions covering the same subject
matter or seeking substantially identical reliefs as those which had
already been finally disposed of (Macias vs. Uy Kim, G.R. No.
31174, May 30, 1972; Gabriel v. CA, G.R. No. 43757, July 30,
1976). Nor should he enter his appearance as counsel for a party
in a case which had long been terminated by final judgment (In re:
Soriano, G.R. No. 24114, June 30, 1970), or misuse legal remedies
to thwart or delay the satisfaction of a judgment (Cobb-Perez vs.
Lantin, G.R. No. 22320, May 22; 1968; Castaneda, vs. Ago, G. R.
No. 288546, July 30, 1987).
1996 Bar, Q. V(2): Atty. X was retained by E in a case for
violation of BP 22 filed by B. Before the scheduled hearing, Atty.
X assured B that E would pay the value of the dishonored check.
Elated at the prospect of being paid, B wined and dined Atty. X
several times. Atty. X convinced B not to appear at the
scheduled hearings. Due to non-appearance of B, the estafa case
was dismissed for failure to prosecute. B, however, was never
paid. Thus, she filed a case for disbarment against Atty. X.
Does the conduct of Atty. X constitute malpractice? Explain.
A: Yes, the conduct of Atty. S constitutes malpractice. A lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. He shall not do
any falsehood or shall be mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice. He owes loyalty to his client. In a case involving
similar facts, the Supreme Court found that the lawyer concerned
obstructed the administration of justice and suspended him for
two years (Cantorne v. Ducusin).
Rule 10.01: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
No Falsehood, Nor Consent to the Doing of the Same
 In all his dealings, a lawyer is expected to act in good faith
just as anybody (Art. 19, NCC) specially in his dealing with
court.
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
[54]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Lawyer’s Oath. I will:
(a) Do no falsehood
(b) Nor consent to the doing of any in court
(c) I will conduct myself as a lawyer to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients
 The violation of the lawyer’s oath is a ground for suspension
or disbarment
Duty Not to Mislead a Judge
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel. Canon 22, CPE
reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and
fairness, and specifically states that “it is not candid nor fair for
the lawyer to knowingly misquote”
Munoz v. People. Attributing to the CA as its findings of fact, the
mere version of the lawyer’s client of what transpired in the case
shows lack of candor.
Limpin, Jr. v. IAC. A lawyer was held in contempt of court for
trying to mislead the SC by raising the issues long laid to rest by
final and executory judgment.
Some Cases of Falsehoods Which Merited Discipline
(1) Sevilla v. Soleta. Lawyer falsely stating in a deed of sale that
property is from all liens and encumbrances when it is not
so.
(2) Monterey v. Arayata. Lawyer making it appear that a
person, long dead, executed a deed of sale in his favor
(3) Calo v. Degamo. Lawyer concealing the fact that he was
charged with or convicted of a crime, in an information
sheet required by law in connection with his employment
Diao v. Martinez. Where lawyer concealed his lack of the required
pre-legal education
(4) In re: Samaniego. Lawyer, encashing a check payable to
deceased cousin by signing the latter’s name on the check
(5) In re: Rusiana. Lawyer falsifying a power of attorney and
used it in collecting the money due to the principal and
appropriating the money for his own benefit
(6) Chavez v. Viola. Lawyer alleging in one pleading that his
clients were merely lessees of the property involved, and
alleged in a later pleading that the same clients were the
owners of the same property.

Occena v. Marquez. Where there are false allegations in pleadings
(7) Martin v. Moreno. Lawyer uttering falsehood in a Motion to
Dismiss
(8) Ragacejo v. IAC. Lawyer denying having received the notice
to file brief which denial is belied by the return card
(9) Bautista v. Gonzales. Lawyer presenting falsified documents
in court which he knows to be false
Berrenger v. Carranza. Introducing false evidence
(10) Retuya v. Gorduiz. Lawyer filing false charges or groundless
suits
(11) Libit v. Oliva. Lawyer falsifying Sheriff’s Return and seeking
the default of the defendant
(12) Bongolota v. Castillo. Using in pleadings the IBP number of
another lawyer
(13) Roces v. Aportadera. Use of fictitious residence certificate
by a notary public.
Offering False Testimony in Evidence is a Crime
RPC, Art. 184. Offering false testimony in evidence – Any person
who shall knowingly offer in evidence a false witness or testimony
in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished as guilty of
false testimony and shall suffer the respective penalties provided
in this section.
Rule 10.02: A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.
Deliberate Misquotation: Deliberate Citation of an Inoperative
Provision as Law; Assertion of Something as a Fact Which Has
Not Been Proved; All Prohibited (Based on Canon 22, CPE)
Rule in the Quotation of a Decision
The Insular Life Assurance Co. Employees Assoc. v. Insular Life
Insurance Co. When a lawyer makes a quotation of a decision in
his pleadings, he should quote the same verbatim to avoid
misleading the court
We must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's
decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and
lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do
this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other
courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is
because the decisions referred to in Art. 8 of the Civil Code which
reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort.
We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al.
that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish
jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present
is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the
decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and
the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and
members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check
and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this
Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that
they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and
punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting
on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding
out whether the citations are correct.
Syllabus of a Case is not the Work of the SC; It Should Not be
Cited in Place of the Text in the Decision
Allied Banking Corp. v. CA. The syllabus of cases in official or
unofficial reports of SC decisions or resolutions is not the work of
the Court, nor does it state this Court’s decision. The syllabus is
simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of
the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience
of lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the
court’s decision. A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of
the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.
Del Rosario v. Chingcuangco. However, a mere typographical
error in the citation of an authority is not contemptuous
Petitioner's counsel obviously had in mind this Court's decision in
Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957.
Although he cites as docket number L-121447 instead of L-12147,
the same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not
sufficient to place him in contempt, especially because the names
of the parties were given correctly. As to said counsel's
interpretation of this Court's decision in said case, or of what the
ruling therein "in effect" created, established or confirmed, the
same are mere arguments fully within the bounds of earnest
debate, rather than a deception urged upon this Court. The first
petition for contempt is therefore without merit.
[55]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel. When the
misquotation is intended, the lawyer is subject to disciplinary
action
Citing as Law, An Inoperative Provision of a Law; Contemptuous
Banogon v. Zerna. Lawyer must not intentionally misread or
interpret the law to the point of distortion in cunning effort to
achieve their purposes
Canon 22, CPE. A lawyer should not cite a decision, knowing it is
invalid or that it has already been overruled. Neither should he
cite a statute knowing that it has already been repealed.
Allied Banking Corp. v. CA. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote
or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and
decisions of the SC accurately.
Asserting a Fact, Something Not Proven
Munoz v. CA & Sutton. A lawyer should not assert as a fact, his
version of the case, which had not yet been proven. Nor, should a
lawyer assert as finding of fact by the Court, which actually is not.
The respondent failed to meet the test of candor and honesty
required of pleaders when, in a petition for certiorari prepared by
her to review a CA decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts
in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its
version as to what transpired. When given an opportunity to
make proper amends, both in her appearance before us and
thereafter in her memorandum, there was lacking any showing of
regret for a misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable. Such an
attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is
clear. Only her relative inexperience in the ways of the law did
save her from a penalty graver than severe censure
Foisting a Non-Existing Rule
Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC. Foisting a non-existing rule to mislead the
Court is a violation of legal ethics
Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. 100643, Oct. 30, 1992
Facts:

1. The instant case originated from a petition for reconstitution
of title over a parcel of land.
2. Sec. 13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12, on which petitioner
bases one of his causes of action provides among others that
notice should be given to the occupants or persons in
possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a
material requirement for granting a petition for
reconstitution of title.
3. The inserted phrase ‘without notice to the actual occupants
of the property, Adez Realty’ was just the right phrase
intercalated at the right place, making it highly improbable
to be unintentionally, much less innocently, committed; and
by the secretary at that.
4. All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our
belief.
5. Certainly, making it appear that respondent CA found that
no notice was given to the occupants of subject property ––
when in fact it did not make such a finding –– is a clear
indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of
the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue
advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more
importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the
final arbiter of litigations.
Held:
1. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in
certain instances, factual findings of the CA are binding upon
this Court.
2. The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the
willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and
should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a
dangerous precedent by, rather, because it is a clear and
serious violation of one's oath as member of the Bar. Rule
10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, CPR directs that "[a] lawyer
shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved”
3. Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court
decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer's solemn
duty to act at all times in manner consistent with the truth.
4. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the court by false
statements or quotations of facts or laws.
5. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales, We suspended respondent for
six (6) months for, among other submitting to the lower
court falsified documents, representing them to the true
copies.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
6. In Chavez v. Viola, We suspend respondent counsel for five
(5) months after he filed an Amended Application for
Original Registration of Title which contained false
statements.
2015 Bar, Q. XXIII: Atty. Billy, a young associate in a medium-
sized law firm, was in a rush to meet the deadline for filing his
appellant's brief. He used the internet for legal research by
typing keywords on his favorite search engine, which led him to
many websites containing text of Philippine jurisprudence. None
of these sites was owned or maintained by the Supreme Court.
He found a case he believed to be directly applicable to his
client's cause, so he copied the text of the decision from the blog
of another law firm, and pasted the text to the document he was
working on. The formatting of the text he had copied was lost
when he pasted it to the document, and he could not distinguish
anymore which portions were the actual findings or rulings of
the Supreme Court, and which were quoted portions from the
other sources that were used in the body of the decision. Since
his deadline was fast approaching, he decided to just make it
appear as if every word he quoted was part of the ruling of the
Court, thinking that it would not be discovered.
Atty. Billy's opponent, Atty. Ally, a very conscientious former
editor of her school's law journal, noticed many discrepancies in
Atty. Billy's supposed quotations from the Supreme Court
decision when she read the text of the case from her copy of the
Philippine Reports. Atty. Billy failed to reproduce the
punctuation marks and font sizes used by the Court. Worse, he
quoted the arguments of one party as presented in the case,
which arguments happened to be favorable to his position, and
not the ruling or reasoning of the Court, but this distinction was
not apparent in his brief. Appalled, she filed a complaint against
him.
(a) Did Atty. Billy fail in his duty as a lawyer? What rules did he
violate, if any?
(b) How should lawyers quote a Supreme Court decision?
A:
(a) Atty. Billy has violated Canon 10 Rule 10.01 and 10.02 of the
CPR which provide as follows:
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
[56]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.
(b) They should be verbatim reproductions of the SC’s decisions,
down to the last word and punctuation mark (Insular Life’s
Assurance Co. Ltd., Employees Association v. Insular Life
Assurance Co. Ltd., G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971)
2000 Bar, Q. XIII: In a pending labor case, Atty. A filed a Position
Paper on behalf of his client, citing a Supreme Court case and
quoting a portion of the decision therein which he stated
reflected the ratio decidendi. However, what he quoted was not
actually the Supreme Court ruling but the argument of one of
the parties to the case. May Atty. A be faulted administratively?
Explain.
A: Yes, he may be faulted administratively. A lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.02, CPR expressly
provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved. To cite an argument of one of the
parties as a ratio decidendi of a Supreme Court decision shows, at
least, lack of diligence on the part of Atty. A (COMELEC v. Noynay,
1998).
Rule 10.03: A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Aim of Lawsuit; Purpose of Rules of Procedure
 The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice. And the rules of
procedure are precisely designed to attain such objective.
Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo. This appeal, moreover, should fail,
predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any
persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a
technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have
left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a
lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law.
Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a
worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert
the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. We
have done so before. We do so again.
Lawyer Not to Misuse Rules of Procedure

 A lawyer should always bear in mind that our rules of
procedure, like the ROC, are intended to facilitate the
delivery of justice to those to whom it is due without
unnecessary expense and waste of time for truly justice
delayed is justice denied.
 Rules of procedure must be used to attain such objective.
Any lawyer who uses them to defeat or frustrate the ends of
justice deserves condemnation.
Canlas v. CA. We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on
matters of procedure — for the enlightenment solely of the bench
and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As
we have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the
proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his
mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his
own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their
object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." If
procedure were to be an impediment to such an objective, "it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy." It was almost eight decades ago that
the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more
deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in
which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court
the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits,
unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. CA and Seelin. A note of
caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final
judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the private
respondents. In the meantime, that petitioner has thwarted
execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on,
so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot
shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing
for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a
mockery of justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they
should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to
exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes. In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al., we ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in
the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this
duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of
the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it
is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them
when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to
merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing
litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts.
Technicalities Should Give Way to the Realities of the Situation
Economic Insurance Co. v. Uy Realty Co. It is understandable for a
party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every
conceivable legal defense the law allows it. In the appraisal,
however, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party like
petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that
procedural rules are intended as an aid to justice, not as a means
for its frustration. Even if the petition were impressed with a
greater degree of plausibility, it would be, considering all the
circumstances, to crown with success an unworthy scheme to
evade a just obligation by perverting the ends procedural
requisites are intended to accomplish. Not once but several times,
from Alonso v. Villamor, we have stressed that we are not to lend
the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort, the result of
which would be to render illusory substantive rights. We do so
again. Technicalities, in the appropriate Language of Justice
Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation."
Rule 10.04: A lawyer shall, when filing a pleading, furnish the
opposing party with a copy thereof, together with all the
documents annexed thereto. Unless a motion is ex parte, he
should set it for hearing, with sufficient notice to the other party
Reason for the Rule
 To prevent unfairness, to avoid surprises and backstabbing
 To prevent delay in judicial proceedings.
 To encourage amicable settlement when parties are brought
to realization that their cases are not worth fighting for.
Pleaders Must Also Furnish Adverse Party or Parties Copies of All
Documents Annexed Thereto
 To disregard this directive is indulging in unfair and vexing
strategy not sanctioned by the Rules
[57]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Motion Must be Set for Hearing; Exception
Rule 15, Sec. 2. Motions must be in writings — All motions shall
be in writing except those made in open court or in the course of
a hearing or trial
Rule 15, Sec. 7. Motion day — Except for motions requiring
immediate action, all motions shall be scheduled for hearing on
Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the
afternoon of the next working day.
Rule 15, Sec. 4. Hearing of motion — Except for motions which
the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date
of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice.
Rule 15, Sec. 5. Notice of hearing — The notice of hearing shall be
addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and
date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days
after the filing of the motion.
Rule 15, Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary — No written motion
set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof.
Canon 11: A Lawyer Shall Observe and Maintain the Respect Due
to the Courts and to Judicial Officers and Should Insist on Similar
Conduct by Others
Lawyer’s First Duty is to the Courts
Salcedo v. Hernandez. A lawyer is an officer of the court.
Cantorne v. Ducosin. He occupies a quasi-judicial office with a
tripartite obligation to the courts.
Langen v. Borkowski. The public duties of the attorney take
precedence over his private duties. His first duty is to the courts.
Where duties to the courts conflict with his duties to his clients,
the latter must yield to the former
Wicker v. Arcangel. A lawyer’s duty to the court is not secondary
to that of his client.

Respect Due to the Courts and Judicial Officers Must Be
Maintained
In re: Sotto. To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for
the last years committing deliberately "so many blunders and
injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one
party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the
adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution,
the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to
take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be the result.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Rule 138, Sec. 20(b). It is the bounden duties of an attorney to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers.
Lacson Jr. v. Hernandez. The respect is not only toward the
Justices and Judges but also to other officers of the Courts like
Clerks of Court, Sheriffs and other judicial officers who take part
in the judicial work.
Rule 71, Sec. 3(a). Disrespectful acts and language are
contemptuous
 Lawyers must exert effort that others, including their own
clients and witnesses, shall deal with the courts and judicial
officers with respect.
 If they may have any complaint, it must be pursued within
the bounds of the law, without in the least promoting
distrust in the administration of justice.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
De Leon v. Torres. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect
to that branch of the government to which they belong, as well as
to the State which has instituted the judicial system.
A lawyer shall not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard toward the court which is essential in the administration of
justice
In re: Almacen. The lawyer's duty to render respectful
subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their
clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect
are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is
the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission.
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are
the temples of right.
2016 Bar, Q. X: Atty. Harold wrote in the Philippine Star his view
that the decision of the Supreme Court in a big land case is
incorrect and should be re-examined. The decision is not yet
final. Atty. Alfonso, the counsel for the winning party in that
case, filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Harold for
violation of the sub judice rule and Canon 11 of the CPR that a
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts.
Explain the sub Judice rule and rule on the disbarment case.
A: The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to pending judicial proceedings, not only by
participants in the pending case, members of the bar and bench,
litigants and witnesses, but also to the public in general, which
necessarily includes the media, in order to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice.
[58]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt
under Rule 71, Sec. 3(d), ROC.
The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
(Marantan v. Diokno, G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014, J.
Mendoza).
After a case is decided, however, the decision is open to criticism,
subject only to the condition that all such criticism shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action. (In re: Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, February 18,
1970).
In this case, the published comment of Atty. Harold was made
after the decision of the Supreme Court was rendered, but the
same was not yet final. The case was still pending. Hence, the
publication of such comment was inappropriate, and Atty. Harold
may be penalized for indirect contempt of court.
Alternative: Although the comment of Atty. Harold was made
while the case was technically still pending, it was made after a
decision was rendered, and the comment made is within the
grounds of decency and propriety. Hence, the lawyer does not
deserve punishment for the same.
The Highest Sign of Respect to the Courts is the Lawyer’s
Obedience to Court Orders and Processes
De Leon v. Torres. However erroneous they may be, court orders
must be respected by lawyers who are themselves officers of the
court
Corleto v. Arro. A lawyer’s unexplained failure to appear at the
scheduled hearing constitutes disrespect to the court and is guilty
of contumacious behavior.
People v. Pascual. Lawyers should stand foremost in complying
with court orders obediently and respectfully.
People v. Dalusag. The lawyer was suspended from the practice
of law for not complying with the court’s resolution giving him 10

days to inform the court whether he could act as counsel for an
accused.
Note: If they want to assail court’s orders, lawyers shall do so
within the framework of the applicable laws and rules.
Criticisms of Courts Must Not Spill Over the Walls of Decency
and Propriety
Zaldivar v. Gonzales. The principal defense of respondent
Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right
of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified
privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee
of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all
this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice,
within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary,
nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy
over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The
freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent
judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be
vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the
capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control
professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and
foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering
justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it
appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to
be more limited than that of a layman.
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a
lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power
in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of the
respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and
"not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier
than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to
criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right
of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr.
Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bonafide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts
is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that
respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the
nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it
was carried out.
1993 Bar, Q. XV: Having lost in the Regional Trial Court and then
in the Court of Appeals, Atty. Mercado appealed to the Supreme
Court. In a minute resolution, the Supreme Court denied his
petition for review for lack of merit. He filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied. After the judgment had
become final and executory, Atty. Mercado publicly criticized
the Supreme Court for having rendered what he called an unjust
judgment, even as he ridiculed the members of the Court by
direct insults and vituperative innuendoes. Asked to explain why
he should not be punished for his clearly contemptuous
statements, Atty. Mercado sets up the defense that his
statements were uttered after the litigation had been finally
terminated and that he is entitled to criticize Judicial actuations.
Is Atty. Mercado's contention tenable? Explain.
A: Atty. Mercado’s contention is not tenable. While he is free to
criticize the decision itself, he is not at liberty to call said judgment
an unjust Judgment and to ridicule the members of the court. It is
one thing to analyze and criticize the decision itself, which is
[59]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
proper, and it is another thing to ridicule the members of the
court, which is wrong. The right of a lawyer to comment on or
criticize the decision of a judge or his actuations is not unlimited.
It is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spell over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and judges on the other. A
publication in or outside the court tending to impede, obstruct,
embarrass or influence the courts in administering Justice in a
pending suit, or to degrade the courts, destroy public confidence
in them or bring them in any way into disrepute, whether or not
there is a pending litigation, transcends the limits of fair
comment. Such publication or intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the lawyer’s duty to respect the courts. It is a
misconduct that subjects him to disciplinary action.
2011 Bar, Q. 45: On November 28, Atty. Patrick wrote in a
newspaper column that the Supreme Court already decided in
favor of the validity of the Executive Order that created the
Truth Commission upon a vote of 13-2. But, as it turned out, the
Court actually rendered an adverse decision only on December
7, and upon a vote of 10-5. Asked to explain his misleading
article, Patrick said that his constitutionally protected right to
free expression covered what he wrote. Can the Court cite
Patrick for contempt?
(a) Yes, because his article obstructs and degrades the
administration of justice.
(b) No, because the right to free expression occupies a high rank
in the hierarchy of cherished rights.
(c) No, because courts must simply ignore public opinion and
the media when rendering decisions.
(d) Yes, because he wrote a lie in his column.
Pleading Containing Derogatory, Offensive or Malicious
Statements Submitted to the Court or Judge in Which the
Proceedings Are Pending, Constitutes Direct Contempt
Wicker v. Arcangel
Facts:
1. Atty. Rayos filed a Motion for Inhibition of the Presiding
Judge.
2. The allegations are derogatory to the honor and integrity of
the judge.
3. Judge held lawyer and his client in direct contempt of court
and orders their incarceration for 5 days.

Issue: WON derogatory pleading filed in the proceedings being
tried by the judge constitute direct contempt?
Held
1. Yes. What is involved in this case is an instance of direct
contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to
the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, as
distinguished from a pleading filed in another case.
2. The former has been held to be equivalent to "misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as
to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the
meaning of Rule 71, §1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore,
direct contempt.
3. It is important to point out this distinction because in case of
indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may be
punished only "[a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself
or counsel," whereas in case of direct contempt, the
respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt.
Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is
appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only
judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are
appealable.
4. Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent
judge to hold a hearing.
Atty. Guerrero v. Hon. Villamor. But if the scurrilous pleading was
filed in another court, the contempt is only indirect, because it is
not misbehavior in the presence or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the administration of justice
Criticism Made in Good Faith May be Tolerated
Soriano v. CA. Malicious attacks on courts have in some cases
been treated as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as a
sufficient ground for disbarment, but mere criticism or comment
on the correctness or wrongness, soundness, or unsoundness of
the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated.
Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Phil. Corp. In criticizing a judge’s
decision, the test is whether it is done in good faith. The use of
the adjective “insufficiently-informed” is disrespectful, abusive or
slanderous.
2015 Bar, Q. XVI(a): Atty. Luna Tek maintains an account in the
social media network called Twitter and has 1,000 followers
there, including fellow lawyers and some clients. Her Twitter
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
account is public so even her non-followers could see and read
her posts, which are called tweets. She oftentimes takes to
Twitter to vent about her daily sources of stress like traffic or to
comment about current events. She also tweets her
disagreement and disgust with the decisions of the Supreme
Court by insulting and blatantly cursing the individual Justices
and the Court as an institution.
Does Atty. Luna Tek act in a manner consistent with the Code of
Professional Responsibility? Explain the reasons for your answer.
A: Atty. Luna Tek did not act in a manner consistent with the CPR.
Canon 11, CPR provides that “a lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct with others” As an officer of the court, a
lawyer should set the example in maintaining a respectful attitude
towards the court. Moreover, he should abstain from offensive
language in criticizing the courts. Atty. Luna Tek violated this rule
in insulting and blatantly cursing the individual Justices and the SC
in her tweets. Lawyers are expected to carry their ethical
responsibilities with them in the cyberspace (Lorenzana v. Judge
Ma. Cecilia L. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014)
1988 Bar, Q. VI(b): May a lawyer criticize a decision of the court?
Explain.
A: Yes, a lawyer may criticize a decision of the court but on legal
grounds and with respectful language. The lawyer in the course of
the criticism should not slander the judge or attack his personality
to the extent of degrading the dignity and respect due to court of
justice. If the lawyer has evidence on the personal behavior of the
judge, he must file administrative charges against him.
2011 Bar, Q. 39. Which of the following demonstrates the
lawyer's duty to give the court the respect it deserves?
(a) Counsel consistently appearing in court on time.
(b) Counsel obeying court's orders and processes.
(c) Woman counsel appearing in court dressed in business
attire.
(d) Counsel addressing the court as "Your Honor" at all times.
Rule 11.01: A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
 The Court can hold the lawyer in contempt of court, if he or
she appears not in proper attire
Rule 11.02: A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
[60]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Punctuality
Canon 21, CPE. It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client,
but also to the courts and to the public to be punctual in
attendance, and to be concise and direct in the trial and
disposition of causes
Lawyer’s Oath. He will delay no man for money or malice
De Garcia v. Warden. Even if the petition has become moot and
academic, it is not proper for counsel not to appear in court on
the very day his own petition was reset for hearing
Saulog v. Custombuilt Manufacturing Corp. Failure to appear in
time in a pre-trial conference may result in the non-suit or the
dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute or in the
declaration of the defendant as in default.
People v. Gagui. Counsel may be held in contempt of court for (a)
coming late in the hearing or trial of a case or (b) for failing to
appear in trial.
Canon 7, CPE. Lack of punctuality interferes in the speedy
administration of justice. Consequently, both the judge and the
lawyer are in duty bound to perform their duties with punctuality
A judge who is unpunctual in his habits sets a bad example to the
bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice.
Rule 11.03: A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Misbehavior in Court is Direct Contempt
Encinos v. National Bookstore Inc. Direct contempt, or contempt
in facie, is misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge so as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same, including disrespect toward the court, and can
be punished summarily without hearing.
Lawyer’s Language Should be Dignified
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel. A lawyer's
language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession." It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.

 Rule 11.03 has similar objective with Rule 8.01
 However, Rule 8.01 is general
 But Rule 11.03 specifies “the courts” before whom the
lawyer is directed to abstain from using the proscribed
language
Raising One’s Voice
2.
Romero v. Valle. A lawyer’s arguments, written or oral, should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words
as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.
Certainly, and most especially in our culture, raising one’s voice is
a sign of disrespect.
People v. Estebia. A lawyer owes the court the duty to observe
and maintain a respectful attitude not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.
People v. Carillo. The respect shown to courts helps build the high
esteem and regard toward them which is essential to the proper
administration of justice.
Montecilla v. Gica
Facts:
1. Atty. Del Mar lost his case in the CA.
3.
2. In his MR, he made a veiled threat to the Justices who
rendered the decision by citing articles of the RPC regarding
“knowingly rendering unjust judgment” and “judgment
rendered through negligence” and making the innuendo
that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
3. He was asked to explain why he should not be disciplined.
4. His explanation having been found unsatisfactory, he was
4.
suspended by the CA.
5. When the case reached the SC, the lawyer’s petition for
review was denied. He filed a MR
6. This time, he also made veiled threats to the members of
5.
the Division of the SC which took cognizance of the case
Issue: WON Atty. Del Mar may be subjected to disciplinary
action
Held:
1. Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by
the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied
on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on
May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and
wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court
requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who
supported the resolution denying his petition, together with
the names of the Justices favoring his motion for
reconsideration.
This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit
in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a
manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating
brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to
you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified
true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court
confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case
entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have
filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and
criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals
who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to
obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose
of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government, so that they may well know them and work for
their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and
in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate
Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled
threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us
for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-
36800.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for
the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy
ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation
is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross
ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery
of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of
the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of
both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in
the integrity of the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his
supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his
contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking
both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own
personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to
comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not
be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what
to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or
[61]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand
that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without
considering the universal law of change. It is with deep
concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing
lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification
for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and
tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense
of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.
6. For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical
and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the
integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy
for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law
practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in
disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor.
7. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the
future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point
to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts
and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the
courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of
our democratic institutions.
8. Lawyer is suspended indefinitely
1998 Bar, Q. V: When Atty. Aldrin received copy of the decision
of the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion for reconsideration
using intemperate and disrespectful language with a subtle
threat that “knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is
punishable under the Revised Penal Code."
The Court of Appeals ordered him to explain why he should not
be cited in contempt of court. Instead of complying, he
submitted to the Court of Appeals his Petition to Retire from the
practice of law which he immediately filed with the Supreme
Court after receiving the citation for contempt. May he be
allowed to retire from the practice of law?
A: No. “A practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing
contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire
from the practice of law which would negate the inherent power
of the court to punish him for contempt (Montecillo v. Gica).
Sangalang v. IAC.The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his MR
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that
the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting
on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an
open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In rendering its
judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the
records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the
influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of
an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one

party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of
bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his
accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity
of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of
justice in general.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a
license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and
recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the
Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to
safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession."
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to
live with and accept with grace criticisms of my decisions".
Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the
Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions,
but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has
transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this
Court's rebuke (Suspended)
A mere Disclaimer of any Intentional Disrespect not a Ground for
Exoneration
Paragas v. Cruz. The lawyer’s disavowal of any offensive intent –
in using defamatory words – is of no avail.
A mere disclaimer of any intentional disrespect by appellant is no
ground for exoneration. His intent must be determined by a fair
interpretation of the languages employed by him. He cannot
escape responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean
what any reader must have understood them as meaning.
2006 Bar, Q. VI: In his petition for certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court. Atty. Dizon alleged that Atty. Padilla, a legal
researcher in the Court of Appeals, drafted the assailed Decision;
that he is ignorant of the applicable laws; and that he should be
disbarred.
Can Atty. Dizon, in castigating Atty. Padilla, be held liable for
unethical conduct against the Court of Appeals?
A: He can be held liable for lack of respect for the Court of
Appeals. “Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the
persons or personnel who may participate therein by virtue of
their office. It is highly improper and unethical for counsel for
petitioners to berate the researcher in appeal. Counsel for the
petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal
profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper
language in its pleadings and should be admonished for his
improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
lawyer should avoid scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the courts” (Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 2000). Lawyer Can Demand That the Misbehavior of a Judge be Placed
on Record: Act Not Contemptuous
Rule 11.04: A lawyer shall not attribute to Judge motives not In re: Aguas. There are times when it is the judge who
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. misbehaved during a court proceeding. The affected lawyer may
demand that the incident be made of record. This act of the
lawyer is not contemptuous
A Lawyer Must Not Attribute to a Judge Motives Not Supported
by the Record or Which Are Immaterial to the Case
In re: Aguas
People v. Carillo. We cannot close this decision without making a
reference to the defamatory remarks which counsel for appellant Facts:
makes in his brief, casting aspersions on the trial Judge's motives
1. It appears from the record in this matter that on the 29th of
and conduct. These remarks have no relevancy to the case, are of
August, 1900, during the progress of a trial then being held
no value to us in the decision of the issues, and are not borne out
before the CFI at Bacolor, in the Province of Pampanga, the
by the record. To say that it is unprofessional worthy of the
court had occasion to caution Angel Alberto, a witness in the
highest rebuke for a lawyer to attribute to a judge motive which
case, not to look at the attorney for the defendant but to fix
do not appear on the record and have no materiality to the case is
his attention on the judge who was at the time examining
to reassert platitude.
him.
2. It seems that the witness did not give heed to this warning,
The fact that counsel, according to a writing filed later with this
and the judge thereupon arose from his seat and
court, has apologized to the judge and the judge has expressed
satisfaction with the apology, has not written finish to the approaching the witness, seized him by the shoulders, and
using the expression, "Lingon ang mucha" ("Look at me"),
episode; for the libel transcends the confines of personalities,
either shook him, as insisted by the attorney for the
injured feelings or mental anguish. Its poison infects the judiciary
of which the judge is a member. In attempting to heap ridicule on defendant, or only turned him about, as claimed by the
judge and others.
the judge and bring him into disrepute without justifiable ends
3. Whether the witness was shaken or only turned about, at all
and basis, in connection with the performance of his official
events "seizing him," brought the defendant's attorney to
duties, counsel by his act put in jeopardy the good name of and
his feet, who, protesting against the action of the judge as
confidence in the court over which the judge presides
coercive of the witness, demanded that a record be made of
Direct Contempt the occurrence and that the further hearing of the case be
postponed.
Adorio v. Bersamin. A lawyer in her Motion for Inhibition of the 4. Two days afterward the clerk entered in his record as recital
presiding Judge stated among others: “It shows the control of the of the incident substantially as above, and also a statement
accused over the court and court procedure”. that on other and prior occasions the attorney, Marcelino
Aguas, had been wanting in respect to the court by making
She was held in direct contempt of court although the SC use of "improper phrases," and by interrupting opposing
modified the penalty from two days imprisonment to a fine. counsel in their examination of witnesses.
5. The court on this record adjudged the attorney to be in
contempt of court and suspended him from the practice of
1998 Bar, Q. XV: For his failure to appear for trial despite notice.
his profession for a period of twenty days. The attorney
Atty. Umali was summarily pronounced guilty of direct contempt
appealed, but his appeal having been disallowed by the
and was fined P10.000.00 by the Judge.
lower court, he asked to be heard in justification, which was
granted.
Is the Judge correct?
Issue: WON the judge is correct
A: The judge is not correct. A lawyer who fails to appear for trial is
only liable for indirect contempt, which cannot be punished
Held:
summarily. (People v. Torio; Atty. Himiniano D. Silva v. Judge
German G. Lee).
[62]

1. In our opinion the action of the judge in seizing the witness,
Alberto Angel, by the shoulder and turning him about was
unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from
unlawful personal violence to which every witness is entitled
while giving testimony in a court of justice.
2. Against such conduct the appellant had the right to protest
and to demand were respectfully made and with due regard
for the dignity of the court.
While Lawyers Are Prohibited to Attribute Motives to a Judge
Not Supported by the Record, Lawyers Must However be
Courageous Enough to Expose Arbitrariness and Injustices of
Courts and Judges
Peopele v. Carillo. Counsel must be courageous enough to point
out errors, arbitrariness, and injustices of courts and judges. The
fear of provoking displeasure of the affected judges must not
deter them from complying with their civil and legal duty to object
to, oppose, and protest against illegal or erroneous judicial
decisions, resolutions, acts, or conduct. Judges and tribunals are
not infallible. As eternal vigilance is the price of democracy and
liberty, so it is in the case of justice. Its efficient administration
needs the assistance of a vigilant bar, composed of persons who
will never sacrifice any principle for the sake of personal
friendship with any judge. But at the same time lawyers must
avoid at all cost launching groundless and irresponsible
defamatory remarks against any member of the bench, and any
member of the bar who should do so must be sternly dealt with,
as a cancerous excrescence in our system of justice. To overcome
cancer no less than scalpel and cautery are needed.
Judge Cervantez v. Atty. Sabio. On the issue, the IBP found that
by filing the groundless bribery charge against complainant,
respondent violated the proscription of the CPR against "wittingly
or willingly promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit" including
baseless administrative complaints against judges and other court
officers and employees.
The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that
While the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the
allegations in respondent’s affidavit-complaint against herein
complainant were false, the evidence nonetheless show[s] that
respondent had knowingly and maliciously instituted a groundless
suit, based simply on his unfounded suspicions against
complainant; and that he violated Canons 10, 11, & 12 and Rule
11.04 of the CPR under his oath of office.
Respondent was fined with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1997 Bar, Q. VII: When is public comment and criticism of a court
decision permissible and when would it be improper?
A: A lawyer, like every citizen, enjoys the right to comment on and
criticize the decision of a court. As an officer of the court, a lawyer
is expected not only to exercise that right but also to consider it
his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts
and judges. But such right is subject to the limitations that it shall
be bona fide. It is proper to criticize the courts and Judges, but it is
improper to subject them to abuse and slander, degrade them or
destroy public confidence in them. Moreover, "a lawyer shall not
attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
no materiality in the case" (Rule 11.04, CPR).
Rule 11.05: A lawyer shall not criticize the personal or official
conduct of a judge in an insulting and intemperate language
Criticism of Court is Not Per Se Contemptuous; Constructive and
Destructive Criticism, Concept
Criticism is an adverse analysis of an order, judgment or judicial
act of a magistrate with the aim of preventing or avoiding an
incipient injustice which may arise from the pernicious effects of
the mistake, error or irregularity committed.
Constructive criticism – if the purpose of the criticism is to timely
correct/rectify the mistake, error, or irregularity that true justice
may be achieved
Contemptuous/Destructive Criticism if the criticism was
arrogantly or haugtingly presented with abusive, scurrilous and
offensive language coupled with the malicious intention to mock,
ridicule, demean and offend the sensibilities of the court or the
sitting judge.
 The Constitutional freedom of free speech cannot shield the
erring lawyer from the punishing hand of the court to
preserve and enforce its order in its immediate presence
when criticism is destructive.
In re: Abistado. The constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech
and press must be protected in its fullest extent, but license or
abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be
confused with liberty in its true sense; that as important as is the
maintenance of an ummuzzled press and the free exercise of the
rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of
the judiciary;
[63]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
That the courts must be permitted to proceed with the disposition
of their business in an orderly manner free from outside
interfered obstructive of their constitutional functions
In re: Almacen
Facts:
1. Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest
against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court."
2. He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity."
3. His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy."
4. In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
5. He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must
never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that:
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
Issue: WON the criticism made of the SC malicious and
contemptuous
Held:
1. Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer
who vigorously assails their actuations. For courageous and
fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into
the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the
court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges.
2. Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and
expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the

executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to
serve.
3. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.
4. Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part
of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written
for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to
see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines
5. Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider
it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into
the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose
him to legal animadversion as a citizen."
6. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
7. Atty. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.
Rule 11.06: A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to
the proper authorities only.
Complaints Against Judges, to be Coursed to Proper Authorities
Only
Maceda v. Ombudsman. A lawyer has the duty to defend a judge
from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack. This is
irrespective of whether he loses or wins his case in the sale of the
judge.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
However, such duty does not prevent a lawyer from filing
administrative complaints against erring judges or from accepting
cases of clients who have legitimate grievances against them.
In so doing, the complaint must be filed with the proper
authorities only, that is, with the SC (through the OCA), if the case
is administrative in nature, or with the Office of the Ombudsman
if the complaint is criminal and not purely administrative in
nature.
Bumanlag v. Bumanlag. Consequently, complaints should not be
coursed to the media, to the Military authorities, the President,
Governors, Mayors, or other officers or institutions which are not
the proper forums to investigate the judges and magistrates.
Grievances Against Justices of the SC
Art. XI, Sec. 2-8. If the complaints are based on impeachable
offenses, the complaints must be coursed through the House of
Representatives and the Senate in accordance with the rules on
impeachment.
Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, Coverage; Justices and Judges are
Excluded
Rule 138-B, Sec. 1, par. 2. The IBP Board of Governors may, motu
propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those
in the government service.
Rule 138-B, Sec. 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision — This
Rule shall take effect June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present
Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS".
All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor
General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as
provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation
has been substantially completed.
Criminal Complaints against Judges in Connection With their
Duties as Such Must be Filed with the SC, Not with the
Ombudsman
Maceda v. Ombudman
Issue: WON the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a
criminal complaint for alleged falsification of a judge’s
certification submitted to the SC, and assuming that it can,
whether referral should be made to the SC
[64]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Held:
1. The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic
argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that
would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge
unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the
Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code
for his felonious act.
2. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of
any administrative action taken against him by this Court
with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
3. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
4. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner
on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a
justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of
the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the
Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but
likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
5. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Court has the
necessary records to make such a determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow
its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
6. Ombudsman was directed to dismiss case filed against the
Judges
Duty of Lawyers When Confronted by Extorting Public Officers

Acejas III v. People. The SC reminded lawyers to report to the
authorities acts of extortion of public officers for appropriate
action and not to participate in the illegal acts.
A lawyer shall not offer any bribe to any public officer (like
magistrate, prosecutor, solicitor, clerks of courts, police, etc.) to
gain an advantage for himself or for a client/ He has a double duty
– to resist extortions and temptations to bribe and to report to
the proper authorities.
2004 Bar, Q. VIII(B): Atty. Jarazo filed a civil suit for damages
against his business associates. After due trial, Judge Dejado
rendered, judgment dismissing Atty. Jarazo's complaint. Atty.
Jarazo did not appeal from the decision rendered by Judge
Dejado, thereby rendering the judgment final and executory.
Thereafter, Atty. Jarazo lodged a criminal complaint accusing
Judge Dejado of rendering a manifestly unjust judgment before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Will Atty. Jarazo's complaint
against Judge Dejado prosper? Why or why not? Reason.
A: Atty. Jarazo’s complaint will not prosper. The rule is that before
a civil or criminal action against a judge for violating Art. 204 of
the RPC (knowingly rendering an unjust judgment) can be
entertained, there must first be a final and authoritative
declaration that the decision is indeed unjust [De Vera v. Pelayo,
2000). By not appealing the decision of Judge Dejado to a higher
court, Atty. Jarazo cannot prove that there is an authoritative and
final declaration that the said decision is unjust. Thus, his criminal
complaint will not prosper.
Canon 12: A Lawyer Shall Exert Every Effort and Consider it His
Duty to Assist in the Speedy and Efficient Administration of
Justice
Speedy and Efficient Administration of Justice, Common Aim of
the Bench and the Bar
 It is a joint responsibility of the judges and lawyers
 Other government officials like police, the sheriffs, the
prosecutors and even witnesses have also the responsibility
to coordinate and cooperate with the judicial officers in the
administration of justice.
Acts Which Obstruct the Administration of Justice Are
Condemned
People v. Jardin. The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and
the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take effective
counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute
obstruction of justice.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
As aptly stared:
12.09 Obstructing the administration of justice
An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the
due administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on the
part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him.
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice
may take many forms. They include such acts as instructing a
complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the
scheduled hearing so that the case against the client, the accused,
would be dismissed. asking a client to plead guilty to a crime
which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, advising a
client who is detained for a crime to escape from prison,
employing dilatory tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly valid
claims, prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or appeals to drain the
resources of the other party and compel him to submit out of
exhaustion and filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause
that has been previously rejected in the false expectation of
getting favorable action. Acts of this or similar nature are grounds
for disciplinary action."
2013 Bar, Q. II: Atty. Serafin Roto is the Corporate Secretary of a
construction corporation that has secured a multi-million
infrastructure project from the government. In the course of his
duties as corporate secretary, he learned from the company
president that the corporation had resorted to bribery to secure
the project and had falsified records to cut implementing costs
after the award of the project.
The government filed a civil action to annul the infrastructure
contract and has subpoenaed Atty. Roto to testify against the
company president and the corporation regarding the bribery.
Atty. Roto moved to quash the subpoena, asserting that lawyer-
client privilege prevents him from testifying against the
president and the corporation.
Resolve the motion to quash.
A: Motion denied.
The motion should be denied because Atty. Roto did not learn of
the bribery and falsification in connection with a lawyer-client
relation. Being a corporate secretary does not create a lawyer-
client relation because membership in the Bar is not a
[65]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
requirement to perform the functions of a corporate secretary.
Consequently, Atty. Roto does not owe any obligation of
confidentiality to the corporation.
Atty. Roto may be compelled to testify. As an officer of the court,
a “lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice” (CPR, Canon
12). Furthermore, “a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court”
Alternative: Motion granted.
It is true that being a corporate secretary does not necessarily
constitute a lawyer-client relation. However, Atty. Roto may be
considered in the practice of law if part of his duties as a
corporate secretary is to give legal advice to or prepare legal
documents for the corporation. Thus, a lawyer-client relationship
may have been constituted between Atty. Roto and the
corporation. Consequently, it is his duty as an attorney “to
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client” (Rule 138, Sec. 20, par. (e))
Atty. Roto learned from the company president of the bribery and
falsification, while Atty. Roto was in the course of his performance
of his duties as a corporate secretary. Thus, he could not be
examined on that matter without the consent of his client.
2013 Bar, Q. XII: A Regional Trial Court issues a temporary
restraining order (TRO) halting the demolition order issued by
the City Mayor who has long loathed the cluster of shanties put
up by informal settlers along the road leading to the city’s
commercial district. The TRO, however, carried conditions that
must be in place before the threatened demolition can be fully
halted.
The city legal officer advised the City Engineer’s Office and the
local PNP chief that the TRO’s conditions are not in place so that
the demolition could proceed. The city filed a manifestation
reflecting the city legal officer’s position, while the informal
settlers’ counsel sought its own clarification and reconsideration
from the court, which responded by decreeing that the
conditions have been fulfilled. Despite this ruling, the city legal
officer insisted that the conditions have not been fulfilled and
thus gave the PNP clearance to aid the City Engineer’s Office in
proceeding with the demolition.
From the perspective of professional ethics, how would you
characterize the city legal officer’s actions?

(a) It is unethical since he counseled civil servants to disregard
a court order.
(b) It is ethical, since he acted in accordance with his honest
conviction after considering that the court’s conditions have
not been met.
(c) It constitutes indirect contempt, but the lawyer cannot be
disciplined because he acted out of his firm and honest
conviction.
(d) It is neither contemptuous nor unethical since he was
performing his duties as city legal officer.
(e) It is unethical since the City Legal Officer was simply blindly
following the Mayor’s wishes.
A: (a). CPR, Canon 12
2013 Bar, Q. XIX: You are a lawyer working at the Office of the
Special Prosecutor and you are part of the team handling the
case against former Senator Avido who is charged with plunder.
Based on your assessment of the evidence that the complainant
Linda submitted, you know that the case against former Senator
Avido is weak, although you instinctively feel that he is guilty.
You inform your friend Atty. Curioso (who works with the office
of Senator Elmismo, a known political rival of Senator Avido)
regarding your instinctive feeling about Senator Avido. Atty.
Curioso springs a surprise by giving you a recording of the
wiretapped conversation between Senator Avido and Napo, a
private party co-accused, about the transaction complained of
and how they would split the proceeds.
What will you do under these circumstances?
(a) Disregard the wiretapped conversation as it is inadmissible
and will not serve any useful purpose in the trial of the
case.
(b) Present the wiretapped conversation in court; although
inadmissible, its introduction and the disclosure of its
existence is a right that the public is entitled to.
(c) Leak the wiretapped conversation to the media, to let the
public know what really happened.
(d) Submit the wiretapped conversation to the Senate which is
in the best position to determine what to do with it.
(e) Let Napo privately know, through 3 rd parties, that you are
aware of the existence of the taped conversation, with the
hint that he can still hope for a lighter penalty if he would
cooperate.
A: (a). CPR, Canon 12
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2004 Bar, Q. I(A)(4): Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, what is the principal obligation of a lawyer
towards: The administration of justice?
A: Canon 12, CPR
Alternative: Canon 4, CPR
1996 Bar, Q. III(1): Why is a lawyer also an “officer of the court"?
Explain.
A: Lawyers are “officers of the court" because they form part of
the machinery of the law for the administration of justice (Hilado
v. David). Under Canon 12, CPR, the lawyer shall exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
2006 Bar, Q. I(2): Why is an attorney considered an officer of the
court?
A: An attorney is considered an officer of the court because he
forms part of the machinery of justice and as such is subject to the
disciplinary authority of court and to its orders and directions with
regard to his relations to the court as well as to his client (Hilado
v. David, 1949). “A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice” (Canon 12, CPR).
Rule 12.01: A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has
adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his
case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its
proferrence. He should also be ready with the original
documents for comparison with the copies.
Duty of a Newly Hired Counsel
Villasis v. CA. A newly hired counsel who appears in a case in the
midstream is presumed and obliged to acquaint himself with all
the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired in
the record prior to his takeover.
Readiness with Admissible Evidence
 The lawyer who is presenting documentary exhibits must
also be ready with the originals thereof for purposes of
comparison with copies thereof – to avoid objections –
which ordinary delay the proceedings.
[66]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Javellana v. Lutero. A counsel for any party in a judicial
controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and with
due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty
bound to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed.
This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case, such
as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and
uncomplicated.
Keeping Abreast of the Law and Legal Developments
Fajardo v. Dela Torre. Ignorance of the law which prejudices a
client may be a ground for disciplinary action. All law practitioners
should be fully conversant of the ROC.
Inadequate Preparation Obstructs the Administration of Justice
New York Central Railroad v. Johnson. A lawyer should never
come to court unprepared. Most cases brought to the court
without preparation are cases lost. Half of the work of a lawyer is
done in the office. It is spent in study and research. Inadequate
preparation obstructs the administration of justice.
Cuaresma v. Daquis. An attorney should be careful in the
preparation of his pleadings so that the least doubt as to his
intellectual honesty cannot be entertained.
Rule 12.01 and Rule 18.01, Compared
 Rule 18.01 is more comprehensive than Rule 12.01
Rule 12.02: A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from
the same cause.
Forum Shopping, Definition
BENECO v. Atty. Flores. Forum shopping exists when, as a result
of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when
he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. The most important factor in
determining the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation
caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs
Prevention and Sanctions Against Forum Shopping
Rule 7, Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping — The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint

or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any
of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions.
If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Effect of Forum Shopping
Buan v. Lopez. Forum shopping is condemnable and the
punishment therefore is the dismissal of all actions pending in the
different courts without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
actions against counsel or party concerned.
Forum Shopping Inapplicable to Disbarment Proceedings
Maronilla v. Jorda. Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases
or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.
Client and Not Counsel Should Sign the Certification Against
Forum Shopping
Far Eastern Shipping Co. v. CA. A certification against forum
shopping by counsel is a defective certification. It must be
executed by the petitioner. If signed only by the counsel, it is
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
equivalent to non-compliance with the requirements of the Rules
and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.
A Lawyer Must Not Abuse His Right of Recourse to the Courts
Garcia v. Francisco. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit.
The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted
to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief
that was consistently denied, as he should have expected. He
thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and
wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience
and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend
herself against his every move.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the
purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he
was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such
actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such
defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or
malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession
and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law
as an officer of the Court.
Vda. de Bacaling v. Laguna. There is something more to be said
about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has its
genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823)
brought before the Iloilo City Court. What transpired therein
presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was
deliberately protracted and made to suffer undue delay in its
disposal. It was originally filed on September 13, 1960; it reached
the appellate courts five (5) times, twice before the Court of
Appeals, Once before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and
twice before this Court.
The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous
attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt
termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her
counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court,
because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari
which should only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this
kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply
wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really
meritorious cases.
[67]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Cabagui v. CA. The Court finds for respondent. Atty. Millado,
guilty of gross negligence in not having complied with a ‘show
cause’ resolution and of abusing the right of recourse to the Court
by filing multiple petitions for the same cause in the false
expectation of getting favorable action from one division as
against the adverse action of the other division.
Forum Shopping is a Reprehensible Manipulation of Court
Processes and Proceedings
Minister of Natural Resources v. Heirs of Hughes. Forum
shopping is a reprehensible manipulation of court processes and
proceedings. The filing of repetitious suits in different courts lays
the foundation for an inquiry into the liability of the litigants and
their counsels for constructive contempt.
BENECO v. NEA. A party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different forums. Forum shopping
is an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as
trifling with the courts and abusing their processes.
Essential Elements of Forum Shopping
Carlet v. CA. A lawyer could be charged with engaging in forum
shopping only when two (or more) cases are pending involving
the same parties, causes of action and reliefs prayed for.
ECC v. CA. If one case had already been litigated before (the
decision therein having become final and executory) and it is
refiled by the same party, the defense of the defendant should be
res judicata and not forum shopping.
Specific Instances of Forum Shopping that Merited Sanction
(1) Earth Minerals Exploration Inc. v. Macaraig. When a case is
filed in court while an administrative proceeding is pending
in order to defeat administrative processes and in
anticipation of an unfavorable court ruling
(2) BENECO v. NEA. During the pendency in the SC of a petition
for certiorari with prayer for injunction to nullify a
Resolution of the NEA, the lawyer filed a complaint for
damages with the RTC where the same allegations in the
petition were reproduced, there is forum shopping which is
an act of malpractice.
(3) New Pangasinan Review Inc. v. NLRC. There is forum
shopping specially, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction
(4) Collado v. Hernando. When counsel omits to disclose the
pendency of an appeal, in filing a certiorari case.

1998 Bar, Q. IV: What is your understanding of forum shopping?
What are the possible consequences?
A: Forum-shopping is the improper practice of filing several
actions or petitions in the same or different tribunals arising from
the same cause and seeking substantially identical reliefs in the
hope of winning in one of them.
The possible consequences of forum-shopping are:
(1) Summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint.
(2) Penalty for direct contempt of court on the party and his
lawyer.
(3) Criminal action for a false certification of non-forum
shopping.
(4) Disciplinary proceeding for the lawyer concerned. (Rule 7,
Sec. 5, ROC)
1997 Bar, Q. VIII: J sustained serious physical injuries due to a
motor vehicle collision between the car she was driving and a
public utility bus, requiring her confinement for 30 days at the
Makati Medical Center. After her release from the hospital, she
filed a criminal complaint against the bus driver for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before the Makati
Prosecutor’s Office. She also filed a civil complaint before the
Paranaque Regional Trial Court against the bus operator and
driver for compensatory, moral, exemplary and other damages.
Aside from the two complaints, she additionally filed an
administrative complaint against the bus operator with the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board for
cancellation or suspension of the operator’s franchise. Would
you say that she and her lawyer were guilty of forum-shopping?
A: No. There is no forum-shopping in the simultaneous filing of a
criminal case and a civil case in this instance. Art. 33, CC allows
the filing by an injured party of a civil action for damages entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. There is also no forum-
shopping involved in filing an administrative complaint against the
bus operator with the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board. It is for a different cause of action, the
cancellation or suspension of the operator's franchise.
2002 Bar, Q. V: On June 28, 2001, RJ filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order/ preliminary injunction, to forestall his removal
as chairman and general manager of a government agency. He
believed he had a fixed term until January 31, 2004, but there
were indications that the new President would replace him. As
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
he had apprehended, an Administrative Order was issued by the
Chief Executive on July 2, 2001 recalling RJ’s appointment.
Shortly thereafter, PT was appointed to the position in question.
On July 3, 2001, RJ filed a motion to withdraw his petition. On
the same day, without waiting for the resolution of his motion,
he filed another petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking to
prevent his removal as chairman and general manager of the
government agency. On July 8, 2001, his motion to withdraw the
first petition was granted by the Supreme Court without
prejudice to his liability, if any, for contempt for engaging in
forum-shopping.
A. Is he guilty of forum-shopping? Explain.
B. Give three (3) instances of forum-shopping.
A. RJ Is guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping is the
practice of filing multiple actions from the same cause (Rule
12.02, CPR). It is clear that RJ’s petition for prohibition was
still pending in the SC when he filed the same petition in the
RTC. He should have waited first for the resolution of his
motion to withdraw before filing the second petition
because he cannot assume that the motion will be granted.
B. Instances of forum-shopping:
(1) When, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another.
(2) When he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition” [BENECO v.
NEA, 1991).
(3) Filing a second suit in a court without jurisdiction (New
Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. NLRC, 1991).
(4) Filing an action in court while the same cause of action is still
pending in an administrative proceeding (Earth Minerals
Exploration, Inc. v. Macaraig, 1991).
(5) When counsel omits to disclose the pendency of an appeal,
in filing a certiorari case [Collado vs. Hernando, 1988).
2009 Bar, Q. XV: Atty. Wilmar represented Beatriz in a partition
case among heirs, and won. When Wilmar demanded payment
of attorney’s fees, Beatriz refused to pay. Wilmar sued Beatriz
for the unpaid attorney’s fees and obtained a favorable
judgment. Thereafter, Beatriz filed an administrative complaint
against Wilmar claiming that he lied when he stated in his claim
for attorney’s fees that the subject of the partition case involved
the entire estate of the deceased when, in fact, it covered only
50% thereof. Wilmar set up the defenses that (1) Beatriz filed
the complaint only to delay the execution of the judgment
[68]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
ordering her to pay attorney’s fees and (2) Beatriz engaged in
forum-shopping. Are the defense of Atty. Wilmar tenable?
Explain.
A: The defenses of Atty. Wilmar are tenable.
(1) The claim of Beatriz that he lied when he stated in his claim
for attorney’s fees that the subject of the partition case
involved the entire estate, should have been raised in the
suit for collection filed by Atty. Wilmar. It is clear that Beatriz
is trying to delay the execution of a final judgment.
(2) Yes. Beatriz engaged in forum shopping. There is forum-
shopping when as a result of a decision in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than appeal or certiorari, raising identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues. There is identity of subject
matter, causes of action and issues between the civil case
brought by Atty. Wilmar and the administrative case
brought by Beatriz.
2011 Bar, Q. 28: Counsel for Philzea Mining appealed a decision
of the Bureau of Mines, which was adverse to his client, to the
Environment Secretary. At about the same time, he filed a
special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the
annulment of the same decision. Did counsel commit any ethical
impropriety in his actions?
(a) Yes, since the action he filed with the Court of Appeals was
barred by the pendency of a similar action before the
Environment Secretary.
(b) Yes, since he was evidently shopping for a sympathetic
forum, a condemnable practice.
(c) No, since his appeal to the Environment Secretary was
administrative, not judicial.
(d) No, since he has to exhaust all available remedies to serve
his client’s interest.
1991 Bar, Q. IV: The spouses X and Y and their three (3) minor
children, A, B, and C, were passengers of one of the buses of the
Lahar Transportation Corp., a common carrier. They were to
attend the wedding of a relative in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The
bus turned turtle along the South Expressway in Biloan, Laguna.
All of them suffered serious physical injuries and were
hospitalized for thirty-one (31) days. Upon the advice of lawyer
V, who claims to have strong special connections with some
judges in Quezon City, where X and Y are resided; in Makati,
where they have a house which is occupied by A; and in Binan,
Laguna, where the accident occurred, they decided to file three
(3) separate complaints for breach of contract of carriage, to wit:
(1) the complaint of X and Y in the RTC of Quezon City; (2) the

complaint of A, assisted by X and Y, in the RTC of Makati; and (3)
the complaint of B and C, assisted by X and Y, in the RTC of
Binan, Laguna.
(A) Are Atty. V is action proper?
(B) If proper, for what may he be charged with, and what
penalty or penalties may be imposed upon him?
A:
(A) Attorney V’s actions are not proper because he engaged in
forum shopping and represented that he has influence. Rule
12.02 provides that a lawyer shall not file multiple actions
arising for the same cause.
(B) The lawyer violated Rule 12.02 for filing multiple actions
arising from the same incident. Penalty of suspension or fine
should be imposed upon him as forum shopping is a
malpractice.
Lawyer Has the Duty to Disclose the Prior Dismissal of His Case
by a Court of Concurrent Jurisdiction
Healy v. Case. By filing the case in the superior court, and when
dismissed with the inferior court, the lawyer’s act was
condemned. It is his duty to disclose the prior dismissal of the
case and his failure to do so is a violation of his oath of office.
Counsel Merits Rebuke for Being a Litigationer
Macias v. Uy Kim. Filing of several actions involving same subject
matter or seeking identical relief unduly burden courts and is
reprehensible.
The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant
herein to file several actions covering the same subject matter or
seeking substantially identical relief, which is unduly burdening
the courts. Coming from a neophyte, who is still unsure of himself
in the practice of the law, the same may be regarded with some
understanding. But considering appellant's ability and long
experience at the bar, his filing identical suits for the same
remedy is reprehensible and should merit rebuke.
Foronda v. Guerrero. Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.
Under the CPR, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly
delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by
misusing court processes.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court’s
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct
and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who files such
multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to
disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better)
or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all
good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as
appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor
Rule 12.03: A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
A Lawyer Who Asked for Extension Time Must Act in Good Faith
 In the event that the lawyer, for one reason or another,
decided to dispense with the filing of the legal paper he had
announced to the court, he should so inform the court by
filing a Manifestation with an explanation of the reason.
 Informing the Court is necessary in order to prevent
unnecessary delay in the disposition of the case or any
incident thereon.
 The delay is ordinarily caused by the waiting period for the
arrival of the pleading, memoranda, or brief, which might be
thought of as having been merely delayed in the mails.
 If the Motion for Extension of Time is filed in bad faith from
the outset, it is an obstruction of justice. The lawyer is
subject to disciplinary action.
Casals v. Cusi, Jr. The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty.
Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period
to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending
to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for
his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for
a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the
petition. The lawyer is suspended.
Achacoso v. CA. The Court censures the practice of counsels who
secure repeated extensions of time to file their pleadings and
thereafter simply let the period lapse without submitting the
pleading or even an explanation or manifestation of their failure
to do so.
Lawyer Should File Their Pleadings on Time or They Suffer the
Consequences
[69]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Roxas v. CA. Thus, the petition to review the assailed resolution
must fail.
Let this serve as warning among members of the Philippine bar
who take their own sweet time with their cases if not purposely
delay its progress for no cogent reason. It does no credit to their
standing in the profession. More so when they do not file the
required brief or pleading until their motion is acted upon. Not
only should they not presume that their motion for extension of
time will be granted by the court much less should they expect
that the extension that may be granted shall be counted from
notice. They should file their briefs or pleadings within the
extended period requested. Failing in this, they have only
themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed
Rule 12.04: A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
Assistance in the Speedy and Efficient Administration of Justice
 Correlate to Canon 12 and Rule 1.03
Execution of Final Decision Should Not be Unduly Thwarted
Likim Tho v. Sanchez. Once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result.
Cobb-Perez v. Lantin. Lawyers should not resort to nor abet the
resort of their clients, to a series of actions and petitions for the
purpose of thwarting the execution of a judgment long final and
executory.
In re: Soriano. A lawyer should not enter his appearance in a case
which had long been terminated by final decision.
He should not appeal a decision manifestly for delay as this is
violation of the attorney’s oath and is obstructive of the
administration of justice.
Uypuanco v. Equitable Banking Corp. The circumstances
surrounding the present litigation definitely prove that the appeal
is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong
litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves severe
condemnation, wasting, as it does, the time that the courts could
well devote the meritorious cases. It is but proper therefore that
appellant's counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances.
A Judge Should Prevent Dilatory Tactics of Lawyers

People v. Jardin. A judge should be quick enough to prevent a
lawyer from resorting to dilatory tactics which obstruct the
administration of justice.
In re: Flordeliza. A judge must cultivate a capacity for quick
decision.
Lawyer Should Not Misuse the Rules of Procedure
Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo. A lawyer should utilize the rules of
procedure to attain the ends of justice and not to frustrate them.
The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to
law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a
worthy objective.
Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which
they are intended deserves condemnation.
Alonso v. Villamor. Litigation is not a game of technicalities in
which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is,
rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust.
Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City. Lawyers
should not misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
Rule 12.05: A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness
during a break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still
under examination.
Coaching of Witness During Break or Recess Condemned
 Both the lawyer and the witness have a common duty – to
uphold the truth – that real justice may be rendered to
whom it is due. This is the essence of administering justice.
 Purpose of Rule 12.05: To prevent the lawyer from coaching
or teaching the witness to answer in a certain way, or to
rectify certain statements damaging to his cause at the
resumption of the trial.
 Rationale of Rule 12.05: (a)To uphold and maintain fair play
with the other party and (b) to prevent the examining
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
lawyer from being tempered to coach his own witness to
suit his purpose
2014 Bar, Q. XXIV(a): May an attorney talk to his witnesses
before and during the trial? Explain.
A: He may talk to his witness before the trial, but he shall refrain
from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the trial,
while the witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06: A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to
misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
Assistance in Misrepresentation or Impersonation Condemned
 Violation of Rule 12.06 subjects the lawyer to disciplinary
action.
 It renders himself totally unfit to assist in the administration
of justice.
Criminal Liability of Witness
 The witness who commits the misrepresentation or
impersonation is criminally liable for “False Tetsimony”
either Art. 181, 182 or 183 of the RPC depending upon the
nature of the case.
Art. 181. False testimony favorable to the defendants - Any
person who shall give false testimony in favor of the defendant in
a criminal case, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period a
fine not to exceed 1,000 pesos, if the prosecution is for a felony
punishable by an afflictive penalty, and the penalty of arresto
mayor in any other case.
Art. 182. False testimony in civil cases - Any person found guilty
of false testimony in a civil case shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed 6,000
pesos, if the amount in controversy shall exceed 5,000 pesos, and
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed 1,000
pesos, if the amount in controversy shall not exceed said amount
or cannot be estimated.
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn
affirmation - The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements
and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding
articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any
[70]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of
an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and
the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein.
 A lawyer who induces a witness to commit false testimony is
equally guilty as the witness
People v. Lumampao. There is nothing more fatal to justice than a
corrupt witness. Thus, the RPC makes false testimony a crime.
 The lawyer who presented a witness knowing him to be a
false witness is criminally liable for “offering false testimony
in evidence” under Art. 184
Art. 184. Offering false testimony in evidence - Any person who
shall knowingly offer in evidence a false witness or testimony in
any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished as guilty of
false testimony and shall suffer the respective penalties provided
in this section.
1994 Bar, Q. IV(a): During the course of his cross-examination,
your client had testified to events and circumstances which you
personally know to be untrue. If his testimony was given
credence and accepted as fact by the court, you are sure to win
your client’s case. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is your obligation to: the court?
A: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice (Rule 10.01, Canon 10, CPR).
A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent
himself or to impersonate another (Rule 12.06, Canon 12);
Rule 12.07. A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a
witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
 It is misbehavior in court for a lawyer:
(a) To frighten or shout at witnesses
(b) To terrorize them or;
(c) To tear them down arrogantly
(d) Cross-examine them with incessant questions beyond what
is fair and necessary or maligning or abusing them with such
other similar acts where disrespect instead of respect, is the
tone of the action.

Rights of Witnesses Which Must be Respected During Trial
Rule 132, Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness — A witness
must answer questions, although his answer may tend to
establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting
questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice
require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to
the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a
penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his
reputation, unless it to be the very fact at issue or to a fact
from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a
witness must answer to the fact of his previous final
conviction for an offense.
Lawyers Should Treat Witnesses with Fairness
 Lawyers must always be reminded that “A lawyer’s language
should always be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession”
Canon 18, CPE. A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses
and suitors with fairness and due consideration, and he should
never minister to the malevolence or prejudices of a client in the
trial or conduct of a cause. The client cannot be made the keeper
of the lawyer's conscience in professional matter. He has no right
to demand that his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or
indulge in offensive personalities. Improper speech is not
excusable on the ground that it is what the client would say if
speaking in his own behalf.
Rule 138, Sec. 20(f). Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged;
Judges are Equally Mandated to be Courteous to Litigants and
Witnesses
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.04. The judge is also under the
obligation to be patient, attentive and courteous to the litigants
and witnesses who appear before his court.
Rule 12.08: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client,
except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or
custody of an instrument, and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is
essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must,
during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.
Rationale of the Rule
Jacobs v. Wessinger. The underlying reason for the impropriety of
a lawyer acting in that dual capacity lies in the difference between
the respective functions of a witness and an advocate.
The function of the witness is to tell the facts as he recalls them in
answer to questions. The function of an advocate is that of a
partisan. It is difficult to distinguish between the zeal of an
advocate and the fainess and impartiality of a disinterested
witness.
The lawyer will find it hard to dissociate his relation to his client as
an attorney and his relation to the party as a witness.
ABA Op. 50, (1931). Even if he can actually do so, the dual
relationship would invite embarrassing criticism. Although his zeal
as a lawyer may not influence his testimony as a witness, an even
critical public is only apt to place such construction upon it.
National Bank v. uy Teng Piao. Although the law does not forbid
an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a
cause, the court’s prefer that counsel should not testify as a
witness unless it is necessary, and that he should withdraw from
the active management of the case
Santiago v. Rafanan. Acting or appearing to act in the double
capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind
criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the
lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested.
Inhibition, A Question of Impropriety
 The inhibition is not a question of competency to testify but
one of propriety – for the dual role of being a witness and a
lawyer at the same time for a client, especially when the
[71]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
procedure followed is one of self-examination (lawyer asking
the questions to himself and answering them) will generally
invite criticism and confusion in the proceedings. The
proceedings become confusing when there are objections
raised to the questions propounded.
 The lawyer witness may be opposing as counsel or arguing
as a witness and the stenographer will find it difficult to
record the proceedings accurately.
Exceptions to the Rule (Rule 12.08(a) and (b))
Salcedo v. Luzarraga. In Rule 12.08(b), to avoid self-examination
style, the lawyer should entrust the conduct of the examination to
another counsel.
He can secure the assistance of an associate or partner in the law
officer or he may engage another lawyer with the consent of the
client for the purpose.
2001 Bar, Q. XV: As a rule, why should an attorney not testify as
a witness for his client?
A: "The underlying reason for the impropriety of a lawyer acting in
such dual capacity lies in the difference between the function of a
witness and that of an advocate. The function of a witness is to
tell the facts as he recalls them in answer to questions. The
function of an advocate is that of a partisan. It is difficult to
distinguish between the zeal of an advocate and the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness. The lawyer will find it hard
to disassociate his relation to his client as an attorney and his
relation to the party as a witness." (Agpalo, p. 129)
2006 Bar, Q. I(3): On which of the following is a lawyer
proscribed from testifying as a witness in a case he is handling
for a client.
(a) On the mailing of documents:
(b) On the authentication or custody of any instrument:
(c) On the theory of the case;
(d) On substantial matters in cases where his testimony is
essential to the ends of justice.
Canon 13: A Lawyer Shall Rely Upon the Merits of His Cause and
Refrain from Any Impropriety Which Tends to Influence, or Gives
the Appearance of Influencing the Court
Lawyer is a Minister of Justice

Art. 19, CC. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
 In prosecuting or defending cases, the lawyer must be
guided by the principles of justice.
Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.03. The judge has the
corresponding duty not to convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge.
Paas v. Almarvez
Facts: A judge allowed her husband who is a practicing lawyer, to
use the address of her court in the latter’s pleadings before other
courts.
Issue: WON the spouses are guilty of any misbehavior
Held:
1. By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in
pleadings before other courts, Judge Paas indeed "allowed
[him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his
private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct"
and of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which
violation is classified as a less serious charge under the Rules
of Court and is punishable under the same Rule.
2. A judge's official conduct should indeed be free from the
appearance of impropriety; and his behavior not only in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life
should be beyond reproach. This is premised on the truism
that a Judge's official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence and that upon a
Judge's attributes depend the public perception of the
Judiciary.
3. On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent,
misleading, and deceptive address that had no purpose
other than to try to impress either the court in which his
cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a
member of the juiciary, in violation of the following rules of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES
SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
CANON 13 — A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS
CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO
INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rau Sheng Mao v. Velasco. The lawyer was suspended for giving
the complainant the impression that he was in a position to
influence the court
Berbano v. Barcelona. The lawyer was disbarred for making the
misrepresentation that he could cause the release of a detainee
from jail through his connection with a SC Justice. He received
money for his act of misrepresentation.
1987 Bar, Q. II: In the newspaper there have appeared from time
to time, the entire texts of pleadings, memoranda, etc. in
important cases involving public interest. In several instances,
these published papers, pleadings, etc. indicate that a well-
known former member of the Judiciary has signed such papers
thus:
X, Y and Associates
Counsel for Respondents
By: Justice X
Does the foregoing constitute a breach of legal or professional
ethics on the part of the law firm and the signing partner?
Answer with reasons.
A: Yes, the submission of court pleadings by a former member of
the judiciary signing as “Justice” creates undue advantage over
[72]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
ordinary practicing lawyers. While Justice X is not prohibited from
practicing law after his retirement, he should sign his name
without necessarily indicating that he was a justice.
2001 Bar, Q. XI: Atty. A is offered professional engagement to
appear before Judge B who is A's relative, compadre and former
office colleague. Is A ethically compelled to refuse the
engagement? Why?
A: "A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of the cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court" (Canon 13, CPR). There is no
ethical constraint against a lawyer appearing before a judge who
is a relative, compadre or former office colleague as long as the
lawyer avoids giving the impression that he can influence the
judge. On the other hand, the judge is required by the Code of
Judicial Conduct not to take part in any proceeding where his
impartiality may be reasonably questioned (Rule 3.12 Code of
Judicial Conduct). Among the grounds for mandatory
disqualification of the judge is if any of the lawyers is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree.
Rule 13.01: A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity
with Judges.
Extraordinary Attention or Hospitality to, or Seek Familiarity
with Judges, to be Avoided
Reason: To protect the good name and reputation of the judge
and the lawyer.
CPE, Canon 3. Attempts to exert personal influence of the court
– Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a
lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the
parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions
of motive and should be avoided.
A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the
judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke
and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge
special personal consideration or favor.
A self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional
duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect
due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial
personal and official relations between bench and bar.
Lawyers Should Not Also Seek for Opportunity to Cultivate
Familiarity with Judge

 A lawyer who joins a club or association – where judges or
some judges are members – for purpose of infiltrating the
circle of judges so that he can later hope to influence them
in relation to his cases or some legal matters is highly
unethical.
Report of the IBP Committee. In order not to subject both the
judge and the lawyer to suspicion, the common practice of some
lawyers of making judges and prosecutors, godfathers of their
children to enhance their influence and their law practice should
be avoided by judges and lawyers alike.
Consequences
Warvelle. A lawyer who resorts to such practices of seeking
familiarity with judges dishonors his profession and a judge who
consents to them is unworthy of his office.
Discussing Cases with Judges Privately Should be Avoided (CPE,
Canon 3)
Austria v. Masaquel. It is improper for a litigant or counsel to see
a judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter not related to
the case pending in the court of said judge.
It is Impropriety for a Judge to Meet Privately with an Accused
Gallo v. Cordero. It is highly improper for a judge to meet
privately with an accused who has a pending case before him
without the presence of the other party.
Fernandez v. Presbitero. The prohibition is to maintain
impartiality. “Judges should not only be impartial but should
appear impartial.
Del Castillo v. Javelona. The courts should administer justice free
from suspicion of bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties-litigants
might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness
and decorum.
2000 Bar, Q. XI: Atty. J requested Judge K to be a principal
sponsor at the wedding of his son. Atty. J met Judge K a month
before during the IBP-sponsored reception to welcome Judge K
into the community, and having learned that Judge K takes his
breakfast at a coffee shop near his (Judge K's) boardinghouse,
Atty. J made it a point to be at the coffee shop at about the time
that Judge K takes his breakfast. Comment on Atty. J's acts. Do
they violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
A: Yes, his actions violate the CPR. Canon 13 of the said Code
provides that a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives
the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 of the same
Code provides that a lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with Judges. Atty. J obviously sought opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judge K by being at the coffee shop
where the latter takes his breakfast, and is extending
extraordinary attention to the judge by inviting him to be a
principal sponsor at the wedding of his son.
2010 Bar, Q. XV(A): Rico, an amiable, sociable lawyer, owns a
share in Marina Golf Club, easily one of the posher golf courses.
He relishes hosting parties for government officials and
members of the bench.
One day, he had a chance meeting with a judge in the
Intramuros golf course. The two readily got along well and had
since been regularly playing golf together at the Marina Golf
Club.
If Atty. Rico does not discuss cases with members of the bench
during parties and gold gamers, is he violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility? Explain.
A: Yes. A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with
judges (Rule 13.01, CPR). Moreover, he should refrain from any
impropriety which gives the appearance of influencing the court
(Canon 13, CPR). In regularly playing golf with judges, Atty. Rico
will certainly raise the suspicion that they discuss cases during the
game, although they actually do not. However, if Rico is known to
be a non-practicing lawyer, there is not much of an ethical
problem.
2013 Bar, Q. IX: Atty. Hermano requested his fraternity brother,
Judge Patron, to introduce him to Judge Apestado, before whom
he has a case that had been pending for sometime.
Judge Patron, a close friend of Judge Apestado, acceded to the
request, telling the latter that Atty. Hermano is his fraternity
“brod” and that Atty. Hermano simply wanted to ask for advice
on how to expedite the resolution of his case. They met, as
arranged, in the fine dining restaurant of a five-star hotel. Atty.
Hermano hosted the dinner.
Did Atty. Hermano, Judge Patron and Judge Apestado commit
any ethical/administrative violation for which they can be held
liable?
[73]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: Yes, the three (3) of them committed ethical/administrative
violations for which they can be held liable.
For hosting the dinner, Atty. Hermano acted in contravention of
ethical standards. A lawyer should refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence or give the appearance of influencing the
court (CPR, Canon 13). A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating
familiarity with judges (Ibid., Canon 13, Rule 13.01). Marked
attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a
judge, uncalled for by the personal relations [of] the parties,
subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstruction of
motive and should be avoided (CPE, Canon 3, par. 2, 1st
sentence). Even if the purpose of the meeting was merely to “ask
advice on how to expedite the resolution of his case,” Atty.
Hermano still acted outside of the bounds of ethical conduct. This
is so because a lawyer deserves rebuke and denunciation for any
device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal
consideration or favor (Ibid., Canon 3, par. 2, 2nd sentence).
Both Judge Patron and Judge Apestado may be held liable for
having the dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano. Judges shall
ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer (New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Canon 2, Sec.
1). Their having dinner with Atty. Hermano, a practicing lawyer
could be construed as appearance of impropriety.
Judge Patron for having allowed himself to use as a “bridge” by
Atty. Hermano, his fraternity “brod”, to meet with Judge
Apestado exhibited judicial misconduct in the following manner
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court
(Ibid., Canon 1, Sec. 3). Furthermore, in allowing Atty. Hernando
to make advantage to his fraternity bond, Judge Patron allowed
the use of prestige of judicial office to advance the private
interests of others, conveyed or permitted his fraternity “brod” to
convey the impression that he is in a special position to influence
the judge (Ibid., Canon 1, Sec. 4, 2nd sentence).
The specific violations of Judge Apestado were committed when
he allowed himself to be convinced by Judge Patron to have the
dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano to discuss how the case may
be expedited in performing judicial duties, judges shall be
independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which
the judge is obliged to make independently (Ibid., Canon 1, Sec.
2). Finally, in having a dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano who
has a pending case with his sala, Judge Apestado has exhibited an
appearance of impropriety in his activities (Ibid., Canon 4, Sec. 1).

Rule 13.02: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party.
Public Statements to Arouse Public Opinion for or Against a
Party Generally Condemned
CPE, Canon 20. Newspaper discussion of pending litigation –
Newspaper publication by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the courts and otherwise
the due administration of justice. Generally, they are to be
condemned.
If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a
statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it
anonymous. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go
beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the
court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid an ex parte
statement
Test When Public Statement is Contemptuous
Toledo. The (1) character of the act done and (2) its direct
tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of official duty is
the test to determine whether a newspaper publication
concerning a pending case is contemptuous
Trial by Publicity, When Prejudicial
Martelino v. Alejandro. In order to warrant a finding of
“prejudicial” publicity, there must be an allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the “barrage” of publicity.
Where the publicity did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners
but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was
claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a
"trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the
Government
Cruz v. Salva. The SC censured the Fiscal for unduly allowing wide
publicity and sensationalism on a case under investigation.
In the case at bar, while the Provincial Fiscal has established a
justification for his reinvestigation of the case although the same
is on appeal and pending consideration by this Tribunal, however,
said Fiscal committed a grievous error and poor judgment when
he allowed, even encouraged, the reinvestigation to be conducted
with much fanfare, publicity and sensationalism. Such actuations
of the Fiscal constitute contempt of court punishable by censure.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Re: Suspension of Atty. Bagabuyo. Respondent violated Rule
11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a
press conference where he made statements against the Order
dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No.
5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that
Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled,
Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue
of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the
article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which
states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party."
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing,
respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court
and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the
law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong
instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent was suspended
Lawyer Equally Guilty as the Client if he Induces the Latter to
Cause the Publicity
 If the counsel instigated or induced his client to make the
public statement or publicity in the media involving a
pending case to arouse public opinion and to influence the
judge, both the client and the lawyer may be subjected to
contempt of court.
Strebel v. Figueras. The reason is that the promulgated decision is
already open to public consumption such that an adhesion
thereto in a news item to justify a criticism is not actionable.
In re: Gomez. However, after the case had already been finished,
the rule in progressive jurisdictions is that, courts are subject to
the same criticism as other people
2008 Bar, Q. III: Dumbledore, a noted professor of commercial
law, wrote an article on the subject of letters of credit which was
published in the IBP Journal.
[74]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(a) Assume he devoted a significant portion of the article to a
commentary' on how the Supreme Court should decide a
pending case involving the application of the law' on letters
of credit. May he be sanctioned by the Supreme Court?
Explain.
(b) Assume Dumbledore did not include any commentary on
the case. Assume further after the Supreme Court decision
on the case had attained finality, he wrote another IBP
Journal article, dissecting the decision and explaining why
the Supreme Court erred in all its conclusions. May he be
sanctioned by the Supreme Court? Explain.
A:
(a) Professor Dumbledore may be sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. Rule 13.02, CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not
make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
The court in a pending litigation must be shielded from
embarrassment or influence in its duty of deciding the case.
(b) He may not be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Once a
litigation is concluded, the judge who decided it is subject to
the same criticism as any other public official, because his
decision becomes public property and is thrown open to
public consumption. The lawyer enjoys a wide latitude in
commenting or criticizing the judge's decision, provided that
such comment or criticism shall be bona fide and not spill
over the bounds of decency and propriety.
2003 Bar, Q. XI: As a defense counsel for the accused in a
sensational case for abduction which the media is covering, you
are fully convinced from the judge's actuations that he is biased
against your client. You are asked by the reporters to comment
on the proceedings and the judge’s conduct. How should you
react on the matter?
A: I will decline to give any comment. Rule 13.02, CPR provides
that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.”
Rule 13.03: A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by
another branch or agency of the government in the normal
course of judicial proceedings.
Lawyer Shall Not Invite Interference by Another Governmental
Agency in the Course of Judicial Proceedings
 When a case is already within the jurisdiction of the court,
the lawyer should not cause or seek the interference of

another agency of the Government in the normal course of
judicial proceedings
Bumanlag v. Bumanlag. A final word is called for on respondent's
statement in his Explanation inferring that he was led to file his
petition with the President by the fact that his MR "were only
denied by the Clerk of Court without any comment whatsoever".
As the Court has had occasion to state in People vs. Catolico and
earlier cases, this remark of respondent exposes his lack of
appreciation or disregard of the time-honored usage of the Court
that minute resolutions, summons and processes of the Court,
upon being duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to the
interested parties by and upon the signature of the Clerk of Court
who is duly authorized to do so.
With the thousands of resolutions approved monthly by the
Court, it would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief
Justice and members of the Court to the prejudice of the
administration of justice if all such papers, other than decisions,
could be released only upon their own signatures.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand
for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in having
asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision
which suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with
warning that the commission of any transgression in the future of
his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt
with.
 Rule 13.03 should be distinguished with Rule 11.05, the
latter rule refers to complaints against judges themselves
which must be coursed to the proper authorities only.
 Rationale: To preserve the independence of the judges in
the performance of their duties.
Chapter IV: The Lawyer and the Client
Canon 14: A Lawyer Shall Not Refuse His Services to the Needy
Services to the Needy
 One of the burden of being a lawyer is the needed
involvement of practicing lawyers in the rendition of legal
aid to the poor and indigent without expecting ordinary
attorney’s fees for their services.
 This burden is a social obligation of every practicing lawyer.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec.11. Free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
2013 Bar, Q. XVIII: You are a lawyer working in the Public
Assistance Office. Yolly, a key witness in the case (reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide) you are handling, is indigent
and illiterate. While Yolly is willing to testify in court, you worry
that the judge might not be able to appreciate the impact of her
testimony, as she has a difficult time answering English
questions. You also worry that this might affect her credibility.
Further, Yolly has indicated that she might not have the money
to pay the fare to attend the trial. You are presenting her as a
witness for the defense at the hearing next week.
Which of the following is NOT a permissible act for you to do?
(a) Provide Yolly with money for fare to ensure her attendance
in court.
(b) Interview Yolly before trial, so that she will be more at ease
when she testifies before the court.
(c) Prepare a judicial affidavit of Yolly’s testimony, which she
will then verify before the court.
(d) Provide her with sample questions that you might ask in the
hearing tomorrow.
(e) All the above are permissible.
A: (e). All are permissible; therefore, (e) should be equivalent to
none of the above.
1988 Bar, Q. I(b): How should a lawyer view representation of
the poor, the marginalized, and the oppressed before our courts
of justice? Explain.
A: As an officer of the court the lawyer has the duty of
representing the poor, the marginalized and the oppressed
without expecting to be compensated for his services. One of the
main duties of the lawyer is to maintain the rule of law. The rule
of law cannot be maintained of the poor, the oppressed or
marginalized are not afforded legal services to protect their rights
against the rich and the privileged. The lawyer should not
consider it as a duty and not as a charitable work.
1989 Bar, Q. VII:
(1) Discuss briefly your understanding of the relationship
between an attorney and his client.
(2) How is such a relationship created? Explain your answer.
A:
[75]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(1) The relationship between an attorney and client is fiduciary,
confidential and personal. By virtue, thereof, the lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
(2) The attorney and client relationship is created by implied or
express contract. The relationship is also created if he is a
court appointed counsel.
Rule 14.01. A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person
solely on account of the latter's race, sex, creed or status of life,
or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
Lawyer Not Bound to Accept All Cases
Legarda v. CA. A lawyer is not bound to accept every case that is
referred to him by a prospective client. Thus, if is already loaded
with cases, he should not accept any more cases which he could
no longer handle.
Enriquez v. Gimenez. He must on his own responsibility decide
what business he will accept as counsel, what cases he will bring
to the court for plaintiffs, or what cases he will contest in court for
defendants.
Tan v. Lapak. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either
as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject,
however, to Canon 14, CPR. Once he agrees to take up the cause
of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The failure of a client to pay the balance of the amount he
promised is not sufficient to justify the lawyer’s failure to comply
with his professional obligation which does not depend for
compliance on the payment of a lawyer’s fees.
Restrictions (Rule 14.01)
Warvelle. A lawyer cannot refuse to under the defense of an
accused person simply because he believes that said person is
guilty. For if the lawyer does so, he assumes the character of the
judge
CPE, Canon 5. The defense or prosecution of those accused of
crime – It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a
person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused; otherwise, innocent persons, victims only
of suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense.
Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair

and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of
the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of
life or liberty but by due process of law.
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not
to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts
or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.
Rule 138, Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the
law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of
life or liberty, but by due process of law.
Santiago v. Fojas. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act
either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Discovering Guilt of Client
Warvelle. Even if, after accepting the case, the lawyer discovers
that his client is guilty, he must still continue with defense of his
client and use all fair arguments arising on the evidence and see
to it that due process is accorded to his client and that he should
not be punished for more than what the law provides.
Rule 133, Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt — In a criminal
case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
Rule 14.01 is Applicable only in Criminal Case
 Rule 138, Sec. 20(i)
 It is not for the lawyer to adjudge the guilt of his own client
who under the law is presumed innocent until proven
otherwise
 Thus, it is not unethical for a lawyer to defend an accused
charged with any crime, heinous or otherwise, because in
the eyes of the law, until his conviction, he enjoys the
rebuttable presumption of innocence.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Francisco v. Portugal. The lawyer should not “brand his own
clients as the culprits”. Such act of discrimination amounts to rank
unprofessionalism.
Rule 14.01 Inapplicable to Civil Cases
 Rule 138, Sec. 20(c) provides:
Rule 138, Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
 Also, Rule 7, Sec. 3:
Rule 7, Sec. 3. Signature and address — Every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either
case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied
if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and
not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action.
 Violation of these Rule, may subject the lawyer to
disciplinary action.
Orcino v. Gaspar. While a lawyer is not bound to accept all cases
referred to him, however, when he decides to handle case, there
is an implied stipulation that it be carried to its conclusion.
Rule 138, Sec. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court
presumed to represent client on appeal — An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed
to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate
court.
[76]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Santiago v. Fojas. It bears repeating that no lawyer is obliged to
act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish
to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
2014 Bar, Q. IV(a): A is accused of robbery in a complaint filed by
B. A sought free legal assistance from the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) and Atty. C was assigned to handle his case. After
reviewing the facts as stated in the complaint and as narrated by
A, Atty. C is convinced that A is guilty.
May Atty. C refuse to handle the defense of A and ask to be
relieved? Explain fully.
A: Rule 14.01, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not decline to
represent a person solely on account of his own opinion regarding
the guilt of the said person. It is not the duty of a lawyer to
determine whether the accused is guilty or not, but the judge’s.
Besides, in a criminal case, the accused is presumed innocent, and
he is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The role of the lawyer is to see to it that his
constitutional right to due process is observed.
2013 Bar, Q. VIII: Vito is a notorious gangster in the province
who has been accused of raping and mercilessly killing a 16-year
old girl. Sentiments run very strongly against him and the local
Bar Association met and decided that no lawyer in the locality
would represent him. Vito could not afford the services of an
out-of-town counsel.
Choose the most appropriate legal and ethical characterization
of the decision of the local Bar Association.
(a) It is within its right to make, since lawyers may freely decide
who to represent and who not to represent.
(b) It is unethical; it constitutes a collective denial of Vito’s
right to the assistance of counsel.
(c) It constitutes an anticipated act of contempt towards the
court that may order any of the members of the association
to represent the accused.
(d) It must be concurred in by each member of the Bar
Association to have any binding force.
(e) It is unethical because the Bar Association already prejudged
Vito.
A: (b). CPR, Rule 14, Rule 14.01; 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2
2013 Bar, Q. XI: Candido engaged the services of Atty. Lebron in
a criminal case. In the course of their consultations, Candido

admitted to Atty. Lebron that he committed the crime and in
fact actively planned its commission. He stressed, however, that
under no circumstance would he admit or confess to the murder
charge he is facing and, in fact, would enter a plea of "not guilty"
on arraignment.
If Candido insists on his planned plea, Atty. Lebron should
__________.
(a) discontinue his representation; to continue would be
unethical since he would then be aiding the accused in
foisting a deliberate falsehood on the court
(b) allow Candido to choose his course of action; Atty.
Lebron’s duty is to protect all his legal and statutory rights
(c) convince Candido to plead guilty and withdraw from the
case if Candido refuses to heed his advice
(d) file a manifestation, if Candido pleads "not guilty," declaring
to the court what he knows of the truth.
(e) play matters by ear and wait for developments as Candido
may still plead guilty.
A: (b). CPR, Canon 14, Rule 14.01.
Alternative: (c)
2011 Bar, Q. 16: Noel and Emily who were involved in a road
accident sued Ferdie, the driver of the other car, for damages.
Atty. Jose represented only Noel but he called Emily to testify
for his client. During direct examination, Emily claimed that her
injuries were serious when Atty. Jose knew that they were not.
Still, Atty. Jose did not contest such claim. Ferdie later sued
Emily for giving false testimony since her own doctor’s report
contradicted it. He also sued Atty. Jose for foisting a false
testimony in court. Is Atty. Jose liable?
(a) No, because he did not knowingly arrange for Emily to lie in
court.
(b) Yes, because he did not advise his client to settle the case
amicably.
(c) No, because Emily did not permit him to reveal the falsity to
the court.
(d) Yes, because he knowingly let Emily's false testimony pass
for truth.
1996 Bar, Q. II(3): Should a lawyer accept a losing case: (a) in a
criminal case; (b) in a civil case. Explain.
(a) A lawyer may accept a “losing" criminal case. An accused is
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by procedure recognized by law. Rule
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
14.01, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not decline to
represent a person solely on account of the latter’s race,
sex, creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion
regarding the guilt of said person. Otherwise innocent
persons might be denied proper defense.
(b) A lawyer may not accept a “losing" civil case. Firstly, his
signature in every pleading constitutes a certification that
there is good cause to support it and that it is not interposed
for delay (Sec. 5. Rule 7, Rules of Court). Secondly, it is the
lawyer’s duty to counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be Just and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law (Sec. 20 (a), Rule 138, Rules of Court). Thirdly, he is
not to encourage either the commencement or continuance
of an action or proceeding or delay in any man’s cause for
any corrupt motive or interest (Sec. 20(g), Rule 138).
Fourthly, he must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make
a defense when convinced that it is intended merely to
harass or injure the opposite party or to work oppression or
wrong (Canon 30, Canons of Professional Ethics). If a lawyer
were to accept a bad civil case, it will either be to exert his
best efforts towards a compromise or, if unsuccessful, to
advice his client to confess Judgment.
Alternative: A lawyer may also accept a losing civil case provided
that in so doing, he must not engage in dilatory tactics and must
advise his client about the prospects and the advantage of settling
a compromise in a case.
2001 Bar, Q. XIV: May an attorney refuse to handle a losing
case? Support your answer.
A: In civil cases, a lawyer may refuse to handle a losing case. In all
probability, a losing case is one which has no basis or cause of
action. Under the Attorney's Oath, the CPR and Rules of Court, it
is the duty of a lawyer not to promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, or give aid or consent to the same.
The same is true in criminal cases, except when a lawyer is called
upon to defend a person guilty of an offense. In such a case, a
lawyer may not refuse to defend a person merely because he
perceives him to be guilty. That matter is within the province of
the Judge. The client is presumed innocent until otherwise
proven. It is the counsel's duty to see to it that his client is
accorded due process, that his rights are respected, and that only
the proper penalties are meted out should he be convicted.
2004 Bar, Q. V(A): Atty. DD’s services were engaged by Mr. BB as
defense counsel in a lawsuit. In the course of the proceedings,
Atty. DD discovered that Mr. BB was an agnostic and a
[77]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
homosexual. By reason thereof, Atty. DD filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel without Mr. BB’s express consent.
Is Atty. DD’s motion legally tenable? Reason briefly.
A: No. Atty. DD’s motion is not legally tenable. He has no valid
cause to terminate his services. His client, Mr. BB, being an
agnostic and homosexual, should not be deprived of his counsel’s
representation solely for that reason.
A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account
of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status of life or because of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of said person (Canon 14, Rule
14.01, CPR).
1991 Bar, Q. VII: May a lawyer decline as appointment by the
court as counsel de oficio for an accused because he believes,
and is fully convinced, that the accused is guilty of the crime
charged?
A: A lawyer may not decline an appointment as counsel de officio
even if he is convinced that the accused is guilty. It is his
obligation to at least protect his rights. He might even have him
acquitted or at least reduce his penalty depending on the
evidence during the trial.
Alternative: A lawyer cannot decline an appointment as counsel
de officio because an accused is entitled to counsel and refusal
may lead to a situation where an accused will be denied his right
to counsel.
Would your answer be the same if he is asked to be counsel for a
defendant in a civil case whose defense is based on falsified
documents? If your answer is different, explain the ethical
considerations for the difference.
A: If the defense in the civil case is based on falsified documents
the lawyer should decline.
That is in compliance with the lawyer’s oath that he should not
wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any ground-less false or
unlawful cause or give nor consent to the same. He is obligated
not to delay a man is cause for money or malice.
2001 Bar, Q. I: What steps should first be done by the attorney
before he can endorse or object to his client is intention to plead
guilty? State your reasons.
A: It is the duty of defense counsel to

(a) Study thoroughly the records and surrounding
circumstances of the case and determine if there are valid
defenses he can use
(b) Confer with the accused and obtain from him his account of
what had happened
(c) Advise him of his constitutional and statutory rights,
including advisability of entering into plea bargaining
(d) Thoroughly explain to him the impact of a guilty plea and
the inevitable conviction that will follow, and
(e) If the client still insists on pleading guilty, see to it that the
prescribed procedure necessary to the administration of
justice is strictly followed and disclosed in the court records.
1989 Bar, Q. III: Robert, your childhood friend, has been accused
of a criminal offense. You have agreed to handle his defense for
a sum which is below your usual billing rate. Robert s alibi
appears to be credible, being backed up by two witnesses who
are also known to you. During the trial, Robert joined a Christian
movement and became an active participant. He then confessed
to you that he, in fact, committed the crime. What will you do?
Explain your answer.
A: I, as the lawyer, shall still defend Robert at least to protect his
rights. Canon 14 Rule 14.01 provides that a lawyer shall not
decline to represent a person even if he knows that he is guilty of
a criminal offense. I may advise him to plead guilty to the offense
and find out if there are mitigating circumstances in his favor. In
case he refuses to plead guilty I am still bound to defend him at
least to protect his rights within the lawful procedures.
1990 Bar, Q. II: Your services as a lawyer are engaged by John
Dizon to defend him from the charge of malversation of public
funds before the Sandiganbayan. John confessed to you that he
actually misappropriated the amount charged but he said it was
out of extreme necessity to pay for the emergency operation of
his wife.
Will you agree to defend him? State your reason.
A: I will agree to defend him, notwithstanding his confession to
me that he actually misappropriated the amount. Rule 14.01, CPR
provides that a lawyer shall not decline to represent a person be-
cause of his own opinion regarding the guilt of the person. One of
the duties of an attorney is that he should, in the defense of a
person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means
regardless of his personal opinion as to guilt of the accused,
present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no
person may be deprived of life liberty but by due process of law.
The burden of proof lies with the prosecution and if the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
prosecution fails to discharge such burden, the lawyer can always
invoke the presumption of innocence for the acquittal of his
client. If the prosecution proves the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the lawyer can strive to lower the penalty by
presenting mitigating circumstances, for he is not necessarily
expected to sustain the client’s innocence. A lawyer is an
advocate, not a judge, and if he has rendered effective legal
assistance to his client as allowed by law, he can rightfully say that
he has faithfully discharged his duties as a lawyer, even if the
accused is found guilty by the court.
1993 Bar, Q. V: Your services as a lawyer were engaged by
Manuel Jalandoni to defend him from the charge of
malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan. Manuel
confessed to you that he actually misappropriated the amount
out of extreme necessity to pay for the emergency operation of
his wife.
Will you agree to defend him? State your reasons.
A: Yes, I will agree to defend Manuel Jalandoni even if he
admitted to me that he malversed public funds. A lawyer has the
duty to defend an accused even if he knows that he is guilty - at
least to defend his rights. He might be able to find some
mitigating or extenuating circumstances. Moreover, it is not the
lawyer who shall decide whether the accused is guilty. It is the
task of the Judge.
1994 Bar, Q. I(1): On the day of his arraignment, your client
confided in you that he in fact killed the victim for which he was
being charged with murder. You had been led to believe initially
that he was just being framed and that another person had
committed the crime.
(1) How would you advise your client to plead?
(2) If he should refuse to heed your advice, what course of
action would you pursue?
A:
(1) I would first inquire fully into the circumstances under which
he killed the victim. If I find out that he is guilty as charged, I
would advise him to plead guilty, after explaining to him his
constitutional rights and the import of plea of guilty.
(2) If he should refuse to follow my advice, I will still render
effective legal assistance to him. I will spare no effort to save
him from an unrighteous conviction and to present, by all
fair and reasonable means, every defense or mitigating
circumstance that the law permits to the end that he may
[78]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
not be deprived of life or liberty but by due process of law
legally applied.
1996 Bar, Q. VI(2): Y hires the services of Atty. Z in a case where
Y is accused of rape. Atty. Z, however, firmly believes that Y is
guilty of the crime of rape.
If you were Atty. Z, would you still accept the case? Explain.
A: I would still accept the case. It is not for me to judge that Y is
guilty of the crime. The law presumes him to be innocent, and is
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt with due process of law. The lawyer's work is to
see to it that due process of law is observed. Otherwise, many
accused will be defenseless.
2000 Bar, Q. XII: M was criminally charged with violation of a
special law. He tried to engage the service of Atty. N. Atty. N
believed, however, that M is guilty on account of which he
declined. Would it be ethical for Atty. N to decline? Explain.
A: It would not be ethical for Atty. N to decline. Rule 14.01, CPR
provides that’ a lawyer shall not decline to represent a person
solely on account of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status of life,
or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person. It
is for the judge, not the lawyer, to decide the guilt of the accused,
who is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond
reasonable doubt by procedure recognized by law.
2005 Bar, Q. IX: Darius is charged with the crime of murder. He
sought Atty. Francia’s help and assured the latter that he did not
commit the crime. Atty. Francia agreed to represent him in
court. During the trial, the prosecution presented several
witnesses whose testimonies convinced Atty. Francia that her
client is guilty. She confronted his client who eventually
admitted that he indeed committed the crime. In view of his
admission. Atty. Francia decided to withdraw from the case.
Should Atty. Francia be allowed to do so? Explain.
A: No, he should not be allowed to withdraw. A lawyer shall not
decline to represent a person solely because of his opinion
regarding the guilt of the said person (Rule 14.01, CPR). It is the
bounden duty of a counsel de officio to defend his client no
matter how guilty or evil he appears to be (People vs. Sta. Teresa,
2001).

2002 Bar, Q. I(B): What is a lawyer's duty if he finds that he
cannot honestly put up a valid or meritorious defense but his
client insists that he litigate? Explain.
A: It depends. If it is a criminal case, he may not decline to
represent the accused solely on his opinion regarding the guilt of
said person (Rule 14.01, CPR). The Supreme Court has held that a
counsel de officio has the duty to defend his client no matter how
guilty he perceives him to be (People v. Nadera, Jr., 2000). But if
the case is a civil case, he should decline to accept the same. In a
civil action, the rules and ethics of the profession enjoin a lawyer
from taking a bad case. The attorney’s signature in every pleading
constitutes a certification that there is good cause to support it
and that it is not interposed for delay. It is the attorney’s duty to
counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law.
2009 Bar, Q. XI(b), True or False: It is ethical for a lawyer to
advise his client to enter a plea of guilty in a criminal case if the
lawyer is personally convinced that he cannot win the case for
his client.
A: TRUE. A lawyer should be candid with a client. But he should
leave it up to the client to decide whether to plead guilty or not.
Rule 14.02: A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and
sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or as
amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
Appointment as Counsel de Oficio
 The duty to appoint a counsel de oficio rests upon the
presiding judge. If an accused appears without counsel, it is
the duty of the judge to inform him that under the
Constitution, it is his right to have an attorney to represent
him.
 The accused must be asked before the arraignment whether
he desires the aid of an attorney.
 If he desires and is unable to employ one, the court must
assign an attorney de oficio to defend him. Rule 116, Sec. 6
provides:
Rule 116, Sec. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to
counsel — Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused
of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one.
Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
employed a counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel
de oficio to defend him.
Olaivar v. Santiago. However, if accused wants to defend himself
without counsel, the Judge may allow him to go to trial without
consent but he cannot later claim he was not accorded due
process for lack of counsel.
Ledesma v. Climaco. The lawyer appointed by the judge as
counsel de oficio cannot decline the appointment except only for
serious and sufficient cause. He cannot ask to be excused for any
trivial and flimsy reason.
Duty of Counsel de Oficio
 An accused, no matter how financially destitute, is entitled
to be heard through counsel. He cannot be deprived of life
and liberty without due process of law.
People v. Ferrer. Without such opportunity, those who are
criminally indicted but cannot afford the services of private
lawyers would become victims of overzealous prosecutors, of the
law’s complexity or of their own ignorance or bewilderment.
Lawyers called to duty to render the Rule, cannot be excused from
rendering efficient and truly decisive legal assistance except for
the most compelling reasons.
People v. Estebia. As counsel de oficio, the lawyer is duty bound
to exert his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the
person assigned to his care.
People v. Simeon. Corollary to this duty, the presiding judge must
give the counsel de oficio ample opportunity to examine not only
the records of the case but also to confer with the accused
lengthily so that he can properly, intelligently and fully represent
and defend the interest of the accused.
Rule 116, Sec. 8. Time for counsel de oficio to prepare for
arraignment — Whenever a counsel de oficio is appointed by the
court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be given
a reasonable time to consult with the accused as to his plea
before proceeding with the arraignment.
People v. Rio. Right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon
the conviction of the accused by the trial court. Thus, if he wants
to appeal, the court must still assign a counsel de oficio for the
purpose.
[79]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Judges are Cautioned Not to Frequently Appoint Same Lawyer as
Counsel de Oficio
People v. Daeng. All courts are cautioned against the frequent
appointment of the same attorney as counsel de oficio, for two
basic reasons:
(1) It is unfair to the attorney concerned, considering the
burden of his regular practice, that he should be saddled
with too many de oficio cases; and
(2) The compensation provided by Sec. 32 of the ROC (a fixed
fee of P500) in capital offenses might be considered by some
lawyers as a regular source of income, something which the
Rules does not envision.
Accused Can Refuse a Counsel de Oficio
People v. Ando. If the accused insists that he be represented by
his counsel de parte who is not available during the trial, and the
judge appointed a counsel de oficio despite the protestation of
the accused, the sentence rendered is void.
Appointment as Amicus Curiae Not to be Declined, Concept
Rule 138, Sec. 36. Amicus Curiae — Experienced and impartial
attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to
help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Fed R. App. As amicus curiae is not a party to the action; he may
petition the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on
behalf of a party but actually to suggest a rationale consistent
with his own views.
Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in appeals
concerning matters of a broad public interest: e.g. civil right cases.
Briefs may be filed also if accompanied by the written consent of
all parties or at the request of the court.
In re: Quirino. The amicus curiae however does not have the right
to interfere with or control the condition of the record; he “has no
control over the suit and no right to institute any proceedings
therein” and “cannot assume the functions of a party in an action
or proceedings pending before the court; ordinarily, he cannot file
a pleading in a cause”
Free Legal Aid on Request of the IBP
 The IBP or any of its chapters may request a member of the
Bar to render free legal aid to poor deserving litigants. The

lawyer so requested must not decline the request except for
serious and sufficient cause.
2002 Bar, Q. VII:
A. May a lawyer decline a request for free legal aid to an
indigent accused made by a chapter of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP)? Explain.
B. Will your answer be different if the legal aid is requested in
a civil case?
A:
A. Rule 14.02, CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not decline,
except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as
counsel de officio or as amicus curiae or a request from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapter for
rendition of free legal aid.” He may, therefore, decline such
appointment for “serious and sufficient cause”. For example,
he may decline such appointment if it will involve a conflict
of interest with another client.
B. My answer will not be exactly the same, because in a civil
case, the Sawyer can also decline if he believes the action or
defense to be unmeritorious. He is ethically bound to
maintain only actions and proceedings which appear to him
to be just and only such defenses which he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law.
Lawyer to Render Free Legal Aid to Destitute Upon Being
Assigned by the Judge
Rule 138, Sec. 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants — A court may
assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any
party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is
destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services
of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to
protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney
so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
 This is different from Rule 116, Sec. 6 which refers to the
appointment of a counsel de oficio to defend an accused in a
criminal case
 Rule 138, Sec. 31 refers to any party in any case other than a
criminal case where the services of counsel are needed to
secure the ends of justice.
 R.A. 6033 (Aug. 4, 1969) directs courts to give preference to
criminal cases where the party or parties involved are
indigents.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
R.A. 6033, Sec. 4. Any willful or malicious refusal on the part of
any fiscal (prosecutor) or judge to carry out the provisions of said
law shall constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action which
may include suspension or removal.
2014 Bar, Q. V: The rendition of free legal service is a lawyer’s:
(a) moral duty
(b) social obligation
(c) legal mandate
A: (b)
Alternative: (a)
1993 Bar, Q. XI: What is the rule on the appointment of counsel
de officio for an accused who was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court and is desirous of appealing from the judgment of
conviction?
A: If an accused is found guilty by the trial court and makes his
intention to appeal the decision, the appellate court may appoint
a counsel de oficio if it is shown by a certificate of the clerk of
court that:
(a) The defendant is confined in prison and not able to file a bail
bond
(b) He is without means to employ an attorney de parte and
(c) He desires to be represented by an attorney de oficio. An
appellant who is not confined in prison is not entitled to an
attorney de oficio unless a request is made within ten days
from notice to file the appellant’s brief and the right thereto
is established by affidavit of poverty (Rule 122, Sec. 13, ROC)
1994 Bar, Q. VII: JG, a known vagrant, was defended by Atty. Go
in his trial for robbery with homicide. After he had been
convicted, he appealed to reverse the decision of the court
claiming that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel
when the court appointed Atty. Go as counsel de officio inspite
of his request to the court that he preferred Atty. Concepcion
whom he knew to be an excellent criminal lawyer.
Is JG correct?
A: The accused is entitled to a counsel of his choice and a counsel
de officio may be appointed for him only if he has no counsel de
parte. In a case, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of
conviction because the Court appointed a counsel de officio and
the accused insisted that he gets his own lawyer (People vs.
Malunsing).
[80]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Alternative: JG is not correct. An accused is entitled to be assisted
by counsel. To constitute a violation of an accused’s right to
counsel of his choice, the accused must inform the trial court of
his desire to be defended by a counsel de parte and if a counsel
de officio is appointed, he must protest such appointment and the
actuation of the counsel de officio. otherwise he cannot rightly
claim that his right was violated. Thus, where a counsel de officio
has been assigned to an accused on trial and such counsel has
acted without objection from the accused, the latter's conviction
cannot be set aside on the sole ground that said counsel was not
of his own choice (People vs. Solis). The said ruling is applicable to
this question. While JG expressed his preference to be defended
by Atty. Concepcion, he really did not object to the appointment
of Atty. Go until after his conviction. Be-sides, if Atty. Concepcion
was really the counsel of his choice, he should have retained him
as counsel de parte.
1996 Bar, Q. IX(1): In a homicide case, Atty. M was appointed by
the Court as counsel de oficio for F, the accused. After trial, F
was acquitted. Atty. M sent F a bill for attorney’s fees.
(a) Can F be compelled to pay? Explain.
(b) Can F employ a counsel de parte to collaborate with Atty.
M, his counsel de oficio? Explain.
A:
(a) No, F may not be compelled to pay attorney’s fees. A
counsel de officio is a lawyer appointed to render
professional services in favor of an indigent client. In the
absence of a law allowing compensation, he cannot charge
the indigent litigant for his professional services. One of the
obligations which the lawyer assumed when he took his
oath as a lawyer is to render free legal services when
required by the law to do so. The Rules of Court provides a
token compensation for an attorney de officio to be paid by
the state.
(b) He may do so, but if he can afford to employ a counsel de
parte, then he is no longer indigent and will not need a
counsel de officio. The latter can withdraw as his counsel if
he chooses to.
1998 Bar, Q. X: When Dennis was arraigned in a case for
Homicide, he was asked by the Judge if he had a lawyer to which
he answered in the negative. The Court then appointed Atty. Go
as his counsel de oficio despite his insistence on the
appointment of Atty. Salvador Laurel, the former Vice-President,
as his counsel.

After conviction, he appealed claiming that he was denied his
constitutional right to counsel. Is Dermis correct?
A: No, he was not denied his constitutional right to counsel. The
right of the accused to counsel does not entitle him to select his
own lawyer. The constitutional right is satisfied by the designation
of counsel de officio by the court as long as the lawyer is a
member of the bar (U.S. v. Laranja)
2000 Bar, Q. I: X was indicted for murder. As he had no counsel
on arraignment, the trial court appointed Atty. A as his counsel
de oficio. When Atty. A asked X what was his stand. X said he
was guilty. X thereupon pleaded guilty. Trial was thereafter
conducted. When the turn of the defense to present evidence
came. Atty. A manifested that he was not presenting any and
that he was submitting the case for decision, praying that X’s
plea be considered mitigating. Did Atty. A’s assistance or
conduct approximate the competence and diligence which the
Code of Professional Responsibility expected of him? Explain.
A: No. It is the duty of defense counsel when his client desires to
enter a plea of guilty to fully acquaint himself with the facts and
surrounding circumstances of the case, advise his client of his
constitutional rights and the full import of a plea of guilty, see to it
that the prescribed procedure is observed, present evidence,
including possible mitigating circumstances, so that the precise
degree of his client's culpability is established and the appropriate
penalty is imposed, and thus leave no room for doubt that there
was a mistake or misunderstanding as to the nature of the
charges to which his client has pleaded guilty. Atty. A has fallen
short of this required conduct.
1994 Bar, Q. II: Atty. Aguirre, as counsel de oficio for Boy
Batongbakal, was able to win an acquittal for Boy who was
charged with robbery in band. A year later, Atty. Aguirre
discovered that Boy in fact had a lot of money which he had
been bragging was part of the loot in the crime for which he was
acquitted. Knowing that Boy could no longer be prosecuted on
the ground of double jeopardy, Atty. Aguirre sent him a bill for
his services as his counsel de officio.
Please give your reasoned comments on the ethical
considerations involved, if any, in the above case.
A: A counsel de oficio is a lawyer appointed by the court to
defend an indigent defendant in a criminal case. The lawyer
designated as counsel de officio cannot charge the indigent
litigant for his professional services. In a sense, there is no
contract for legal services between him and the defendant. In the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
absence of an express or implied contract, there is no obligation
to compensate. Suing his client for attorney’s fees might also
involve a violation of the confidential nature of a lawyer-client
relationship.
1988 Bar, Q. III: Atty. J. Bonanza, a semi-retired Metro Manila
practitioner has a cattle ranch in the remote municipality of
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. He attends to his law office in Manila
on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays, and the rest of the
week he spends in his cattle ranch riding horses.
In a criminal case pending before the Municipal Trial Court of
Carranglan, the only other licensed member of the bar in the
place is representing the complainant. The accused is a
detention prisoner. The judge wants to expedite proceedings.
(a) What must the judge do to expedite proceedings?
(b) If Atty. Bonanza is requested to act as counsel for the
accused, could he or should he refuse by saying that in the
province, he wants to do nothing except ride horses and
castrate bulls? Explain.
A:
(a) The judge may appoint attorney Bonanza as counsel de
oficio considering that the accused is a detention prisoner
and therefore it is assumed that he has no financial means
of engaging a paid counsel.
(b) The attorney cannot refuse to be appointed as counsel de
oficio merely on the reason that he is a semi-retired
practicing lavyyer. Precisely one of the reasons for the
integration of the bar on the Philippines is to compel all
person who have been admitted to the practice of law in the
Philippines to perform their duties to assist the courts in the
administration of public.
1993 Bar, Q. XX: Atty. Vidal, a semi-retired Metro Manila law
practitioner, has a cattle ranch in the remote municipality of
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. He attends to his law office in Manila
on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, and spends the rest of
the week in his cattle ranch riding horses and castrating bulls.
In a criminal case pending before the Municipal Trial Court of
Carranglan. the only other licensed member of the Bar is
representing the private complainant. The accused is a detention
prisoner. The judge wants to expedite proceedings.
(1) What must the judge do to expedite proceedings?
(2) If Atty. Vidal is appointed to act as counsel de oficio for the
accused, could he refuse by saying that in the province, he
[81]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
does not want to do anything except ride horses and
castrate bulls? Explain.
A:
(1) The judge may appoint Atty. Vidal as counsel de oficio in
order to expedite the proceedings. This is especially because
the accused is a detention prisoner who is presumed to be
indigent and cannot retain a paid counsel.
(2) Atty. Vidal cannot validly refuse the appointment as counsel
de oficio. While it is true that he stays in the province to rest
during the latter part of the week as lawyer he must comply
with his oath to assist in the administration of justice. This is
precisely one of the objectives of the Integrated Bar which is
to compel all lawyers whether in the active practice or not
to comply with their obligation to assist in the
administration of justice.
Rule 14.03: A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of
an indigent client except:
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or
competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the
prospective client or between a present client and the
prospective client.
Coverage of the Rule
 Rule 14.03 involves indigent clients who come to a lawyer
for legal services
 See Rule 138, Sec. 31
Rule 138, Sec. 31 Rule 14.03
There is already a pending case The lawyer is just being
engaged by a destitute client
 In brief, the lawyer shall not refuse to accept his
engagement by a poor client for reasons of insufficient
compensation or lack of it.
Humility to Admit Incapability
 Rule 14.03 is in line with Art. XIII, Sec. 1 and Art. III Sec. 11 of
the Constitution
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and

political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,
use, and disposition of property and its increments.
Exceptions:
(a) Lack of competence
(b) Conflict of interest
 Violation of Rule 14.03(b) may subject the lawyer to Art. 209
of the RPC
RPC, Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor;
Revelation of secrets - In addition to the proper administrative
action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period,
or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador
judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his
professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or
solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense
of a client or having received confidential information from said
client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party
in the same case, without the consent of his first client.
Lawyer who Pretends to be Disqualified Under the Rule is
Committing Grave Misconduct
 A lawyer who pretends to be incompetent when he is not, to
evade his obligation under the Rule or who falsely claims the
presence of conflict of interest when there is none, will be
liable administratively.
2001 Bar, Q. XIII: When may refusal of a counsel to act as
counsel de oficio be justified on grounds aside from reasons of
health, extensive travel abroad, or similar reasons of urgency?
Support your answer.
A: Other justified grounds for refusal to act as counsel de oficio
are:
(a) Too many de oficio cases assigned to the lawyer (People v.
Daeng);
(b) Conflict of interest (Rule 14.03, CPR);
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(c) Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively
or competently;
(d) Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of his
public office which prohibits appearances in court; and
(e) Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases which will spell
prejudice to the new clients.
2004 Bar, Q. IV: Primo, Segundo and Tercero are co-accused in
information charging them with the crime of homicide. They are
respectively represented by Attys. Juan Uno, Jose Dos and Pablo
Tres. During the pre-trial conference, Attys. Uno and Dos
manifested to the court that their clients are invoking alibi as
their defense. Atty. Tres made it known that accused Tercero
denies involvement and would testily that Primo and Segundo
actually perpetrated the commission of the offense charged in
the information.
In one hearing during the presentation of the prosecution’s
evidence in chief, Atty. Uno failed to appear in court. When
queried by the Judge if accused Primo is willing to proceed with
the hearing despite his counsel’s absence, Primo gave his
consent provided Attys. Dos and Tres would be designated as his
joint counsel de oficio for that particular hearing. Thereupon,
the court directed Attys. Dos and Tres to act as counsel de oficio
of accused Primo only for purposes of the scheduled hearing.
Atty. Dos accepted his designation, but Atty. Tres refused.
A. Is there any impediment to Atty, Dos acting as counsel de
oficio for accused Primo? Reason.
B. May Atty. Tres legally refuse his designation as counsel de
oficio of accused Primo? Reason.
A:
A. There is no impediment to Atty. Dos acting as counsel de
oficio for accused Primo. There is no conflict of interest
involved between Primo and his client Segundo, considering
that both are invoking alibi as their defense.
B. Atty. Tres may legally refuse his designation as counsel de
oficio for accused Primo. Since the defense of his client
Tercero is that Primo and Segundo actually perpetrated the
commission of the offense for which they are all charged,
there is a conflict of interest between Tercero and Primo.
There is conflicting interest if there is inconsistency in the
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is
whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty
to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client (Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics).
[82]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1995 Bar, Q. IX: Renato Adorable, Registrar of Land Titles and
Deeds, and Olivia Perez were charged with falsification of public
document. The complaining witness claimed that he was
dispossessed of his ancestral home through the fraudulent acts
of Renato and Olivia. Halfway through the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution the lawyer of Renato withdrew his
appearance thus forcing Renato to seek the assistance of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to defend him he being a
government official. But the OSG refused the request.
Can the OSG be compelled to defend Renato Adorable? Discuss
fully.
A: The OSG cannot be compelled to defend Renato Adorable. The
OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at any state of
a criminal case (Urbano v. Chavez). The OSG is the appellate
counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. It is
supposed to take a stand against the accused in case of an appeal
from a judgment of conviction. How can it do so if it represented
the accused in the trial of the case. There would be a clear conflict
of interest. Moreover, the accused public official should not
expect the State, through the OSG, to defend him for a wrongful
act which cannot be attributed to the State itself. A public official
who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his personal
capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the
author of a wrongful act, much less commit a crime.
1997 Bar, Q. V: Mrs. F, a young matron, was referred to you for
legal advice by your good friend in connection with the matron's
jewelry business. She related to you the facts regarding a sale on
consignment of pieces of Jewelry to someone she did not name
or identify. Since she was referred to you by a close friend, you
did not bill her for the consultation. Neither did she offer to
compensate you. Six months later, Mrs. G, the wife of the
general manager of a client company of your law firm, asked you
to defend her in a criminal case for estafa filed by Mrs. F. Would
you agree to handle her case?
A: First. I will inquire if the case for estafa filed by Mrs. F against
the wife of the general manager, is the same matter concerning
which Mrs. F consulted me six months before. If it is the same
matter. I will not be able to handle the case for the general
manager's wife, because of a conflict of interest. When Mrs. F
consulted me and I gave her professional advice, a lawyer-client
relationship was created between us. regardless of that fact that I
was not compensated for it. It would involve a conflict of interest
if I will handle the case for the opposite party on the same matter
(Hilado v. David).

Alternative: The lawyer may also inform the parties about a
possible conflict of interest, and if they do not object, it will not be
improper for him to accept.
2012 Bar, Q. (14): Mr. Joseph, owner of an investment house,
consulted a friend, Atty. Miro, about a potential criminal action
against him because he cannot pay investors due to temporary
liquidity problems. Atty. Miro asked Mr. Joseph to transfer to
him all assets of the firm and he will take charge of settling the
claims and getting quitclaims. A month later, Mr. Joseph was
surprised to receive a demand letter from Atty. Miro, as counsel
for all the claimants, for the pay back of their investments. After
a while, Mr. Joseph received releases and quitclaims from the
investors, with desistance from filing criminal action against him.
Atty. Miro later told Mr. Joseph that he sent the demand letter
so he can claim attorney's fee. Was there a conflict of interest?
(a) No, there was no formal engagement of Atty. Miro as
counsel for Mr. Joseph.
(b) Yes, by giving legal advice to Mr. Joseph, the latter became
a client of Atty. Miro.
(c) No, there is no attorney-client relationship between Mr.
Joseph and Atty.· Miro as no attorney's fee was charged nor
paid to the latter.
(d) Yes, because Atty. Miro was representing Mr. Joseph when
he disposed the assets to pay off the claims.
1992 Bar, Q. I: Atty. V. Suarez represented Altamarino in an
ejectment case against Orbido. Judgment was rendered in favor
of Altamarino and Orbido vacated the property forthwith.
Subsequently, a case for annulment of Altamarino's title over
the property subject of the ejectment case was filed by Orbido
who is now represented by Atty. Suarez. Altamarino filed a
motion for the disqualification of Atty. Suarez for representing
conflicting interests as the latter was his lawyer in the ejectment
case against attorney and client relationship between her and
Altamarino had already terminated and that she did not obtain
any confidential information regarding Altamarino's title in
handling the ejectment case, which is different from the present
case for annulment of title.
Rule on the motion for disqualification of Atty. Suarez.
A: The motion for the disqualification of Atty. Suarez should be
granted.
Atty. Suarez violated Canon 14, Rule 14.03, prohibiting lawyers
from appearing for conflicting interests. Atty. Suarez is opposing
his former client in a related suit. Although the ejectment case
had already terminated in favor of Altamarino who was his client,
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
he had already acquired information concerning the ownership of
the property. An attorney who appears for opposing clients in the
same or related action puts himself in that awkward position
where he will have to contend in behalf of one client that which
he will have to oppose on behalf of the other client. He cannot in
all situations give disinterested advice to both clients.
Alternative: Atty. Suarez is not disqualified on the ground of
conflicting Interest. It is true that the employment of a lawyer in a
subsequent case involving a former client would result in a
conflicting Interest if the two cases are related. In the present
case however, the two cases are not related. An ejectment case
involves issue of physical possession (possession de facto):
whereas the second case involves a question on the issue of
ownership or title.
1994 Bar, Q. X: The law firm of Sale, Santiago and Aldeguer has
an existing and current retainership agreement with XYZ
Corporation and ABC Company, both of which were
pharmaceutical firms. XYZ Corporation discovered that a number
of its patented drugs had been duplicated and sold in the market
under ABC Company’s brand names. XYZ Corporation turned to
the law firm and asked it to bring suit against ABC Company for
patent infringement on several counts.
What are the ethical considerations involved in this case and
how are you going to resolve them?
A: A lawyer may refuse to accept representation of a client if he
labors under conflict of interest between him and the prospective
client or between a present client and the prospective client (Rule
14.03. Canon 14, CPR). It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts (Canon 6, CPE). A
lawyer cannot accept a case against a present client either in the
same case or a totally unrelated case.
Rule 14.04: A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable
to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of
conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
Same Standards of Conduct to be Employed for a Client Unable
to Pay Lawyer’s Fees
Ledesma v. Climaco. The degree of care and skill required of the
lawyer is not affected by the fact that his services are rendered
gratuitously.
[83]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sarenas v. Ocampo. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
It bears emphasis that a client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and
expects his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Blanza v. Arcangel. If a lawyer volunteers his services to a client,
and therefore not entitled to attorney’s fees, nevertheless, he is
bound to attend to the client’s case with all due diligence and
zeal. By volunteering his services, he has established a client-
lawyer relationship.
People v. Cawili
Facts:
1. Atty. Hospicio Zapata, failed to submit the brief for his
accused client within the reglementary period.
2. Required to explain, he alleged that the accused was in a
state of indigence resulting not only in not being paid but
also in his party assuming the expenses entailed in the
defense; that the expenses incident to the printing of the
brief is beyond the power of the accused’s wife to defray.
Issue: WON Atty. Zapata is correct
Held:
1. It cannot be denied that the failure of counsel to submit the
brief within the reglementary period is an offense that
entails disciplinary action.
2. The recital of the circumstances on which counsel would
seek to reduce its gravity do not call for exculpation.
3. He could have sought the permission to file a mimeograph
brief, or, at the very least, he could have informed us of the
difficulties attendant on defending his client.
4. For him to blithely assume that a mere reading of the record
would suffice to discharge an obligation not only to his client
but to this Court is to betray a degree of irresponsibility.
5. It is not in keeping, even, with the minimal standards
expected of membership in the bar to be so lacking in
elementary courtesy that this Court was not even informed
of his inability to comply with what was incumbent of him.
His conduct was therefore accusable, although the
explanation he tendered and the two under which he
worked would, to a certain degree, invite less than full
punishment.

American Home Assurance Co. Inc. v. NLRC. Evidently, the
supposed extreme poverty of the client is not a justifiable excuse
for the failure of his counsel to file the motion for reconsideration
on time under the circumstances. Instead, there was gross
negligence on the part of Atty. Montesclaros in the discharge of
his duty and this cannot be countenanced if we are to have an
orderly administration of justice. It has always been the judicial
policy and an accepted rule that the client shall be bound by the
acts of his lawyer, and no compelling reason exists in this case to
sanction a deviation therefrom.
No Discrimination in Rendition of Service
Ramos v. Dajoyag, Jr. All clients of a lawyer, whether rich or poor,
are entitled to the same level of professionalism, dedication,
diligence, skills and competence.
Regardless of the agreement he had with complainant with
respect to the payment of his fees, respondent owed it to
complainant to do his utmost to ensure that every remedy
allowed by law is availed of. Rule 14.04, CPR enjoins every lawyer
to devote his full attention, diligence, skills, and competence to
every case that he accepts. Pressure and large volume of legal
work do not excuse respondent for filing the petition for certiorari
out of time
2014 Bar, Q. XXIX: If a lawyer volunteers his free legal service to
a poor client:
(a) a lawyer-client relationship is established between them
(b) he is bound to serve his poor client with the same degree
of competence, fidelity, and diligence as his paying client
(c) he is not justified to neglect the cause of his client for the
client’s inability to defray the costs of court litigation
A: (b)
Canon 15: A Lawyer Shall Observe, Candor, Fairness and Loyalty
in All His Dealings and Transactions with His Clients
Candor, Fairness and Loyalty, Required of Lawyers (Canon 15)
Castaneda v. Ago. Rule 15.05 is an instance of candor. The lawyer
must give a candid and honest opinion on the merit or lack of
merit of his client’s case.
Cantelang v. Medina. The counsel should advise his clients of the
futility of their cause to avoid unnecessary expenses.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
He must neither overstate nor understate the prospects of the
case. A: (a). CPR, Canon 15
 Rule 15.01 is an instance of fairness and loyalty. The lawyer Alternative: (c). CPR, Canon 5 and 18; Reproductive Health Law
must immediately inform his prospective client of the
involvement of another client or his own interest in the case 2004 Bar, Q. I(A)(5): Under the Code of Professional
which will result in representing conflict of interests Responsibility, what is the principal obligation of a lawyer
 He is not allowed to represent conflicting interests except by towards: His client?
written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the
facts. A: Canon 15
 Rule 15.02 and Rule 138, Sec. 20(e) are instances of loyalty.
The lawyer must keep the confidences and secrets of his
Rule 15.01: A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client,
clients even after the termination of their professional
shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would
relationship as lawyer and client
involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if
so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
2013 Bar, Q. XV: Based on the same facts as Question XIV,
assume that Diana, aside from being a family friend of the
Possible Involvement in Conflict Interests to be Disclosed
couple, has been formally and informally acting as their lawyer
Immediately to Prospective Clients
in all their personal and family affairs. She has represented them
in court in a case involving a car accident and in the purchase of
their family home, for which they formally paid the attorney’s Mejia v. Reyes
fees that Diana billed.
Facts:
In this instance, Wanda asked about her legal rights but did not
formally ask for a written opinion from Diana. Horacio never had 1. Reyes, a practicing lawyer was appointed bank attorney and
any input on the query as he was then away on an out-of-town notary public for the PNB, Baguio Branch
trip for his office. 2. During his stint as such officer, he accepted to handle the
case of Mejia against PNB before the CFI of Baguio City.
Diana advised Wanda that she is fully protected in law and her 3. The Court rendered a decision.
best course of action is to have an abortion while her pregnancy 4. Mejia wanted to appeal.
is not yet far advanced. 5. Upon advice of Reyes, the case was not appealed.
6. Later, Mejia learned that Reyes is the Bank attorney.
Did Diana violate the prohibition against representing conflicting 7. Hence, this disbarment case.
interests when she provided legal advice to Wanda without
Horacio’s knowledge? Issue: WON Reyes is qualified to represent Mejia
(a) Yes. The decision of whether to have an abortion should be Held:
decided by both spouses; thus, Diana should not have
provided legal advice in the absence of Horacio whose 1. Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting
concerns and positions are unknown to her. interests in a case
(b) No. Diana did not give any formal advice that would 2. The respondent's act of appearing and acting as counsel for
constitute legal practice calling for the strict observance of the complainants Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case
the conflict of interest rules. against the PNB, that had appointed him bank attorney and
(c) No. The decision on whether or not to have an abortion lies notary public, constitutes malpractice
solely with Wanda; it is her body and health that is in issue.
(d) No. Horacio and Wanda are married, any advice given to Lawyer Shall Not Place His Private Interests Over and Above that
Wanda is deemed to have been given to Horacio as well. of His Clients
(e) No. Giving advice to Wanda is not necessarily acting against
Horacio’s interest; Diana was giving advice based on the Sta. Maria v. Tuason
couple’s best interest.
[84]

Facts:
1. A lawyer won a collection case for his 3 clients.
2. When the amount was received by the Sheriff following
execution, the lawyer took the money from the Sheriff and
got P10,000 therefrom for his attorney’s fees and the rest he
gave to two of his clients.
3. The third client did not receive his case. Hence, this case.
Issue: WON the lawyer’s act of taking the P10,000 as attorney’s
fees considered as malpractice
Held:
1. After an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case, We find that the findings and
conclusions of the Solicitor General are supported by the
evidence of record.
2. The fact that the respondent has placed his private and
personal interest over and above that of his clients
constitutes a breach of a lawyer's oath, to say the least.
3. Call it professional indiscretion or any other name, but the
cold fact remains that the act, as found by the Solicitor
General, is not conducive to a healthy growth of the legal
profession.
4. The respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of
similar acts will merit more drastic action.
Failure to Disclose Prior Engagement or Interest
MacArthur v. Fry. The attorney’s failure to disclose his prior
engagement or interest is a good ground for the client to
discharge the attorney.
A lawyer will be representing conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client (previous, present or potential), he is required to
oppose.
 In Rule 15.01, as soon the lawyer perceives that probable
generation of a conflict of interests, he must disclose the
same to the prospective client.
 Together with the disclosure, he must inform the
prospective client that he is under strict prohibition to
handle the case and advise the latter to seek the assistance
of another lawyer.
Possible Exception to the Rule
 See Rule 15.03
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
 There is conflict of interest when the lawyer has to pursue
an issue positively in behalf of one client but has to pursue it
negatively in behalf of his other client
 A lawyer must have undivided fidelity to his client. This
undivided fidelity will not be possible where he serves two
masters at the same time or different times with
antagonistic interests.
Kinds of Conflict of Interests
(a) Concurrent (or Multiple Representation) – generally occurs
when a lawyer represents clients whose objectives are
adverse to each other, no matter how slight or remote such
adverse interests may be.
(b) Sequential (or Successive Representation) – generally
occurs when a law firm takes a present client who has an
interest adverse to the interest of a former client of the
same law firm.
The rule in the U.S. is that a “substantial relationship” must be
shown to exist between the former and present representations.
If they are substantially related, it is presumed that during the
former representation the law firm might have acquired
information related to the subject matter of the new
representation.
If it can be established that a substantial relationship exists, courts
in the U.S. have conclusively presumed that the lawyer (law firm)
possess confidential information adverse to the former client if it
appears by the nature of the former representation that
confidential information of material value to the current dispute
would have been confided to the lawyer, the situation will
disqualify the firm from representing the present client.
Rule 15.02: A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege
communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.
Preservation of the Confidences and Secrets of Clients
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND
SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of
his client except:
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the
consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
[85]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his
employees or associates or by judicial action.
Privileged Communication Safeguards the Revelation of
Confidences and Secrets
Rule 130, Sec. 24(b). An attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with
a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
Even Mere Prospective Clients Are Protected
Rule 138, Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(e) To maintain inviolate, the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
Consequently, the attorney cannot be compelled to disclose the
privileged communication relayed to him by his client.
Note: The privilege applies even to a mere prospective client,
whose case has not been accepted by the lawyer.
Hadjula v. Madianda. Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to
establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the
protection be waived.
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached
his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the
information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the
course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in
the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the
complainant.

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the
client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a
consultation with a lawyer.
2015 Bar, Q. III: Maria and Atty. Evangeline met each other and
became good friends at zumba class. One day, Maria
approached Atty. Evangeline for legal advice. It turned out that
Maria, a nurse, previously worked in the Middle East. So she
could more easily leave for work abroad, she declared in all her
documents that she was still single. However, Maria was already
married with two children. Maria again had plans to apply for
work abroad but this time, wished to have all her papers in
order. Atty. Evangeline, claiming that she was already
overloaded with other cases, referred Maria's case to another
lawyer. Maria found it appalling that after Atty. Evangeline had
learned of her secrets, the latter refused to handle her case.
Maria's friendship with Atty. Evangeline permanently turned
sour after Maria filed an administrative case against the latter
for failing to return borrowed jewelry. Atty. Evangeline, on the
other hand, threatened to charge Maria with a criminal case for
falsification of public documents, based on the disclosures Maria
had earlier made to Atty. Evangeline.
(a) Was the consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline
considered privileged?
(b) What are the factors to establish the existence of attorney-
client privilege?
A:
(a) The consultation of Maria and Atty. Evangeline is considered
privileged.
In Hadjudala v. Madianda (A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007), which
involves basically the same facts, the SC held as follows:
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who
incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered
personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant
approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.
Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions
circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens
of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in
this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired
or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the
end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of
consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it
make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed
by the parties to memorialize the relationship.
(b) In the same case, the SC cited Wigmore on the factors
essential to establish the attorney-client privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the
protection be waived.
2013 Bar, Q. XVI: ABLE Law Office has a retainer agreement with
Santino, a businessman with shady connections, who has
recently been charged with laundering money for an illegal
drugs syndicate using Cable Co., Santino’s holding company. The
lawyers of ABLE Law Office assigned to handle Santino’s account
have been impleaded as co-defendants for incorporating and
actively handling the affairs of Cable Co.
In its bid to strengthen its case against the defendants, the
prosecution approached you (as the least guilty defendant who
would qualify for a discharge as a state witness) and offers to
make you a state witness.
Can you accept, within the bounds of professional ethics, the
prosecution’s offer?
(a) No, as Santino’s lawyer you are duty-bound to protect his
interests, ably represent him in court, and not turn against
him.
(b) Yes, as an officer of the court, you have the duty to disclose
to the court information crucial to the case.
(c) No, the information you acquired involving the criminal
case against Santino is covered by the privileged
communications rule.
(d) Yes, a lawyer may testify against his client provided he first
severs the lawyer-client relationship.
(e) Yes, the law of self-preservation is akin to the law of self-
defense and stands higher than any obligation you may have
with your client.
A: (c). CPR, Canon 15, Rule 15.02; Privileged Communication Rule
Alternative: (b). CPR, Canon 10, Rule 10.01
2013 Bar, Q. XVII: Under the same essential facts as the
preceding Question XVI, assume that you have resigned from
[86]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
ABLE Law Office and that you were never impleaded as a co-
defendant, but during your stay with the firm, you assisted in
handling the Cobra Co. account, which is largely owned by Cable
Co.
The prosecutor handling the case against Santino and the law
firm asks you, as a former law firm member, if you can help
strengthen the prosecution’s case and hints that you, too, may
be impleaded as a co-defendant if you do not cooperate.
What is your best legal and ethical course of action?
(a) Offer to testify on what you know and provide evidence
against the defendants in exchange for a guarantee of
immunity from prosecution in the case.
(b) Offer to provide evidence against Santino, but clarify that
you cannot testify against Santino because of the privileged
communications rule
(c) Decline to testify against the defendants and to provide
evidence in the case as the attorney-client privilege lasts
even beyond the termination of the relationship
(d) Decline to testify against the defendants as whatever
information you acquired from Santino and Cable Co. in the
course of the lawyer-client relationship is privileged.
(e) Alert the law firm to the prosecution’s offer so that they can
prepare for the evidence within your knowledge that the
prosecution may use.
A: (c). CPR, Canon 15, Rule 15.02
1987 Bar, Q. V: In a prosecution for murder against a ranking
army officer, the latter engaged the services of RS, a well-known
trial lawyer, to whom the officer in one of their conferences
disclosed a plan to “eliminate” or “salvage” -i.e., kill or
otherwise cause to disappear, -the only witness, a fellow
military officer, through a contrived traffic or highway vehicular
accident.
(a) What are the legal and moral obligations of Atty. RS, to his
client and to the authorities, under the given
circumstances?
(b) Should the planned “accident” take place and the witness
for the prosecution be killed as a result is Atty. RS under
any obligation to disclose to the authorities the plan that
his client had mentioned to him, as abovementioned?
Answer with reasons.
(a) The legal and moral obligation of Atty. RS is to advise his
client not to proceed with his unlawful plan to kill the

witness against him. Although this plan was disclosed to the
lawyer in confidence, it is not covered by the rule on
privileged communication.
The privileged communication under Rule 138, Sec. 20(e), ROC,
covers only lawful and honest purposes. The protection of the
attorney-client privilege has reference to communications which
are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful
employment and does not extend to those made in
contemplation of a crime or perpetuation of a fraud. If the
unlawful purpose is avowed, the client does not consult the
lawyer professionally because it is not within the profession of a
lawyer to be advising persons as to how they may commit crimes
or frauds or how they may escape the consequences of the
contemplated wrong-doings. If the client does not reveal his
illegal motive, he reposes no confidence in the attorney because
the state of facts which is the foundation of confidence does not
exist. In either case, the attorney-client privilege does not attach,
there being no professional employment properly speaking
(Standard F. Ins. Co. vs. Smithart, 1919; Strong vs. Abner, 1937;
People vs. Van Alstine, 1885; Hamil & Co. vs. England, 1892;
People ex rel. Vogelstein vs. Warden, 1934).
Under the circumstances, if his client insists on his plan, the
lawyer should withdraw from the case.
(b) Yes, it is the obligation of the lawyer to disclose to the
authorities about the plan of his client. Before reporting the
matter to the authorities, however, he should ascertain first
if it was his would-be client who committed the crime.
1988 Bar, Q. VII: In a prosecution for murder against a ranking
army officer, the latter engaged the services of Atty. Carlos
Malilin, a well-known trial lawyer, to whom the officer in one of
their conferences disclosed a plan to “eliminate” or “salvage”—
i.e., kill or otherwise cause to disappear— the only witness, a
fellow military officer, through a contrived traffic or highway
accident.
(a) What are the legal and moral obligations of Atty. Carlos
Malillin to his client and to the authorities, under the given
circumstances?
(b) Should the planned “accident” take place and the only
witness for the prosecution be killed as a result, is Atty.
Carlos Malillin under any obligation to disclose to the
authorities the plan that his client had mentioned to him as
above mentioned? Reasons.
A:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) Attorney Malillin has the moral and legal obligation to advise
the army officer not to execute his plan. If the accused army
officer does not abide by his advise, Atty. Malillin should
withdraw from the case.
(b) Atty. Malillin has the obligation to testify in said case if he is
called upon by the Court to do so. The obligation of the
lawyer to keep the secrets of his client obtained in the
course of his employment covers only lawful purposes.
1998 Bar, Q. XI: A mayor charged with Homicide engaged your
services as his lawyer. Since there is only one witness to the
incident, the mayor disclosed to you his plan to kill the lone
witness through a contrived vehicular accident.
(1) What are the moral and legal obligations to the mayor, and
to the authorities?
(2) Should the killing push through and are you certain that
the mayor is the one responsible, are you under obligation
to disclose to the authorities what was confided to you? Is
this not a privileged communication between client and
attorney?
A:
(1) It is the duty of an attorney to divulge the communication of
his client as to his announced intention to commit a crime to
the proper authorities to prevent the act or to protect the
person against whom it is threatened.
(2) Public policy and the lawyer's duty to counsel obedience to
the law forbid that an attorney should assist in the
commission of a crime or permit the relation of attorney and
client to conceal a wrongdoing. He owes it to himself and to
the public to use his best efforts to restrain his client from
doing any unlawful act and if, notwithstanding his advise, his
client proceeds to execute the illegal deed, he may disclose
it or be examined as to any communication relating thereto.
There is privileged communication only as to crimes already
committed before its communication to the lawyer.
2009 Bar, Q. XVII: When Atty. Romualdo interviewed his client,
Vicente, who is accused of murder, the latter confessed that he
killed the victim in cold blood. Vicente also said that when he
takes the witness stand, he will deny having done so. Is Atty.
Romualdo obliged, under his oath as lawyer, to inform the judge
that [a] his client is guilty and [b] his client will commit perjury
on the witness stand? Explain.
A:
[87]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(a) Atty. Romualdo cannot reveal to the judge that Vicente is
guilty. He is bound to keep what Vicente told him in
confidence, because that is an admission of a crime already
committed.
(b) Atty. Romualdo can reveal to the judge that Vicente will
commit perjury on the witness stand. This is already a
revelation of a crime still to be committed, and that lies
outside the mantle of privileged communication.
2011 Bar, Q. 20: After representing Lenie in an important lawsuit
from 1992 to 1995, Atty. Jennifer lost touch of her client. Ten
years later in 2005, Evelyn asked Atty. Jennifer to represent her
in an action against Lenie. Such action involved certain facts,
some confidential, to which Atty. Jennifer was privy because she
handled Lenie's old case. Can Atty. Jennifer act as counsel for
Evelyn?
(a) No, but she can assist another lawyer who will handle the
case.
(b) Yes, but she must notify Lenie before accepting the case.
(c) No, because her duty to keep the confidences of previous
clients remains.
(d) Yes, but she cannot reveal any confidential information she
previously got.
2012 Bar, Q. (20): Atty. Lorna, a legal officer of a government
agency, and Chona, a nurse in the medical department, were
best friends. At one time, Chona consulted Atty. Lorna about a
legal matter, revealing that she is living with a married man and
that she has a child out of wedlock fathered by another man.
Later, the relation between Atty. Lorna and Chona soured. When
Chona applied for promotion, Atty. Lorna filed immorality
charges against Chona utilizing solely the disclosure by the latter
of her private life. Chona objected and invoked confidentiality of
information from attorney-client relationship. Decide.
(a) There is no attorney-client relationship because, being in the
government, Atty. Lorna is disallowed from practicing her
profession.
(b) No lawyer-client relationship privilege because the
information was given as a friend, and not as a lawyer.
(c) Personal secrets revealed to Atty. Lorna for the purpose of
seeking legal advice is covered by attorney-client privilege.
(d) There is no attorney-client relationship because no
attorney's fee was paid to Atty. Lorna.
1999 Bar, Q. VII: A, who is charged in Court with estafa for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by B, consulted Atty. C
about the case with the intention of engaging his services as

defense counsel. Because A could not afford to pay the fee that
Atty. C was charging him, A engaged the services of another
counsel, Atty. D. At the trial of the case for estafa against A the
prosecutor announced in open court that his next witness was
Atty. C. whom he was calling to the witness stand. Counsel for A.
Atty. D, vigorously opposed the prosecutor's move on the
ground that Atty. C may not be called as a witness for the
prosecution as he might disclose a would be client's confidence
and secret. Asked by the presiding Judge what would be the
nature of Atty. C's testimony, the prosecutor answered it has
something to do with how A obtained from B the funds that the
latter received from the former but failed to account for.
Thereupon, Atty. A vigorously opposed the prosecutor's motion.
If you were the Judge, how would you rule on the matter?
A: If I were the judge, I will not allow Atty. C to take the witness
stand. When A consulted Atty. C about his case, a lawyer-client
relationship was established between them. It does not matter
that A did not eventually engage his services because of his fees;
such relationship has already been created (Hilado v. David). A
lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged communication in
respect to matters disclosed to him by a prospective client (Rule
15.02, CPR). The rule on privileged communication provides that
an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him
(Sec. 21 [b], Rule 130, Rules of Court). The prosecutor has
announced that Atty. C will be asked about how A obtained from
B the funds that he failed to account for. Atty. C's knowledge of
such matter could have come only from A.
Comment: There seems to be a typographical error in the last
sentence which refers to Atty. A. Perhaps, the examiner intended
to refer to simply A or to his counsel Atty. D. It is recommended
that the use by the candidate of Atty. A should not detract from
the appreciation of his answer.
Form of Communication
The form of the communication may not only be in writing or oral,
but may also be in the form of actions or signs or other means of
communication.
The transmission may be direct or through messenger, interpreter
or through other modes of transmission.
Requisites of the Privileged Communication
Uy Chico v. Union Life Ass. Society. In order that the rule on
privileged communication may be availed of, it is necessary that:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) There exists an attorney and client relationship or a kind of
consultancy relationship with a prospective client. That is,
legal advice is what is sought
(b) The communication was made by the client to the lawyer in
the course of the lawyer’s professional employment; and
(c) The communication must be intended to be confidential
No Presumption of Confidentiality
Mercado v. Vetriolo. The mere relation of attorney and client
does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must
intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted
by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or
the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without
her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there
was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. The
Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of
facts which the complainant must prove
Duration of the Privilege
Baldwin v. Comm. of Internal Revenue. The privilege continues to
exist even after the termination of the attorney-client
relationship. It outlasts the lawyer’s engagement. The privileged
character of the communication ceases only when waived by the
client himself or after his death, by his heir or legal
representative.
When Contents of Pleadings Ceased to be Privileged
Snow v. Gould. The contents of the pleadings of an engaged
attorney prepared on the basis of the communications
transmitted to him by the client ceased to become privileged
communications after the pleadings have been filed.
Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance Society. In the same light, a
communication intended by the client to be sent to a third person
through his counsel loses its confidential character as soon as it
has reached the hands of the third person.
Two-Fold Purposes of the Rule
[88]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Report of the IBP Committee. The purpose of attorney-client
privilege is two-fold:
(a) To encourage a client to make a full disclosure of the facts of
the case to his counsel without fear, and
(b) To allow the lawyer freedom to obtain full information from
his client.
Without the privilege, a client will suppress facts which he
believes are unfavorable to him such as incriminatory facts. This
will consequently mislead the attorney in the evaluation of the
merits of the case and the legal advice he may give or the legal
steps he may pursue may not square with the undisclosed facts.
This will in the end, result in surprises during the trial which may
prove destructive to the case of the client or to the interest of
justice.
Burden of Proof
People v. Sleeper. The party who avers that the communication is
privileged has the burden of proof to establish the existence of
the privilege unless from the face of the document itself, it clearly
appears that it is privileged.
The mere allegation that the matter is privileged is not sufficient.
Instances When Communication is Not Privileged
1. Haves v. State. When communication is made to a person
who is not a lawyer even if such person committed himself
to render legal services
2. Pfeider v. Palanca. When communication is made to a
lawyer for some other purpose (such as lease) other than on
account of the lawyer-client relationship
U.S. v. Kovel. When the advice sought from the attorney is not
legal but involves accounting services or business assistance
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
1. Several ACCRA lawyers were included as defendants in a
case (for recovery of ill-gotten wealth) filed by the PCGG
against Eduardo Cojuangco, et. al. with the Sandiganbayan
2. Their inclusion was intended to compel them to reveal the
identity of their clients.
3. The ACCRA lawyers filed a Motion for their exclusion from
the case as defendants.

4. The Court denied the Motion for the lawyer’s refusal to
reveal the identity of their clients which is one of the
conditions for the exclusion as defendants
Issue: WON the revelation of the names of the clients of the
lawyers is privileged
Held:
1. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in
our jurisdiction as well as in the U.S. is that a lawyer may not
invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of this client.
2. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the client's name would implicate that client
in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
3. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his
identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and
circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., prompted
the New York SC to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that
he could not reveal the name of his client because this
would expose the latter to civil litigation.
4. Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other
situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general
rule.
5. For example, the content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject
matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.
6. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of
the client has been held to be privileged, since such
revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction.
7. The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to
his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but extends even
after the termination of the relationship.
2009 Bar, Q. I[d]: A lawyer cannot refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client.
A: FALSE. As a general rule, a client’s name is not confidential, but
there, are exceptions enumerated in Regala v. Sandiganhayan
(1996), to wit:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) where a strong possibility exists that a revealing a client’s
name would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer’s advice,
(b) where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, and
(c) where the government’s lawyers have no case against an
attorney’s client unless by revealing the client’s name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime.
Parties Entitled to Invoke the Privilege
The following can assert the privilege:
(a) The client, who is primarily intended to the protected by the
privilege;
(b) The lawyer himself or the client’s employee may claim the
privilege in the absence of any waiver on the part of the
client
(c) The attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk, who
acquired confidential communication in such capacity, save
only when the client and the attorney jointly consent
thereto.
Unprivileged Communication
 The information obtained by a lawyer from a client in their
lawyer-client relationship may be privileged or unprivileged
 As to privileged, if the lawyer is called as a witness to
disclose any privileged communication, he may legally
refuse to testify in the absence of any waiver on the part of
the client. But, he cannot legally refuse to testify and may be
compelled to disclose any unprivileged communication,
otherwise, if the proceedings are in a court of justice, he
may be held in contempt of court.
 However, even if the communication is unprivileged, the
rule of ethics prohibits him from voluntarily revealing or
using to his benefit or third person at the disadvantage of
the client the said communication unless the client consent
thereto. He can be judicially compelled though to reveal the
unprivileged communication of the client but not the
privileged ones.
2014 Bar, Q. VII: The court ordered Atty. Z to testify as a witness
for his client in the very case he is handling, but he refused on
the ground that it would violate the rule on privileged
communication. Atty. Z is guilty of:
(a) direct contempt
(b) indirect contempt
[89]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(c) violation of his duty to the court
A: (b)
Alternative: (a)
Basic Limitations of the Privileged Communication
Radiant Burners v. American Gas Assoc. The communication
(knowledge or information) or the physical object must have been
transmitted to the counsel by the client for the purpose of seeking
legal advice. Otherwise, there is no privileged communication.
Thus, the client or the lawyer cannot invoke the privilege if the
papers and documents were handed to the lawyer only for
purposes of custody or for purposes of some business or personal
services and assistance.
CPE, Canon 37. It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's
confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment and
extends as well to his employees; and neither of them should
accept employment, which involves or may involve the disclosure
or use of these confidences, either for the private advantages of
the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though
there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer
should not continue employment when he discovers that this
obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former
or to his new client.
Gernoch v. State. A person committing or about to commit a
crime or wrong can have no privileged witness.
Alexander v. U.S. However, information on crimes or frauds
already committed falls within the privilege and the lawyer cannot
reveal or be compelled to reveal the confidences of the client
People v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
1. On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who
had initiated the perjury and graft charges against
respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman
seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for
falsification of public documents.
2. He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his
herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true
copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of
arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of

stenographic notes supposedly taken during the
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.
3. These falsified documents were annexed to respondent
Paredes' MR of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a
graft charge against him, in order to support his contention
that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
4. In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a
certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received
by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification of
Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño that said perjury case in his
court did not reach the arraignment stage since action
thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by
the Department of Justice.
5. Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but
Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the
submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-
called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications,
respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have
the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on
the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the
perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he
had been arraigned therein.
6. For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by
respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were
prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in
the house of respondent Paredes.
7. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to
pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in
the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed
by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
8. As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on
July 27, 1993 for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a
state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites
therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was
concerned.
9. The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness
testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct
evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of
documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
10. The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to discharge Sansaet
to become a state witness on the ground that the testimony
of Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charge is
privileged communication
Issue:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(1) WON the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as
proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client;
(2) WON, as consequences thereof, he is eligible for discharge
to testify as to particeps criminis
Held:
1. As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due
to the lawyer-client relationship which existed between
herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant
periods, the facts surrounding the case and other
confidential matters must have been disclosed by
respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his
lawyer.
2. Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further since
Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against
accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter's
consent."
3. The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client
privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof
and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that
evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting
mental cobwebs in these cases.
4. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the
instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter
stands charged, a distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes already
committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by
the client.
5. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a
client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.
Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the
instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that
respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts
of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
6. The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by
a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar
as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the
past.
7. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege,
however, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the
attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past
or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the
future.
[90]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
8. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares
cannot be broken by the attorney without the client's
consent.
9. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not
attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to
commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of
which he seeks the lawyer's advice.
10. Statements and communications regarding the commission
of a crime already committed, made by a party who
committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are
privileged communications.
11. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the
effect that communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or
in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications
between attorney and client.
12. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the
commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes
and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It
is well settled that in order that a communication between a
lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a
lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching.
13. In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the
"prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client
will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy
which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney
under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at
once in the interest of justice."
14. It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent
Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications
intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To
prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a
crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client,
would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence
and practice in the noble profession of law.
15. On the second issue, the Court is reasonably convinced, and
so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and
should have been favorably appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan.

Rule on Privileged Communication is Applicable to Students
under the Student Practice Law Program
Rule 138-A, Sec. 3. Privileged communications — The Rules
safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and
client shall apply to similar communications made to or received
by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
Rule 15.03: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
Conflicting Interests, Concept
 There is conflicting interests if there is an inconsistency in
the interests of two or more opposing parties.
 The test is WON in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is duty to oppose it
for the other client.
CPE, Canon 6. It is a duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to
disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the
parties and any interest in or connection with the controversy,
which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters
adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed.
Abaquita v. Florido. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client.
Pierce v. Palmer. There is representation of conflicting interests if
the acceptance of a new retainer will require the attorney to do
anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation, to use against his client any knowledge
acquired through their connection.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Test in Determining Conflicting Interests
Test: WON a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in
behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim
for the other client.
Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by
that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is violation
of the rule.
Santos v. Beltran. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof
Gonzales v. Cabucana. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.
In the process of determining whether there is a conflict of
interests an important criterion is probability, not certainty of
conflict.
Quiambao v. Bamba. While the complainant lacks personality to
question the alleged conflict of interests on the part of the
respondent in serving both security agencies, we cannot just turn
a blind eye to respondent’s act. It must be noted that the
proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to
the same general matter however slight the adverse interest may
be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer’s private
activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional
capacity. In the process of determining whether there is a conflict
of interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of
conflict.
Hornilla v. Salunat. In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is
that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation
and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of
interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and
should not be influenced by any interest of the individual
corporate officials.
The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After
due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are
sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a
corporation cannot represent members of the same corporation’s
board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do
[91]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests,
which is prohibited by the CPR
2016 Bar, Q. XIX: St. Ivan's Hospital, Inc. (St. Ivan's) and Allied
Construction Co. (Allied) separately retained the legal services of
Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices. St. Ivan's engaged the
services of Allied for the construction of a new building but
failed to pay the contract price after the completion of the
works. A complaint for sum of money was filed by Atty. Budoy, a
former associate of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, on behalf
of Allied against St. Ivan's. St. Ivan's lost the case and was held
liable to Allied.
Thereafter, St. Ivan's filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Budoy. It claimed that while Atty. Budoy has established his own
law office, an arrangement was made whereby Tomas and
Benedicto Law Offices assign cases for him to handle, and that it
can be assumed that Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices
collaborate with Atty. Budoy in the cases referred to him,
creating a conflict of interest. Rule on the complaint with
reasons.
A: I will rule in favor of St. Ivan’s and against Atty. Budoy.
St. Ivan’s was a client of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, of
which Atty. Budoy was an associate attorney. As such, St. Ivan’s
was also his client, because of the principle that when a party
hires a law firm, he hires all the lawyers therein. Moreover, Atty.
Budoy was in a position to know the information transmitted by
St. Ivan’s to the firm. “There is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.” (Hornilla v.
Salunat, A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003).
“As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste” (Anglo v. Atty. Valencia, A.C. No.
10567, February 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe).
Falame v. Atty. Baguio
1. In the first civil case involving a certain property, a lawyer
acted as counsel to his client.
2. The court ruled in favor of them.

3. Years passed by, in the second civil case then same lawyer
again acted as counsel, but this time adverse to his former
client and involving the same property subject of the first
civil case.
Issue: WON there is conflicting interests in representing his
clients
Held:
1. The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer
from representing a client if that representation will be
directly adverse to any of his present or former clients.
2. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent
a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is
grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
3. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the client's case,
including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature
of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence
of the highest degree.
4. The termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to
or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's
confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere
expiration of professional employment.
2015 Bar, Q. XV: Jon served as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
PBB Cars, Inc. (PBB), a family-owned corporation engaged in the
buying and selling of second-hand cars. Atty. Teresa renders
legal services to PBB on a retainer basis.
In 2010, Jon engaged Atty. Teresa's services for a personal case.
Atty. Teresa represented Jon in a B.P. 22 case filed against him
by the spouses Yuki. Jon paid a separate legal fee for Atty.
Teresa's services. Jon subsequently resigned as CEO of PBB in
2011. In 2012, Atty. Teresa filed on behalf of PBB a complaint for
replevin and damages against Jon to recover the car PBB had
assigned to him as a service vehicle. Atty. Teresa, however,
hadnot yet withdrawn as Jon's counsel of record in the B.P. 22
case, which wasstill then pending.
Jon filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Teresa for representing conflicting interests and violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Teresa countered that
since the B.P. 22 case and the replevin case are unrelated and
involved different issues, parties, and subject matters, there was
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
no conflict of interest and she acted within the bounds of legal
ethics.
Is Atty. Teresa's contention tenable? Explain.
A: The SC has adopted the following tests for determining conflict
of interest:
(1) Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim
in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that
claim for the other client;
(2) Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of his duty of undivided loyalty to his client
(3) Whether the acceptance of a new relation would invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness of double-dealing in the
performance of his duty of fidelity and loyalty;
(4) Whether in the acceptance of the new relation, he would be
called upon to inquire his former client on a matter that he
has handled for him, or require him to reveal information
that his former client has given to him
Although the case for replevin filed by Atty. Teresa against Jon is
different from the B.P. 22 she was handling for him, the pendency
of the two cases at the same time is likely to invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of her duty
and fidelity to Jon.
Teresa’s contention is, therefore, not tenable
Defense that Prospective Client Has No Lawyer to Turn to is Not
Acceptable
Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr. Respondent further argued that it was
his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not
him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not
agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which
represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the
rule against representing conflicting interests applies.
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with
honest intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does
not render the prohibition inoperative.
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the
spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot
prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where
lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to
labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a
prospective one.
[92]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could
handle the spouses’ case other than him, still he should have
observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring
with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable
whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client
then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full
disclosure of the facts. These respondent failed to do thus
exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
Conflict of Interests May Arise in the Same Action or Unrelated
Actions
Quiambao v. Bamba. The proscription against representation of
conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to
oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to
use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one
of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or
conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed
the replevin case on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of
record of the complainant in the pending ejectment case. We do
not sustain respondent’s theory that since the ejectment case and
the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with different issues,
parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His
representation of opposing clients in both cases, though
unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the
least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent
may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his
continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent
failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients
and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant
and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15, CPR
Unauthorized Act of Representing Conflicting Interests is a
Criminal Offense
 A lawyer who having undertaken the defense of a client shall
undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same
case without the consent of the first client shall be liable
criminally for the offense of “betrayal of trust by an
attorney” punishable under Art. 209, par. 2 of the RPC

RPC, Art. 209, par. 2. The same penalty shall be imposed upon an
attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having
undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential
information from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense
of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his
first client.
Undivided Allegiance to Client, A Must
Am. Jur. An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After
being retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he
cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act
both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or
conflicting with that of, his client in the same general matter.
The consent of the client must be given after full knowledge of all
the facts and circumstances.
The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight;
neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney
may have been honest.
Rationale of the Rule
Hilado v. David. The rule aims not only to bar the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct but also to prevent where
he may be required to choose between conflicting duties.
It is designed to prevent the honest lawyer from attempting to
reconcile conflicting interests rather than to enforce to the full
extent this rights or the interest which he should alone represent.
Treachery and Double-Dealing Condemned
Ong v. Gruijaldo. A lawyer violates hi oath of office and duties as
counsel when he approaches his client’s opponent and offers to
delay the case in exchange for money.
Hilado v. David
Facts:
1. Atty. Francisco was consulted by a party.
2. After studying the case, Atty. Francisco gave his written
opinion on the case wherein he stated: it will not ordinarily
prosper based on the facts. Hence, he did not handle the
case.
3. However, the opposite party hired the services of Atty.
Francisco
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Issue: WON there was a conflict of interest
Held:
1. To constitute professional employment it is not essential
that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion.
2. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case
about which the consultation was had.
3. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of
any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional
capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established
4. The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude
the attorney from accepting the opposite party's retainer in
the same litigation regardless of what information was
received by him from his first client.
5. The relation of attorney and client is founded on principles
of public policy, on good taste.
6. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the
parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind,
it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
7. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.
In re: De la Rosa. It is very difficult for an attorney to give
interested advice where he represent both parties to a
controversy — so difficult, in fact, that it has become a fixed rule
in all branches of the law that, when one is representing another
in a given matter, he cannot, at the same time, legally represent
his principal's adversary. "No servant can serve two masters: for
either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold
to the one, and despise the other." We discourage the practice
indulged in by the attorney in this case as dangerous in its
possibilities.
Nombrado v. Hernandez. Even if respondent did not use against
his client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel
it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information
regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later
litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the
land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the
[93]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado
vs. David, are apropos:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled
relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to
the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might
only further prejudice the complainant's cause.
San Jose v. Cruz. An Attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in
the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not a good
practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other
persons against his former client under the pretext that the case
is distinct from, and independent of the former case.
Natan v. Capule. An attorney who accepts professional
employment in the very case in which his former client is the
adverse party, and utilizing against the latter papers, knowledge
and information obtained in the course of his previous
employment is guilty of misconduct.
The fact that he had retired from the first case prior to accepting
the second case against his former client, does not relieve him
from his obligation of fidelity and loyalty to the latter.
Gamilla v. Marino, Jr. A lawyer failed to avoid conflict of interests
where he negotiated for a compromise agreement wherein he
played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney, and
interested party, being one of the dismissed employees seeking
his own restitution and thereafter, when he obtained the
attorney’s fees without full prior disclosure of the circumstances
justifying such claim to the members of the union.
The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is "whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance thereof
When Representing Conflicting Interests is Authorized
Bautista v. Gonzales. The lawyer may appear against his own
client only on condition that the client has given his written
consent thereto and after a full disclosure of the facts to him.
In re: De la Rosa. Without these strict conditions having been
complied with, it is highly reprehensible for a lawyer to represent

one client whose interests conflict or collide with the interest of
another client.
Teodosio v. Nava. Even granting that the interests of Espinosa,
Palma, and Batislaong are conflicting, petitioner cannot be held
liable for acting as their common counsel in view of the fact that,
as stated in their affidavits, petitioner explained to them the
consequences of his representation and that they gave their
consent to the same. Indeed, Espinosa and Palma stated that it
was they themselves who brought Batislaong to petitioner’s office
so that the latter could engage his services.
The fact that the first set of affidavits were uniformly notarized by
an associate in petitioner’s law firm and that they did not state
certain data relating to the residence certificates of the affiants do
not adversely affect their validity absent any proof that the
affiants did not execute them of their own volition or that their
signature therein are not authentic.
Nakpil v. Valdez
Facts:
1. Atty. Valdes is both a lawyer and a CPA. He is practicing both
professions. He is the managing partner of his Law Firm and
his Accounting Firm.
2. In the estate of the late Jose Nakpil, he appeared as counsel
for the estate. At the same time, his Accounting Firm
prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and
also computed the claims of two creditors of the estate
3. Two claimants are also his clients as an accountant.
4. In his REJOINDER, respondent insisted that complainant
cannot hold him liable for representing the interests of both
the estate and the claimants without showing that his action
prejudiced the estate.
5. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondent's
accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its
creditors.
6. He reiterated that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both
the estate and its claimants.
Issue:
(1) WON Atty. Valdez represent conflicting interests in acting
in two capacities in the estate proceedings?
(2) If the misdemeanor pertain to his accounting practice, can
he disciplined as a lawyer
Held:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1. Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel
situation as it involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for
his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice
in connection with the property of his client.
2. As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is
guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally the
rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to
represent both sides of an issue.
3. The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter and is
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be.
4. It applies although the attorney's intentions and motives
were honest and he acted in good faith.
5. However, representation of conflicting interests may be
allowed where the parties consent to the representation,
after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough
for the clients must give their informed consent to such
representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the
nature and extent of the conflict and the possible adverse
effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients.
6. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of
the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each
other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of
assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate.
7. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate
which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants
who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance,
respondent's law firm questioned the claims of creditor
Angel Nakpil against the estate.
8. Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly
placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his
client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty
of respondent's law firm was to contest the claims of these
two creditors but which claims were prepared by
respondent's accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid
and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still
undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a
conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not
certainty of conflict. It was respondent's duty to inhibit
either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the
probability of conflict of interest.
9. Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was
conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this
Court as his alleged "misconduct" pertains to his accounting
practice.
[94]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
10. We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is
actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner
of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the
case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with
breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the
estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his
accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and,
at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the
estate in the proceedings where these claims were
presented.
11. The act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as
it placed respondent's and his law firm's loyalty under a
cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondent's misconduct
refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this
Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule
is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for
ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities,
as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.
12. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite
to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to
the practice of law.
13. Atty. Valdez was suspended
2009 Bar, Q. XI(c): There is no presumption of innocence or
improbably of wrongdoing in an attorney’s favor when he deals
with his client concurrently as lawyer and as businessman.
A: TRUE. This is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Nakpil v. Valdes
(1998).
2003 Bar, Q. IX: You are the counsel for the estate of a deceased
person. Your wife is a practicing Certified Public Accountant. She
was asked by her client to prepare and submit an itemized claim
against the estate you are representing. She asks for your advice
on the legal propriety of her client’s claim. What advice would
you give her? Explain.
A: I would advise her that it will be improper for her to handle her
client’s claim against the estate. As a counsel for the estate, it is
my duty to preserve the estate. Her client’s claim seeks to reduce
the said estate. If she will handle such claim, I can be suspected of
representing conflicting interests. The interests of the estate and
of its creditors are adverse to each other (Nakpil v. Valdez, 1998).
Even if she is a different person, the fact that she is my wife will
still give rise to the impression that we are acting as one.
Lim-Santiago v. Sagucio
Facts:

1. Respondent Atty. Carlos Sagucio was the former Personnel
Manager and retained counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc.
until his appointment as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992
2. Complainant Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the
daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former
President of Taggat Industries, Inc.
3. Upon his death, complainant took over the management of
the corporation which ceased operations in 1997 not long
after it was sequestered by the PCGG
4. In July 1997, 21 employees of the corporation filed a
criminal complainant against Lim-Santiago for withholding
payment of salaries without valid cause from April 1, 1996 to
July 15, 1997
5. Respondent, as prosecutor was assigned to investigate the
case.
6. Thereafter, he filed 651 Information against complaint for
violation of Art. 188 in relation to Art. 116 of the Labor Code
7. Complainant charged respondent with disbarment for
violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR for allegedly representing
conflicting interests
Issue: WON the respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests
Held:
1. In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when
respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997.
2. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment
of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat
during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
3. In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests, evidence must be presented to prove that
respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous
employment.
4. The only established participation respondent had with
respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who
conducted the preliminary investigation.
5. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that
respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in
resolving the criminal complaint.
6. The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing
conflicting interests.
7. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment
with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on
matters that he previously handled for the former client and
not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.
Termination of Relationship is No Justification
Pormento v. Pontevedra. The proscription against representation
of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be
The fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable
does not make the prohibition inoperative
The termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client.
2014 Bar, Q. II: R is a retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita
Branch. One day, his Balikbayan compadre B, consulted him
about his unclaimed deposits with the said branch of ABC Bank,
which the bank had refused to give to him claiming that the
account had become dormant. R agreed to file a case against the
bank with the RTC-Manila. B lost the case, but upon the advice
of R, he no longer appealed the decision. B later discovered that
R was the retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita Branch.
Does B have any remedy? Discuss the legal and ethical
implications of the problem.
A: Atty. R clearly violated the rule against representing conflicting
interest (Rule 15.03, CPR)
B may file an action to set aside the judgment on the theory that
if a lawyer is disqualified from appearing as counsel for a party on
account of conflict of interests, he is presumed to have
improperly and prejudicially advised and represented the party in
the conduct of the litigation from beginning to end.
He may also file an action for damages against Atty. R, aside from
an administrative complaint due to his misconduct. He was
prejudiced by the adverse decision against him, which he is no
longer appealed upon the advice of Atty. R.
[95]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1993 Bar, Q. XII: What is the meaning of the phrase “a lawyer
representing conflicting interests”? Why is it forbidden by Canon
6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics?
A: The phrase “a lawyer representing conflicting interests" means
that he acts as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with
that of his present or former client or accepts employment from a
party in the performance of which he may be forced to act in a
double capacity or be suspected of divided loyalty. The reason for
the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client,
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A
lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his
client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the
action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be
given him to take advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must
have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is
abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
1997 Bar, Q. IV: Explain your understanding of "Conflict of
Interest" under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A: A lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests.
There is conflict of interests within the context of the rule when,
on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contend for that
which his duty to another client requires him to oppose. Another
test is whether the acceptance of a new lawyer-client relation will
prevent a lawyer from discharging fully his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to another client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.
It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party
against his present client even in a totally unrelated case. With
regard to a former client, the traditional rule is to distinguish
between related and unrelated cases. A lawyer may not represent
a subsequent client against a former client in a controversy that is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client,
otherwise, he may. However, in the case of Rosacia vs. Atty. B.
Bulalacao, the Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer may not accept
a case against a former client, even on an unrelated matter.
“The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client
not only in the case in which he has represented him but also
after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not
good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case
other person against his former client under the pretext that the
case is distinct from, and independent of the other case. It
behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and

double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice."
2009 Bar, Q. II(b): What are the three (3) tests to determine
conflict of interest for practicing lawyers? Explain each briefly.
A:
(1) When in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to
fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty bound to oppose
it for another client;
(2) When the acceptance of the new retainer will require an
attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the
first client or when called upon in a new relation to use
against the first client any knowledge acquired through their
professional connection;
(3) When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty (Northwestern University v. Arquillo, 2005).
1987 Bar, Q. IV: Atty. FG, a provincial lawyer, had been acting as
counsel for a close relative who had been sued in the Batangas
Regional Trial Court by the PILIPINO BANK for collection of a
debt incurred in 1985. Pending this collection case, Atty. FG was
appointed by the same bank’s Manila central office, as a “special
counsel” in the credit and collections department. Despite this
Manila appointment, Atty. FG continued to appear in the
collection case abovementioned, and was in fact able to
negotiate for a compromise of the case. Thereafter, however,
the Bank’s chief legal counsel, primarily for personal reasons,
not only took steps to have FG dismissed as special counsel, but
also filed, in behalf of the bank, a petition for disbarment against
FG on the principal ground that FG’s actuations constituted
malpractice.
May the petition to discipline Atty. FG prosper?
Answer with reasons.
A: Atty. FG is deemed to be appearing for conflicting interest.
When he accepted his position as “special counsel” for the
Pilipino Bank although in the Manila Central Office, the bank
became his client, he should have discontinued his attorney and
client relationship with his relative in the collection suit filed by
the bank. He was in fact appearing for antagonistic interest.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1993 Bar, Q. XVI: Huey Company and Dewey Corporation are
both retainer clients of Atty. Anama. He is the Corporate
Secretary of Huey Company. He represents Dewey Corporation
in three pending litigation cases. Dewey Corporation wants to
file a civil case against Huey Company and has requested Atty.
Anama to handle the case.
(1) What are the options available to Atty. Anama? Explain
your answer.
(2) If you were Atty. Anama, which option would you take?
Explain.
A:
(1) The options available to Atty. Anama are:
(a) To decline to accept the case because to do so will
constitute representing conflicting interests. It is unethical
for a lawyer to represent a client in a case against another
client in the said case.
(b) To accept to file the case against Huey Company, after full
disclosure to both retained clients and upon their express
and written consent. The written consent may free him from
the charge of representing conflicting interests, because
written consent amounts to a release by the clients of the
lawyer’s obligation not to represent conflicting interests.
(2) If I were Atty. Anama, I will choose the first option and
inhibit myself in the case as both entities are my clients. The
conflict of interests between the contending clients may
reach such a point that, notwithstanding their consent to
the common representation, the lawyer may be suspected
of disloyalty by one client. His continuing to act in a double
capacity strikes deeply in the foundation of the attorney-
client relationship.
1991 Bar, Q. V(A): Atty. B acted as counsel for C in a civil case. He
also acted as counsel for D against C in another civil case, when
D lost his case against C, he filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. B for conflict of interest. Decide.
A: If the case of C in the first case Is entirely different and related
with the case of D against C, there is no conflict of interest. If the
two cases however are related wherein attorney has knowledge
of the evidence of C then there is conflict of interest.
Rule 15.01 provides that: A lawyer in conferring with a
prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether
the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own
interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
[96]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Rule 15.03 further provides that: A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interest except try written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
1997 Bar, Q. VI: You are the lawyer of Mr. "H", the plaintiff, in a
civil case for rescission of contract. The prospects for an
amicable settlement look bright. Impressed by your ability, Mr.
"I", the defendant, would like very much to retain you as his
defense counsel in a criminal case for homicide through reckless
imprudence. Mr. "I" wants you to forthwith enter your
appearance, the arraignment already having been scheduled.
Would you accept the offer?
A: It depends. If the criminal case for homicide through reckless
imprudence is against Mr. "H", I cannot accept the same for that
will involve a conflict of interest, although it is an unrelated case.
But if it will not involve Mr. "H". I can accept the same. However,
to avoid suspicion and misunderstanding. it would be better if I
inform Mr. H" about the offer and secure his conformity to my
handling the same.
1999 Bar, Q. VIII: Atty. Juan Cruz, a practicing lawyer, was
employed by Pilipinas Bank as its bank attorney and notary
public in three of its branches in Manila. While thus employed,
Maria del Rio, who was unaware of Atty. Cruz employment in
the bank, engaged Atty. Cruz’s services as a lawyer in a case that
was filed by Pilipinas Bank for collection of sum of money
involving one of its branches in Quezon City which Atty. Cruz
accepted. The Quezon City Regional Trial Court, after due
proceeding and hearing, rendered judgment in favor of Pilipinas
Bank and against Maria del Rio who wanted to appeal the
adverse judgment. But upon advice of Atty. Cruz, the adverse
judgment was not appealed. Thereafter, Maria del Rio learned
Atty. Cruz was employed by Pilipinas Bank as one of Its
attorneys. She now consults with you and asks you to take legal
steps against Atty. Cruz for his apparent misconduct.
What do you think of what Atty. Cruz did? Is there a valid and
legal basis to discipline him?
A: In agreeing to represent Maria del Rio in a case which Pilipinas
Bank filed against her, Atty. Cruz violated the rule against
representing conflicting interests. Rule 15.03, CPR provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. It is
improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or former client, even in
an unrelated case (PNB v. Cedo). It does not matter that the
Pilipinas Bank branch in Quezon City is not one of the branches he

services in Manila. The bank itself is his client. This constitutes
malpractice for which Atty. Cruz can be disciplined.
2001 Bar, Q. II: Atty. A's former Client B is deceased. A new
Client C proposes to engage the legal services of Atty. A against
the heirs of deceased Client B. Has Atty. A absolute right to
accept the engagement since Client B is no longer his client?
Decide.
A: The right of Atty. A to accept the engagement of client C is
qualified by his obligations to avoid conflict of interest arising
from his relation to the deceased client B. Atty. A has received
information and confidences from client B which Atty. A is
prohibited from utilizing against the heirs of the deceased client.
The obligation to hold in confidence communications and
information received from Client B is not terminated by the death
of the client.
2002 Bar, Q. VIII: Six months ago, Atty. Z was consulted by A
about a four-door apartment in Manila left by her deceased
parents. A complained that her two siblings, B and C, who were
occupying two units of the apartment, were collecting the
rentals from the other two units and refusing to give her any
part thereof. Atty. Z advised A to first seek the intervention of
her relatives and told her that, if this failed, he would take legal
action as A asked him to do. Today, September 22, 2002, B asks
Atty. Z to defend him in a suit brought by A against him (B) and C
through another counsel.
A. Should Atty. Z accept the case? Why?
B. Should Atty. Z tell B that A consulted him earlier about the
same case? Why?
A:
A. Atty. Z should not accept the case. When A consulted him
about her complaint against B and C, a lawyer-client
relationship was created between A and Atty. Z. Atty. Z
cannot subsequently represent B against A in a matter he
was consulted about. This constitutes conflict of interest It
does not matter if Atty. Z is not handling the case for A.
B. Rule 21.07, CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not reveal that
he has been consulted about a particular case except to
avoid possible conflict of interest” In this case, he has to
reveal to B that he had been consulted by A on the case that
B if offering to retain his services, in order to avoid a
possible conflict of interest.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2006 Bar, Q. IX: Atty. Marie consulted Atty. Hernandez whether
she can successfully prosecute her case for declaration of nullity
of marriage she intends to file against her husband. Atty.
Hernandez advised her in writing that the case wall not prosper
for the reasons stated therein.
Is Atty. Hernandez’s acquiescence to be Noel’s counsel ethical?
A: No, Atty. Hernandez’s acquiescence to be Noel’s counsel will
not be ethical. It will constitute a conflict of interests. When Atty.
Marie consulted Atty. Hernandez for advice on whether she can
successfully prosecute her case for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Noel, and he advised her that it will not prosper, a
lawyer-client relationship was created between them, although
his advice was unfavorable to her. From that moment, Atty.
Hernandez is barred from accepting employment from the
adverse party concerning the same matter about which she had
consulted him (Hilado v. David, 1949).
2008 Bar, Q. II: In 1998, Acaramba, a telecommunications
company, signed a retainer agreement with Bianca & Sophia Law
Office (B & S) for the latter’s legal services for a fee of P2,000 a
month. From 1998 to 2001, the only service actually performed
by B & S for Acaramba was the review of a lease agreement and
representation of Acaramba as a complainant in a bouncing
checks case. Acaramba stopped paying retainer fees in 2002 and
terminated its retainer agreement with B 6s S in 2005. In 2007,
Temavous, another telecommunications company, requested B
& S to act as its counsel in the following transactions: (a) the
acquisition of Acaramba; and (b) the acquisition of Super-6, a
company engaged in the power business.
In which transactions, if any, can Bianca & Sophia Law Office
represent Temavous? Explain fully.
A:
(a) B & S cannot represent Temavous in the transaction for the
acquisition of Acaramba, as this will constitute conflict of
interest. One of the tests of conflict of interest is whether or
not in the acceptance of a new relation, the lawyer would be
called upon to use against a client confidential information
acquired or presumed to have been acquired through their
connection. Another test is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance of the lawyer’s duty of
undivided fidelity or loyalty to the client (Quiambao v.
Bamba, 2005). The rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
[97]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
used. In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is
remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good
faith with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
(Heirs of Lydio “Terry” Falanme v. Atty. Edgar J. Baguio, A.C.
6876, March 7, 2008)
Alternative: There seems to be no conflict of interest involved if B
& S will act as counsel for Temavous in the acquisition of
Acaramba. Acaramba is no longer its client, and the only service
Acaramba asked B & S to render during their relationship was to
review a lease agreement and handle a bouncing checks case. U.S.
courts have denied disqualification where there is no evidence
that the law firm has acquired confidential information during the
prior representation that would be of value in the current
representation.
(b) S & B can represent Temavous in the acquisition of Super-6.
The subject matter of such transaction is no longer related
to the work that the law firm had previously performed for
Acaramba. There is no conflict of interest involved, even
though Acaramba and Temavous are competing companies.
2012 Bar, (13): Atty. Quiso was the retained counsel for Alfa
Security Agency and handled all the cases involving the
company. Adam, the Assistant Manager of the agency, hired
Atty. Quiso when he was sued in an ejectment case. Later, Adam
was fired from the agency. Adam did not return a vehicle and so,
Atty. Quiso - as counsel for the security agency - filed a replevin
suit Adam moved for Atty. Quiso's disqualification considering
that the ejectment case is still pending. Is there conflict of
interest?
(a) No, the cases are totally unrelated and there is no occasion
to unduly use confidential information acquired from one
case in the other.
(b) No, Atty. Quiso is duty bound to handle alI cases of his
client, including the replevin case against Adam.
(c) Yes, proscription is against representation of opposing
parties who are present clients or in an unrelated action.
(d) Yes, Atty. Quiso must withdraw as counsel for Adam,
otherwise he will lose his retainer
2012 Bar, Q. (19): Atty. Juan Cruz of the Cruz, Cruz and Cruz Law
Office personally handled a damage case of Mr. Gonzalo which
resulted in an award of Php 500,000.00. The writ of execution
was served by Sheriff Onoy, but resulted in recovery of only Php
70,000.00. Mr. Gonzalo was unsatisfied and filed an
administrative complaint. When informed, Sheriff Onoy berated
and threatened Mr. Gonzalo; and for this, the Sheriff was
charged with Grave Threat. Atty. Pedro Cruz of the same Cruz,

Cruz and Cruz Law Office appeared as defense counsel pro bono.
Mr. Gonzalo seeks his disqualification. Decide.
(a) No conflict of interest. The Grave Threat case arose out of a
different factual scenario.
(b) There is conflict of interest because both Atty. Juan Cruz
and Atty. Pedro Cruz belong to one law office.
(c) No conflict of interest since the court case was wholly
handled by Atty. Juan Cruz. The law office did not participate
in any way.
(d) No conflict of interest. No likelihood that information in the
civil case can be used in the criminal case.
1992 Bar, Q. IV: Atty. Belle Montes is a former partner in the
Rosales Law Office which is representing Corporation X before
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Atty. Montes who is
now practicing on her own, entered her appearance as counsel
for Corporation Y in a suit between said corporation and
Corporation X. Atty. Montes claims that since she did not
personally handle the case of Corporation X when she was still
with the Rosales Law Office she will not be representing
conflicting interests.
Is such argument valid? Explain.
A: Atty. Belle Montes will be deemed to be appearing for
conflicting interests if she appears for Corporation Y against
Corporation X.
This question is similar to the case of Philippine Blooming Mills vs.
Court of Appeals, November 1989. In said case, the Philippine
Blooming Mills was the retainer of the ACCRA Law Office. Three
lawyers of the ACCRA Law Office separated from said law firm and
established their own law office. The three lawyers were
disqualified from appearing for a corporation against the
Philippine Blooming Mills.
The rule prohibiting appearing for conflicting interests applies to
law firms. The employment of one member of a law firm is
considered as an employment of the law firm and that the
employment of a law firm is equivalent to a retainer of the
members thereof.
2005 Bar, Q. XI: Atty. Japzon, a former partner of XXX law firm, is
representing Kapuso Corporation in a civil case against
Kapamilya Corporation whose legal counsel is XXX law firm.
Atty. Japzon claims that she never handled the case of
Kapamilya Corporation when she was still with XXX law firm.
Is there a conflict of interest? Explain.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
A: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interest if the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also where he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection (Santos vs.
Beltran, 2003). Since Atty. Japzon was a partner of the XXX law
firm which has Kapamilya Corporation as its client, she cannot
handle a case against it as such will involve conflict of interest.
The employment of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of the
members thereof. It does not matter if Atty. Japzon never
handled a case of the Kapamilya Corporation when she was still
with the XXX law firm.
2000 Bar, Q. XV: In a contentious transaction of sale and
purchase involving real property between X (seller) and Y
(purchaser), whose interests were diametrically opposed to each
other. Atty. Z with the knowledge and consent of X and Y, acted
as the attorney for both parties. Did Atty. Z commit malpractice?
Explain.
A: Rule 15.03, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. In this case, although Atty.
Z acted as lawyer for both X and Y with the knowledge and
consent of both, such consent was not made in writing. Atty. Z
may be held liable for malpractice.
Alternative: In the case of In re: De la Rosa, (1914), the Supreme
Court held that where a lawyer acted as attorney for both a
vendor and a purchaser, whose interests were diametrically
opposed to each other, but with the knowledge and consent of
both parties, this did not constitute malpractice under the law.
Neither party was deceived by the lawyer, and neither one
suffered involuntary damages by reason of his action.
Nevertheless, the lawyer’s conduct constituted a practice severely
to be condemned.
Rule 15.04: A lawyer may, with the written consent of all
concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling
disputes.
Report of the IBP Committee. Consent in writing is required to
prevent future controversy on the authority of the lawyer to act
as mediator, conciliator, or arbitrator.
[98]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
However, a lawyer who acts as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator
in settling a dispute, cannot represent any of the parties to it.
2013 Bar, Q. XIII: The mediator assigned to a civil case happens
to be your law school classmate and he makes a doctrinal
statement about the rights of the parties. You knew that the
statement, although favorable to your client’s case, is incorrect.
The ethical move to make under the circumstances is to
__________.
(a) correct the mediator and state the right doctrine
(b) just keep quiet because the other counsel might learn about
your relationship with the mediator
(c) reveal your relationship with the mediator and ask the
opposing counsel if he has any objections
(d) request the Mediation Supervisor to immediately change
the mediator
(e) simply withdraw from the case because of the unfair
advantage that you enjoy
A: (a).
Alternative: (c). (CPR, Canon 15, Rule 15.04)
Rule 15.05: A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid
and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the
client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects
of the case.
Overstatement or Understatement of Prospects of the Case, Not
Proper
 When a case is presented to the lawyer by a client, and the
latter is seeking advice on the probability or improbability of
success, the lawyer should refrain from giving any advice
unless he has obtained sufficient understanding of the
client’s cause.
 A careful investigation and examination of the facts must
first be had before any legal opinion be ventured by the
lawyer to the client.
Report of the IBP Committee. Ordinarily, clients are unfamiliar
with the intricacies and vagaries of the law. That being so, they
are entitled to and the lawyer is bound to give a candid and
honest opinion on the merit or lack of merit of the case
Castaneda v. Ago. We condemn the attitude of the respondents
and their counsel who, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for

those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very
ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty
his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended;
what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence
despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at
bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman
to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of
merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.
Lawyer Should Temper Inclination of Client to Appeal
Notwithstanding the Clear Absence of Success
Arangco v. Baloso. There is need, it would appear, for members
of the Bar to temper their enthusiasm in seeking appellate review
whether by an ordinary appeal or through a writ of certiorari. It is
well that they keep ill mind that as officers of the court, they are
required to exercise the utmost care and to undertake the most
thorough preparation to assure that all the learning at their
command be brought to bear on the legal questions that might be
raised, or, in their opinion, could be raised, for the resolution of a
higher court. To act otherwise would show less than full
compliance with their duty to the bench
Overstatement or Understatement of the Prospects of the Case
to be Avoided
Choa v. Chiongson. It is incumbent upon a lawyer to give a candid
and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his
client case with the end view of promoting respect for the law and
legal processes.
Duty of Lawyer When Civil Case is Defenseless
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Rollon v. Naraval. Rule 15.05 of the CPR requires that lawyers
give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or
lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating
their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have
some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an
obligation on the part of lawyers.
If they find that their client’s cause is defenseless, then it is their
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than to traverse the incontrovertible.
The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking
constitutes a violation of his duty to "observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients."
Lawyers Are Admonished from Making Bold Assurances to
Clients
Mercado v. Security Bank Corp. We have repeatedly admonished
lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer
who guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert
heavy pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs.
But when the case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them
under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this case, Atty.
Villanueva’s statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also
to believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or influenced
Rule 15.06: A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Influence-Peddling Not Included in Practice of Law
 Such a display of influence whether factual or imaginary
does not only undermine our judicial or legal systems but
also degrades our courts or tribunals for the dangerous
impression is created that cases are won not on the merits
but on the magnetic pill of influential connections.
 This will erode the reputation and integrity of courts and
tribunals.
Report of the IBP Committee. Lawyers must be reminded that
“the practice of law does not include influence-peddling”
Mercado v. Security Bank Corp. Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the
CPT states that "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." Further,
Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer must impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
[99]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In informing Mercado
that he was "a very very good, close and long time friend" of the
ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can
obtain a favorable disposition of his case. However, when his
petition was dismissed twice, Mercado’s expectation crumbled.
This prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious, and
disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice Davide and the
ponente.
Rule 15.07: A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness.
Lawyers Must Promote Respect for the Law
 Rule 15.07 carries more or less the same intendment as Rule
1.02 of the CPR
 Art. 19 of the CC
Gonzales v. Sabacajan. If complainants did have the alleged
monetary obligations to his client, that does not warrant his
summarily confiscating their certificates of title since there is no
showing in the records that the same were given as collaterals to
secure the payment of a debt. Neither is there any intimation that
there is a court order authorizing him to take and retain custody
of said certificates of title.
Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with
the laws and principles of fairness. Instead, he unjustly refused to
give to complainants their certificates of titles supposedly to
enforce payment of their alleged financial obligations to his client
and presumably to impress the latter of his power to do so.
Lawyer Should Give Proper Advice to Clients
Jessup. The lawyer shall not abet or encourage any person,
especially public officials to disregard the supremacy of the law
and respect for the rights of the citizens.
Am. Jur. It is his duty to counsel his fellow citizens to use peaceful
and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an
intentional wrong to their adversaries.
Malcolm. The lawyer must restrain his clients from committing
improprieties offensive to the judicial and legal system
He has failed in his duty to promote respect for the law if he could
not impart upon his clients the citizen’s duty to respect the law.

Pros. Visbal v. Judge Sescon. Lawyers must resist the whims and
caprices of clients and to temper their propensity to litigate
because his lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his clients.
On Matters of Law
Cabilan v. Ramolete. As counsel of record, a lawyer has control of
the proceedings and whatever steps his client takes should be
within his knowledge and responsibility.
Radion Communications of the Phil. v. FCWF. The honor of the
profession requires that on matters of law, it is the client who
should yield to the lawyer and not the other way around.
Lawyer is Not Gun for Hire
Millare v. Montero. Under Canon 19 of the CPR, a lawyer is
required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law."
The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means
to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns
him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Lawyer Should Advice Clients on Matters of Decorum and Proper
Attitude Toward Courts of Justice
Nestle Phil. Inc. v. Sanchez. We realize that the individuals herein
cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware
that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are
protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or
influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right
amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of
constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such
efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of
court.
The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest
primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this
Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability
of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a
reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their
duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on
matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice,
and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing
educational program for their members.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Rule 15.08: A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make
clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
When Lawyer Concurrently Engaged in Business, He Must Clarify
to Client in What Capacity He is Acting
Report of the IBP Committee. It is not uncommon for lawyers to
combine law practice with some other occupation. The fact of
being a lawyer does not preclude him from engaging in business
and such practice is not necessarily improper.
Impropriety arises when the business is such of a nature or is
conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the
lawyer’s duties as a member of the Bar
 To avoid breach of legal ethics, the lawyer should keep any
business, in which he is engaged in concurrently with the
practice of law, entirely separate and apart from the latter.
 He must keep paramount the protection of the legal
profession even when he is engaged in any other legitimate
profession.
Report of the IBP Committee. The lawyer should inform the client
when he is acting as a lawyer and when he is not, because certain
ethical considerations governing the client-lawyer relationship
may be operative in one case and not in the other.
New Sampaguita Builders Construction Inc. v. PNB. A party’s
engagement of his counsel in another capacity concurrent with
the practice of law is not prohibited, so long as the roles being
assumed by such counsel is made clear to the client.
The only reason for this clarification requirement is that certain
ethical considerations operative in one profession may not be so
in the other.
Lawyer Cannot Divide His Personality
Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro. A lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the
laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his
professional dealings nor lead others in doing so.
2011 Bar, Q. 7: Which of the following statements best describes
the distinct traditional dignity that the legal profession enjoys
over other professions?
[100]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(a) People are quite dependent on lawyers for their skills in
getting them out of trouble with the law.
(b) Its members strive to maintain honesty even in their
private dealings.
(c) Its members earn by charging specified emoluments or fees.
(d) The profession is anchored on a fiduciary relation with the
client.
Canon 16: A Lawyer Shall Hold in Trust All Moneys and
Properties of His Client That May Come into His Possession
Lawyer is Trustee of Client’s Moneys and Properties
Malcolm. The moneys collected by an attorney for his client
belong to the client.
Aya v. Bigornia. The moneys collected by a lawyer in pursuance of
a judgment in favor of his client are held in trust for the client.
Rule 16.01: A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Lawyer Accountable for All Moneys and Properties of Client
In re: Bamberger. The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of
attorney and client requires that the lawyer should promptly
account for all the funds received or held by him for the client’s
benefit.
McKraken v. Harned. In order that he may promptly account for
or deliver the same to the client or representative, he should keep
and maintain adequate records of the client’s moneys or
properties in his custody.
CBA, Code of Professional Conduct. The lawyer is under strict
obligation to identify the client’s property and keep it separate
and apart from his own.
ABA, CPR. He must not commingle his client’s money with other
moneys in his possession. The prohibition against commingling is
not only to prevent confusion but also to “avoid the appearance
of impropriety”
Report of IBP Committee. If funds are kept in separate account,
the temptation to convert them to personal use is one step
removed.
Unlawful Retention of Client’s Funds, Contemptuous

Rule 138, Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt
— When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his
client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions; but proceedings under this Section shall not
be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Businos v. Ricafort. A lawyer was disbarred for having used the
money of his clients without the consent of the latter in violation
of Canon 16 and the first three (3) Rules thereof.
Money Not Used for Specific Purpose is Held Also in Trust and
Must Be Accounted Immediately
In re: Nueno. Money delivered to the lawyer for specific purpose
such as for filing fee, for appeal expenses, for arrangement of an
amicable settlement, if not utilized for failure of counsel to take
such steps must immediately be returned
Attorney’s Lien is Not an Excuse for Non-Rendition of Accounting
In re: Bamberger. The lawyer is not relieved of the obligation to
make a proper accounting even if he has an attorney’s lien over
the client’s moneys or funds in his possession (Rule 16.03)
De Jesus-Alano v. Hon. Tan. In any event, it is to be observed that
the amount of P2,500.00 in question was by the writ of execution
ordered delivered to petitioner, she "being the lawyer of
defendant Mrs. Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas." Petitioner has,
therefore, acquired, and may validly exercise, a general or
retaining lien over the amount of P2,500.00.
As provided in the first sentence of Section 33 of Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court, "An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into
his possession, and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof." Such lien has been held to extend to moneys
collected by the attorney for his client in the course of his
employment, whether or not upon a judgment or award.
The petitioner being in possession of general or retaining lien
conceded to her by the first part of section 33 of Rule 127, there
can be no question that she had the right to retain the amount of
P2,500.00 and to apply it to the satisfaction of her claim for
attorney's fees, the same having been already adjudicated as the
reasonable value of her professional services to the respondent
Mrs. Roxas. Courts, in the exercise of their exclusive and
supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the court, are
bound to respect and protect the attorney's lien, which as held in
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
the case of Rustia vs. Abeto, "is necessary to preserve the
decorum and respectability of the profession.”
Lawyer Cannot Disburse Client’s Money to Client’s Creditors
Without Authority
In re: Abad. In the absence of authority from his client, he is not
allowed to disburse the money collected for his client in favor of
persons who may be entitled thereto considering that he owes
fidelity to the client and not to the creditor. He needs a special
power of attorney to effect such payment.
2016 Bar, Q. VIII: Arthur hired Atty. Jojo to file a complaint for
the collection of P500,000.00. He agreed to pay Atty. Jojo the
amounts of P100,000.00 as acceptance fee and Pl 00,000.00 as
success fee. Arthur paid P50,000.00 as partial payment of the
acceptance fee with the promise to pay the balance of
P50,000.00 after presentation of Arthur's evidence. During the
pre-trial, the defendant paid to Atty. Jojo the amount of Pl
00,000.00 as partial payment of his debt. Considering that he has
not yet been paid of the balance of his acceptance fee, Atty. Jojo
applied P50,000.00 to the balance of the acceptance fee and the
remaining P50,000.00 was deposited in his bank account for
safekeeping. Despite the lapse of one (1) month, Arthur was not
informed of the payment. Arthur sued Atty. Jojo for keeping the
money and argues that the latter violated the rules under Canon
16 of the CPR that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies of his
client that may come into his possession. Atty. Jojo claims he has
a lien on the monies paid to him by the defendant. Rule on the
complaint and explain.
A: Atty. Jojo violated Canon 16, CPR which provides that “a lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession” and Rule 16.01, which provides that “a
lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client”.
Atty. Jojo received P100,000.00 from the defendant as partial
payment of his debt to Arthur. Instead of holding the said amount
in trust for Arthur, Atty. Jojo applied P50,000.00 to the unpaid
balance of his acceptance fee, and deposited the other
P50,000.00 in his bank account.
While Rule 6.03 provides that a lawyer shall have a lien over the
funds of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, the
Supreme Court has held that this is applicable only if there is an
agreement between the lawyer as to the payment of his fees and
the client is notified of the recipient of payment for him. There
was no notice of the payment made to the client, and no
[101]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
agreement between Atty. Jojo and Arthur as to when the balance
of the former’s acceptance fee should be made. In fact, Arthur
promised to pay the same after presentation of his evidence.
Moreover, when Atty. Jojo deposited the balance of P50,000.00 in
his bank account, he violated Rule 16.02 which provides that “a
lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and with those of others kept by him.
2015 Bar, Q. II: In open court, accused Marla manifested that she
had already settled in full the civil aspect of the criminal case
filed against her in the total amount of P58,000.00. Marla
further alleged that she paid directly to private complainant
Jasmine the amount of P25,000.00. The balance of P33,000.00
was delivered to Atty. Jeremiah, Jasmine's lawyer, evidenced by
a receipt signed by Atty. Jeremiah himself.
However, Jasmine manifested that she did not receive the
amount of P33,000.00 which Marla turned over to Atty.
Jeremiah. Despite Jasmine's requests to tum over the money,
Atty. Jeremiah failed to do so. It was only after Jasmine already
filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Jeremiah that the
latter finally paid the P33,000.00 to the former, but in three
installment payments of P11,000.00 each. Atty. Jeremiah
claimed that he decided to hold on to the P33,000.00 at first
because Jasmine had not yet paid his attorney's fees.
Is Atty. Jeremiah administratively liable? Explain.
A: Atty. Jeremiah is administratively liable for violating Rule 16.01
of the CPR which provides that “a lawyer shall account for all
money and property collected or received by him for or from the
client” His claim that he held on to the P33,000 because his client
Jasmine had not yet paid his attorney’s fees.
Rule 16.03 of the CPR provides that “a lawyer shall have a lien
over the funds (of the client) and may apply as much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client”
But the SC has held that this can be availed of by a lawyer only if
there is an agreement between him and the client as to the
amount of his attorney’s fees. There is no evidence of such
agreement in this case. In fact, Atty. Jeremiah claimed his exercise
of a retaining lien only after an administrative case was already
filed against him; moreover, it is belied by the fact that Atty.
Jeremiah paid the P33,000 to his client Jasmine, albeit in
installments.

2008 Bar, Q. VIII(d): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
lawyer concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: Keeping money he collected as rental from his client’s
tenant and remitting it to the client when asked to do so.
A: The lawyer may be sanctioned for not delivering the rentals
that he collected from the client’s tenant Immediately, and
waiting for his client to ask for it yet. In the case of Licuanan v.
Melo (1989), a lawyer who collected the rentals of his client’s
property for a period of one year without reporting and/or
delivering such collections to his client until the latter demanded
for it, was disbarred by the Supreme Court. Money collected for
the client should be reported and accounted for promptly.
Alternative: The lawyer may not be sanctioned as long as he holds
his client’s funds in trust and accounts for them and delivers them
upon demand (Canon 16, Rules 16.01, 16.03, CPR).
Rule 16.02: A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate
and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Funds of Clients Not to be Commingled with Funds of Counsel
Espiritu v. Cabredo. The relationship between a lawyer and a
client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and
good faith. Hence, in dealing with trust property, a lawyer should
be very scrupulous. Money or other trust property of the client
coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by
the latter and account any circumstances, and should not be
commingled with his own or be used by him.
Rule 16.03: A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien
to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
When Shall Client’s Funds and Properties Be Delivered;
Presumption of Misappropriation
Dumadag v. Lumaya. A lawyer who obtained possession of the
funds and properties belonging to his client in the course of his
professional employment shall deliver the same to his client when
(a) they become due, or (b) upon demand.
In re: David. The lawyer’s failure to deliver upon demand gives
rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated the funds for
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
his own use to the prejudice of the client and in violation of the
trust reposed in him.
Almendrez, Jr. v. Langit. A lawyer cannot unilaterally appropriate
the client’s money for himself by the mere fact that the client
owes him attorney’s fees.
What he can do is to exercise his right of lien, if proper.
Implementation of Attorney’s Retaining or Charging Liens
 Rule 16.03 is applicable to the lawyer’s retaining lien
 In effect, the Rule abandoned the ruling in Cabigao v.
Rodrigo, where it was held that a lawyer cannot unilaterally
appropriate his client’s funds for payment of his unpaid
attorney’s fees.
Report of the IBP Committee. Rule 16.03 gives the lawyer a lien
over the client’s funds and allows him to apply the same to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements but giving notice promptly to
the client.
 For the further protection of lawyer, he shall also have a lien
to the extent of his attorney’s fees and legal disbursements
on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client
as provided in Rule 138, Sec. 37. This lien refers to charging
liens.
 To enforce a charging lien, it is necessary that the lawyer
shall have caused a statement of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court which rendered the favorable
judgment with written notice to the client and to the
adverse party.
Rule 138, Sec. 37. Attorneys' liens — An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have
lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until
his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply
such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to
the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he
has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time
when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such
lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over
such judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
[102]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Attorney’s Retaining Lien Does Not Apply to Public Documents
and Exhibits Introduced in Court
 These documents are subject to the court’s custody.
 To hold otherwise would be curtail unduly the inherent
power of judicial tribunal in the conduct of the proceedings
before it.
When Documents Are Subject of Lien, Adequate Security May be
Required
 When documents in the possession of a lawyer are the
subject of attorney’s lien, he cannot be compelled to
surrender the same without prior proof that his fees have
been fully satisfied.
 If the fees have not been paid, and there is a genuine need
for the court to gain possession of the documents, it must
first require the claimant to file an adequate security for the
lawyer’s fees before it can require the surrender thereof.
Matute v. Matute. Under Rule 138, Sec. 37, the attorney cannot
be compelled to surrender the muniments of title mentioned
without prior proof that his fees have been duly satisfied. The
courts, in the exercise of their supervisory authority over
attorneys as officers of the court, are bound to respect and
protect the attorney's lien as a necessary means to preserve the
decorum and respectability of the profession.
But if it be entirely indispensable for the court to gain possession
of the documents that have come to the attorney and are held by
him in the course of his employment as counsel, it can require
surrender thereof by requiring the client or claimant to first file
proper and adequate security for the lawyers' compensation
Lawyer Cannot Be Deprived of His Attorney’s Fees Through the
Client’s Maneuvers
Aro v. Nanawa. Surely, "the client cannot, by setting,
compromising or dismissing his suit during its pendency, deprive
the attorney of his compensation for the agreed amount, unless
the lawyer consents to such settlement, compromise or
dismissal", for the, attorney is or "Shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client - a reasonable compensation (not more)
for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered,
and the professional standing of the attorney", (Sec. 24, Rule 138,
on Attorney and Admission to Bar) albeit, under Canon 12 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, "in fixing fees, it should not be
forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of
justice and not a mere money-getting trade."

Corollarily, the attorney’s fees of a lawyer which had already been
registered as a charging lien, cannot be altered or defeated by the
client’s act of terminating the lawyer’s services, compromising the
case, or waiving his rights in favor of the adverse party.
Client Can Dismiss the Lawyer Anytime; Consequences
 A client has the prerogative to dismiss his lawyer anytime as
the relationship is one based on trust and confidence (see
R.A. 636)
 There is no such thing as “illegal dismissal” in a client-lawyer
relationship.
 However, if the dismissal of the lawyer is without justifiable
cause, the client will pay in full attorney’s fees expressly
agreed upon in their contract.
Aro v. Nanawa. True it is also that "a client may, at anytime,
dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place", (Sec. 26,
Rule 138) but it must be emphasized that the same provision,
which is an incorporation of Republic Act 636 into the Rules of
Court, also provides that "if the contract between client and
attorney had been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the
attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client full compensation ..." In the case at bar, by
entering into the compromise agreement in question and even
inserting therein a prayer to the court to dismiss their case filed
by petitioner, petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed him. Such
implied dismissal appears to Us to have been made without
justifiable cause, none is urged anywhere in the record, and so,
the above-quoted provision of Section 26, Rule 138 applies here.
Lawyer’s Charging Lien May Be Assigned
 A charging lien, anchored on the accomplishment of services
and resulting in favorable money judgment for the client,
may be assigned because it is a property
Menzi Co. v. Bastida. The assignee will be subrogated to all the
rights of the lawyer which he has in the charging lien.
Charging Lien Survives the Death of the Client
Olave v. Canlas. If the charging lien had already been duly
registered in the records of the case, it survives the death of the
client and therefore it need not be enforced in the proceeding for
the settlement of the client’s estate.
A lawyer is not deprived of his attorney’s fees by the death of his
client although the client-lawyer relationship is terminated.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Probate Court Has No Authority to Enforce a Lien
Olave v. Canlas. A probate court, being of limited jurisdiction, has
no authority to enforce a lien unless conferred by a statute. The
statutory jurisdiction of a probate court is exclusive, and since the
lien referred to in Section 1, Rule 88 (now Rule 87, Sec. 1) is not
among those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 87 (now Rule 87, Sec.
5), it is reasonable to assume that all money claims secured with a
lien are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court.
Effect of Enforcement of Charging Lien
Llamas v. Encarnacion. When a lawyer enforces a charging lien
against his client, the client-lawyer relationship is terminated.
2011 Bar, Q. 17: In settling his client's claims, Atty. Cruz received
from the adverse party P200,000 in cash for his client. Which of
the following is an IMPROPER way for Atty. Cruz to handle the
money?
(a) Ask his client to prepare a check for his fees for swapping
with the cash.
(b) Deposit the cash in his own bank account and later issue
his personal check to his client, less his fees.
(c) Turn over the cash to his client with a request that the latter
pay him his fees.
(d) Tell his client about the settlement and the cash and wait for
the client's instructions.
1994 Bar, Q. V: The client with whom you have a retainer
agreement had not been paying you contrary to your
stipulations on legal fees, even as you continue to appear at
hearings in his case. A Judgment was finally rendered in your
client's favor awarding him the real property in litigation as well
as a substantial amount in damages.
As the counsel who had not been paid, what steps can you take
to protect your interests?
A: I will cause a charging lien for my fees to be recorded and
attached to the judgment insofar as it is for the payment of
money in damages. Then, I will have the right to collect my fees
out of such judgments and executions issued in pursuance
thereof.
Rule 16.04: A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client's interest are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
[103]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
Lawyer Shall Not Borrow Money from or Lend Money to Client
Report of IBP Committee. The rule against borrowing of money
by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the former from
taking advantage of his influence over the latter.
The second part of the rule is to assure the lawyer’s independent
professional judgment. If the lawyer acquires financial interest in
the outcome of the case the free exercise of his judgment may be
adversely affected.
In re: Pelayo. A lawyer, who as guardian, borrowed money for his
benefit using the property of the ward as collateral without court
approval is guilty of misconduct
Frias v. Lozada. A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what
respondent did, and her failure to pay the same, is very unethical.
Lawyer was disbarred.
Junio v. Grupo. Five (5) years had already passed since
respondent retained the cash for his own personal use. But
notwithstanding the same and his firm promise "to pay Mrs. Junio
on or before January 1997" he has not demonstrated any volition
to settle his obligation to his creditor, although admittedly "there
w[ere] occasions when complainant's sister came to respondent
to ask for the payment in behalf of complainant," worse, "the
passage of time made respondent somehow forgot about the
obligation."
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice (Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility). This rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from
taking advantage of his influence over the client.
This rule is especially significant in the instant case where the
respondent enjoys an immense ascendancy over the complainant
who, "as well as two of his sisters, had served respondent's family
as household helpers for many years."
Having gained dominance over the complainant by virtue of such
long relation of master and servant, the respondent took
advantage of his influence by not returning the money entrusted
to him. Instead, he imposed his will on the complainant and
borrowed her funds without giving adequate security therefor
and mindless of the interest of the complainant

In the light of the foregoing, . . . respondent has committed an act
which falls short of the standard of the norm of conduct required
of every attorney. If an ordinary borrower of money is required by
the law to repay the loan failing which he may be subjected to
court action, it is more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct
serves as an example.
Exceptions to the Rule Against Borrowing or Lending of Money
(Rule 16.04)
 A lawyer may borrow money from a client bank, for here the
client’s interests are fully protected by the bank’s rules and
regulations which have to be complied with.
 The lawyer’s use of his influence over the client – which is
sought to be prevented by the rule – shall have no suasion
for the grant of the loan is governed by fixed by banking
rules.
Bautista v. Gonzales. The lawyer may lend money to a client,
when it is necessary in the interest of justice to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The advances made shall be subject to reimbursement.
Otherwise, if the lawyer spends for all legal expenses, his contract
of legal employment might become champertous, if his attorney’s
fees will be payable in kind. Champertous contracts are void.
2007 Bar, Q. II: C engaged the services of attorney D concerning
various mortgage contracts entered into by her husband from
whom she is separated fearful that her real estate properties
will be foreclosed and of impending suits for sums of money
against her. Attorney D advised C to give him her land titles
covering her lots so he could sell them to enable her to pay her
creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his
favor without any monetary or valuable consideration, to which
C agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the
proceeds pay her creditors. Later on, C came to know that
attorney D did not sell her lots but instead paid her creditors
with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his
name.
Did attorney D violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Explain.
A: The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Hernandez v. Go, (2005), is squarely applicable to this problem.
Under the same set of facts, the Supreme Court held the lawyer
to have violated Canons 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides as follows:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold entrust all moneys and properties of
his client hat may come into his possession.
and Canon 17 of the same Code, which provides s follows:
“Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The Supreme Court further held that the lawyer concerned has
engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral
acts, which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
Consequently, the Court disbarred him.
2009 Bar, Q. XIV: Marlyn, a widow engaged the services of Atty.
Romanito in order to avert the foreclosure of several parcels of
land mortgaged by her late husband to several creditors. Atty.
Romanito advised the widow to execute in his favor deeds of
sale over the properties, so that he could sell them and generate
funds to pay her creditors. The widow agreed. Atty. Romanito
did not sell the properties, but paid the mortgage creditors with
his own funds, and had the land titles registered in his name.
Atty. Romanito succeeds in averting the foreclosure. Is he
administratively liable? Reasons.
A: Yes, Atty. Romanito is administratively liable. The basic facts in
this case are the same as the facts in Hernandez v. Go (2005),
where the Supreme Court found the lawyer to have violated
Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
disbarred him. The Supreme Court held that a lawyer’s acts of
acquiring for himself the lots entrusted to him by his client are, by
any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct. The lawyer in
that case was disbarred.
2011 Bar, Q. 46: Atty. Ramon borrowed his client's (Menchu)
land title. After eight months, Menchu demanded its return but
he failed to comply and changed his residence. After Menchu
tracked him down, she confronted him about the title. He then
offered to just buy the property and gave her five checks for it
but these bounced. Charged with malpractice, Atty. Ramon
answered that his license to practice law cannot be in issue. He
merely incurred civil liability for a failed transaction. Will the
malpractice action prosper?
(a) No, because his failure to pay his obligation only makes him
civilly liable.
(b) No, since Menchu did not transact business with Atty.
Ramon as a lawyer.
[104]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(c) Yes, because it is professionally reprehensible for a lawyer to
be unavailable to a person in need.
(d) Yes, he having taken advantage of Menchu who was not
fully protected and had no independent advice.
Canon 17: A Lawyer Owes Fidelity to the Cause of His Client and
He Shall Be Mindful of the Trust and Confidence Reposed in Him
Fidelity to the Cause of Client Must Always Be Maintained
 Fidelity to the cause of client is the essence of the legal
profession. Without this fidelity, the profession will not
survive, for in the long run, no one will engage any lawyer
anymore.
Canon 15, CPE. How far a lawyer may go in supporting a client's
cause. The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public
popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.
In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much
less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery, he must obey his own conscience
and not that of his client.
CPE, Canon 6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests. It is a
duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all
the circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest
in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the
client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters
adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed.

 It is not be stressed; the duty of fidelity requires the
existence of the attorney and client relationship. Once the
relationship exists, the SC will not hesitate to enforce
compliance with the standards of honorable dealing set by
law, by means of reprimands, fines, imprisonment,
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law
Lorenzana Food Corp. v. Daria. An attorney owes loyalty to his
client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and
it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in
another case other persons against his former client under the
pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the
former case.
It is Not a Good Practice for Lawyers to Fight Former Clients
Rosacia v. Bulalacao. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not
only in the case in which he has represented him but also after
the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good
practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other
person against his former client under the pretext that the case is
distinct from, and independent of the former case.
Relationship of Lawyer-Client, is Highly Fiduciary
Igual v. Javier. The relationship of lawyer-client demands utmost
fidelity and good faith.
Members of the Bar, was and is expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly the following Canons, viz.:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in all his dealings and transactions with his client
CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys properties of
his client that may come into his possession
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him
CANON 20 — A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
People v. Remudo. While a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s
cause, the fidelity should not, however, be at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Canon is a Strong Reminder of Lawyer’s Obligation to Remain
Loyal to the Client and to Keep Latter’s Secrets Given in
Confidence
 The second part of the Cannon is a ready reminder to
lawyers to keep their loyalty to their clients as well as to
keep the latter’s secrets given in confidence even after the
termination of the attorney-client relationship
 However, undivided fidelity to clients should not be at the
expense of truth and the fair dispensation of justice.
Canon 18: A Lawyer Shall Serve His Client with Competence and
Diligence
Diligence Defined
Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr. Diligence is "the attention and care
required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence." A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting
that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus
owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be
taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally
applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of
success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
Presumption of Diligence
People v. Mantawar. In the absence of any contrary evidence, a
lawyer is presumed to be prompt and diligent in the performance
of his duties and to have employed his best efforts, learning and
ability in the protection of his client’s interests and in the
discharge of his duties as an officer of the court.
Rule 131, Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
Competence and Diligence Highly Demanded of Lawyers
ABA, CPR. A lawyer should strive proficiency ion his practice and
should only accept employment in matters in which he is or can
become competent after reasonable preparation.
Rochelle v. Purpose. He attains and maintains his competence by
keeping abreast of current legal literature, participating in legal
[105]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
education program, concentrating in particular areas of the law
and availing himself of these means.
ABA, Code of Professional Conduct. The lawyer owes a duty to his
client to be competent to perform the legal services which the
lawyer undertakes on his behalf. The lawyer should serve his
client in a conscientious manner and he should provide a quality
of service at least equal to that which lawyers generally would
expect a competent lawyer in a like situation.
The competence referred to in the Canon goes beyond formal
qualification of the lawyer to practice of law. It has to do with the
sufficiency of the lawyer’s qualifications to deal with the matter in
question and includes knowledge and skill and the ability to use
them effectively in the interest of the client.
Blaza v. CA. The legal profession demands a lawyer that degree of
vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family and
should adopt “the norm of practice expected of men of good
intentions”
In brief, a lawyer must always be protective of the interests of his
clients as a good father would be protective of his own family.
Extraordinary Diligence, Not Required
Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr. The practice of law does not require
extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme
measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence
and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights."
All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree
of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias.
Exact Given Address Must Be Indicated in the Pleadings
NPA v. Tac-an. If a lawyer has two or more addresses, the address
indicated in the record of the case will alone be considered. The
court cannot take judicial notice of his new or other address. The
lawyer must observe due diligence.
2013 Bar, Q. XX: Armin, holding a transfer certificate of title to a
lot in downtown Calamba in the name of Bobby, shows you the
title and claims that Bobby sold him the lot. He then asks you to
draft a deed of sale covering the transaction. In reply to your
query on where Bobby is, Armin explains that Bobby is currently
out of the country but he (Armin) has his general power of
attorney which he also shows to you. The power of attorney
empowers Armin to do everything that Bobby can do with the
Calamba lot, but you note that it does not specifically authorize
Armin to sell the property. Armin also assures you that he wants

the deed of sale drafted so he can send it to Bobby for his
signature even while overseas.
How will you act under the given circumstances?
(a) Agree to draft the deed of sale, subject to your usual
10%commission.
(b) Refuse to draft the deed of sale, as Armin has not
presented a special power of attorney that would support
the deed that he is asking you to prepare.
(c) Refuse to draft the deed of sale, as Bobby is not present to
sign the deed of sale and verify that he is indeed selling his
lot to Armin.
(d) Agree to draft the deed of sale, since it is only a draft that
Bobby still has to consider and sign.
(e) Refuse to have anything to do with Armin’s request because
it is a potentially problematic situation given the price of lots
in downtown Calamba.
A: (b). CPR, Canon 18
2008 Bar, Q. VIII(a): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
lawyer concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: Filing a complaint that fails to state a cause of action,
thereby resulting in the defendant succeeding in his motion to
dismiss.
A: The lawyer may be sanctioned for lack of competence and
diligence (Canon 18, CPR). Rule 18.02 provides that a lawyer shall
not handle a case without adequate preparation. Filing a
complaint that fails to state a cause of action resulting to the
dismissal of his case shows incompetence and lack of adequate
preparation.
2011 Bar, Q. 50: Which of the following demonstrates a lawyer’s
fidelity to known practices and customs of the bar regarding a
case he is handling?
(a) Treating his client’s disclosures as confidential but not the
documents he submits for review.
(b) Meeting with his client’s opponent over lunch to discuss
settlement without telling his client.
(c) Accepting a tough case although he is new in practice,
trusting that his diligence would make up for lack of
experience.
(d) Inviting the judge hearing the case to dinner with no
purpose to discuss the case with him.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Rules 18.01: A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which
he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Implication of Acceptance of Cases
Islas v. Platon. When a lawyer accepts a case, whether for a fee or
not, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possess
the requisite degree of academic learning, skill and ability in the
practice of his possession; that he will exert his best judgment in
the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; and
that he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in
the pursuit or defense of the case.
Clients Entitled to Effective Representation
Benetti and Manzulla. Not only does everyone have the right to
representation but he has a right to an effective representation
Report of the IBP Committee. The lawyer should recognize his
lack of competence for a particular task and the disservice he
would do his client if he undertook that task. If he consulted in
such circumstances, he should either decline to act or obtain his
client’s instructions to retain, consult or collaborate with a lawyer
who is competent in that field.
He should also recognize the advice from or collaborate with
experts in scientific, accounting or other non-legal fields. He
should not hesitate to consult experts in non-legal areas where
consultation is needed
Government Lawyer, Disqualified to Practice Law
Ramos v. Imbang. A lawyer who is part of the PAO cannot
practice law. His acceptance of attorney’s fees from outside
clients is a violation of Canon 1 and Rule 18.01 of the CPR. He was
disbarred.
Collaborating Counsel
A collaborating counsel is one who is subsequently engaged to
assist a lawyer already handling a particular case for a client.
When a case is complicated, it is not unusual for the handling
lawyer to suggest to the client to allow him to take another
lawyer to assist or collaborate with him in the case.
The handling lawyer cannot just take another counsel without the
consent of the client. The new lawyer on the other hand, cannot
just enter his appearance as collaborating counsel without
[106]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
conformity of the first counsel. Coordination is therefore
necessary to avoid any misunderstanding.
Sublay v. NLRC. The same diligence required of the first counsel is
required of the collaborating counsel. The negligence of the latter
is binding on the client.
2014 Bar, Q. XXIII: May a client hire additional counsel as
collaborating counsel over and above the objection of the
original counsel?
A: Yes, the client is entitled to have as many lawyers as he can
afford. Professional courtesy, however, demands that a lawyer
retained as a collaborating counsel should at least communicate
with the original counsel before entering his appearance. On the
part of the original counsel, he should not look at the
employment of a collaborating counsel as a loss of confidence in
him.
2001 Bar, Q. IX: What should a lawyer, generally obligated by
law to accept a retainer, do if he knows or should know that he
is not qualified to render the legal service required? Explain.
A: "A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may
render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain
as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the
matter." (Rule 18.01, CPR)
1989 Bar, Q. IV(2): Does the client have the right to hire another
lawyer as collaborating counsel at any time? Explain your
answer.
A: Yes, the client has the right to hire another lawyer as
collaborating counsel anytime. It is the prerogative of the client to
employ as many attorneys as he may desire to protect his
interest.
Rule 18.02: A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Adequate Preparation, Concept
 Adequate preparation includes among other virtues,
sufficient knowledge of the law and jurisprudence, ability in
trial technique and high proficiency in the formulation of
pleadings.

Bautista v. Rebueno. A lawyer must keep himself constantly
abreast with the trend of authoritative pronouncements and
developments in all branches of the law.
Phil. Assoc. of Free Labor Unions v. BLR. Lawyers should include
in the pleadings all material and vital facts bearing on the merit or
lack of merit of the case. He should find time to attend legal
seminars for intellectual advancement.
Javellana v. Lutero. A counsel for any party in a judicial
controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and with
due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty
bound to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed.
This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case, such
as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and
uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-
appellant has been remiss in this respect.
Comfortable Workload; Too Much Work Will Adversely Affect
Lawyer’s Proficiency
Legarda v. CA. A lawyer must handle cases only as much as he can
efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be prejudiced.
ABA, CPR. It is not enough that a lawyer is qualified to handle the
legal matter. He is also required to prepare adequately for and
give appropriate attention to his legal work.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Ordinary Diligence, Required of the Lawyer
Pajarillo v. WCC. The lawyer owes it to his clients to exercise his
utmost learning and ability in maintaining causes. A license to
practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the
licensee possess sufficient skill and knowledge to manager their
causes.
Hermanos v. Perez. In the practice of law, eternal diligence is the
price of success.
PBC v. Aruego. The legal profession demands of a lawyer that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a
family.
He is required to exercise ordinary diligence in the prosecution or
defense of his client’s causes
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Edquibal v. Ferrer. All that is required is ordinary pater familias. It
is very ideal if a lawyer strives to observe extraordinary diligence
in protecting the interest of the client. That is walking the extra
mile.
Guiang v. Antonio. A lawyer was suspended from the practice of
law for not appealing (Petition for Review) the adverse decision of
the CA to the prejudice of his clients.
Attorney Not Bound to Exercise Extraordinary Diligence
Adarne v. Aldaba. An attorney is not bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and
skill, having reference to the character of the business he
undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being, he is
not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected
as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill
and knowledge.
In re: Filart. An attorney is not expected to know all laws. He is
not liable for disbarment for an honest mistake or error.
He is not an insurer of the result in a case where he is engaged in
as counsel. Only ordinary care and diligence and required of him.
Lawell v. Groman. The degree of care and skill required of the
lawyer is not affected however by the fact that the lawyer’s
services are rendered gratuitously.
Greenhills Airconditioning and Services Inc. v. NLRC. Litigants
should give the necessary assistance to their counsel for what is at
stake is their interest in the case.
A Lawyer is Liable For His Negligence
 If by reason of the lawyer’s negligence, actual loss has been
caused to his client, the latter has a cause of action against
him for damages.
 However, for the lawyer to be held liable, his failure to
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence must be the
proximate cause of the loss
Applicability of “Command Responsibility” in Law Firm
Practitioners
Solatan v. Inocentes. The failure of a senior lawyer to exercise
certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law
firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. While the term “command
responsibility” has special meaning within the circle of men in
[107]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
uniform in the military, the principle does not abide solely
therein.
Let it not be said that law firm practitioners are given a free hand
to assign cases to seasoned attorneys and thereafter conveniently
forget about the case. To do so would be a disservice to the
profession, the integrity and advancement of which this Court
must jealously protect.
The name practitioner of the law office is tasked with the
responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all
lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the CPR.
Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are
legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising
themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by the
persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and
in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the occurrence of
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons
under their charge
Cuison v. Macalino. In the instant case, after agreeing to
represent the complainant's husband, taking possession of their
car and persuading the complainant to sell the same to him for a
nominal amount, the respondent refused to carry out his duties as
counsel prompting the complainant to secure the services of
another lawyer to defend her husband. The respondent clearly
breached his obligation under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
The respondent's infraction is compounded by the fact that he
issued a check in favor of the complainant's husband which was
later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
Such conduct indicates the respondent's unfitness for the trust
and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of
public confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action
Lawyer Has No Authority to Waive Client’s Right to Appeal
Reontoy v. Ibadlit. A lawyer has no authority to waive his client's
right to appeal. His failure to perfect an appeal within the
prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice
proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Instances of Negligence of Attorneys
1. Mapua v. Mendoza. Failure of counsel to ask for additional
time to answer a complaint resulting in default judgment
against his client.
2. Fitch v. Scott. Failure to bring suit immediately. When the
belated suit was filed, the defendant had already become
insolvent and recovery could no longer be had. The lawyer
was declared liable to the client.
3. Joven-de Jesus v. PNB. Failure to ascertain date of receipt
from post office of notice of decision resulting in non-
perfection of the appellant’s appeal.
4. People v. Cawili. Failure to file briefs within the
reglementary period.
5. Gaerlan v. Bernal. Failure to attend to trial without filing a
motion for postponement or without requesting either of
his two partners in the law office to take his place and
appear for the defendants.
Agravante v. Patriarca. Failure to appear at pre-trial.
6. Ventura v. Santos. Failure of counsel to notify clients of the
scheduled trial which prevented the latter to look for
another lawyer to represent them while counsel was in the
hospital.
7. Alcoriza v. Lumakang. Failure to appear simply because the
client did not go to counsel’s office on the date of the trial as
was agreed upon.
8. Capulong v. Alino. Failure to pay the appellate docket fee
after receiving the amount for the purpose.
9. PHHC v. Tiongco. Failure to take action to have the adverse
decision reconsidered
Toquib v. Tomol. Failure to appeal the adverse decision
10. Juane v. Garcia. Failure to notify the court of counsel’s
change of address resulting in failure to receive judicial
orders to the prejudice of client.
11. Rigi-Bilt Industries, Inc. v. CA. Failure to take necessary
precaution to insure that he receives all court notices and
processes promptly.
12. Gonzales v. Presiding Judge of RTC of Bohol. Failure to
present evidence
13. Lorenzana Food Corp. v. Daria. Failure to file the required
position paper which prejudiced the client’s cause.
14. Five Star Bus Co. v. CA. Failure to inform client of the
scheduled pre-trial conference.
15. Tuason v. CA. Failure of counsel to notify his client on time
of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
16. Villafuerte v. Cortez. Failure to do anything to protect
client’s interest after receiving acceptance fee.
17. Fil-Garcia Inc. v. Hernandez. Failure to file Petition for
Review.
Villafuerte v. Cortez
1. Lawyer received P1,750 as acceptance fee from complainant
for the former to handle a case
2. There were two conferences held between them.
3. But the lawyer still needs the records of the case which were
in the possession of the former lawyer of the complainant.
4. The latter promised to return and bring the records. He did
not return.
5. Respondent lawyer did not enter his appearance in the case.
6. When the complainant returned, he left a writ of execution
involving the ejectment case filed against him.
7. He charged the lawyer with disbarment
Issue:
(1) WON there was a lawyer-client relationship created to pin
down the lawyer for negligence
(2) WON there is negligence on the part of the client
Held:
1. The Court is convinced that a lawyer-client relationship,
given the circumstances, has arisen between respondent
and complainant. Respondent lawyer has admitted having
received the amount of P1,750.00, including its nature and
purpose, from complainant.
2. His acceptance of the payment effectively bars him from
altogether disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between them.
3. It would not matter really whether the money has been
intended to pertain only to Civil Case No. 83-18877 or to
include Civil Case No. 062160-CV, there being no showing, in
any event, that respondent lawyer has attended to either of
said cases.
4. It would seem that he hardly has exerted any effort to find
out what might have happened to his client's cases. A
lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be
ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected
of him.
5. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect, within
the bounds of the law, the interests of his client. The Code
of Professional Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its
dictum than when it has stated that a "lawyer shall serve his
[108]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
client with competence and diligence," decreeing further
that he "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
6. Complainant, nevertheless, is not entirely without fault
himself. He cannot expect his case to properly and
intelligently handled without listening to his own counsel
and extending full cooperation to him. It is not right for
complainant to wait for almost two years and to deal with
his lawyer only after receiving an adverse decision.
7. Recommended suspension was reduced to one month
A Lawyer Should Adopt A System Which Will Assure Him of
Receiving Judicial Notices Properly
Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos. Court has repeatedly
admonished lawyers to adopt a system whereby they can always
receive promptly judicial notices and pleadings intended for them,
and they should always notify the court whenever they change
their address
Lawyer Should Accept Only So Much Cases He Can Handle
Legarda v. CA. A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and
time to his cases. This is the reason why a practicing lawyer
should accept only so many cases he can handle. Once he agreed
to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication
and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his oath
as a lawyer.
Moton v. Cadiao. Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by
reason of Atty. Cadiao's negligence, actual loss has been caused to
his client Elmo S. Moton. He should give adequate attention, care
and time to his cases. This is why a practising lawyer may accept
only so many cases that he can efficiently handle. Otherwise, his
clients will be prejudiced. Once he agrees to handle a case, he
should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should
do any less, then he is not true to his lawyer's oath.
2014 Bar, Q. XXX(b): May a lawyer be held liable for damages by
his client for the lawyer’s failure to file the necessary pleadings
to prosecute the client’s case and as a result of which the client
suffered damages?
A: Yes, he may be held liable. Rule 18.03, CPR provides that “a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable”. But
attorney-client relationship, want of reasonable care and
diligence, and injury sustained by the client as the proximate

result thereof, are the prerequisites to the maintenance of an
action for damages against a lawyer.
2002 Bar, Q. I(A): After reading the decision against his client
Jose Kapuspalad, Atty. Calmante was convinced that it had a
reasonable basis and that he would have difficulty obtaining a
reversal. For this reason, Atty. Calmante did not appeal. When
Jose learned about the judgment against him, he blamed Atty.
Calmante for not taking a timely appeal and filed an
administrative complaint for negligence against the latter.
Decide the case.
A: I would rule in favor of Jose Kapuspalad. In Reontoy v. Ibadlit,
1998, the Supreme Court found a lawyer to be negligent for
failing, first of all, to notify his client about the adverse decision,
and, secondly, for failing to file an appeal in the belief that such
appeal would be useless. He thus deprived his client of his right to
appeal. If a lawyer cannot contact his client at once after receiving
the adverse decision, the prudent step for him to take is to file a
notice of appeal, and withdraw it afterwards if his client should
decide against the appeal. It is the client’s decision whether or not
to appeal.
2003 Bar, Q. VI: The Supreme Court issued a resolution in a case
pending before it, requiring the petitioner to file, within ten (10)
days from notice, a reply to the respondent's comment.
Attorney A, representing the petitioner, failed to file the reply
despite the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Court’s
resolution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for non-
compliance with its resolution. Attorney A timely moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition, claiming that his
secretary, who was quite new in the office, failed to remind him
of the deadline within which to file a reply. Resolve Attorney A's
motion.
A: Attorney A’s motion is not meritorious. He has violated Rule
12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that “a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to
do so”. His claim that it was the fault of his secretary is not
sufficient. He cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of his
secretary because the latter is not a guardian of the lawyer’s
responsibilities (Nidua v. Lazaro, 1989).
2005 Bar, Q. VIII: Due to the number of cases handled by Atty.
Cesar, he failed to file a notice of change of address with the
Court of Appeals. Hence, he was not able to file an appellant’s
brief and consequently, the case was dismissed. Aggrieved, Atty.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Cesar filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing the appeal and to set aside the entry of judgment on
the ground that he already indicated in his “Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appeal Brief’ his new address and that
his failure to file a notice of change of address is an excusable
negligence.
Will the motion prosper? Explain.
A: The motion will not prosper. It is the lawyer’s duty to inform
the court or to make of record of his change of address. His failure
to do so does not constitute excusable negligence. The lawyer
cannot presume that the court will take cognizance of the new
address in his motion for extension of time (Philippine Suburban
Dev. Corp. v. CA, 1980).
2011 Bar, Q. 34: Which of the following instances demonstrates
counsel’s LACK of diligence in serving his client's interest?
(a) Failing to file his client’s appeal brief despite 2 extensions
upon the excuse that the client did not coordinate with
him.
(b) Failing to send to client a requested legal opinion until after
the latter gave him the additional documents he requested.
(c) Failing to rehearse his client on his testimony before the
trial.
(d) Updating his client about the status of his case by phone and
electronic mail.
2007 Bar, Q. III: Attorney M accepted a civil case for the recovery
of title and possession of land in behalf of N. Subsequently, after
the Regional Trial Court had issued a decision adverse to N, the
latter filed an administrative case against attorney M for
disbarment. He alleged that attorney M caused the adverse
ruling against him; that attorney M did not file an opposition to
the Demurrer to Evidence filed in the case, neither did he appear
at the formal hearing on the demurrer, leading the trial court to
assume that plaintiffs counsel (attorney M) appeared convinced
of the validity of the demurrer filed; that attorney M did not
even file a motion for reconsideration, causing the order to
become final and executory; and that even prior to the above
elements and in view of attorney M’s apparent loss of interest in
the case, he verbally requested attorney M to withdraw, but
attorney M refused. Complainant N further alleged that attorney
M abused his client’s trust and confidence and violated his oath
of office in failing to defend his client’s cause to the very end.
Attorney M replied that N did not give him his full cooperation;
that the voluminous records turned over to him were in
disarray, and that when he appeared for N, he had only half of
[109]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
the information and background of the case; that he was
assured by N’s friends that they had approached the judge; that
they requested him (M) to prepare a motion for reconsideration
which he did and gave to them; however, these friends did not
return the copy of the motion.
Will the administrative case proper? Give reasons for your
answer.
A: The administrative case will prosper. In failing to file an
opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence and to appear at the
hearing thereof, and, more so, in failing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the demurrer, thereby
causing the same to become final and executory, Attorney M
violated Canon 18, CPR, which provides that a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence, and Rule 18.03 which
provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall make him
liable.
In refusing to comply with N’s request to withdraw from the case,
Atty. M violated the rule that a client has the absolute right to
terminate the lawyer client relationship at any time with or
without cause.
Atty. M’s defense that the voluminous records turned over to him
were in disarray and when he appeared for B he had only half of
the information and background of the case, is not meritorious.
Rule 18.02 provides that he shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation. He should have been competent
and diligent enough to organize the records given to him, and not
go to trial with only half of the information and knowledge of the
case. It is his duty to go to trial adequately prepared (Rule 12.01,
CPR).
His defense that friends of N assured him that they had
approached the judge, and asked him to prepare a motion for
reconsideration, which he allegedly did and gave to them, is
incredible. Even if true, Atty. M violated Canon No. 13 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer shall
rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing
the court.”
For that matter, even his alleged giving of his motion for
reconsideration to the friends of N for filing, is another instance of
negligence on the part of Atty. M. He should have taken care to
file his motion himself (Francisco v. Portugal, 2006).
1989 Bar, Q. VII:

(1) Does the mistake of an attorney bind his client? Explain
your answer.
(2) Does the negligence of an attorney bind his client? Explain
your answer.
A:
(1) Yes, mistakes of an attorney bind his client. This
consequence is based on the rule that any act performed by
the lawyer within the scope of his general and implied
authority is regarded as the act of his client.
(2) Likewise, the negligence of the counsel also binds the client.
Under the system of advocacy, the client has to bear the
adverse consequences of the mistake and negligence of his
counsel and may not be heard to complain that the result
might have been different had he proceeded differently.
An exception, however, may be applied if the mistakes or
negligence is so gross that injustice may have resulted.
2002 Bar, Q. IV:
A. State the rule on whether a client is bound by the mistake
of his counsel.
B. On account of his mistake, Is counsel liable to his client for
damages? Explain.
A:
A. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer (Cabales v.
Nery, 1979; Valerio v. Sec. of Agriculture, 1963). However,
when the lawyer has practically sold his client down the river
or when the negligence is so gross that the client was
deprived of due process, the client is not bound by the
negligence of the lawyer (PHHC v. Tiongco, 1964); SMC v.
Laguesma, 1994).
B. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall make him
liable (Rule 18.03, Code of Professional Responsibility). A
client who suffers prejudice by reason of his counsel’s
Inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his duty may
filean action for damages against him. However, there must
be a showing that had the lawyer exercised due diligence,
the client under the facts and the law would have succeeded
in recovering from the adverse party or in resisting the claim
of the latter.
2000 Bar, Q. X(a): State the exception to the rule that the
negligence of counsel binds the client.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. The exception is where the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law or where its application results in the outright
deprivation of one’s property through a technicality (Salonga
v. CA, 1997), or when the application of the general rule will
result in serious injustice (SMC v. Laguesma, 1994).
1998 Bar, Q. VI: Nene approached Atty. Nilo and asked him if it
was alright to buy a piece of land which Maneng was selling.
What was shown by Maneng to Nene was an Original Certificate
of Title with many annotations and old patches, to which Nene
expressed suspicion. However, Atty. Nilo, desirous of pushing
through with the transaction because of the high notarial fee
promised to him, told Nene that the title was alright and that
she should not worry since he is an attorney and that he knew
Maneng well. He notarized the Deed of Sale and Nene paid
Maneng P 108,000.00. It turned out that Maneng had previously
sold the same property to another person.
For the injustice done to Nene, may Atty. Nilo be disciplined?
A: Yes. Atty. Nilo is guilty of gross negligence in protecting the
interests of his client. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable (Rule 18.03, Code of Professional Responsibility).
Worse, he was negligent because he placed his own interest in
receiving a high notarial fee over and above the Interest of his
client. In the case of Nadayag v. Grageda, which involves similar
facts, the Supreme Court held that the lawyer "should have been
conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect
of a transaction for which his services had been engaged, in
conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the
Bar."
Rule 18.04: A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
Client Must Be Kept Informed of the Status of the Case (Rule
18.04)
 In case of adverse decision, the client must be informed
within the period of appeal to enable him to decide whether
or not he will still seek an appellate review of the decision
Alcala v. De Vera. In failing to inform his clients, the petitioners,
of the decision in said civil case, respondent failed to exercise
"such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
[110]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment". The relationship of lawyer-client being one of
confidence, there is ever present the need for the client's being
adequately and fully informed and should not be left in the dark
as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being
defended. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain
unimpaired. Lawyer was severely censured
Five Star Bus Co. v. CA. Failure of the lawyer to inform the client
of the scheduled pre-trial conference where the client’s presence
is required, resulting in the client’s declaration as in default or in
the non-suiting of the client as the case may be is gross negligence
for which the lawyer may be made liable administratively or for
damages, should the client be prejudiced thereby.
Ventura vs. Santos. The lawyer was suspended from the practice
of law for his failure to inform his clients of the scheduled trial of
the case, which trial, the clients failed to attend.
Katindig v. Brillantes. A lawyer should not also give an erroneous
information to the client regarding the case. Such an act is often
the root of unpleasant relationship between them.
Mejares v. Romana. Keeping the client informed of the
developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and
lost of trust and confidence in the attorney.
Indeed, the relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence,
there is ever present the need for the lawyer to inform timely and
adequately the client of important developments affecting the
client’s case. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.
Duty of a Party-Litigant as Regards His Case of Cases
 It is the duty of a party litigant to be in contact with his
counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the
progress of the case.
Bernardo v. CA. True enough, the party-litigant should not rely
totally on his counsel to litigate his case even if the latter
expressly assures that the former's presence in court will no
longer be needed. No prudent party will leave the fate of his case
entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings may be
negligible but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case
for several months (four, in this case) is inexcusable. It is the duty
of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to
time in order to be informed of the progress of his case.
Petitioner simply claims that he was busy with his gravel and sand
and trading businesses which involved frequent traveling from

Manila to outlying provinces. But this was not a justifiable excuse
for him to fail to ask about the developments in his case or to ask
somebody to make the query for him. Petitioner failed to act with
prudence and diligence; hence, his plea that he was not accorded
the right to due process cannot elicit this Court's approval or even
sympathy.
GCP-Manny Transport Services Inc. v. Principe It is petitioner’s
duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be
constantly posted about the case. It is mandated to inquire from
its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to
time and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and
await the outcome of the case.
Villariasa-Rosenbeck v. Abarrientos. A lawyer who repeatedly
fails to answer the inquiries or communications of a client violates
the rules of professional courtesy and neglects the client's
interests.
Analogous Cases
Greenhills Airconditioning and Services v. NLRC. Litigants should
give the necessary assistance to their counsel for what is at stake
is their interest in the case.
Canon 19: A Lawyer Shall Represent His Client With Zeal Within
the Bounds of the Law
Devotion to the Client; Limitation
CPE, Canon 15. How far a lawyer may go in supporting a client's
cause. The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public
popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.
In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much
less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery, he must obey his own conscience
and not that of his client.
 The responsibility for advising as to questionable defenses is
the lawyer’s responsibility. He cannot escape it by urging as
an excuse that he is only following his client’s instructions.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Maglasang v. People. A lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
2016 Bar, Q. XII: Jaybee engaged the services of Atty. Pete to
defend him in a criminal case for murder. During trial, when the
defense was presenting its evidence, Jaybee admitted to Atty.
Pete that he killed the victim in the case. Atty. Pete withdrew
from the case. Jaybee sued Atty. Pete for disbarment alleging
that the latter violated Canon 15 of the CPR that "a lawyer shall
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client" and Canon 17 of the CPR that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." Rule on the
case and explain.
A: I will rule in favor of Atty. Pete.
A lawyer’s duty of entire devotion to his client’s cause must be
performed within the bounds of the law. Canon 19, CPR provides
that “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law” Canon 15, CPE also provides that:
“The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public
popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.
In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much
less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery, he must obey his own conscience
and not that of his client.”
Moreover, Rule 19.02, CPR provides that “a lawyer who has
received information that his client has in the course of his
representation, perpetuated fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which
he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance
with the ROC”.
[111]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
But of course, Atty. Pete should not reveal what Jaybee revealed
to him, because the same is covered by the duty of confidentiality
under Canon 21 of the same code.
2003 Bar, Q. VII: Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, "a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law." How far, in general terms, may a
lawyer go in advocating, supporting and defending the cause of
his client in a criminal case filed against the latter?
A: “The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a
lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is simply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel
who commits himself to the cause of the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind the basic rights of the accused, his
being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental
procedure, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of
an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it
means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a
simple prefunctory representation. "(People v. Bernas, 1999),
cited in People v. Sta. Teresa, 2001). However, a lawyer shall
employ only honorable and honest means in the maintenance of
his client’s cause. (Section 20, Rule 128).
2006 Bar, Q. VIII: Prosecutor Coronel entered his appearance on
behalf of the State before a Family Court in a case for
declaration of nullity of marriage, but he failed to appear in all
the subsequent proceedings. When required by the Department
of Justice to explain, he argued that the parties in the case were
ably represented by their respective counsels and that his time
would be better employed in more substantial prosecutorial
functions, such as investigations, inquests and appearances in
court hearings.
Is Atty. Coronel’s explanation tenable?
A: Atty. Coronel’s explanation is not tenable the role of the State’s
lawyer in nullification of marriage cases is that of protector of the
institution of marriage (Art 48, Family Code). “The task of
protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant .and zealous participation and not mere pro forma
compliance" (Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 2001). This role could not be
left to the- private counsels who have been engaged to protect
the private interests of the parties.

Rule 19.01: A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Only Honorable, Fair and Honest Means Shall Be Employed in
the Maintenance of Cases
Lacsamana v. Dela Pena. The lawyer must not present and offer
in evidence any document which he knows is false.
ABA Op. 150. He should not also under any circumstance present
a false witness whom he knows will perjure.
RPC, Art. 184. Offering false testimony in evidence - Any person
who shall knowingly offer in evidence a false witness or testimony
in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished as guilty of
false testimony and shall suffer the respective penalties provided
in this section.
Negative Pregnant Improper
 A negative pregnant is condemned because it is pregnant
with alternative admissions to allegations of the complaint.
Galofa v. Nee Bon Sing. A denial in the form of a negative
pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be ascertained
whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is intended to
be denied.
Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying
language, and the denial is conjunctive, a "negative pregnant"
exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied, while
the fact itself is admitted.
Sy-Quia v. Marsman. A lawyer should not also resort to that form
of denial “of lack of knowledge or information to form a belief as
to the truth of an allegation” – in bad faith. The lawyer who
resorts to such negative denial for the purpose of confusing the
other party or for purposes of delay invites disciplinary action
from the court.
Capital Motors Corp. v. Yabut. Furthermore, such kind of denial
may amount to an admission of the material allegations when the
fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is so plainly and
necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge that his averment
of ignorance must be palpably untrue. Such admission could be a
basis for rendition of judgment on the pleadings.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Rule 138, Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
CPE, Canon 15. The lawyer can present every remedy or defense
authorized by law in support of his client’s cause, regardless of his
personal views
People v. Prieto. Reason: The lawyer’s belief has no real bearing
on the case.
Moreover, if expression of personal views were permitted, that
would give improper advantage to the experienced and better
known lawyers whose views would carry more weight.
CPE, Canon 15. The lawyer’s omission to make an assertion on the
justice of the case might be interpreted as lack of belief in the
soundness of the client’s case. In the full discharge of his duties,
the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public.
Lawyer Shall Not File or Threaten to File Any Unfounded or
Baseless Cases Against Adversaries of His Client
 The lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded
or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of
his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer’s client
CPE, Canon 30. Justifiable and unjustifiable litigations. The
lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense
when convicted that it is intended merely to harass or to injure
the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. But otherwise
it is right, and having accepted retainer, it becomes his duty to
insist upon the judgment of the court as to the legal merits of his
client's claim. His appearance in court should be deemed
equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion his
client's case is one proper for judicial determination.
Pena v. Aparicio. Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a
standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually
done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that
he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of
his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's
claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as
[112]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified
period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a
simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory
charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his
client's claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously
designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to
their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed
by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Blackmail
Pena v. Aparicio. Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a
person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the
public prints, obtaining of value from a person as a condition of
refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing
some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common
parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and
synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the
performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise
of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by
operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal
or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the
victim.
 However, the lawyer may file criminal cases or other cases
which are ripe and justifiable under the attendant
circumstances against the adversaries of his clients
 See Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.02
 A lawyer shall not bribe or attempt to bribe a judge to win
his case. Any means not honorable, fair and honest which is
resorted by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to
his client’s cause is condemnable and unethical.
Lacson, Jr. v. CA. A client’s cause does not permit a lawyer to
cross the line between liberty and license
Defense of a Person Accused of a Crime
Rule 138, Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the
law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of
life or liberty, but by due process of law.
1997 Bar, Q. XIII: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall
represent his client with zeal in the maintenance and defense of

his rights. How far, in general terms, may a lawyer go in
advocating, supporting and defending his client’s rights and
interests?
A: Rule 19.01, CPR provides that a lawyer shall employ only fair
and honest means to obtain the lawful objectives of his client. In
championing the cause of his client a lawyer should employ only
such means as are consistent with truth and honor. He should not
go beyond the bounds of the law or the ethics of his profession.
Rule 19.02: A lawyer who has received information that his
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate
the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
Lawyer Shall Not Allow His Client to Perpetuate Fraud
CPE, Canon 16. Restraining clients from improprieties. A lawyer
should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients
from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do,
particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts,
judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persist sin
such wrongdoings the lawyer should terminate their relation.
 However, the lawyer shall not volunteer the information
about the client’s commission of the fraud to anyone for
that will run counter to his duty to maintain at all times the
client’s confidences and secrets under Canon 21
1993 Bar, Q. XIII: Atty. Cua wins a case involving a donation
mortis causa. Afterwards, she discovers, and is convinced, that
the Deed of Donation was falsified, and that it was her client
who did the falsification. If you were Atty. Cua. what would you
do? Explain.
A: If I were Atty. Cua. I would resign as his lawyer. The question as
to whether the attorney should disclose the falsification to the
court or to the prosecuting attorney Involves a balancing of
loyalties. One ethical rule states that “counsel upon the trial of a
cause in which perjury has been committed owes it to the
profession and the public to bring the matter to the knowledge of
the prosecuting authorities". Another ethical rule provides that
when “a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which is unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he
should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if
his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained. he
should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that
they may take appropriate steps". A literal application of these
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
ethical injunctions requires the disclosure of the falsification. On
the other hand, the attorney’s duty to keep Inviolate the client's
confidence demands that he refrain from revealing the client’s
wrong-doing, the same being a past offense. Resigning as a lawyer
will enable the lawyer to observe such loyalties. If the decision is
already final, as a lawyer. I would advise my client to withdraw
any claim on the donation mortis causa and have the property be
given to the rightful owner of the property the subject matter of
the donation.
This action is in compliance with my duty as a lawyer to assist in
the administration of justice and in compliance of my oath; “I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; that I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
and or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same”.
During the investigation before the IBP, Matapobre interposed
the following defenses:
(1) He cannot possibly be charged with usury since the Usury
Law has been virtually repealed and the Central Bank
allows the Imposition of any rate of interest;
Even assuming that he charges “usurious" rates of interest,
the debtor freely assumes the obligation;
(2) The charges being preferred against him concern his
personal conduct and has nothing to do with the practice
of his profession; and
(3) The IBP has no jurisdiction over his acts, personal or
professional. If at all, it is only the Supreme Court that can
discipline him.
How do you dispose of Matapobre’s arguments? Rebut each one
in sequence.
A:
(1) What is in issue in this question is not the violation of the
Usury Law but the action of Attorney Matapobre in taking
undue advantage of borrowers to make it appear that the
Bouncing Check Law was violated by his victims. Certainly it
is grossly immoral for the lawyer to manipulate the
transactions which resulted in charging excessive rates of
interests on loans and later threatening them with violation
of the Bouncing Check law. Canon 1, Rule 1.01 provides that
a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
(2) It is not altogether true that the borrowers freely assumed
the obligation as it was the lawyer himself who drafted and
manipulated the documents and made the borrowers sign
them which they did not fully comprehend.
[113]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(3) The lawyer is liable even for acts not connected in his legal
profession.
(4) The IBP has jurisdiction to investigate the case through the
Grievance Committee under Rule139 (b) of the Rules of
Court.
1995 Bar, Q. V: Winnie retained the services of Atty. Derecho to
file a collection case against Carmen. Winnie paid Atty. Derecho
a sizeable retainer's fee which the latter accepted. Later, in the
process of determining the amount of debt to be collected from
Carmen, Atty. Derecho noticed that of the total claim of 8.5
Million, certain invoices covering 3.5 Million appeared to be
Irregular. Winnie while admitting the irregularity assures her
lawyer that there would be no problem as Carmen was by
nature negligent in keeping her records and would not notice
the mistake anyway. Atty. Derecho tried to convince Winnie to
exclude the amount of 3.5 Million but Winnie refused. As a
consequence, Atty. Derecho terminated their relationship and
withdrew from the case.
Was Atty. Derecho right in terminating their relationship and
withdrawing from the case? How about the fact that he had
already accepted a sizeable retainer’s fee from his client?
Discuss fully.
A: Atty. Derecho was right in terminating the lawyer-client
relationship and withdrawing from the case. Rule 22.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer may
withdraw his services when the client pursues an illegal or
immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is
handling, or when the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of the canons and rules. Rule 15.07 provides
that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness. While he owes his client warm
zeal, it should always be within the bounds of the law (Canon 19,
CPR).
The fact that Atty. Derecho had already accepted a sizeable
retainer’s fee should make no difference on his decision to
withdraw. Moreover, he may retain the fees he has already
received, his withdrawal being justified (Pineda. Legal & Judicial
Ethics. 1994 edition, p. 223), unless the same is unconscionable.
2001 Bar, Q. X: Atty. A discovered his client's fraud against the
adverse party. What steps should he take so that his client will
secure only that which is legally and justly due him?
A: "A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify

the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court". (Rule
19.02, CPR)
1994 Bar, Q. IV(b): During the course of his cross-examination,
your client had testified to events and circumstances which you
personally know to be untrue. If his testimony was given
credence and accepted as fact by the court, you are sure to win
your client’s case. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is your obligation to: your client?
A: A lawyer who has received information that his client has. in
the course of the representation, perpetuated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and failing which he has to terminate the relationship with
such client in accordance with the Rules of Court (Rule 19.02,
Canon 19, CPR).
Rule 19.03: A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.
Lawyer, Not Client Controls the Procedure in the Handling of a
Case
Crespo v. Amurao. In matters of law, it is the client who yields to
the lawyer and not the lawyer yielding to the client. The lawyer
must not accede, but instead must resist his client’s unlawful
requests or instructions.
Hale v. Wheeler. The basis for this rule of giving the attorney the
full charge of the remedy and procedure is because he is trained
and skilled in the law.
The client has no knowledge of procedure and necessarily
entrusts this to the attorney he employs.
Dick v. U.S. The Rule speaks of procedure only. The lawyer can for
instance choose the proceedings he will institute in the pursuit of
his client’s case; he will determine the witnesses to be presented
in court. He can enter into stipulations of fact, though of not law.
He can agree to advance the date of hearing or to continue the
case; he can waive objections to evidence as he may deem fit.
In brief, in matters of procedure, where he is skilled, he is in
control but not as to the subject matter of the case.
Mobil Oil Phil. Inc. v. CFI of Rizal. The counsels of the parties in
this case had the implied authority to do all acts necessary or
incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
behalf of their clients of their clients who were all present and
never objected to the disputed order of the respondent court.
They have the exclusive management of the procedural aspect of
the litigation including the enforcement of the rights and
remedies of their client. Thus, when the case was submitted for
decision on the evidence so far presented, the counsel for private
respondents acted within the scope of his authority as agent and
lawyer in negotiating for favorable terms for his clients.
Belandres v. Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co. Inc.
Facts:
1. Plaintiff Soledad Belandres brought an action to recover
damages for the death of her son Querubin Villa, employed
as train conductor of the defendant.
2. The complaint was filed under Art. 2176 and 2180 of the CC.
3. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter which
should have been brought before the WCC which has
exclusive jurisdiction over claims for compensation for the
death, Injury or illness of workers.
4. The motion was granted.
5. The trial court used as one of the reasons the supposed
admission of plaintiff’s counsel that his client’s action was
one for compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Act
Issue: WON the act of the lawyer binds the plaintiff
Held:
1. The admission of plaintiff’s counsel was beyond the scope of
his authority as counsel.
2. The admission does not refer to any matter of judicial
procedure related to the enforcement of the remedy but to
the subject matter or cause of action which the client alone
can make the binding admission.
 See Rule 15.07 and Rule 1.03
Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union v. Lo Bu. The lawyer ought
to know that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than
the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like
an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to
do his bidding.
CPE, Canon 24. Right of lawyer to control the incidents of the
trial. As to incidental matters pending trial, not affecting the
merits of the cause, or working substantial prejudice to the rights
of the client, such as forcing the opposite lawyer to trial when he
[114]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
is under affliction or bereavement; forcing the trial on a particular
day to the injury of the opposite lawyer when no harm will result
from a trial at different time; agreeing to an extension of time for
signing a bill of exceptions, cross interrogatories and the like, the
lawyer must be allowed to judge. In such matters no client has a
right to demand that his counsel shall be illiberal, or that he does
anything therein repugnant to his own sense of honor and
propriety.
Obligations of Counsel to Comply with His Client’s Lawful
Requests; Remedy if Lawyer Does Not Agree
 When the client’s requests are proper and lawful, the lawyer
has the duty to oblige. Thus, on matters of compromise, the
client’s instructions are generally followed.
 See Rule 1.04
 The client decides whether to appeal or not to appeal an
adverse decision. If he decides not to appeal, the lawyer
must not insist otherwise
Roldan v. Panganiban. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. It is the client who finally decides whether to
appeal or not an adverse decision
People v. Pagaro. Even if a lawyer believes that the appeal of his
client is frivolous, he cannot move to dismiss the appeal without
the consent of his client. His remedy is to withdraw from the case.
2016 Bar, Q. XVI: Pedro was accused of the crime of murder
before the RTC and was found guilty of homicide. His counsel,
Atty. Nestor, told him that he will file an appeal before the Court
of Appeals (CA) because he believes that the claim of self-
defense of Pedro will be given merit by the appellate court and
that he will be acquitted. Pedro explains that he is amenable to
the penalty imposed upon him. Despite the opposition of the
accused, Atty. Nestor went on with the appeal. The CA decided
that the conviction should be for murder in view of a qualifying
circumstance. A petition with the High Court proved futile.
Pedro hires you to file a disbarment suit against Atty. Nestor.
What canon or rule of the CPR will you use as ground for the
suit? Explain.
A: I will base my action on Canon 19, particularly Rule 19.03, CPR
which provides that “a lawyer shall not allow the client to dictate
the procedure in handling the case”
The other side of the coin of this rule is that the substantive
aspects of the case are within the sole authority of the client to
decide. The lawyer’s authority is limited only to the procedural

aspects of the case. Certainly, the matter of whether or not to
appeal an adverse decision is a substantive matter which is
exclusively for the client to decide. Having filed an appeal against
the decision of his client, the lawyer should be held liable for its
negative result.
2014 Bar, Q. XXIV(b): In case of postponement of the trial,
whose decision should prevail – the client or his attorney?
Explain the governing rule.
A: On the matter of the postponement of the trial, the lawyer’s
decision shall prevail. Rule 19.03, CPR provides that “a lawyer
shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case”. Rule 138, Sec. 23, ROC provides that lawyers have the full
authority to bind their clients in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure.
2011 Bar, Q. 5: Sheryl, Eric's counsel, once asked for
postponement and the court granted it since the opposing
counsel, Bernadine, did not object. Eric then asked Sheryl not to
allow any further postponements because his case has been
pending for 8 years. When trial resumed, Bernadine moved to
reset the trial because of her infant's ailment. What must Sheryl
do?
(a) Remind the Court that it has the duty to promptly decide the
case.
(b) Interpose no objection since she too once sought
postponement without Bernadine's objection.
(c) Vehemently oppose Bernadine's motion for being contrary
to Eric's wishes.
(d) Submit the motion to the Court's sound discretion.
Canon 20: A Lawyer Shall Charge Only Fair and Reasonable Fees
2006 Bar, Q. XII(2): Give 4 instances when a client may validly
refuse to pay his lawyer the full amount of attorney’s fees
stipulated in their written contract.
A: Any four of the following instances constitute valid grounds for
client to refuse to pay the full amount of the attorney’s fees
stipulated in their contract:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(d) When the lawyer simultaneously represents an adverse
interest without his client’s consent;
(e) When the amount fixed is excessive, unconscionable, or
unreasonable;
(f) Where the contract of employment is void because of some
irregularity in its execution or as to purely formal matters.
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or
required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule
of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Two Concept of Attorney’s Fees; Bases
(a) Ordinary concept – an attorney’s fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal services he has
rendered to a client. The basis of this compensation is the
fact of employment by the client.
(b) Extraordinary concept – an attorney’s fee is an indemnity
for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing
party to the prevailing party in a litigation.
The basis of this is any of the cases authorized by law and is
payable not to the lawyer but to the client – unless they have
agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.
Legal Basis of Lawyer’s Right to Demand Compensation for His
Services
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Oreving v. Chicago. Consequently, the lawyer cannot recover
compensation from one who did not employ him not authorize his
employment, no matter how valuable the results of his services
may have been to such person.
 If the lawyer was allowed by the client to represent the
latter in a proceeding, even if there is no agreement on
payment of attorney’s fees, the lawyer is entitled reasonable
fee for his services under the principle of quasi-contract,
that is, no man must be enriched at the expense of another
Unauthorized Counsel, Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees
Orosco v. Hernandez. A lawyer who rendered services to a party
who did not employ him nor authorize his employment, cannot
recover compensation even if his services redounded to the
benefit of such party.
However, if there is a quasi-contract, the lawyer must be paid
reasonable attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit.
Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr. If the lawyer had not rendered service, he
is not entitled to attorney’s fees.
Rationale of Adequate Compensation
California Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 2-107. Adequate
compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve
his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and
independence of the profession.
ABA, CPR. The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in
fulfilling its role in our society unless the lawyer receives adequate
compensation for his services.
Calalang v. De Borja. The protection of attorney’s lien by the
court is necessary to preserve the decorum and respectability of
the profession.
Stansell v. Roach. A lawyer like all other human beings has a right
to livelihood.
Lawyer Must Be Secured on His Honorarium Lawfully Earned

(a) When the lawyer was negligent in the performance of his Doy Mercantile Inc. v. AMA Computer College. While the practice
 The fact of employment as lawyer by the client constitutes
duties; of law is not a business, the attorney plays a vital role in the
the legal basis of the lawyer’s right to demand payment for
(b) When the lawyer gave just cause for the termination of his administration of justice and, hence, the need to secure to him his
his services. No formal contract is necessary to effectuate
services; honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum
employment
(c) When the lawyer unceremoniously withdraws from or and respectability of the legal profession.
abandons a case without just cause;

[115]

Malonso v. Principe. While the practice of law is not a business
venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated
for professional services rendered
Forms of Employment as Counsel to a Client; Oral or Express
1. Oral – when the counsel is employed without a written
agreement – but the conditions and amount of attorney’s
fees are agreed upon.
Peyer v. Peyer. A written agreement is not however necessary to
prove a client’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees.
2. Express – when the terms and conditions including the
amount of fees, are explicitly stipulated in a written
document which may be a private or public document.
Commencement of Employment
 Once there is a meeting of the minds between the lawyer
and client on the case or subject to be handled and the
consideration therefor, the lawyer is deemed employed
even if no acceptance fee is paid yet.
Rabanal v. Tugade. Consultations which the lawyer permits with a
view of obtaining professional advice or assistance also creates a
lawyer-client relationship
 Payment of attorney’s fees is not, however, a necessary
element to create said relationship
 As in fact, there are items, when lawyers represent clients
pro bono, which act is considered a social obligation.
2014 Bar, Q. XXVII: Atty. C was hired by D to file an action
against E for recovery of possession of real property. In their
contract of service, they stipulated that D cannot compromise
the case without the consent of Atty. C. After trial and unknown
to Atty. C, D entered into a compromise with E. Atty. C withdrew
from the case and collected from D:
(a) his attorney’s fees under their contract
(b) his attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit
(c) nothing by way of attorney’s fees
Engaging a Law Firm; Significance
 When a client employs the service of a law firm, he does not
employ the services of a lawyer who is assigned to
personally handle the case – he employs the entire law firm
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Balgani v. CA. The Court sees no reason why the principle – that
when the counsel appearing for the client resigns, the firm is
bound to provide a replacement – should not apply to a case
where a partner or associate is suspended from the practice of
law.
Proper Time of Fixing Attorney’s Fees
Silva Vda. de Fajardo v. Bugaring. The proper time of fixing the
attorney’s fees, which is a delicate matter, is at the
commencement of the lawyer-client relationship.
Written Contract of Attorney’s Fees is the Law Between the
Lawyer and the Client
Reparations Commission v. Visayan Packaging Corp. Anent the
contention of FICI that the trial court erred in ordering Vispac to
pay to FICI attorney's fees equivalent to only 10% of the amount
due despite the fact that Vispac bound itself to pay to FICI
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total amount due but in
no case less than P200.00 as per their Indemnity Agreement
(Exhibit "1-FICI"), it has been held that a stipulation regarding the
payment of attorney's fees is neither illegal nor immoral and is
enforceable as the law between the parties, as long as such
stipulation does not contravene law, good morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
Implied Contract of Employment
 The contract is implied when there is no agreement,
whether oral or express, but the client allowed the lawyer to
render legal services not intended to be gratuitous without
objection, and the client is benefited by reason thereof.
 There is an implied promise to pay reasonable attorney’s
fees on the principle that the client shall not be allowed to
enrich himself at the expense of the lawyer
Junio v. Grupo Respondent claims that complainant is a close
personal friend and that in helping redeem the property of
complainant's parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a friend,
hence there is no client-attorney relationship between them. This
contention has no merit. As explained in Hilado v. David,
To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the
client should have employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should
have been paid. promised, or charged for; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case
about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to
his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
[116]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established
Immediately Fixing of Attorney’s Fees, Advisable
 It is advisable for the benefit of both the lawyer and the
client, that as soon as they have agreed on the engagement
of the former by the latter, the attorney’s fees are
immediately determined and fixed.
 This is to avoid future misunderstandings which usually arise
when the client thinks law of the value of services of the
counsel, and the latter thinks high of his services, and no
one expressing what is in his mind.
Francisco v. Matias. It is further advisable that the contract for
attorney’s fees be reduced to writing where all the terms and
conditions are set forth and fully understood by the client. It
becomes conclusive. The client cannot reduce (unless
unreasonable) and the lawyer cannot increase the stipulated fees
without judicial approval.
 By having a clear-cut agreement on the attorney’s fees,
lawyers can avoid the embarrassment they have to suffer
when they have to file cases against their own clients for the
fixing and collection of their attorney’s fees.
 Filing of cases against clients is unwise because in the
process, the lawyer loses the clients aside from suffering a
broken reputation of being money-oriented.
 Rule 20.01
Silva Vda. de Fajardo v. Bugaring. A disbarment case may
proceed independently of the civil action for collection of
professional fees, without running afoul of the prohibition against
forum shopping.
Advantages of a Written Contract for Attorney’s Fees
1. Rodfish v. Fox. An express valid contract stipulating for the
compensation which the attorney is to receive for his
services is generally held conclusive as to the amount of
compensation.
Rule 138, Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to
fees — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by

the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract
for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
2. Aro v. Nanawa. In case of unjustified dismissal of attorney,
he shall be entitled to recover from the client full
compensation stipulated in the contract. The law seeks to
protect lawyers from unscrupulous and ungrateful clients
who dismiss lawyers to avoid payment of attorney’s fees
Pauper, Not Exempted from Attorney’s Fees
Cristobal v. ECC. Plaintiff who filed a complaint as a pauper while
exempted from payment of legal fees is not exempted from
payment of attorney’s fees.
Ambiguities in Contract, Interpretation
De los Santos, Sr. v. Palanca. In the interpretation of ambiguities
in a contract of attorney’s fees, that interpretation which is
favorable to the client will be adopted.
Situations When Counsel Cannot Recover Full Amount, Despite a
Written Contract for Attorney’s Fees
(a) Montinola v. Hofilena. When the services called for were
not performed as when the lawyer withdrew before the
case is finished. He will be allowed only reasonable fees
(b) Cristobal v. Ocson. When there is a justified dismissal of the
attorney, the contract will be nullified and payment will be
on the basis of quantum meruit only
Any stipulation that despite such dismissal, the stipulated fee shall
be demandable at once and payable in full shall be invalid
(c) In re: Cupid. When the stipulated attorney’s fees are
unconscionable – that is, when they are so disproportionate
compared to the value of services rendered and is revolting
to human conscience. The court has the power to reduce
the unreasonable fees agreed upon.
(d) When the stipulated attorney’s fees are in excess of what is
expressly fixed by law
(e) Medina v. Bautista. When the lawyer is guilty of fraud and
bad faith toward his client in the matter of his employment.
(f) Wolfson v. Anderson. When the counsel’s services were
worthless because of his negligence. However, an attorney is
not an insurer of the results of the case, unless he expressly
so agrees
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(g) Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co. When contract of
employment is illegal, against moral or public policy
(h) Strong v. Brennan. Serving adverse interests, unless lawyer
proves he acted with the consent and acquiescence of both
parties.
Winning Litigant is Not Always Granted Attorney’s Fees
Country Bankers Insurance Corp. v. Lianga Bay and Community
Multi-Purpose Coop. Inc. Attorney’s fees are not awarded every
time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Kinds of Payment Which May Be Stipulated
The client may stipulate with his counsel to pay him either:
(a) At a fixed or absolute fee which is payable regardless of the
result of the case;
(b) A contingent fee that is conditioned to the securing of a
favorable judgment and recovery of money or property and
the amount of which may be on a percentage basis
2016 Bar, Q. VI: Andrew engaged the services of Atty. Juju under
a contingent fee agreement to help him file a complaint for
damages against his employer, Wilkon Shipping, Inc. Atty. Juju
handled Andrew's case for two (2) years before the Labor
Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
filing the necessary pleadings and attending several hearings.
The complaint, however, was dismissed. To improve his chances,
Andrew replaced Atty. Juju with Atty. Jen, who eventually
succeeded in getting a favorable decision from the Court of
Appeals, which became final. When Andrew's claims were
satisfied by Wilkon, Atty. Juju filed a collection suit against him
claiming that he (Atty. Juju) is entitled to attorney's fees for the
services he rendered for two (2) years. Will the collection suit
prosper? Explain.
A: The collection case will not prosper.
The agreement for attorney’s fees between Andrew and Atty. Juju
was a contingent fee agreement. A contingent fee agreement is
one in which the lawyer will be paid a fee only when he is
successful in handling the case of the client.
In this case, Atty. Juju was not successful in handling the case of
Andrew. It was Atty. Jen who won the case for the client.
Alternative: Atty. Juju is entitled to attorney’s fees based on
quantum meruit. The case was decided in favor of Andrew by the
[117]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Court of Appeals. In appealed cases, the appellate court relies on
what is presented during the hearings, and no other evidence is
presented at that stage.
(c) A fixed fee payable per appearance
(d) A fixed fee computed by the number of hours spent
(e) Fixed fee based on piece work
 The lawyer and the client may enter into a combination of
the above arrangements or an entirely different agreement
not contrary to law, public morals or public policy
1996 Bar, Q. XII: Mindful that the law is a profession and not a
trade or business, what are the factors must you, as a lawyer,
consider in charging reasonable compensation for your services?
A: Rule 20.1, CPR
Retainer, Concept
Retainer is the act of the client by which he employers a lawyer to
manage for him a cause to which he is a party, or otherwise
advise him as counsel.
Retainer is also used to refer to the fee which the client pays his
attorney whom he retains, that is, the retaining fee.
Kinds of Retainer Agreements on Attorney’s Fees
1. General retainer or retaining fee – is the fee paid to a
lawyer to secure is future services as general counsel for any
ordinary legal problem that may arise in the ordinary legal
problem that may arise in the ordinary business of the client
and referred to him for legal action. The future services of
the lawyer are secured to the retaining client. And for this,
the client pays the lawyer fixed retainer fees which could ne
monthly or otherwise, depending upon the agreement. The
fees are paid WON there are cases referred to the lawyer.
The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of
the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposite
party.
A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel
to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for
the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being
deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and
the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express
understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in

payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no
relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
services for which he has retained him to perform.
2. Special retainer – is a fee for a specific case or service
rendered by the lawyer for a client
Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC. A
client may have several cases. If for every case there is a separate
and independent contract for attorney’s fees, each fee is
considered a special retainer.
Hausserman v. Rahmeyer. Per hour charge is not appropriate
method of determining the value of professional services of
lawyers in the absence of an agreement.
Attorney’s Fees on Percentage Basis
Pineda v. De Jesus. Lawyers could not charge their clients fees
based on percentage basis in the absence of an agreement to that
effect.
Champertous Contract is Void Even if Agreed Upon
 In a champertous contract, the lawyer agrees to spend for
all the litigation expenses in consideration for a bigger
percentage as fees on the property subject of litigation.
 It is void being against public policy
2016 Bar, Q. VII: Apollo hired Atty. Dennis to file an action for
damages. Since Apollo has no money, he entered into a
contingent fee agreement where Atty. Dennis will shoulder all
expenses of litigation and will not charge for legal services. In
case of a favorable decision, Apollo agreed to transfer to his
lawyer a lot in Cebu. Eventually, Apollo won the case. Atty.
Dennis asked Apollo to execute the deed of sale, but the latter
refused upon advice of a friend that the agreement is illegal. Due
to threats of legal action by his lawyer, Apollo filed a complaint
before the Supreme Court alleging that the agreement is a
champertous contract. Rule on the legality of the agreement on
contingent fee and the propriety of getting the property of
Apollo. Explain.
A: The contract for attorney’s fees between Atty. Dennis and
Apollo is indeed a champertous agreement.
A champertous agreement is similar to a contingent fee
agreement wherein the lawyer will be paid only if he is successful
in handling the case. But what makes it champertous is the
provision, as in this case, that the lawyer will shoulder all the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
expenses of litigation. That makes the lawyer a businessman who
invested in the case in the hope that he will profit from such
investment. A contingent fee contract is valid, while a
champertous agreement is invalid.
With regard to the acquisition by Atty. Dennis of Apollo’s
property in Cebu, the same will not be in violation of Art. 1491,
CC, if the contract was simply a contingent fee contract, because
the property in Cebu was not involved in the case that Atty.
Dennis handled, and the lot will not be transferred to Atty. Dennis
until the case was terminated.
2014 Bar, Q. XII: A inherited a parcel of land situated in Batasan
Hills which is occupied by informal settlers. He wants to eject the
occupants, but he has no financial means to pursue the
ejectment case. He contracted the services of Atty. B, who
agreed to defray all the expenses of the suit on the condition
that he will be paid one-half (½) of the property to be recovered
as his compensation.
What is this kind of attorney’s fees? Can Atty. B enforce this
contract against A? What are the respective remedies relative to
the collection of attorney’s fees, if any, of A and Atty. B against
each other?
A: This is a champetous fee agreement because Atty. B agreed to
defray all the expenses of the action and will be paid only if he is
successful in recovering A’s property. Atty. B cannot enforce it
because it is contrary to public policy and the ethics of the legal
profession.
The remedy of A is to file an action to have the agreement
declared null and void, or simply to refuse to pay attorney’s fees
to Atty. B on the basis of the said agreement.
On the other hand, Atty. B will still be entitled to collect attorney’s
fees on a quantum meruit basis. He may bring an action to collect
such fees.
Attorney’s Fees Based on Quantum Meruit; Concept
Mead v. Ringling. Quantum meruit means “as much as he has
deserved”
Recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is
authorized when:
(1) There is no express contract of payment of attorney’s fees
agreed upon between the lawyer and the client;
[118]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(2) When although there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees,
the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or
unreasonable by the court
(3) When the contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely
formal matters or defects of execution;
(4) When the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to
finish the case to its conclusion
(5) When the lawyer and client disregard the contract for
attorney’s fees and placed themselves as though there was
no express stipulation as to the attorney’s fee
Quantum meruit is a legal mechanism in legal ethics which
prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits
of the legal services of a counsel without paying therefor. It is in
line with the fundamental principle against unjust enrichment at
the expense of another.
Soler v. CA. It is essential for the proper operation of the principle
that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be
charged for the services rendered under circumstances as
reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was
expecting to be paid compensation therefor. The doctrine of
quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based
on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain
benefit without paying for it.
2015 Bar, Q. IX(A): Explain the doctrine of quantum meruit in
determining the amount of attorney’s fees.
2015 Bar, Q. IX(B): Identify the factors to be considered in
determining attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis?
A: Rule 20.01.
2014 Bar, Q. XXII(a): May a lawyer collect fees for services
rendered to his client despite the absence of an agreement to
pay attorney’s fees?
A: A lawyer may collect fees for services rendered to his client in
the absence of an agreement, on the basis of quantum meruit,
which means as much amount as his services are worth.
The basic rule is that when one has rendered services to another
and these services were accepted by the latter, in the absence of
proof that the services were rendered gratuitously, it is but just
that the recipient should make compensation therefor, pursuant
to well-known and accepted principle of law that no one should
be permitted to enrich himself at the expense of another."
(Dominguez v. CA, G.R. No. 52715, February 28, 1985)

2014 Bar, Q. XXII(b): In the absence of a contract for the
payment of attorney’s fees, what factor/s may be considered in
fixing the amount of attorney’s fees?
A: Rule 20.01
2011 Bar, Q. 3: Atty. Francisco’s retainer agreement with RXU
said that his attorney's fees in its case against CRP "shall be 15%
of the amounts collected." Atty. Francisco asked the trial court
to issue a temporary restraining order against CRP but this was
denied, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals to question the order of denial. At this point,
RXU terminated Atty. Francisco’s services. When the parties
later settled their dispute amicably, CRP paid RXU P100 million.
Because of this, Atty. Francisco came around and claimed a 15%
share in the amount. What should be his attorney’s fees?
(a) Nothing because the compromise came after RXU
terminated him.
(b) 15% of what CRP paid RXU or P15 million.
(c) A reasonable amount that the court shall fix upon proof of
quantum meruit.
(d) Nothing since he was unable to complete the work stated in
the retainer contract.
1998 Bar, Q. XIV: What is your understanding of quantum meruit
as attorney's fees?
No Lawyer Engaged, But Attorney’s Fees Allowed
Philrock, Inc. v. CIAC. Where the award is not only for attorney’s
fees but also for expense of litigation, it does not matter if the
litigant represented himself in court, because it is obvious that he
incurred expenses in pursuing his action.
Pineda v. De Jesus. The recovery of attorney’s fees on this basis is
permitted, as in this case, where there is no express agreement
for the payment of attorney’s fees. Basically, it is a legal
mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from running
away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without
paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the
part of the lawyer himself.
Soler v. CA. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent
undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.
Duty of Courts on Payment of Attorney’s Fees
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Fernandez v. Bello. The duty of the courts is not alone to see that
lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to
see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. The courts
cannot deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them
to do so.
Attorney’s Fees to be Justified, Its Reason Must be Mentioned in
the Text of the Decision
 If the attorney’s fee granted by the Court is mentioned only
in the dispositive portion, it will be disallowed on appeal.
 The reason for this is that the award of attorney’s fee to a
winning party is not the general rule but only the exception
 Hence, there must be findings of facts and law to justify its
grant.
Car Coor Phil. Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Dev. Corp. Attorney’s fee
must be mentioned and justified in the decision.
Villanueva v. Salvador. The factual, legal or equitable justification
for the award must be set forth in the text of the decision
Tamayo v. Heirs of Dominguez. Award of attorney’s fees not fully
discussed in the dispositive portion of the decision was not
proper.
Agustin v. CA. The award to private respondent of attorney's fees,
however, must be disallowed considering that the award of
exemplary damages was eliminated by respondent court and the
text of the decision of the trial court, which was aimed by the
Court of Appeals, is bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify
such award. The accepted rule is that the reason for the award of
attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision;
otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the
decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal. The award of
attorney's fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it
is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that
would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of
such award
Attorney’s Fee, Not Included in the General Prayer (such other
relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable)
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA. Attorney’s fee must be
specifically prayed for and proven and justified in the decision
itself. It is not deemed incorporated in the general prayer for
“such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and
equitable”
[119]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Blanco v. Gabriel. The Court need not enumerate I nthe text of
the Decision the different factors (in Rule 20.01) in determining
the attorney’s fees. It is enough that the Court utilized them as its
guides in determining the lawyer’s fees.
Bach v. Ongkiko Kalaw, Manhit & Accorda Law Offices. Legal
interest cannot be imposed on attorney’s fees because legal
services “stand upon an entirely different footing from contracts
for the payment of compensation for any other services”
Effect of Elimination of Moral and Exemplary Damages on
Attorney’s Fees
Francisco v. Co. The award of attorney’s fees must be deleted
where the award of moral and exemplary damages are
eliminated.
Stipulated Attorney’s Fees is Conclusive; Exceptions
Compania Maritima, Inc. v. CA. GR: The amount of attorney’s
fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer’s compensation
XPN: In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is
fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth
of his services
The other exception is when the amount fixed is unconscionable.
No Attorney’s Fees Would be Allowed if Parties Have Legitimate
Claims Against Each Other
Phil. Communications Satellite Corp. v. Globe Telecom, Inc. In
cases where both parties have legitimate claims against each
other, an award of attorney’s fees would not be warranted.
Pajuyo v. CA. Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party
prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate.
Villanueva v. Ishiwata. Where what the lawyer handled is merely
a labor case, his attorney’s fee should not exceed 10%.
Guides in Determining Attorney’s Fees on Quantum Meruit Basis
Full Blown Trial is Needed in “Quantum Meruit”
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. CA. In the determination of
the reasonableness of a lawyer’s attorney’s fees anchored on the

factors enumerated in the Rule, full-blown trial is necessarily
needed because the factors must be established by evidence.
(a) Time Spent and Extent of the Services Rendered or
Required
 A lawyer is justified in fixing higher fees when the case is so
complicated and requires more time and effort to finish
 Example: intestate or testate proceedings.
In re: Estate of Mina. Where the attorney contested the probate
of two wills and upheld the probate of the third one, in three
separate proceedings, involving an estate worth more than half-
million pesos, he was awarded P50,000 as compensation on a
quantum meruit basis
Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB. Foreclosing a mortgage judicially
is more tedious and time-consuming than an extrajudicial
foreclosure. In the latter case, the only effort to be done by the
lawyer is to file a petition for foreclosure with the Sheriff. Thusly,
charging 10% of the total indebtedness for an extrajudicial
foreclosure is unreasonable.
(b) Novelty and Difficulty of Questions Involved
 When the questions in a case are novel and difficult, greater
efforts, deeper study and research, are bound to burn the
lawyer’s time and stamina – considering that there are no
local precedents to rely upon.
(c) Importance of Subject Matter
Recto v. Harden. The more important the subject matter or the
bigger the value of the interest or property in litigation, the higher
is the attorney’s fee.
The reason for the higher fee is to justify and commensurate the
greater responsibility to be discharged by the lawyer.
Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB. However, even though the
interest or property involved is of considerable value, if the legal
services rendered do not call for much effort (e.g. mere filing of
petition for foreclosure with the Sheriff) there is no justification
for an award of high fees.
Meralco Workers Union v. Gaerlan (Teehankee’s Concurring Op.)
This is especially true to labor cases involving a big number of
laborers whose accumulated claims may run to millions of pesos.
The controversy is generally the same and does not call for the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
extortion of special and additional services and efforts in
proportion to the number of workers involved.
Orbeta v. Oquinera. The importance of the subject matter of the
controversy does not necessarily depend on the amount involved
therein. Though a controversy involves only a small amount, it
may be important either from the standpoint of the legal
profession or from the standpoint of a client.
(d) Skill Demanded of the Lawyer
 The totality of the lawyer’s experience provides him the skill
and competence admired in lawyers.
 A lawyer of great skills justifies a higher fee than an ordinary
practitioner
Francisco v. Matias. Courts may take judicial notice of the skill
and competence of lawyers.
Skill Not Measured by Income
Ingersoll v. Malabon Sugar Co. The ability, skill and competence
of a lawyer is not necessarily equated by his income.
Perez v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. Neither is the length of
practice of lawyer a safe criterion of his professional ability.
The income of a lawyer is not a safe criterion of his professional
ability. Many very good lawyers earn but small incomes while
lawyers of inferior ability may prosper financially. Neither is the
length of time a lawyer has practiced a reliable measure of his
ability; his competence must be judged by the character of his
work
Ingersoll v. Malabon Sugar Co. Rather, the ability and
competence of the lawyer must be judged by the character and
quality of his work
(e) Probability of Losing Other Employment
 A lawyer is entitled to a better compensation if by reason of
his retention as counsel by a client, he loses the opportunity
or chance to be employed by the opposite party because of
the prohibition against representing conflicting interests
 If the work entrusted to the lawyer will require the exertion
of much time and efforts, he will be deprived of
considerable time which he could otherwise use for other
gainful services. In effect, he loses opportunity for other
employment
[120]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
 For this, he deserves higher compensation that when the
case is NOT exhausting in point of time and efforts.
(f) Customary Charges for Similar Services and Schedule of
Fees of IBP
 In the determination of the reasonable fees of lawyers,
reference can be made to the charges customarily
collected from clients for similar services
 If there is an approved Schedule of Fees of the IBP
Chapter where the lawyer is a member, then this
Schedule must be applied as close as possible to avoid
unnecessary competitions among lawyers on the
matter of rendering legal services
(g) Amount Involved in the Controversy and Benefits Resulting
to the Client from the Service
Franciso v. Matias. Generally, when the amount involved is
considerable, the attorney’s fee is also considerable. The greater
the amount or the greater the value of the property involved the
greater the responsibility of the lawyer. Greater responsibility
means greater exertion of efforts, more time and expenses.
Consequently, it is but fait to recompense the lawyer with higher
fees than in ordinary cases.
Related to this is the consideration of the benefits obtained by the
client as a result of the legal services rendered. Thus, if despite
the efforts of the counsel, only minimal benefits had resulted
from the services, the court may order a reduction of the fees if it
is now disproportionate to the recovery
Conversely, if the lawyer had agreed to receive a minimal
attorney’s fee because the client misrepresented the value of the
property subject of the case, which turned out later to be of
greater value, the court may order an increase in the attorney’s
fees agreed upon.
 If despite great efforts exerted, the case is lost, the lawyer is
not deprived of his right to collect his rightful compensation,
unless the agreement is on contingent basis.
 If the contract is absolute, the contract will be respected just
the same, unless, the agreed fee is unconscionable or
unreasonable.
(h) Contingency or Certainty of Compensation
Felicer v. Madrilejos. A contingent fee contract is one which
stipulates that the lawyer will be paid for his legal services only if
the suit or litigation ends favorably to the client.

Malonso v. Principe. Contingent fee is not per se prohibited by
law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the
reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the
circumstances of the case.
 It is like a contract subject to a suspensive condition. If the
condition is not fulfilled, the obligation to pay does not arise.
 Contingent fees are sanctioned by Canon 13 of CPE and Rule
20.01 of the CPR but subject to certain limitations
Licudan v. CA. It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent
fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule
20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of Professional
Responsibility. However, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco
v. De Dumo:
. . . When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was
obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his
client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is
clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved
party.
In the instant case, the lawyer was getting the entire property for
his attorney’s fees.
Francisco v. Matias. Acceptance of an initial fee before or during
the progress of litigation does not detract from the contingent
nature of the fees, as long as the bulk thereof is made dependent
upon the successful outcome of the action.
Law Firm of Armovit v. CA. The initial fees and subsequent fees
paid during the progress of the litigation are independent of the
contingent fees.
 In taking the risk that the lawyer may not be paid at all
despite exertion of serious efforts, he can charge attorney’s
fees much higher than the charges based on absolute fee
arrangement
Warvelle. The increased sum that is recovered in case of success
merely offsets the risk of loss that would have resulted in case of
failure
Coto Labor Union v. Espinas
Facts:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1. The written contract between petitioner union and
respondent counsel explicitly stipulated in the latter’s favor
an aggregate compensation of 25% of any amount due the
union or its members as a result of the case, whether by
action or settlement
2. The cases were settled amicably, without the intervention of
counsel, for the sum of P300,000 to be paid to the union.
3. The union argues that its original willingness to pay said rate
of fees had been due to counsel’s assurance that the union
would recover not less than 2M.
Issue: WON the attorney may recover from P300k or P2M
Held:
1. The Court of Industrial Relations, before which the bulk of
the cases handled by respondent counsel were heard, is in a
better position to assess the nature and value of the services
by him rendered to the union.
2. Taking into account that said services had been rendered for
over 6 years and that the fees had been fixed on a
contingent basis, the conclusion reached by the trial court as
regards the amount due to respondent counsel, exclusively,
for his services was not disturbed
Laig v. CA. There is nothing wrong in the client’s giving ½ of his
property to his lawyer by way of contingent fees which are
recognized in this jurisdiction
Contract for Contingent Fee is Not Prohibited Under Art. 1491 of
the Civil Code and the Canons
Dir. of Lands v. Ababa. Petitioners contend that a contract for a
contingent fee violates Article 1491 because it involves an
assignment of a property subject of litigation. That article
provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
petition of another.
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior and other o and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions;
this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and
shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession (Emphasis supplied).
[121]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the
sale or assignment between the lawyer and his client, of property
which is the subject of litigation. As WE have already stated. "The
prohibition in said article a only to applies stated: " The
prohibition in said article applies only to a sale or assignment to
the lawyer by his client of the property which is the subject of
litigation. In other words, for the prohibition to operate, the sale
or t of the property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property" (Rosario Vda. de Laig vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-26882, November 21, 1978).
A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491
because the tranfer or assignment of the property in litigation
takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the
instant case, the attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of
one-half (1/2) of whatever Maximo Abarquez might recover from
his share in the lots in question, is contingent upon the success of
the appeal. Hence, the payment of the attorney's fees, that is, the
transfer or assignment of one-half (1/2) of the property in
litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the
tranfer actually takes effect after the finality of a favorable
judgment rendered on appeal and not during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property in question. Consequently, the
contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491.
Petitioners her contend that a contract for a contingent fee
violates the Canons of Professional Ethics. this is likewise without
merit This posture of petitioners overlooked Canon 13 of the
Canons which expressly contingent fees by way of exception to
Canon 10 upon which petitioners relied. For while Canon 10
prohibits a lawyer from purchasing ...any interest in the subject
matter of the litigation which he is conducting", Canon 13, on the
other hand, allowed a reasonable contingent fee contract, thus:
"A contract for a con. tangent fee where sanctioned by law,
should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the ca
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness."
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to
the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases
where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means
with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the
sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid
out of the proceeds of the litigation" (Francisco, Legal Ethics, p.
294 [1949], citing Lipscomb vs. Adams 91 S.W. 1046, 1048 [1949]).
Oftentimes, contingent fees are the only means by which the poor
and helpless can redress for injuries sustained and have their
rights vindicated.

2013 Bar, Q. VII: In an action to prevent the condominium
developer from building beyond ten (10) floors, Judge Cerdo
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant developer. The
judgment became final after the plaintiffs failed to appeal on
time. Judge Cerdo and Atty. Cocodrilo, counsel for the
developer, thereafter separately purchased a condominium unit
each from the developer.
Did Judge Cerdo and Atty. Cocodrilo commit any act of
impropriety or violate any law for which they should be held
liable or sanctioned?
A: Judge Cerdo and Atty. Cocodrilo did not commit any act of
impropriety, nor did they violate any law.
The prohibition imposed by the Civil Code, Art. 1491(5),
prohibiting judges and attorneys, and that contained in the
Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 10, with regard to purchase
of any interest in the subject matter of the litigation both refer
only to instances where the property is still the subject of
litigation.
The prohibition does not apply to instances, such as in the
problem, where the conveyance takes place after the judgment
because the property can no longer be said to be the “subject of
litigation” (Director of Lands vs. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096,
February 27, 1979, 88 SCRA 513).
Alternative: Atty. Cocodrilo did not commit any ethical violation
nor did he violate any law when he purchased a condominium
unit from the developer. The prohibition under the Canons of
Professional Ethics and under the Civil Code, Art. 1491(5) finds
application only why the property is still the subject of litigation.
With the judgment having attained a state of finality, the property
can no longer be said to be the “subject of litigation.” (Ibid.)
While technically, Judge Cerdo has not violated the provisions of
the Civil Code, Art. 1491(3), when he purchased a condominium
unit from the developer because the judgment has attained a
state of finality, there may be some concerns on the ethical
aspect of what he has done.
Familiar is the maxim, Non omne quod licet honestum est (Not
everything that is legal is ethical). Judges, like Judge Cerdo, should
be free from any whiff of impropriety. Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities (New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
Canon 4, Sec. 1).
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
His purchase of a condominium unit from the developer might be
interpreted by some quarters as a consideration for his having
decided the case in favor of the defendant developer.
2008 Bar, Q. IV(b): Chester asked Laarni to handle his claim to a
sizeable parcel of land in Quezon City against a well-known
property developer on a contingent fee basis. Laarni asked for
15% of the land that may be recovered or 15% of whatever
monetary settlement that may be received from the property
developer as her only fee contingent upon securing a favorable
final judgment or compromise settlement. Chester signed the
contingent fee agreement.
Assume there was no settlement and the case eventually
reached the Supreme Court which promulgated a decision in
favor of Chester. This time Chester refused to convey to Laarni
15% of the litigated land as stipulated on the ground that the
agreement violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits
lawyers from acquiring by purchase properties and rights which
are the object of litigation in which they take part by reason of
their profession. Is the refusal justified? Explain.
A: Chester's refusal is not justified. A contingent fee agreement is
not covered by Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, because the transfer or
assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only upon
finality of a favorable judgment (Director of Lands v. Ababa, 1979;
Macariola v. Asuncion, 1982).
2010 Bar, Q. VIII: For services to be rendered by Atty. Delmonico
as counsel for Wag Yu in a case involving 5, 000 square meters
(sq.m.) of land, the two agreed on a success fee of P50, 000 plus
500 sq.m. of the land.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Wag Yu which
became final and executory.
After receiving P50, 000 Atty. Delmonico demanded the transfer
to him of the promised 500 sq.m. Instead of complying, Wag Yu
filed an administrative complaint charging Atty. Delmonico with
violation of the Code of Professional; Responsibility and Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code for demanding the delivery of a
portion of the land subject of litigation.
Is Atty. Delmonico liable under the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Civil Code? Explain.
A: Atty. Delmonico is not guilty of violation the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Civil Code.
[122]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
He and his client agreed on a success fee of P50, 000 plus 500
sq.m. of the land in the case that he was handling. This is a
contingent fee contract which is allowed under Canon 20, Rule
20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Ethics.
A contingent fee agreement does not violate Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code, because the transfer or assignment of the property in
litigation takes effect only after the finality of favorable judgment
(Director of Lands v. Ababa, 1979)
1996 Bar, Q. X(1): Judge P decided an annulment of title suit In
favor of A. After the decision had become final and executor, A
sold the property to a realty firm. Judge P, a good friend of the
owner of the realty firm, purchased two lots in the property at a
substantial discount.
(a) Did Judge P violate any provision of the Civil Code with
respect to the purchase of a litigated property?
(b) Did Judge P go against any provision of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics?
(a) Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code provides as follows:
“Art. 1491(5). The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or Judicial auction, either in person or through
the mediation of another:
Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with
the administration of justice. the property and rights in litigation
or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective function:
this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and
shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation to which they may take
part by virtue of their profession."
In the case of Macariola v. Asuncion, the Supreme Court held that
Article 1491 does not apply where the property was not acquired
from any of the parties to the case, or when the litigation is
already terminated. In this case, Judge P bought the property not
from A but from a realty firm which was not a party to the case.
Moreover, his Judgment had already become final and executory,
hence, the property was no longer in litigation. There is no
violation of Article 1491.
(b) However, in the same case, the Supreme Court held that
while the respondent judge may not have violated Art. 1491
of the Civil Code, still, it was improper for him to have

acquired the property concerned. He has violated Canon 3
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that a judge's
official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. It was unwise
and indiscreet of him to have acquired the subject property,
because it gives cause for doubt or mistrust in the
uprightness of the administration of justice.
Death or Disability of Lawyer Employed on Contingent Basis
Morton v. Forsee, Ann. Cas. If a lawyer employed on contingent
basis dies or becomes disabled before the final adjudication or
settlement of the case has been obtained, he or his estate will be
allowed to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered.
The recovery will be allowed only after the successful termination
of the litigation in the client’s favor.
Champertous Contracts, Void; Concept, Different from
Contingent Fee
Thompson v. Reynolds. A champertous contract is one where the
lawyer stipulates with his client that in the prosecution of the
case, he will bear all the expense for the recovery of things or
property being claimed by the client, and the latter agrees to pay
the former a portion of the thing or property recovered as
compensation.
 It is void being contrary to public policy and Canon 42 of the
CPE.
 However, the lawyer may in good faith advance expenses as
a matter of convenience, but subject to reimbursement
Bautista v. Gonzales. A lawyer was suspended for entering into a
contract of attorney’s fees whereby he gets 50% of the property
recovered as contingent fee, but he would defray all expenses for
the suit including court fees – without any arrangement for
reimbursement. This is champertous contract which is prohibited.
Champertous contract Contingent fee
Paid in kind Paid in cash
Counsel undertakes to bear all Counsel does not undertake to
expenses of litigation bear all expenses of litigation
2015 Bar, Q. X: The spouses Manuel were the registered owners
of a parcel of land measuring about 200,000 square meters. On
May 4, 2008, the spouses Manuel sold the land for
P3,500,000.00 to the spouses Rivera who were issued a
certificate of title for said land in their names. Because the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
spouses Rivera failed to pay the balance of the purchase price
for the land, the spouses Manuel, through Atty. Enriquez,
instituted an action on March 18, 2010 before the RTC for sum of
money and/or annulment of sale, docketed as Civil Case No.
1111. The complaint in Civil Case No. 1111 specifically alleged
that Atty. Enriquez would be paid P200,000.00 as attorney's fees
on a contingency basis. The RTC subsequently promulgated its
decision upholding the sale of the land to the spouses Rivera.
Atty. Enriquez timely filed an appeal on behalf of the spouses
Manuel before the CA. The appellate court found for the spouses
Manuel, declared the sale of the land to the spouses Rivera null
and void, and ordered the cancellation of the spouses Rivera's
certificate of title for the land. The SC dismissed the spouses
Rivera's appeal for lack of merit. With the finality of judgment in
Civil Case No. 1111 on October 20, 2014, Atty. Enriquez filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Meanwhile, the spouses Rivera filed on November 10, 2014
before the RTC a case for quieting of title against the spouses
Manuel, docketed as Civil Case No. 2222. The spouses Manuel,
again through Atty. Enriquez, filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 2222 on the ground of res judicata given the final judgment
in Civil Case No. 1111.
Pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.
2222, theRTC granted on February 9, 2015 the motion for
issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1111 and placed
the spouses Manuel in possession of the land. Atty. Enriquez,
based on a purported oral agreement with the spouses Manuel,
laid claim to Y2 of the land, measuring 100,000.00 square meters
with market value of P1,750,000.00, as his attorney's fees. Atty.
Enriquez caused the subdivision of the land in two equal
portions and entered into the half he appropriated for himself.
Based on the professional and ethical standards for lawyers,
may Atty. Enriquez claim Yi of the land as his contingency fee?
Why?
A: Atty. Enriquez may not claim ½ of the land as his contingency
fee.
In the first place, a lawyer cannot charge his client a contingent
fee or a percentage of the amount recovered as his fees in the
absence of an express contract to that effect (Corpus v. CA, G.R.
No. L-40424, June 30, 1980). There is no such contract in this case.
As a matter of fact, the claim of a purported oral agreement for a
contingency fee of ½ of the land is contradicted by the allegation
in the Complaint in Civil Case No. 1111 for a contingency fee of
P200,000 only.
[123]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Moreover, the amount claimed as contingent fee appears to be
excessive and unreasonable. The issue involved in the case was
simple and did not require extensive skill, effort and research on
the part of Atty. Enriquez.
Furthermore, Atty. Enriquez caused the division of the land and
appropriated one half thereof, pending resolution of the motion
to dismiss in Civil Case no. 2222. This constitutes a violation of Art.
1491, NCC, because the case in which the property is involved has
not yet been terminated (The Conjugal Partnership of the Sps.
Cadavedo v. VictorinoLacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014)
2014 Bar, Q. X: Atty. M is a partner in the law firm OMP &
Associates. C, a former classmate of Atty. M engaged the legal
services of Atty. M to handle his appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA) from an adverse decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
his annulment case. After the notice to file brief was issued by
the CA, Atty. M met an accident which incapacitated him from
further engaging in law practice.
May Atty. P, his partner in the law firm, file the required appeal
brief for C? Explain your answer.
A: It depends on whether or not C knew Atty. M to be a partner of
the OMP & Associate law firm when he hired him. Generally, the
retainer of a member of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of
the firm itself. Thus, if the said member dealt with dies or is
incapacitated to render service, the law firm is bound to provide a
substitute. Atty. P may file the required brief for C.
On the other hand, if Atty. M. was retained alone, without
knowledge that he belonged to a law firm, P may not file the
required brief for C without the consent of the latter. There is no
statement in the problem that C knew M to be a member of the
law firm OMP & Associates at the time that C engaged his
services.
2000 Bar, Q. VIII:
(a) What is a champertous contract? Is it valid?
(b) Distinguish between a champertous contract and a
contingent fee contract.
A:
(a) A champertous contract is one where the lawyer agrees to
conduct the litigation on his own account and to pay the
expenses thereof, and to receive as his fee a portion of the
proceeds of the Judgment. It is contrary to public policy and
invalid because it violates the fiduciary relationship between

the lawyer and his client (Bautista v. Gonzales, 1990). In
effect, he is investing in the case with the expectation of
making a profit. The practice of law is a profession and not a
business venture.
(b) A contingent fee contract is an agreement in which the
lawyer’s fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be
recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success
in the effort to enforce or defend the client’s right. It is a
valid agreement. It is different from a champertous contract
in that the lawyer does not undertake to shoulder the
expenses of the litigation.
2006 Bar, Q. XI: The contract of attorney’s fees entered into by
Atty. Quintos and his client, Susan, stipulates that if a judgment
is rendered in her favor, he gets 60% of the property recovered
as contingent fee. In turn, he will assume payment of all
expenses of the litigation.
(1) Is the agreement valid?
(2) May Atty. Quintos and Susan increase the amount of the
contingent fee to 80%?
A:
(1) The agreement that the lawyer will assume payment of all
the expenses of litigation makes it a champertous contract,
which is invalid.
(2) Atty. Quintos and Susan can freely agree to increase the
amount of the contingent fee to 80%, but as long as the
agreement, is still champertous, the agreement will still be
invalid. Besides, even if there is no champertous provision
present, the contingent fee of 80% of the property
recovered could still be considered as unconscionable,
because it is so disproportionate as to indicate that an
unjust advantage had been taken of the client, and is
revolting to human conscience. Contracts for attorney’s fees
are always subject to control by the courts.
2010 Bar, Q. XIV: Farida engaged the services of Atty. Garudo to
represent her in a complaint for damages. The two agreed that
all expenses incurred in connection with the case would first be
shouldered by Atty. Garudo and he would be paid for his legal
services and reimbursed for all expenses which he had advance
out of whatever Farida may receive upon the termination of the
case. What kind of contract is this?
A: This appears to be a champertous contract, which is invalid.
Atty. Garudo agreed to shoulder all expenses in connection with
the case, and Farida will reimburse him only out of whatever
Farida may receive upon termination of the case. In other words,
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Atty. Garudo will be reimbursed only if he will be successful in
winning the case for Farida. If he is not successful, he will not be
reimbursed. He is, thus, investing in the outcome of the case.
1999 Bar, Q. VI: Atty. A’s services as a lawyer were engaged by B
to recover from C certain construction- materials and
equipment. Because B did not have the means of defray the
expenses of litigation he proposed to Atty. A that he (A)
shoulders all expenses of the litigation and he (B) would pay him
(A) a portion of the construction materials and equipment to be
recovered as compensation for his professional services.
May Atty. A correctly agree to such arrangement?
A: No, Atty. A may not correctly agree to such an agreement.
Such an arrangement would constitute a champertous contract
which is considered void due to public policy, because it would
make him acquire a stake in the outcome of the litigation which
might lead him to place his own interest above that of the client
(Bautista v. Gonzales). A champertous contract is one in which a
lawyer undertakes to prosecute a case, and bear all the expenses
in connection therewith without right of reimbursement, and will
be paid his fees by way of a portion of the property or amount
that may be recovered, contingent on the success of his efforts. It
is different from a contingent fee contract, which is valid, in which
the lawyer will also be paid depending on the success of his
efforts, but he does not undertake to shoulder all the expenses in
the case. He may advance such expenses but always subject to
reimbursement by his client.
(i) Character of the Employment, Whether Occasional or
Established
 Based on Canon 12 of CPE
 Employment is occasional when the client is not a constant
client.
 It is considered established when the client is constantly
engaging the services of the counsel
 Generally, a lawyer charges higher fee for services rendered
to a casual client than to a constant client, all other things
being equal.
(j) Professional Standing of the Lawyer
 Measured by the skill and competency of the lawyer as
evidenced by the result of his work
 A seasoned lawyer known for his ability and competency,
not only in the practice of law but also in his other
[124]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
endeavors, is entitled to higher fees than an inexperienced
lawyer. Professional standing counts.
Francisco v. Matias. The professional standing of appellee has
been amply attested to by the late Senator Claro M. Recto and the
former Secretary of Justice Jose P. Bengzon. Appellee has been
shown to have practiced law since his admission to the bar in
1914, either alone or in association with other equally prominent
lawyers; to have figured in several precedent-laying controversies
decided by this Court; to have annotated or written
commentaries on practically every branch of the law; to have
published and edited for 23 years, the Lawyers Journal; to have
founded a law school; to have actively participated in various
political and civic organizations, to have been elected to the
Philippine Senate, obtaining the highest number of votes among
all the senatorial candidates the election held in the year 1945,
etc.
There, is no doubt, he belongs in the front line of the legal
profession. In trial work, there are few who match his mental
acumen and resourcefulness. Counsel was granted 25% of the
subject amount
None of the Above Guide is Controlling
 None of the above consideration in itself is controlling
 They are mere guides in determining the real worth as close
as possible to the services rendered by a lawyer to a client.
 They are resorted to only when there are no conclusive
contracts for attorney’s fees which could be enforced
without objections.
Rule 138, Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to
fees — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by
the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract
for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
What is a Fee Considered Reasonable?
De Guzman v. Visayan Rapid Transit Co. Inc. There is no hard and
fast rule which could be utilized to determine the reasonableness
of attorney’s fees. Same must be determined from the facts in
each case.

Delgado v. De la Rama. There will be a combination of factors
that must be considered such as those enumerated in Rule 20.01
of the CPR. Other matters like the financial ability of the client
may also be considered.
 The fee is reasonable if it is within the capacity of the client
to pay, and is directly commensurate with the value of the
legal services rendered.
 The judge has the discretion to determine the
reasonableness of the attorney’s fees which must be
exercised soundly to maintain the dignity and respectability
of the legal profession.
When is a Fee Unconscionable?
 To be unconscionable, the amount contracted for must be
such that no man in his right senses would offer on the one
hand and no honest and fair man would accept on the other.
In re: Cupid. The amount if compared to the value of the services
rendered must be clearly disproportionate as to be revolting to
the conscience.
High Point Casket Co. v. Wheelers. The fee is “unconscionable” if
standing alone and unexplained, is sufficient to show that an
unfair advantage had been taken of the client – that is, a legal
fraud had been perpetrated upon the client
Roxas v. De Zuzuaregui, Jr. Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if
they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness.
Here, the fee being charged is 44% of the just compensation in an
expropriation case which ended in compromise
Taganas v. NLRC. 50% of the judgment award in a labor case as
attorney’s fees is excessive and unreasonable
The Charging of Attorney’s Fees Beyond What is Fixed in the Law
is Malpractice
Nando v. Lansangan. In labor laws, the attorney’s fees which can
be charged by the lawyer is fixed. If the lawyer charges more than
the maximum fixed by law – (10%) – constitutes malpractice.
Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. CA. If the attorney’s fee is found grossly
excessive, the Court has the authority to reduce the same to a
reasonable amount.
Judge’s Sole Opinion Not a Basis
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Fernandez v. Hon. Bello. The opinion of the judge as to the
capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer’s fee.
It is the contract between the lawyer and client and the nature of
the services rendered in addition to other circumstances like
those enumerated in Rule 20.01 which control.
In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his
order for the return of the P200.00 on the ground that petitioner
is "below average standard of a lawyer." The opinion of a judge as
to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a
lawyer's fee. It is the contract between the lawyer and client and
the nature of the services rendered. Petitioner claims that he won
a civil case for his client, the deceased father of the guardian and
the wards. That P200.00 is the amount of the fee of petitioner is
admitted by the guardian. We find that the court's order directing
petitioner to return the P200.00, and in effect denying him the
right to collect the same, is not justified, to say the least.
Opinion of Attorneys as Expert Witnesses Not Controlling
 No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge
 A written contract for services shall control the amount to
be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
Guidelines Provided in the Rule May be Used in Determining
Fees in a Formal Contract for Employment
Gorospe v. Gochangco. Experienced and fair lawyers generally
consider the guidelines in Rule 20.01 in the determination of their
fees in their contract for employment. They are guided by the
principle that the legal profession is a branch of the
administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade.
They are aware that if they over exaggerate their fees, they have
no contend with the reality that in this jurisdiction, attorney’s fees
are subject to judicial control.
Sta. Maria v. Tuason. More, they are aware that there is
disciplinary action for overcharging of attorney’s fees.
A Counterclaim for Attorney’s Fee Partakes of the Nature of
Compulsory Counterclaim
Intestate Estate of Dalisay v. Marasigan. Petitioner comes before
us through the instant petition for certiorari raising a sole
question of law, that is, whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to
[125]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
award attorney's fees after affirming the dismissal of the case by
the MTCC for lack of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the case.
Petitioner asseverates that as the MTCC and the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the principal action for unlawful detainer, then it
had no jurisdiction over the compulsory counterclaim of
attorney's fees either. The petition is meritorious.
A counterclaim is compulsory where: (1) it arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) it does not
require the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and, (3) the trial court has jurisdiction to
entertain the claim. Tested by these requirements, private
respondent's claim for attorney's fees is indubitably in the nature
of a compulsory counterclaim.
And We have consistently held that a compulsory counterclaim
cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
2008 Bar, Q. IV: Chester asked Laarni to handle his claim to a
sizeable parcel of land in Quezon City against a well-known
property developer on a contingent fee basis. Laarni asked for
15% of the land that may be recovered or 15% of whatever
monetary settlement that may be received from the property
developer as her only fee contingent upon securing a favorable
final judgment or compromise settlement. Chester signed the
contingent fee agreement.
(a) Assume the property developer settled the case after the
case was decided by the Regional Trial Court in favor of
Chester for PI Billion. Chester refused to pay Laami PI50
Million on the ground that it is excessive. Is the refusal
justified? Explain.
A:
(a) The refusal of Chester to pay is unjustified. A contingent fee
is impliedly sanctioned by Rule 20.01 (f) of the CPR. A much
higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer will get nothing if
the suit fails. In several cases, the Supreme Court has
indicated that a contingent fee of 30% of the money or
property that may be recovered is reasonable. Moreover,
although the developer settled the case, it was after the
case was decided by the Regional Trial Court in favor of
Chester, which shows that Atty. Laarni has already rendered
service to the client.
Alternative: Chester’s refusal to pay Atty. Laarni P150 million as
attorney’s fees on the ground that it is excessive, isjustified. In the

case of Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals (245 SCRA 30 [1995]), the
Supreme Court held that “contingent fee contracts are under the
supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients
may be protected from unjust charges” and that “its validity
depends on a large measure on the reasonableness of the
stipulated fees under the circumstances of each case.” Also,
“stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable whenever the
amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the value of the
services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetuated against the
client.” Considering the circumstances that the case was decided
by settlement of the property developer, the attorney’s fee of
P150 Million would be unconscionable.
2009 Bar, Q. XI(d), (True or False): The satisfaction of a judgment
debt does not, by itself, bar or extinguish the attorney’s liens,
except when there has been a waiver by the lawyer, as shown by
his conduct or his passive omission.
A: TRUE. In the case of Sesbreño v. CA (2008), the Supreme Court
held that the satisfaction of the judgment extinguishes the lien, if
there has been a waiver as shown either by the lawyer’s conduct
or by his passive omission. No rule will allow a lawyer to collect
from his client and then collect anew from the judgment debtor
except, perhaps, on a claim for a higher amount.
1998 Bar, Q. II: An attorney-client relationship starts from the
moment the attorney is engaged or retained.
(a) Discuss briefly the different types of fee arrangements an
attorney may enter into with his client.
(b) In the absence of such a fee arrangement, how would the
services of an attorney be compensated? Explain.
(c) What is a champertous contract? What is its effect in this
jurisdiction? Why?
A:
(a) The following are the types of fee arrangements:
(1) Retainer’s fee where lawyer is paid for services for an
agreed amount for the case.
(2) The lawyer agrees to be paid per court appearance.
(3) Contingent fee where the lawyer is paid for his services
depending on the success of the case. This applies usually in
civil suits for money or property where the lawyer’s fee is
taken from the award granted by the court.
(4) Attorney de Ojicio. The attorney is appointed by the court to
defend the indigent litigant in a criminal case. The client is
not bound to pay the attorney for his services although he
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
may be paid a nominal fee taken from a public fund
appropriated for the purpose.
(5) Legal Aid. The attorney renders legal services for those who
could not afford to engage the services of paid counsel.
(6) Quantum merit basis. If there is no specific contract
between the lawyer and the client, the lawyer is paid on
quantum merit basis that is what the lawyer deserves for his
services.
(b) In the absence of a fee arrangement, the lawyer is paid on a
quantum merit basis. The factors to be taken into
consideration in determining the amount are:
(1) The amount and character of the services rendered;
(2) The labor, time and trouble involved;
(3) The nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered;
(4) The amount of money or the value of the property affected
by the controversy involved in the employment;
(5) The skill and experience called for in the performance of the
services;
(6) The professional character and social standing of attorney;
(7) The results secured; and
(8) Whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent. (Delgado
vs. dela Rama, 43 Phil. 499; Panis vs. Yangco, 52 Phil. 499; de
Guzman Visayan Rapid Co.)
(c) A champertous contract is where the attorney agrees to
prosecute the case at his own expenses for the recovery of
property or money for the client, the latter agree to pay the
attorney from a portion of property on money awarded.
Champertous contracts are void in this jurisdiction as
contrary to public policy for the reason that it encourages
unnecessary litigation. In a champertous contract, the
lawyer is encouraged to solicit cases.
2006 Bar, Q. IV: When is recovery of attorney’s fees based on
quantum meruit allowed?
A: Recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is
authorized when:
(1) There is no express contract for payment of attorney’s fees
agreed upon between the lawyer and the client;
(2) When although there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees,
the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or
unreasonable by the court; and
(3) When the contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely
formal defects of execution;
[126]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(4) When the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to
finish the case to its conclusion;
(5) When lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney’s
fees (Rilloraza v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., 1999)
1991 Bar, Q. III: Miss Amparo engaged the services of Atty. Rito,
a young lawyer and her former boyfriend, to act as her counsel
in a case. True to his lawyer is oath. Atty. Rito represented her to
the best of his ability even when he had no opportunity to talk
to her on the progress of the case. When the case was
terminated, Amparo refused to pay Atty. Rito is fees on the
ground that there was no written contract of their professional
relationship.
(A) Can Amparo justify her action?
(B) If Amparo cannot, upon what basis then may Atty. Rito be
compensated? What are the considerations to be taken
into account?
A:
(A) Amparo may not justify her refusal to compensate Atty. Rito
for his legal service. An attorney is entitled to attorney’s fees
for services rendered even in the absence of a contract for
attorney's fees.
Alternative: She had the right to assume that that because of the
past relation, she can presume that the services will be rendered
for free.
(B) Atty. Rito has the right to demand attorney’s fees based on
an implied contract and for services rendered. The
determination of the amount of attorney’s fees will be
based on quantum merit, namely; time spent and extent of
services rendered; novelty of the case; importance of the
subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other
employment; customary changes, amount involved;
contingency or certainty of compensation; professional
standing and capacity of the client to pay.
2012 Bar, Q. (16): Mr. Joey owns a 5-hectare parcel of land
which is being expropriated as market site. The government is
offering only Php 15 per sqm while Mr. Joey deserves Php 20 per
sqm. Atty. AI agreed to represent Mr. Joey in the expropriation
case on contingent basis in that his attorney's fees shall be the
excess of Php 20 per sqm. Due to expert handling, the
expropriation court awarded Mr. Joey the fair market value of
Php 35 per sqm. Mr. Joey complained to the court that the
attorney's fee being charged is excessive as it amounts to about
63% of the award. Decide.

(a) A retainer's agreement, as a contract, has the force of law
between the parties and must be complied with in good
faith.
(b) It was the excellent handling of the case that resulted in a
bigger award; hence, it is fair that Atty. AI should be
rewarded with the excess.
(c) Mr. Joey got the desired valuation for his land. So, he must
honor his contract with Atty. AI.
(d) Attorney's fees is always subject to court supervision and
may be reduced by the court based on quantum meruit.
2002 Bar, Q. VI: Atty. CJ handled the case for plaintiff GE against
defendant XY in an action for damages. Judgment was rendered
for plaintiff GE. When a writ of execution was issued, the sheriff
levied on a 400-square meter lot of defendant XY. Pursuant to
their contingent fee contract, plaintiff GE executed a deed of
assignment in favor of Atty. CJ of one-half of the lot. Atty. CJ
accepted the assignment.
A. Is the contract for contingent fee valid? Explain.
B. Did Atty. CJ commit any violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility? Explain.
A. Contract for contingent fee is a contract wherein the
attorney’s fee, usually a percentage of what may be
recovered in the action, Is made to depend upon the success
of the lawyer in enforcing or defending his client’s right. It is
a valid contract, unlike a champertous contract which is
invalid because the lawyer undertakes to shoulder the
expenses of the litigation. However, the amount of the fee
agreed upon may be reduced by the courts if it should be
unconscionable. Fifty percent (50%) of what the client might
recover may or may not be unconscionable depending on
the factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of an attorney's fee.
B. In the case of Daroy v. Abecia (1998), the Supreme Court
held that the assignment to a lawyer of a portion of property
levied on by the sheriff for the satisfaction of a judgment in
favor of his client, does not violate Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code, if the property was not involved in the litigation
handled by the lawyer. In this case, since the action handled
by Atty. CJ was for damages, the property was apparently
not involved in the litigation. Hence, his acquisition of 50%
of the same is ethical.
2011 Bar, Q. 40: Atty. Arthur agreed to represent Patrick in a
personal injury case after the latter signed a retainer agreement
for a 33% fee contingent on their winning the case. In the course
of trial, Patrick dismissed Atty. Arthur after he presented their
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
evidence in chief and engaged Atty. Winston another lawyer.
They lost the case. What fee would Atty. Arthur be entitled to?
(a) Thirty three percent of the fee actually paid to Winston.
(b) The reasonable value of his services.
(c) A flat hourly rate for the time he invested in the case.
(d) Absolutely nothing.
1990 Bar, Q. I: Mrs. Amy Dizon’s husband was killed in a traffic
accident. She wants to sue the bus company for damages but
she cannot afford a lawyer. She approached Atty. Larry Rio who
agreed to handle the case without any retainer’s fee or expenses
on her part, on the condition that in case of recovery of
damages, he shall get 33% of the award by the court. Is this
arrangement valid and permissible? Decide with reasons.
A: In the recent case of Angel L. Bautista vs. Atty. Ramon A.
Gonzales. Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990, the Supreme
Court held that an agreement as to attorney's fees which provides
that the lawyer shall defray all the expenses of the suit, “is
contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay
or bear the expenses of litigation (See also Tule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility). The Court added that “although a
lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the
same should be subject to reimbursement." And. “an agreement
whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the client’s rights is champertous" and “against public
policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to
carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some
bargain to have part of the thing in dispute."
The arrangement between Amy Dizon and Atty. Larry Rio, which
provides that the latter will handle the case without any retainer’s
fee or expenses on her part, can be taken to mean that the lawyer
will carry out the case at his own expenses without
reimbursement. On the basis of the foregoing decision of the
Supreme Court, such an arrangement is invalid.
However, the contingent fee contract is not prohibited by law and
is impliedly sanctioned. A contingent fee is however closely
supervised by the court to safeguard the client from unjust
charges, and its validity depends, in large measure, upon the
reasonableness of the amount fixed under the circumstances of
the case. A contingent fee of 33% of the amount of recovery may
be reasonable if the bus company fights the case until the
Supreme Court and the litigation is hard-fought and long drawn; It
may be unreasonable If the bus company agrees to compromise.
But the fact that a contingent fee is unreasonable does not
[127]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
preclude the lawyer from being paid his fees on quantum meruil
basis.
Rule 20.02 – A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent
of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the
work performed and responsibility assumed.
Sharing or Division of Attorney’s Fees, When Allowed
 It is when two or more lawyers are engaged simultaneously
or at different times by the client that the problem of
division of fees may arise.
Underwood v. Overstreet. The general rule is that when lawyers
jointly represent a common client for a given fee without any
express agreement on how much each will receive, they will share
equally as they are considered special partners for a special
purpose.
But if there are specific contracts for the payment of the fees of
each lawyer, the contracts shall prevail unless found
unconscionable
If the lawyers are engaged at different stages of the case, and
there are no specific contracts executed, the lawyer who bore the
brunt of the prosecution of the case to its successful end is
entitled to the full amount of his fees despite the fact that the
client has retained another lawyer as “exclusive” counsel who
appeared only after the rendition of favorable judgment.
Gualberto Cruz v. CIR. Going over the evidence presented in this
case, we find reason to sustain the finding of the trial judge that
petitioner Cruz bore the brunt of the prosecution of the
employees' claim to its successful end. It was petitioner who
attended the daily hearings, presented witnesses, filed the various
pleadings and conducted the appeal to this Court of the original
case. It is true that in the so-called manifestation dated December
20, 1956, the employees supposedly appointed Atty. Rafael their
"exclusive" counsel, yet it appears that said pleading was actually
filed in the Industrial Court only on February 28, 1957, or after the
favorable decision to the employees was made known. It is not
difficult to see that it was more of a devise to deprive petitioner
Cruz of what would be due him as attorney's fees.
Amalgamated Laborers’ Assoc. v. CIR. When two or more lawyers
representing common clients have a professional breakup during
the pendency of the case, their attorney’s fees shall be shared in
amounts to be determined by the court.
Lawyer-Referral System, Effects; Fees of Collaborating Counsel

 If another counsel is referred to the client, and the latter
agrees to take him as collaborating counsel, and there is no
express agreement on the payment of his attorney’s fees,
the said counsel (or substituting counsel, if the first one
lawyer withdraws) will receive attorney’s fees in proportion
to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
 The propotion may be agreed upon by the lawyers and the
client. In case of disagreement, the court may fix the
proportional division of fees.
ABA, CPR. The lawyer-referral system helps individuals in locating
lawyers competent to handle their particular problems. It enables
a layman to have an informed selection of competent lawyers
who have experience in the subject matter involved. Lawyers
should support the principle of lawyer-referral system and should
encourage the evolution of other ethical plans which aid in the
selection of the qualified counsel.
Classification of Practicing Lawyers According to Lines of
Specialty
 In support of the idea of lawyer-referral system, an
appropriate classification of practicing lawyers according to
their lines of specialty may be introduced in the country.
 The IBP is in the best position to initiate the classification or
listing of practicing lawyer in each Chapter.
 The public may then be guided when the need arises to hire
lawyers known for their competency on particular subjects
or cases. Specialists make things easier for the court.
Compensation to an Attorney for Merely Recommending
Another Lawyer, Contempt
 It is improper for a lawyer to receive any compensation for
merely recommending another lawyer to his client and
render no legal service at all in the pursuit or defense of the
client’s case.
 This practice is allowed and abetted, will commercialize the
legal profession for the recommending lawyers will be acting
like “agents” for the others. This is disregarding the legal
profession.
Attorney’s Fees for Legal Services Shared or Divided to Non-
Lawyers, Prohibited
Amalgamated Laborers Assoc. v. Court of Industrial Relations.
Attorney’s fees cannot be shared to a non-lawyer. It is immoral.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal
agreement entered into by the union and its officers thru its
President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty.
Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall be divided equally
("share and share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez
and Felisberto Javier, the union president.
We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union
president should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of Legal
Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It
says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."
The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may
seek compensation only as such president. An agreement
whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is
immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be
justified.
Rule 20.03: A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and
consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs, commission,
interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation
whatsoever related to his professional employment from
anyone other than the client.
Rationale of the Rule
ABA Op. 196. The reason for the rule is to secure the fidelity of
the lawyer to his clients’ cause and to prevent a situation in which
the receipt by him of a rebate or commission from another with
the client’s business may interfere with the full discharge of his
duty to his client.
Report of the IBP Committee. There should be no reason for
suspicion on the part of the client that his lawyer is receiving
compensation in connection with the case from third persons
with hostile interests
 If the evil sought to be prevented is allowed, unscrupulous
lawyers will find it easy and convenient to sell their clients’
cases down the river for valuable considerations offered by
persons with hostile interests.
 And even if the secret compensation comes from a friendly
person, if the act is discovered, it is bound to create
dissension in the client-lawyer relationship.
 Worse, the lawyer will be able to enrich himself by receiving
more than what is due him as attorney’s fees.
Exception
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an attorney:
[128]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
 The term “compensation” is used in its general connotation
and will include any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest,
rebate, forwarding allowance or any other benefits received
from any other person/s – in relation to the lawyer’s
employment in a case.
2003 Bar, Q. XIV: In securing a bond for a writ of preliminary
injunction issued in favor of his client, Attorney X was given
P10,000.00 by the surety company as commission for the
premium on the bond. Is the acceptance of the P10,000.00 by
Attorney X proper? Explain your answer.
A: The acceptance of P10,000.00 from the insurance company is
improper. Rule 20.03, CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not,
without the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept any
fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding
allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his
professional employment from anyone other than the client.”
1997 Bar, Q. XIV: A real estate company, elated over the decision
in a case regarding a dispute over a personal matter between its
top sales representative and his neighbor, gifted Atty. O, who
represented its sales representative in the litigation, with a 240-
square-meter lot in its newly developed subdivision. The case
handled by Atty. O had nothing to do with the sales
representative in the litigation, with a 240 square-meter lot in its
newly developed subdivision. The case handled by Atty. O had
nothing to do with the sales representative's work for the real
estate company. The latter's offer of the lot, which Atty. O
accepted, was in consideration of its sales representative’s being
the firm's Number One salesman. Was there a breach of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by Atty. O when he accepts
the 240 square-meter lot?
A: Rule 20.03, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not, without the
full knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward,
costs, commission, interests, rebate of forwarding allowance or
other compensation whatsoever related to his professional
employment from anyone other than the client.
"(There should be no room for suspicion on the part of the client
that his lawyer is receiving compensation in connection with the
case from third persons with hostile interests" (Report of IBP
Committee, p. 112). Even if the secret compensation comes from

a friendly person, if the act is discovered, it is bound to create
dissension in the client lawyer relationship. Worse, the lawyer will
be able to enrich himself by receiving more than what is due him
as attorney’s fees. (Pineda, Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1995 ed. p.
243)
Alternative: The gift of the real estate company does not come
from the adverse party, hence, there is no violation of the lawyer
is duty of loyalty to his clients. The property given was not his
client's property involved in the litigation. Hence, it does not
violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code. The lawyer's acceptance of
the gift is proper. However, it would be better if he informs his
client.
Rule 20.04: A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients
concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Controversies with Clients Regarding Attorney’s Fees Must Be
Avoided (Rule 20.04)
Retuya v. Gorduiz. Filing a case to harass a client is condemnable.
After reflecting on the conflicting contentions of the parties, the
Court finds that there is justification for suspending the
respondent.
Respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against
his client for the supposed misappropriation of his attomey's fees.
It is not altogether clear that his client had swindled him and,
therefore, there is some basis for concluding that, contrary to his
lawyer's oath, he had filed a suit against her and had harassed and
embarrassed her.
Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics prescribes that
"controversies with clients concerning compensation are to be
avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-
respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for
his services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only
to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud."
The rule will prevent the creation of the impression the lawyer is
mercenary
Perez v. Scottish Union and National Insurance Co. The validity of
Exhibit D having been upheld, appellant's claim that plaintiff's
stipulated fee was only P550 which had already been paid,
necessarily becomes untenable. We may add, however, in
plaintiff's favor that judicial actions for the recovery of fees,
unless righteous and well founded and unless forced by an
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
intolerable attitude assumed by clients, are seldom, if ever,
resorted to, because they cannot fail to create the impression,
however wrong it may be, that the lawyer instituting them are
mercenary.
Report of IBP Committee. A lawyer should avoid controversies
over fees with his client and should try to settle amicably any
differences on the subject.
Montano v. IBP. We find Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a
member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services
only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the
client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services,11 under
the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal
was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him
the attorney's fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to
fulfill his obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does
not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the
amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. rule 20.4 of Canon 20,
mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients
concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so
large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer
failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.
Judicial Action to Recover Attorney’s Fees
When proper, the lawyer can pursue judicial actions to protect or
collect attorney’s fees due to him. He has two options:
(a) In the same case:
Lichauco v. CA. He may enforce his attorney’s fees by filing an
appropriate motion or petition as an incident in the main action
where he rendered legal services. This is to avoid multiplicity of
suits.
Further, the court trying the main case is in the best position to
determine the nature and extent of the lawyer’s services.
Such action however is not proper if the client recovered nothing
in the main case.
Palanca v. Pecson. The motion or the petition must be filed with
the court before the judgment had been satisfied or before the
proceeds were delivered to the client.
(b) In a separate action
[129]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
NWSA v. NWSA Consolidated Union. The lawyer may also
enforce his attorney’s fees by filing an independent separate
action for collection of attorney’s fees/
Occena v. Marquez. Same options are opened to a lawyer who
claims attorney’s fees in an estate proceeding.
He can either file a motion for payment of his fees in the
proceedings or, he can file a separate action against the executor
or administrator as an individual.
If paid, the latter will include the amount as part of the expenses
of administration in his accounting to be submitted to the probate
court. The executor or administrator will be reimbursed by the
estate if he paid the lawyer with his own money.
Aldamiz v. Judge, CFI of Mindoro. The correct procedure for the
collection of attorney's fees, is for the counsel to request the
administrator to make payment and file an actin against him in his
personal capacity and not as an administrator should he fail to
pay. If the judgment is rendered against the administrator and he
pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the court.
The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an action, file a
[petition in the testate or intestate proceeding "asking that the
court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and
direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of
administration."
Client Shall Not Lose Everything for Attorney’s Fees
Licudan v. CA. There should never be an instance where a lawyer
gets as attorney’s fees the entire property in litigation. It is
unconscionable for the victor in litigation to lose everything he
won to the fees of his own lawyer.
Cueto v. Jimenez. Where the record shows the lawyer was
already paid more than ½ of the fees agreed, there is no
imposition, injustice or fraud that will justify a judicial action for
collection of the remainder.
2016 Bar, Q. XV: Atty. Alex entered into an agreement for his
legal services with Johnny where it is provided that the latter
will pay him Pl 00,000.00 as acceptance fee and P 100,000.00
upon submission of the case for decision. The court granted
Johnny moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
of Pl 00,000.00. After execution of the judgment, Atty. Alex kept
the Pl 00,000.00 as his attorney's fees. Johnny sued Atty. Alex
for violation of the CPR claiming that the attorney's fees

awarded by the court belongs to him. Decide the case with
reasons.
A: I will rule in favor of Johnny.
The P100,000.00 awarded to him as moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees, are items of damages which are due
to him as plaintiff in the case. Attorney’s fees awarded to a party
pursuant to Art. 2208, CC, constitutes extraordinary attorney’s
fees which belong to the client, not to the lawyer. It is not the
ordinary attorney’s fees which is the compensation due from a
client to his lawyer.
1998 Bar, Q. XVII: Discuss the propriety of a lawyer filing a suit
against his client concerning his fees.
A: Rule 20.04, CPR provides that “a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with his clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice
or fraud.” The legal profession is not a money-making trade but a
form of public service. Lawyers should avoid giving the impression
that they are mercenary (Perez v. Scottish Union and National
Insurance Co., 76 Phil. 325). It might even turn out to be
unproductive for him for potential clients are likely to avoid a
lawyer with a reputation of suing his clients.
2006 Bar, Q. XII: What is “Assumpsit” and when is it proper?
A: Assumpsit is an action in common law for the recovery of
damages for the nonperformance of a parol or simple contract,
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. 1, pp. 269-270). The term has been
used in relation to the collection of attorney’s fees on a quantum
meruit basis. Where the lawyer has been employed without a
contract for his compensation, he is entitled to recover an amount
his services merit, on the basis of an implied promise by the client
to pay for such services. This has been referred- to as an
assumpsit on quatum meruit (Qui/ban v. Robino/ 1989]).
1987 Bar, Q. VII: The services of Atty. BB were engaged by CC for
the filing of a complaint for recovery of a sum of money, under a
written contract which also stipulated for the down payment to
Atty. BB of a fixed sum, the balance to be given upon recovery of
the amount of the claim. Shortly after the complaint was filed,
Atty. BB took steps to reach a settlement with the defendant,
but without the prior permission of CC. Resenting this action, CC
immediately wrote BB terminating his services.
(a) May CC dismiss Atty. BB under the given circumstances?
(b) What rights, if any, would Atty. BB have on the matter?
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Answer with reasons.
A:
(a) Yes, CC may dismiss Atty. BB. A client has the right to
terminate the services of counsel on loss of confidence in
him. The lawyer’s attempt to enter into a compromise with
the adverse party without his consent is a violation of the
fiduciary relationship of the attorney and the client.
(b) Since the client dismissed the attorney for a valid reason,
Attorney BB has no more right on his attorney’s fees.
A, after taking his oath as a lawyer in 1985. was maliciously
charged with the crime of seduction by Amor, his former
girlfriend. Her parents instigated the filing of the case. A
appeared for and defended himself. In the decision acquitting
him, the court explicitly stated that he was a victim of malicious
prosecution. A then filed a complaint for damages and attorneys
against Amor and her parents. A likewise appeared for himself in
the case. Can her recover attorney’s fees?
A: No. Attorney A is not entitled to attorney's fees. He may,
however, be entitled to attorney’s fees in the form of damages
upon proof of bad faith of the defendant and a definite ruling be
made by the court on the claim.
1991 Bar, Q. VI: XYZ Corporation, represented by Atty. W. won in
a civil case against ABC Co. and was awarded attorney’s fees in
the amount of P25.000.00. In its contract with Atty. W in relation
to said case, XYZ Corp. bound itself to pay him with P10.000.00
for attorney’s fees, which it paid when it rested its case. ABC Co.
failed to pay the adjudged attorney’s fees even after the
decision had become final. Atty. W filed a motion for execution
of Judgment on the attorney’s fees, claiming to be his. XYZ Corp.
also had a similar motion claiming that the adjudged attorney’s
fees belong to it. Which motion will you grant?
A: The attorney’s fees awarded by the court is in the form of
damages and should belong to the client XYZ Corporation.
1992 Bar, Q. XI: Atty. Nicasio handled a case for Lydia
Domondon wherein Judgment was rendered in the latter’s favor
in the amount of P 10,000.00. Upon finality of the judgment, the
judgment debtor paid the full amount of PI 10,000.00 to Atty.
Nicasio. However, Atty. Nicasio turned over only P80.000.00 to
Lydia Domondon, explaining that he had already deducted the
amount of P20,000.00 for his professional services in accordance
with their written agreement, and the amount of P 10,000.00
[130]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
awarded by the court by way of attorney’s fees from the total
sum of PI 10,000.00 received by him from the judgment debtor.
Comment on the proprietary of the action of Atty. Nicasio.
A: The action of Atty. Nicasio in retaining the amount of P
10,000.00 as attorney’s fees because said amount belongs to his
client.
The award of attorney's fees and damages under Art. 2208, par.
10 of the Civil Code refers to damages suffered by the client.
1994 Bar, Q. IX: Deciding a case for malicious prosecution, Judge
Sales awarded attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, in
addition to exemplary damages, to the plaintiff.
(1) Did the judge act within his discretion in awarding
attorney's fees?
(2) As counsel for the plaintiff, are you entitled to receive the
attorney's fees thus awarded in addition to your stipulated
legal fees?
A:
(1) A party may recover attorney's fees in cases of malicious
prosecution against him in an action for damages against the
party responsible therefore (Art. 2208 (3), Civil Code). But he
must prove not only that he was acquitted in the criminal
action, but that the person who charged him knowingly
made a false statement of facts to induce the prosecutor to
prosecute or that the institution of the criminal action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate him and to
cast upon him dishonor and disgrace.
(2) No. Attorney’s fees in the concept or as an item of damages
is an indemnity for damages sustained by the client, and
belongs to him.
Canon 21: A Lawyer Shall Preserve the Confidence and Secrets of
His Client Even After the Attorney-Client Relation is Terminated
Confidences and Secrets of Clients, Concepts
Report of the IBP Committee. “Confidences” refers to
information protected by the attorney-client privilege under the
Revised Rules of Court
Rule 130, Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
Report of the IBP Committee. Secrets refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client.
People v. Syjuco. It is one of the express duties of a lawyer to
“maintain inviolate the confidences and at every peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client”
Communication Must Be Intended to be Confidential
Hiltpold v. Stern. The mere establishment of client-attorney
relationship does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
There must be an intention that the communication relayed by
the client to the lawyer be treated as confidential. The very
essence of the veil of secrecy is that the communication is not
intended for the information of third persons. For if it were, and it
was related to third persons, the communication is not
considered privilege.
Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance Society. It will be noted that the
evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's
attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of
secrecy which surrounds communications made between
attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended
for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them,
put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is
evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for
the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person
is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the
attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering
the communication to the third person for whom it was intended
and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever,
be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication
between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it was
intended at least, is a communication between the client and a
third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of
intermediary or agent.
Preservation of Client’s Confidences and Secrets
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Rule 138, Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
CPE, Canon 37. Confidence of a client. It is the duty of a lawyer to
preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's
employment and extends as well to his employees; and neither of
them should accept employment, which involves or may involve
the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private
advantages of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and
even though there are other available sources of such
information. A lawyer should not continue employment when he
discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his full
duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from
disclosing the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidence which he is bound to respect. He may properly make
such disclosure as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect
those against whom it is threatened.
XPN:
(a) Rule 21.01
(b) Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. When the
client himself or in case of his death, his heir or legal
representative relieved the lawyer of his duty.
(c) Rosacia v. Bulalacao. If the advice sought from the lawyer is
not legal advice but something else like an accounting
advice, business or personal assistance, the privilege does
not attach a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Rationale of the Canon
 The reason for the attorney-client privilege is to encourage
and inspire clients to tell all about the facts of their case.
 Unless the clients are also assured that what they disclose to
their lawyers will not be revealed to third persons, they will
keep and suppress matters which they consider unfavorable
to them such that the edited facts presented will be
distorted and the legal advice proffered thereon will become
misleading and inaccurate.
[131]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
 Trial may even be conducted along false lines or theories
and this will open the lawyer to damaging surprises which
may be too late to correct.
 Such surprises could be avoided if the clients could candidly
tell all without suppression of facts from the start
Canon Applies to Confidences and Secrets of Prospective Clients
In re: Hamilton. Under Rule 21.01, communication made by a
prospective client is covered. The confidential communication
must be made to the lawyer or in his professional capacity.
Mode of Communication
State v. Dawson. The communication may be verbal, written or
through any other means.
Rule 21.01: A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets
of his client except:
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the
consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his
employees or associates or by judicial action.
Prohibition Against Revelation of Confidences and Secrets of
Client Subject to Exceptions (Rule 21.01)
Article 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor -
Revelation of secrets - In addition to the proper administrative
action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period,
or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador
judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his
professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or
solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense
of a client or having received confidential information from said
client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party
in the same case, without the consent of his first client.
Reason for the Strict Prohibition
Samala v. Valencia. The prohibition that the lawyer must preserve
or keep the confidences or secrets of his client even after the
termination of their attorney-client relationship is strict because

of the relationship is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.
As the lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts of the client’s
case, he is informed of the weak as well as the strong points of
the case. Such information or knowledge must be considered
sacred and guarded with care.
When Properly Authorized Lawyer May Break the Seal of Secrecy
 If the client had authorized his lawyer after having been fully
informed of the consequences to reveal his confidences or
secrets, there is a waiver on the part of the said client to
invoke the attorney-client privilege. This waiver is sufficient.
 However, the waiver of the client is not sufficient if the
witness to be examined in regard to the privilege
communication is the lawyer’s secretary. stenographer, or
clerk involving facts acquired in such capacity. In such a
situation, the consent of the attorney is also required.
When Required by Law
 When the law directs the lawyer to reveal the confidences
and secrets of the client, the law prevails
 The privilege cannot be utilized as a weapon to frustrate the
administration of justice or the enforcement of laws.
Gerhardt v. United R. Co. The law does not make a law office a
nest of vipers in which to hatch crimes or frauds.
 Consequently, both public policy and the lawyer’s duty to
forbid the lawyer from assisting in the commission of a
crime or permitting the privilege to conceal a wrong-doing
 See Canon 37
Will v. Tornabelles & Co. His duty to society obliges him to make
the revelation.
ABA Op. 155. When a client jumped bail and his lawyer knows his
whereabouts or is living somewhere under an assumed name, the
lawyer must so inform the proper authorities. Failure to do so is a
misconduct for which the lawyer may be disciplined.
Hamil & Co. v. England. The client cannot also invoke the
privilege, if the communication related to the lawyer involves the
commission of future fraud or crime.
Alexander v. U.S. The reason for this is that the lawyer cannot be
professionally consulted on the commission of future crimes and
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
frauds. Hence, he is not estopped from making disclosures or the
proper authorities.
However, information on crimes or frauds already committed falls
within the privilege and the lawyer cannot reveal or be compelled
to reveal the confidences of the client.
When Necessary to Collect Fees or to Defend Himself or Staff by
Judicial Action, Rule of Secrecy Shall Yield
 Rule 21.01(c) is intended for the protection of the lawyer’s
rights, his employees or associates – whose rights cannot be
suppressed by the use of the privilege.
 The lawyer may divulge the confidential communication of
his client in proper judicial proceedings, if that is necessary
to protect his rights.
 The client cannot frustrate the action of the lawyer by taking
advantage of the privilege and enrich himself at the expense
of the lawyer.
 The same rule applies in relation to the lawyer’s staff and
associates.
 The lawyer however is permitted only to make disclosures
which are necessary for his action or defense and not to go
beyond what is relevant and material
2006 Bar, Q. X: In the course of a drinking spree with Ally.
Holgado Who has always been his counsel in business deals,
Simon bragged about his recent sexual adventures with
socialites known for their expensive tastes. When Ally. Holgado
asked Simon how he manages to finance his escapades, the
latter answered that he has been using the bank deposits of rich
clients of Banco Filipino where he works as manager.
Is Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado covered by the attorney-
client privilege?
A: Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado is not covered by the
lawyer-client privilege. In the first place, it was not made on
account of a lawyer-client relationship, that is, it was not made for
the purpose of seeking legal advice. In the second place, it was
not made in confidence. (Mercado v. Vitriolo, 2005). In the third
place, the attorney-client privilege does not cover information
concerning a crime or a fraud being committed or proposed to be
committed.
2008 Bar, Q. VII: In need of legal services, Niko secured an
appointment to meet with Atty. Henry of Henry & Meyer Law
Offices. During the meeting, N Niko divulged highly private
information to Atty. Henry, believing that the lawyer would keep
the confidentiality of the information. Subsequently, Niko was
[132]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
shocked when he learned that Atty. Henry had shared the
confidential information with his law partner, Atty. Meyer, and
their common friend, private practitioner Atty. Canonigo. When
confronted, Atty. Henry replied that Niko never signed any
confidentiality agreement, and that he shared the information
with the two lawyers to secure affirmance of his legal opinion on
Niko’s problem. Did Atty. Henry violate any rule of ethics?
Explain fully.
A: Atty. Henry violated Canon No. 21 of the CPR by sharing
information obtained from his client Niko with Atty. Canonigo.
Canon No. 20 provides that “a lawyer shall preserve the
confidences or secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relationship is terminated.” The fact that Atty. Canonigo is a friend
from whom he intended to secure legal opinion on Niko’s
problem, does not justify such disclosure. He cannot obtain a
collaborating counsel without the consent of the client (Rule
18.01, CPR).
On the other hand, Atty. Henry did not violate Canon 21 in sharing
information with his partner Atty. Meyer. Rule 21.04 of the CPR
specifically provides that “a lawyer may disclose the affairs of a
client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless
prohibited by the client”. Atty. Henry was not prohibited from
disclosing the affairs of Niko with the members of his law firm.
The employment of a member of a firm is generally considered as
employment of the firm itself (Hilado v. David, 1949).
2008 Bar, Q. I: Christine was appointed counsel de oficio for
Zuma, who was accused of raping his own daughter. Zuma
pleaded not guilty but thereafter privately admitted to Christine
that he did commit the crime charged.
(a) In light of Zuma’s admission, what should Christine do?
Explain.
(b) Can Christine disclose the admission of Zuma to the court?
Why or why not?
(c) Can Christine withdraw as counsel of Zuma should he insist
in going to trial? Explain.
A:
(a) Christine should continue to act as counsel de oficio for
Zuma. Christine was appointed counsel de oficio and should
not decline to do so even if she believes her client to be
guilty. Her client is entitled to the presumption of innocence
and is not obliged to plead guilty. There is no fraud involved
in his pleading not guilty.

Alternative: Rule 19.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) provides that “a lawyer who has received information that
his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetuated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of
Court.” In the light of this provision, Christine should call upon
Zuma to immediately rectify the fraud he committed upon the
court by pleading not guilty when he really committed the crime
charged.
(b) Christine cannot disclose the admission of Zuma to the
Court. If she does so, she will violate her obligation to
preserve confidences or secrets of her client (Canon 21, Rule
21.02, CPR). The privileged communication between lawyer
and client may be used as a shield to defend crimes already
committed.
(c) No. Christine cannot withdraw as counsel of Zuma should he
insist in going to trial. It is Christine’s duty and moral
obligation when she accepted the assignment as Zuma’s
counsel de oficio. It is not up to her to judge him to be
guilty; that is the responsibility of the court. She should not
ask the court to excuse her from her responsibility as
counsel de oficio.
Alternative: Pursuant to Rule 19.02 Christine should terminate
her relationship with Zuma in accordance to Section 26, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, which provides that a lawyer may retire at
any time from an action by the written consent of the client, or,
without such consent, by permission of the court upon notice to
the client and hearing. Christine should therefore first try to
secure the written consent of Zuma to her withdrawal as his
counsel,
and if he refuses, she can file a motion asking the court to allow
her to withdraw as such counsel, for serious and sufficient cause
(Rule 14.02, CPR).
Rule 21.02: A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client,
use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall
he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.
Prohibition to Use Information Acquired in the Course of
Professional Employment to the Disadvantage of Client
GR: A lawyer, who acquired information from a client in the
course of his legal employment, is prohibited from making use of
such information whether privilege or not:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) To the disadvantage of his client
(b) To the lawyer’s advantage
(c) To the advantage of a third person
XPN: If the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents to the use thereof.
XPN to XPN: In matters of unprivileged information, the lawyer
may be judicially compelled to make a disclosure even if the client
objects. Also, under the exceptions mentioned in Rule 21.01
Violation of Rule is Breach of Trust
Bautista v. Barrios. If the lawyer makes the prohibited disclosures
– that is, the revelation does not fall under any exceptions – he
will be subjected to disciplinary action for breach of trust
 A lawyer who gives an incriminating information which the
client had confided to him to a third party who in turn used
it as basis for the filing of a case, the lawyer has violated the
rule
Rule 21.03: A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of
his client, give information from his files to an outside agency
seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.
Disclosure of Information from Lawyer’s Filed Prohibited
Without the Consent of Client Which Must be in Writing (Rule
21.03)
People v. Sy Juco
Facts:
1. Certain government officers, armed with a search warrant
duly issued, seized among other things, a filing cabinet,
belonging to Atty. R.
2. In seeking return of the cabinet, Atty. R claimed the cabinet
contained documents and articles belonging to his clients.
3. Because of the refusal of the government men to return the
cabinet, Atty. R petitioner the CFI which issued the warrant
praying that the agents be prohibited from opening the
cabinet
Issue: WON the seizure of the filing cabinet valid
Held:
[133]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1. Since, it has been proven that the cabinet belongs to a
lawyer and that he keeps the records of his client therein,
the lower court cannot order the opening of said cabinet.
2. To do so is in violation of his rights as an attorney.
3. It would be tantamount to compelling him to disclose his
client’s secrets
Rule 21.04: A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the
firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the
client.
Without Prohibition, Disclosure of Client’s Affairs to Partners or
Associates in a Law Firm May Be Done (Rule 21.04)
 In a law firm, partners or associates usually consult one
another involving their case and some work as a team.
 Consequently, it cannot be avoided that some information
about the case received from the client may be disclosed to
the partners or associates.
Rule 21.05: A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be
required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him,
from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.
Client’s Confidences and Secrets, to be Guarded Also by the
Lawyer’s Personnel in His Office
Report of the IBP Committee. The prohibition against a lawyer
from divulging the confidences and secrets of his clients will
become futile exercise, if the secretary or staff are given the
liberty to do what is prohibited by the lawyer.
To maintain therefore the confidentiality of the client’s
confidences and secrets, the lawyer must adopt measures as will
prevent those working under him from making disclosures or
using said confidences and secrets.
The lawyer is obliged to exercise care in selecting and training his
employees so that the sanctity of all confidences and secrets of
his clients may be preserved
Rule 21.06: A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a
client's affairs even with members of his family.
Indiscreet Conversation About Client’s Affairs, to be Avoided
(Rule 21.06)

 He should avoid committing calculated indiscretion, that is,
accidental revelation of secrets obtained in the professional
employment.
 Reckless or imprudent disclosure of the affairs of his clients
may jeopardize them. Not every member of the lawyer’s
family has the proper orientation and training for keeping
client’s confidences and secrets
 Hence, it is the better practice of lawyers to be always
careful and reserved about the secrets of their clients which
they must keep inviolate.
Rule 21.07: A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted
about a particular case except to avoid possible conflict of
interest.
Prohibition to Disclose Secrets Covers Consultations
 If a lawyer was consulted about a particular case, and
irrespective of WON he was thereafter hired as counsel,
should not reveal to others the matter subject of the
consultation. To do so will be tantamount to revelation of
the confidences and secrets of a client.
Hilado v. David. The prohibition applies, even if the prospective
client did not thereafter actually engage the lawyer. By the
consultation, the lawyer already learned the secrets of the
prospective client. It is not fair, if he will not be bound by the rule
on privileged communication in respect of matters disclosed to
him by a prospective client.
XPN: When the lawyer will be placed in a situation of representing
conflicting interests if he does not disclose the consultation to the
next person consulting him on the same matter.
Otherwise, if he remains silent, he may be violating the rules
against representing conflicting interests (See Rule 15.03)
Canon 22: A Lawyer Shall Withdraw His Services Only For Good
Cause and Upon Notice Appropriate in the Circumstances
Rule 22.01: A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the
following case:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of
conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not
promote the best interest of the client;
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office;
and
(g) Other similar cases.
Q: Give three (3) instances when a lawyer is allowed to
withdraw his/her services.
1989 Bar, Q. IV(3): When can a lawyer validly withdraw as
counsel? Explain your answer.
1997 Bar, Q. XI: Cite at least five (5) valid reasons under any of
which a lawyer may be allowed to withdraw from a case even
without her client's consent.
A: Rule 22.01
1988 Bar, Q. V(a): Under what instances or circumstances may
an attorney be permitted to withdraw as counsel for his client?
A: Rule 22.01
Concept of Appearance
Appearance refers to the act of submitting or presenting oneself
to the court, either as plaintiff or defendant, personally or
through counsel, and seeking general reliefs or special reliefs from
the court.
GR: When a person appears, he submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court, which means, he agrees to be bound by the
judgment of the court without prejudice to his right to appeal.
XPN: The voluntary appearance of a defendant in an action is
equivalent to service of summons under Rule 14, Sec. 20
Kinds of Appearance
1. General appearance – is that kind where the party comes to
the court either as plaintiff or defendant and seeks general
reliefs from the court for satisfaction of his claims or
counterclaims respectively
2. Special appearance – is that kind where a defendant
appears in court solely for the purpose of objecting to the
[134]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
jurisdiction of the court over his person. The aim is simply
the dismissal of the case.
Flores v. Zurbito. If the defendant seeks other reliefs, the
appearance, even if qualified by the word special, is equivalent to
a general appearance.
Lawyer Who Appear in Lower Court is Presumed to be Lawyer on
Appeal
Rule 138, Sec. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court
presumed to represent client on appeal — An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed
to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate
court.
Jose v. CA. A counsel de parte is presumed to be the lawyer on
appeal, unless he has finally withdrawn his appearance.
GR: With respect to a counsel de oficio, there should be no
difference (same rule applies)
XPN: When the court relives him and appoints another counsel de
oficio, or when the defendant has secured the services of a
counsel de parte.
Formal Appearance of Counsel in a Case, How Effected
Guzman v. Caluag. An attorney must take notice of appearance in
order to be considered a counsel of record, served upon the
adverse party and filed with the court
 In practice, the notice of appearance bears the written
conformity of the client and the first counsel, in case the
second lawyer is appearing as collaborating counsel
Luzon Rubber & Manufacturing Co. v. Estaris. The appearance
must be in writing. The reason for the requirement is to enable
the officers (of the court) concerned to effectively serve notices
on the attorney of record
Judgment (and court processes) may be served upon the parties
themselves if no attorneys appear on the record
Lawyer (Without Formal Notice of Appearance) is Presumed to
be Properly Authorized to Represent Any Cause in Which he
Appears and No Written Power of Attorney is Required to
Authorize Him to Appear

Mercado v. Ubay. An attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear
in court for his client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, ROC). The fact that
private respondents had not personally appeared in the hearings
of Case TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The filing of the
answer by and appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are
sufficient to give private respondents standing in court. It is hard
to believe that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case
would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he
had not been authorized or employed by the party concerned.
Land Bank of the Phil. v. Pamintuan Dev. Corp. The presumption
in favor of the counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is
a strong one. A lawyer is not even required to present a written
authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal
notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts
performed by the counsel in his client’s name
Absent a formal notice of substitution, all lawyers who appeared
before the court or filed pleadings in behalf of the client are
considered counsels of the latter. All acts performed by them are
deemed to be with the client’s consent.
The new counsel who filed the MR in behalf of the client is
presumed to be authorized even if he filed no formal notice of
entry of appearance
Judge May Require Counsel, On Reasonable Grounds to Produce
or Prove His Authority to Appear for a Client
Rule 138, Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear — An attorney
is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any
issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys
wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Porac Trucking Corp. v. CA. A lawyer who appeared for a
corporation in an action for damages anchored on reckless
imprudence without having been employed was suspended by
the SC from the practice of law for malpractice.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Cases When Lawyer May Withdraw
 Rule 22.01 is not exclusive. Letter (g) states any other similar
cases
1994 Bar, Q. XI(2): May a lawyer withdraw as counsel at any
time?
A: A lawyer may withdraw as counsel only with the consent of the
client and with leave of court, and only for good cause
enumerated in Rule 22.01.
(a) Clients Pursuing an Illegal or Immoral Cause of Conduct
CPE, Canon 44. Withdrawal from employment as attorney or
counsel. The right of an attorney or counsel to withdraw from
employment, once assumed, arises only from good cause. Even
the desire or consent of the client is not always sufficient. The
lawyers should not throw up the unfinished task to the detriment
of his client except for reasons of honor or self-respect. If the
client insists upon an unjust or immoral course in the conduct of
his case, or if he persists over the attorney's remonstrance in
presenting frivolous defenses, or if he deliberately disregards an
agreement or obligation as to fees or expenses, the lawyer may
be warranted in withdrawing on due notice to the client, allowing
him time to employ another lawyer. So, also, when a lawyer
discovers that his client has no case and the client is determined
to continue it; or even if the lawyer finds himself incapable of
conducting the case effectively. Sundry other instances may arise
in which withdrawal is to be justified. Upon withdrawal from a
case after a retainer has been paid, the attorney should refund
such part of the retainer as has not been clearly earned.
Donton v. Tansingco. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act
which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
2013 Bar, Q. I: Atty. Bravo represents Carlos Negar (an insurance
agent for Dormir Insurance Co.) in a suit filed by insurance
claimant Andy Limot who also sued Dormir Insurance. The
insurance policy requires the insured/claimant to give a written
notice to the insurance company or its agent within 60 days
from the occurrence of the loss.
Limot testified during the trial that he had mailed the notice of
the loss to the insurance agent, but admitted that he lost the
registry receipt so that he did not have any documentary
evidence of the fact of mailing and of the timeliness of the
mailed notice. Dormir Insurance denied liability, contending that
[135]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
timely notice had not been given either to the company or its
agent. Atty. Bravo’s client, agent Negar, testified and confirmed
that he never received any notice.
A few days after Negar testified, he admitted to Atty. Bravo that
he had lied when he denied receipt of Limot’s notice; he did
receive the notice by mail but immediately shredded it to defeat
Limot’s claim.
If you were Atty. Bravo, what would you do in light of your
client’s (Carlos Negar’s) disclosure that he perjured himself when
he testified?
A: If I were Atty. Bravo I shall promptly call upon Carlos Negar, my
client, to rectify his perjured testimony by recanting the same
before the court.
Should he refuse or fail to do so, I shall then terminate my
relationship with him (Rule 19.02, CPR) stating that with his
having committed perjury he pursued an illegal conduct in
connection with the case. (Rule 22.01)
Since my client Limot refuses to forego the advantage thus
unjustly gained as a result of his perjury, I should promptly inform
the injured person or his counsel, so that they may take the
appropriate steps (CPE, Canon 41)
Finally, as part of my duty to do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court (CPR, Rule 10.01), and the Attorney’s Oath, I
shall file a manifestation with the court attaching thereto the
notice of termination as Limot’s counsel.
(b) Client’s Insistence that Lawyer Pursues Act Violative of the
Canons and Rules
CPE, Canon 16. Restraining clients from improprieties. A lawyer
should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients
from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do,
particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts,
judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in
such wrongdoings the lawyer should terminate their relation.
2011 Bar, Q. 24: A difficult client directed his counsel to bring up
to the Supreme Court the trial court’s dismissal of their action.
Counsel believes that the trial court acted correctly and that an
appeal would be futile. Which of the following options should
counsel take?
(a) Withdraw from the case to temper the client’s propensity
to litigate.

(b) Engage a collaborating counsel who can assist in the case.
(c) Submit a new retainer proposal to the client for a higher fee.
(d) Elevate the case to the Supreme Court as directed by client.
2004 Bar, Q. II: On the eve of the initial hearing for the reception
of evidence for the defense, the defendant and his counsel had a
conference where the client directed the lawyer to present as
principal defense witnesses two (2) persons whose testimonies
were personally known to the lawyer to have been perjured. The
lawyer informed his client that he refused to go along with the
unwarranted course of action proposed by the defendant. But
the client insisted on his directive, or else he would not pay the
agreed attorney’s fees.
When the case was called for hearing the next morning, the
lawyer forthwith moved in open court that he be relieved as
counsel for the defendant. Both the defendant and the plaintiffs
counsel objected to the motion.
A. Under the given facts, is the defense lawyer legally justified
in seeking withdrawal from the case? Why or why not?
Reason briefly.
B. Was the motion for relief as counsel made by the defense
lawyer in full accord with the procedural requirements for
a lawyer’s withdrawal from a court case? Explain briefly.
A:
A. Yes, he is justified. Under Rule 22.01, CPR, a lawyer may
withdraw his services "if the client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules". The
insistence of the client that the lawyer present witnesses
whom he personally knows to have been perjured, will
expose him to criminal and civil liability and violate his duty
of candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
B. No, his actuation is not in accord with the procedural
requirements for the lawyer’s withdrawal from a court case.
Whether or not a lawyer has a valid cause to withdraw from
a case, he cannot just do so and leave the client in the cold
unprotected. He must serve a copy of his petition upon the
client and the adverse party. He should, moreover, present
his petition well in advance of the trial of the action to
enable the client to secure the services of another lawyer.
(c) Inability of Lawyer to Work with Co-counsel
 If the client has two or more retained lawyers to represent
him, and the lawyers could not get along in the handling of
the case, such as when each counsel takes diametrically
opposite stance and strategy on substantial matters – and
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
which in harmony is detrimental to the case, the lawyer
whose opinion is not sustained by the client, may withdraw.
 Whenever there are two or more lawyers engaged by a
client, ordinarily, there is an arrangement forged among
them as to who will be the lead counsel. In case of
differences of opinions, the lead counsel’s opinion prevails.
2014 Bar, Q. XXIII(b): If the client insists, may the original
counsel withdraw from the case, and how?
A: If the client insists on retaining a collaborating counsel over and
above the objection of the original counsel, the latter may
withdraw his services when his inability to work with counsel will
not redound to the best interest of the client (Rule 22.01, CPR)
(d) Mental and Physical Inability of Counsel to Handle Case
Effectively
 If after the services of counsel had been engaged by a client
and later he became mentally or physically incapable to
carry out effectively his employment as a lawyer due to
sickness or some other kinds of disability, he is allowed to
withdraw from the case
 If the disability is just temporary, the lawyer is not obliged to
withdraw if during that period, postponement is still
possible and allowable.
 Insanity of the attorney terminates the relation of attorney
and client
(e) Client’s Deliberate Failure to Pay Attorney’s Fees Agreed
Upon
Montano v. IBP. The failure of the client to pay the lawyer’s fee
must be deliberate to justify the latter’s withdrawal from the
case.
Orwing v. Chicago. The rights of a lawyer to demand payment of
his services depends on the fact of employment. He cannot
recover compensation from who did not employ nor authorize his
employment, however valuable the results of his services may
have been to such person.
Cassel v. Gregory. An attorney, however, is not also justified in
withdrawing from a case because his client refuses to consent to
an increase in attorney’s fees.
2000 Bar, Q. V: Atty. X filed a notice of withdrawal of
appearance as counsel for the accused Y after the prosecution
rested its case. The reason for the withdrawal of Atty. X was the
failure of accused Y to affix his conformity to the demand of
[136]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Atty. X for increase in attorney’s fees. Is the ground for
withdrawal justified? Explain.
A: The ground for the withdrawal is not justified. Rule 22.01(e),
CPR provides that a lawyer may withdraw his services when the
client deliberately fails to pay the fees for his services or fails to
comply with the retainer agreement.
In this case, the client has not failed to pay the lawyer’s fees or to
comply with the retainer agreement. He has only refused to agree
with the lawyer’s demand for an increase in his fees or to comply
with the retainer agreement. He has only refused to agree with
the lawyer’s demand for an increase in his fees. It is the right to
refuse; that is part of his freedom of contract
Arce v. PNB. The law is a profession, not a business. Lawyers are
officers of the court. That is true. At the same time professional
men are entitled to have and recover from their clients a
reasonable compensation for their services rendered with a view
to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of
the lawyer
Stansell v. Roach. While the legal profession is not a business and
should be pursued mainly for its own sake and not for money, the
lawyer like all other human beings has a right to a livelihood.
Albano v. Coloma. Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his
hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his
capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at
tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time
and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal
against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of
his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in
him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself
would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is
determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every
effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of
his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves
condemnation.
1988 Bar, Q. V(b): You are counsel for Don Juan Roxas who is a
wealthy businessman residing in Forbes Park. While he never
questions your bill for legal services, he never pays you on time,
and subjects you to the indignity of having to personally call him
up at least seven times before he pays his bills. This, needless to
say, irritates you no end.
Are you justified in withdrawing from acting as counsel for Don
Juan Roxas? Explain.

A: Yes, I am justified in withdrawing from the case but it should be
with the express consent of Don Juan Roxas and the approval by
the court. One of the valid reasons for withdrawal of counsel is
when the client deliberately fails to pay attorney’s fees for
services rendered. In the case in question, Don Juan Roxas has all
the financial means to pay the attorney’s fees agreed upon. It is
certainly degrading on the lawyer to practically beg for the
payment of attorney’s fees for services rendered.
2011 Bar, Q. 15: On 17 April 2006 NWD, a local water district
entity, hired Atty. Chito as private counsel for a year with the
consent of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC). Shortly after, a leadership struggle erupted in NWD
between faction A and faction B. Siding with the first, Atty. Chito
filed several actions against the members of faction B.
Eventually, the court upheld Faction B which thus revoked Atty.
Chito’s retainer on 14 January 2007. With OGCC’s approval,
NWD hired Atty. Arthur in his place. When Atty. Arthur sought
the dismissal of the actions that Atty. Chito had instituted, the
latter objected on the ground that his term had not yet expired
and Atty. Arthur had no vacancy to fill up. Is Atty. Chito right?
(a) No, because Atty. Chito’s continued appearances in the
cases [were] without authority since 14 January 2007.
(b) No, because Atty. Arthur would have violated the rule on
forum shopping.
(c) Yes, because Atty. Chito’s retainer and authority remained
valid until 17 April 2006.
(d) No, because Atty. Chito has the duty to expose the
irregularities committed by the members of Faction B.
(f) Election or Appointment of Lawyer to Public Office
 When a lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office
which under the law is incompatible to law practice, his
existing relationship as lawyer to his client automatically
terminates
Justice v. Lairy. A lawyer who is appointed as a Judge or Justice
ceases to be in practice by operation of law.
Aquino v. Blanco. The same rule applies to a lawyer who is
appointed as Fiscal who upon his qualification simultaneously
ceases as counsel for his client. Hence, notice to him after his
qualification is not notice to client.
Dalisay v. Goyo. It is the duty of the lawyer to inform the court, if
he is appointed to a position which prohibits the practice of law.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
The court does not take judicial notice of the lawyer’s election or
appointment to a public position.
 If the lawyer is appointed to a public position which allows
concurrent practice of law, he should use his sound
discretion whether to withdraw or not in his case (Rule 6.02)
a. Other Similar Cases
(1) State v. Bersch. Where the client conducts himself in a
manner which tend to degrade the attorney
(2) Alton v. Ross. When it is apparent that he may be called as
witness on substantial matters
(3) Tenny v. Berger. When the client attempts to support his
case with subordination of witnesses
(4) Ventura v. Santos. When the client refuses to extend
cooperation
(5) Republic v.CFI. When client stops having contact with him
who thereby is left without the usual means which are
indispensable in the proper defense of his client’s cause
(6) People v. Casimiro. When he is disauthorized to file a brief
by client’s parents
 Consequently, the lawyer who renders services to a client
with the devotion and zeal required by the Rules, who is not
being paid for his services as agreed upon, may withdraw
from the case.
1998 Bar, Q. VIII: State the rule on the prerogative of a lawyer to
withdraw as counsel.
A: On the other hand, the lawyer does not have an unqualified
right to withdraw as counsel. As an officer of the court, he may
not withdraw or be permitted to withdraw as counsel if such
withdrawal will work Injustice to a client or frustrate the ends of
justice. A lawyer may withdraw at any time with his client's
written consent. Without such consent, he may withdraw his
services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances (Canon 22, CPR).
Death of Client Automatically Terminates Client-Lawyer
Relationship
 The relation of attorney and client is terminated by the
death of the client.
 In the absence of a retainer from the personal
representative of his deceased client, the attorney has, after
the death of the latter, no further power or authority to
appear or take any further action on behalf of the deceased.
[137]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Duty of an Attorney Upon Death of a Client
Rule 3, Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel — Whenever a
party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall
be a ground for disciplinary action.
City Sheriff, Iligan City v. Fortunado. A lawyer was reprimanded
when he failed to inform the court about the death of his client
causing delay in the disposition of the case.
Death of the Attorney Also Terminates Client-Lawyer
Relationship; Exception
GR: A contract for legal services being personal, it terminates
upon the death of the lawyer
XPN: However, if the lawyer is a member of a Law Firm, which
firm appears as counsel for the client, the death of the attending
attorney will not terminate the relationship. The Firm shall
continue to appear for the client.
XPN to XPN: Where is an understanding that the legal services
were to be rendered only by the said attorney
Dissolution of Law Firm Does Not Terminate Client-Lawyer
Relationship
 Dissolution of law firm or a law partnership does not
terminate the relation and obligations of the partners to the
clients who have previously engaged the partnership to
represent them.
Right of Client to Terminate Relation with Counsel Absolute; But
Not Vice Versa
Francisco v. Portugal. While the right of the client to terminate
the relation is absolute, the right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause, is
considerably restricted.
Stork v. Mishel. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination. He is not at
liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.

De Juan v. Baria III. Without a proper revocation of his authority
and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of record
and whether or not he has a valid cause to withdraw from the
case, he cannot just do so and leave his client out in the cold. An
attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent
of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and
hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the
name of the new attorney is recorded in the case. Respondent did
not comply with these obligations.
Rinconada Tel. Co. v. Buenviaje. The right of client to terminate
his relations with his counsel is universally recognized. Such
termination may be with or without cause.
1998 Bar, Q. VIII(a): State the rule on the right of the client to
dismiss his lawyer
A: A client has the sight to dismiss his lawyer at any time, with or
without just cause. The existence or non-existence of Just cause is
material only for determining the right of the lawyer to
compensation for services rendered. The client's right to
terminate the lawyer's services springs from the strictly personal
and highly confidential nature of the relationship between the
lawyer and the client. Once the client loses confidence in his
lawyer, he has the right to dismiss him.
1989 Bar, Q, IV(1): Does the client have the right to dismiss his
lawyer at any time? Explain your answer.
A: Yes, the client has the right to dismiss his lawyer anytime with
or without cause. The reason is that a lawyer’s employment is
strictly personal and highly confidential in nature. The client’s loss
of confidence in his lawyer deprives the relation of that special
element of trust.
1994 Bar, Q. XI(1): May a client dismiss his lawyer at any time?
A: A client may dismiss his lawyer at any time with or without
cause because the relationship is one of trust and confidence.
Situation When Lawyer Cannot Just Be Dismissed
Hydro Resources v. LA. When a lawyer is engaged not on retainer
basis, but as a “legal assistant” of a corporation and as such he is
required to observe office hours, the corporation cannot just
terminate his employment on the theory that he may be
terminated with or without cause.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Under the control test, the termination of the lawyer’s services
shall be governed by the Labor Code.
Mechanics of Withdrawal as Counsel for a Client
Guanzon v. Aragon. An attorney may only retire from a case
either by the written consent of his client or by permission of the
court, after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney
should see to it the name of the new attorney be recorded in the
case
Visitacion v. Manit. An attorney who could not get written
consent of his client must make an application to the court, for
the relation does not terminate formally until there is a
withdrawal of record.
Counsel has no right to presume that the court would grant his
withdrawal and therefore must still appear on the date of hearing.
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. v. De Dios Transportation
Co. Inc. Notice of withdrawal without conformity of client is a
mere scrap of paper. The lawyer remains bout to the case of the
client.
Mechanics of Substitution of Counsel in a Case
Rincoda Tel. Co. v. Buenviaje. The right of a client to terminate
his relations with his counsel is universally recognized.
Such termination may be with or without cause. The right of a
client to terminate the authority of his counsel includes the right
to make a change or substitution at any stage of the proceedings.
To be valid, any such change or substitution must be made:
(a) Uupon written application;
(b) With written consent of the client;
(c) Upon written consent of the attorney to be substituted;
(d) In case the consent of attorney to be substituted cannot be
obtained there must be at least a proof of notice that the
motion for substitution has been served upon him in the
manner prescribed by the rules (Rule 138, Sec. 26, ROC).
Requirement When Appearance of New Counsel is Occasioned
by the Death of Original Counsel of Record
Tan v. CA. All the requirements of a proper substitution must be
met, one of which is a verified proof of the death of such
attorney. The party seeking substitution, therefore, cannot escape
the effects of new counsel's error in failing to furnish the required
[138]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
proof of death, as such negligence does not result in deprivation
of due process to said party.
Termination of Lawyer’s Employment Subject to Certain
Requirements
Nacuray v. NLRC. While petitioners have the right to terminate
their relations with their counsel and make substitution or change
at any stage of the proceedings, the exercise of such right is
subject to compliance with the prescribed requirements. There
must be proper substitution of counsel.
Simple Misunderstanding
Orcino v. Gaspar. A case arising from a simple misunderstanding
between client and counsel does not fall under any of the grounds
where a lawyer may validly withdraw.
Montano v. IBP. Where the client’s failure to pay the fees of the
lawyer is not deliberate and in fact, had exerted efforts to pay his
obligation, there is no good cause for the lawyer to withdraw as
counsel in the case.
Attorney-Client Relationship Does Not Terminate Formally Until
There is a Withdrawal Made of Record
Tumbagahan v. CA. Unless properly relieved, the counsel is
responsible for the conduct of the case.
There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel
of record may be considered relieved of his responsibility as such
counsel. The withdrawal as counsel of a client, or the dismissal by
the client of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in
the case. In this case, the termination of the attorney-client
relationship between the petitioner and Atty. Salise does not
automatically severe the same relations between the petitioner
and Atty. Amarga. Only Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of
record. None was made with regard to the other counsel.
The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until
there is a withdrawal made of record; at least so far as the
opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues
until the end of the litigation. Unless properly relieved, the
counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case.
Cuizon v. Macalino. A lawyer must serve his client with
competence and diligence and champion the latter’s cause with
wholehearted fidelity. An attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion

Termination of Attorney-Client Relationship
The attorney-client relationship is terminated by any of the
following causes:
(1) Withdrawal of the lawyer under Rule 22.01
(2) Death of the lawyer, unless it is a Law Firm, in which case,
the other partners may continue with the case
(3) Barrameda v. Barbara. Death of the client as the
relationship is personal, and one of agency
(4) Discharge or dismissal of the lawyer by the client, for the
right to dismiss a counsel is the prerogative of the client,
subject to certain limitations
(5) Appointment or election of a lawyer to a government
position which prohibits private practice of law
(6) Full termination of the case or cases
(7) Disbarment or suspension of the lawyer from the practice of
law
(8) Gorostiaga v. Sarte. Intervening incapacity or incompetency
of the client during the pendency of the case, for then the
client loses his capacity to contract, or to control the subject
matter of the action. The guardian may authorize the lawyer
to continue his employment
(9) Declaration of the presumptive death of the lawyer under
Art. 390 of the CC and Art. 41 of the FC
(10) Conviction of a crime and imprisonment of the lawyer for
quite sometime.
Duty of Attorney
GR: It is the duty of the attorney to inform the court of the
termination of the attorney-client relationship
XPN: Item (2) and (6)
Duty of Counsel, Effect of Service on Him
Belen v. Chavez. Upon death of the counsel, the lawyer-client
relationship between him and his clients ceases, and any service
of a decision on him is ineffective and does not bind his clients.
Duty of Client; Effect
Active Realty and Dev. Corp. v. Fernandez. Death of the client
terminates the lawyer-client relationship. All pleadings filed
thereafter by the lawyer are unauthorized, hence, invalid.
Rule 22.02 – A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall,
subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Duty to Discharged Lawyer or One Who Withdraws (Rule 22.02)
 The turnover of all papers and property is subject to the
lawyer’s retainer lien
Attorney’s Lien Protected Under the Rules of Court
Rule 138, Sec. 37. Attorneys' liens — An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have
lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until
his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply
such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to
the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he
has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time
when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such
lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over
such judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
 The first portion is the retaining lien while the second part is
the charging lien
Courts Must Respect and Protect the Attorney’s Lien
Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co. The Courts in the exercise of their
exclusive and supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of
the court, are bound to respect and protect the attorney’s lien,
which, in the words of CJ Marshall, “is necessary to preserve the
decorum and respectability of the profession.
Dicas v. Stockley. If the papers are improperly taken away from
the custody of an attorney, his lien is not lost thereby.
 An attorney from whom papers, which he has a right to hold
to secure payment for his services, have been taken by an
order and decree of the court, thereby swelling the funds for
the payment of creditors of the client, is entitled to the
payment of the funds realized from the sale of the client’s
property, the debts for which the papers were held.
Rule 22.02 Applies Only to Retaining Liens
[139]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
 Rule 22.01 cannot apply to a charging lien which arises only
after counsel shall have secured a favorable money
judgment for the client
 The Rule contemplates of a lawyer who withdrew from the
case or is discharged without finishing the case
Concept of Retaining Lien
A retaining lien is a passive lien and may not be actively enforced.
It amounts to a mere right to retain the papers as against the
client until the lawyer is fully paid.
Lawyer’s refusal to Return Documents or Receipts Subject to
Retaining Lien; Not Guilty of Malpractice
Dauz v. Fontanosa. The refusal of the respondent to return the
documents or receipts that had come into his possession as
attorney, whose professional service had been engaged by the
complainant to bring the action against the latter's debtors, may
not be the proper conduct, but is not devoid of justification
because the respondent believed he was entitled to retain them
unless his fees agreed upon in writing be paid first.
2014 Bar, Q. XIII: M engaged the services of Atty. D to prosecute
his annulment of marriage case in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
After a long-drawn trial, Atty. D was able to secure a favourable
judgment from the court. Unfortunately, M failed to pay in full
the stipulated attorney’s fees of Atty. D. How can Atty. D collect
his fees from M? Discuss fully.
A: He can collect his fees either by filing a motion in the
annulment of marriage case that he handled, and to order M to
pay the same, or he can file a separate action for the recovery of
his attorney’s fees.
Of the two, the first is preferable because the judge in the
annulment case will be in a better position to evaluate the
amount and value of his services. In the meantime, he may avail
of the retaining lien, which is to retain the moneys and properties
of M in his possession until he is paid for his services, or a
charging lien, which is to charge the money judgment in the case
for the payment of his fees.
2011 Bar, Q. 38: Which of the following is required of counsel
when withdrawing his services to a client in a case?
(a) Counsel's desire to withdraw, expressed in his motion.
(b) Payment of withdrawal fee.
(c) Opposing counsel’s conformity to the withdrawal.
(d) Client's written consent filed in court.

1997 Bar, Q. X: M has a pending case for collection of a sum of
money. He is not satisfied with his lawyer N, who, almost
always, goes to court evidently unprepared. He wants you to
promptly take over the case. You agree to handle the case. What
steps must you take to formalize the engagement?
A: I will ask M to first terminate or secure the withdrawal of N as
his counsel. If N’s services are terminated. I can subsequently
enter my appearance as the new counsel of M. If he agrees to
withdraw simultaneously with my appearance.
I will prepare a Substitution of Attorney to be filed in court,
containing the written conformities of M and N.
2012 Bar, Q. (17): Atty. Atras was the counsel for Mr. Abante.
Soon after the case was submitted for decision, Mr. Abante got
the files and informed Atty. Atras that he was hiring another
lawyer. On that same day, a copy of the decision was received
by Atty. Atras but he did not do anything anymore. He also'
failed to file his withdrawal, and no appearance was made by
the new counsel. When Mr. Abante found out about the adverse
decision, the period to appeal had lapsed. Was service to Atty.
Atras effective?
(a) Yes, Atty. Atras is still considered the counsel of record
until his withdrawal of appearance has been actually filed
and granted.
(b) Service should be done on Mr. Abante because he had
already severed lawyer-client relationship with Atty. Atras.
(c) Service should be done on the new counsel as soon as he
enters his appearance.
(d) Service upon Atty. Atras is not effective because his services
have already been terminated by the client.
2004 Bar, Q. I(B): In the course of a judicial proceeding, a conflict
of opinions as to a particular legal course of action to be taken
arose between AB and CD, two (2) lawyers hired by Mr. XX, a
party-litigant, to act jointly as his counsel.
How should such problem be resolved, and whose opinion
should prevail? What can AB, the lawyer whose opinion was not
followed, do when she honestly believes that the opinion of CD,
the other counsel, is not as legally and factually well-grounded
as her opinion is? Explain briefly.
A: "When lawyers jointly associated in a cause cannot agree as to
any matter vital to the interest of the client, the conflict of
opinion should be frankly stated to him for his final
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
determination. His decision should be accepted unless the nature Ababa, et al., we held that "(a) charging lien under Section 37,
of the difference makes it impracticable for the lawyer whose Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money
judgment has been overruled to cooperate effectively. In this judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract
event, it is his duty to ask the client to relieve him.” (Canon 7, or for delivery of real property as in the instant case."
Canons of Professional Ethics).
Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that an enforceable
2012 Bar, Q. (23): A recovery of ownership complaint was filed charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court
by the Dedo and Dedo Law Firm, through Atty. Jose Dedo as trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is
counsel. During all the phases of trial, it was Atty. Jose Dedo settled.
who appeared. Unfortunately, Atty. Jose Dedo died before
completion of trial. Notices and orders sent to the Dedo and Basic Difference of Charging and Retaining Lien
Dedo Law Firm were returned to the court with the
manifestation that Atty. Dedo already died and requesting the Tuler v. Superior Court. A charging lien does not rest upon
court to directly send the matters to the client. Is this proper? possession as in the case of the retaining lien but upon the equity
of an attorney to be paid his fees out of the judgment which he
(a) No, the law firm – through another lawyer – should has obtained.
continue to appear for the client.
(b) Yes, because the death of the handling lawyer terminates Rustia v. Abeto. Unlike a charging lien, a retaining lien is
the attorney-client relationship. dependent upon possession and does not attach to anything not
(c) Yes, because attorney's fees was not paid to the law firm. in the attorney’s hands. It subsists only as long as the attorney has
(d) No, it will be unjust for the client to pay another lawyer. possession.
Concept of Charging Lien 2016 Bar, Q. III: Differentiate "retaining lien" from "charging
lien."
Myers v. Miller. Charging lien is the equitable right of the
attorney to have the fees due him for services in a particular suit Retaining Lien Charging Lien
secured by judgment or recovery in such suit. The object of the Gives the lawyer the right to A lien upon all judgments for
lien is to protect the claim on the fruits of the lawyer’s labor. retain the funds, documents payment of a sum of money
and papers of the client which and executions thereof, to
Charging lien may be exercised on all judgments for the payment have lawfully come into his ensure payment of his fees and
of money and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments possession, until his lawful fees disbursements in the said case.
which the attorney had secured for his client in litigations. and disbursements have been
paid.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. CA. Consequent to such A passive lien; the lawyer is not An active lien; the lawyer is
provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the required to perform any act required to file a motion in
payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a except to hold on to the court, with copy served on the
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such client’s funds, documents and adverse party, to have a
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of papers, until his fees and statement of his claim to such
his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the disbursements are paid fees and disbursements
necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his charged or attached to the
services were rendered when something is due his client in the decision in such case and
action from which the fee is to be paid. executions thereof.
A general lien; it may be A special lien; it can be utilized
In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al., the Court had the occasion to resorted to in order to secure for the purpose of collecting
rule that "the lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches payment to the lawyer’s fees in only the unpaid fees and
to the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim all the cases he has handled disbursements of the lawyer in
enforceable by a writ of execution." In Ampil vs. Juliano-Agrava, et and services he had rendered the case where the judgment
al., the Court once again declared that a charging lien to the client. for a sum of money may be
"presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money secured.
judgment for his client . . ." Further, in Director of Lands vs.
[140]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Requisites of a Retaining Lien  The retaining lien, therefore, exists only so long as the
attorney retains possession of the subject matter and May a Lawyer Exercise a Charging Lien on the Land of His Client?
 In order that the exercise of a retaining lien may be valid, it expires when the possession ends.
is not enough that there exists a client-lawyer relationship,  The retaining lien is only a passive right and cannot be MBTC v. CA. No. Although he had successfully prosecution an
that the claims for attorney’s fees are not satisfied and that actively enforced. It amounts to a mere right to retain the action to establish the client’s title thereto, he cannot have a lien
counsel is in possession of the subject papers, documents papers as against the client, until the attorney is fully paid. on the land. There is no money judgment on which it can arise.
and funds.
 It is still required that his possession be lawful. Otherwise, Requisites of Charging Lien However, there can be an exception as when the lawyer and
the lawyer cannot exercise his right to retaining lien client have entered into an agreement authorizing it.
(1) Existence of a client-lawyer relationship
A Lawyer Hired by the Administrator is Not Necessarily the (2) Favorable judgment secured by the counsel for his client In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the
Lawyer of the Estate which judgment is a money judgment American cases it cited expressly declares that "in the absence of
(3) Noting into the records of the case through the filing of an a statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise, the
Inton v. Matute. It is clear therefrom that appellant was appropriate motion of the statement of the lawyer’s claim general rule is that an attorney has no lien on the land of his
appointed by Alonzo as his lawyer, to represent him in all suits for attorney’s fees with copies furnished to the client and client, notwithstanding such attorney has, with respect to the
affecting the Estate under his trust. This appointment, however, adverse party. land in question, successfully prosecuted a suit to establish the
was not in pursuance to any court order, nor was it approved by title of his client thereto, recovered title or possession in a suit
the probate court. It was an act personal to the administrator. The May a Charging Lien Be Entered into the Records Even Before a prosecuted by such client, or defended successfully such client's
creation of the professional relationship between appellant and Judgment is Rendered? right and title against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack,"
the administrator did not, therefore, make the Estate also a client as is the situation in the case at bar. This is an inescapable
of the said lawyer. A: Palanca v. Pecson. Yes. However, it can be enforced only after recognition that a contrary rule obtains in other jurisdictions
the judgment is secured in favor of the client. thereby resulting in doctrinal rulings of converse or modulated
It follows as a necessary consequence that the lawyer for the import.
administrator or executor cannot claim to have a retaining lien Effect and Importance of Noting or Charging Lien
over any funds, papers, or documents belonging to the Estate, Comparative Distinction Between Retaining and Charging Lien
even if these properties may have come into his possession in the Palanca v. Pecson. Once the lawyer’s charging lien is entered
course of his work as such counsel for the administrator. upon the records of the case, the lawyer’s fee is protected. It Retaining Lien Charging Lien
prevents the dishonest client from depriving the counsel of his Nature Passive lien. It Active lien. It can
Rustia v. Abeto, et. al. It is to be observed that the petitioner is fees. cannot be actively be enforced by
not only counsel of the respondent administratrix personally, but enforced. It is a execution under
also in the latter's capacity as personal representative of the Moreover, an attorney who has cause a statement of his lien to general lien Rule 138, Sec. 37,
estate. Hence, the petitioner may excercise a retaining lien not be entered upon the records of a case wherein his client is last sentence. It is a
only over the administratrix's personal papers but also ove all the involved need not file a separate suit to determine the amount of special lien
papers of the estate delivered by the administratrix to the his claim and to enforce his lien. Such may properly be Basis Lawful possession Securing a
petitioner in connection with the administration of the estate. As determined by the court in which the claims had been filed. of papers, favorable money
held in the Matter of Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284, an attorney may claim a documents, judgment for the
lien on property belonging to an estate, placed in his hands by the Against Whom Can a Charging Lien Be Enforced? property belonging client
representative of that estate in his representative capacity, for to the client
services rendered him in such capacity.  A charging lien which is enforceable by writ of execution, Coverage Covers only papers, Covers all
may be enforced against the attorney’s client or against the documents and judgments for the
Retaining Lien Expires When Possession Ends judgment debtor. property in the payment of money
lawful possession and executions
 The general or retaining lien of an attorney is dependent Bacolod Murcia Co. v. Henares. It may be enforced against the of the attorney by issued in pursuance
upon possession and does not attach to anything not in the client who, for receiving the proceeds of the judgment without reason of his of such judgments
attorney’s hands. paying his lawyer for his services, holds so much thereof in trust professional
 It should be distinguished from the special or charging lien for the lawyer as may be necessary to satisfy the recorded lien employment Note: Dir. of Lands
provided for in Rule 128, Sec. 37 which was created to “save v. Aldaba. It cannot
attorney’s right where he had been unable to get Calalang v. De Borja. It may also be enforced against the attach to
possession” judgment debtor, who, for disregarding the charging lien properly judgments for
served on him, becomes liable to the extent of the lawyer’s claim. delivery of real

[141]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
estate or for puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from
annulment of continue in the practice of law. every member of the bar and officer of the courts.
contract
Effectivity As soon as the As soon as the Warning, Admonition and Reprimand Distinguished Limit of Suspension from Practice of Law
attorney gets claim for attorney’s
possession of the fees had been Tobias v. Velasco. A warning, in ordinary parlance, has been Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr. The suspension referred to in Rule 138,
papers, documents entered into the defined as "an act or fact of putting one on his guard against an Sec. 27 of the ROC, refers only to suspension from the practice of
or property records of the case impending danger, evil consequences or penalties," (DEP) while law. It would be improper for the Court to impose as a penalty for
Notice Client need not be Client and adverse an admonition, "refers to a gentle or friendly reproof, a mild a lawyer’s breach of legal ethics and the lawyer’s oath, suspension
notified to make it party must be rebuke, warning or reminder, counseling (RWRC), on a fault, error from his employment in the Judge Advocate General’s Service.
effective notified to make it or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning".
effective They are not considered as penalties. A reprimand, on the other Disbarment, Concept
Applicability May be exercised Generally, it is hand, is of a more severe nature, and has been defined as a public
before judgment or exercisable only and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in Disbarment is the act of the Philippine SC in withdrawing from an
execution, or when the attorney fault by his superior officer or a body to which he belongs. It is attorney the privilege to practice law. The name of the lawyer is
irregardless had already more than just a warning or an admonition. stricken out of the Roll of Attorneys. And he does not have the
thereof. secured a favorable right to put in his name even the prefix “Atty.”. Neither can he
judgment for his  The distinction in Tobias v. Veloso which were based on the sign pleadings even if he does not personally appear in court.
client Civil Service Law and Police Act, have the same connotations
and meanings when we speak of warning, admonition and Contempt and Disbarment are Two Different Things
Administrative Liabilities of Lawyers reprimand in the legal profession.
 When the unethical act committed by a lawyer is not so People v. Godoy. The power to punish for contempt and the
serious, the Court may simply warn, admonish, or reprimand power to disbar are separate and distinct, and that the exercise
Preliminary the attorney with a warning that the repetition of similar act of one does not exclude the exercise of the other.
in the future will be dealt with severely.
In re: Publico. Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with Who Has the Power to Discipline Errant Lawyers?
conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that Black’s. Censure is an official reprimand. Censure and reprimand
a lawyer is officers of the court. are synonymous  The SC under Rule 138, Sec. 27
 The CA and RTC are also empowered to ward, admonish,
In re: Parazo. The legal profession unlike any other calling is Suspension, Concept reprimand and suspend an attorney who appears before
subservient to the court. Courts have the inherent power to adopt them from the practice of law for any of the causes
proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity and Suspension is the temporary withholding of the lawyer’s privilege mentioned in Rule 138, Sec. 27 (Rule 139-B, Sec. 16). But
render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, to practice his profession for a certain period, or for an indefinite they cannot disbar a lawyer
including the investigation of charges of error, abuse or period of time.
misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers. Balasabas v. Aquilisan. An RTC Judge cannot summarily suspend
Archer. It is the act of the court in prohibiting an attorney from a lawyer as punishment for committing an indirect contempt.
People v. Andan. Membership in the Bar being merely a privilege, practicing law for a definite period of time. That is not allowed under Rule 71, Sec. 6 of the ROC
the same may be suspended or removed from the lawyer for
reasons provided in the Rules, law and jurisprudence. Indefinite Suspension is Not a Cruel Punishment When  The inferior courts (MTCs) are not empowered even just to
Warranted suspend an attorney, although, they may cite or hold a
The actuations of lawyers are subject to scrutiny at all times. The lawyer in contempt of court for contemptuous act
professional activities as well as the lawyer’s private lives, insofar Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan. The indefiniteness of the respondent's  Justices and Judges, who are also lawyers, if found guilty of
as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," certain crimes and/or of the causes for disbarment under
prestige of the profession and the courts may at any time be the has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of the ROC may also be disbarred
subject of inquiry by the proper authorities. his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That
sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge Cuenco v. Fernan. Justices of the SC however may not be
Synder’s Case. Disbarment proceedings may be anchored on acts himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by disbarred unless and until they shall have been first impeached in
committed in or out of court. acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate accordance with the Constitution.
repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live
Melendrez v. Decena. Gross misconduct, although not related to
the discharge of professional duties as member of the Bar, which
[142]

The same is true with the other impeachable officers who are
members of the Bar
Main Objectives of Disbarment and Suspension
(1) To compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his
clients;
(2) To remove from the profession a person whose misconduct
has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney;
(3) To punish the lawyer although so much as to safeguard the
administration of justice;
(4) To set an example or a warning for the other members of
the bar
(5) To safeguard the administration of justice from
incompetence and dishonesty of lawyers
(6) To protect the public
No Private Interest is Involved in Disbarment
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.
Esquivias v. CA. Whatever has been decided in the disbarment
case cannot be a source of right that may be enforced in another
action for reconveyance and damages
Goal of Disbarment
Gamilia v. Marino, Jr. Restorative justice, not retributive justice is
the goal in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers.
Power to Discipline Lawyers is Judicial in Nature
 The power to suspend or disbar a lawyer is judicial in nature
and can be exercised only by the courts.
 It cannot be defeated by the legislative or executive
department
Royong v. Oblena. While the legislature may provide in a statute
that certain acts may require disbarment, such statute cannot
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
restrict the general power of the court over attorneys who are its
officers.
 The Constitutional basis of power to disbar is Art. VIII, Sec.
5(5) of the Constitution
Characteristics of Disbarment Proceeding
(1) It is sui generis
(2) In re: Laureta. It is neither civil nor criminal proceeding.
(3) De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces. Double jeopardy cannot be
availed of in a disbarment proceeding against an attorney.
Disbarment does not partake of a criminal proceeding.
Thus, a lawyer who was found guilty of falsification of public
documents cannot put up the defense of double jeopardy in the
disbarment proceeding filed against him which is based on the
same facts as the criminal case.
(4) It can be initiated motu proprio by the SC or by the IBP. It
can be initiated without a complainant
(5) Go v. Candoy. It can proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.
(6) Calo v. Degama. It is imprescriptible. Unlike ordinary
proceedings, it is not subject to the defense of prescription.
The ordinary statutes of limitations have no application to
disbarment proceedings.
Salamanca v. Bautista. However, an unexplained long delay in
the filing of an administrative case creates suspicion in the
motive of complainant.
The delay, among other factors, was favorably considered and
respondents were exonerated.
Heck v. Santos. An administrative complaint against an erring
lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only
after 24 years after the offending act was committed, is not
barred by prescription – no matter how much time has elapsed
from the time of the commission of the act complaint of and the
time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the
bench and bar cannot escape disciplinary arm of the Court.
(7) It is conducted confidentially being confidential in nature
until its final determination
(8) In re: Montagne. It is itself due process of law
(9) Esquivas v, CA. Whatever has been decided in a disbarment
case cannot be a source of right that may be enforced in
another action, like action for reconveyance or damages
(10) Morfel v. Aspiras. In pari delicto rule is not applicable.
[143]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(11) Penalty in a disbarment case cannot be in the alternative
2016 Bar, Q. XIV(b): Sonia, who is engaged in the lending
business, extended to Atty. Roberto a loan of P500,000.00 with
interest of P25,000.00 to be paid not later than May 20, 2016. To
secure the loan, Atty. Roberto signed a promissory note and
issued a postdated check. Before the due date, Atty. Roberto
requested Sonia to defer the deposit of the check. When Atty.
Roberto still failed to pay, Sonia deposited the check which was
dishonored. Atty. Roberto ignored the notice of dishonor and
refused to pay.
Can he be held civilly liable to Sonia in an administrative case for
suspension or disbarment? Explain.
A: No. The sole issue in an administrative case is the
determination of whether or not a lawyer is still fit to continue
being a lawyer. The SC will not order the return of money which is
not intimately related to a lawyer-client relationship (Wong v.
Moya, A.C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008; Sps. Concepcion v. Atty.
De la Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, February 3, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe).
2002 Bar, Q. IX: A proceeding for disbarment is considered sui
generis, explain briefly, giving at least five (5) reasons in support
of your answer.
A: A disbarment proceeding is sui generis or a class by itself,
because of the following reasons:
(1) It Is neither a civil nor a criminal proceeding;
(2) Double jeopardy cannot be availed of as a defense;
(3) It can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or by
the IBP;
(4) It can proceed regardless of Interest or lack of Interest of the
complainant;
(5) It is Imprescriptible;
(6) It Is confidential;
(7) It Is in itself due process.
2009 Bar, Q. XIII: Atty. Hyde, a bachelor, practices law in the
Philippines. On long weekend, he dates beautiful actresses in
Hong Kong. Kristine, a neighbor in the Philippines, filed with the
Supreme Court an administrative complaint against the lawyer
because of sex videos uploaded through the internet showing
Atty. Hydes sordid dalliance with the actresses in Hong Kong.
In his answer, Atty. Hyde (1) questions the legal personality and
interest of Kristine to institute the complaint and (2) insists that
he is a bachelor and the sex videos relate to his private life

which is outside public scrutiny and have nothing to do with his
law practice.
Rule on the validity of Atty. Hyde’s defenses.
(a) The legal personality and interest of Kristine to initiate the
complaint for disbarment is immaterial. A disbarment
proceeding is sui generis, neither a civil nor a criminal
proceeding. Its sole purpose is to determine whether or not
a lawyer is still deserving to be a member of the bar. In a
real sense, Kristine is not a plaintiff; hence, interest on her
part is not required.
(b) Atty. Hyde’s second defense is untenable. His duty not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct under Rule 1.01 of the CPR, as well as his duty not
to engage in scandalous conduct to the discredit of the legal
profession under Rule 7.03, is applicable to his private as
well as to his professional life.
Penalty in a Disbarment Case Cannot be in the Alternative
Navarro v. Meneses III
Facts:
1. Respondent lawyer was charged with disbarment for
dishonesty.
2. The IBP found him guilty.
3. The dispositive portion of the IBP Resolution reads:
. . . Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed
to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received from the
petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution.
Failure on his part to comply will result in his DISBARMENT.
Issue: WON a penalty in the alternative is proper
Held:
1. Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the
imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the
rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in
the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative
penalties, nor can such penalty be subject to a condition.
2. There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law
should not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which,
as in this case, also involve punitive sanctions.
3. Lawyer is disbarred
Restrictions on the Power to Suspend and Disbar
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Am. Jur. The courts should exercise sound discretion and extreme
care in suspending or disbarring lawyers. Such power is not
arbitrary or despotic one to be exercised at the pleasure of the
court or in the form of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.
It should be exercised wisely in such a way that the rights and
independence of the Bar will be scrupulously guarded and
maintained by the court as the rights and dignity of the court
itself.
The courts should suspend or disbar a lawyer only where the
courts find that continuance of the attorney in practice would be
subversive to the proper respect of the court for itself or a proper
regard for the integrity of the profession.
Bradley v. Fisher. The court should exercise a sound discretion in
determining whether a lawyer should be disbarred or merely
suspended. It should bear in mind that admission to the Bar is
obtained only after years of labor and study and the office
acquired often becomes the source of great honor and
emolument to its possessor. To most members of the legal
profession, it is the means of support for themselves and their
families. To deprive one of such an office is often to decree
poverty to the lawyer and destitution to his family.
Disbarment therefore, should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish
the end desired.
The Power to Disbar Must be Exercised with Caution
Siervo v. Infante. The power to disbar attorneys ought always to
be exercised with great caution, and only in clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
Ibanez v. Vina. In the last analysis, the lawyer’s good name is his
most important possession.
Albano v. Coloma. The lawyer’s reputation is likened to a plant of
tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.
In re: De Lara. Consequently, the power of the court to discipline
lawyers should not be exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner. It must not be exercised either at the pleasure of the
court or from passion, prejudice personal hostility.
Rather, it must be exercised with caution and moderation under a
sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the independence of
[144]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
the bar and its rights shall be guarded scrupulously by the court as
the rights and dignity of the court.
Grounds for Suspension or Disbarment of Members of the Bar
Specific Grounds under the Rules
(1) Deceit
(2) Malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office
(3) Grossly immoral conduct
(4) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
(5) Violation of oath of office
(6) Wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court
(7) Corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so
Scope of the Word “Conduct”
Co v. Bernardino. The word “conduct” as used in the Rule is not
limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance
of the lawyer’s professional duties.
It also includes gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privilege which his license and law confer upon
him.
General or Comprehensive Ground; Gross Misconduct
 Grounds in Rule 138, Sec. 27 is not limited/exclusive
 Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity which puts his moral
character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, will
render him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Melendez v. Decena. Generally, a lawyer should not be
suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal
or non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside
his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to
demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession,
the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the
Rollo of Attorneys.
The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he
shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the
Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not
related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of

the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders
him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero
Facts:
1. Respondent Rovero was convicted of smuggling
2. Later, a disbarment case was filed against him.
3. While he admits his conviction, he sets up the defense that
the decision of conviction was not sufficient to disqualify
him from the practice of law, because he claims, he
committed the act as an individual and not in pursuance or
in the exercise of his legal profession.
Issue: WON Atty. Rovero should be disbarred
Held: Rovero was disbarred. Crime of smuggling involves moral
turpitude
Royong v. Oblena. The grounds under Rule 138, Sec. 27 are not
exclusive and are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct
of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
1. Deceit
Deceit, Concept
Moreno’ Legal Dictionary. Deceit may consist in (a) a
misrepresentation or (b) in the positive assertion of a falsehood,
or (c) in the creation of a false impression by words or acts, or (d)
in any trick or device
People v. Gatmaitan. As a GR, in order to constitute deceit, there
must be a false representation as to a matter of fact.
People v. Torres. It is an act or spoken or written by a party to
mislead another into believing something to be true when it is not
so in fact.
Garcia v. Wycoco. It can also exist when to obtain the consent of
a party, material facts are concealed or omitted with intent to
deceive, by reason of which concealment or omission, the other
party was induced to give consent which he would otherwise have
given
Eco v. Ramirez. Making an illiterate sign a blank paper and making
it a receipt for money is deceit.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
 There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent under Art. 3 of the RPC. This principle applies in legal
ethics.
Black’s. Deceit is a fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation,
artifice, or device, used by one or more persons to deceive and
trick another, who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice
and damage of the party imposed upon.
To constitute deceit, the statement must be untrue, made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless and conscious ignorance
thereof, especially if parties are not on equal terms, made with
intent that plaintiff act thereon or in a manner apparently fitted
to induce him to act thereon, and plaintiff must act in reliance on
the statement in the manner contemplated, or manifestly
probable, to his injury
There is No Presumption of Innocence in Favor of the Lawyer
Cruz v. Jacinto. An attorney is in easy position to take advantage
of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption
of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an
attorney’s favor.
 See Rule 1.01 for cases involving deceit and dishonesty
2. Malpractice or Other Gross Misconduct in Office
Malpractice, Concept
Tan Tek Beng v. David. Malpractice refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Neel v. Maganan. Legal malpractice consists of failure of an
attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in
performance of tasks which they undertake, and when such
failure proximately causes damage it gives rise to an action in tort.
Gross Misconduct, Concept
Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to
the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.
Such conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate
or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily
imply corruption or criminal intent.
Instances of Malpractice and Gross Misconduct
[145]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(1) Toquib v. Tomol, Jr. Failure of lawyer to appeal in allowing
the period of appeal to lapse
(2) People v. Villar. Failure of a lawyer to submit his client’s
brief within the reglementary period
(3) In re: Atty. Bucana. Preparation and notarization of immoral
contracts or agreements
Alitagtag v. Garcia. Notarizing a forged document
(4) Vda. de Guerrero v. Hernando. Preparation by a notary
public of a false affidavit
(5) Tan v. David. Solicitation of cases either directly or indirectly
through paid agents or brokers
(6) In re:Yeager. Abandonment of client’s case
(7) In re: Carmen. Delay in filing of a client’s case
(8) Vda. de Guerrero v. Hernando. Notary public, who makes it
appear in the jurat of a contract that an affiant exhibited to
him his residence certificate when in fact he did not do so.
Gamido v. NBP Officials. Notarizing a document without the
affiant’s presence
(9) Lara v. Baretto. Acknowledging a SPA in the absence of one
of the parties
(10) Gonzales v. Parrenas. Compromising a client’s case without
authority
(11) Flores v. Lozada. Notarizing documents after the lawyer’s
commission as notary public had expired
Nadayag v. Grazeda. Reckless notarization
Arrieta v. Llosa. Notarizing a deed of sale where the sellers could
not have signed because they had long passed away.
(12) Mejia v. Reyes. Representing conflicting interests
(13) Laput v. Remotigue. Encroaching upon the business of
another lawyer
(14) In re: Tagorda. Advertisement of a lawyer’s skill in a
newspaper or publication
(15) U.S. v. Ney and Bosque. Cooperating in illegal practice of
law such as the formation of a partnership with a layman
(16) Daroy v. Legaspi. Conversion of client’s money to his
(lawyer’s) own benefit
(17) Cantiller v. Potenciano. Gross negligence
(18) Notarizing one’s own affidavit
(19) Vda. de Barrera v. Laput. Intimidating a client by a display of
a revolver
(20) In re: Dianala Jo. Failure to pay a fine imposed for failure to
file a brief

(21) In re: Edillon. Refusal to pay IBP dues
(22) In re: David. Practicing law despite the lawyer’s suspension
even if he retained from using the word “attorney”
(23) Vda. de Alisbo v. Jalandoon, Sr. Lack of fidelity, care and
devotion to the cause of the client
(24) Limpin, Jr. v. IAC. Attempting to mislead the SC by raising
issues long laid to rest by final and executory judgment
(25) Constantino v. Saludares. Unwarranted obstinacy in evading
payment of debt.
(26) Hernandez, Jr. v. Go. Acquiring for himself the lots of his
client which were entrusted to him
(27) Ting-Dumali v. Torres. Offering false testimony
(28) In re:2003 Bar Exams. Downloading by Atty. De Guzman of
the Bar Exam questions from Atty. Balgo’s computer without
the knowledge of the latter.
(29) Nunez v. Ricafort. Issuance of bouncing checks.
(30) Chua v. Mesina. Advising client to sign an ante-dated deed
of sale to avoid capital gains taxes
(31) Grande v. De Silva. Disregarding orders of the IBP-CBD
3. Grossly Immoral Conduct
Grossly Immoral Conduct, Concept
Arciga v. Maniwang. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix
an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or
to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conducthas been defined as "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community"
2016 Bar, Q. XX: Atty. Gail was separated from her husband,
Dino, for more than ten (10) years due to incompatibility. She
fell in love with Mica who was also separated from her husband.
She filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Dino, and also a petition for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Mica with her husband. While the cases were
pending, Atty. Gail and Mica lived in their respective residences
but were often seen together in parties, events and in public
places. Dino filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gail for
immorality, alleging that Atty. Gail and Mica are lovers. Decide
whether Atty. Gail should be sanctioned for immorality.
A: I will rule in favor of Atty. Gail.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
In the first place, being seen together with Mica in parties, events
and public places is not sufficient proof of immorality, which has
been defined as “that conduct which is wilful, flagrant or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community (Arciga v.
Maniwang, A.M. No. 1608, August 14, 1981).
Besides, I will be mindful of the injunction in Canon 5, Sec. 1 of
the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which
provides that “a judge shall be aware of, and understand, diversity
in society and differences arising from various sources, including
but not limited to race, religion, national origin, caste, disability,
age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status
and other like causes”
Is the Sexual Intimacy of a Male Lawyer with a Woman Not His
Wife or Without the Benefit of Marriage Grossly Immoral Per
Se?
A: No, as to whether cohabitation with a woman not the lawyer’s
wife or without marriage is grossly immoral as to merit
disciplinary action depends upon the circumstances of each case.
Sobrena v. Villanueva. Mere intimacy between a lawyer and a
woman with no impediment to marry each other voluntarily
cohabited and had two children is neither so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of
the bar.
Radaza v. Tejano. The respondent lawyer was 28 years of age and
the complainant woman was 30 years of age. They had been
having sexual intimacies but the lawyer married another woman.
There was no finding of gross immorality. The case is a product of
indiscretion between two consenting adults.
Sulu Islamic Assoc. v. Malik. It is not immoral by Muslim standard
for a Muslim judge to have a second wife.
Marcayda v. Naz. The lawyer had an affair with a married woman.
A child was born as a result of the affair. For the reason that the
lawyer admitted the paternity of the child and agreed to support
him, this circumstance has rendered the immorality not so gross
and scandalous.
Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro. Disbarment proceeding is
warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman.
[146]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
4. Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude
Moral Turpitude, Defined
Soriano v. Dizon. Moral turpitude has been defined as
"everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Pendency of Criminal Charge
 The mere existence of criminal charges against the lawyer
cannot be a ground for his disbarment or suspicion. He is
presumed innocent unless otherwise proven guilty with
finality
 However, after conviction, the presumption no longer holds.
5. Violation of Oath of Office
 See Lawyer’s Oath
The Attorney’s Oath is a Condensed Code of Ethics
In re: Cuevas, Jr. The attorney’s oath is not just a mere formality
recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and
before the presence of select witnesses.
It is rather a solemn affirmation of the lawyer’s lifetime
commitment to be a loyal citizen, a law-abiding person, a
defender of truth and justice, an advocate of the rule of law, an
exemplar of loyalty and fidelity to the courts and to clients and a
model to emulate both in his professional and private life.
Violation of Oath, Consequence
 The violation of oath is a ground for suspension or
disbarment under Rule 138, Sec. 27
6. Willful Disobedience of Any Lawful Order of a Superior
Court
Disobedience Must Be Willful
People v. Dalusog. The resistance or defiance to the order of the
Court must be willful. Thus, a lawyer who is directed to do
something, such as to surrender records, to appear as counsel de
oficio, to comment on a matter pending with the Court, may be
disciplined for willful disobedience.

Villaflor v. Sarita. Disregarding a TRO issued by the CA is
disobedience. The lawyer filed a Motion for enforcement of a writ
of demolition despite the pending TRO.
7. Corrupt or Willful Appearance for a Client Without Being
Employed
 It is prohibited for a lawyer to appear for a person in court
without being hired or employed unless, there is leave of
court first obtained
Rule 138, Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear — An attorney
is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any
issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys
wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Porac Trucking Corp. v. CA. Thus, Atty. Macalino, a lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law in appearing for a party
defendant without authority.
Disbarment or Suspension of a Filipino Lawyer in a Foreign
Country; Effect in the Philippines
In re: Suspension from the Practice of Law in the Territory of
Guam of Atty. Maquera. If the Filipino lawyer is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law by a competent court or
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has been
admitted as an attorney, and the ground therefor includes any of
the acts enumerated in Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the ROC, such
disbarment or suspension in the Philippines.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinatory agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground
for disbarment or suspension.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar
by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
includes any of the acts provided for in Rule 138, Sec. 27, as
amended
2015 Bar, Q. XIX(B): If Atty. Babala is also admitted as an
attorney in a foreign jurisdiction what is the effect of his
disbarment or suspension by a competent court or other
disciplinary authority in said foreign jurisdiction to his
membership in the Philippine Bar?
2014 Bar, Q. XXVIII: Atty. Forma is a member of the Philippine
Bar. He went to New York City, took the New York State Bar, and
passed the same. He then practiced in New York City. One of his
American clients filed a case for disbarment against him for
pocketing the money which was entrusted to him as payment
for the filing fee and other incidental expenses of his damage
suit. Atty. Forma was later disbarred for dishonesty.
Disheartened, Atty. Forma came back to the Philippines and
practiced as a lawyer.
Will his disbarment in New York be used against him for
purposes of disbarment proceedings here in the Philippines?
A: Atty. Forma may be disbarred in the Philippines if the ground
for his disbarment in New York is also a ground for disbarment in
this country. But he is still entitled to due process of law, and the
foreign court’s judgment against him only constitutes prima facie
evidence of unethical conduct as a lawyer. He is entitled to be
given an opportunity to defend himself in an investigation to be
conducted in accordance with Rule 139, ROC (In re: Suspension
from the Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon
Maquera, B.M. No. 793, July 30 2004; Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No.
6697, July 25, 2006)
Special Disabilities of Lawyers
Purchase of Property or Rights of Clients Subject of Litigation,
Prohibited; Purchase is Void
Rubias v. Batiller. Art. 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of
the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain
persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control
over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or
control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial
auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators;
(4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees,
prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially
disqualified by law.
[147]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
The SC has declared such sale as void adopting the opinion of
Castan
It is noteworthy that Castan's rationale for his conclusion that
fundamental consideration of public policy render void and
inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public
officers and employees of government property intrusted to them
and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights
in litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article
1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted
in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such
prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning."
Purchase Cannot Be Ratified
Rubias v. Batiller. The nullity of such prohibited contracts is
definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The
public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not
permit of compromise or ratification
Lawyer Shall Hold the Property in Trust for the Client
Palma v. Cristobal. Any contract of sale in violation of the
statutory prohibition (Art. 1491, CC) is void and the lawyer-
purchaser shall hold the same in trust for the client and he cannot
acquire it by prescription.
Sotto v. Samson. The client can recover the property including the
fruits but he must return the purchase price with legal interests.
There is Violation Even if the Lawyer Did Not Pay Money for it
Ordonio v. Eduarte. The prohibition under Art. 1491 applies even
if the lawyer has not paid money for the property, it having been
merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered
at a time when the property is still subject of a pending case.
It does not matter whether the sale was at the behest of the
client. Lawyer’s good faith is no defense.
In re: Ruste. The property being thus in suit, which the
respondent was waging on behalf of his clients, his acquisition
thereof by the deed of sale, Exhibit B, constitutes malpractice.
Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the
instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity, as
contended by the respondent, or at the latter's behest, as
contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case
as attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate
his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so amply

protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily
exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both."
When Purchase of Client’s Property is Not Violation of the Law
Laig v. CA. The lawyer commits no breach of the law when the
property he purchased from the client is (a) not subject of a
litigation, or if he acquired it (b) before he became counsel for
the client or he (c) acquired it after the case involving the
property had terminated.
Ramos v. Ngaseo. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated
property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a
prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Art. 1491.
Extension of Prohibition in Art. 1491
Art.1492, CC. The prohibitions in the two preceding articles are
applicable to sales in legal redemption, compromises and
renunciations.
In re: Suspension of Atty. Maquera. The Superior Court of Guam
found that Maquera acquired his client's property by exercising
the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client
in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely
under Art. 1492 in relation to Art. 1491, par. 5 of the CC. Par. 5 of
Art. 1491 prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the
client's property which is the subject of the litigation handled by
the lawyer. Under Art. 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in
legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in par. 5 of Art. 1491 and Art. 1492 is
founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an
attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance
of his client30 and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his
client.
Prohibition Also Includes the Leasing of Client’s Property Subject
of Litigation (Art. 1646, NCC)
Mananquil v. Villegas. Moreover, the claim that the heirs of
Filomena Zerna have acquiesced and consented to the assailed
lease contracts does not militate against respondent's liability
under the rules of professional ethics. The prohibition referred to
in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code, as far as lawyers
are concerned, is intended to curtail any undue influence of the
lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and
confidential association. Thus, the law makes the prohibition
absolute and permanent. And in view of Canon 1 of the new CPR
and Sections 3 & 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
whereby lawyers are duty-bound to obey and uphold the laws of
the land, participation in the execution of the prohibited contracts
such as those referred to in Art. 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil
Code has been held to constitute breach of professional ethics on
the part of the lawyer for which disciplinary action may be
brought against him. Accordingly, the Court must reiterate the
rule that the claim of good faith is no defense to a lawyer who has
failed to adhere faithfully to the legal disqualifications imposed
upon him, designed to protect the interests of his client
Mortgage
Fornilda v. RTC. Mortgage is deemed included within the
prohibition in Art. 1491
The reason is that the mortgage may be closed and the property
sold at public auction, where the lawyer may bid to be able to
collect the loan and interests. The ultimate end is purchase.
Other Special Disabilities: Betrayal of Trust; Revelation of Secrets
RPC, Article 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. -
Revelation of secrets - In addition to the proper administrative
action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period,
or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador
judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his
professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or
solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense
of a client or having received confidential information from said
client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party
in the same case, without the consent of his first client.
Presentation of Inadmissible Affidavits Under the Rule on
Summary Procedure
Rules on Summary Procedure, Sec. 20. Affidavits — The
affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only
facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are
admissible in evidence, and shall show their competence to testify
to the matters stated therein.
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the
counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall be
cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof
from the record.
[148]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Deliberate Non-Signing and Signing of Pleadings in Violation of
the Rules; Effect
Rule 7, Sec. 3. Signature and address — Every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either
case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied
if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and
not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action.
Civil Liability for Damages
Civil Liability of Lawyers for Intended Omission or Gross
Negligence Resulting in Client’s Prejudice
Adarne v. Aldaba. An attorney is not bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and
skill, having reference to the character of the business he
undertakes.
PNB v. Aruego. Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay are liable for damages (Art.
1170, CC). The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, or the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Art. 1171 and
2201, par. 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which
is expected of a good father of a family shall be required (Art.
1173, CC).
All what is required of the lawyer in the performance of his
duties is to exert that degree of vigilance and attention expected
of a good father of a family.

Isaac v. Mendoza. A client who is prejudiced by the negligence or
misconduct of his lawyer can recover damages against him.
Requisites to Render an Attorney Liable for Damages Due to his
Negligence or Omission
National Savings Bank v. Ward. To make the lawyer liable, it is
essential that (a) the attorney-client relationship be established;
(b) that there is want of reasonable care and diligence, (c) that
injury was suffered by the client which was the proximate result
thereof.
Negligence of Counsel Binds Clients; Exception
GR: Cabales v. Nery. Clients are prejudiced by the negligence of
their lawyers because of the recognized rule that clients are
bound by the conduct, negligence, and mistake of their counsel.
PHHC v. Tiongco. However, when the lawyer had practically sold
his client down the river or when the negligence is so gross that
the client did not have due process, the client is not bound by the
negligence or act of the lawyer.
Salonga v. CA. On the other hand, it is well-settled that the
negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule
that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general
or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against
them.
Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in
cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when its application "results in the
outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality."
None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the
present case.
Petitioners argue that their previous counsel Garlitos was guilty of
gross negligence in handling their case before the trial court and,
thus, they should not be bound by the consequences of his said
negligence. They insist on the applicability of Legarda vs. CA
asserting that "it sets the correct directions upon which the Public
Respondent CA should have steered its course." We are not
persuaded. The factual scenario in Legarda is not on all fours with
the case before us. The counsel in the cited case was found
grossly negligent because of the sheer absence of real effort on
his part to defend his client's cause. In the present case, however,
counsel Garlitos was merely guilty of simple negligence. Although
his failure to file a timely answer had led to a judgment by default
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
against his clients, his efforts at defending their cause were
palpably real, albeit bereft of zeal.
Rule That Mistake of Lawyer Binds Client is Not a Hard and Fast
Rule
GR: Tan v. CA. The client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel.
This is not a hard and fast rule.
XPN: Salonga v. CA. When through the recklessness and gross
negligence of the counsel, the client is deprived of due process of
law, or when its application results in the outright deprivation of
one’s property through technicality, the client is not bound by the
acts of the lawyer.
Callangan v. People. Also, when the interests of justice so require
Client must also Exercise Diligence
Leonardo v. S.T. Best, Inc. Clients should maintain contact with
their counsel from time to time, and inform themselves of the
progress of the case, thereby exercising that standard of care
“which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his business.”
MTM Garment Mfg. Inc. v. CA. A party cannot blame his counsel
for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect.
Procedure in Disbarment and Other Disciplinary Proceedings
Preliminary
Disbarment Proceedings, Judicial in Nature
A disbarment proceeding is an investigation conducted by the SC,
by the IBP or other authorized body to determine the fitness of a
lawyer to remain in the Roll of Attorneys.
The lawyer as respondent is accorded the process of law and the
ultimate authority to decide the matter of disbarment of the
respondent lawyer rests in the SC alone. The IBP investigates
through its Commission on Bar Discipline.
Presumption of Innocence Exists in Favor of the Respondent-
Lawyer
 Like in criminal proceedings, the respondent is presumed
innocent until otherwise proven guilty of the charge
Segovia v. Sardana. In the absence of convincing proof of
misconduct on the part of the respondent, as in this case where
[149]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
the complainants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
witnesses and failed not only to substitute the charges but also to
appear in the hearing thereof before the Investigating Judge
despite due notice to them and counsel. We find the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge to dismiss the
complaint to be meritorious. Well settled is the rule that an
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. It is
only when such presumption is overcome by convincing proof of
the lawyer's misconduct that the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension should follow.
Clearly Preponderant Evidence, Required
Lim v. Antonio. Considering the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension, it has been consistently held that
clearly preponderant evidence is required to justify the imposition
of either penalty.
Banaag v. Salondong. When the evidence is insufficient, the
required quantum of proof is not met, in which event, the case
must be dismissed.
Cabatu v. Domingo. More so, when there is not witness to prove
the charge (immorality), the case must be dismissed.
Burden of Proof Rests Upon the Complainant
 In disbarment proceedings, the respondent lawyer enjoys
the legal presumption of innocence which must be
overcome by clear preponderance of evidence before the
lawyer would be meted the imposition of disbarment or
suspension.
 The complainant has the burden of proof.
In re: De Guzman. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him
must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose
as free from doubt a case which compels exercise by this Court of
its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as
well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.
Authority to Suspend or Disbar Must be Exercised with Great
Caution
Alcala v. De Vera. In failing to inform his clients, the petitioners,
of the decision in said civil case, respondent failed to exercise
"such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional

employment". The relationship of lawyer-client being one of
confidence, there is ever present the need for the client's being
adequately and fully informed and should not be left in the dark
as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being
defended. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain
unimpaired
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment,
but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable, and reliable; men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence. This purpose should be borne in
mind in the exercise of disbarment, and the power should be
exercised with that caution which the serious consequences of
the action involve. Lawyer severely censured
Duty of the SC in Disbarment Cases
Re: Letter-Complaint against Solicitor General Varela. The duty
of the Court towards members of the bar is not only limited to
the administration of discipline to those found culpable of
misconduct but also to the protection of the reputation of those
frivolously or maliciously charged. The Court will not thus shirk
from its responsibility to mete out proper disciplinary punishment
to lawyers who are shown to have failed to live up to their sworn
duties; but neither will it hesitate to extend its protective arm to
those the accusation against whom is not indubitably proven. For
a lawyer’s good name is, in the ultimate analysis, his most
important possession.
Principle of Res Ipsa Loquitor Applicable to Judges and Lawyers
Res Ipsa Loquitor
People v. Valenzuela. There is no question that the principle of
res ipsa loquitor had been applied to judges. Under this principle,
judges had been dismissed from the service without need of
formal investigation because based on the records, the gross
misconduct or inefficiency of the judge clearly appears.
Prudential Bank v. Castro. The same principle had been applied to
lawyers. Thus, if on the basis of the lawyer’s comment or answer
to a show-cause Order of the SC, it appears that the lawyer has so
conducted himself in a manner which exhibits his blatant
disrespect to the Court, or his want of good moral character or his
violation of the attorney’s oath, the lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred without need of a trial-type proceeding.
Roces v. Aportadera. What counts is that the lawyer has been
given the opportunity to give his side.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Richards v. Asoy. The facts, as disclosed, require no further
evidentiary hearing, and speak for themselves. Res ipsa loquitor.
The Orders of the Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. 181-P are of
record and Respondent’s excuse that he can no longer recall them
is feeble. Respondent’s side has been fully heard in the pleadings
he has filed before this Court. A trial-type hearing is not de
riqueur. The requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard.
1988 Bar, Q. VIII(a): In Administrative Circular No. 1 addressed to
all lower courts dated January 28, 1988, the Supreme Court
stressed:
All judges are reminded that the Supreme Court has applied the
“Res Ipsa Loquitur” rule in the removal of judges even without
any formal investigation whenever a decision, on its face,
indicates gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law or
gross misconduct (See: People vs. Valenzuela; Cathay Pacific
Airways vs. Romillo, Jr.).
The application of the “res ipsa loquitur” rule in the removalof
judges is assailed in various quarters as inconsistent with due
process and fair play.
Is there basis for such a reaction? Explain.
A: In one view, there is a basis for the reaction against the res ipsa
loquitur rule on removing judges. According to the position taken
by the Philippine Bar Association. The res ipsa loquitur rule might
violate the principle of due process, that is the right to be heard
before one is condemned
Moreover, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the
procedure for the removal of judges. Upon service of the
complaint against him, he is entitled to file his answer. If the
answer merits a hearing, it is referred to a justice of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, the report of the investigation is
submitted to the Supreme Court for proper disposition.
The danger in applying the res ipsa loquitur rule is that the judge
may have committed only an error of judgment. His outright
dismissal does violence to the jurisprudence set In Re: Horilleno.
The other view taken by the Supreme Court is that the lawyer or a
judge can be suspended or dismissed based in his activities or
decision, as long as he has been given an opportunity to explain
his side. No investigation is necessary.
[150]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Filing of Complaint and Investigation
 The only officers authorized to investigate cases of
disbarment are:
(a) SC
(b) IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline or authorized
investigators
(c) OSG
 The CA and RTC can investigate and take action only against
lawyers who appear for litigants in cases pending before
them.
Rule 139-B, Sec. 1. How Instituted — Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by
such documents as may substantiate said facts.
Rule 139-B, Sec. 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision — This
Rule shall take effect June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present
Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS".
All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor
General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as
provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation
has been substantially completed.
2003 Bar, Q. II(2): A Justice of the Supreme Court, while reading
a newspaper one weekend, saw the following advertisement:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Competent Lawyer
Reasonable Fee
Call 221-2221
Mondays-Fridays
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
The following session day, the Justice called the attention of his
colleagues and the Bar Confidant was directed to verify the
advertisement. It turned out that the number belongs to
Attorney X, who was then directed to explain to the Court why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for the improper
advertisement.

Attorney X, in his answer, averred that: He could not be
subjected to disciplinary action because there was no complaint
against him.
Rule on Attorney X’s contention.
A: A complaint is not necessary to initiate disciplinary action
against a lawyer. In Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
disciplinary action against a lawyer may be initiated by the
Supreme Court motu proprio.
Rule 139-B, Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of
Governors
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the
IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting
of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's
Report.
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of
the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the
disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall
issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such
sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
petition of the complainant or other interested party filed
with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise.
(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be
given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
Rule 139-B, Sec. 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other
Court-designated Investigator — Based upon the evidence
adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other
Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations for the final action of the Supreme Court.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Rule 139-B, Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court — The Court of Appeals or
Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for
any of the causes named in Rule 138, Sec. 27 2, until further
action of the Supreme Court in the case.
Rule 138, Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance — The Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for
any of the causes named in the last preceding Sec., and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Rule 139-B, Sec. 13. Supreme Court Investigation — In
proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme Court or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Solicitor-General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge
of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in
the same manner provided in Sec.s 6 to 11 hereof, save that the
review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly
by the Supreme Court.
Lim-Santiago v. Saguccio. The IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate violations of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees) unless the acts
involved also transgress provisions of the CPR
Where to File Complaint for Disbarment
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator. A complaint for disbarment may
be filed directly in the SC, IBP National Office or in any of the IBP
Chapter Offices in the country.
The NLRC and the POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate
charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.
Zaldivar v. Gonzales. The SC ordinarily refers disbarment cases to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation or it may
itself, for special reasons, investigate the same like the
investigation of the anomalies in the 1989 IBP National Elections
and the investigation of Atty. Eugene Tan, then IBP President
(B.M. 565).
However, referral of disbarment cases (filed with or initiated by
the SC) to the IBP is not mandatory.
When an IBP Chapter receives a complaint, the same will be
referred to the IBP National Office for appropriate action
[151]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
How the Complaint is Instituted
Rule 139-B, Sec. 1. How Instituted — Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by
such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by
the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the
instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in the government
service.
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the
Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who
shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors
for assignment to an investigator.
Investigation is Mandatory
Nava v. Sorongan. In complaints for disbarment, formal
investigation is mandatory.
Cotton v. Laysa. Ex parte investigation may only be conducted
when respondent fails to appeal despite reasonable notice
Villanueva v. Deloria. In a Resolution dated February 19, 2001, we
referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted a
Report dated September 29, 2005, finding merit in the Complaint
and recommending that Atty. Deloria be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years and/or be fined in the amount of
P20,000.00. This recommendation was annulled and set aside by
the IBP in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-279 dated May 26, 2006.
The case was instead dismissed for lack of merit.
The report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner appears to be based solely on the Rollo of the case
which the Court sent to the IBP pursuant to the Resolution dated
February 19, 2001. The Investigating Commissioner did not
conduct any hearing to determine the veracity of the allegations
in Villanueva’s Complaint and the truthfulness of Atty. Deloria’s
answers thereto.

A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not
be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons. In
Baldomar v. Paras, we held:
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally
addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds a
complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses
the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further
inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be
resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral
is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during
which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex-
parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails
to appear despite reasonable notice.
Vuerte de los Santos v. Atty. Robiso. In complaints for
disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement
except in such extreme situations as when respondent fails to
appear at the hearing despite reasonable notice.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the
IBP for further proceedings, and it is directed to act on this
referral with dispatch.
Arandia v. Magalong. Complaints against lawyers for misconduct
are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the Court
finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly
dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that
further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could
not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a
referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case
during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard.
An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when
respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice.
Board of Governors
 See Rule 139-B, Sec. 12
Suspension of a Lawyer by the IBP Board of Governors;
Requisites
Malonso v. Principe. It is clear that before a lawyer may be
suspended from the practice of law by the IBP, there should be (1)
a review of the investigator’s report; (2) a formal voting; and (3) a
vote of at least five (5) members of the Board.
IBP Should Resolve Cases on Time; Application for Extension of
Time should be Filed with the SC if More Time is Needed
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
BENECO v. Flores. The IBP is given 90-day period within which to
finish its investigation of administrative cases from the time of
commencement of the cases. Should it require more time, it
should file with the SC a request for extension, giving the reason
for such request.
Ignoring IBP Proceedings; Effect
Berbano v. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona was disbarred for ignoring
IBP proceedings involving hearings of his disbarment, among
other causes
Santeco v. Avance. Atty. Avance was suspended for 5 years for
same defiance.
Disqualification of Commissioner or Investigator
Rule 139-B, Sec. 2., par. 2. National Grievance Investigators — An
Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship within
the fourth degree of consanguinity of affinity to any of the parties
of their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having
acted as counsel to his acting as such Investigator. Where the
Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may appeal to the
IBP Board of Governors, which by majority vote of the members
present, there being a quorum, may order his disqualification.
Proceedings in the SC
Rule 139-B, Sec. 13. Supreme Court Investigation — In
proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme Court or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Solicitor-General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge
of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in
the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that
the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted
directly by the Supreme Court.
Rule 139-B, Sec. 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other
Court-designated Investigator — Based upon the evidence
adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other
Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations for the final action of the Supreme Court.
The Requirement That the IBP Board of Governors’ Decision in
Disciplinary Proceedings Must State the Facts and the Reasons
on Which They are Based is Akin to What is Required of the
Decisions of Court of Record
[152]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Quiambao v. Bamba. Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court reads in part as follows:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the
IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted
to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
We may consider the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as
a memorandum decision adopting by reference the report of the
investigating commissioner. However, we look with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty without any explanation
therefor. Again, we remind the IBP Board of Governors of the
importance of the requirement to announce in plain terms its
legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in
disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on
which its decision is based is akin to what is required of the
decisions of courts of record. The reasons for handing down a
penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the
ratio.
Who Can File a Disbarment Case Against a Lawyer
 See Rule 139-B, Sec. 1
Is it Necessary that the Complainant Should Have Personal
Knowledge of the Facts and Circumstances?
Illusorio-Bildner v. Lokin. Personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances for which respondent is sought to be
administratively liable is not a requisite for filing a disbarment
complaint. Personal knowledge is required not of the complainant
but of her witnesses if there are any.
Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.
The Lawyer Who Can be Investigated by the IBP-CBD
SC Circular No. 3-9, s.1989. All lawyers whether in the
government service or in private practice may be investigated by
the CBD except those who are in the judiciary, that is, Judges and
Justices. They are not contemplated in the clause “including those
in the government service” in Rule 139, Sec. 1, par. 2.
Referral of Cases to the IBP is Not Mandatory

Bautista v. Gonzales. The above contention of respondent is
untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim,
reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not
mandatory upon the Court. Reference of complaints to the IBP is
not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B,
the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without
the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to
the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and
recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed
directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action
on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the
investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties
during the investigation.
Confidentiality of Disbarment or Suspension Proceedings
Ibanez v. Vina. The professional success of a lawyer depends
almost entirely on his good reputation. If that is tarnished, it is
difficult to restore the same to its former state.
Thus, it has been held that the lawyer’s good name in the last
analysis is his most important possession.
Rule 139-B, Sec. 18. Confidentiality — Proceedings against
attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final
order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in
other cases.
Rationale behind Confidentiality
In re: Agbistado. Disbarment proceedings shall be private and
confidential in order to enable the SC to make its investigation
free from any extraneous influence or interference, as well as to
protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and
judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and
irresponsible clients and litigants.
Mitigating Circumstances in Disbarment
 Just like in criminal cases, mitigating circumstances may be
considered in favor of the respondent which has the effect
of lessening the gravity of the administrative imposition that
may be meted to him.
 The following have been considered as mitigating factors in
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions upon the erring
lawyers:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(1) In re: Ruste. Good faith in the acquisition of a property of a
client subject of litigation
(2) Munoz v. People. Inexperience of the lawyer
(3) Santos v. Tan. Age
(4) Munoz v. People. Apology
(5) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer. Lack of intention to
slight or offend the Court
Affidavits of Desistance, Settlement, Compromise, Restitution,
Withdrawal of Charges, or Failure to Prosecute; Effects
Rule 139-B, Sec. 5, par. 2. No investigation shall be interrupted or
terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same, unless the Supreme
Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors, determines that there is no compelling reason to
continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against
the respondent.
Tejada v. Hernando. Complaint's Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw
Complaint hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this
nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same"
(Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court).
Bolivar v. Simbol. "Any person may bring to this Court's attention
the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the
facts proven so warrant". The power to discipline lawyers —
officers of court — may not be cut short by a compound of
compromise and withdrawal of charges. Lawyer was suspended
Affidavits of Desistance Will Cause Dismissal of Case if there is
Nothing More Which Could Substantiate the Charge
Arfapo v. Nano. In the case at bar, complainant, instead of
proving his affirmative allegations, submitted an affidavit of
desistance, stating that he has settled his differences with the
respondent, and asked for the dismissal of this administrative
case. Although the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal
of the charges will not necessarily curtail the authority of this
Court to proceed further on the matter, such circumstance will
undoubtedly render the investigation of the case difficult. In the
case at bar, not only is the respondent entitled to the
presumption that as an officer of the Court, he has performed his
duty in accordance with his oath, but also no evidence has been
submitted to substantiate the charges. It appears also that the
deed of sale which complainant claims to have been altered,
[153]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
appears on its face to be regular and bears no traces of any
alteration whatsoever.
Withdrawal of Complaint, Effect
In re: Tipon. If the complaint is withdrawn and there is no more
evidence which could substantiate the charge, the case is
dismissible.
Sapalo v. Diaz. Authenticity and voluntariness of the withdrawal
of the complaint against a member of the bar must be
determined before the same shall be considered.
Lack of Interest to Prosecute, Effect
Worthington v. Fernandez. Complainant’s lack of interest in the
prosecution of the respondent may justify the dismissal of the
case.
In Pari Delictor Rule Will Not Exempt Lawyer
Mortel v. Aspiras. In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial
that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a
proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge
the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public
and the courts.
Applicability of the Rule on Prejudicial Question, When Proper
 If the subject matter of the complaint is also the subject of,
or is intertwined in the subject matter of another pending
case, and the resolution of which is determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the respondent in the disbarment case,
the disbarment proceedings may be dismissed for being
premature, or it may be held in abeyance pending the final
determination of the other case.
Ramos v. Miculob
Facts:
1. The verified complaint filed by petitioner, Eufrosino L.
Ramos, a member of the bar, against respondent Eugenio P.
Miculob, also a member of the bar, alleges that in a sworn
statement addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on
July 6, 1961, said respondent stated, among other things,
that in December, 1960, he gave Jose Fornier, Philippine
Consul General in Hongkong, the sum of HK$2,500.00 in
order to secure the issuance of a visa for his client, one John
Lau, alias Lau Chen Ping, an applicant for a visa to the

Philippines; that if true, the act committed by respondent
constitutes malpractice, gross misconduct, bribery, and a
violation of his oath of office as a member of the bar.
2. It appears, however, that the matter is still pending
investigation in the DFA by reason of the charges filed by
respondent against Consul General Fornier and Consuls
Sabalones and Cataumber.
Issue: WON the case should be dismissed
Held: For the reason stated in the preceding paragraph, it is
hereby resolved to dismiss the present case, without prejudice to
filing it again if the decision that will be rendered in due time
upon the administrative charges heretofore mentioned would so
justify.
Degamo v. Calo. It appears that the charges filed in this case by
complaint against respondent are directly involved in two cases
now pending in the CFI of Agusan, namely, Civil Case No. 117,
entitled Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. vs. Villamor Dizon, at al., and
Criminal Case No. 2347, entitled People vs. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr.
In view of the above, upon motion of respondent, it is resolved
that the investigation of the present Administrative case be held
in abeyance until such time as this Court receives notice of the
final determination of the two cases mentioned above.
Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio. When the criminal prosecution
based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any
administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must
await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory
findings.
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent
himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon
9 and Rule 9.01 of the CPR
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds
himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and
aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
Case Where Prejudicial Question Was Ruled Out
In re: Brillantes. The contention that the criminal cases now
pending against the respondent pose prejudicial questions to the
resolution of the primordial issue in the instant proceeding has no
merit. First, the respondent has not cited, and this Court does not
find, any provision of the Constitution, the statutes, or the Rules
of Court which can justify the theory. Second, in a criminal case it
is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, which is not so in
a suspension or disbarment proceeding where only clearly
preponderant evidence is required. Third, an accused in a criminal
case may escape conviction not necessarily on the ground that he
did not commit the acts charged in the information. Not
infrequently, criminal cases pending in trial courts are dismissed
on account of the failure of witnesses for the prosecution to
appear and testify or on account of a sworn desistance by the
complainant. And fourth, in our opinion, it is not sound judicial
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before we
may act on a complaint or information against a lawyer and
impose the judgment appropriate to the facts. Otherwise, this
Court as well the courts below will be effectively rendered
helpless from vigorously applying the rules on admission to and
continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole
period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.
Conviction for Violation of B.P. 22 is Not Essential before the
Attorney Who Drew the Bouncing Checks Could be
Administratively Charged for Misconduct
De Jesus v. Collado
Facts: We note that respondent Collado had also admitted before
the Office of the Prosecutor of the City of Manila, during
preliminary investigation of the charges of estafa or violations of
B.P. 22, that she had issued the postdated checks which were
dishonored upon their presentment
Issue: WON conviction of violation of B.P. 22 is essential before
attorney could be held administratively liable
Held:
1. In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
has as yet been obtained against respondent Collado.
2. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal
charges raised against her is essential, so far as either the
administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge
against her is concerned.
3. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not
have enough money in her bank account to cover the total
amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with
which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized
by B.P. Blg. 22
4. We consider that issuance of checks in violation of the
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on
the part of a member of the Bar.
[154]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
The Dismissal of a Criminal Case is Not Determinative of the
Liability of the Accused for Disbarment
Gerona v. Datingaling. The power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of a respondent as an
officer of the court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment
should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired. To be
sure, conviction in a criminal case is not necessary for finding a
member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding. As we
have held in Calub v. Suller, the dismissal of a criminal case is not
determinative of the liability of the accused for disbarment. In the
case at bar, however, the criminal prosecution based on the same
acts charged in this case is still pending in the court. To avoid
contradictory findings, therefore, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the
criminal case for falsification of a public document.
The Contradiction
Catherine and Henry Yu v. Atty. Palana. The fact that the criminal
case against the respondent involving the same set of facts is still
pending in court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member
of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the
same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the
final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a
lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered
helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing
membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that
the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives
of the two proceedings are vastly disparate
Application for Reinstatement
Reinstatement, Concept
In disbarment proceedings, reinstatement means the restoration
to a disbarred lawyer, the privilege to practice law. It is nothing
more than readmission to membership in the Bar.
SC Alone Has the Authority to Reinstate
 The power of the SC to reinstate the privilege to practice law
to a disbarred lawyer is anchored on its constitutional
prerogative to promulgate rules on the admission of

applicants to the practice of law under Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of
the Constitution.
In re: Edillon. Relative to the issue of the power and/or
jurisdiction of the SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and
the authorities holding such are legion.
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
(Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
Object and Criterion of Reinstatement
In re: Rusiana. The sole object of the Court upon an application
for reinstatement to practice, by one previously disbarred, is to
determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and
convinced the Court by positive evidence that the effort he has
made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been
successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a
profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.
Prudential Bank v. Benjamin. The criterion for reinstatement has
been stated as follows:
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great
extent in the sound discretion of the court, The court action will
depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of
justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in
the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant
must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court
that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper
person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the
applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.
Criteria for Reinstatement
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Tan v. Sabandal. In several cases wherein reinstatements to the
legal profession were allowed, the following criteria were
considered:
(1) The person appreciates the insignificance of his dereliction
and
(2) He has assured the Court that he now possesses the
requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that
he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law;
(3) The time that has elapsed between disbarment and the
application for reinstatement,
(4) His good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his
disbarment,
(5) His active involvement in civic, educational, and religious
organizations;
(6) The favorable indorsement of the IBP, as well as the local
government officials and citizens of his community;
(7) The pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future
of his family
Effect of Reinstatement
Cui v. Cui. Reinstatement to the Roll of Attorneys wipes out the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from a previous disbarment
Condition May Be Imposed on the Applicant for Reinstatement
 The SC, in addition to the required rehabilitation of the
applicant for reinstatement may require special conditions
to be fulfilled by the applicant
Quingwa v. Puno. The SC required respondent Puno to (a)
formally acknowledge his child, Armando Puno, Jr., who is in the
care of the mother, complainant Flora Quingwa, and (b) to
support the said child
In re: Rusiana. The respondent was required to enroll in and pass
the regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school,
the fulfillment of which must be certified by the individual
professors of the review classes.
Lifting of Suspension, Bases
Artiaga, Jr. v. Villanueva. The suspension of a lawyer from the
practice of law, specially, when the suspension is indefinite
requires strong proofs of rehabilitation.
Laguitan v. Tinio. The SC resolved to lift the suspension of Atty.
Tinio upon presentation of satisfactory evidence that he is
[155]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
supporting his illegitimate children and has given up his immoral
course of conduct
Executive Pardon
Is a Disbarred Lawyer Due to Conviction for a Crime
Automatically Reinstated to the Practice of Law Upon Being
Pardoned by the President?
A: In re: Rovero. No. To be reinstated, there is still a need for the
filing of an appropriate petition with the SC
Effect of Executive Pardon During the Pendency of a Disbarment
Proceeding
 If during the pendency of a disbarment proceeding, the
respondent was granted an executive pardon, the dismissal
of the case on that sole basis will depend on whether the
executive pardon is absolute or conditional.
 If the pardon is absolute or unconditional, the disbarment
case will be dismissed
Note: If aside from the crime, there is still an existing ground for
disbarment, the pardon will not be a bar to the continuation of
the disbarment proceeding.
In re: Lontok. A disbarment proceeding was filed against
Marcelino Lontok because he was convicted of bigamy, a crime
involving moral turpitude.
During the pendency of the disbarment proceeding, Lontok was
pardoned by the Governor-General. At the instance of the
Attorney-General, the disbarment cases against Lontok was
dismissed by reason of the pardon
In re: Saturnino Parcasio. This Court in the Lontok case applied
the rule that "a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed
for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense." "If granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new
man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.". As to
nondisbarment cases where the rule was applied.
In re: Gutierrez
Facts:

1. Respondent was charged with murder. He was convicted.
2. After serving a portion of his sentence, he was granted
conditional pardon by the President
3. The unexcused portion of the prison term was remitted on
condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines.
4. He was subsequently indicted for disbarment
Issue: WON a conditional pardon may exonerate the respondent
Held:
1. No. The rule that pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment
of the attorney after the pardon has been granted applies
only where the pardon is absolute
2. But when, as in this case, the pardon granted is conditional
and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of the penalty.
3. In such a case, the attorney must be judged upon the fact of
his conviction for the crime he has committed
4. Gutierrez is ordered disbarred
In re: Avancena. The fact that a lawyer, convicted of falsification,
was conditionally pardoned does not preclude his being
disbarred.
The pardon relieved him of the penal consequences of his act. He
is being disbarred for professional misconduct.
Rule 135: Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers
Sec. 1. Courts always open; justice to be promptly and
impartially administered – Courts of justice shall always be open,
except on legal holidays, for the filing of any pleading, motion or
other papers, for the trial of cases, hearing of motions, and for the
issuance of orders or rendition of judgments. Justice shall be
impartially administered without unnecessary delay.
Sec 2. Publicity of proceedings and records – The sitting of every
court of justice shall be public, but any court may, in its discretion,
exclude the public when the evidence to be adduced is of such
nature as to require their exclusion in the interest of morality or
decency. The records of every court of justice shall be public
records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested
person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the
clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any
special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of
morality or decency.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Section 3. Process of superior courts enforced throughout the (f) To administer or cause to be administered oaths in a case
Philippines – Process issued from a superior court in which a case pending therein, and in all other cases where it may be
is pending to bring in a defendant, or for the arrest of any accused necessary in the exercise of its powers;
person, or to execute any order or judgment of the court, may be (g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make
enforced in any part of the Philippines. them conformable to law and justice;
(h) To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other
paper to be filed and used instead of the original, and to
Section 4. Process of inferior courts – The process of inferior
restore, and supply deficiencies in its records and
courts shall be enforceable within the province where the
proceedings.
municipality or city lies. It shall not be served outside the
boundaries of the province in which they are compromised except
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect – When by law
with the approval of the judge of first instance of said province,
and only in the following cases: jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to
(a) When an order for the delivery of personal property lying
be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
outside the province is to be complied with;
pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or
(b) When an attachment of real or personal property lying
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable
outside the province is to be made;
to the spirit of the said law or rules.
(c) When the action is against two or more defendants residing
in different provinces; and
(d) When the place where the case has been brought is that Sec. 7. Trials and hearings; orders in chambers – All trials upon
specified in a contract in writing between the parties, or is the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as
the place of the execution of such contract as appears convenient in a regular court room. All other acts or proceeding
therefrom. may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers, without the
attendance of the clerk or other court officials.
Writs of execution issued by inferior courts may be enforced in
any part of the part of the Philippines without any previous
Sec. 8. Interlocutory orders out of province – A judge of first
approval of the judge of first instance.
instance shall have power to hear and determine, when within
the district though without his province, any interlocutory motion
Criminal process may be issued by a justice of the peace or other
or issue after due and reasonable notice to the parties. On the
inferior court, to be served outside his province, when the district
filing of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus or for release
judge, or in his absence the provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his
upon bail or reduction of bail in any Court of First Instance, the
opinion the interest of justice require such service.
hearings may be had at any place in the judicial district which the
judge shall deem convenient.
Section 5. Inherent powers of court – Every court shall have
power:
Sec. 9. Signing judgments out of province – Whenever a judge
appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a Court of First
(a) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by expiration
person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial
of his temporary assignment, without having decided a case
investigation under its authority;
totally heard by him and which was argued or an opportunity
(c) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and
given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be
processes, and to the lawful orders of a judge out of court,
lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case
in a case pending therein;
anywhere within the Philippines. He shall send the same by
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
registered mail to the clerk of the court where the case was heard
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
or argued to be filed therein as of the date when the same was
connected with a case before it, in every manner
received by the clerk, in the same manner as if he had been
appertaining thereto;
present in court to direct the filing of the judgment. If a case has
(e) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case
been heard only in part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of any
pending therein;
of the parties to the case and the recommendation of the
[156]

respective district judge, may also authorize the judge who has
partly heard the case, if no other judge had heard the case in part,
to continue hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his
transfer or appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction.
1999 Bar, Q. IX: Justice X of the Court of Appeals, by mutual
agreement of two opposing parties, asked him to be their sole
arbitrator in the controversy that arose out of the construction
of a building in Makati City. The fee that would be paid to him
was substantial, it amounting to double his annual salary and
allowances. When Justice X declined the offer, the parties
suggested that he go on leave of absence for three months to
enable him to do the job.
May Justice X accept the work offered to him while on leave of
absence?
A: Judge X may not accept the work offered him even while on
leave of absence from the Court of Appeals.
A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the
risk of conflict with judicial duties (Canon 5, Code of Judicial
Ethics). He shall not accept appointment or designation to any
agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Rule
5.09, Code of Judicial Conduct). This is specially so since decisions
of voluntary arbitrators are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
He must minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties (Canons 4
and 5, Code of Professional Responsibility). Moreover, he will
create the Impression that he is merely interested in the fee
involved, which will detract from the integrity of the judiciary.
1988 Bar, Q. X(b): Judge Bantayog signed a decision (sentence),
dated January 31, 1979, convicting the accused of murder and
set the promulgation thereof on February 9, 1979, which was
postponed on motion of the accused and did not therefore take
place. This gave the judge time for further deliberation which
created on his mind doubt as to the guilt of the accused. He
therefore drafted and signed another decision also dated
January 31, 1979 which rendered a judgment of acquittal. This
was promulgated. Atty. Jesus, counsel for the complainant,
somehow was able to get a copy of the unpromulgated copy of
the “decision” and now has charged Judge Bantayog of
misconduct.
Will the charge prosper? Explain. Also comment on the Conduct
of Judge Bantayog.
A: No. The charge will not prosper.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
The judgment was not yet promulgated. Consequently, Judge
Bantayog’s act was proper considering that it was still within his
power to change his decision if he believes honestly that the later
one is the correct one to render under the premises.
1991 Bar, Q. VIII: Explain the meaning and ramifications of this
statement: “The judge is an arbiter of law and a minister of
justice."
A: This statement is taken from a decision of the Supreme Court
in Alonso vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 259. It
means that a judge should not unfeelingly literally apply the law
yielding like robots which may result in gross injustice. He should
interpret and apply the law for the main purpose of administering
justice.
1991 Bar, Q. IX: Lawyer W lost his ejectment case in the
Municipal Trial Court. He appealed the decision to the RTC which
V, the judge thereof, affirmed through a memorandum decision.
He filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the RTC
should state the facts and the law on which its decision is based.
Judge V denied his motion. Instead of filing a Petition for
Review, lawyer W filed an administrative complaint against
Judge V for breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct. What is the
liability of Judge V, if any?
A: There is no breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct committed
by the RTC Judge. The memorandum decision rendered in an
appeal from the Municipal Court in its original jurisdiction officers
carries with it the statement of facts found by the Municipal Court
which are deemed affirmed by the RTC judge. Memorandum
decisions are allowed on appeal.
1992 Bar, Q. V: Judge Dino was transferred to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig after serving as Judge of the Regional Trial Court
in Sorsogon. Delighted with her transfer, she immediately
assumed her new post. However, she brought with her the
records of five cases which were completely heard by her in her
former assignment and already submitted for decision.
Thereupon, she prepared the decision in said five cases, by
registered mail to her former Clerk of Court. One of the losing
parties questioned the authority of Judge Dino in deciding the
cases after her transfer to Pasig.
Are the decisions rendered by Judge Dino in the five cases valid?
Why?
A: The decisions are valid considering that the Regional Trial Court
in Sorsogon is coequal with that of the Regional Trial Court of
[157]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Manila. It is assumed of course that the five cases were already
submitted for decision at the time Judge Dino transferred to
Manila (Valentin v. Sta. Maria).
Alternative: Judge Dino can decide the five (5) cases as ruled in
Valentin v. Sta. Maria which abandoned the earlier ruling in
People v. Soria
1994 Bar, Q. XIV: After a study of the records and deciding that
plaintiff was entitled to a favorable Judgment, Judge Reyes
requested Atty. Sta. Ana, counsel for the plaintiff, to prepare the
draft of the decision. Judge Reyes then reviewed the draft
prepared by Atty. Sta. Ana and adopted it as his decision for
plaintiff. Judge Reyes saw nothing unethical in this procedure as
he would ask the other party to do the same if it were the
prevailing party.
Please comment on whether Judge Reyes' approach to decision-
writing is ethical and proper.
A: This procedure of Judge Reyes is unethical because the judge is
duty bound to study the case himself; he must personally and
directly prepare his decisions and not delegate it to another
person especially a lawyer in the case (See Section 1. Rule 36,
Rules of Court).
Alternative: In the case of Lantoria vs. Bunyi, a lawyer was
suspended for preparing drafts of decisions for a judge. The
Supreme Court held that this violated Canon No.13 and Rule
13.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide
that:
“CANON 13. - A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his case and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives
the appearance of influencing the court."
“Rule 13.01 -A lawyer should not extend extraordinary attention
or hospitality to nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity
with the judge."
Conversely, therefore, a judge should not ask lawyers of parties to
a case before him to draft his decisions. “A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." (Rule 2.01, Code of
Judicial Conduct)
2008 Bar, Q. IX(c): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
judge concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: Dictating his decision in open court immediately after
trial.

A: There is no rule prohibiting such conduct, especially in simple
cases such as when an accused pleads guilty to an Information for
a minor offense. But in complex and serious cases, such conduct
maybe considered improper, and the judge accused of arriving at
hasty decisions. In the case of People v. Eleuterio (1989), the
Supreme Court criticized the same conduct of the judge in the
following words:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2002 Bar, Q. XV: While Miss Malumanay, a witness for the
plaintiff, was under cross-examination, Judge Mausisa asked
questions alternately with the counsel for the defendant. After
four questions by the judge, the plaintiffs’ counsel moved that
the judge refrain from asking further questions which tended to
favor the defense and leave the examination of the witness to
the defendant's counsel, who was a new lawyer. The judge
explained that he was entitled to ask searching questions.
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly provides that "a
judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in
all activities.
Alternative: The conduct of Judge A is proper because he did
nothing more than introduce his cousin to Judge C and asked her
to decide the case expeditiously. He did not suggest to Judge C
how the case should be decided.

The Court agrees, however, that Judge Enrique Agana was
exceptionally careless, if not deliberately high-handed, when he
immediately after the trial dictated his decision in open court.
One may well suspect that he had prejudged the case and had a
prepared decision to foist upon the accused even the submission
of the case. And what is worse is that the decision was wrong.
1988 Bar, Q. VIII(b): How shall a judge conduct court
proceeding? May he participate intensively in the examination
of the wit-nesses? Explain.
A: A judge should not participate intensively in the examination of
witnesses. He may ask questions only to clarify some points but
not to the extent of taking the place of a counsel, otherwise he
may be accused of partiality. In other words, he should assume
the posture of “cold neutrality” of a judge.
1996 Bar, Q. IX(2): In a murder trial. Judge T asked searching
questions of all the witnesses for the accused prompting Atty. O,
counsel of the accused, to request Judge T to desist from acting
as counsel for the prosecution. The Judge, however, reminded
Atty. O that she wanted to determine whether the accused was
guilty of the crime charged.
Is it proper for Judge T to take an active part on the examination
of the accused's witnesses?
A: No, it is not proper. Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial conduct
provides that “While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent
waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in
the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be
borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth." The
intervention of the judge in a case must be done with
considerable circumspection. It must be done sparingly and not
throughout the trial, which will have the effect of or will tend to
build or bolster the case for one of the parties. The reason for this
rule is that the judge should not only be impartial but also appear
to be impartial.
A. Is the motion tenable? Why? Rule 136: Court Record and General Duties of Clerk and
B. Can the judge justify his intervention? How? Stenographers
A:
Sec. 1. Arms and great seal of court – The arms and great seal of
the Supreme Court are these:
A. It depends. Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that while a judge may, to promote justice, prevent
Arms — Paleways of two pieces azure and gules superimposed a
waste of time or clear up some obscurity, property intervene
balance or center with two tablets containing the commandments
in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should
of God or on either side; a chief argent with three mullets or
always be borne in mind that undue interference may
equidistant from each other; in point of honor, avoid argent over
prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the
all the sun rayonant or with eight major and minor rays.
ascertainment of truth. Thus, if in asking four questions
alternately with counsel for the defendant, Judge Mausisa
The great seal of the Supreme Court shall be circular in form, with
was only trying to clear up some obscurity, he cannot be
the arms as described in the last preceding paragraph and a scroll
accused of undue interference. But if his “searching
argent with the following inscriptions: Lex Populusque, and
questions” were such as to give the impression that he was
surrounding the whole a garland of laurel leaves; in or around the
already acting as a counsel for the defendant, his conduct is
garland the text "Supreme Court, Republic of the Philippines."
improper.
B. The judge can justify his intervention on any of the grounds
The arms and the seal of the Court of Appeals shall be the same as
mentioned by the rule, namely, to promote justice, avoid
that of the Supreme Court with the only difference that in the seal
waste of time, or clear up some obscurity.
shall bear around the garland and text "Court of Appeals, Republic
of the Philippines."
2003 Bar, Q. XII: B, who was given no more than six (6) months
to live by her physician, requested her cousin Judge A to The arms and the seal of the Court of First Instance shall be the
introduce her to Judge C before whose sala she has a case same as that of the Supreme Court with the only difference that
submitted for resolution. B would wish to have the case decided in the seal shall bear around the garland and text "Court of First
before her expected demise. Judge A, who personally knows Instance, the name of the province, Republic of the Philippines."
Judge C, accompanied B to the latter, introduced her as his
cousin, and explained that all that B wants is for her case to be
Sec. 2. Style of process – Process shall be under the seal of the
expeditiously resolved, without, in any way, suggesting in whose
court from which it issues, be stayed "Republic of the Philippines,
favor it should be decided.
Province or City of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." to be signed by the clerk
and bear date the day it actually issued.
Comment on the conduct of Judge A.
A: The conduct of Judge A may be considered unethical. Rule 2.04 Sec. 3. Clerk's office – The clerk's office, with the clerk or his
of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “a judge shall refrain deputy in attendance, shall be open during business hours on all
from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or days except Sundays and legal holidays. The clerk of the Supreme
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.” Court and that of the Court of Appeals shall keep office at Manila
Although Judge A did not suggest to Judge C in whose favor the and all papers authorized or required to be filed therein shall be
case should be decided, the fact that he introduced B as his cousin filed at Manila.
is enough suggestion as to how the case should be decided.
[158]

Sec. 4. Issuance by clerk of process – The clerk of a superior court
shall issue under the seal of the court all ordinary writs and
process incident to pending cases, the issuance of which does not
involve the exercise of functions appertaining to the court or
judge only; and may, under the direction of the court or judge,
make out and sign letters of administration, appointments of
guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all writs and process
issuing from the court.
Sec. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the
judge – In the absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the
duties of the judge in receiving applications, petitions, inventories,
reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices that follows as
a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when directed
so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors,
administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all
evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons, or to guardianship, trusteeships, or
receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and
evidence to the judge, together with his findings in relation to the
same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include
the same in his report.
Sec. 6. Clerk shall receive papers and prepare minutes – The clerk
of each superior court shall receive and file all pleadings and other
papers properly presented, endorsing on each such paper the
time when it was filed, and shall attend all of the sessions of the
court enter its proceedings for each day in a minute book to be
kept by him.
Sec. 7. Safekeeping of property – The clerk shall safely keep all
records, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to
his charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and
furniture belonging to his office.
Sec. 8. General docket – The clerk shall keep a general docket,
each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for receiving
all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases,
numbered consecutively in the order in which they were received,
and, under the heading of each case and complete title thereof,
the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment
entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by
reference to a single page the history of the case may be seen.
Sec. 9. Judgment and entries book – The clerk shall keep a
judgment book containing a copy of each judgment rendered by
the court in order of its date, and a book of entries of judgments
containing at length in chronological order entries of all final
judgments or orders of the court.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Sec. 10. Execution book – The clerk shall keep an execution book
in which he or his deputy shall record at length in chronological
order each execution, and the officer's return thereon, by virtue
of which real property has been sold.
Sec. 11. Certified copies – The clerk shall prepare, for any person
demanding the same, a copy certified under the seal of the court
of any paper, record, order, judgment, or entry in his office,
proper to be certified, for the fees prescribed by these rules.
Sec. 12. Other books and duties – The clerk shall keep such other
books and perform such other duties as the court may direct.
Sec. 13. Index; separating cases – The general docket, judgment
book, entries book and execution book shall each be indexed in
alphabetical order in the names of the parties, and each of them.
If the court so directs, the clerk shall keep two or more of either
or all of the books and dockets above mentioned, separating civil
from criminal cases, or actions from special proceedings, or
otherwise keeping cases separated by classes as the court shall
deem best.
Sec. 14. Taking of record from the clerk's office – No record shall
be taken from the clerk's office without an order of the court
except as otherwise provided by these rules. However, the
Solicitor General or any of his assistants, the provincial fiscal or his
deputy, the attorneys de oficio shall be permitted, proper receipt,
to withdraw from the clerk's office the record of any cases in
which they are interested.
Sec. 15. Unprinted papers – All unprinted documents presented
to the superior courts of the Philippines shall be written on paper
of good quality twelve and three inches in length by eight and
one-half inches in width, leaving a margin at the top and the left-
hand side not less than one inch and one-half in width. Papel
catalan, of the first and second classes, legal cap, and typewriting
paper of such weight as not to permit the writing of more than
one original and two carbons at one time, will be accepted,
provided that such papers is of the required size and of good
quality. Documents written with ink shall not be of more than
twenty-five lines to one page. Typewritten documents shall be
written double spaced. One side only of the page will be written
upon, and the different sheets will be sewn together, firmly, by
five stitches in the left -hand border in order to facilitate the
formation of the expediente, and they must not be doubled.
[159]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 16. Printed papers – All papers require by these rules to be
printed shall be printed with blank ink on unglazed paper, with
pages six inches in width by nine inches in length, in pamphlet
form. The type used shall not be smaller than twelve point. The
paper used shall be of sufficient weight to prevent the printing
upon one side from being visible upon the other.
Sec. 17. Stenographer – It shall be the duty of the stenographer
who has attended a session of a court either in the morning or in
the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the
close of such morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has
taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall
likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that the stenographer
comply with said duty. The clerk of court shall stamp the date on
which such notes are received by him. When such notes are
transcribed the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk, duly
initiated on each page thereof, to be attached to the record of the
case.
Whenever requested by a party, any statement made by a judge
of first instance, or by a commissioner, with reference to a case
being tried by him, or to any of the parties thereto, or to any
witness or attorney, during the hearing of such case, shall be
made of record in the stenographic notes.
Sec. 18. Docket and other records of interior courts – Every
justice of the peace and municipal judge shall keep a well-bound
book labeled "docket" in which he shall enter for each case:
(a) The title of the case including the names of all the parties;
(b) The nature of the case, whether civil or criminal, and if the
latter, the offense charged;
(c) The date of issuing preliminary and intermediate process
including orders of arrest and subpoenas, and the date and
nature of the return thereon;
(d) The date of the appearance or default of the defendant;
(e) The date of presenting the plea, answer, or motion to quash,
and the nature of the same;
(f) The minutes of the trial, including the date thereof and of all
adjournments;
(g) The names and addresses of all witnesses;
(h) The date and nature of the judgment, and, in a civil case, the
relief granted;
(i) An itemized statement of the coast;
(j) The date of any execution issued, and the date and contents
of the return thereon;
(k) The date of any notice of appeal filed, and the name of the
party filing the same.

A justice of the peace or municipal judge may keep two dockets,
one for civil and one for criminal cases. He shall also keep all the
pleadings and other papers and exhibits in cases pending in his
court, and shall certify copies of his docket entries and other
records proper to be certified, for the fees prescribed by these
rules. It shall be necessary for the justice of peace or municipal
judge to reduce writing the testimony of witnesses, except that of
the accused in preliminary investigations.
Sec. 19. Entry on docket of interior courts – Each justice of the
peace or municipal judge shall, at the beginning and in from of all
his entries in his docket, make and subscribe substantially the
following entry:
A docket of proceedings in cases before . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.; justice of the peace) or municipal judge) of the municipality (or
city) of . . . . . . . . . . . ., in the province of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Republic,
of the Philippines.
Witness my signature,
.............................
Justice of Peace (or Municipal Judge)
Rule 138: Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Sec. 1. Who may practice law — Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
1993 Bar, Q. VI: What do you understand by “practice of law"?
A: Generally, to engage in the practice of law is to do any of those
acts which are characteristics of the legal profession. It embraces
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience. It involves the carrying on of
the calling of an attorney, usually for gain, acting in a
representative capacity and rendering service to another.
Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of an
attorney-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-
client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his
profession as a lawyer.
Alternative: Practice of law is understood in two senses, namely
(1) as a qualification for a position in the government service and
(2) as a habitual act of a lawyer in contrast to the term of
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
unauthorized practice of law. In the first sense it is under-stood as
now defined by the Supreme Court in Cayetano vs. Monsod, as
any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge training and experience.
Practice of law in the second sense implies customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer, for
compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
service. Hence, an individual who has not been admitted to the
bar performs legal services for compensation is engaged in
unauthorized practice of law.
2005 Bar, Q. X: Atty. Yabang was suspended as a member of the
Bar for period of one (1) year. During the period of suspension,
he was permitted by his law firm to continue working in their
office, drafting and preparing pleadings and other legal
documents, but was not allowed to come into direct contact
with the firms’ clients. Atty. Yabang was subsequently sued for
illegal practice of law.
Would the case prosper? Explain.
A: The Supreme Court has defined the practice of law as any
activity in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (Cayetano vs. Monsod, 1991).
Based on this definition, the acts of Atty. Yabang of preparing
pleadings and other legal documents, would constitute practice of
law. More so, if his activities are for the benefit of his law firm,
because the employment of a law firm is the employment of all
the members thereof. The case against him will prosper.
Alternative: The traditional concept of practice of law requires
the existence of a lawyer-client relationship as a requisite.
Pursuant to this concept, inasmuch as Atty. Yabang was not
allowed by his law firm to come into direct contact with the firm’s
clients during the period of his suspension, he cannot be
considered as having engaged in illegal practice of law. The case
against him will not prosper.
2008 Bar, Q. VIII(b): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
lawyer concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: A suspended lawyer working as an independent legal
assistant to gather information and secure documents for other
lawyers during the period of his suspension.
A: The lawyer may be not be sanctioned. Practice of law has been
defined as any activity, inside or outside the courtroom which
requires knowledge of the law and procedure (Cayetano v.
Monsod, 1991). The act of gathering information and securing
documents for other lawyers, and not for a client, does not
[160]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
constitute practice of law. Any clerk can be tasked by a lawyer to
perform such services.
However, if these acts will involve the exercise of professional
judgment of a lawyer, the essence of which has been said to be
his educated ability to relate the general body of and philosophy
of law to a specified legal problem, such acts would constitute
practice of law, and the suspended lawyer can be sanctioned for
performing them.
2011 Bar, Q. 41: Ronnie, a paralegal in a law firm, helped Beth in
a property dispute in which she was involved by giving her legal
advice and preparing a complaint that she eventually filed in
court under her own signature. When the lawyer for the
defendant learned of it, he told Ronnie to desist from practicing
law. But he disputed this, claiming that he had not practiced law
since he did not receive compensation from Beth for his help. Is
Ronnie correct?
(a) Yes, because he could as a paralegal provide competent
legal help to litigants.
(b) Yes, for so long as he did not sign the complaint or appeared
as Beth's lawyer.
(c) No, unless Beth was ill-advised in filing her complaint in
court.
(d) No, because receipt of compensation is not the sole
determinant of legal practice.
2012 Bar, Q. 40: Atty. Dude is the COMELEC Officer in a very
distant municipality. He is. the only lawyer in that area. When
election period is over, he has much spare time. Many people go
to him for counseling, legal advice, preparation of documents of
Sale, Mortgage and the like. He does not charge a fee in money,
but he receives gifts which are offered. Is there impropriety?
(a) Yes, giving legal advice and preparing legal documents,
even if free, constitutes private practice of law, which is
prohibited of government employees.
(b) No, it is only giving of advices, and not court appearance.
(c) Yes, because Atty. Dude accepts gifts.
(d) No, since Atty. Dude does not accept money.
1995 Bar, Q. I(1): Is the practice of law a right or a privilege?
Discuss fully.
A: The practice of law is basically a privilege because it is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. (5 Am. Jur. 270) Thus, only those
persons are allowed to practice law, who by reason of

attainments previously acquired through education and study,
have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science. Attorneys are the court’s constituency
to aid it in the administration of justice. (Dodge v. State, 38 NE
745)
Additional: However, Prof. Agpalo in his book has pointed out
that practice of law is also a right because a lawyer holds office
during good behavior and he cannot be deprived of the right to
practice law except for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after observing due process.
2006 Bar, Q. I(1): Why is law a profession and not a trade?
A: Law is a profession and not a trade because its basic ideal is to
render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid.
The gaining of a livelihood is only a secondary consideration.
Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar
— Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be
a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
1. Qualification Required for Admission to the Bar (Rule 138,
Sec. 2)
The “bar” originates from the short wall in courtrooms that
separates the general public from the tables where lawyers sit.
The “bar” has come to mean the hurdle that must be overcome
for one to become a lawyer. Hence, the phrase “passing the bar”.
And the hurdle has become the examinations to be taken by
applicant. Hence, the phrase “passing the bar examinations”
2. Other Requisites for Admission to the Bar
(a) Furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications (Rule 138, Sec. 2, 5 and 6)
(b) Passing the bar examinations (Rule 138, Sec. 8 to 11 & 14)
(c) Signing the Roll of Attorneys
(d) Receiving from the clerk of court of the SC a certificate of
the license to practice law (Rule 138, Sec. 18 & 19)
3. Admission to the Bar is NOT a Right but a Privilege
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
In re: Argosino, (1995). Admission to the bar is a personal
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Admission to the bar is imbued with public interest. Paramount is
the prevention of the victimization of clients by incompetent law
practitioners.
In other jurisdictions, the term is not “admission to the bar” but
rather “called to the bar”. In Ireland, the term is “enrolled on the
roll of solicitors.
4. Requirement of Disclosure of Charges Filed or Pending;
Application to Take the Bar Examinations
In re: Meling, (2004). Thus, the deliberate silence of the applicant
pertaining to his three (3) pending criminal cases constitutes
concealment, done under oath. It would not matter if the pending
criminal cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant. It is the Court which should determine if the pending
cases would affect the required moral fitness of the applicant. By
the mere concealment, the applicant fails in the test of moral
fitness.
In re: Lanuevo, (1975). The disclosure requirement is imposed to
determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant. Where the bar exam applicant
intentionally withheld and concealed his pending criminal case for
slight physical injuries, the Court held that the applicant also
committed perjury upon his declaration under oath that he had
no pending criminal case.
Such concealment in the application to take the Bar exam is a
ground for the revocation of the license to practice law, where it
has been granted.
5. When Oath-Taking of a Successful Examinee May be
Deferred
Andres v. Cabrera, (1979). An applicant found wanting in moral
fitness or lacking in good moral character may not be allowed to
take his oath as a lawyer until he has shown that he has amended
his ways.
6. Inquiry into Moral Character of Applicant is Broader That in
Disbarment Proceeding
In re: Argosino. Inquiring into the moral character of an applicant
for admission to the bar is broader than inquiry into the moral
[161]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment. Thus, all
aspect of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in
respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
7. The Requirement of Good Moral Character for Applicants is
More Stringent Than The Norm of Conduct Expected from
Members of the General Public
In re: Argosino. The requirement of good moral character to be
satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected
from members of the general public.
8. The Requirement of Good Moral Character is More
Important Than the Possession of Legal Learning
In re: Argosino. The requirement of good moral character is, in
fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. Thus, it was held in In re: Applicants
for License:
“Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant
passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the
chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a
curse instead of a benefit to his community”
Vda. De Mijares v. Villaluz, (1997). A retired justice of the CA was
suspended for 2 years for grossly immoral conduct for marrying
the complainant when the decision of the court annulling his
marriage to his first wife had not yet attained finality.
9. Successful Bar Examinee NOT Necessarily Allowed to Take
Lawyer’s Oath; When Good Moral Character Must be
Exhibited
In re: Argosino. Good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the bar examinations but also,
and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Hence, a successful bar examinee found wanting in moral
qualifications will NOT be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
Bitangcor v. Tan. A successful bar examinee who was not allowed
to take the lawyer’s oath due to a breach of promise of marriage
may be allowed to take his oath after 10 years during which no
offense has been attributed to him.

Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr. (1997). A successful bar examinee was
finally allowed to take the lawyer’s oath 26 years after a
complaint was filed against him when it was finally determined
that the respondent did not commit a grossly immoral conduct in
failing to fulfill a promise to marry.
10. Reconsideration of the Denial of Application to Take
Lawyer’s Oath
Tan v. Sabandal, (1989). Where an applicant has been denied his
application to take his lawyer’s oath because of questions as to his
good moral character, such findings may be reconsidered upon a
showing the applicant has shown contrition and willingness to
reform and has submitted proof of his good moral character and
civic consciousness.
A period of 10 years had lapsed from the time his application to
take the lawyer’s oath was denied to the time he was
subsequently allowed to take the oath.
Other criteria taken in consideration in applications for
reinstatement:
(a) Magat v. Santiago, (1980). Appreciation of the significance
of his dereliction and his assurance of the court that he now
possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to
guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice of
law.
(b) In re: Publico. The time that has elapsed between
disbarment and the application for reinstatement, his good
conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his
disbarment, his active involvement in civil, educational, and
religious organizations.
(c) In re: Vailoces, (1982). The favorable indorsement of the
IBP, as well as the local government officials and citizens of
the community.
(d) Andres v. Cabrera, (1984). The pleas of his mother and wife
for the sake and future of the family.
11. Examples of Lack of Good Moral Character:
In re: Argosino. Participation in a fraternity hazing which led to
the death of the neophyte “constituted evident rejection of that
moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant then possessed of good
moral character”
12. What it Means to be Admitted to the Bar (Apostacy in the
Legal Profession)
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
13. The Requirement of Citizenship; Effect of Loss and Re-
Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 14. The practice of all professions
in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.
In re: Bosque. The loss of Philippine citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
Foreigners may not practice law in the Philippines.
However, pursuant to R.A. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), “a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with R.A. 9225”.
Thus, if a Filipino is naturalized as a citizen of another country and
subsequently reacquires his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.
9225, he is deemed never to have terminated his membership in
the Philippine bar.
Nevertheless, his right to practice law does not automatically
accrue. Pursuant to R.A. 9225, “he shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice (Sec.
5(4))
In re: Dacanay, (2007). Petitioner must first secure authority from
the SC upon compliance with the following conditions:
(a) The updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
(b) The payment of professional tax;
(c) The completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is especially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) The retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
1995 Bar, Q. II: Evelyn, Luisa. Myra, Josefina, Pamela and Rose
are bona fide members of the Philippine bar. They agree to form
a close corporation to be named LEGALCARE the principal
purpose of which is “to provide clients legal services, research
and advice as well as trial advocacy for a fee." The services shall
be rendered not only by these enterprising pioneers of
LEGALCARE but also by lawyers to be employed by the projected
corporation on regular monthly salary basis.
May LEGALCARE be legally incorporated? Discuss fully.
[162]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: A corporation can not engage in the practice of law even by
hiring lawyers to perform legal work. It has been held that only a
natural person can engage in the practice of law. A lawyer is
burdened with peculiar duties and responsibilities. A corporation
cannot take an oath of office, be an officer of the court or
subjected to court discipline: it cannot engage in law practice
directly, it cannot evade the requirements by (employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. (Matter of Cooperative Law
Co., N.Y. 579). Hence, LEGALCARE cannot be legally incorporated
because the principal purpose involves the practice of law.
1996 Bar, Q. VII(2): A group of businessmen formed a
corporation, the primary purpose of which is to furnish legal
advice and service to subscribers as a collection agency. To
accomplish this purpose, the group planned to employ a staff of
lawyers to initiate and prosecute collection suits entrusted to it
by its clients. The SEC denied registration of the corporation on
the ground that it was disqualified to practice law.
Is the SEC correct? Discuss briefly.
A: The SEC is correct. Itis well settled that a corporation cannot
engage in the practice of law. Only a natural person may be
admitted to the practice of law (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
A corporation cannot perform the conditions required for
membership in the bar, such as possession of good moral
character. A corporation cannot practice law directly or indirectly
by employing a lawyer to practice for it or to appear for others for
its benefit.
2013 Bar, Q. III: Miguel Jactar, a fourth year law student, drove
his vehicle recklessly and hit the rear bumper of
SimplicioMedroso’s vehicle. Instead of stopping, Jactar
accelerated and sped away. Medroso pursued Jactar and caught
up with him at an intersection.
In their confrontation, Jactar dared Medroso to sue, bragged
about his connections with the courts, and even uttered veiled
threats against Medroso. During the police investigation that
followed, Medroso learned that Jactar was reviewing for the Bar
examinations.
Under these facts, list and justify the potential objections that
can be made against Jactar’s admission to the practice of law.
A: The potential objection that can be made against Jactar’s
admission to the practice of law is the absence of good moral
character (Rule 138, Sec. 2)

Jactar’s bragging about his connection with the courts and
uttering veiled threats against Medroso are indications of his lack
of good moral character. His acts are contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals (In re: Basa). He has acted in a manner
that has violated the private and social duties which a man owes
to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
man. (Takng v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13017, December 23, 1959)
If light threats would be filed against him, then another potential
objection would be the pendency of charges against him,
involving moral turpitude (Rule 138, Sec. 2)
2013 Bar, Q. V: Atty. Repatriar, a law school classmate,
approached you on your 25th Class Reunion, with questions on
how he can resume the practice of law in the Philippines. He left
the country in 1977 after two (2) years of initial law practice, and
migrated to the United States where he was admitted to the
practice of law in the State of New York. He asks that you give
him a formal legal opinion on his query.
Outline briefly the steps and the supporting legal reasons you
would state in your legal opinion on what Atty. Repatriar should
do to resume his Philippine practice.
A: Atty. Repatriar must prepare a sworn petition to re-acquire the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. He should manifest in
his petition his desire to resume his law practice in the
Philippines, and he is not disqualified to practice law. The “right to
resume the practice of law” is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in
the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice. It cannot be overstressed
that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It
is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the
power and duty of the state (through the Supreme Court) t
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal
profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement, and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required
for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of
his professional privilege (In re: petition to re-acquire the privilege
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
to practice law in the Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses, B.M. No.
2112, July 24, 2011).
He should file the petition with the Supreme Court, through the
Bar Confidant, accompanied by the original or certified copies of
the following documents:
(1) Showing that he is still a Filipino citizen. “The Court
reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.” (Ibid.) Having retained
Philippine citizenship could be evidenced by the Philippine
passport, the U.S. Green Card showing Philippine citizenship
and U.S. residency, or other authentic documents which the
Supreme Court may require.
On the other hand, if Atty. Repatriar has lost his Philippine
citizenship, he must submit the following:
(a) Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
(b) Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship);
(c) Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
(d) Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of
Immigration.
The loss of Filipino citizenship means termination of Atty.
Repatriar’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. “Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath
of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes
a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 remains to be a member of the
Philippine bar.” (Ibid.)
(2) Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of
annual membership dues;
(3) Proof of payment of professional tax; and
(4) Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office. (Ibid.)
(5) A certificate of good moral character attested to by at least
three (3) members of the bar; and
(6) A certification from the State Bar of New York that Atty.
Repatriar does not have any previous or pending disciplinary
action filed against him before that body.
1997 Bar, Q. XVIII(a): What are the requirements for eligibility to
take the Bar Examinations?
[163]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: The requirements for eligibility to take the bar examinations
area as follows:
(1) The applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines.
(2) He must be a resident of the Philippines.
(3) He must be of good moral character.
(4) No charge against him involving moral turpitude has been
filed or is pending in any court in the Philippines.
(5) He must have studied law for four years and has successfully
completed all prescribed courses in a law school or
university officially approved and recognized by the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports.
(6) Before he began the study of law, he had satisfactorily
completed in an authorized or recognized university or
college, requiring for ' admission thereto the completion of a
four-year high school 1 course, the course of study
prescribed W a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with
any of the following subjects as major or field of
concentration: Political Science. Logic. English, Spanish,
History and Economics. (Secs. 2, 5, and 6, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court)
2011 Bar, Q. 37: After hearing in a sensational criminal case,
counsel for the accused told television viewers how the judge
unfairly ruled to stop his witness from testifying fully about
certain aspects of the case that would help the accused. Counsel
said that the public should know the injustice to which his client
was being subjected. Can counsel be disciplined for his
utterances?
(a) Yes, because rather than defend the judicial system as was
his duty, he attacked it.
(b) No, since counsel did not use obscene language.
(c) No, so long as counsel did not knowingly make false
statements or act in reckless disregard of truth.
(d) Yes, even if the judge may have actually made unfair rulings
in the course of trial.
Sec. 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United
States of America – Citizens of the United States of America who,
before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine
Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good
and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of
those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue
such practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to
continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as

well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
2013 Bar. Q. II. The following are duties of a lawyer but only one
of these is expressly stated in the Lawyer’s Oath. Choose the
express duty that the Oath contains.
(a) To maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts.
(b) To uphold the honor and dignity of the legal profession.
(c) To act with courtesy, candor and fairness toward other
lawyers.
(d) To do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court.
(e) To respect the courts and uphold the dignity of the
profession.
A: (d). Lawyer’s Oath
Sec. 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions –
Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled
attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United
States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or
in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States,
and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have
practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such
practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been
suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be
admitted without examination.
Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants — All
applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two
preceding Sec. shall, before being admitted to the examination,
satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four
years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved and recognized by the
Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law,
shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may
be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he
has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
or university duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation,
medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Sec. 6. Pre-Law — No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic,
english, spanish, history and economics.
1. Misrepresentation of Educational Attainment
In the Matter of Diao, (1963). A lawyer who had completed his
legal education and thereafter passed the bar exams was
disbarred after it had been discovered that he did not complete
his high school studies, having left his high school studies in third
year; and not having completed his Associate in Arts degree
before he began his law studies. It appeared that “he began his
law studies (2nd semester of 1948-49) six months before obtaining
his Associate in Arts degree”.
The Court held that “taking the prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally essential”
2. Law Degrees
Legal education means completion of a degree in law called
Bachelor of Laws (LLB) or Juris Doctor (JD). In certain jurisdictions,
they are also called Bachelor of Civil Law (BCL)
3. Articled Clerkship
In certain jurisdiction, but not in the Philippines, admission to the
bar also requires practical training in a law firm. This is called
Articled Clerkship. Practical legal training is called Articling.
1988 Bar, Q. XV(a): What do you think of the suggestion from
some sources for the abolition of the bar examinations? Discuss.
A: There is some merit in the abolition of the bar examinations.
Bar examination is not altogether an accurate means of testing
the knowledge of law. The means of selecting bar examiners and
the questions to ask are not consistent. It has been experienced in
the past that examiners ask unusually tough questions causing the
[164]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
failure of even the better students in law. What is more the fact
that only about ten to fifteen percent of the candidates aregiven
passing marks shows that there is something wrong in
examinations or in the law schools that train students.
The real test of a good lawyer is his ability to analyze actual or
hypothetical cases and how he can present or defend them in
court.
1988 Bar, Q. XV(b): What alternatives to the bar examinations
would you suggest, bearing in mind the need to raise the
standards of the law profession, the judicial system, and the
administration of justice. Explain.
A: One alternative to the bar examinations which is now used in
several countries is to have an effective and strict supervision of
law schools so that by the time the student graduates, he is
thoroughly prepared to be admitted to the bar. Aside from the
strict supervision of law schools, the graduate should be required
to undergo at least one year training in law firm of recognized
reputation to be approved by the Supreme Court. After one year
of active training, the law firm will certify to the Supreme Court
that the candidate is ready to be admitted to the bar.
2009 Bar, Q. II(a): What is the object of the bar examinations?
Explain.
A: Public policy demands that any person seeking admission to
the bar in the Philippines be required to furnish satisfactory proof
of his knowledge of the law and ethical standards and of his
possession of such degree of learning and proficiency in law as
may be deemed necessary for the due performance of the duties
of lawyer.
1991 Bar, Q. I: In at least two (2) paragraphs, give all your
reasons why you want to become a lawyer, and discuss what
values you must cultivate and how you must conduct yourself to
uphold the nobility, protect the integrity, and enhance the
prestige of the law profession.
A: I want to be a lawyer in order to be a member of a very noble
profession and to participate in the administration of justice. As a
lawyer, I am an officer of the court sworn to assist in the
administration of justice.
As a lawyer, I am sworn to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, support the Constitution and obey the laws and
maintain the respect due the courts of Justice. I shall accept cases

that I honestly believe to be meritorious and to employ methods
consistent with truth and honor.
I want to become a lawyer because the profession of law is more
a mission than a business, trade or craft and therefore its object is
not material reward but to promote the administration of Justice.
Lawyers are an essential ingredient of justice which is vital to the
survival of every society. Without justice, there will be anarchy. As
a lawyer, I will have the noblest opportunity to become an officer
of the court, to help maintain the respect due to the court and to
employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor so
that justice will prevail.
Include in the values to cultivate honesty, truthfulness, industry,
honor and independence.
Sec. 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications – All applicants for
admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the
evidence required by Section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15)
days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced
within Section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the
same period the affidavit and certificate required by Section 5,
and if embraced within Sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a
license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice,
satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and
certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also
file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age,
residence, and citizenship.
Sec. 8. Notice of Applications – Notice of applications for
admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in
newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least
ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination.
Sec. 9. Examination; subjects – Applicants, not otherwise
provided for in Sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to
examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social
Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law
(Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers);
International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law
(Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Sec. 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in
writing – Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers,
books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall
be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or
Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer
the questions personally without help from anyone.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his
penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers
without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such
examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only
noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are
necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of
other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the
examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.
Sec. 11. Annual examination – Examinations for admission to the
bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of
Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the
chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall
be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law
(morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second
day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day:
Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth
day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (afternoon).
Sec. 12. Committee of examiners – Examinations shall be
conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by
the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice
of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall
be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight
members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a
period of one year. The names of the members of this committee
shall be published in each volume of the official reports.
Sec. 13. Disciplinary measures — No candidate shall endeavor to
influence any member of the committee, and during examination
the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall
they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates
this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred
from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against
him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent
disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.
Sec. 14. Passing average – In order that a candidate may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining
the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the
following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social
Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal
Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent;
[165]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Sec. 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers –
Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon
thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its
report on the result of such examination. The examination papers
and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may
there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has
approved the report.
1. The Bar Scandals; A Look at the Bar Scandals Over the
Years
(a) People v. Romualdez and Mabunay, (1932)
(b) In re: Lanuevo, (1975)
(c) 1981 Bar involving Chief Justice Ramon Fernandez
(d) 1979 Bar Leakage in Labor Law and Taxation
(e) In re: 1999 Bar Exams, (2000). Associate Justice Purisima is
the very first Justice of the SC to be censured by the Court
en Banc.
(f) In re: 2003 Bar Examinations
Sec. 16. Failing candidates to take review course – Candidates
who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be
disqualified from taking another examination unless they show
the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed
regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar
review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the
candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the
candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the
subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the
ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.
1. Burden of Admission to the Bar
In re: Publico. Admission to the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. The most important of these conditions is the
mindfulness that he becomes an officer of the court.
2. Authority of the SC over Admissions to the Bar
The “ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to” the Supreme Court.
In the Matter of Petitions for Admission to the Bar of the
Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953, (1954). Hence, a law,
R.A. 972 otherwise known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953”,

decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar exams of
1946-1952, a general average of 70% without falling below 50% in
any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law is
unconstitutional and void.
Any legislation pertaining to the admission to the bar is of a
“permissive character” which the SC may or may not permit.
In re: Guari’a, (1913). A law, Act No. 1597, allowing admission to
the bar of one who had previously served as fiscal without a
previous examination was not given effectivity by the SC.
Nevertheless, in the exercise of its own exclusive power, the Court
allowed the applicant to take a “special” examination in view of
the applicant’s previous satisfactory service to the government.
3. Appellation for Those Admitted to the Bar
(a) Attorney-at-Law – a person admitted to practice law in his
respective state and authorized to perform both civil and
criminal legal functions for clients, including drafting of legal
documents, giving of legal advice, and representing such
before courts, administrative agencies, boards, etc.
For all intents and purposes, the term ‘Attorney-at-Law’ is the
same as ‘Lawyer’ and ‘Barrister’
Barrister is a term commonly used in England, referring to an
advocate; a counselor learned in the law who has been admitted
to plead at the bar, and who is engaged in conducting trial or
argument o f causes. A person called to the bar by the benches of
Inns of Court giving right of audience in the SC.
A barrister is one granted permission to plead and practice before
the high courts. On the other hand, solicitors are those “admitted
to the roll” after a legal practice course and training lasting a
specified number of years. A solicitor, therefore, may not be
called a barrister. These are two roles distinct from each other.
Hong Kong, adopting the practice in England, maintains a different
role for barristers and solicitors.
In the Philippines, there is no distinction between a barrister and
a solicitor.
Black’s. Lawyer is a person learned in the law; as an attorney,
counsel, or solicitor; a person licensed to practice law. Any person
who prosecutes or defends causes in courts of record or other
judicial tribunals, or whose business it is to give legal advice or
assistance in relation to any cause or matter whatever.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(b) Esquire – it is a title commonly used in the U.S. and
appended after the name of the attorney. It is a title of
dignity of English origin given to one considered above a
gentleman and below a knight. It is title given to barristers at
law and justices of the peace.
(c) Solicitor – chief law officer of a city, town, or other
governmental body or department.
4. Bar Examinations Distinguished from Shari’a Bar
Examinations
Alawi v. Alauya, (1997). A clear distinction between the regular
bar exams and the Shari’a bar exams was made:
Persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of
the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney."
The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
2005 Bar, Q. II: Mike Adelantado, an aspiringlawyer, disclosed in
his petition to take the 2003 Bar Examinations that there were
two civil cases pending against him for nullification of contract
and damages. He was thus allowed to conditionally take the bar,
and subsequently placed third in the said exams.
In 2004, after the two civil cases had been resolved, Mike
Adelantado filed his petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys before the Supreme Court. The Office of
the Bar Confidant, however, had received two anonymous
letters: the first alleged that at the time Mike Adelantado filed
his petition to take the bar, he had two other civil cases pending
against him, as well as a criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22; the other letter alleged that Mike
Adelantado, as Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairperson, had
been signing the attendance sheets of (SK) meetings as “Atty.
Mike Adelantado."
(a) Having passed the bar, can Mike Adelantado already use
the appellation “attorney"? Explain your answer.
(b) Should Mike Adelantado be allowed to take his oath as a
lawyer and sign the Roll of Attorneys? Explain your answer.
[166]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A:
(a) No. Only those who have been admitted to the Philippine
Bar can be called “Attorney" (Alawi v. Alauya, 1997). Passing
the Bar examination is not sufficient for admission of a
person to the Philippine Bar. He still has to take the oath of
office and sign the Attorney's Roll as prerequisites to
admission.
(b) No, he should not be allowed to take his oath and sign the
Attorney’s Roll. Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall be answerable
for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar”. Mr. Adelantado made a false
statement in his application to take the bar by revealing only
that there were two civil cases pending against him, and
suppressed the material facts that there were two other civil
cases as well as a criminal case pending against him. This is
sufficient ground to deny him admission to the bar (In Re:
Galang, 1975). He also showed lack of good moral character
in using the title “attorney” before admission to the Bar
(Aguirre v. Rana, 2003).
Sec. 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants – An
applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been
otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take
and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath
of office.
Sec. 18. Certificate – The supreme Court shall thereupon admit
the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the
Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect
upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to
him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to
practice.
Sec. 19. Attorney's roll – The clerk of the Supreme Court shall
kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be
signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys — It is the duty of an attorney:
(j) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines.
(k) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers;

(l) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(m) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(n) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(o) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged;
(p) Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(q) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself,
the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(r) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the
law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of
life or liberty, but by due process of law.
2000 Bar, Q. X(b): Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
enumerates nine (9) duties of attorneys. Give at least three (3)
of them.
2007 Bar, Q. I: What are the duties of an attorney?
A: The duties of attorneys can be found either in the Attorney’s
Oath, Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, or the Code of
Professional Responsibility in the Attorney’s Oath:
(1) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) To support its Constitution;
(3) To obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein;
(4) To do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
(5) To avoid wittingly or unwittingly promoting or suing any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to
the same;
(6) To delay no man for money or malice,
(7) To conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity well to the
courts as to his clients.
In Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Courts:
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(1) To maintain the allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice an and
judicial officers;
(3) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
(4) To employ, for the purposes of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(5) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secret of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client’s business except
from him with his knowledge and approval;
(6) To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged;
(7) Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man’s
cause from any corrupt motive or interest;
(8) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself,
the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(9) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the
law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of
life or liberty, but by due process of law.
In the Code of Professional Responsibility, the duties of a lawyer
are grouped into four, the principal ones in each group being:
(1) Duties to society in general - to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes;
(2) Duties to the legal profession – to uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession;
(3) Duties to the court - to be candid with and promote respect
for the courts and judicial officers, and to assist the courts in
rendering speedy and efficient justice, and,
(4) Duties to the client – to observe candor, fairness and loyalty
to the client; hold the client’s money and property in trust,
serve the client with competence and diligence, and to
preserve the confidence of the client.
It is recommended that an enumeration on the basis of any one of
the foregoing sources be given full credit.
[167]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2009 Bar, Q. XI(a), (True or False): The duty of a lawyer to his
client is more paramount than his duty to the court.
A: FALSE. A lawyer’s paramount duty is to the court. This is
because he is an officer of the court.
2003 Bar, Q. VIII: Attorney A is the legal counsel of “Ang
Manggagawa," a labor union whose case is pending before the
Court of Appeals. In order to press for the early resolution of
their case, the union officers decided to stage a demonstration
in front of the Court of Appeals, which Attorney A, when
consulted, approved of, saying that it was their constitutional
right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of their grievances and for the speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies. Is it appropriate for Attorney A to give that advice to the
union officers? Explain.
A: The advice of Attorney A is not proper. In the case of Nestle’
Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 1987, the Supreme Court held that
picketing before a court are attempts to pressure or influence the
courts of justice and constitute contempt of court. The duty of
advising the picketers and their leaders lies heavily on their
lawyers.
1988 Bar, Q. I(1): What is the first and most important duty of an
attorney? Why?
A: The first and most important duty of the lawyer is his duty to
the court. The reason is that the attorney is an officer of the
court. He is an officer of the court in the sense that his main
mission is to assist the court in administering justice. His public
duties take precedence over his private duties.
Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear — An attorney is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any
issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys
wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.

Sec. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to
represent client on appeal — An attorney who appears de parte
in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition
withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
1999 Bar, Q. II: Atty. X was de parte counsel for Y at the trial of a
case for estafa against Y in the Regional Trial Court where, after
trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty
that was imposed. The convicted accused appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals then sent notice to
Atty. X that the record of the case had already been forwarded
to and received in the appellate court for counsel to prepare and
file the brief for the appellant. Because of Atty. X's failure to file
the brief for the accused, the latter's appeal was dismissed.
Complaint for disbarment was filed by Y against Atty. X for
neglect of duty. Atty. X's defense is that he ceased to be counsel
for Y after the adverse decision was rendered by the trial court.
Is Atty. X’s contention tenable?
A: Atty. X's contention is not correct. An attorney who appears de
parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to
continue representing his client on appeal unless he files a formal
petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. (Sec.
22, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients — Attorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive
anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in
cash.
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees — An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy,
the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing
of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but
may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt — When
an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions; but proceedings under this Section shall not be a bar
to a criminal prosecution.
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys — An attorney may retire at any
time from any action or special proceeding, by the written
consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time
from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and
on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In
case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed
shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former
one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another
in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has
been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was
without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the
client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However,
the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the
case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation
the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment
of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment,
rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by
the client.
2014 Bar, Q. IV(b): A is accused of robbery in a complaint filed by
B. A sought free legal assistance from the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) and Atty. C was assigned to handle his case. After
reviewing the facts as stated in the complaint and as narrated by
A, Atty. C is convinced that A is guilty.
(a) May Atty. C refuse to handle the defense of A and ask to be
relieved? Explain fully.
(b) In problem (A), if the lawyer is counsel de parte for the
accused and he learns later after accepting the case and
while trial is ongoing that his client was indeed the
perpetrator of the crime, may the lawyer withdraw his
appearance from the case? Why or why not?
A: He may withdraw his appearance but in accordance with
procedure in Rule 138, Sec. 26, ROC. Moreover, Rule 19.02, CPR
provides that “a lawyer who has received information that his
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetuated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which, he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the ROC.
[168]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2014 Bar, Q. XX: B hired Atty. Z to file a replevin case against C
for an agreed acceptance fee of P30,000.00 which was evidenced
by a written contract. After the complaint was filed by Atty. Z, B
terminated his services and hired a new lawyer for the same
amount of attorney’s fees. How much attorney’s fees is Atty. Z
entitled to?
A: Atty. Z is entitled to the entire amount of the attorney’s fees
agreed upon because his services were terminated by the client
without just cause (Rule 138, Sec. 26)
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds thereof – A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar
by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (As amended by SC Resolution dated
February 13, 1992)
1. Authority of the SC to Regulate the Practice of Law (1987
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5))
2. Enumeration of Grounds is NOT Exclusive
Royong v. Oblena, (1963). The power of the courts to exclude
unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession is inherent; it
is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice, and
may be exercised without any special statutory authority. The
statutes enacted by the legislature or the rules promulgated by
the SC by virtue of its rule-making power do not restrict the
general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers
and who, as such, may be removed for other than statutory
grounds.
3. Discipline of Lawyers for Acts or Omissions Committed in a
Foreign Jurisdiction

In re: Maquera, (2004). Rule 138, Sec. 27 provides the answer to
this issue.
If the basis of the foreign court’s disciplinary action includes any
of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in Philippine
jurisdiction, then the foreign jurisdiction’s disciplinary action
would constitute a ground for disbarment or suspension in
Philippine jurisdiction. But note that the foreign disciplinary action
would constitute as a “mere ground” and “does not automatically
result in his (the respondent’s) suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines”
The decision or judgment in the foreign jurisdiction only
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts. Hence, the
respondent would have to be accorded full due process, that is,
the opportunity to defend himself and to present evidence in an
investigation in accordance with Rule 139-B, ROC.
4. The Nature of the Penalty of Indefinite Suspension
In re: Almacen, (1970). Where the demonstrated persistence of
the misconduct of the lawyer leaves the court unable to assess or
determine how long the suspension should last and that
disbarment should not be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, the erring lawyer should be
indefinitely suspended and not disbarred. In such instances, at
any time after the suspension becomes effective, the lawyer may
prove to the court that he is once against fit to resume the
practice of law.
In other words, the duration of the suspension would be up to the
respondent himself, depending on his own repentance.
2015 Bar, Q. XIX(A): What are the grounds for disbarment or
suspension from office of an attorney?
2008 Bar, Q. VIII(f): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
lawyer concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: An unwed female lawyer carrying on a clandestine affair
with her unwed male hairdresser.
A: She may not be sanctioned. In Soberano v. Villanueva
(1962), the Supreme Court held that intimacy between a man and
a woman who are of age and are not disqualified from marrying
each other is “neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act
nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary
action against the man as a member of the Bar.”
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2012 Bar, Q. (33): Victor has been legally separated from his
wife, Belen for fifteen (15) years. He has found true love and
happiness with Amor and they lived together as husband and
wife. Amor convinced Victor to study law and gave him financial
support. Recently, Victor passed the 2011 Bar Examinations.
Upon knowing this, Belen filed a complaint against Victor for
immorality. Should Victor be allowed to take oath as an
attorney?
(a) Yes, his relationship with Amor is imbued with genuine love
and cannot be considered immoral and indecent.
(b) Yes, legal separation does not allow the spouses to remarry.
(c) No, because legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage and, therefore, Victor's relationship with Amor is
still considered illicit.
(d) Yes, it is totally unfair for Belen to complain since they have
lived separate lives.
2009 Bar, Q. XVI: Atty. Simeon persuaded Armando, Benigno
and Ciriaco to invest in a business venture that later went
bankrupt. Armando, Benigno and Ciriaco charged Atty. Simeon
with estafa. Simultaneously, they filed an administrative
complaint against the lawyer with the Supreme Court.
(a) If Simeon is convicted of estafa, will he be disbarred?
Explain.
(b) If Simeon is acquitted of the estafa charge, will the
disbarment complaint be dismissed? Explain.
A:
(a) Yes. One of the grounds for disbarment under Sec. 27, Rule
138, is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Estafa is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(b) Not necessarily. If the acquittal is based on the ground that
no crime was committed, or that Simeon is innocent, the
administrative case may be dismissed. But if the acquittal is
based merely on reasonable doubt, the disbarment
proceeding may still continue. The purpose of a disbarment
proceeding is to determine whether a lawyer still deserves
to remain a member of the bar. For such determination,
conduct which merely avoids the penalty of the law is not
sufficient.
1993 Bar, Q. II: A lawyer was prosecuted for rape. The charge,
however, was dismissed on reasonable doubt. The offended
party subsequently filed disbarment proceedings against the
lawyer under the same facts upon which the criminal charge was
based. May the disbarment case prosper? State your reasons.
[169]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: Yes. In In re: Del Rosario, the Supreme Court ruled that the
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal law.
The Supreme Court added that in acting on the disbarment case,
the Court sits in an entirely different capacity from that which it
assumed in trying the criminal case. If the act constitutes gross
immorality, even if the same act did not constitute the crime of
rape, he may still be disbarred. For as the Court in In re: Del
Rosario. supra, stressed, it would be a disgrace to the judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the
Court, to clothe him with the prestige of its confidence, and then
to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of
the bar.
Alternative: Yes, the disbarment proceeding may still prosper
even if the criminal case for rape is dismissed against the lawyer.
What is in issue in disbarment proceeding is the good moral
character of a lawyer. A criminal case is different from an
administrative proceeding for disbarment. The evidence required
in a criminal case is beyond reasonable doubt while in a
disbarment proceeding a mere clear preponderance of evidence
to prove the lawyer's bad moral character is sufficient to disbar
him. Moreover, in criminal cases desistance on the part of the
complainant is sufficient to dismiss the case. In disbarment
proceedings, desistance or refusal of the complainant to appear
will not necessarily dismiss the proceeding as long as
there is evidence sufficient to find the guilt of the lawyer which
affects his good moral character.
2006 Bar, Q. XV: Which of the following acts does not constitute
a ground, for disbarment? Explain.
(1) Gross misconduct;
(2) Fraudulent misrepresentation;
(3) Grossly immoral conduct;
(4) Violation of the Lawyers Oath;
(5) Willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Supreme
Court;
(6) Malpractice;
(7) Appearance of anon-lawyer as an attorney for a litigant in
a case.
A: No. 7, “Appearance of a non-lawyer as an attorney for a litigant
in a case", is not a ground for disbarment, for the simple reason
that the offender is not a lawyer, and only a lawyer can be
disbarred.
2010 Bar, Q. IV: Atty. XX rented a house of his cousin JJ on a
month-to-months basis. He left for a 6-month study in Japan

without paying his rentals and electric bills while he was away
despite JJ’s repeated demands.
Upon his return to the Philippines, Atty. XX still failed to settle
his rental arrearages and electric bills, drawing JJ to file an
administrative complaint against Atty. XX.
Atty. XX contended that his non-payment rentals and bills to his
cousin is a personal matter which has no bearing on his
profession as a lawyer and, therefore, he did not violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
A. Is Atty. XX’s contention in order? Explain.
B. Cite two (2) specific Rules in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, violation of which subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action by the Supreme Court although the acts
complained of are purely personal or private activities that
do not involve the practice of law.
A:
A. No. In a case involving the same facts, the Supreme Court
held that having incurred just debts, a lawyer has a moral
duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they
become due. “Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the court and
to their clients. As part of their duties, they must promptly
pay their financial obligations.” (Wilson Cham v. Atty. Eva
Pata-Moya, 2008).
B.
(1) Rule 1.01 “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct”
(2) Rule 7.03 “A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
2012 Bar, Q. (24): Which of these is not a ground for
disbarment?
(a) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
(b) Belligerent disobedience to a lawful order of a trial court.
(c) Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
(d) Grossly immoral conduct.
2004 Bar, Q. VIII(B): Atty. Walasunto has been a member of the
Philippine Bar for twenty (20) years but has never plied his
profession as a lawyer. His sole means of livelihood is selling and
buying real estate. In one of his transactions as a real estate
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
broker, he issued a bouncing check. He was criminally
prosecuted and subsequently convicted for violating B.P. Big. 22.
In the disbarment proceedings filed against him, Atty.
Walasunto contended that his conviction for violation of B.P.
Big. 22 was not a valid ground for disciplinary action against a
member of the bar. He further argued that his act in issuing the
check was done in relation to his calling as a real estate broker
and not in relation to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer.
Are the contentions of Atty. Walasunto meritorious or not?
Reason.
A: No. His contentions are not meritorious. In the first place, a
ground for disbarment is conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court), and the violation of
B.P. 22 is considered to be a crime involving moral turpitude
(People v. Tuanda, 1990). In the second place, Rule 7.03, CPR
provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.” Additionally, Rule 1.01 of the
same Code provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
2009 Bar, Q. V: Cliff and Greta were law school sweethearts. Cliff
became a lawyer, but Greta dropped out. One day, Cliff asked
Greta to sign a marriage contract. The following day, Cliff
showed Greta the document already signed by an alleged
solemnizing officer and two witnesses. Cliff then told Greta that
they were already married and Greta consented to go on a
honeymoon. Thereafter, the couple cohabited and begot a child.
Two years later, Cliff left Greta and married a Venezuelan
beauty. Incensed, Greta filed a disbarment complaint against
Cliff. Will the case prosper? Explain.
A: The disbarment case will prosper. In the case of Cabrera v.
Agustin (1959), a lawyer who deceived a woman to believe that
they were already married after they had signed an application
for a marriage license, and afterwards took advantage of her
belief to satisfy his lust, until she bore him a child, was considered
by the Supreme Court to be lacking in integrity and good moral
character to remain a member of the bar.
2002 Bar, Q. XII: Atty. BB borrowed P30,000.00 from EG to be
paid in six months. Despite reminders from EG, Atty. BB failed to
pay the loan on its due date. Instead of suing in court, EG lodged
with an IBP chapter a complaint for failure to pay a just debt
against Atty. BB. The chapter secretary endorsed the matter to
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). A Commissioner of the
CBD issued an order directing Atty. BB to answer the complaint
[170]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
against him but the latter ignored the order. Another order was
issued for the parties to appear before the Commissioner at a
certain date and time but only EG showed up. A third order
submitting the case for resolution was likewise ignored by Atty.
BB.
A. May disciplinary action be taken against Atty. BB for his
failure to pay the loan? Why?
B. Was Atty. BB justified in ignoring the orders of the
Commission on the ground that the Commission had no
power to discipline him for acts done in his private
capacity? Why?
A:
A. In the case of Toledo v. Abalos, (1999), the Supreme Court
held that a lawyer may not be disciplined for failure to pay
her loan obligation. The remedy is to file an action for
collection against her in the regular courts. However,
unwarranted obstinacy in evading the payment of a debt has
been considered as gross misconduct (Constantino v.
Saludares, 1993).
B. Atty. BB is not justified in ignoring the orders of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. In doing so, he violated his
oath of office for disobeying orders of a duly constituted
authority.
2001 Bar, Q. IV: Atty. A. is an incorrigible gambler. He borrowed
money left and right and was eventually sued for payment of
debts. In the Supreme Court, he moved to dismiss the
disbarment case against him reasoning that his unpaid debts and
collection suits against him are not legally valid grounds to
discipline him. Decide.
A: Atty. A cannot be disciplined for non-payment of debt.
In Toledo v. Abalos, the Court held that respondent lawyer therein
may not be disciplined for failure to pay her indebtedness. The
remedy is to file a collection case before a regular court of justice
against the lawyer. The Supreme Court followed the general rule
that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court
may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for
incurring indebtedness in his private capacity.
Alternative: The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
mandates that a lawyer shall not engage in an unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Nonpayment of his debt
constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct on the part of the
lawyer and therefore is a valid ground to discipline him. However,

Supreme Court has ruled that a disbarment case is not a proper
forum for the collection of debts.
2012 Bar, Q. (18): Atty. Utang borrowed from Y Php 300,000.00
secured by a post-dated check. When presented, the check was
dishonored. Y filed a BP 22 case in court, and a disbarment
complaint with the IBP. In the latter case, Atty. Utang moved for
dismissal as the act has nothing to do with his being. a lawyer
and that it is premature because the case is pending and he is
entitled to presumption of innocence. Should the disbarment
complaint be dismissed?
(a) No, because lawyers may be disciplined for all acts,
whether professional or private.
(b) Yes, there is no conviction yet.
(c) Yes, BP 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
(d) No, unless he pays the amount of the check to the
satisfaction of Y.
2010 Bar, Q. V: When is professional incompetence a ground for
disbarment under the Rules of Court?
A: Professional incompetence of a lawyer may be a special ground
for disbarment if his incompetence is so total, gross and serious
that he cannot be entrusted with the duty to protect the rights of
clients. “A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service where he
knows or should know that he is not qualified to render” (Rule
18.01, CPR). If he does so, it constitutes malpractice or gross
misconduct in office which are grounds for suspension or
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
2002 Bar, Q. X: Atty. N had an extramarital affair with O, a
married woman, as a result of which they begot a child, P. Atty.
N admitted paternity of the child P and undertook to support
him. On the basis of this admission, is Atty. N subject to
disciplinary action by the Supreme Court? Why?
A: In the case of Tucay v. Tucay, (1999), the Supreme Court held
that the finding that a lawyer had been carrying on an illicit affair
with a married woman is a “grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics
of his profession.”
1991 Bar, Q. II: What is the purpose of disbarment as a means of
disciplining erring lawyers?
A: The purposes of disbarment are:
(1) To protect the public
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(2) To protect and preserve the legal profession and
(3) To compel the lawyer to comply with his duties and
obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In re: Vicente Pelaez as reiterated in Cuyugan U. Amante the
Court stated the purpose as follows: The purpose of disbarment is
to purge the legal profession of any lawyer who exhibits a want of
professional honesty, as to render him unworthy of public
confidence and unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal
business of others. The reason is because it is the court which
admits an attorney to the bar and the court requires for such
admission the possession of a good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license and privilege to
enter upon the practice of law it would seem to be equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise
of the privilege. So itis held that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty to his profession but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties
which shows him to be unfit to the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
Disbarment is necessary so that respectability of the bar will be
maintained.
Is the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law
imposed upon an erring lawyer a cruel and unusual punishment?
May a suspended lawyer nevertheless appear in court to
prosecute or defend a case?
A: In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that the
penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law is not
cruel and unusual punishment. The lifting of suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law depends on the lawyer himself to
show with convincing evidence that he had rehabilitated and
reformed and his willingness to comply with the rules of ethics of
the profession. The said case involved Raul Gonzales who was
indefinitely suspended until he apologizes to the court for the
offensive and disrespectful language used against the court.
Note: While the Supreme Court has already held that suspension
is not a cruel and unusual punishment, a student may believe that
it is cruel and unusual for the following reasons: suspension is an
indefinite kind of penalty and you will have to beg for
reinstatement.
A suspended lawyer may appear in court to prosecute or defend a
case in his behalf but not in behalf of other clients.
1990 Bar, Q. VI: A lawyer charged his client P 10,000.00 for filing
fees pertaining to the complaint he filed in court. He actually
spent only PI,000,00. He did not account for the balance.
[171]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(1) May his client charge him for misconduct as a member of
the Philippine Bar? Explain your answer.
(2) Suppose that the lawyer should be charged, how and
where should the complaint be filed? Explain your answer.
A:
(1) The client may charge his lawyer with misconduct for not
accounting for the balance of P9.000.00. It is well settled
that where the client gives his lawyer money for a specific
purpose, such as to pay the docket fees for the filing of an
action in court, so much of the money not used for the
purpose belongs to the client and the lawyer holds it in trust
for him. And it Is the lawyer's duty to promptly account for
all money received from his client. For this reason, the
lawyer’s failure to account for the balance of the money not
spent for filing fees will render him liable for
misappropriation, which is a ground for disbarment.
(2) The client may file a verified complaint for disbarment
against his lawyer. His verified complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of person or persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts. The client may
file the complaint directly with the Supreme Court, in which
case at least 18 copies thereof shall be filed, and the
Supreme Court may refer the complaint to the IBP Board of
Governors for appropriate action, such as assigning the
complaint to an investigator, or to the Solicitor General or
court officer or judge for investigation when the interest of
justice requires. The client may, however, file his complaint,
in six copies, with the IBP Board of Governors, which will
then assign the case to an investigator for investigation, or
with the Secretary of a local chapter of the IBP, which will in
turn transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for
assignment to an investigator. (Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court).
2000 Bar, Q. VII: Atty. E entered his appearance as counsel for
defendant F in a case pending before the Regional Trial Court. F
later complained that he did not authorize Atty. E to appear for
him. F moved that the court suspend Atty. E from the practice of
law. May the judge grant the motion? Explain.
A: The judge may grant the motion. Unauthorized appearance is a
ground for suspension or disbarment (Rule 138, Sec. 27, ROC).
Alternative: It depends. A lawyer’s appearance for a party
without the authority of the latter must be willful, corrupt or

contumacious in order that he may be held administratively liable
therefor. But if he has acted in good faith, the complaint for
suspension will fail (Garrido v. Quisumbing, 1969).
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding Sec., and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
2014 Bar, Q. VI: Atty. D was required by Judge H of the RTC
ofManila to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt of courtfor shouting invectives at the opposing
counsel and harassing his witness.
Assuming that there was sufficient cause or ground, may Judge
H suspend Atty. D from the practice of law? If Judge H finds that
the actuations of Atty. D are grossly unethical and unbecoming
of a member of the bar, may Judge H disbar Atty. D instead?
Explain your answer.
A: Under Rule 138, Sec. 28, ROC, a RTC may suspend a lawyer
from the practice of law for any of the causes provided in Sec. 27,
until further action of the SC. But is may not disbar him, for only
the SC can disbar a lawyer pursuant to its constitutional power to
admit persons to the practice of law.
Sec. 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of
First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court – Upon such
suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance
shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon
which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified
copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full
investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking
or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his
office as such, as the facts warrant.
Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension – No
attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his
profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation,
the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Sec. 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants — A court may assign an
attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute
and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of
counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect
the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so
assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
Sec. 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio – Subject to
availability of funds as may be provided by the law the court may,
in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio
to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance
with Sec. 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed,
it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more
than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies;
(2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two
hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital
offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.
Sec. 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for
Government — Any official or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government
of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized
member of the bar to appear in any case in which said
government has an interest direct or indirect.
Sec. 34. By whom litigation conducted — In the court of a justice
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or
with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Sec.35. Certain attorneys not to practice — No judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of
the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Sec. 36. Amicus Curiae — Experienced and impartial attorneys
may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in
the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Sec. 37. Attorneys' liens — An attorney shall have a lien upon the
funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully
come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
[172]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when
he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to
be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over
such judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
1998 Bar, Q. II(3): Explain the meaning of attorney’s lien
Attorney's lien – a lien created by law to insure payment of a
lawyer's professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful
disbursements. Section 37 of Rule 138 provides for two kinds of
attorney's lien, a retaining lien which gives the lawyer the right to
retain the client's money, property and documents which have
legally come into his possession until he is paid all his fees and
advances for all his services to the client, and a charging lien
which gives the lawyer the right to charge a judgment for money
and its execution with his fees for services rendered in the case.
2000 Bar, Q. IX:
(a) Define an attorney's retaining lien.
(b) G was appointed administratrix of the estate of her
deceased father. She engaged the services of Atty. H as her
personal counsel to represent her in court proceedings. G
later discharged the services of Atty. H. Invoking his
retaining lien, Atty. K retained documents bearing on the
estate of the decedent which were entrusted to him by G.
Is Atty. H’s retention of the documents justified? Explain.
A:
(a) A retaining lien is the right of an attorney to retain the
funds, documents, and papers of his client which have
lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and to apply such funds to
the satisfaction thereof (Sec. 37, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
(b) The retention of the documents in this case is not justified.
Atty. H was the personal counsel of G. He was not the
counsel of the estate. The documents bearing on the estate
of the decedent entrusted by G to him are not properties of
G but of the estate which is not his client. Atty. H has no
right to exercise a retaining lien over such documents.
2012 Bar, Q. 47: What is a retaining lien?

(a) The lawyer who handled the case during the trial stage
should continue to be retained up to the appeal.
(b) The right of the lawyer to be retained as counsel for a party
until the entire case is finished.
(c) The right of a lawyer who is discharged or withdrawn to
keep the records and property of the client in his
possession until his lawful services have been paid.
(d) The prerogative of a client's retainer to recover out-of-
pocket expenses.
1995 Bar, Q. VI: Harold secured the services of Atty. Jarencio to
collect from various debtors. Accordingly, Atty. Jarencio filed
collection cases against the debtors of Harold and in fact
obtained favorable Judgments in some. Atty. Jarencio demanded
from Harold his attorney’s fees pursuant to their agreement but
Harold refused. When one of the defendants paid his
indebtedness of 20,000.00 through Atty. Jarencio, the latter
refused to turn over the money to Harold; instead. Atty. Jarencio
applied the amount to his attorney’s fees having in mind the
provisions of the Civil Code on legal compensation or set-off to
Justify his act.
Was Atty. Jarencio correct in refusing to turn over to his client
the amount he collected? Discuss fully.
A: A lawyer has a retaining lien which entitled him to retain
possession of a client’s document, money or other property which
come into the hands of the attorney professionally, until the
general balance due him for professional services is paid. Under
Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the attorney cannot be
compelled to surrender the documents in his possession without
prior proof that his fees have been duly satisfied.
However, Atty. Jarencio here cannot appropriate the sum of
20,000.00. If there is a dispute between him and Harold as to the
amount of the fees that he can collect, what he should do if
Harold disputes the amount of the fees he is entitled, he must file
an action for the recovery of his fee or record a charging lien so
that the court can fix the amount to which he is entitled.
1996 Bar, Q. X(3): Upon being replaced by Justice C. Atty. B, the
former counsel of the parents of the victims of the OZONE Disco
tragedy, was directed to forward all the documents in his
possession to Justice C. Atty. B refused, demanding full
compensation pursuant to their written contract. Sensing that a
favorable Judgment was forthcoming, Atty. B filed a motion in
court relative to his attorney’s fees, furnishing his former clients
with copies thereof.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Is Atty. B legally and ethically correct in refusing to turn over the
documents and in filing the motion? Explain.
A: Atty. B is legally and ethically correct in refusing to turn over
the documents. He is entitled to a retaining lien which gives him
the right to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come to his possession until his lawful fees
and disbursement have been paid (Sec. 37, Rule 138. Rules of
Court. Rule 16.03, Code of Professional Responsibility). Likewise,
he is legally and ethically correct in filing a motion in court relative
to his fees. He is entitled to a charging lien upon all judgments for
the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of
such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client,
from and after the time when the records of the court rendering
such judgment or issuing such execution
2008 Bar, Q. VIII(e): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
lawyer concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: Refusing to return certain documents to the client
pending payment of his attorney’s fees.
A: He may not be sanctioned. He is entitled to a retaining lien by
virtue of which he may retain the funds, documents and papers of
his client which have lawfully come into his possession, until his
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid (Sec. 37, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).
2011 Bar, Q. 42: Which of the following characteristics pertains
to a charging lien?
(a) It cannot attach to judgments for delivery of real estates.
(b) It involves documents placed in the lawyer's possession by
reason of the retainer.
(c) It does not need any notice to the client to make it effective.
(d) It may be exercised before judgment or execution.
2008 Bar, Q. V: The vendor filed a case against the vendee for
the annulment of the sale of a piece of land.
(a) Assume the vendee obtained a summary judgment against
the vendor. Would the counsel for the defendant vendee
be entitled to enforce a charging lien? Explain.
(b) Assume, through the excellent work of the vendee’s
counsel at the pre-trial conference and his wise use of
modes of discovery, the vendor was compelled to move for
the dismissal of the complaint. In its order the court simply
granted the motion. Would your answer be the same as in
question (a)? Explain.
[173]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(a) A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for payment of
attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in
favor of his client [Metropolitan Bank v. CA, 1990). A
summary judgment against the vendor in this case only
means that his complaint was dismissed. This is not a
judgment for payment of money, hence, a charging lien
cannot attach. However, if the judgment should include a
money judgment in favor of the vendee on his counterclaim,
a charging lien can properly be enforced.
(b) My answer will not be the same, because a dismissal simply
on motion of plaintiff to dismiss will certainly not include a
judgment for a sum of money; hence, no charging lien can
attach.
2009 Bar, Q. I(c): A charging lien, as distinguished from a
retaining lien, is an active lien which can be enforced by
execution.
A: TRUE. It is active because it requires the lawyer to charge the
judgment and its execution for the payment of his fees.
2011 Bar, Q. 14: After Atty. Benny got a P2 million final
judgment in his client’s favor, he promptly asked the court,
without informing his client, to allow him a charging lien over
the money in the amount of P500,000, his agreed fees, The Court
issued a writ of execution for the whole judgment in Atty.
Benny's name with an order for him to turn over the excess to
his client. Is Atty. Benny’s action correct?
(a) No, since his fees are excessive.
(b) Yes, since he was merely asserting his right to collect his
fees.
(c) Yes, since he would anyway give the excess to his client after
getting his fees.
(d) No, since he did not disclose to his client the matter of
getting a charging lien and a writ of execution in his name.
Rule 139-A: Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Sec. 1. Organization – There is hereby organized an official
national body to be known as the "Integrated Bar of the
Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear
or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
Sec. 2. Purposes – The fundamental purposes of the Integrated
Bar shall be to elevate the standards of the legal profession,

improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Sec. 3. Regions – The Philippines is hereby divided into nine
Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:
(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra,
Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur,
Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province,
Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.
(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan,
Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and
Zambales;
(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon
City;
(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas,
Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental
Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;
(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines
Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and
Sorsogon;
(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu,
Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern
Leyte;
(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan,
Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.
(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del
Norte, Agusan Del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del
Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental,
Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and
(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and
Zamboanga, and the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte,
Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.
In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of
Governors shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court,
determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.
Sec. 4. Chapters – A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be
organized in every province. Except as hereinbelow provided,
every city shall be considered part of the province within which it
is geographically situated.
A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following
political subdivisions or areas;
(a) The sub-province of Aurora;
(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(c) Quezon City;
(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;
(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;
(f) Cebu City; and
(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of
the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or,
in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall
any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for
by uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of
this Rule notwithstanding.
Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional
conventions on matters and problems of common concern.
Sec. 5. House of Delegates – The Integrated Bar shall have a
House of Delegates of not more than one hundred twenty
members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective
members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. On
or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter,
the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment of
Delegates.
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the
opening of the annual convention of the House and shall end on
the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the
next succeeding annual convention. No person may be a Delegate
for more than two terms.
The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board
of Governors at any time during the month of April of each year
for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports
including the annual report of the Board of Governors, the
transaction of such other business as may be referred to it by the
Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be
requested in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special
conventions of the House may be called by the Board of
Governors to consider only such matters as the Board shall
indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered for a
convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum
to do business.
Sec. 6. Board of Governors – The Integrated Bar shall be governed
by a Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected by the
[174]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation
basis of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be
chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the Delegates from
the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come
from any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President,
if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves as
provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become
members of the Board.
The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year
from the date of their election and until their successors shall
have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a
Governor for more than two terms.
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such
date and such time and place as it shall designate. A majority of all
the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do
business. Special meetings may be called by the President or by
five members of the Board.
Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall
adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of Professional
Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws
and the Canons may be amended by the Supreme Court motu
propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may
be necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the
Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.
Sec. 7. Officers – The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an
Executive Vice President who shall be chosen by the Governors
immediately after the latter's election, either from among
themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the
vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional members of
the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which
he represents.
The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office
for a term of one year from the date of their election and until
their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice
President shall automatically become the President for the next
succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from year to year
among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board
of Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be President or
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than one
term.
The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such
other officers and employees as may be required by the Board of

Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Board, and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for
such terms as it may fix. Said officers and employees need not be
members of the Integrated Bar.
2012 Bar, Q. (27): During the IBP Chapter elections, the
candidates for President were Atty. EJ, a labor arbiter of the
NLRC, Fiscal RJ of the DOJ and Atty. Gani of the PAO. After
canvass, Fiscal RJ garnered the highest number of votes,
followed by Arbiter EJ and by Atty. Gani. The winning Vice-
President moved for the annulment of the election for President
because all the candidates for President are government officials
and are disqualified. Decide.
(a) The election for presidency is invalid, and the elected Vice-
President shall assume the Presidency by succession.
(b) The election is a failure, and new elections should be held.
(c) Fiscal RJ and Arbiter EJ are disqualified. Atty. Gani should be
declared winner.
(d) All the candidates who are government officials are deemed
resigned upon their acceptance of nomination; and so, Fiscal
RJ is winner.
2012 Bar, Q. (29): Who elects the members of the Board of
Governors of the IBP?
(a) The Presidents of all IBP Chapters;
(b) The members at large of the IBP;
(c) The House of Delegates;
(d) The Past Presidents of all IBP chapters.
2012 Bar, Q. (30): Who elects the President and Vice-President
of the IBP?
(a) The President of all IBP Chapters;
(b) The IBP members voting at large;
(c) The Board of Governors;
(d) The outgoing IBP officers.
Sec. 8. Vacancies – In the event the President is absent or unable
to act, his duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice
President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal
of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting
President during the remainder of the term of the office thus
vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or
disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President,
the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold
office until the next succeeding election or during the period of
disability.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of
Governors, and all other positions of Officers of the Integrated Bar
shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an
office or position is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a
vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Sec. 9. Membership dues – Every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection from each
Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues – Subject to the provisions
of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
2014 Bar, Q. XXX(c): Can a lawyer still practice his profession
despite having arrears in his Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues?
A: Sec. 10, Rule 139, ROC provides that “default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of members
in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys”
Hence, a lawyer who is in arrears in the payment of his IBP dues
may still practice his profession until he is suspended and/or
disbarred.
2008 Bar, Q. VIII(g): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
lawyer concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: Not paying the annual IBP dues.
A: It is the duty of every lawyer to support the activities of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Canon 7, CPR). Default in
payment of IBP dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership to the Integrated Bar, and default to make such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys (In Re: Atty.
Marcial Edition, 1978).
[175]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2012 Bar, Q. 48: For grave misconduct, a lawyer was suspended
from the practice of law indefinitely. Is he still obliged to pay his
IBP dues during his suspension?
(a) Yes, as he continues to be a lawyer and a member of the
IBP.
(b) No, because indefinite suspension is practically disbarment.
(c) No need to pay IBP dues because he cannot practice
anyway.
(d) Pay only after the lifting of the suspension, if it comes.
2006 Bar, Q. IV: Atty. Oldie, 80 years old, refuses to pay his IBP
dues. He argues he is a senior citizen and semi-retired from the
practice of law. Therefore, he should be exempt from paying IBP
dues.
(1) Is his argument correct?
(2) For the same reasons, Atty. Oldie also insists that he should
be exempt from the MCLE requirements. Should he be
exempt?
A:
(1) Atty. Oldie is not correct. The Senior Citizen’s Act is not
applicable to the IBP dues, and there is no such thing as a
lawyer, who is semi-retired in the practice of law (Santos v.
Llamas, 2000).
(2) Atty. Oldie is not exempt from the MCLE requirement. The
MCLE is required of all members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. As long as a person is a member of the IBP, he
should comply with the MCLE requirement.
2012 Bar, Q. (15): Atty. Gelly passed the Bar 1n 1975. After
taking his oath, he did not enlist in any IBP chapter because he
went to the USA to pursue a Master's Degree. Eventually, he
passed the state bar and specialized in lmmigration law. In 2005.
he returned to the Philippines and was but the IBP is charging
him from 1975 up to the present and threatening him with
expulsion if he does not comply. Is the IBP correct?
(a) Atty. Gelly cannot be compelled to pay the IBP dues because
he was not engaged in the practice of law from 1975-2005.
(b) Atty. Gelly is exempt from 1975-2005 because he was out of
the country.
(c) Atty. Gelly should pay the dues from 1975 to the present
since membership in the IBP is [compulsory].
(d) Atty. Gelly should not pay because the rule on bar
integration is unconstitutional for compelling a lawyer to
join an association.

Sec. 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement –
A member may terminate his membership by filing a written
notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who
shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the
Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his
name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys.
Reinstatement may be made by the Court in accordance with
rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Court.
2013 Bar, Q. III: Atty. Avaro has consistently failed to pay his
annual IBP dues for several years. Demand letters have been
sent to him and he has acknowledged receipt of these letters.
However, all the IBP’s efforts proved futile. As a result, the IBP
sent Atty. Avaro a notice that his name would be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.
Was the IBP’s action correct?
(a) No, because default in the payment of annual dues only
warrants suspension of Integrated Bar members.
(b) Yes, because non-payment of annual dues is an indicator of
the lawyer’s moral fitness; refusal to pay is refusal to honor
his obligation to the IBP.
(c) No, because failure to pay affects a member’s capability to
practise, but not his membership in the Bar.
(d) Yes, because payment of membership dues and other lawful
assessments are conditions sine qua non to the privilege of
practising law and to the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys.
(e) None of the above choices is correct.
A: (e). The striking out of names in the Roll of Attorneys can be
ordered only by the SC. Also, due process must be observed.
The Constitution vests upon the SC the power to integrate the
Philippine Bar (Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2009, Agpalo;
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5)
2012 Bar, (28): Atty. Edad is an 85 year old lawyer. He does not
practice law anymore. However, his IBP Chapter continues to
send him notices to pay his IBP dues of more than ten (1 0) years
with warning that failure to comply will result in the removal of
his name. Piqued by this, Atty. Edad filed with the IBP Secretary
a sworn letter notifying that he is voluntarily terminating his
membership with the IBP. Should he be allowed?
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) No, because membership in IBP is compulsory for all
lawyers.
(b) Yes, an erstwhile IBP member may terminate his
membership for good reasons.
(c) No, that is only a ploy to evade payment of IBP dues.
(d) Yes, it will violate his right not to join an association.
Sec. 12. Grievance procedures – The Board of Governors shall
provide in the By-Laws for grievance procedures for the
enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the
members of the Integrated Bar, but no action involving the
suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his
name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the
final approval of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 13. Non-political Bar – The Integrated Bar shall be strictly
non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic
feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly.
No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of
appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter
thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position
as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
1997 Bar, Q. XVII: A presidential aspirant was the guest of honor
at a testimonial dinner for the officers and new members of a
provincial chapter of the IBP. In his speech, the presidential
aspirant announced that the IBP would play a major role in his
administration. The officers of the chapter, after the speech,
declared their unqualified support for the "presidentiable's"
candidacy and enjoined all members to do likewise. Comment
on this announcement of support of the IBP chapter.
A: The announcement of support of the IBP Chapter is not proper.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is strictly non-political. A
delegate, governor, officer or employee of the IBP or any chapter
thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position
as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office (Art. I, Sec. 4, By Laws of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines). The IBP chapter's announcement of support
for a presidential aspirant is engaging in a partisan political
activity.
2012 Bar, Q. (8): Atty. Aga was appointed as Treasurer by the IBP
President with the approval of the Board of Governors for a
[176]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
term coterminous with that of the President. A year thereafter,
Atty. Aga ran as Barangay Chairman of their place, and took a
leave of absence for two (2) weeks to campaign. May Atty. Aga
re-assume as Treasurer after his leave of absence?
(a) Yes, since he lost in the election.
(b) No, because he was deemed resigned upon filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
(c) Yes, because his position as Treasurer is coterminous with
the President of the IBP.
(d) No, because he should first seek the approval of the IBP
Board of Governors before running as Brgy. Chairman.
Sec. 14. Positions honorary – Except as may be specifically
authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate or
Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member
shall receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from
the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein
or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the
discharge of his functions.
Sec. 15. Fiscal matters – The Board of Governors shall administer
the funds of the Integrated Bar and shall have the power to make
appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause
proper Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to
be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is made of all
accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.
Sec. 16. Journal – The Board of Governors shall cause to be
published a quarterly Journal of the Integrated Bar, free copies of
which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.
Sec. 17. Voluntary Bar associations – All voluntary Bar
associations now existing or which may hereafter be formed may
co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-
purposes therewith.
Sec. 18. Amendments – This Rule may be amended by the
Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the
Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.
Sec. 19. Organizational period – The Commission on Bar
Integration shall organize the local Chapters and toward this end
shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all
Judges throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational
meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every
case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time
and place of the meeting called to organize a Chapter shall
constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of a

President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five
Directors.
The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and
apportion the same among all the Chapters as nearly as may be in
proportion to the number of their respective members, but each
Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each
Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of
Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where
the Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which
case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.
The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect
additional as well as alternate Delegates.
The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on
Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose of electing a Board of
Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and
forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The
Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective
positions.
Sec. 20. Effectivity – This Rule shall take effect on January 16,
1973.
Rule 139-B: Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
Sec. 1. How Instituted — Proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents
as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by
the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the
instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in the government
service.
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the
Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who
shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors
for assignment to an investigator.
1. The Power of the Court to Discipline is an Inherent and
Exclusive Power
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Andres v. Cabrera. The power to disbar and to reinstate is an
inherently judicial function.
Hilado v. David, (1949). The courts have the summary jurisdiction
to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any
conduct of lawyers prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Cadalin v. POEA’s Administrator. Moreover, the power is
exclusive and only the SC can exercise such power. Hence, the
NLRC and the POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of
unethical conduct of lawyers.
2. Disbarment Proceedings is Sui Generis; A Class of Their
Own
In re: Almacen, (1970). Administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
Disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does
not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not
being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
3. The Purpose of Disbarment
Geeslin v. Navarro, (1990). The purpose of disbarment is not
meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the
public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to
ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence. Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal
fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for
[177]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.
4. Withdrawal of Complaint
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, (1998). The withdrawal of the complaint
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or
lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge has
been duly proven.
5. Burden of Proof in Disbarment Cases
Argana v. Cruz. Convincing evidence is required for the
disbarment of a lawyer.
De los Reyes v. Aznar. Affirmative testimony is given greater
weight than negative testimony.
Reyes v. Gaa, (1995). When the integrity of a member of the bar
is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Quingwa v. Puno. Mere denial by the respondent would be a
fatally erroneous course of action.
Adarne v. Albaba. The complainant has the burden to prove his
case by convincing proof.
Ala v. Atencia. If there is doubt as to the guilt of the respondent
lawyer as to the crime charged against him, then the doubt should
be resolved in his favor.
Bautista v. Ydia. An attorney is presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved by convincing evidence.
6. Disbarment Proceeding are Matters of Public Interest; No
Private Interest Involved in Disbarment Cases; Hence, a
Real Party-in-Interest is NOT Required
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, (1998). A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official

ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Mejares v. Romana, (2004). The procedural requirement in
ordinary civil proceedings that only real party-in-interest must
initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. The right to
institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is
it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceeding are matters of public
interest.
7. Quantum of Proof in Disbarment Cases
Gatchalian Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, (1999). IN administrative
cases for disbarment or suspension, the quantum of proof is
“clearly preponderant evidence”
8. No Res Judicata in Disbarment Cases
Dinsay v. Cioco, (1996). The doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to disbarment cases.
The respondent was previously dismissed from the government
service by the SC as a clerk of court; thereafter he was
subsequently administratively charged as a lawyer and suspended
for 1 year. It was in the subsequent disbarment case where
respondent invoked res judicata, which the Court rejected.
XPN: De Vera v. Layague, (2000); Basilia v. Becamon, (2004). Res
judicata was made applicable.
9. No Prejudicial Questions in Disbarment Proceedings
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions
of this Code.
Rule 111, Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question –
A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in
the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed
in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Rule 111, Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question – The elements
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
 Accordingly, under no circumstance may a disbarment
proceeding be suspended or held in abeyance on the ground
of prejudicial question for the reason that there is no
statutory basis for such suspension or abeyance
Regalado. There is no prejudicial question where on case is
administrative and the other civil, or where one case is
administrative and the other is criminal.
Te v. CA, (2000). The concept of prejudicial question involves a
civil and a criminal case.
Salonga v. Cruz, (1985). A prejudicial question is defined as one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending the criminal case
in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.
XPN:
(a) Ramos v. Miculob, (1961). Prejudicial question was made to
apply in disbarment proceedings against lawyers. The
pending incident was another administrative investigation
being conducted by the DFA
(b) Degamo v. Calo. The pending incidents were previously filed
civil and criminal cases.
Note: Both cases are penned by Arsenio Dizon. However,
disbarment proceedings are not administrative in nature but are
sui generis.
In re: Brillantes, (1977). First, the respondent has not cited, and
this Court does not find, any provision of the Constitution, the
statutes, or the Rules of Court which can justify the theory.
[178]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Second, in a criminal case it is the duty of the prosecution to
prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, which is not so in a suspension or disbarment
proceeding where only clearly preponderant evidence is required.
Third, an accused in a criminal case may escape conviction not
necessarily on the ground that he did not commit the acts
charged in the information. Not infrequently, criminal cases
pending in trial courts are dismissed on account of the failure of
witnesses for the prosecution to appear and testify or on account
of a sworn desistance by the complainant.
And fourth, in our opinion, it is not sound judicial policy to await
the final resolution of a criminal case before we may act on a
complaint or information against a lawyer and impose the
judgment appropriate to the facts. Otherwise, this Court as well
the courts below will be effectively rendered helpless from
vigorously applying the rules on admission to and continuing
membership in the legal profession during the whole period that
the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives
of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.
Note: Calo v. Degamo, (1967) made clear that the pendency of a
criminal case does not pose a prejudicial question in disbarment
cases.
10. Prescription; Disbarment Cases Do Not Prescribe
Calo v. Degamo, (1967). The statute of limitations has no
application to disbarment cases. Hence, they do not prescribe.
Disbarment proceedings are “imprescriptible” and that “ordinary
statute of limitations have no application to disbarment
proceedings”
Heck v. Santos, (2004). A retired judge was administrative found
guilty as a member of the bar, in 2004, for notarizing a document
without a notarial commission twenty four years before, or in
1980, when the judge was still a practicing lawyer.
11. In Pari Delicto is NOT a Defense
Mortel v. Aspiras, (1956). The respondent in a disbarment case
cannot raise the defense of in pari delicto.
12. Monetary Claims Cannot be Granted in Disbarment Cases
Except Restitution and Return of Monies and Properties of
the Client Given in the Course of the Lawyer-Client
Relations

Orozco v. Beltran. A claim for back rentals cannot be made in the
disbarment case against the lawyer, the remedy is to file a civil
action therefor.
13. The Powers of the SC to Punish for Contempt and the
Power to Discipline Lawyers, Distinguished
Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, (1988). The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to
punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both
by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently,
where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also
constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the
respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court
does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court
over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power
of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but
also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share
in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society.
14. Argument that SC is ‘Complainant, Prosecutor and Judge’
All Rolled Into One is Baseless
In re: Almacen. Even if it be conceded that the members of the SC
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone
does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the
power to discipline because public policy demands that they,
acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action.
1994 Bar, Q. VI: A verified complaint for disbarment was filed
against Atty. Cruz who was accused of misappropriating funds
belonging to the complainant. The matter was referred to the
IBP which forthwith conducted an investigation through its local
chapter. During the pendency of the investigation, the
complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance claiming that Atty.
Cruz had already reimbursed him for the funds which he had
accused him of unlawfully spending for his own use. Atty. Cruz
moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
As the hearing officer, how will you act on the motion of Atty.
Cruz?
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
A: The desistance of a complaint in a disbarment proceedings or
his withdrawal of the charges against a lawyer does not deprive
the court of the authority to proceed to determine the matter.
Nor does it necessary result in the dismissal of the complaint,
except when, as a consequence of withdrawal or desistance. no
evidence is adduced to prove the charges. Since a disbarment
proceeding is neither a civil nor a criminal action but one
presented solely for public interest, the fact that the complainant
and the respondent have considered the case closed, is
unimportant.
As hearing officer, 1 will deny the motion of Atty. Cruz and
continue the hearings.
2000 Bar, Q. VI: C filed a verified administrative complaint
against Atty. D. In the course of the investigation, C presented
an affidavit of desistance which she identified on the witness
stand. What course of action should the investigator take?
Explain.
A: The investigator should continue with the investigation. A
disbarment proceeding is sui generis, neither a civil nor criminal
action. As such, a desistance by the complainant is unimportant.
The case may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of
the complainant (Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 1998). If the evidence on
record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
regardless of the desistance of the complainant. Of course, if the
complainant refuses to testify and the charges cannot then be
substantiated, the court will have no alternative but to dismiss the
case.
2010 Bar, Q. XX: Arabella filed a complaint for disbarment
against her estranged husband Atty. P on the ground of
immorality and use of illegal drugs.
After Arabella presented evidence and rested her case before
the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline, she filed an Affidavit of Desistance and motion to
dismiss the complaint, she and her husband having reconciled
for the sake of their children.
You are the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP. Bearing in
mind that the family is a social institution which the State is
duty-bound to preserve, what will be your action on Arabella’s
motion to dismiss the complaint?
A: I would still deny the motion to dismiss. The general rule is that
“no investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of
the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal
of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
[179]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
same unless the Supreme Court motu proprio or upon
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors determines that
there is no compelling reason to continue with the proceedings.
An administrative investigation of a lawyer is sui generis, neither a
civil nor criminal proceeding. An affidavit of desistance has no
place in it.
2004 Bar, Q. VI(B): Alleging that Atty. Malibu seduced her when
she was only sixteen (16) years old, which resulted in her
pregnancy and the birth of a baby girl, Miss Magayon filed a
complaint for his disbarment seven years after the alleged
seduction was committed.
Atty. Malibu contended that, considering the period of delay,
the complaint filed against him can no longer be entertained
much less prosecuted because the alleged offense has already
prescribed.
Is Atty. Malibu’s contention tenable or not? Reason briefly.
A: Atty. Malibu’s contention is not tenable. Disciplinary
proceedings are sui generis. They are neither civil nor criminal
proceedings. Its purpose is not to punish the individual lawyer but
to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court
and the public from the misconduct of lawyers and to remove
from the profession of law persons whose disregard of their oath
of office proves them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar. Disbarment is
imprescriptible. Unlike ordinary proceedings, it is not subject to
the defense of prescription. The ordinary statute of limitations
has no application to disbarment proceedings (Calo v. Degamo,
1967).
2011 Bar, Q. 44: After several years as a private practitioner, Ben
got appointed as Regional Trial Court judge. Five years after his
appointment, he received summons directing him to answer a
disbarment complaint that pertained to a document he
notarized more than 10 years ago from appointment date. He
sought the dismissal of the complaint arguing that the cause of
action has prescribed. Must the complaint be dismissed?
(a) No, because such complaints do not prescribe.
(b) Yes, because the complaint creates a chilling effect on
judicial independence.
(c) No, but the complaint should be verified to ensure
transparency.
(d) Yes, because actions on contracts prescribe in 10 years.

1989 Bar, Q. I(1): How may a proceeding for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys be instituted?
A: A proceeding for disbarment, or suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, on its own motion, or upon
complaint under oath of another in writing. The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines may investigate the matter and recommend to the
Supreme Court the disbarment and suspension from the practice
of law of the erring lawyer.
1996 Bar, Q. IV(b): Where should the complaint for disbarment
be filed?
A: The Complaint for disbarment may be filed with the Supreme
Court or with the Board of Governors of the Integrated bar of the
Philippines, or with the IBP chapter of which Atty. Z is member
(Rule 139-B, Rules of Court).
A. Proceedings in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Sec. 2. National Grievance Investigators — The Board of
Governors shall appoint from among IBP members an Investigator
or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3)
investigators to investigate the complaint. All Investigators shall
take an oath of office in the form prescribed by the Board of
Governors. A copy of the Investigator's appointment and oath
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship
within the fourth degree of consanguinity of affinity to any of the
parties of their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his
having acted as counsel to his acting as such Investigator. Where
the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may appeal to
the IBP Board of Governors, which by majority vote of the
members present, there being a quorum, may order his
disqualification.
Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due
hearing, by the vote of at least six (6) members of the IBP Board
of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in all cases
of disqualification or removal shall be final.
Sec. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator – The
National Grievance Investigators shall investigate all complaints
against members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the
IBP Board of Governors.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1989 Bar, Q. I(2): Under the grievance procedures in Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, may judges be investigated by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines? Explain.
A: Judges may not be investigated under the grievance procedure
in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Complaints against judges are
filed with the Supreme Court which has administrative supervision
over all courts. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court in a
minute resolution in reply to the letter of acting Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals Rodolfo Nocon 03 January 1989.
1999 Bar, Q. I: A engaged the services of Atty. B to defend him in
a case for collect ion of sum of money that was brought against
him in the Municipal Trial Court by D. Despite notice of the
scheduled dates of hearing, Atty. B failed to appear much less to
inform A about it. The case was decided against A. It was only
when the adverse judgment was being executed against him
that A learned he had lost the case. When he went to see
counsel, Atty. B put up the excuse that he was busy attending to
his cases which were more important than A's.
Before whom can A seek redress against Atty. B who apparently
was negligent in attending his case? (5%)
A: He may file a verified complaint against Atty. B, asking that he
be administratively disciplined, with either the Supreme Court,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), or the EBP Chapter to which Atty. B belongs. (Sec. 1, Rule
139-B).
Additional: He may also file a complaint against Atty. B before a
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, depending on the
amount involved, for damages he may have sustained due to the
latter's negligence.
2011 Bar, Q. 43: To whom may the Supreme Court refer
complaints against lawyers for investigation?
(a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
(b) Office of the Bar Confidant.
(c) Judicial and Bar Council.
(d) Office of the Court Administrator.
2004 Bar, Q. VIII(A): A disbarment complaint against a lawyer
was referred by the Supreme Court to a Judge of the Regional
Trial Court for investigation, report and recommendation. On
the date set for the hearing of the complaint, the Judge had the
case called for trial in open court and proceeded to receive
evidence for the complainant. What would you have done if you
[180]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
were the counsel for the respondent-lawyer? Why? Reason
briefly.
A: I would object to the holding of a trial in public. Disciplinary
proceedings against an attorney are confidential in nature until its
termination. The professional success of a lawyer depends almost
entirely on his good reputation. If that is tarnished, it is difficult to
restore the same (Ibanez v. Vina, 1981). To avoid the unnecessary
ruin of a lawyer’s name, disbarment proceedings are directed to
be confidential until their final determination (Sec. 18, Rule 139-B,
Rules of Court).
2010 Bar, Q. IX: Is the defense of Atty. R in a disbarment
complaint for immorality filed by his paramour P that P is in pari
delicto material or a ground for exoneration? Explain.
A: The defense of in pari delicto is immaterial in an administrative
case which is sui generis. The administrative case is about the
lawyer’s conduct, not the woman’s (Mortel v. Aspiras, 1956; Po
Cham v. Pizarro, 2005; Marjorie F. Samaniego v. Atty. Andrew V.
Ferrer, 2008).
2003 Bar, Q. IV: Y hired Attorney X to represent him in a
collection case he filed against Z. The parties later on agreed to
settle the case and Z turned over to Attorney X the amount of
P25,000.00 as partial settlement of his obligation. Attorney X
kept the money. Y. upon learning of Attorney X’s action, filed a
disbarment case against the latter before the Supreme Court,
which in turn, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP Commissioner tasked to investigate the case reviewed
all the pleadings submitted by Y and Attorney X and their
respective witnesses, and promptly made a report
recommending that Attorney X be suspended for six months.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Attorney X assailed his suspension
on the ground of an impingement on his right to due process. Is
Attorney X's contention sustainable? Explain.
A: There is no impingement on Attorney X’s right to due process.
The IBP Commissioner tasked to investigate the case reviewed all
the pleadings of the parties and their respective witnesses. This
implies that Atty. A was given an opportunity to present his side.
Due process has been satisfied. This is especially true if the
principle of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. (However, it may be
noted that the IBP Board of Governors is not authorized to impose
the penalty of suspension).

2010 Bar, Q. XI: After passing the Philippine Bar in 1986,
Richards practiced law until 1996 when he migrated to Australia
where he subsequently became an Australian citizen in 2000. As
he kept abreast of legal developments, petitioner learned about
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003
(Republic Act No. 9225), pursuant to which he reacquired his
Philippine citizenship in 2006. He took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen at the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia.
Jaded by the laid back life in the outback, he returned to the
Philippines in December 2008. After the holidays, he established
his own law office and resumed his practice of law.
Months later, a concerned woman who had secured copies of
Atty. Richards’ naturalization papers with consular
authentication, filed with the Supreme Court an anonymous
complaint against him for illegal practice of law.
A. May the Supreme Court act upon the complaint filed by an
anonymous person? Why or why not?
B. Is respondent entitled to resume the practice of Law?
Explain.
A:
A. Yes, the Supreme Court may act upon the complaint filed by
an anonymous complaint, because the basis of the
complaint consists of documents with consular
authentication which can be verified being public records.
There is no need to identify the complainant when the
evidence is documented and verifiable (In re: Echiverri,
1975; In re: Araula, 1978; Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 1995).
Besides, the Supreme Court or the IBP may initiate
disbarment proceedings motu proprio.
B. Yes, as long as he observes the procedure laid down in
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin M.
Dacanay (B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007), to wit:
(a) Updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
(b) Payment of the professional tax;
(c) Completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education;
(d) Pre-taking of the lawyer’s oath.
Sec. 4. Chapter assistance to complainant – The proper IBP
Chapter may assist the complainant(s) in the preparation and
filing of his complaint(s).
Sec. 5. Service or dismissal – If the complaint appears to be
meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same
within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the complaint
does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of
the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same
may be dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his
recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be
furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may
review the case motu propio or upon timely appeal of the
complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of
the complainant.
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of
the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal
of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines that
there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or
suspension proceedings against the respondent. (Amendment
pursuant to SC Resolution dated May 27, 1993; In re: Bar Matter
356)
Sec. 6. Verification and service of answer – The answer shall be
verified. The original and five (5) legible copies of the answer shall
be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy
thereof on the complainant or his counsel.
Sec. 7. Administrative counsel – The IBP Board of Governors shall
appoint a suitable member of the Integrated Bar as counsel to
assist the complainant of the respondent during the investigation
in case of need for such assistance.
Sec. 8. Investigation – Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of
the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate
speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have
the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to
present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and
counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails
to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3)
months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for
good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful
order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect
contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the
Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require
the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from
[181]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct
hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth
in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall
as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from
its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall
within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if
warranted, the imposition of penalty.
1. Disposition on the Complaint by the Investigating
Commissioner
Gatmaytan v. Ilao, (2005). The Investigating Commissioner may
take either of the two actions upon the complaint: either (a)
dismiss the complaint without delay or (b) proceed with the
investigation
A. The Investigator shall proceed with the investigation of the
case:
(1) If the complaint appears to be meritorious; or
(2) Upon joinder of the issues (upon submission of the answer
by respondent within fifteen (15) days from the date of
service), when the answer shows that the complaint is
indeed meritorious; or
(3) If respondent fails to answer
B. The Investigator may recommend the dismissal of the same:
(1) If the complaint lacks merit; or
(2) If the answer shows, to the satisfaction of the Investigator,
that the complaint is not meritorious
Thus, it is within the sound discretion of the Investigator to
determine WON the complaint is meritorious and if an
investigation must indeed ensue. If the complaint is bereft of
merit, either on its face or as proven by respondent’s answer, it
will be unjust to mandate the Investigator to conduct an
investigation.
Villanueva v. Deloria, (2007). If an investigation is clearly
warranted, the disbarment case shall be remanded to the IBP for
investigation.
Baldomar v. Paras, (2000). When the matter could not be
resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral
is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during
which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex-

parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails
to appear despite reasonable notice.
Tabang v. Gacott, (2004). GR: A formal investigation is a
mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with.
XPN: Valid and compelling reasons
2. Misconduct Committed During the Investigation Itself
Toledo v. Abalos, (1999). A respondent may be sanctioned for
disregarding the lawful orders of the Commission on Bar
Discipline as an investigating authority.
Investment and Management Services Corp. v. Roxas, (1996).
Acts of impropriety and lack of candor committed during the
investigation may be grounds for disciplinary action.
Hence, where during the investigation of the disbarment
complaint, the respondent kept on changing his address without
informing the investigating authorities, respondent showed that
he had no intention of squarely facing the charges against him.
While the original disbarment complaint against the respondent
was dismissed for lack of evidence, said respondent was
suspended for 6 months for the lack of respect he exhibited
during the investigation of the disbarment complaint in changing
his address several times without informing the investigating
authorities.
Sec. 9. Depositions – Depositions may be taken in accordance
with the Rules of Court with leave of the investigator(s).
Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any
member of the Board of Governors, the President of any Chapter,
or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.
Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before
diplomatic or consular representative of the Philippine
Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or
designated by the Board of Governors.
Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the place where a
deposition shall be taken may be designated by the Investigator
to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a
deposition.
Sec. 10. Report of Investigator – Not later than thirty (30) days
from the termination of the investigation, the Investigator shall
submit a report containing his findings of fact and
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with
the stenographic notes and the transcript thereof, and all the
evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of
the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic
notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce substantially
from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and pertinent
testimonies.
Sec. 11. Defects – No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in
the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall be considered as
substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the
whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in
a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such
remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including
invalidation of the entire proceedings.
Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors
(e) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the
IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting
of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's
Report.
(f) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of
the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
(g) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the
disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall
issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such
sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
petition of the complainant or other interested party filed
with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise.
(h) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be
given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
1. Decision of Board Must be in Writing
[182]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Cruz v. Cabrera, (2004). The decision of the Board of Governors of
the IBP must state the fact and the reason on which it is based,
which is akin to what is required of the decision of courts of
record.
Teodosio v. Nava. For aside from informing the parties the reason
for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court
the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of
them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that
the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his
judgment through the process of legal reasoning.
Thus, the Board of Governors may not simply pass a Resolution
annulling or setting aside the finding of guilt in the
recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to
approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit without a
written decision stating clearly the facts and reasons on which the
decision is based.
B. Proceedings in the Supreme Court
Sec. 13. Supreme Court Investigation — In proceedings initiated
motu propio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when
the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer
the case for investigation to the Solicitor-General or to any officer
of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in
Section 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Sec. 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other Court-
designated Investigator — Based upon the evidence adduced at
the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator
designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations for the final action of the Supreme Court.
1. SC May Dismiss Groundless Complaints Outright
Manubay v. Garcia, (2000). Administrative complaints that are
prima facie groundless as shown by the pleadings filed by the
parties need not be referred to the IBP for further investigation.
They may be summarily dismissed for utter lack of merit by the
SC.
2. Referral by the SC to the IBP is NOT Mandatory
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, (1988). Reference to the IBP of complainants
against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court.

Bautista v. Gonzales, (1990). Reference of complaints to the IBP is
not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the
Revised ROC. Under Sec. 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the SC may
conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the
IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or
to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In
such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating
official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court
shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the
evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.
3. SC is NOT Bound by the Findings or Recommendations of
the IBP
Dumadag v. Lumaya, (2000). The SC is not bound by the findings
of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to accept such findings as a
matter of course. Hence, the Court may disregard a
recommendation from the IBP for the lifting of a suspension.
Investment and Management Services Corp. v. Roxas, (1996).
The decision of the IBP Board of Governors is merely
recommendatory.
C. Common Provisions
Sec. 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court – After receipt
of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the
Supreme Court, motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP Board
of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may
suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of
the causes specified in Rule 138, Sec. 27, during the pendency of
the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme
Court.
Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court — The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial
Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in Rule 138, Sec. 27 2, until further action of the
Supreme Court in the case.
Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial
Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court – Upon such
suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which
the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or
disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.
2012 Bar, Q. (11): RTC Judge Bell was so infuriated by the
conduct of Atty. X who conveniently absents himself when his
clients do not pay his appearance fee in advance. Atty. X also
uses disrespectful and obscene language in his pleadings. At one
point, when his case was called for hearing, Atty. X did not
appear for his client although he was just outside the door of the
court room. Judge Bell directed the client to summon Atty. X,
but the latter refused. Judge Bell then issued an Order directing
Atty. X to explain why no disciplinary action shall be imposed on
him for this misconduct but he refused the directive. Decide.
(a) RTC Judge Bell can suspend Atty. X from the practice of law
before his sala.
(b) The case of Atty. X can be dismissed due to non-appearance
of counsel even though the party was present.
(c) The hearing of the case should be rescheduled in the
interest of justice.
(d) The court can admonish the client for the unprofessional
conduct of his lawyer and ask him to change his lawyer.
A: [BONUS: Option A – not part of the scale of penalties; options
B, C, and D – unresponsive to the question.]
2012 Bar, Q. (26): Atty. Aimee was convicted by final judgment
of Estafa Thru Falsification of a Commercial Document, a crime
involving moral turpitude. What is the appropriate penalty?
(a) Disbarment
(b) Indefinite suspension
(c) Suspension for three (3) years
(d) Admonition
1987 Bar, Q. VI: In the course of the testimony of an almost
illiterate victim of a swindling travel syndicate, the trial judge
addressed these words to the witness: “You have no business
coming to court without being sure of your facts; the way I look
at it, you are here to blackmail these businessmen into giving
you free airplane travel.” The private prosecutor stood up to
move that the remarks of the court regarding the alleged
“blackmail” be made of record for purposes of the appeal or
other future proceedings. The trial Judge countered with an
order directing the lawyer to show cause why he should not be
held in direct contempt, for allegedly “threatening the court”
with possible future action.
May the contempt citation be upheld? Explain.
[183]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: The contempt citation may not be sustained. A judge should
exercise proper judicial decorum. He should be considerate of
witness and others in attendance upon his court. He should be
courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter
intemperate language during the hearing of a case (Retuya v.
Equipilog, G.R. Adm. Case No. 1431-MJ, July 16, 1979; Santos vs.
Cruz, G.R. Adm. Matter No. 491-MJ, Oct. 30, 1980).
It was the right of counsel to put on record said remarks for the
protection of his witness and client (In Re: Aguas).
1989 Bar, Q. XII: Judge Masungit convicted the accused. The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for new
trial. The counsel for the accused petitioned the Supreme Court
that the new trial be held before another judge because Judge
Masungit had formed a prejudice against the accused. The
petition was denied. The counsel for the accused then asked
Judge Masungit to inhibit himself but Judge Masungit refused. A
few days before the trial, the counsel for the accused filed an
urgent motion seeking to disqualify Judge Masungit. Judge
Masungit held the counsel for the accused in contempt.
Was Judge Masungit correct in citing the counsel for the accused
in contempt? Explain your answer.
A: Judge Masungit committed an error in holding in contempt of
court the counsel for the accused for his motion to disqualify the
judge in the case for new trial.
While it may be true that the ground for disqualifying the judge
for his ruling before the motion for new trial was granted may not
be a valid ground for disqualifying the judge from sitting in the
case, the judge should not consider it an offense which will
amount to contempt of court if counsel for the accused moves for
his disqualification.
The Supreme Court set guidelines on the matter of inhibitionof
judges in Pimentel vs. Salonga, 21 SCRA 160 that all judges should
pay attention to the appropriate guidelines in a situation where
their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the
fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may
not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but, when a
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in
favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a
state mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in
the courts of justice is not impaired.
1993 Bar, Q. X: Atty. Reyes, in his Memorandum filed with the
Regional Trial Court, used disrespectful and threatening

language against the Court for which he was summarily ordered
to pay P200.00 fine or in case of default, to suffer 10 days
imprisonment. Atty. Reyes challenged the Order claiming that
there was no formal charge against him and. that if there was
any contempt at all, it was only indirect contempt, the act
having been done away from the Court and not in or near the
Judge’s presence as to interfere in the proceedings before the
Court.
What can you say about the lawyer's arguments? Explain.
A: The lawyer's argument is without merit. The disrespectful and
threatening language in a memorandum or pleading filed with the
Court constitutes direct contempt and can therefore be punished
summarily, as the same consists of misbehavior in the presence of
the Court. A lawyer who uses in his pleading words that tend to
degrade the court or bring it into disrepute commits contempt of
court. Thus, a lawyer has been cited and punished for contempt in
facie for describing the decision of a court as absolutely
erroneous, an outrage to the right of a litigant and a mockery of
the popular will; charging the high tribunal of erroneously
interpreting the law. exhibiting incompetence and narrow
mindedness and deliberately committing many blunders and
injustice; accusing the court of repeatedly falling into the pitfall of
blindly adhering to its previous erroneous pronouncements;
imputing irregularity in the internal procedure of the Supreme
Court and laxity in similar matters; calling the minute resolution of
the Supreme Court an unjust judgment and ridiculing the
members thereof as blind, deaf and dumb; and resorting to veiled
threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
knowingly rendering unjust judgment.
2000 Bar, Q. IV: Atty. A was found guilty of indirect contempt by
the Regional Trial Court and summarily suspended indefinitely,
from the practice of law. Atty. A appealed to the Supreme Court.
Is his appeal meritorious? Reasons.
A: His appeal is meritorious. A person cannot be summarily
penalized for indirect contempt. In indirect contempt, the law
requires that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and
an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or
counsel.
2004 Bar, Q. VI(A): Upon learning from newspaper reports that
bar candidate Vic Pugote passed the bar examinations. Miss
Adorable immediately lodged a complaint with the Supreme
Court, praying that Vic Pugote be disallowed from taking the
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar because he was
maintaining illicit sexual relations with several women other
than his lawfully wedded spouse. However, from unexplained
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
reasons, he succeeded to take his oath as a lawyer. Later, when
confronted with Miss Adorable’s complaint formally, Pugote
moved for its dismissal on the ground that it is already moot and
academic.
Should Miss Adorable’s complaint be dismissed or not? Explain
briefly.
A: It should not be dismissed. Her charge involves a matter of
good moral character which is not only a requisite for admission
to the Bar, but also a continuing condition for remaining a
member of the Bar. As such, the admission of Vic Pugote to the
Bar does not render the question moot and academic.
1994 Bar, Q. VIII: Atty. Queliza was convicted of qualified
seduction. He was subsequently disbarred at the initiative of the
IBP. Before he could complete the service of his sentence, he
was given an absolute pardon by the President. He thereupon
petitioned the Supreme Court for reinstatement to the practice
of law as a legal and logical consequence of the absolute pardon.
Is he entitled to reinstatement?
A: An absolute pardon granted to a lawyer who has been
previously disbarred for conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude does not automatically entitle him to
reinstatement. The matter of his reinstatement is still subject to
the discretion of the Supreme Court. He should still show by
evidence aside from the absolute pardon that he is now a person
of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law
(In Re: Rovero).
1998 Bar, Q. XVI: Ben filed proceedings for disbarment against
his lawyer, Atty. Co, following the latter’s conviction for estafa
for misappropriating funds belonging to his client (Ben). While
the proceedings for disbarment was pending, the President
granted absolute pardon in favor of Atty. Co. Atty. Co. then,
moved for the dismissal of the disbarment case.
Should the motion be granted?
A: An absolute pardon by the President is one that operates to
wipe out the conviction as well as the offense itself. The grant
thereof to a lawyer is a bar to a proceeding for disbarment against
him, if such proceeding is based solely on the fact of such
conviction (In re: Parcasion). But where the proceeding to disbar
is founded on the professional misconduct involved in the
transaction which culminated in his conviction, the effect of the
pardon is only to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act
and does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding,
[184]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof
that the attorney does not possess good moral character (In re:
Lontoc).
1999 Bar, V: X, a member of the Bar, was charged with and
found guilty of estafa for which he was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party for the
amount involved. Not having taken an appeal from the
judgment of conviction, upon finality thereof he was taken into
custody to serve sentence. A month after he was incarcerated he
was granted pardon by the Chief Executive on condition that he
would not commit another offense during the unserved portion
of his prison sentence. Soon after X's release from custody after
being pardoned, the offended party in the criminal case filed a
Complaint for Disbarment against X in the Supreme Court. X set
up the defense that having been pardoned by the Chief
Executive for which reason he was released from imprisonment,
he may not be disbarred from the practice of law anymore.
Is X's contention tenable?
A: X’s contention is not tenable.
He was granted only a conditional pardon. Such conditional
pardon merely relieved him of the penal con-sequences of his act
but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment. Such pardon does
not reach the offense itself. Hence, it does not constitute a bar to
his disbarment. (In re: Gutierrez; In re Avanceña). Furthermore,
the acts of X leading to his conviction maybe used to show that he
does not possess the necessary requirement of good moral
character for continued membership in the Bar (In re: Vailoces.
2012 Bar, Q. 49: Because of his political beliefs, Atty. Guerra
joined a rebel group. Later, he was apprehended and charged
with Rebellion in court. A disbarment case was also filed against
him. While the case was pending, the government approved a
general amnesty program and Atty. Guerra applied for and was
granted amnesty. Should the disbarment case be also dismissed
automatically?
(a) Yes, because amnesty obliterates the criminal act.
(b) No, disciplinary action on lawyers are sui generis and general
penal principles do not strictly apply.
(c) No, a lawyer has the duty to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines.
(d) Yes, if the Secretary of Justice approves the dismissal.

2002 Bar, Q. XI: Atty. LA is a member of the Philippine Bar and
the California Bar in the United States. For willful disobedience
of a lawful order of a Superior Court in Los Angeles, Atty. LA was
suspended from the practice of law in California for one (1) year.
May his suspension abroad be considered a ground for
disciplinary action against Atty. LA in the Philippines? Why?
A: The suspension of Atty. LA from the practice of law abroad may
be considered as a ground for disciplinary action here if such
suspension was based on one of the grounds for disbarment in
the Philippines or shows a loss of his good moral character, a
qualification he has to maintain in order to remain a member of
the Philippine Bar.
2006 Bar, Q. XIV: Atty. Perez was admitted as a member of the
New York Bar. While in Manhattan, he was convicted of estafa
and was disbarred.
Does his disbarment in New York a ground for his automatic
disbarment in the Philippines?
A: The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (pars. 2 & 3, Section 27, Rule 138, as
amended by SC Resolution, dated February 13,1992).
Thus, the disbarment of Atty. Perez in New York for estafa is a
ground for his disbarment in the Philippines. However, such
disbarment in the Philippines is not automatic. Atty. Perez is still
entitled to due notice and hearing. (In Re: Suspension from the
Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,
2004).
2012 Bar, Q. 50: Soon after Atty. Cesar passed the Philippine Bar
in 1975, he also took the New York State Bar and passed the
same. He practiced law for 25 years in the USA, but he was
disbarred therein for insurance fraud. He returned to the
Philippines and started to practice law. X, who knew about his
New York disbarment, filed a disbarment complaint with the
IBP. Decide.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) The factual basis for the New York disbarment which is
deceit also constitutes a ground for disbarment in the
Philippines.
(b) The acts complained of happened in a foreign country and
cannot be penalized here.
(c) Norms of ethical behavior of lawyers are the same
worldwide.
(d) A lawyer's fitness to become a lawyer must be maintained
wherever he may be.
1993 Bar, Q. XIV: The Faculty of the College of Law of the
University of the Philippines pleaded for compassion on behalf
of Atty. Juan Santos. The Supreme Court had earlier found Atty.
Santos guilty of grave professional misconduct and imposed
upon him “an indefinite suspension, leaving it to him to prove at
some future and opportune time that he shall have once again
regained the fitness to be allowed to resume the practice of law
as an officer of the court."
Is the plea of the Faculty for Atty. Juan Santos well taken?
Explain.
A: The plea of the Faculty of Law of the University of the
Philippines asking compassion on behalf of Atty. Juan Santos is
not well taken.
In order that a lawyer who was disbarred can be reinstated, he
must show with convincing proof that he has good moral
character acquired through positive efforts, honorable dealings
and moral reformation as to be fit to practice law again. Mere
allegation of compassion for a lawyer 1s not sufficient. In one
decision of the Supreme Court, in order that a disbarred lawyer
can be reinstated, he must prove his good moral character as if he
is applying for admission to the bar.
Sec. 18. Confidentiality — Proceedings against attorneys shall be
private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme
Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
Sec. 19. Expenses – All reasonable and necessary expenses
incurred in relation to disciplinary and disbarment proceedings
are lawful charges for which the parties may be taxed as costs.
Sec. 20.Effectivity and Transitory Provision — This Rule shall take
effect June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139
entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS". All cases
pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall
[185]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this
Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed.
1. Forfeiture of the Right to Cross-Examine
Melendrez v. Decena. A respondent may forfeit his right to cross-
examine where he asked for numerous continuances which
indicated a clear attempt to delay the investigation.
2. Waiver of the Right to be Heard
In re: Vinzon, (1967). Failure of a respondent in a disbarment
proceeding to appear at the scheduled hearing amounts to a
waiver of his right to be heard
Toledo v. Toledo, (1963). Failure to file an answer seasonably also
constitutes a waiver. Thus, filing a motion to dismiss instead of an
answer is waiver of right to present evidence.
3. Penalty of Suspension
Dumadag v. Lumaya, (2000). The SC may indefinitely suspend a
lawyer.
In this case, the indefinite suspension of a lawyer was reduced to
a suspension of 10 years on the 9th year of his suspension.
4. Confidential Proceedings
Murillo v. Superable, (1960). All disciplinary proceedings are
confidential until the final disposition of the matter. Hence, the
verbatim publication of the disbarment complaint in a newspaper
is actionable.
Villalon, Jr. v. IAC. However, this confidentiality may be waived by
the lawyer himself.
In re: Abistado, (1932). Violations of this confidentiality rule is
punishable in contempt proceedings.
The purpose of this confidentiality rule is “not only to enable the
court to make its investigations free from any extraneous
influence or inference, but also to protect the personal and
professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless
charges of disgruntled, vindicative, and irresponsible clients and
litigants.
5. Reinstatement of Disbarred Lawyer, Nature of

In re: Rusiana, (1974). The sole object of the Court upon an
application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously
disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has
satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the
effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has
been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted
to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.
The “positive evidence” required refers to proofs of honesty,
integrity, and good moral character through written testimonials
of credible institutions and personalities.
In view of the long duration of 13 years in which the lawyer had
been removed from the legal profession, he was required, as a
condition for his reinstatement, to enroll in, and pass, regular
fourth years review classes in a recognized law school in order to
update him with the current laws and jurisprudence.
Prior to actual reinstatement the respondent will be required to
take anew the lawyer’s oath and sign once again the roll of
attorneys after paying the requisite fees.
6. Reinstatement, Effect of
Cui v. Cui. Reinstatement of a lawyer wipes out the restriction and
disabilities resulting from a previous disbarment.
Rule 140: Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
Sec. 1. How instituted – Proceedings for the discipline of judges of
regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by
affidavits of person who have personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said
allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by
public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in
writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for
Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
2015 Bar, Q. XXIV: An anonymous letter addressed to the
Supreme Court was sent by one Malcolm X, a concerned citizen,
complaining against Judge Hambog, Presiding Judge of the RTC
of Mahangin City, Branch 7. Malcolm X reported that Judge
Hambog is acting arrogantly in court; using abusive and
inappropriate language; and embarrassing and insulting parties,
witnesses, and even lawyers appearing before him. Attached to
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
the letter were pages from transcripts of records in several cases
heard before Judge Hambog, with Judge Hambog's arrogant,
abusive, inappropriate, embarrassing and/or insulting remarks
or comments highlighted.
(a) Will the Court take cognizance of the letter-complaint even
coming from an anonymous source? Explain.
(b) Describe briefly the procedure followed when giving due
course to a complaint against an RTC judge.
A:
(a) Yes. Rule 140, Sec. 1, ROC, provides that proceedings for the
discipline of judges of regular or special courts, and Justices
of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, may be instituted “upon
an anonymous complaint supported by public records of
indubitable integrity”
(b) If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy
thereof shall be sent to the respondent, and he shall be
required to comment within 10 days from date of service.
Upon the filing of the respondent’s comment, the SC shall
refer the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation or assign the case
to a Justice of the CA, for investigation, report and
recommendation. The investigating Justice shall set a date
for the hearing and notify the parties thereof, and they may
present evidence, oral or documentary, at such hearing. The
investigating Justice shall terminate the investigation within
90 days from its commencement, and submit his report and
recommendations to the SC within 30 days from the
termination of investigation. The SC shall take action on the
report as the facts and the law may warrant.
2013 Bar, Q. VI: An audit team from the Office of the Court
Administrator found that Judge Contaminada committed serious
infractions through the indiscriminate grant of petitions for
annulment of marriage and legal separation. In one year, the
judge granted 300 of such petitions when the average number of
petitions of similar nature granted by an individual judge in his
region was only 24 petitions per annum.
The audit revealed many different defects in the granted
petitions: many petitions had not been verified; the required
copies of some petitions were not furnished to the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor;
docket fees had not been fully paid; the parties were not actual
residents within the territorial jurisdiction of the court; and, in
some cases, there was no record of the cross-examinations
conducted by the public prosecutor or any documentary
evidence marked and formally offered. All these, viewed in their
[186]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
totality, supported the improvident and indiscriminate grant
that the OCA found.
If you were the counsel for Andy Malasuerte and other litigants
whose marriages had been improperly and finally annulled,
discuss your options in administratively proceeding against
Judge Contaminada, and state where and how you would
exercise these options.
A: As counsel for Andy Malasuerte, I have the option of
participating in the administrative proceedings by filing a verified
complaint in writing against Judge Contaminada with the Office of
the Court Administrator, supported by affidavits of persons who
have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for
judges by law, the Rules of Court, the Code of Judicial Conduct
(Rule 140, Sec. 1), and the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
2011 Bar, Q. 35: What is the method of national inquiry into the
conduct of Supreme Court magistrates?
(a) Administrative investigation.
(b) Disqualification.
(c) Impeachment.
(d) Disbarment.
2005 Bar, Q. I(2): Which of the following statements is false?
(a) All administrative cases against Justices of appellate courts
and judges of lower courts fall exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
(b) Administrative cases against erring Justices of the Court of
Appeals and Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the
government service are not automatically treated as
disbarment cases.
(c) The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio, or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiates and
prosecutes proper charges against erring lawyers including
those in the government service.
(d) The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not a
ground for disqualification/inhibition.
(e) Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of
offenses committed by justices of appellate courts and
judges of lower courts.

1988 Bar, Q. X(a): The position of a judge, exalted though it may
be, involves certain risks or hazards of the profession. May he be
held liable for malfeasance or misfeasance in office?
(1) What are these acts of malfeasance or misfeasance in
office? State the nature of the judge’s liability.
(2) Are Justices of the Supreme Court similarly liable? Reasons.
A: Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 204), a judge may be held
criminally liable for knowingly rendering an unjust, judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision. This is deemed to be
misfeasance, that is the improper doing of an act which he might
lawfully do. It may also constitute malfeasance, that is the doing
of an act which he should not have done.
To discipline a judge under the said provision, it must be clearly
shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being contrary to
law or not supported by evidence, and that the judge rendered it
with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. It is not
merely error of judgment.
1991 Bar, Q. XII: In the pre-trial during the plea bargaining of a
criminal case for murder, accused OA wanted to enter a plea of
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. Private complainants
agreed, but the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor hesitated, reasoning
that he still has to get the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor.
The pre-trial was cancelled and reset to a date, thirty (30) days
after. On this hearing date, the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
manifested that his request for approval of accused OA is plea
bargain was not acted upon by the Provincial Prosecutor. He
asked for a resetting of the pretrial, which was forthwith denied.
Judge O, after ascertaining that private complainants were
amenable to accused OA is plea bargain, proceeded to arraign
him, then imposed the sentence for homicide. The Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari and an
administrative case against Judge O for grave abuse of discretion
and ignorance of the law. Decide.
A: Plea bargaining is now allowed under the rules of procedure.
Although the assistant provincial prosecutor may have objected to
the prayer of the accused to a lesser offense, it is within the
discretion of the judge to accept said plea as a measure towards
speedy disposal of cases.
The petition for certiorari and the administrative charge against
the judge will not prosper.
Alternative: There is grave abuse of discretion. This is forum
shopping. Since a petition for certiorari has already been filed, the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
administrative case should not have been filed anymore. (Sec. 2
Rule 116).
2010 Bar, Q. XIII: Reacting to newspaper articles and verbal
complaints on alleged rampant sale of Temporary Restraining
orders by Judge X, the Supreme Court ordered to conduct of a
discreet investigation by the Office of the Court Administrator.
Judges in the place where Judge X is assigned confirmed the
complaints.
A. What administrative charge/s may be leveled against Judge
X? Explain.
B. What defense/s can Judge X raise in avoidance of any
liability?
A:
A. He could be charged with Gross Misconduct, arising from
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.
No. 3019). He could also be charged with violations of Canon
4, Section 13 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which provides that “judges and
members of their families shall neither ask for, not accept,
any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done
or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.”
B. He could raise the defense of hearsay evidence, lack of
substantive evidence, and denial of due process.
1996 Bar, Q. VIII(1): May a judge be disciplined by the Supreme
Court based solely on a complaint filed by the complainant and
the answer of respondent Judge? If so, under what
circumstances? What is the rationale behind this power of the
Supreme Court?
A: A judge may be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely
on the basis of the complaint filed by the complainant and the
answer of the respondent judge, under the principle of res ipsa
loquitur. The Supreme Court has held that when the facts alleged
in the complaint are admitted or are already shown on the record,
and no credible explanation that would negate the strong
inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to
establish such facts to support a judgment as to culpability of the
respondent is necessary (In Re: Petition for dismissal of Judge
Dizon).
2003 Bar, Q. X: May a judge be held liable on the basis of res ipsa
loquitur? Explain.
[187]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: “There is no question that the principle of res ipsa loquitur had
been applied to judges. Under this principle, judges had been
dismissed from the service without need of formal investigation
because based on the records, the gross misconduct or
inefficiency of the judge clearly appears” (see People vs.
Valenzuela, 1985; Uy v. Mercado, 1987) (Pineda, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1994 ed., pp. 297-298).
Sec. 2. Action on the complaint – If the complaint is sufficient in
form and substance, a copy thereof shall be served upon the
respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10)
days from the date of service. Otherwise, the same shall be
dismissed.
Sec. 3. By whom complaint investigated – Upon the filing of the
respondent's comment, or upon the expiration of the time for
filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are
required, the Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation
or assign the case for investigation, report, and recommendation
to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a
Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a
Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to
a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the respondent is a Judge of
an inferior court.
Sec. 4. Hearing – The investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day
of the hearing and send notice thereof to both parties. At such
hearing the parties may present oral and documentary evidence.
If, after due notice, the respondent fails to appear, the
investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation
within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or
within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant.
Sec. 5. Report – Within thirty (30) days from the termination of
the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to
the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and
recommendation. The report shall be accompanied by the record
containing the evidence and the pleadings filed by the parties. The
report shall be confidential and shall be for the exclusive use of
the Court.

Sec. 6. Action – The Court shall take such action on the report as lost Jurisdiction after elevating the records of the case to the
the facts and the law may warrant. Regional Trial Court.
If I am the RTC Judge assigned to investigate the case I would
Sec. 7. Classification of charges – Administrative charges are
recommend the dismissal of the Judge for gross ignorance of the
classified as serious, less serious, or light.
law.
Sec. 8. Serious charges – Serious charges include:
Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges – Less serious charges include:
(1) Bribery, direct or indirect;
(1)
(2) Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
(2)
(3) Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct;
(3)
(4) Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as
(4)
determined by a competent court in an appropriate
(5)
proceeding;
(5) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(6)
(6) Willful failure to pay a just debt;
(7)
(7) Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a
case pending before the court;
(8) Immorality; Sec. 10. Light Charges – Light charges include:
(9) Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
(10) Partisan political activities; and (1)
(11) Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. (2)
(3)
1991 Bar, Q. XI: A complaint for rape against ZZ was filed by the
(4)
father of Dulce, an 11-year old girl, with the Municipal Trial
Court of Bantayan, Cebu. After preliminary examination of the
offended party and the witnesses, Judge YY of said court issued Sec. 11. Sanctions –
an order finding probable cause and ordering the arrest of ZZ
without bail ZZ was arrested and detained. He file: (1) a Waiver A.
of Preliminary Investigation, and (2) an Ex- Parte Motion to Fix
Bail Bond. Judge YY granted the waiver and forthwith elevated
the records of the case to the RTC, which forwarded the same to (1)
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Ten (10) days after the elevation of the records. YY, acting on the
Motion to Fix Bail, issued an order fixing the bail bond at
P20.000.00. The father of Dulce filed against YY an
administrative complaint for ignorance of law. oppression, grave (2)
abuse of discretion and partiality, if you were the executive
(3)
judge of the RTC designated to investigate the case and to make
a report and recommendation thereon, what would be your
recommendation?
B.
A: The facts narrated in this case is similar to the decision of the
Supreme Court in 1989. The judge was found guilty of ignorance
of the law for granting bail despite the fact that he had already (1)
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(2) A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the
following sanctions shall be imposed:
(1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00 and/or
(2) Censure;
(3) Reprimand;
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in
(4) Admonition with warning.
transmitting the records of a case;
Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or
habitual tardiness; Sec. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings – Proceedings against
Unauthorized practice of law; Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of
Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars; Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential,
Receiving additional or double compensation unless but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be
specifically authorized by law; attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the
Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and Court Administrator.
Simple Misconduct.
These amendments to Rule 140 shall take effect on October 1,
2001 following their publication in two newspapers of general
circulation on or before September 15, 2001.
Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
Gambling in public; 2011 Bar, Q. 26: Administrative proceedings against Judges of all
Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
case/cases in his court; and Sandiganbayan shall be
Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
(a) private and confidential.
(b) public but subdued.
(c) private but transparent.
If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the (d) public.
following sanctions may be imposed:
2012 Bar, Q. (25): Administrative complaints against Judges and
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the Justices below the Supreme Court are handled by:
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, (a) Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
including government-owned or controlled corporations. (b) Ombudsman.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no (c) Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
case include accrued leave credits; (d) Office of the Court Administrator.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding 2011 Bar, Q. 13: On appeal, RTC Judge Rudy affirmed the MTC’s
conviction of Lorna for violation of the bouncing checks law and
P40,000.00
awarded Agnes, the complainant, Php1.6 million in damages.
Two years later, upon Lorna’s motion and after ascertaining that
If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the
following sanctions shall be imposed: her counsel never received the court's decision, Judge Rudy
recalled the entry of judgment in the case, reversed himself, and
absolved Lorna of guilt. Claiming an unjust judgment, Agnes filed
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
an administrative complained against Judge Rudy, saying that it
not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
is plain from the circumstances that he connived with Lorna, her
[188]

counsel, and the handling prosecutor. But she offered no further
evidence. Rudy denied the charges and asserted that any error
in his judgment is correctible only by an appeal, not by an
administrative suit. Should Judge Rudy be disciplined?
(a) No, because Agnes' complaint is merely based on
suspicions and speculations.
(b) No, because Agnes has yet to establish that Rudy's decision
is plainly erroneous.
(c) Yes, because he gravely abused his discretion in recalling the
entry of judgment.
(d) Yes, because reconsidering the judgment of conviction that
the MTC and he earlier issued shows anomaly in Judge
Rudy's action.
(e) 2009 Bar, Q. VIII: Court of Appeals (CA) Justice Juris
administratively charged with gross ignorance of the law
for having issued an order “temporarily enjoining” the
implementation of a writ of execution, and for having
issued another order for the parties to “maintain the status
quo” in the same case. Both orders are obviously without
any legal basis and violate CA rules. In his defense, Justice
Juris claims that the challenged orders were collegial acts
of the CA Division to which he belonged. Thus, he posits
that the charge should not be filed against him alone, but
should include the two other CA justices in the Division. Is
the contention of Justice Juris tenable? Explain.
(f)
(g) A: No, the contention of Justice Juris is not tenable. Section
5, Rule VI, of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
provides that:
(h)
(i) “Sec. 5. Action by a Justice – All members of the Division
shall act upon an application for a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction. However, if the
matter is of extreme urgency, and a Justice is absent, the
two other Justices shall act upon the application. If only the
ponente is present, then he shall act alone upon the
application. The action of the two Justices or the ponente
shall however be submitted on the next working day to the
absent member or members of the Division for ratification,
modification or recall.”
(j)
(k) In this case, if Justice Juris acted alone in issuing the
erroneous orders, he alone should be held liable. But if the
orders were issued by the Division to which he belongs, all
the members of the Division should be included in the
charge. It appears that Justice Juris acted alone in issuing the
said orders.
Rule 141: Legal Fees
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Sec. 1. Payment of fees – Upon the filing of the pleading or other
application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees
prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.
2013 Bar, Q. VI: Plaintiff Jun Ahorro filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Because of the large amount of his claim, he had to pay
a sizeable docket fee. He insisted on paying the docket fee and
other fees in installments because staggered payment is allowed
under Rule 141, as amended. The Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC) refused to accept the complaint unless he paid the full
amount of the docket and other required fees.
Plaintiff Jun Ahorro’s position __________.
(a) is allowed because of the large amount of the docket fee
(b) is justified because it is discretionary on the part of the OCC
to accept staggered payment
(c) is incorrect because the amendment on staggered payment
has been suspended
(d) is not allowed because the full payment of docket fee is
jurisdictional
(e) cannot be allowed because of its prejudicial impact on the
judiciary’s financial operations
A: (d). Rule 141, Sec. 1
Rule 142: Cost
Sec. 1. Cost ordinarily follow results of suit – Unless otherwise
provided in these rules, cost shall be allowed to the prevailing
party as a matter of course, but the court shall have power, for
special reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of
an action, or that the same be divided, as may be equitable. No
costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the Philippines
unless otherwise provided by law.
Sec. 2. When action or appeal dismissed – If an action or appeal
is dismissed for want of jurisdiction or otherwise, the court
nevertheless shall have the power to render judgment for cost, as
justice may require.
Sec. 3. Cost when appeal frivolous – Where an action or appeal is
found to be frivolous, double or treble cost may be imposed on
the plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so
ordered by the court.
[189]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 4. False allegations – An averment in a pleading made
without reasonable cause and found untrue shall subject the
offending party to the payment of such reasonable expenses as
may have been necessarily incurred by the other party by reason
of such untrue pleading. The amount of expenses so payable shall
be fixed by the judge in the trial, and taxed as costs.
Sec. 5. No cost for irrelevant matters – When the record contains
any unnecessary, irrelevant, or immaterial matter, the party as
whose instance the same was inserted or at whose instance the
same was printed, shall not be allowed as costs any disbursement
for preparing, certifying, or printing such matter.
Sec. 6. Attorney's fees as cost – No attorney's fees shall be taxed
as costs against the adverse party, except as provided by the rules
of civil law. But this section shall have no relation to the fees to be
charged by an attorney as against his client.
Sec. 7. Restriction of cost – If the plaintiff in any action shall
recover a sum not exceeding ten pesos as debt or damages, he
shall recover no more cost than debt or damages, unless the court
shall certify that the action involved a substantial and important
right to the plaintiff in which case full cost may be allowed.
Sec. 8. Costs, how to taxed – In inferior courts, the costs shall be
taxed by the justice of the peace or municipal judge and included
the judgment. In superior courts, costs shall be taxed by the clerk
of the corresponding court on five days' written notice giving by
the prevailing party to the adverse party. With this notice shall be
served a statement of the items of the cost claimed by the
prevailing party, verified by his oath or that of his attorney.
Objections to the taxation shall be made in writing, specifying the
items objected to. Either party may appeal to the court from the
clerk's taxation. The costs shall be inserted in the judgment if
taxed before its entry, and payment thereof shall be enforced by
execution.
Sec. 9. Cost in justice of the peace or municipal courts – In an
action or proceeding pending before a justice of the peace or
municipal judge, the prevailing party may recover the following
cost, and no other:
(a) For the complaint or answer, two pesos;
(b) For the attendance of himself, or his counsel, or both, on the
day of trial, five pesos;
(c) For each additional day's attendance required in the actual
trial of the case, one peso;

(d) For each witness produced by him, for each day's necessary
attendance at the trial, one peso, and his lawful traveling
fees;
(e) For each deposition lawfully taken by him and produced in
evidence, five pesos;
(f) For original documents, deeds, or papers of any kind
produced by him; nothing;
(g) For official copies of such documents, deeds, or papers, the
lawful fees necessarily paid for obtaining such copies;
(h) The lawful fees paid by him for service of the summons and
other process in the action;
(i) The lawful fees charged against him by the judge of the
court in entering and docketing and trying the action or
proceeding.
Sec. 10. Cost in Court of First Instance – In an action or
proceeding pending in a Court of First Instance, the prevailing
party may recover the following costs, and no other:
(a) For the complaint or answer, fifteen pesos;
(b) For his own attendance, and that of his attorney, down to
and including final judgment, twenty pesos;
(c) For each witness necessarily produced by him, for each day's
necessary attendance of such witness at the trial, two pesos,
and his lawful traveling fees;
(d) For each deposition lawfully taken by him, and produced in
evidence, five pesos;
(e) For original documents, deeds, or papers of any kind
produced by him, nothing;
(f) For official copies of such documents, deeds, or papers, the
lawful fees necessarily paid for obtaining such copies;
(g) The lawful fees paid by him in entering and docketing the
action or recording the proceedings, for the service of any
process in action, and all lawful clerk's fees paid by him.
Sec. 11. Costs in Court of Appeals and in Supreme Court –In an
action or proceeding pending in the Court of Appeals or in the
Supreme Court, the prevailing party may recover the following
costs, and no other:
(a) For his own attendance, and that of his attorney, down to
and including final judgment, thirty pesos in the Court of
Appeals and fifty pesos in the Supreme Court;
(b) For official copies of record on appeal and the printing
thereof, and all other copies required by the rules of court,
the sum actually paid for the same;
(c) All lawful fees charged against him by the clerk of the Court
of Appeals or of the Supreme Court, in entering and
docketing the action and recording the proceedings and
judgment therein and for the issuing of all process;
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(d) No allowance shall be made to the prevailing party in the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals for the brief or written
or printed arguments of his attorney, or copies thereof,
aside from the thirty or fifty pesos above stated;
(e) If testimony is received in the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals not taken in another court and transmitted thereto,
the prevailing party shall be allowed the same cost for
witness fees, depositors, and process and service thereof as
he would have been allowed for such items had the
testimony been introduced in a Court of First Instance;
(f) The lawful fees of a commissioner in an action may also be
taxed against the defeated party, or apportioned as justice
requires.
Sec. 12. Costs when witness fails to appear – If a witness fails to
appear at the time and place specified in the subpoena issued by
any inferior court, the cost of the warrant of arrest and of the
arrest of the witness shall be paid by the witness if the court shall
determine that his failure to answer the subpoena was wilful or
without just excuse.
Sec. 13. Costs when the person cited for examination in probate
proceedings – When a person is cited, on motion of another, to
appear before the court to be examined in probate proceedings,
the court may, in its discretion tax costs for the person so cited
and issue execution therefor, allowing the same fees as for
witnesses in Courts of First Instance.
Rule 143: Applicability of the Rules
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and
election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Rule 144: Effectiveness
These rukes shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern
all cases brought after they take effect, and also all
furtherproceedings in cases then pending. except to the extent
that in the opinion of the court their application would not be
feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former
procedure shall apply.
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC: Adopting the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
WHEREAS, at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 25-26 November 2002, at which
[190]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
the Philippine Supreme Court was represented by the Chief
Justice and Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Bangalore Draft
of the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Judicial Group on
Strengthening Judicial integrity was deliberated upon and
approved after incorporating therein several amendments;
WHEREAS, the Bangalore Draft, as amended, is intended to be the
Universal Declaration of Judicial Standards applicable in all
judiciaries;
WHEREAS, the Bangalore Draft is founded upon a universal
recognition that a competent, independent and impartial judiciary
is essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in upholding
constitutionalism and the rule of law; that public confidence in
the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the
judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society;
and that it is essential that judges, individually and collectively,
respect and honor judicial office as a public trust and strive to
enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system;
WHEREAS, the adoption of the universal declaration of standards
for ethical conduct of judges embodied in the Bangalore Draft as
revised at the Round Table Conference of Chief Justices at The
Hague is imperative not only to update and correlate the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted for the
Philippines, but also to stress the Philippines’ solidarity with the
universal clamor for a universal code of judicial ethics.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts this New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:
1. Prior to the adoption of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
(NCJC), judicial ethics was governed by the Code of Judicial
Conduct approved by the SC on September 5, 1989 and
which took effect on October 20, 1989
2. During the roundtable meeting of the Chief Justices at the
Peace Palace, The Hague in 2002, the so-called Bangalore
Draft of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“Bangalore Draft”)
was approved. The Bangalore Draft was subsequently
adopted by the Philippine SC through A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC
and which took effect on June 1, 2004
2009 Bar, Q. I(a), (True or False): The Bangalore Draft,
approved at a Roundtable Meeting of Chief Justices held at The
Hague, is now the New Code of Judicial Conduct in the
Philippines.
A: TRUE. The whereas clause of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
in the Philippines provides that the Bangalore Draft of the Code of
Judicial Conduct is intended to be a Universal Declaration of

Judicial Standards applicable in all judiciaries. As such, it was
adopted by the Supreme Court as its Code of Judicial Conduct, in
solidarity with other jurisdictions in the world.
2011 Bar, Q. 19: One of the foundation principles of the
Bangalore Draft of the Code of Judicial Conduct is the
importance in a modern democratic society of
(a) a judicial system that caters to the needs of the poor and
the weak.
(b) public confidence in its judicial system and in the moral
authority and integrity of its judiciary.
(c) the existence of independent and impartial tribunals that
have the support of its government.
(d) judges who are learned in law and jurisprudence.
2015 Bar, Q. XIV: Identify and briefly explain three (3) canons
under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
2007 Bar, Q. VI(b): What qualities should an ideal judge possess
under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary?
A: The qualities required of judges by the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine-Judiciary are Independence (Canon 1),
Integrity (Canon 2), Impartiality (Canon 3), Propriety (Canon 4),
Equality (Canon 5), and Competence and Diligence (Canon 6).
Qualifications of Judges
1997 Bar, Q. I: Atty. A has plans to join the Judiciary. He has
been a lawyer for about twenty years now. He has been an
esteemed member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a
legal consultant to a number of business entities, and an "of
counsel" of a medium-size law firm. Strangely enough, however,
he has yet to see a court room. Never, during his 20-year stint as
a lawyer, has he had the opportunity to conduct any actual trial
or litigation work. Does he possess the necessary qualifications
for a Regional Trial Court Judge?
A: The qualifications for a Regional Trial Court judge are:
(a) natural born citizen of the Philippines;
(b) at least 35 years of age; and;
(c) for at least ten years, has engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines or has held public office in the Philippines
requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite (Sec. 15, B.P. 129).
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
In Cayetano v. Monsod, the SC defined "practice of law" as "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." Under the
said definition, Atty. A is qualified to be appointed as a member of
the judiciary, assuming that he has the other qualifications for the
particular position. But he may not be suitable.
Canon 1: Independence
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore
uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.
1. Canon 1: Independence
In the Matter of Macasaet, (2008). Chief Justice Shirley
Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that
judicial independence encompasses two distinct but related
concepts of independence.
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses
on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to
decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A
judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job
without having to hear – or at least without having to take it
seriously if he does hear – criticisms of his personal morality and
fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional
judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the
judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a
class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts
of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the
public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of
this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent
Third Estate.
2. Judicial Independence, as a duty of a lawyer (Rule 13.03,
CPR)
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on
the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a
conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
[191]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1. Individual Judicial Independence
 Judges must carry out their judicial functions on the basis of
their own discernment and judgment. Such discernment and
judgment must be free from any undue outside influence.
 At the first attempt at extraneous influence, the judge must
promptly and decisively, but in a courteous manner, reject
or decline the attempt. In this way, the judge asserts his
individual judicial independence.
Sec. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent
from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is
obliged to make independently.
1. Individual Independence from Judicial Colleagues
 Every judge must decide independently, even in collegial
court divisions.
 While there may be discussions and exchanges of ideas
among judges, at the end of such discussion, the judge must
decide on the basis of his own, sole, judgment.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 1, Sec. 2
Re: Letters of Vasquez, Jr., (2008). A Justice of the CA who, in
violation of the internal rules (IRCA), allowed herself to be rushed
into signing a decision without reading the parties’ memoranda
and without the deliberation among members of the Division
required by the IRCA, showed “weakness and lack of
independence on her part” (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal,
admonished)
Sec. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.
1. Duty Against Meddling with Another Court or
Administrative Agency
Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor, (1991). A Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation
or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04).
Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with the
end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation
does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also
undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 1, Sec. 3

(a) Marces v. Judge Arcangel, (1996). A judge writing a note to
another judge which states:
Judge Edipolo Sarabia
Br. 3, City Trial Court
Davao City
Dear Ed:
If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still
pending, please issue another alias warrants as the accused is
now in town.
Thanks.
(Sgd.) Paul Arcangel
The judge thereby committed impropriety.
(b) Marces v. Judge Arcangel, (1996). Respondent Judge who
allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely
private matter between feuding families. In attending, at the
request of Mrs. Canas, the barangay conciliation
proceedings and introducing himself there as the Executive
Judge of the RTC in an obvious demonstration of support for
Mrs. Canas, respondent lent the prestige of his office to a
party in a case.
(c) OCA v. Judge Floro, (2006). A judge entering his appearance
in a court case representing himself but signing the pleading
wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC,
Br. 73, Malabon City and appending to the pleading a copy
of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking is trying to
influence or put pressure on a fellow judge.
2007 Bar, Q. VI(a): A and B are accused of Estafa by C, the wife of
RTC Judge D. Judge D testified as a witness for the prosecution in
the Estafa case. Did Judge D commit an act of impropriety? Give
reasons for your answer.
A: If the testimony of Judge D is essential for the prosecution of
the estafa case brought by his wife, it is not improper for him to
testify. But if it is not essential, as it does not appear to be so, his
act of testifying will be improper.
Sec. 3, Canon 1, of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary provides, that “judges shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court of administrative agency.”
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Sec. 8, Canon 4, of the same Code provides that “judges shall not
use nor lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their
private interests, or those of a member of their family or of
anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the
impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial will convey the
impression that he is trying to influence the presiding judge.
1992 Bar, Q. IX: In connection with a sensational criminal case,
the Public Relations Officer of the All-Judges Association, Inc.
issued two press releases, one stating that the trial judge should
not have granted bail to the accused since evidence of guilt was
strong and the other, calling upon said judge to inhibit himself
from trying the case since he did not exhibit the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge in ruling upon certain motions. Comment
on the actuations of the Public Relations Officer who is
presumably authorized by the Association.
A: The actuations of the Public Relations Officer of the All-Judges
Association is improper. What the All-Judges Association should
do is to report the matter to the SC and file the proper charges.
The SC may refer the matter for investigation to a Justice of the
CA.
The issuance of the press release is in violation of the rule that
charges and investigations against Judges should be confidential
in character and should not be published.
The Public Relations Officer can even be held in contempt of
court.
Furthermore, Sec. 3, Canon 1, of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides, that “judges shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation
or dispute pending before another court of administrative
agency.”
Rule 3.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that “A judge
should abstain from making public comments on any pending
case and should require similar restraint on the part of court
personnel."
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships
to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial
office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.
1. Individual Independence from Private Interests
[192]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
 Relationships with the judge can be used, for selfish
interests, to influence a judgment. The judge must be ever
aware that such friendly or cordial relations should not be
exploited to influence a decision.
 Consequently, the judge should not allow or tolerate those
friendly or cordial relations to be used by his friends and
relatives to protect the image that the judge can be
influence. Hence, the judge must be conscious of
relationships.
2. Judge’s Family, Defined
“Judge’s family” includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-
law, daughter-in-law, and any other relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a companion
or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
2009 Bar, Q. XI(e): A companion or employee of the judge who
lives in the judge’s household is included in the definition of the
“judge’s family.”
A: TRUE. A judge’s family as defined in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary “includes a judge’s spouse,
son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and many other
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree,
or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who
lives in the judge’s household.”
3. Mandatory Inhibition
Hurtado v. Judalena, (1978). Where a relative of the judge is one
of the parties to a case, within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, the disqualification is mandatory.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate
connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative
branches of government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
1. Judicial Independence from the Executive and Legislative
Branches of Government (Canon 1, Sec. 5)
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 1, Sec. 5
(a) Alfonso v. Alonzo-Legasto, (2002). Referring the matter of
the transfer of court employees to a local government
official, in this case to the Vice-Mayor, where the liaison
work “for all liaison and coordination activities with the
Legislative and Executive departments as well as with local
government officials” was the sole responsibility of the
Court Administrator and not the trial judge. The personnel

action initiated by the trial judge was a clear derogation of
the power of administrative supervision of the SC over court
employees.
Bagatsing v. Herrera, (1975). For judicial independence to be a
reality, the least interference by or influence from other
governmental departments is of the essence.
OCA A.C. 17-99. Lest it be against ignored, we stress in this regard
that only this Court has the authority to order a personnel
accounting of locally-funded employees assigned in the lower
courts to determine the necessity of their detail, and that
accordingly, all requests for detail of locally-funded employees,
including complainants herein, must pass the OCA for review and
appropriate action.
3. Illustration Where There is No Undue Influence
Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Joboco, (1998). Congenial
relationships, however, between a judge and a provincial
governor does not by itself tarnish the image of an independent
judiciary. A LGU which provides a vehicle for the use of the judge
does not impinge on judicial independence, in the absence of any
indication of corruption or anomalous undertakings.
2010 Bar, Q. XIX: Judges of the first and second level courts are
allowed to receive assistance from the LGUs where they are
stationed. The assistance could be in the form of equipment or
allowance.
Justices at the Court of Appeals in the regional stations in the
Visayas and Mindanao are not necessarily residents there,
hence, they incur additional expenses for their accommodations.
Pass on the propriety of the Justices’ receipt of assistance/
allowance from the local governments.
A: In the cases of Dadole v. COA (2002), and Leynes v. COA (2003),
the Supreme Court has upheld the grant of allowances by LGUs to
“judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers,
and other national government officials” stationed in or assigned
to the locality pursuant to Sec. 447(a)(l)(xi), 458(a)(l)(xi) and
468(a)(l)(xi) of R.A. 7160 (LGC). The SC held that “to rule against
the power of the LGUs to grant allowances to judges will subvert
the principle of local autonomy zealously guaranteed by the
Constitution.” Hence, it is not improper for judges and justices to
receive allowances from local government units, since it is
allowed by law for LGUs to give the same.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Alternative: Sec. 5, Canon I of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary provides that “judges shall be free
from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the
executive and legislative branches of the government, and must
also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable extent.” It is a
common perception that the receipt of allowances or assistance
from a local government unit may affect the judge’s ability to rule
independently in cases involving the said unit.
1989 Bar, Q. X: An RTC judge was designated as member of a
Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential
E.O. 856. The provincial committees on justice were created to
ensure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees. Among the
functions of the committee are:
(1) Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail
warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have
committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer
the same to the proper authority for appropriate action;
and;
(2) Recommend revision of any law or regulations which is
believed prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
These committees are under the supervision of the Secretary of
Justice.
Before accepting the designation, the judge requested for the
issuance of a resolution authorizing him to accept their
appointment. Can the request be granted? Why?
A: In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo Manzano, RTC of Ilocos
Norte as member of the Provincial Committee on Justice, the SC
ruled that Judge Manzano should decline said designation
because he will be performing non-judicial functions in violation
of the Constitution. The Committee in fact has to submit reports
and recommendation to the Secretary of Justice who is in the
executive branch. It violates the principle of separation of powers.
In view thereof the request of the RTC judge may not be granted.
Sec. 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in
general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which
he or she has to adjudicate.
1. Individual Independence from Society and from Litigants
 Canon 1, Sec. 6 speaks of independence “in relation to
society” and does not speak of withdrawal from society.
Hence, the judge is not expected to live in isolation away
from society
[193]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
 Canon 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics
Canon 30: It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial
duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is
desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the
completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in
social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A
judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before
him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business
relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his
judicial course.
 More importantly in Canon 1, Sec. 6 is the independence
from the party-litigants. Party-litigants must be kept at a
distance during course of the litigation. Hence, ex parte
communications with any of the parties must be vigorously
avoided.
 In case of social contact with a litigant, the pending case
should never be discussed.
 In the same way, emissaries for the party or go-betweens
should be rejected by the judge
2. Violation of Independence from Litigants
Tan v. Rosete, (2004). The act of a judge in meeting with litigants
outside the office premises beyond office hours violates the
standard of judicial conduct.
Sec. 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the
discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
1. Duty to Uphold Safeguards
 There are safeguards put in place by the ROC, circulars from
the SC, and even ordinary protocols. These safeguards are
designed to promote judicial independence.
 The judge must zealously uphold such safeguards
Sec. 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial
conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary,
which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
1. Duty of High Standards in Judicial Conduct
Arban v. Borja, (1986). Sec. 8 is a mere affirmance of the judges
are the visible representation of the law and justice.

Dimatulac v. Villon, (1998). A judge should always be imbued
with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must
view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to
a religious crusade.
Canon 2: Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
1. Duty to Disclose to the Appointing Authority and JBC
OCA v. Judge Estacion. Respondent judge was dismissed for
concealing from the appointing authority information regarding
the criminal charges for homicide and attempted homicide filed
against him.
1996 Bar, Q. VIII(2): A Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
notwithstanding the fact that he was facing criminal charges at
the time he obtained his appointment, did not disclose the
pendency of the cases either to the President or to the Supreme
Court. He claims that: (a) he enjoys presumption of innocence in
the pending criminal cases; (b) that the said cases even if
sustained after trial do not involve moral turpitude; and (c)
before an administrative complaint based on a criminal
prosecution can be given due course there must be a conviction
by final Judgment.
May the Judge be considered as an undeserving appointee and
therefore be removed from his office?
A: He may be considered as undeserving and removed from
office. This problem falls squarely under the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Court Administrator v. Estacion,
wherein a complaint was filed concerning the appointment of a
Regional Trial Court judge notwithstanding the fact that he was
then facing criminal charges for homicide and attempted
homicide. The Judge also claimed that (a) he enjoys the
presumption of innocence, (b) the said cases, even if sustained,
do not involved moral turpitude, and (c) before an administrative
complaint based on a criminal prosecution is given due course,
there must be a conviction by final judgment. The Supreme Court
held:
“The argument that he had not yet been convicted and should be
presumed innocent is beside the point, and so is the contention
that the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide do not
involve moral turpitude. The important consideration is that he
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
had a duty to inform appointing authority and this Court of the
pending criminal charges against him to enable them to
determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he
was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not
contain the important information in question because he
deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor
is as obvious as his reason for suppression of such vital fact, which
he knew would have been taken into account against him if it had
been disclosed.
As stressed in the report, it behooves every prospective appointee
to the judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every
matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These
are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the
judiciary under Article VIII, Sec. 7 (3) of the Constitution. The fact
alone of his concealment of the two criminal cases against him is
clear proof of his lack of the said qualifications and renders him
unworthy to sit as a Judge."
The respondent Judge was accordingly removed from office.
1998 Bar, Q. III: Judge C was appointed MTC Judge in 1993.
Subsequently, the Judicial and Bar Council received information
that previously he had been dismissed as Assistant City
Prosecutor of Manila. It appeared that when he applied for
appointment to the Judiciary, his answer to the question in the
personal Data Sheet - “Have you ever been retired, dismissed or
forced to resign from any employment?" was - “Optional under
Republic Act No. 1145.” The truth is, he was dismissed for gross
misconduct as Assistant City prosecutor.
May he be dismissed as Judge?
A: Yes. "By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the
public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have
taken into consideration in acting on his application for
appointment as a judge, he (the judge) committed an act of
dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed, and to
remain, in the Judiciary he has tarnished with his falsehood." (Re:
Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube; Jose
Estacion; Estanislao v. Belan, August 6, 1998).
Re: Judge Cube. Judge Cube was dismissed from the service when
he purposely did not disclose his previous dismissal when he
accomplished the bio-data form required by the JBC.
Court Administrator v. Judge Magtibay. There was deliberate
concealment of his prior suspension in A.C. 2489.
[194]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
1. Duty to be Above Reproach and Duty to Appear Above
Reproach
Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan, (1999). “The Court pointed out in
Dawa v. De Asa that the people’s confidence in the judicial system
is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and
diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to
possess.
2. Integrity is a Necessity
Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio, (2003). In the Judiciary, moral
integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity.
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
1. Duty of Public Conduct
Junio v. Rivera, Jr. (1993). The judge must not only appear to be a
“good judge” but also appear as a “good person”. This must be so
at all times.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 2, Sec. 2
(a) Dawa v. De Asa, (1998). Sexual harassment upon his court
employees by forcibly kissing them (Judge dismissed from
the service)
(b) In re: Judge Marcos, (2001). Maintaining a mistress and
bringing such mistress in functions attended by other judges
(Judge dismissed from the service)
(c) Lachica v. Flordeliza, (1996). Asking intimidating questions
while in an inebriated or drunken state during a party of a
municipality.
(d) City of Tagbilaran v. Hontanas, (2002). Habitually gambling
and frequenting casinos and cockpits. The judge’s argument
that he only played the slot machines was not accepted as
such machines were also for gambling.
2005 Bar, Q. V: Judge Horacio would usually go to the cockpits
on Saturdays for relaxation, as the owner of the cockpit is a
friend of his. He also goes to the casino once a week to
accompany his wife who loves to play the slot machines.
Because of this, Judge Horacio was administratively charged.

When asked to explain, he said that although he goes to these
places, he only watches and does not place any bets.
Is his explanation tenable? Explain.
A: The explanation of Judge Horacio is not tenable. In the case of
City of Tagbilaran vs. Hontanosas, Jr., (2002), the SC penalized a
city court judge for going to gambling casinos and cockpits on
weekends. According to the Court, going to a casino violates
Circular No. 4, dated August 27, 1980, which enjoins judges of
inferior courts from playing or being present in gambling casinos.
The prohibition refers to both actual gambling and mere presence
in gambling casinos. A judge’s personal behavior, not only in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach.
With regard to going to cockpits, the SC held that “[V]verily, it is
plainly despicable to see a judge inside a cockpit and more so, to
see him bet therein. Mixing with the crowd of cockfighting
enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming a judge and undoubtedly
impairs the respect due him. Ultimately, the Judiciary suffers
therefrom because a judge is a visible representation of the
Judiciary" (City of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, Jr.)
(e) Judge Naval v. Judge Panday, (1997). Having sexual
intercourse with a 15-year-old minor (Judge dismissed from
the service)
(f) Judge Alumbres v. Judge Caoibes, (2002). Punching a fellow
judge in the face after a disagreement over the use of an
office table.
Sec. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
1. Duty to Instill Discipline Among Lawyers and Court
Personnel
Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Joboco, (1998). A judge has the
prerogative to discipline his staff for negligence and/or a mistake.
However, a judge should not make it a habit of showing fits of
temper and resorting to verbal abuse against erring employees.
Thus, he should be mindful of the need to maintain professional
and harmonious relations with his personnel with a view to the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
However, judges do not have the power and authority to
preventively suspend a clerk of court as such power is vested
exclusively with the SC
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2. Slightest Impropriety of Court Personnel Should be
Checked
Buenaventura v. Benedicto, (1971). Oftentimes, such leniency
provides the court employees the opportunity to commit minor
transgressions of the laws and slight breaches of official duty
ultimately leading to vicious delinquencies. The respondent judge
should constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his
employees. He should realize that big start small. His constant
scrutiny of the behavior of his employees would deter any abuse
on the part of the latter in the exercise of their duties. Then, his
subordinates would know that any misdemeanor will not remain
unchecked. The slightest semblance of impropriety on the part of
the employees of the court in the performance of their official
duties stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the
judicial administrators. The slightest breach of duty by and the
slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and
employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the
faith of the people in the judiciary.
Canon 3: Impartiality
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial
office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made.
1. Duty to be Impartial
Edano v. Asdala, (2007). This duty does not apply only to the
decisions but to the process as well.
Castillo v. Juan, (1975). Hence, the objectivity is essential to an
independent judiciary.
In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the
manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone
concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not
for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to
the at times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to
refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It
would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of
reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in
the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be
obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the
traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides
with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an
unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should
possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to
hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should
[195]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartially. What has
been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed
with constitutional significance.
2. Allegations of Partiality Must Be Substantiated
Dimo Realty & Dev. Inc. v. Dimaculangan, (2004). Allegations of
partiality or bias must have a factual basis. Bare allegations or
suspicions of partiality will not be sufficient to cause the
disqualification of the judge.
Sec. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor,
bias or prejudice.
1. Duty to be Free From Favor, Bias or Prejudice
 Justice is rendered exclusively on the basis of the law, the
relevant facts, and the jurisprudence
 All other human factors such as emotions, relationships,
preconceptions are unseen by Lady Justice, and are to be
excluded totally from the judge’s consideration.
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out
of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and
of the judiciary.
1. Duty to Appear Impartial
Sps. Nazareno v. Judge Almario, (1997). A judge should only be
impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest as well.
The judge should be careful with his public conduct and his
speech and remarks to others. Hence, the judge must exercise
prudence and restraint and should reserve personal views and
predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and
unfairness.
Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon, (2000). “Like Caesar’s wife, a judge
must not only be pure but above suspicion”
People v. CA. The judge must portray the “cold-neutrality of an
impartial juge”
2. Illustration of Violation of this Canon 3, Sec. 2
(a) OCA v. Judge Floro, (2006). Stating to his court staff and the
PAO lawyer that he is “pro-accused” particularly concerning

detention prisoners, the judge opened himself up to
suspicion regarding his impartiality.
(b) Sison v. Judge Caoibes, (2004). A judge based in Las Pinas
was dismissed from the service after it was found that the
judge had, without basis and authority, cited an MMDA
traffic enforcer for indirect contempt after the MMDA traffic
enforcer cited the judge’s driver, his son, for traffic violation
along EDSA. The judge’s argument that his driver was on
official errand was not given credence and the Court ruled
that the contempt charge was actually a retaliation.
(c) Cabreana v. Avelino. Hitching a ride in the car of a party-
litigant on the way to an ocular inspection.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves
as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for
them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
1. Duty Not to Give Cause for Disqualification
Te v. CA. Disqualification is also called inhibition or to recuse.
Where the allegation of partiality has not been reasonably
established, then there would be no ground for the judge to
inhibit. The test to determine the propriety of the denial of a
motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a fair
and impartial trial.
People v. Gako, Jr. A ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot be
overturned in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge. Where, however, bias and partiality is evident,
then the judge must inhibit from the case.
2. Guidepost for Voluntary Inhibition of Judges
Pimentel v. Salonga, (1967). The Court laid down the following
guideposts for voluntary inhibition of judges:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced
to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting
such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.
1991 Bar, Q. VIII: What rule should guide a Judge in determining
whether he should not voluntarily inhibit himself in a case
pending before him?
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
A: The Rule is stated in the last paragraph of Rule 137, Sec. 1, ROC
which provides that in the exercise of his sound discretion a judge
should disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons.
If there is any circumstance that might affect his impartiality, the
judge should exercise his sound discretion to inhibit himself from
trying a case. As ruled in Pimentel vs. Salonga, when suggestion is
made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind,
he should conduct a careful examination and in good grace inhibit
himself where that case could be heard by another judge and
where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others
involved therein.
Alternative: “A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in
a litigation. But when the suggestion is made of record that he
might be induced to act in favor of-one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising from circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination."
Constante v. Pimentel, (1978). The procedure for disqualification
of judges in Rule 137, Sec. 2 must be substantially followed.
2012 Bar, Q. (36): Bong, son of Judge Rey, is a fourth year law
student. He helped his friend prepare an affidavit-complaint for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. After drafting, they showed
it to Judge Rey who made some corrections. Later, the BP 22
case was raffled to Judge Rey who tried and convicted the
accused. Was there impropriety?
(a) Yes, since Judge Rey was not a fair and impartial judge.
(b) No, the evidence for the prosecution was strong and
sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(c) No, because any other judge would also have convicted the
accused.
(d) No, those matters were not known to the accused.
3. Provision in the ROC
Rule 137: Disqualification of Judicial Officers
Rule 137, Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges – No judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
[196]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
2015 Bar, Q. XIII(A): In a land registration case before Judge
Lucio, the petitioner is represented by the second cousin of
Judge Lucio’s wife.
Differentiate between compulsory and voluntary disqualification
and determine if Judge Lucio should disqualify himself under
either circumstance
A: In compulsory disqualification, the judge is compelled to inhibit
himself from presiding over a case when any of the ground
provided by the law or the rules exists
Under Rule 137, Sec. 1, ROC, no judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case:
(1) In which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
(2) In which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or
(3) In which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or
(4) In which he has been presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
Sec. 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary adds the following grounds:
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or
personalknowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material
witness in the matterin controversy;
In voluntary disqualification, a judge may inhibit himself in the
exercise of his discretion.

Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, ROC provides that “a judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.”
The New Code of Professional Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
adds that “judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in
any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially (Canon 3,
Sec. 5)
There is no mandatory ground for Judge Lucio to disqualify
himself. The second cousin of his wife, a sixth degree relative, is
appearing not as a party but as counsel.
2015 Bar, Q. XIII(B): In a land registration case before Judge
Lucio, the petitioner is represented by the second cousin of
Judge Lucio’s wife.
If none of the parties move for his disqualification, may Judge
Lucio proceed with the case?
A: If none of the parties moves for his disqualification, Judge Lucio
may proceed with the case. All the more so if, without the
participation of the judge, the parties and their lawyers execute a
written agreement that Judge Lucio may proceed with the same,
and such agreement is signed by them and made a part of the
records of the case.
2011 Bar, Q. 6: In a verified complaint, Kathy said that Judge
Florante decided a petition for correction of entry involving the
birth record of her grandson, Joshua, who happened to be child
of Judge Florante's daughter, Pilita. Judge Florante insisted that
he committed no wrong since the proceeding was non-
adversarial and since it merely sought to correct an erroneous
entry in the child’s birth certificate. Is Judge Florante liable?
(a) Yes, because Florante breached the rule on mandatory
disqualification.
(b) No, because Judge Florante has no pecuniary interest in the
proceeding.
(c) No, because it is true the proceeding was non-adversarial so
it prejudiced no one.
(d) Yes, since the correction in the child’s record affects the
details of birth of the child.
1989 Bar, Q. IX(1): Discuss briefly the grounds for disqualification
or inhibition of judges to try a case.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
A: Under Rule 137 Sec. 1, ROC, a judge is disqualified to sit in
every case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heirs; legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed
according to the rules of civil law or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. This rule
enumerates the grounds under which a judge is legally
disqualified from sitting in a case, and excludes all other grounds
not specified therein. The judge may, however, in the exercise of
his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Under
said rule, the judge may voluntarily inhibit himself from sitting in a
case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned in the
rule.
1988 Bar, Q. IX: On what grounds may a judge be disqualified, or
asked to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing a case? Briefly
explain each ground.
A: Rule 137, Sec. 1, ROC provides that a judge is disqualified Rom
sitting on any case in which he or his wife or child is pecuniarily
interested as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise or in which he is
related to either party within sixth degree of consanguinity of
affinity or to counsel within the fourth civil degree.
Under the last sentence of Rule 137, Sec. 1, ROC, a judge may
voluntarily inhibit himself from participating in a case for just and
valid reasons.
The rule on voluntarily inhibition of judges was set by the
Supreme Court in Pimentel vs. Salonga, as follows:
“All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion
as any to draw the attention of all judges to appropriate
guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide
fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from
any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation. But when the suggestion is made of record
that he might be induced to act in favor ' of one party or with bias
or prejudice ‘against a litigant arising out of circumstances
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is
not impaired.”
[197]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Rule 137, Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made
and effect – If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from
sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency
may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the
grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with
the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision
shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers
in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by
reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after
final judgment in the case.
4. Persons Who Are NOT Parties May NOT Seek Inhibitions
Hilado v. Judge Reyes, (2006). Persons who are not parties to the
case may not seek the inhibition of a judge
Sec. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or
could come before them, make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding
or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges
make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the
fair trial of any person or issue.
1. Duty to Refrain from Undue Comments on a Case
Cacatian v. Liwanag, (2003). Irresponsible speech or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
Fecundo v. Berjamen, (1989). A judge’s language, both written
and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued.
Where such comment has been made, the judge would have the
obligation to recuse himself from hearing the case.
2000 Bar, Q. XIV: Before he joined the bench, Judge J was a vice-
mayor. Judge J resumed writing a weekly column in a local
newspaper. In his column, Judge J wrote:
“I was wondering if the present vice-mayor can shed off his
crocodile hide so that he can feel the clamor of the public for the
resignation of hoodlum public officers of which he is one".
When charged administratively, Judge J invoked freedom of
expression. Is his defense tenable? Explain.
A: The Judge’s reliance on freedom of expression is untenable.
The judge's vicious writings compromise his duties as judge in the

impartial administration of justice. His writings lack judicial
decorum which requires the use of temperate language at all
times. The judge should not instigate litigation (Galang v. Santos,
1999; Royeca v. Animas, 1976).
2014 Bar, Q. XIX(a): After the pre-trial of a civil case for replevin,
Judge D advised B’s counsel to settle the case because according
to Judge D, his initial assessment of the case shows that B’s
evidence is weak.
Did Judge D commit an act of impropriety? Explain.
A: Yes, Judge D acted improperly.
Sec. 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary provides that “judges shall not knowingly,
while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make
any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or
otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
In the case of Castillo v. Juan (G.R. No. L-39516-17, January 28,
1975), a judge spoke to the complainants in two rape cases in his
chamber before trial, and advised them to settle their cases with
the accused because their evidence was weak. The SC found the
conduct of the judge to be violative of duty of impartiality.
The Court stated that the judge should avoid any conduct that
casts doubt on his impartiality. It is not merely a matter of judicial
ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
2014 Bar, Q. XIX(b): After the pre-trial of a civil case for replevin,
Judge D advised B’s counsel to settle the case because according
to Judge D, his initial assessment of the case shows that B’s
evidence is weak.
What remedy or remedies may be taken by B’s lawyer against
Judge D? Discuss fully.
A: B’s lawyer could move for the disqualification or inhibition of
the judge, and if he refuses to inhibit, his refusal can be raised to a
higher court by certiorari.
Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material
witness in the matter in controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an
economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a
former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness
therein;
(e) The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party
litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the
fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a
financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or
otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
1. Instances of Mandatory Inhibition
(a) Austria v. Masaquel, (1967). Where the judge can be
associated with either of the parties or their counsel
(b) Umale v. Villaluz, (1973). Where the judge has prior
personal knowledge about the facts of the case.
2016 Bar, Q. II: State at least five (5) instances where judges
should disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceedings where their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
A: Canon 3, Sec. 5 of New Code Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
Rule 137, Sec. 1, ROC provides for similar grounds
2014 Bar, Q. XXI: Justice B of the Court of Appeals (CA) was a
former Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge. A case which he heard
as a trial judge was raffled off to him. The appellant sought his
disqualification from the case but he refused on the ground that
he was not the judge who decided the case as he was already
promoted to the appellate court before he could decide the
case.
[198]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Was the refusal of Justice B to recuse from the case proper?
Explain your answer.
A: The refusal of Justice B to recuse from the case is improper.
In the case of Sandoval v. CA (G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996),
involving the same facts, the SC held that the CA Justice
concerned was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case.
However, he “should have been more prudent and circumspect
and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement
in the case”, because “a judge should not handle a case in which
he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to
bias and partiality”. This axiom is “intended to preserve and
promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the
judiciary.
2012 Bar, Q. 34. Judge Nacy personally witnessed a vehicular
accident near his house. Later, the Reckless Imprudence case
was raffled to his sala. Is there a valid ground for his inhibition?
(a) No. he is [neither] acquainted nor related with any of the
parties or lawyer.
(b) No, his personal knowledge of what actually happened will
even ensure that he will decide the case justly on the basis
of the true facts.
(c) Yes, because a judge should decide a case on the basis of
the evidence presented before him and not on extraneous
matters.
(d) No, because there is no ground for disqualification and no
motion for inhibition.
2009 Bar, Q. IV(a): In a case for homicide filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Presiding Judge Quintero issued an
order for the arrest of the accused, granted a motion for the
reduction of bail, and set the date for the arraignment of the
accused. Subsequently, Judge Quintero inhibited himself from
the case, alleging that even before the case was raffled to his
court, he already had personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the case. Is Judge Quintero’s inhibition justified?
Explain.
A: Judge Quintero’s inhibition is justified. One of the grounds for
inhibition under Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary is “where the judge has actual
bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings.”
2004 Bar, Q. VIII(A): Judge Aficionado was among the several
thousands of spectators watching a basketball game at the Rizal

Memorial Coliseum who saw the stabbing of referee Maykiling
by player Baracco in the course of the game. The criminal case
correspondingly filed against Baracco for the stabbing of
Maykiling was raffled to the Regional Trial Court branch
presided over by Judge Aficionado. Should Judge Aficionado sit
in judgment over and try the case against Baracco? Explain.
A: No, he should not preside over the case. Rule 3.12 (a) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should not take
part in any proceeding where the judge has personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the same.
(c) People v. Gomez, (1967). Where the judge is biased or
partial
2014 Bar, Q. XVII: Judge Clint Braso is hearing a case between
Mr. Timothy and Khristopher Company, a company where his
wife used to work as one of its Junior Executives for several
years. Doubting the impartiality of the Judge, Mr. Timothy filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Clint Braso. Judge Clint Braso refused on
the ground that his wife has long resigned from the company.
Decide.
A: The fact that Judge Braso’s wife used to work for Kristofer
Company is not a mandatory ground for his inhibition.
However, Sec. 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges should disqualify
themselves from participating in any proceeding in which “it may
appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide
the matter in partially”. The SC has advised that a judge “should
exercise his decision in a way that the people’s faith in the courts
of justice is not impaired” (Pimentel v. Salanga, G.R. No. L-27934,
September 18, 1967).
While it may not be reasonable to believe that Judge Braso cannot
be impartial because his wife used to work as a Junior Executive
for Kristofer Company, the better part of prudence would dictate
that he inhibit himself from the case involving the said company.
(d) Villauz v. Mijares, (1998). Where the judge is related to the
party-litigant or the counsel. In this case, the judge took
cognizance of a petition for correction of entry in the birth
record of her grandson, Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, the
child of her daughter Ma. Pilita M. Guarango,
notwithstanding such close relationship
2012 Bar, Q. (31): A judge or judicial officer is disqualified to
hear a case before him wherein a party is related to him by
consanguinity or affinity –
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(a) up to the 6th degree;
(b) up to the 5th degree;
(c) up to the 4th degree;
(d) up to the 3rd degree.
2012 Bar, Q. (32): A judge or judicial officer should inhibit
himself from hearing a case before him where the counsel for
either party is a relative by consanguinity or affinity –
(a) up to the 3rd degree;
(b) up to the 4th degree;
(c) up to the 5th degree;
(d) up to the 6th degree.
2010 Bar, Q. XII: Rebecca’s complaint was raffled to the sala of
Judge A. Rebecca is a daughter of Judge A’s wife by a previous
marriage. This is known to the defendant who does not,
however, file a motion to inhibit the Judge.
Is the Judge justified in not inhibiting himself from the case?
A: The judge is not justified in not inhibiting himself. It is
mandatory for him to inhibit if he is related to any of the parties
by consanguinity or affiant within the sixth civil degree (Sec. 3 [f]
Canon 3, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary). Judge A, being the stepfather of Rebecca, is related to
her by affinity by just one degree. “Judges shall disqualify
themselves from participating in any proceeding in which they are
unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear
to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the
matter impartially” (Sec. 5, Canon 3). The fact that Rebecca is a
daughter of Judge A’s wife is liable to make a reasonable observer
doubt his impartially.
2008 Bar, Q. IX(a): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
judge concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
below: Refusing to inhibit himself although one of the lawyers in
the case is his second cousin.
A: One of the mandatory grounds for inhibition of a judge is when
he is related to any of the lawyers handling a case before him
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. (Sec. 5
[f], New Code of Judicial Conduct, Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of
Court). A second cousin of a judge is his relative within the sixth
degree, hence, he may not be sanctioned for not inhibiting on
such ground.
[199]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1999 Bar, Q. XI: In a case before him, it was the son of Municipal
Trial Court Judge X who appeared as counsel for the plaintiff.
After the proceeding, Judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant. B, the defendant in the case,
complained against Judge X for not disqualifying himself in
hearing and deciding the case. In his defense. Judge X alleged
that he did not disqualify himself in the case because the
defendant never sought his disqualification.
Is Judge X liable for misconduct in office?
A: Judge X is liable for misconduct in office. Rule 3.12 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should take no part in a
proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. In fact, it is mandatory for him to inhibit or disqualify
himself if he is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party
litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth
degree (Hurtado v. Jurdalena). He need not wait for a motion of
the parties in order to disqualify himself.
1988 Bar, Q. IX(b): Atty. Andres has been in the active practice of
law for the last 25 years in Makati, Metro Manila. Quite a
number of his cases are pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Makati. Recently, his brother Eduardo was appointed
judge to preside over one of the three (3) branches of that court.
Some of the cases being handled by Atty. Andres were raffled or
assigned to the branch presided by Judge Eduardo. Judge
Eduardo inhibited himself from hearing those cases handled by
his brother, Atty. Andres. Now, Judge Santander, to whose sala
most of the cases were re-assigned, complained and suggested
to Judge Eduardo that Atty. Andres should inhibit or refrain from
handling cases in Makati.
Is there basis for the complaint of Judge Santander? Explain.
A: There is no valid basis for the complaint of Judge Santander.
Precisely, Judge Eduardo had properly inhibited himself from
participating in all the cases wherein his brother lawyer is
appearing in accordance with Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
It would be unreasonable to prohibit Andres from handling cases
in Makati where he was practicing for twenty five years. It is his
means of livelihood and he has his duties to his clients.
2. Instances When Judge Need Not Inhibit
(a) Aparicio v. Andal, (1989). The fact that an administrative
case has been filed by a party against the judge is not a
ground for inhibition in the absence of factual basis for bias
and prejudice. This is especially true where the

administrative cases were filed only to force the judge to
inhibit himself from the consideration of the case before
him.
2008 Bar, Q. VI: Atty. Abigail filed administrative cases before
the Supreme Court against Judge Luis. Thereafter, Atty. Abigail
filed a Motion for Inhibition praying that Judge Luis inhibit
himself from trying, hearing or in any manner acting on all cases,
civil and criminal, in which Atty. Abigail is involved and handling.
Should Judge Luis inhibit himself as prayed for by Atty. Abigail?
Explain fully.
A: Judge Luis should not inhibit himself. The mere filing of an
administrative case against a judge is not a ground for
disqualification on the ground of bias and prejudice (Aparicio v.
Andal, 1989; Medina v. De Guia, 1993; Mantaring v. Roman, Jr.,
1996).
(b) Choa v. Chiongson, (1996). The fact that the judge is a next-
door neighbor of the complainant was found to be petty.
(c) Macariola v. Asuncion. Close personal friendship is not a
ground for inhibition. As long as that friendly relations with a
party-litigant does not influence his official conduct as a
judge in the cases where his close friend was a party.
Santos v. Judge Lacurom, (2006). There must be convincing court
to his close friend, or that his close friend benefited from his
personal relations with respondent judge, or that respondent
judge used his influence, if any, to favor his close friend. However,
it would have been prudent for the judge to inhibit himself.
2016 Bar, Q. IX: Atty. Tristan filed a motion to disqualify Judge
Robert from hearing a civil case on the ground that the latter
was the classmate and fraternity brother of Atty. Mark, Atty.
Tristan's opposing counsel. Judge Robert denied the motion on
the ground that under Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
he is not required to inhibit in all cases where his classmates and
fraternity brothers are participating lawyers in cases before him.
Is Judge Robert correct in denying the motion?
A: Judge Robert is correct in denying the motion for inhibition on
the ground that he was the classmate of Atty. Tristan’s adverse
counsel.
That one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the judge is
not a mandatory ground for his disqualification (Vda. De Bonifacio
v. BLT Bus Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-226810, August 31, 1970; Santos v.
Lacurom, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006).
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
However, he may inhibit on the discretionary ground that his
refusal to inhibit may reasonably cause the parties to lose trust
and confidence on the court.
2011 Bar, Q. 31: Serving as counsel de oficio, Atty. Mamerto
advised John of the consequences of his plea of not guilty to the
charge. Before trial could be held, however, the presiding judge
died. As it happened, Atty. Mamerto was appointed judge and
John’s case was assigned to him by raffle. John quickly moved
for the judge’s disqualification. Is Judge Mamerto under
obligation to inhibit himself from the case?
(a) No, because his service to John was just momentary.
(b) Yes, because his knowledge of John’s case affects his
judgment.
(c) No, because he was merely a counsel de oficio.
(d) Yes, because he served as John's counsel.
2005 Bar, Q. VII(1): Judge Segotier is a member of Phi Nu Phi
Fraternity. Atty. Nonato filed a motion to disqualify Judge
Segotier on the ground that the counsel for the opposing party is
also a member of the Phi Nu Phi Fraternity. Judge Segotier
denied the motion.
Comment on his ruling.
A: The ruling of Judge Segotier is correct. The fact that a judge is a
former classmate of one of the counsels in a case has been held to
be insufficient ground for the disqualification of the judge (Vda.
de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co., Inc., 1970). Intimacy or friendship
between judge and an attorney of record has also been held to be
insufficient ground for the former’s disqualification (Masadao &
Elizaga, Re Criminal Case No. 4954-M, 1987).
1997 Bar, Q. XVI: RTC Judge Q is a deacon in the Iglesia ni Kristo
church in San Francisco del Monte. Quezon City. R. a member of
the same religious sect belonging to the same INK community in
San Francisco del Monte, filed a case against S who belongs to
the El Shaddai charismatic group. The case was raffled to Judge
Q's sala. The lawyer of S filed a motion to disqualify Judge Q on
the ground that since he and the plaintiff belonged to the same
religious sect and community in San Francisco del Monte, Judge
Q would not possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Judge Q denied the motion on the ground that the, reason
invoked for his disqualification was not among the grounds for
disqualification under the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Was Judge Qis denial of the motion for inhibition well
founded?
[200]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: The fact that Judge Q and Litigant R both belong to the Iglesia
Ni Kristo while Litigant S belongs to the El Shaddai group, is not a
mandatory ground for disqualifying Judge Q from presiding over
the case. The motion for his inhibition is addressed to his sound
discretion and he should exercise the same in a way the people's
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. He should reflect on
the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his
mind the thought that the Judge had unmeritoriously tilted the
scales of Justice against him (Dimacuha v. Concepcion). Under the
circumstances of this case, where the only ground given for his
disqualification is that he and one of the litigants are members of
the same religious community, I believe that his denial of the
motion for his disqualification is proper. In Vda. de Ignacio vs. BLT
Bus Co., the Supreme Court held that the fact that one of the
counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal
ground for the disqualification of the judge.
1994 Bar, Q. XIII: In a civil case, the defendant discovered that
the counsel for the plaintiff used to be a member of the Judicial
and Bar Council during whose time the Judge presiding over the
case was appointed and confirmed. He filed a “Motion to Inhibit
the Judge” on the ground that the latter's ability to act
independently and Judiciously had been compromised and
seriously impaired because of his “utang na loob" to the
plaintiffs’ counsel.
If you were the judge, how would you rule on the Motion?
A: I will deny the Motion for Inhibition because every judge is
sworn to uphold the decisions of cases in accordance with the
law. The fact that the judge was recommended by the JBC which
has seven (7) members and deliberated even confidentially does
not make the judge even morally indebted to the JBC member
who may not even voted for him.
Alternative: Section 1. Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides
specific grounds where it is mandatory for a judge to be legally
disqualified from sitting in a case. None of those grounds is
applicable in this case. However, the same rule adds that the
Judge may. “In the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than
those mentioned above. The Supreme Court has held that when a
suggestion is made that a judge might be induced to act in favor
of one party and against another arising out of circumstances
capable of inciting such state of mind, he should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is
not impaired (Masadao & Elizaga Re Crim. Case No. 4954-M).
The fact that the counsel of one of the parties was a member of
the Judicial and Bar Council during the time that the judge was

appointed, would not by itself constitute sufficient ground for the
judge to inhibit himself. However, if there is a “probability that a
losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought
that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice
against him", it may be more prudent for the judge to inhibit
himself.
1989 Bar, Q. IX(2): A judge rendered a decision in a criminal case
finding the accused guilty of estafa. Counsel for the accused filed
a motion for reconsideration which was submitted without
arguments. Later, another lawyer entered his appearance for the
accused. The judge issued an order inhibiting himself from
further sitting in the case because the latter lawyer had been
among those who recommended him to the Bench. Can the
judge's voluntary inhibition be sustained?
A: The judge may not voluntarily inhibit himself by the mere fact
that a lawyer recommended him to the Bench. In fact, the
appearance of said lawyer is attest as to whether the judge can
act independently and courageously in deciding the case
according to his conscience. “Inhibition is not allowed at every
instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a
presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the
parties to a case. “Utang na loob”, per se, should not be a
hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should recognition
of such value in Philippine society prevent the performance of
one’s duties as judge”. (Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal Case
No. 4954-M; 155 SCRA 78- 79). However, in order to avoid any
suspicion of partiality, it is better to the judge to voluntarily inhibit
himself.
Sec. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the
basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties
and lawyers, independently of the judge’s participation, all agree
in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or
unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding.
The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
1. Grounds for Inhibition May be Waived by the Parties
 In order for a valid waiver to be made, the judge must first
be transparent and forthright with the grounds for
inhibition. The waiver should be made by the parties and
their counsels and the waiver must be in writing.
 Canon 3, Sec. 6 would be applicable only in the event that
the grounds for inhibition are immaterial or unsubstantial.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
1999 Bar, Q. X: In the contract of lease of the house and lot
located in Quezon City that A entered into with B, it is stipulated
that if at the end of the lease term, the lessee B should refuse
and fail to vacate the premises and the parties fail to agree on
the extension of the lease, period, the case for eviction should
be filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila. Because of the
refusal of B to vacate the premises at the end of the lease
period, A, the lessor, filed the Complaint for Detainer with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, as agreed upon. The judge of the
Regional Trial Court of to whom the case was assigned motu
proprio dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff A and
defendant B presented separate motions urging the Court to
reconsider its order and assume jurisdiction of their case by
mutual agreement. The Judge denied their motion insisting that
his Court has no jurisdiction over the case for detainer.
May the Regional Trial Court upon the facts of the case assume
jurisdiction of it as suggested by the parties?
A: No, the Regional Trial Court may not assume jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by
agreement of the parties. While Rule 3.13 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides for a Remittal of Disqualification of judges, it
refers to remittal of the disqualification of a judge to take part in a
case because of grounds that may put his impartiality in doubt. It
is not applicable to lack of jurisdiction.
Canon 4: Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
2014 Bar, Q. I: Judge A is a close friend of Governor G. On several
occasions, Judge A would borrow vehicles from the Office of the
Governor to travel to his judicial station. Judge A’s actuation:
(a) Violates the Canon on Propriety
(b) Creates an appearance of an improper connection with the
executive branch
(c) Is downright unethical
A: (a)
Alternative:(b)
Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
[201]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1. Duty to Avoid Improprieties and Appearance of
Improprieties
 A judge is not just a person who was given an employment
in government to decide disputes. A judge occupies a
position in government which gives a tangible semblance to
an important intangible concept, viz: justice in society.
 Thus, appearance of the judge is not just a shallow concept
but an embodiment of society’s aspiration for justice itself.
2. Illustrations of Violations of Canon 4, Sec. 1
(a) OCA v. Judge Floro, (2006). Including self-laudatory details
stated in his professional calling card such as that he topped
the bar exams with a grade of 87.55 and having graduated
with “full second honors” from ADMU, breached the norms
of simplicity and modesty required of judges. Circulating or
distributing such calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements is simple misconduct.
(b) OCA v. Judge Floro, (2006). Announcing, through his branch
clerk of court, his qualifications, in open court before the
start of the proceedings is unnecessary publicity. The Court
noted that such a practice shows that “the judges appear so
unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants
and their lawyers’ approval”. Since the questioned practice
occurred only for one (1) week the judge was found guilty of
simple misconduct.
(c) Presado v. Genova, (1993). The judge and his family were
found to be using his chambers as their residence, with the
provincial government paying for the electric bills. The judge
was found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
(d) Alday v. Cruz, (2001). Poking a gun at a person with whom
he had a traffic altercation (Judge suspended for 1 year and
fined P50,000)
2012 Bar, Q. 35: Judge Ramon obtained a two (2) year car loan
from a financing company. He never paid a single amortization.
After the lapse of two (2) years, the financing company filed an
administrative complaint against the judge for willful failure to
pay a just debt. Is the judge administratively liable?
(a) No, since the loan is not connected with his judicial function.
(b) Yes, because a judge should avoid impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety even in his private dealings.
(c) No, the financing company should have availed of the
remedy of foreclosure.
(d) No, because the administrative charge is only meant to force
the judge to pay.

2011 Bar, Q. 30: A Court Administrator's auditing team found
that Judge Ruby used business cards which stated, in addition to
her official title as presiding judge of her court, that she is bar
topnotcher, her law school’s "class valedictorian," and "one of
the most sought after private law practitioners" before she
joined the judiciary, all of which are true. Asked to explain this
seeming impropriety, Ruby pointed out that business cards can
include the person’s "title" which is broad enough to include in
her case her standing in the bar and all the honors she earned.
Did Ruby commit an impropriety?
(a) Yes, unless the cards were given to her as a gift.
(b) No, because all she stated in her business cards are true.
(c) Yes, because she showed a hunger for publicity and
recognition that debases her judicial post.
(d) No, because she is free to include in her business cards
details that say who she is.
2011 Bar, Q. 36: What unhealthy attitude of mind should a judge
avoid falling into?
(a) Hearing and adjudicating cases is an important job.
(b) Courts are made for litigants.
(c) Litigants are made for the courts.
(d) Courts should dispose of their cases on time.
2011 Bar, Q. 48: After the prosecution cross-examined Sheila, a
witness for the accused, Judge Pedro asked her ten additional
questions that were so intense they made her cry. One question
forced Sheila to admit that her mother was living with another
man, a fact that weighed on the case of the accused. This
prompted the latter’s counsel to move to expunge the judge’s
questions for building on the prosecution's case. Judge Pedro
denied the motion, insisting that bolstering a party’s case is
incidental to the court’s desire to be clarified. Did Pedro commit
an impropriety?
(a) No, his ten questions could not be considered an undue
intervention.
(b) No, because the judge is free to inquire into any aspect of
the case that would clarify the evidence for him.
(c) Yes, because he effectively deprived the defense of its right
to due process when he acted both as prosecutor and
judge.
(d) Yes, because nothing connects his desire to be clarified with
the questions he asked.
2007 Bar, Q. V: During the hearing of an election protest filed by
his brother, Judge E sat in the area reserved for the public, no
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
beside his brother’s lawyer. Judge E’s brother won the election
protest. Y, the defeated candidate for mayor, filed an
administrative case against Judge E for employing influence and
pressure on the judge who heard and decide the election
protest.
Judge E explained that the main reasons why he was there in the
courtroom were because he wanted to observe how election
protests are conducted as he has never conducted one and
because he wanted to give moral support to his brother.
Did Judge E commit an act of impropriety as a member of the
judiciary? Explain.
A: Judge E committed an act of impropriety in appearing in
another court at the hearing of his brother’s election protest. In
the case of Vidal v. Dojillo, Jr., (2005), which involved the same
facts, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing
of his brother’s election protest case just to give moral support
and, in the process, also observe how election protest
proceedings are conducted. Although concern for family members
is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a
judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the
higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid
not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety
in all activities. Even if respondent did not intend to use his
position as a judge to influence the outcome of his brother’s
election protest, it cannot be denied that his presence in the
courtroom during the hearing of his brother’s case would
immediately give cause for the community to suspect that his
being a colleague in the judiciary would influence the judge trying
the case to favor his brother.”
2003 Bar, Q. XIII: Following a protracted trial, a case was
submitted for decision. The Presiding Judge then asked the
counsel of each party to prepare and submit to the court their
respective memoranda in decision form, the idea being that the
Judge would then choose which, between the two, he will adopt
as his own decision. Did the judge commit an infraction
warranting disciplinary action?
A: Yes, the judge committed an infraction warranting disciplinary
action. In the case of Heinz R. Heck v. Judge Anthony E. Santos,
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1630, April 9, 2003, the Supreme Court held that
the respondent judge’s order for the counsel of one of the parties
to draft the decision and his adoption verbatim of the draft clearly
violate Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“A Judge should
[202]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities) and Canon 3 of the same Code (A Judge should perform
official duties honestly and with impartiality and diligence
adjudicative responsibilities”), in relation to Section 1, Rule 36 of
the Revised Rules of Court which provides that “a judgment or
final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing,
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly the
facts and the law on which it is based.” The Court added: “By such
order, respondent abdicated a function exclusively granted to him
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. It is axiomatic
that decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and
most important duty of a member of the bench. He must use his
own perceptiveness in understanding and analyzing the evidence
presented before him and his own discernment when determining
the proper action, resolution or decision. Delegating to a counsel
of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and parroting it
verbatim reflect blatant judicial sloth.”
1998 Bar, Q. XVIII: Judge Silva upon seeing a reckless tricycle
driver almost hitting a boy by the side of the road, gave chase
and stopped the tricycle. Judge Silva then confiscated the
driver's license and told him to get it from his office. Was the
conduct of Judge Silva proper”?
A: The facts are akin to those in Paguirigan v. Clavano (1974),
where the Supreme Court held:
While respondent might have been motivated by a spirit of
civicism in cooperating with the city authorities in the
enforcement of traffic laws, it is obvious that the investigation of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, the arrest of errant
motor vehicle drivers and the confiscation of their licenses are
essentially police functions which are specifically vested by law
upon law enforcement officers of the government. Respondent as
Judge of the City Court will necessarily hear and decide all cases
filed in his court regarding such violations and infractions of the
Motor Vehicle Law or traffic regulations by the law enforcement
officers. It is patent, therefore, that respondent should not have
taken upon himself the responsibility of confiscating the license of
the motorcab driver but he should have referred the matter to
the police. We deem it relevant to emphasize that the official
conduct of a judge should be free from impropriety or any
appearance thereof. His personal behavior in the performance of
his official duties and in his everyday life should be beyond
reproach. By confiscating the driver's license without issuing any
Traffic Violation Report (TVR) and losing the same while in his
possession, respondent Judge has acted in a manner unbefitting
his high judicial office.

1990 Bar, Q. III(1): A Judge seen having lunch with a litigant with
a case pending before him in a court. He was also seen at the
racetrack placing his bet on certain horses. How would you
evaluate the behavior of the judge? Explain.
A: The judge’s behavior is highly improper. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01 of
the same Code provides that a judge should so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the Judiciary. His having lunch with a litigant with a case
pending before him in court violates such rule and gives the
adverse party cause to complain against his impartiality.
His going to the race track to place a bet on certain horse puts the
judiciary personified by him in a bad light. For the personal
behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in everyday
life, should be above reproach and free from the appearance of
impropriety. His judicial office circumscribes his personal conduct
and imposes a number of restrictions, which he must observe
faithfully as the price he has to pay for accepting and occupying
an exalted position in the administration of Justice.
1987 Bar, Q. IX: A provincial lawyer who was married, and with
children, met, courted, and eventually had several illegitimate
children by, another woman whom he maintained under
scandalous circumstances in his own hometown. This lawyer,
who was active in politics, was later appointed a Regional Trial
Court Judge for one of the provincial branches. In the course of a
litigation assigned to him, one of the parties feeling aggrieved by
some actuations of the Judge, filed a complaint against him on
the ground of immorality for maintaining a woman not his wife,
under scandalous circumstances. The Judge, who was required
to submit his comments, interposed the defense that assuming
the truth of his having a “querida”, that fact does not affect his
duties as a Judge.
Decide the case with reasons.
A: The defense of the judge is without merit.
The personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but
also in his everyday life, should be above reproach and free from
the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical
principles and sense of propriety without which he cannot
preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so indispensable
in an orderly society (Candia vs. Tagabucha, G.R. Adm. Matter No.
528-MJ, Sept, 12, 1977, See also Borja vs. Bercasio, G.R. Adm.
matter No. 561 - MJ, Dec, 29, 1976). For the judicial office
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a
number of restrictions thereon. (Canon 1, Canon of Judicial Ethics)
1987 Bar, Q. X: Judge XX presided over the trial of a legal dispute
among several heirs, involving real properties which included a
residential lot adjacent to a rented property owned by said
Judge. The case was eventually terminated through a settlement
reached by the heirs. One month after the case was terminated,
the heirs to whom the abovementioned residential lot was
allocated offered to sell said lot to Judge XX who promptly
agreed to, and did purchase the property at a reasonable price.
Did Judge XX commit a breach of any law or rule of judicial
ethics?
Answer with reasons.
A: The purchase of the property after the termination of the case
may not be in violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code as the case
had already terminated. However, it might be improper and
unethical for the judge to purchase said property as it might invite
suspicion considering that said property was the subject matter of
a case he tried. In Macariola vs Asuncion, while the Supreme
Court exonerated the judge for purchasing a property after the
termination of the case, the judged was admonished as his act
was improper under the canon of judicial ethics.
3. Gross Misconduct of a Judge, Defined
SPO2 Yap v. Judge Inopiquez, Jr. (2003). “Misconduct” is defined
as a wrong or improper conduct, while “gross” connotes
something “out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be
excused; flagrant; shameful”
Francisco v. Cosico, (2004). For serious misconduct to exist, the
judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules.
1999 Bar, Q. XII: X, a MTC Judge, received the amount of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in cash from accused charged with
slight physical injuries in his court, whereupon he was released
from custody. After dismissal of the case against him, the
accused sought to withdraw the amount he had deposited as
bail. It was not at once returned to the accused because
according to the Judge, it was stolen from the drawer of his table
where he kept it after receipt. Nonetheless, the amount was
returned to the accused.
[203]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Is the Judge guilty of misconduct for which he may be
disciplined?
A: Yes, the judge is guilty of misconduct and may be disciplined.
He was negligent in keeping the money in his drawer instead of
depositing it with the municipal treasurer as required by law. His
failure to return it at once after the acquittal of the accused
creates a suspicion that he misappropriated the money. A judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
his activities (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Alternative: No. While it is the obligation of Judge X to turn over
the cash bond to the Municipal Treasurer, there is no showing in
the factual setting that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred, or similar motive when he kept the cash bond inside his
drawer. Thus, he should not be administratively charged for mere
error in judgment, in the absence of bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose (Guerrero v. Hon. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-483; Carlos
v. Hon. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-617, September 25, 1998)
Sec. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
1. Personal Restrictions in the Conduct of Judges
Vedana v. Valencia. Upon taking his oath of office as a judge, the
judge, who was formerly an ordinary lawyer, surrenders his
former lifestyles to the guarded lifestyle of a judge. He steps onto
a stage always subject to public scrutiny. A judge’s official life
cannot simply be detached from his personal life.
Resngit-Marquez v. Judge Llamas, (2002). A “magistrate has to
live by the example of his precepts. He cannot judge the conduct
of others when his own needs judgment. It should not be ‘do as I
say and not what I do’. For then the court over which he is called
to preside will be a mockery, one devoid of respect.
2. Illustrations of Violations of Canon 4, Sec. 2
(a) Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, (1999). A party-litigant and the
judge were photographed coming out of a private room of a
resort hotel. While the photographs did not show that
parties in sexual activity, the Court gave due credence to the
complainant’s allegation that the judge solicited sexual
favors from her while she had a pending case before the
judge

(b) Fidel v. Judge Caraos, (2002). A judge who went to a police
station demanding the release of a detention prisoner and
shouting: “Putang ina ninyong mga pulis kayo, nasaan si
hepe? Hoy, ilabas ninyo ito ngayon din, putang ina ninyong
mga pulis. Sinong masusunod dito, mayor, pulis o judge?, is
guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual
members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their
court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
1. Duty to Restrict Relations with Lawyers
 The judge must maintain a respectable distance between
himself and the lawyer that appear before him. Cordial
relations should be maintained at a respectable level.
 Excessive camaraderie can be misinterpreted as a ground to
unduly influence the judge. Conversely, excessive closeness
can be exploited to portray a baseless image of influence
over the judge.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 3
(a) OCA v. Judge Paderanga, (2005). A judge who unjustifiably
used his contempt powers. While a lawyer may have been
discourteous by repeatedly interrupting the court
proceedings, that lawyer should have been first warned. A
magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament
of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable
qualities of every judge. A short temper may create an
image of bias against a particular lawyer or party
(b) Omana v. Yulde, (2002). A judge who engages in a drinking
spree with a lawyer who has pending cases before him.
3. Related Provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 3.04 – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to
lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants
are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
2015 Bar, Q. XXI: Judge Junior attended the 50th birthday party
of his fraternity brother, Atty. Vera. Also present at the party
was Atty. Rico who was Atty. Vera's classmate way back in high
school and who was handling Civil Case No. 5555 currently
pending before Judge Junior's court. Well-aware that Atty. Rico
had a case before his sala, Judge Junior still sat next to Atty. Rico
at a table, and the two conversed with each other, and ate and
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
drank together throughout the night. Since Atty. Vera was a
well-known personality, his birthday party was featured in a
magazine. The opposing party to Atty. Rico's client in Civil Case
No. 5555, while flipping through the pages of the magazine,
came upon the pictures of Judge Junior and Atty. Rico together
at the party and used said pictures as bases for instituting an
administrative case against Judge Junior. Judge Junior, in his
answer, reasoned that he attended Atty. Vera's party in his
private capacity, that he had no control over who Atty. Vera
invited to the party, and that he and Atty. Rico never discussed
Civil Case No. 5555 during the party. Did Judge Junior commit an
administrative infraction? Explain.
A: Canon 4, Sec. 3 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary provides that “judges shall, in their personal relations
with individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably
give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
The act of Judge Junior in sitting next to Atty. Rico, a lawyer whom
he knew had a case before his sala, and dining and conversing
with him throughout the night, violates the foregoing rule. It
tends to give rise to suspicion of partiality. It is improper conduct
for which he may be reprimanded.
1996 Bar, Q. VII(1): In a hearing before the Court of Tax Appeals.
Atty. G was invited to appear as amicus curiae. One of the
Judges hearing the tax case is the father of Atty. G. The counsel
for the respondent moved for the inhibition of the judge in view
of the father-son relationship.
Is there merit to the motion? Decide.
A: There is no merit to the motion. Rule 3.12 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that “A judge should take no part where
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Among
the instances for the disqualification of a judge is that he is
related to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity. But this
refers to counsel of the parties. An amicus curiae is supposed to
be an experienced and impartial attorney invited by the court to
appear and help in the disposition of issues submitted to it. He
represents no party to the case. There is, therefore, no ground to
fear the loss of the judge's impartiality in this case if his son is
appointed amicus curiae.
Alternative: Yes. There is merit in the motion. Although Atty. G
was appearing only as amicus curiae, his opinion may influence
the decision of one of the judges who is his father. Rule 137, par.
1 of the Rules of Court does not distinguish whether the lawyer
[204]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
who is related to the judge within the fourth degree is appearing
as amicus curiae or hired counsel.
2009 Bar, Q. XVIII: On a Saturday, Atty. Patemo filed a petition
for a writ of amparo with the Court of Appeals (CA). Impelled by
the urgency for the issuance of the writ, Atty. Patemo persuaded
his friend, CA Justice Johnny de la Cruz, to issue the writ of
amparo and the notice of hearing without the signature of the
two other Justices members of the CA division. Are Atty. Paterno
and Justice de la Cruz guilty of unethical conduct? Explain.
A: Yes. Atty. Paterno violated Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall rely
on “the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing
the court.” Atty. Paterno has relied on his friendship with Justice
de la Cruz to obtain a writ of amparo without a hearing. He thus
makes it appear that he can influence the court.
Justice de la Cruz, violated Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provides that
“judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members
of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts, avoid
situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality.”
2010 Bar, Q. XV(B): Rico, an amiable, sociable lawyer, owns a
share in Marina Golf Club, easily one of the posher golf courses.
He relishes hosting parties for government officials and
members of the bench.
One day, he had a chance meeting with a judge in the
Intramuros golf course. The two readily got along well and had
since been regularly playing golf together at the Marina Golf
Club.
How about the members of the bench, who grace the parties of
Rico, are they violating the Code of Judicial Conduct? Explain.
A: Members of the bench who grace the parties of Atty. Rico
would be guilty of violating Sec. 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that
“judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members
of the legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid
situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality”. It has been held that “if a
judge is seen eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer
who has cases pending in his or her sala, public suspicion may be
aroused, thus tending to erode the trust of litigants in the

impartiality of the judge” (Padilla v. Zantua, 1994). But if Atty. Rico
is not a practicing lawyer, such suspicion may not be aroused.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case
in which any member of their family represents a litigant or is
associated in any manner with the case.
1. Restrictions Involving the Judge’s Family
Garcia v. De la Pena. The rule on compulsory disqualification of a
judge to hear a case where the respondent judge is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity
rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law
conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him
and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of
written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
2. Illustrations of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 4
(a) Ortiz v. Jaculbe, (2005). Hearing a case wherein his son-in-
law, who is within the first degree of affinity, appeared as
counsel of the plaintiff.
(b) Sales v. Judge Calvan, (2002). The Court found that Judge
Calvan violated the rule on disqualification of judges as set
out in the Code of Judicial Conduct and the ROC when he
conducted the preliminary investigation of a criminal case
where his wife was the niece of the private complainant and
who was also one of the witnesses.
2016 Bar, Q. V: Constantino was accused of estafa by Hazel, the
wife of Judge Andres, for misappropriating the ring she
entrusted to him. Since Judge Andres was present when Hazel
handed the ring to Constantino, he was compelled by his wife to
testify as a witness for the prosecution in the criminal case. Did
the judge commit any violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary? Explain.
A: Canon 4, Sec. 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary provides that “Judges shall not participate in
the determination of a case in which any member of their family
represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
Judge Constantino’s appearance as a witness in the criminal case
in which his wife was the offended party is violative of this rule.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
It may also be violative of Canon 3, Sec. 1, which provides that
“Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome
of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a
member of the legal profession to receive clients of the latter or
of other members of the legal profession.
1. Restrictions in the Use of Judge’s Residence
 Judges must keep their distance from lawyers and avoid
involvement with their respective practice of law even if
such lawyers have no pending cases before them.
 Judges and lawyers must maintain a discreet relationship. As
such, vulgar display of friendship must be avoided.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 5
J. King & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, (2004). A judge inviting
a litigant to his house in order to demand from him a certain
amount
Sec. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
1. Exercise of Constitutional Rights Should NOT Impinge
Judicial Independence
 While judges continue to enjoy their constitutional rights as
citizens, their exercise of such rights must be mindful of
their equally important constitutional duty to uphold judicial
independence.
 In the event that such constitutional rights and
constitutional duty clash, the judge must be mindful of the
judicial office which he holds and his sworn duty to uphold
judicial independence.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 6
(a) In re: Judge Acuna, (2005). A judge who expresses himself
with expletives commits an impropriety. Hence, the use of
“putris” and “putang ina” were unfit expressions for men of
the robe. It did not matter that they were not directed to
any person in particular, as they give the impression of a
[205]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
person’s ill manners. Considering that the respondent is not
an ordinary citizen, such intemperate language detracts
from how a judge should conduct himself. The respondent’s
use of such expletives is improper for the extolled office of a
magistrate of the law. Thus, the respondent’s claim that his
“favorite expressions” were not directed at anyone in
particular is unacceptable”
(b) Seludo v. Judge Fineza, (2004). The judge was Fined for
using intemperate language.
Sec. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal
fiduciary and financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts
to be informed about the financial interests of members of their
family.
1. Duty of Financial Transparency and Duty to Avoid Financial
Conflicts of Interests
 A judge should avoid financial improprieties. He must be
always conscious of his and his family’s financial dealings,
when practicable, to avoid being caught inadvertently in
financial entanglements.
 Where a potential financial conflict would occur, the judge
becomes duty-bound to inhibit from the case.
 A judge should be conscious about going into a debtor-
creditor relationship with others, as well as mindful of his
financial investments.
Sec. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of
their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit
others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special
position improperly to influence them in the performance of
judicial duties.
1. Duty NOT To Use Judicial Influence
 A judicial office carries a certain amount of prestige and
influence in society. That prestige and influence should be
used to promote and enhance respect for the law and the
administration of justice, and not to further the judge’s and
his family’s personal interests
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 8
(a) Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, (2005). A judge who attends the
proceedings of an election protest before a MCTC where his
brother was the election protestor purportedly in order to
give moral support to his brother.

(b) Perez v. Costales, (2005). In writing to the administrative
officials of the university which employs the professors sued
by the judge’s wife, respondent judge obviously sought to
influence or put pressure on them with regard to the actions
to be taken against the four professors. His wife could have
written the letter herself, as she is the complainant in the
criminal cases against the four professors. Instead, it was
respondent judge who did, and he even used and stated his
judicial position in his letter, thereby insinuating that it
should not be ignored or trifled with. It cannot be gainsaid
that respondent Judge is aware that his judicial position
alone could exert influence or authority over the university
officials, and he took advantage of such authority.
2015 Bar, Q. V: Judge Ana P. Sevillano had an issue with the
billings for the post-paid cellular phone services of her 16-year-
old daughter for the last three consecutive months. Although
Judge Sevillano had been repeatedly calling the Customer
Service Hotline of Universal Telecoms, the billings issue was
never fully settled to Judge Sevillano's satisfaction. Finally, Judge
Sevillano wrote the National Telecommunications Commission a
letter of complaint against Universal Telecoms, using her official
court stationery and signing the letter as "Judge Ana P.
Sevillano." Did Judge Sevillano violate any professional or ethical
standard for judges? Justify your answer.
A: Judge Sevillano violated Sec. 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provides that
“judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to
advance their private interests, or those of a member of their
family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to
convey the impression that anyone is in a special position
improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial
duties, as well as Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.”
In the case of Ladigon v. Garong (A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712, August
20, 2008), where a MTC Judge wrote a letter to a religious
organization abroad, about the complaint of one of its members,
using the stationary of his court and signing with his title of
“Judge”, the SC held with regard to the use of the stationary, that:
In the present case, the respondent Judge crossed the line of
propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint
involving an alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of
Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter addressed to
a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
impression of official recognition or notice of the reported
violation.
With regard to the use of the judge’s title in signing the letter, the
SC held that:
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the
use of the title of "Judge" or "Justice" in the correspondence of a
member of the Judiciary. While the use of the title is an official
designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a
line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of
the appellation. While the title can be used for social and other
identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use
the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal,
family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a
judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge. To do
any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.
2013 Bar, Q. VIII: The criminal case arising from the P10-Billion
Peso pork barrel scandal was raffled to Sandiganbayan Justice
Marciano Cobarde. Afraid that he would antagonize the parties,
his political patrons and, ultimately, his judicial career, he
decided to inhibit from participating in the case, giving "personal
reasons" as his justification.
If you were to question the inhibition of SB Justice Cobarde, on
what legal basis, and where and how will you do this?
A: The grounds relied upon by Justice Cobarde for his inhibition
conveys the impression that “the parties” and “his political
patrons” are in a special position improperly to influence him in
the performance of judicial duties (New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, Canon 4, Sec. 8). Furthermore, the
Sandiganbayan sits in Divisions, so the fears of Justice Cobarde are
unfounded. Justice Cobarde should not shirk from the
performance of his judicial duties.
I would file a motion with the Division of the Sandiganbayan in
which Justice Cobarde is sitting for the remittal of his voluntary
inhibition. I would advance in motion the reasons why the
“personal reasons” set forth by the Justice are insubstantial and
do not merit his inhibition. I would likewise set the motion for
hearing as appropriate.
Notes: The decision of Justice Marciano Cobarde to inhibit himself
on account of “personal reasons” is not conclusive, and his
competency may be determined on an application for mandamus
[206]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
to compel him to act (Palang vs. Zosa, G.R. No. L-38229, August
30, 1974)
The voluntary inhibition of Justice Marciano Cobarde is not
subject to mandamus because voluntary inhibition involves the
exercise of discretion (Gutang, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 124760, July 8, 1998).]
1990 Bar, Q. III(2): Discuss the propriety of a judge standing as
sponsor at the wedding of the son of the litigant his court?
A: For reasons above stated, a judge’s standing as sponsor at the
wedding of the son of a litigant in his court is highly improper for
it gives the Impression, rightly or wrongly, that he is disposed to
resolve the case in favor of such litigant. Public confidence in the
impartiality of the judge is eroded, and the due administration of
Justice suffers thereby. It is also a violation of the letter and spirit
of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that the
prestige of judicial office shall not be used orient to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge.
2010 Bar, Q. XXI: On the proposal of Judge G, which was
accepted, he and his family donated a lot to the city of Gyoza on
the condition that a public transport terminal would be
constructed thereon. The donation was accepted and the
condition was complied with.
The family-owned tracts of land in the vicinity of the donated lot
suddenly appreciated in value and became commercially viable
as in fact a restaurant and a hotel were soon after built.
Did the Judge commit any violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct?
A: In Salunday v. Labitoria (A.M. No. CA-01-31, July 25, 2002), the
Supreme Court held that the act of Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria of
recommending the construction of a Hall of Justice in a parcel of
land close to a hotel owned by a corporation of which his wife was
a stockholder, was not improper because “there is no clear
indication that in recommending the Ranada property, the
respondent was impelled by a desire to benefit financially”.
In the instant case, it seems clear that the judge and his family
were principally motivated by the anticipated increase in the
value of their property as a consequence of the donation of a lot
for the construction of a transport facility. He may, thereby, be
held liable for violating Section 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that “judges

shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance
their private interests, or those of a member of their family or of
anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the
impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial duties”.
1990 Bar, Q. IV(1): Would it be proper for the judge to accept a
donation of a lawyer’s table and chairs for his sala from the local
chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)? Explain
your answer.
A: It would be proper for a Judge to accept the donation of a
lawyer’s table and chairs for his sala from the local chapter of the
IBP because the donation comes from an organization of lawyers
whose duty, among others, is to help in the proper administration
of justice. Accepting the donation is not for the personal benefit
of the judge but for providing physical facilities for the
administration of justice, which is the concern by both the Judge
and the IBP local chapter. What is prohibited is accepting presents
or donations from litigants or from particular lawyers practicing
before him.
1990 Bar, Q. IV(2): May a judge properly solicit for his promotion
the endorsement of the local chapter of the IBP to the Judicial
and Bar Council? Explain your answer.
A: A judge may not properly solicit for his promotion the
endorsement of the local chapter of the IBP to the Judicial and Bar
Council because it will give the impression that his promotion is
not purely on merit, and the Judge may feel beholden to the
particular officers of the local chapter which may, in the future,
influence him in the disposition of cases handled by such officers
as counsel for litigants. Moreover, considering his position, the
local chapter officers may not be able to refuse such solicitation
even if they believe that he is not qualified for promotion. The
judge should stand by his own ability, qualifications and fitness,
without exerting extra efforts on his part to influence the local
chapter to indorse his promotion. The local chapter should, on its
own and without solicitation from the judge. make its own
assessment and appraisal of the judge’s qualifications and fitness
for promotion, and if it is convinced that the judge possesses the
required qualifications, it is the duty of the local chapter to make
known such assessment to the Judicial and Bar Council.
2014 Bar, Q. XXV: Judge A has an illicit relationship with B, his
Branch Clerk of Court. C, the wife of Judge A, discovered the
illicit affair and consulted a lawyer to vindicate her violated
marital rights. If you were that lawyer, what would you advice C,
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
and if she agrees and asks you to proceed to take action, what is
the legal procedure that you should follow? Discuss fully.
A: I will advise her to file an administrative case against Judge A
with the SC. I can tell her that she can also file civil or criminal
actions against him. But an administrative case is confidential in
nature and will not unnecessarily drag the name and reputation of
the court into the picture.
2011 Bar, Q. 49: Administrative penalties imposed on judges are
(a) curative.
(b) punitive.
(c) corrective.
(d) both punitive and corrective.
Sec. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial
capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose
related to their judicial duties.
1. Duty of Confidentiality
 Judges come into possession of various information in the
course of their judicial duties. These information should only
be used in arriving at a decision of a case, and not for any
other use.
 Hence, the judge may not use any information for other
unofficial purposes.
2. Court Records as Public Documents; Access Requires
“Legitimate Reasons”
In re: Gitto, (2005). Relevant documents which are submitted to,
and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course
of adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the
presumption of public access applies. Courts in the U.S. have
recognized the general right to inspect and copy public records
and documents, including judicial records and documents.
FTC v. Standard Financial Management Corp. (1987). The
presumption that the public has a right to see and copy judicial
records attaches to those documents which properly come before
the court in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding and which
are relevant to the adjudication.
In the Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, (1984).
The policy reasons for granting public access to criminal
proceedings include the public’s right to monitor the functioning
of our courts, thereby ensuring quality, honesty and respect for
[207]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
our legal system. Such policy reasons apply to the grant of public
access to civil cases as well.
tHilado v. Judge Reyes, (2006). Not all court records may be
accessed by the public:
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other
documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public
concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of
establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or
a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may
be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties filed them is to
be considered.
If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or
interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen's
constitutional right to information.
Once a particular information has been determined to be of public
concern, the accessory right of access to official records, including
judicial records, are open to the public.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be
restricted on a showing of good cause. How "good cause" can be
determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Republican Company v. Appeals Court teaches:
The public's right of access to judicial records, including
transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and court orders, maybe
restricted, but only on a showing of "good cause." "To determine
whether good cause is shown, a judge must balance the rights of
the parties based on the particular facts of each case." In so doing,
the judge "must take into account all relevant factors, 'including,
but not limited to, the nature of the parties and the controversy,
the type of information and the privacy interests involved, the
extent of community interest, and the reason for the request.'"
And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and
protective powers of every court over its own records and files.
The Supreme Court of Canada, expounding on the right of the
court to exercise supervisory powers over materials surrendered
into its care, held:
It follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound
to inquire into the use that is to be made of them and, in my view,
is fully entitled to regulate that use by securing appropriate

undertakings and assurances if those be advisable to protect
competing interests.
In exercising its supervisory powers over materials surrendered
into its care, the court may regulate the use made of it. In an
application of this nature, the court must protect the respondent
and accommodate public interest in access. In an application of
this nature the court must protect the respondent and
accommodate the public interest in access. This can only be done
in terms of the actual purpose, and in the face of obvious
prejudice and the absence of a specific purpose, the order for
unrestricted access and reproduction should not have been made.
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion
and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court,
after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request
for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties.
In the exercise of such discretion, the following issues may be
relevant: "whether parties have interest in privacy, whether
information is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper
purpose, whether there is threat of particularly serious
embarrassment to party, whether information is important to
public health and safety, whether sharing of information among
litigants would promote fairness and efficiency, whether party
benefiting from confidentiality order is public entity or official,
and whether case involves issues important to the public."
Accordingly then, as long as any party, counsel or person has a
legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and pays court
fees, a court may not deny access to such records.
3. Rationale for Public Access to Court Records
Barretto v. Philippine Publishing Co. The foundation of the right
of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not the fact
that the public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what goes on
in the court is news, or would be interesting, or would furnish
topics of conversation; but is simply that it has a right to know
whether a public officer is properly performing his duty. In other
words, the right of the public to be informed of proceedings in
court is not founded in the desire or necessity of people to know
about the doings of others, but in the necessity of knowing
whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing his duty.
The case of Cowley vs. Pulsifer is so pertinent to the questions
presented for our decision in the case at that we cannot refrain
from quoting extensively therefrom.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings
made public more than counterbalances the inconveniences to
the such proceedings."
The chief advantage to the country which we can discern, and
that which we understand to be intended by the foregoing
passage, is the security which publicity gives for the proper
administration of justice. It is desirable that the trial of causes
should take place under the public eye, not because the
controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern,
but because it is of the highest moment that those who
administer justice should always act under the sense of public
responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy
himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is
performed.
From this quotation it is obvious that it was not the idea of the
supreme court of Massachusetts to lay down the proposition that
simply because a pleading happened to be filed in public office it
became public property to such n extent that any individual,
whether interested or not, had the right to publish its contents, or
that any newspaper was privileged to scatter the allegations
contained therein to the four corners of the country. The right of
the public to know the contents of the paper is the basis of the
privilege, which is, as we have said, the right to determine by its
own senses that its servant, the judge, is performing his duties
according to law
4. Court Records or Judicial Records, Defined
Hilado v. Judge Reyes, (2006). The term "judicial record" or "court
record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of
the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers,
exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued
and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word
testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the
possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for
purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described
to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape,
photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter's notes,
transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in
physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or
in connection with the transaction of any official business by the
court, and includes all evidence it has received in a case.
1995 Bar, Q. VIII(1): At the pre-trial of a civil case for collection,
one of the parties mentioned that he expected to settle his
obligation as he was investing in some stocks of a realty
corporation that were sure to soar in the market because of
some confidential information he obtained from his brother-in-
[208]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
law, a top-rank officer of the corporation. Upon hearing the
information the judge lost no time in buying stocks in the realty
corporation and as predicted made a lot of money.
Is the judge guilty of unethical conduct? Discuss fully.
A: Yes. Rule 5.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that
“No information acquired in a judicial capacity shall be used or
disclosed by a judge in any financial dealing or for any other
purpose not related to judicial activities." The judge in this case
has violated the foregoing rule, and acted unethically.
Sec. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties,
judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning
the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or
related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned
with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract
from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere
with the performance of judicial duties.
1. Allowable Judicial Activities
 A judge, just like any other human beings, should have other
social and professionally-related activities. Nevertheless,
these activities must be consistent with the dignity and
responsibility of the judicial office
2005 Bar, Q. XII: Pending before the sala of Judge Magbag is the
case of CDG versus JQT. The legal counsel of JQT is Atty. Ocsing
who happens to be the brother of Atty. Ferreras, a friend of
Judge Magbag. While the case was still being heard, Atty.
Ferreras and his wife celebrated their wedding anniversary. They
invited their friends and family to a dinner party at their house
in Forbes Park. Judge Magbag attended the party and was seen
conversing with Atty. Ocsing while they were eating at the same
table.
Comment on the propriety of Judge Magbag's act.
A: A judge is not required to live in seclusion. He is permitted to
have a social life as long as it does not interfere with his judicial
duties or detract from the dignity of the court (Canon 5, Code of
Judicial Conduct). However, he should be scrupulously careful to
avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion
that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an

element in determining his judicial action (Canon 30, Canons of
Judicial Ethics). A judge should avoid impropriety and appearance
of impropriety in all activities (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Sitting on the same table and conversing with a lawyer with a
pending case before him raises such appearance of impropriety.
1987 Bar, Q. VIII: A Regional Trial Court Judge is the head of
family concerns engaged in business enterprises, among which
are (a) a book store/distributor; (b) a chain of restaurants; and
(c) a surety company actively engaged in posting bonds required
in court cases.
In your considered opinion, are there legal and ethical
implications in the financial interests of this member of the
judiciary? Explain.
A: There are no legal or ethical implications on the business
enterprises of the regional trial court judge on (a) owning a
bookstore, (b) owning a chain of restaurants as along as said
enterprise do not conflict with his judicial duties or takes undue
advantage thereof because of his position (Macariola vs.
Asuncion).
It is unethical and improper, however, for the judge to be
engaged in (c) a surety company posting bonds in court cases. The
said business certainly is in conflict with his ju¬dicial duties. The
judge should not enter into such private business or pursue such a
course of conduct as would justify such suspicion, nor use the
power of his office or the in¬fluence of his name to promote the
business interests of others; he should not solicit for charities, nor
should he enter into any business relation which, in the normal
course of events reasonably to be expected, might bring his
personal interest into conflict with the impartial performance of
his official duties. (Borre vs. Maya, G.R. Adm. Matter No. 5 176CFI
Oct. 17, 1980).
2002 Bar, Q. XIV: The family of Judge Matrabaho owns a small
department store. With his knowledge, an employee of the store
posted on the bulletin board of his court an ad for job openings
informing the public that applications must be filed in the office
of the judge. For this purpose, the applicants would also be
interviewed therein. Is the judge liable for misconduct? Explain.
A: The judge is liable for misconduct. In the case of Dionisio v.
Escano, (1999), the Supreme Court held that the acts of posting
advertisements for restaurant personnel on the court bulletin
board, using his court address to receive applications, and of
screening applicants in his court, constitute involvement in private
business and improper use of court facilities for the promotion of
family business in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
restriction enshrined in Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct on judges with regard to their own business interests is
based on the possible interference which may be created by these
business involvements in the exercise of their judicial duties which
tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the courts as the
bastion of justice. Judges must not allow themselves to be
distracted from the performance of their judicial tasks by other
lawful enterprises.
2011 Bar, Q. 18: Judge Cristina has many law-related activities.
She teaches law and delivers lectures on law. Some in the
government consult her on their legal problems. She also serves
as director of a stock corporation devoted to penal reform,
where she participates in both fund raising and fund
management. Which of the following statements applies to her
case?
(a) She should not engage in fund raising activities.
(b) Her activities are acceptable except the part where she is
involved in fund management.
(c) She can teach law and deliver lectures on law but not do
the other things.
(d) All of her activities are legal.
Sec. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial
office.
1. Duty NOT To Practice Law
Carual v. Judge Brusola, (1999). The basis for this rule is public
policy.
The rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It
also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention
to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special
favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to
promote the public interest.
2. Private Practice by a Judge, Defined
Ziga v. Judge Arejola, (2003). “Private practice” is more than an
isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
[209]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
OCA v. Judge Floro. Where it appears that save for the “Motion
for Entry of Judgment” it does not appear from the records that
Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court
proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to
conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for
entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise
constitute private practice of law. Moreover, Judge Floro is
obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is
the petitioner.
3. Other Basis for Prohibition
Rule 138, Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice – No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct. A judge shall not
engage in the private practice of law.
1995 Bar, Q. X: Comment on the propriety of the acts of the
municipal judge who prepared and notarized the following
documents:
(a) a deed of absolute sale executed by two of his friends;
(b) an extrajudicial settlement of estate of his cousins;
(c) a memorandum of agreement between a building
contractor and a neighboring municipality;
(d) a memorandum of agreement between another private
contractor and the municipality where he sits as judge.
A: Municipal Judges may not engage in notarial work except as
notaries public ex officio. As notaries public ex officio, they may
engage only in notarization of documents connected with the
exercise of their judicial functions. They may not. as such notaries
public ex-officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment
of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyance,
which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as
judges.
However, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still
municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, the
Supreme Court ruled that MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to
municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may,
in their capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform any act
within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that:
(1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government
and turned to the municipal treasurer and (2) certification be
made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any

lawyer or notary public of such municipality or circuit (Balayon, Jr.
vs. Ocampo).
On the basis of the foregoing, I would say that the propriety of the
actuations of the municipal judge in this problem depends on
whether or not there are notaries public available in his
community. If there are notaries available, his acts are improper.
Otherwise they are proper, provided that the two conditions
mentioned above are complied with.
1996 Bar, Q. V(1): Talbog, a small town, has only two practicing
lawyers. Jose, a good friend of Judge M, requested the latter to
notarize a deed of sale for his farm lot, because the two lawyers
of their town charged exorbitant fees. Judge M notarized the
document and charged P 10.00 as fee. The two lawyers
complained to the Supreme Court.
(a) Will their complaint prosper? Explain.
(b) Can Judge M charge a fee?
A:
(a) The complaint will prosper. Circular No. 1-90 of the Supreme
Court provides that Municipal Circuit Trial Court judges may
act as notaries public ex officio only in the notarization of
documents connected with the exercise of their official
functions and duties. They may not, as notaries public ex
officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of
private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances
which bear no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges. As an exception. MTC and MCTC judges
assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or
notaries public may, in their capacity as notaries public ex
officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular
notary public, provided that:
(1) All notarial fees charged shall be for the account of the
government and turned over to the municipal treasurer, and
(2) Certification be made in the notarized documents attesting
to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit. In this case, there were two lawyers
available in the municipality, only that they were charging
exorbitant fees, which is not an exception to the general
rule.
(b) As can be seen from Circular No. 1-90 above, the judge, if
allowed to perform the functions of a regular notary, may
charge a fee, but such fee shall be for the account of the
government and turned over to the municipal treasurer.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2002 Bar, Q. XIII: In an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
the late Juan Mayaman, the heirs requested Judge Maawain, a
family friend, to go over the document prepared by a new
lawyer before they signed it. Judge Maawain agreed and even
acted as an instrumental witness.
Did Judge Maawain engage in the unauthorized practice of law?
Why?
A: Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court and Rule
5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit a judge from
engaging in the private practice of law as a member of the bar or
giving professional advice to clients. In the case of De Castro v.
Capulong, (1982), the Supreme Court held that a judge who
merely acted as a witness to a document and who explained to
the party waiving his rights of redemption over mortgaged
properties and the consequences thereof, does not engage
himself in the practice of law. This appears to be more applicable
to the case of Judge Maawain. He did not give professional advice
in anticipation of litigation. He was just asked to review was a
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. He signed merely as an
instrumental witness and not as a legal counsel. Besides, his act
was an isolated act.
2004 Bar, Q. V(B): Assume that your friend and colleague, Judge
Peter X. Mahinay, a Regional Trial Court judge stationed at KL
City, would seek your advice regarding his intention to ask the
permission of the Supreme Court to act as counsel for and thus
represent his wife
in the trial of a civil case for damages pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
What would be your advice to him? Discuss briefly.
A: I would advise him against it. Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct expressly and absolutely prohibits judges from engaging
in the private practice of law, because of the incompatible nature
between the duties of a judge and a lawyer. Moreover, as a Judge
he can influence to a certain extent the outcome of the case even
if it is with another court. A Judge shall refrain from influencing in
any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency (Rule 2.04, Code of
Judicial Conduct).
2007 Bar, Q. VII(b): When can Judges of the Municipal Trial
Courts (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC) perform
the function of notaries public ex officio, even if the notarization
of the documents are not in connection with the exercise of
their official functions and duties?
[210]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities of circuits
with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notary
public ex-officio perform any act within the competency of a
regular notary public, provide that:
(1) All notarial fee charged be for the account of the
government and turned over to the municipal treasurer
(Lapena v. Marcos, A.M. No. 1969-MJ); and
(2) Certification be made in the notarized documents attesting
to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit (Abadilla v. Tabiliran, Jr., Adm. Matter
MTC92-716).
1998 Bar, Q. XII: A judge, in order to ease his clogged docket,
would exert efforts to compel the accused in criminal cases to
plead guilty to a lesser offense and advise party litigants in civil
cases, whose positions appear weak, to accept the compromise
offered by the opposing party.
Is the practice legally acceptable?
A: The practice is legally acceptable as long as the judge does not
exert pressure on the parties and takes care that he does not
appear to have prejudged the case. Where a judge has told a
party that his case is weak before the latter was fully heard, such
was considered as a ground for his disqualification (Castillo v.
Juan).
Sec. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or
participate in other organizations representing the interests of
judges.
1. Involvement in Judicial Organizations
 Membership and active participation of judges, in judges’
organizations is a welcome activity.
 Such social activities of judges with lawyers are restricted,
such activities afford an opportunity to socialize with one’s
peers. It is also a venue to pursue professional development
in the exchange of ideas with fellow judges.
Sec. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask
for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her
in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
1. Duty of Judges and Members of His Family Against
Soliciting or Accepting Financial or Material Gain

Haw Tay v. Singayao. The acts of respondent Judge in demanding
and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court
constitute serious misconduct in office. This Court condemns in
the strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent Judge.
It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of
those who are charged with the responsibility of administering
the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes
the respect for law and the courts without which government
cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 13
NBI v. Judge Reyes, (2000). A judge who asked for a sum of
money in return for the dismissal of drug-related criminal charges
was entrapped by the NBI.
2014 Bar, Q. IX: Judge A accepted a gift consisting of assorted
canned goods and other grocery items from his compadre whose
friend has a pending case with him. He accepted the gift just so
as not to embarrass his compadre. When his compadre left his
chambers, he asked his secretary to donate the gift he received
to the victims of Typhoon Yolanda.
Did the judge cross the ethical line? Explain your answer.
A: In accepting a gift from his compadre, which he must have
suspected was connected with the case of his compadre’s friend,
because he accepted just in order not to embarrass his compadre,
Judge A violated Sec. 13, Canon 4 of the New Code of Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary which provides that:
Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.
2005 Bar, Q. VII(2): In an intestate proceeding, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in favor of a Regional Trial
Court Judge was filed by one of the heirs. Another heir opposed
the petition on the ground that the judge is disqualified to
become an administrator of the estate as he is the brother-in-
law of the deceased.
Rule on the petition.
A: I will deny the petition for issuance of letters of administration
in favor of a Regional Trial Court judge. Rule 5.06 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that “a judge should not serve as the
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary,
except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the
immediate family, and then only if such service will not interfere
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
with the proper performance of his judicial duties.” The exception
is not applicable because “member of the immediate family” is
defined in the same rule as "limited to the spouses and relatives
within the second degree of consanguinity”. The deceased
brother-in-law of the judge is not a relative within the second
degree of consanguinity, but of affinity.
1999 Bar, Q. XIV: Justice AR of the Sandiganbayan was named
executor of the Will of his good friend BT whose estate is valued
approximately at Two Billion (P2,000,000,000.00) Pesos.
Upon BT's death, may Justice AR accept the trust and serve as
executor of BT's Will while still in office?
A: No, he may not. Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a judge shall not serve as the executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary except for the
estate, trust, or person of a member of the immediate family, and
then only if such service will not interfere with the proper
performance of judicial duties. Member of immediate family shall
be limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of
consanguinity.
2000 Bar, Q. XVI: Before his appointment to the judiciary, Judge
K was the administrator of the estate of his second cousin. After
joining the judiciary, could Judge K continue to be the
administrator? Explain.
A: No. Judge K may no longer continue to be the administrator of
the estate of his second cousin. Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that: “(a) judge should not serve as the
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary,
except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the
immediate family, and then only if such service will not interfere
with the proper performance of judicial duties. ‘Member of
immediate family’ shall be limited to the spouse and relatives
within the second degree of consanguinity." A second cousin is
not a relative within the second degree of consanguinity.
1995 Bar, Q. VIII(2): In an intestate estate proceeding a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of an RTC
judge was filed by one of the heirs. Another heir opposed the
petition on the ground that the judge was disqualified to
become administrator of the estate as he was the first cousin of
the deceased. The petitioner however argued that the judge was
not disqualified as the case was not pending before him.
Rule on the petition. Discuss fully.
[211]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides f that “A
Judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust or person
of a member of the immediate family, and then only if such
service will not interfere with the proper performance of Judicial
duties. Members of immediate family’ shall be limited to the
spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity".
Under the foregoing rule, the petition should be denied. The
Judge should not be appointed administrator of the estate of his
first cousin, who is not a relative within the second degree of
consanguinity.
Sec. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their
duties or functions.
1. Duty of Court Staff and Persons Under the Judge’s
Authority Against Soliciting or Accepting Financial or
Material Gains
 What a judge cannot do directly, the judge should not be
allowed to do through his staff and other under his
authority.
 Canon 4, Sec. 13 and 14 postulate that those enjoying the
judge’s trust and confidence should not be used as “bridges”
to the judge himself.
1999 Bar, Q. XIII: Judge A went to Hong Kong on vacation on
board a Philippine Airlines plane and they (sic) stayed in a first
class hotel for three days and three nights. The round trip ticket
Manila-Hongkong-Manila and board and lodging in the hotel
where he stayed were paid for as a birthday gift to the Judge by
a friend whose son has a case for estafa pending in another
Branch of the Court where Judge A is assigned.
Did Judge A commit any infraction of the Code of Judicial
Conduct under the circumstances?
A: Yes. He violated Canon 5, Rule 5.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that a judge or any immediate member
of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from
anyone except as may be allowed by law. Also, Canon 2 of the
same Code provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Accepting a
birthday gift of a vacation in Hong Kong from a friend whose son
has a case for estafa pending in another branch of the Court
where Judge A is assigned raises a suspicion of impropriety on his
part. The fact that the case is pending in another branch is

immaterial because he could be suspected of having been bribed
to influence the presiding judge of the other branch. A judge shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation
or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency
(Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial Conduct).
1995 Bar, Q. III: Judge Roman Pulido, an incumbent RTC judge,
ran for President of the Rotary Club of Bacolor and won. His first
project was to put up a livelihood center to help the lahar
victims. To raise funds he sent to the business community
solicitation letters for contributions. His rival in their club filed
an administrative charge against Judge Pulido alleging unethical
conduct for socializing and being actively involved in an
organization the members of which are mostly practicing
lawyers, and for soliciting contributions.
Are the grounds raised valid for the charge of unethical conduct?
Discuss fully.
A: Rules 5.01, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that:
Rule 5.01. A judge may engage in the following activities provided
that they do not interfere with the performance of judicial duties
or detract from the dignity of the court:
(c) participate in civil and charitable activities:
(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal adviser of
a non-profit or non-political, educational, religious.
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization"
A Judge is not required to live in seclusion.
However, Section "t. Code of Judicial Ethics, provides that a judge
should avoid giving ground for reasonable suspicion that he is
utilizing the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce
others to patronize or contribute to charitable enterprises.
Hence, while it is ethical for Judge Pulido to become President of
the Rotary Club of Bacolor, it would be unethical for him to send
letters soliciting contributions from the business community.
1997 Bar, Q. XV: As the guest speaker in a Rotary Club weekly
luncheon meeting, Judge P was asked during the open forum
what might his personal opinion be on PIRMA's move to initiate
a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. He expressed the
view that PIRMA's crusade should be allowed because it would
be in consonance with the declaration in the Constitution that
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." He likewise enjoined the members to
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
support PIRMA. An administrative complaint was filed against
him by a club member, a staunch oppositor to the PIRMA
petition before the COMELEC, alleging that the judge's public
statement had constituted conduct unbecoming a judge. Judge
P's answer to the complaint was that membership in the
judiciary did not deprive him of his right to free speech, that he
was entitled to express his view even on political issues, and
that any issue requiring resolution on the PIRMA petition was
outside the Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts. Was there a
breach of the Code of Judicial conduct by Judge P?
A: Yes, there is a breach. Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a judge is entitled to entertain personal views on
political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship,
a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or
participate in other partisan political activities. Since judge P
considered the PIRMA petition to be a political issue, he should
have refrained from making his speech and enjoining his listeners
to support PIRMA because he might be suspected in engaging in a
partisan political activity.
Alternative:
(1) Yes, there is a breach. The judge's view that PIRMA should
be allowed and that his audience should support it, may be
misunderstood as encouraging a defiance of the Supreme
Court which has already ruled that there is no law
implementing the constitutional provision for the exercise of
the People's Initiative in amending the Constitution.
(2) No, there is no breach. Espousing the PIRMA is not engaging
in a partisan political activity.
2010 Bar, Q. XVII: Judge X was invited to be a guest speaker
during, the annual convention of a private organization which
was covered by media Since he was given the liberty to speak on
any topic, he discussed the recent decision of the Supreme Court
declaring that the President is not, under the Constitution,
proscribed from appointing a Chief Justice within two months
before the election.
In his speech, the judge demurred to the Supreme Court decision
and even stressed that the decision is a serious violation of the
Constitution.
A. Did Judge X incur any administrative liability? Explain.
B. If instead of ventilating his opinion before the private
organization, Judge X incorporated it, as an obiter dictum,
in one of his decisions, did he incur any administrative
liability? Explain.
[212]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A. He did not incur administrative liability. Sec. 4, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
provides that “[Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but
in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of
the judiciary.”
B. In deciding cases, a judge is supposed to be faithful to the
law, which includes decisions of the Supreme Court. If he
feels that a doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court is
against his way of reasoning or his conscience, he may state
his personal opinion on the matter but should decide the
case in accordance with the law or doctrine and not with his
personal views (Garcia v. Burgos, 1998). The fact that Judge
X ventilated his personal opinion merely as an obiter dictum
indicates that he did not decide the case in accordance with
his personal opinion. But, still, it undermines the authority of
the Supreme Court, and he may incur administrative liability
for it.
2010 Bar, Q. XVI: Judge L is assigned in Turtle Province. His
brother ran for Governor in Rabbit Province. During the election
period this year, judge L took a leave of absence to help his
brother conceptualize the campaign strategy. He even
contributed a modest amount to the campaign kitty and hosted
lunches and dinners.
Did Judge L incur administrative and/or criminal liability?
Explain.
A: Judge L incurred administrative liability. Rule 5.18 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct (which is applicable in a suppletory character
to the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) provides
that “[A] Judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political
questions, but to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge
shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds,
publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in
other partisan political activities.”
He may also be held criminally liable for violation of Section 26 (I)
of the Omnibus Election Code, which penalizes any officer or
employee in the civil service who, directly or indirectly,
intervenes, in any election campaign or engages in any partisan
political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order.
Sec. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public
disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as
appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that

such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as
intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial
duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
1. Acceptable Financial or Material Gains
 Token gifts or reasonable occasions are acceptable/ Three
factors would be relevant:
(a) The value of the gift which obviously should not be
excessive.
(b) The regularity of the occasion. Thus, it should not be for a
frivolous occasion not normally celebrated.
(c) The source of the gift. If the gift-giver happens to be a party-
litigant with a pending case before the judge, the value of
the gift might be immaterial as the propriety of the gesture
might be misconstrued or questioned
Canon 5: Equality
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is
essential to the due performance of the judicial office.
Sec. 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in
society and differences arising from various sources, including but
not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and
economic status and other like causes.
1. Duty to be Aware of Social Diversities
 A judge should not find a witness less credible simply
because of the lack of education or under-education of that
witness, or because a witness is a gay or a lesbian. These are
matters irrelevant in deciding a case.
 Understanding social diversities would also help a judge in
appreciating the witness because of a particular social trait.
 A Muslim litigant or witness would be better understood, in
terms of religious belief or customs, by a Christian judge, or
that the testimonial inclination of a pauper litigant would be
different from the inclinations of a well-off witness.
Sec. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person
or group on irrelevant grounds.
1. Duty Against Bias and Prejudice
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
State Prosecutors v. Muro. What is required on the part of judges
is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges
can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are
both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their
role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit
limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not
to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw
his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He
is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial
necessity of order in the social life."
Sec. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation
on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance
of such duties.
1. Duty to Give Due Consideration, Respect and Courtesy
 Judicial functions should be carried out in an orderly manner
free from any extraneous disruptions. Acts of
inconsiderateness disrespect and discourtesy disrupts
judicial proceedings which unduly hampers the judge’s task.
 In the end, it is the administration of justice which suffers as
a result of poor human relations with the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and even judicial obligations.
2. Illustration of Lack of Consideration to a Judicial Colleague
Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. (2008). A CA Justice
was found to be disrespectful to a judicial colleague “when he
unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision
that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly
forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had
already been “reorganized-out” of the Special Ninth Division as of
July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he
should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why
he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to his or her influence, direction or control to differentiate
between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any
irrelevant ground.
1. Duty to Ensure Equal Treatment by Court Staff
[213]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
 Inappropriate conduct of the court staff towards the party-
litigants should be the accountability of the judge. His failure
to properly supervise his staff constitutes negligence on the
part of the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the
court to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally
relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of
legitimate advocacy.
1. Duty to Ensure Lawyers are NOT Biased or Prejudiced
 Without awaiting the objection from the opposing counsel,
the judge may motu proprio rule a manifestation, which
smack of bias and prejudice, as immaterial and irrelevant.
 Pursuant to Canon 5, Sec. 5, the judge may reprimand the
counsel for such biased or prejudiced manifestation.
Canon 6: Competence and Diligence
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due
performance of judicial office.
1987 Bar, Q. XI: In the course of a proceeding before a Regional
Trial Court involving a petition for admission to bail of a person
charged with rebellion, the prosecution cited various Supreme
Court decisions in which similar petitions by other accused
persons were dismissed by the Supreme Court. The RTC Judge, in
rejecting the prosecution’s arguments, and ordering the
defendant’s admission to bail, perorated, inter alia, as follows: “I
personally believe that the Supreme Court was wrong in refusing
to allow bail in the cases cited by the Fiscal. I know that the facts
in the cited cases are almost identical to those shown in this
case, but I strongly feel that the Supreme Court overlooked the
equitable and humanitarian aspects of the case.”
Discuss the legal and ethical aspects of these statements of the
trial court judge.
A: A judge may not decide contrary to a jurisprudence set by the
Supreme Court. If he feels that the application of a doctrine
promulgated by the Supreme Court is against his way of reasoning
or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter
but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his
personal views, he must first think that it is his duty to apply the
law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the land, and that any
deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would

unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconvenience,
delays and expenses to the litigants (Albert vs. CFI of Manila (Br.
VI), G.R. No. L-26364, May 29, 1968).
1991 Bar, Q. X: In the Course of a petition for ball in a case for
illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pending
before him, judge AM (who has been long frustrated with his
work because he has not been appointed to the Court of Appeals
despite the strong recommendations of several Members of
Congress) made statements contrary to the rulings of the
Supreme Court on the matter. He further made utterances
imputing bias to the Supreme Court in favor of the
Administration which, according to him, is the reason why all
petitions for bail in similar cases were denied despite the
apparent weakness of the evidence for the prosecution.
(A) What are the implications of Judge AM's actuations?
(B) Is he liable for disciplinary action? For what?
A:
(A) The facts related in this question are similar to the case of
Judge Jesus Morfe of the Court of First Instance of Manila
who had long been aspiring for an appointment to the Court
of Appeals. He held a contrary view from the decision of the
Supreme Court in People vs. Hernandez that all crimes are
absorbed in a lesser of crime of rebellion which he did so in
his decision.
To maintain the stability of jurisprudence and an orderly
administration of justice to trial judge should render decisions in
accordance with settled jurisprudence set by the Supreme Court.
If he feels that a law or doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court
is against his conviction, he may state his personal opinion on the
matter but should decide the case in accordance with the law or
settled doctrine and not with his personal views. He may likewise
recommend remedial measures.
The implications of Judge AM is actuations are that he could be
violating his oath of office of upholding the law and the Code of
Judicial conduct to administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of law. He could also be violating his duty
as a minister of justice under a government of laws and not of
men.
(B) The Judge can be liable for disciplinary action for violations
of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
2008 Bar, Q. IX(b): State, with a brief explanation, whether the
judge concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
below: Deciding a case in accordance with a Supreme Court
ruling but adding that he does not agree with the ruling.
A: There is nothing wrong with such conduct. In fact, in Santos,
cited in Vivo v. Cloribel (1966) and Albert v. CFI of Manila, Br. VI
(1968), the Supreme Court ruled that if a judge of a lower court
feels that a decision of the Supreme Court is against his way of
reasoning or against his conscience, he may state his opinion, but
apply the law in accordance with the interpretation of the
Supreme Court.
Sec. 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all
other activities.
1. Primacy of Judicial Duties
In re: Echiverri, (1975). Judges should be attentive of their work
ethic:
Judges are duty bound to comply with the above to insure the
maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a speedy administration
of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of five hours per working day
of the week will enable the judge to calendar as many cases as
possible and to dispose with regular dispatch the increasing
number of litigations pending with the court. All other matters
needing the attention of the judge are to be attended to outside
of this five-hour schedule of trial.
Sec. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial
duties, which include not only the performance of judicial
functions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the
court’s operations.
1. Coverage of Judicial Duties
Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Joboco, (1998). A judge was
“Admonished” for his refusal to sign the certificates of service of
his Clerk of Court which resulted in the withholding of the clerk’s
salary. The judge was also “Advised” “to exert care and
consideration in his dealings with his office staff.
Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and
enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary
for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage
for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should
be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
[214]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1. Duty of Professional Development
In re: HDO Issued by Judge Sardido, (2001). The Court
reprimanded Judge Sardido for issuing a HDO contrary to Circular
No. 39-97.
Cabilao v. Judge Sardido, (1995). The Court fined the same Judge
Sardido P5,000 for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion and gross misconduct. The Court gave stern warning to
Judge Sardido that a commission of the same or similar act would
be dealt with more severely.
Almeron v. Judge Sardido, (1997). The Court imposed on the
same Judge Sardido, once again, a stiffer fine of P10,000 for gross
ignorance of the law. He was again sternly warned that the
commission of the same or similar act in the future would be dealt
with more severely including, if warranted, his dismissal from the
service.
Torcende v. Judge Sardido, (2003). The Court found Judge
Sardido again guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of gross
misconduct. This time the Court dismissed Judge Sardido from the
service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits.
2. More Than Just a Cursory Acquaintance with the Statutes
and Procedural Rules is Needed
Aguilar v. Dalanao, (2000). There is the need to be diligent in
keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence, for
the study of law is a never-ending and ceaseless process.
Almeron v. Sardido, (1997). Members of the judiciary are
supposed to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules, more so with legal principles
and rules so elementary and basic that not to know them, or to
act as if one does not know them, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.
Sec. 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant
developments of international law, including international
conventions and other instruments establishing human rights
norms.
1. Duty Towards Developments in International Law and
Human Rights
1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2. The Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land.

 International law, therefore, is an indispensable basis of
judicial action. In today’s era of international inter-
dependence and international trade and relations,
knowledge of international law has become imperative.
Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.
1. Duty to be Efficient, Fair and Prompt
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 6, Sec. 5
(a) Sabatin v. Mallare, (2004). Undue delay in the resolving
pending motions or incidents within the reglementary
period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.
(b) OCA v. Judge Floro. Directing the release of an accused on
recognizance on the basis of a cursory interview of the
custodian and the applicant without an investigation report
from the probation officer is a violation of the rules on
probation under P.D. 968 (Probation Law). Under the
Probation Law, the accused’s temporary liberty is warranted
only during the period for awaiting the submission of the
investigation report on the application for probation and the
resolution thereon.
3. Illustration of Ignorance of Procedural Rule
(a) Oral Orders Not Reduced into Writing
OCA v. Judge Floro. The judge’s argument that his Orders need
not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes was due to ignorance of a procedural rule.
Echaus v. CA, (1990). No Judgment, or order whether final or
interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down
in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e. delivered by the Judge to
the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation.
4. Judicial Errors
Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, (2000). Not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of law. If committed in good faith, such errors
do not warrant administrative sanctions. Otherwise, judges, in
effect, will be expected to render infallible judgments. However,
this would apply only within certain tolerable judgments and does
not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of
error.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Manlavi v. Gacott, Jr. A judge is not subject to disciplinary action
for acts committed in his judicial capacity unless they were
committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption and bad faith.
Gil v. Judge Lopez, (2003). Where the judge acted in good faith
but his ignorance is so gross or patent or when the judge acts
fraudulently, he should be held liable.
5. Delay in Resolving Cases
In re: Request of Judge Masamayor, (1999). For failure to resolve
cases within the reglementary period, a judge may be held liable
for gross inefficiency and dereliction of duty. On meritorious
grounds, judges may ask for additional time to resolve cases. But
such application for extension must be filed before the expiration
of the prescribed period.
CJC, Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Fernandez v. Hamoy, (2004). The judge may not attribute delay in
resolution to a mix-up of the records. The inefficiency of his court
personnel was not given serious consideration in view of the
Court’s observation that “it was the judge’s duty to devise an
efficienct recording and filing system in his court to enable him to
monitor the flow of cases. In this case, the case was not resolved
for 13 years (Judge dismissed from service)
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC-Iriga City, Br. 34,
(2000). Delay in resolution of cases also constitutes a violation of
the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of
their cases.
Re: Request for the Expeditious Resolution of Civil Case Pending
at RTC Branch 9, Tacloban City, (1998). By a regulation, a judge
may not receive his salary where a number of cases remain
unresolved. But a judge who collects his salary upon false
certification that he has resolved the required number of cases is
guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct.
Gaspar v. Judge Bayhon. Where, of course, they delay cannot be
attributed to the judge, such as when the completion of the
transcript of stenographic notes is up to a stenographer which is
not under the control of the judge, the judge may not be held
accountable.
6. Inefficiency of Court Personnel is NOT an Excuse
[215]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Pagayao v. Imbing, (2001). A judge may not raise as an excuse the
inefficiency of his court personnel.
Gonzales-Decano v. Siapno, (2001). The judge bears ultimate
responsibility for the inefficiency in his court.
Sec. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.
1. Duty to Maintain Order, Decorum and Respect in Court
Proceedings
Fineza v. Aruelo. All judges should always observe courtesy and
civility.
Fidel v. Caraos. Judge must also be temperate, patient and
courteous both in conduct and language especially to those
appearing before him.
Turqueza v. Hernando, (1980). Judicial decorum requires a
magistrate to be at all times temperate in his language, refraining
from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting “to
language of vilification”
Impao v. Makilala. Judicial decorum also requires that a judge
must look respectable and be properly attired. Hence, a judge
must not attend to a case in sleeveless shirt and slippers or in a
polo jacket.
2. Television Coverage of a Trial
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan
of the Plunder Cases Against the Former Pres. Estrada, (2001).
The live media (television) coverage of a trial would be a denial of
due process as it could undermine a fair and impartial trial.
3. Illustration of Violation of Canon 6, Sec. 6
(a) OCA v. Judge Floro. A trial judge was found guilty of using
intemperate language upon the testimony of a clerk of court
in an administrative investigation of said judge. The clerk of
court testified:
Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence
of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk,
he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court.

There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-
luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not
during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter
"malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did not surprise us
one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for
Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he
uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the
transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the
Court Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the
Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after
hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open Court, before all of us,
the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and
the defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not
to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual
transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive
languages against the justice system, against a certain judge,
against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against
people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit
of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between
the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of
Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the
stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in
the record because it contained offensive languages highly
improper and intemperate languages like for example, "putang
ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera,
etcetera"
(b) Mane v. Judge Belen, (2008). A trial judge was reprimanded
after said respondent judge made “sarcastic and humiliating,
even threatening and boastful remarks to complainant who
is admittedly ‘still young’ ‘unnecessary lecturing and
debating’ as well as unnecessary display of learning
(c) Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, (2007). A judge who utters “next
time you see your husband, open your arms and legs”, was
found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct.
(d) Santos v. Cruz. Berating a witness and telling him: “You can
go to hell I don’t care or where do you want to go Mr.
Cano”
2014 Bar, Q. XI: A judge who insults counsel and shouts
invectives at a litigant is guilty of:
(a) serious misconduct
(b) committing acts unbecoming of a judge
(c) manifest bias and partiality
A: (b)
2009 Bar, Q. IV(b): After being diagnosed with stress dermatitis,
Judge Rosalind, without seeking permission from the Supreme
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Court, refused to wear her robe during court proceedings. When
her attention was called, she explained that whenever she wears
her robe she is reminded of her heavy caseload, thus making her
tense. This, in turn, triggers the outbreak of skin rashes. Is Judge
Rosalind justified in not wearing her judicial robe? Explain.
A: Judge Rosalind is not justified. In Chan v. Majaducon (2003),
the Supreme Court emphasized that the wearing of robes by
judges as required by Adm. Circular No. 25, dated June 9, 1989,
serves the dual purpose of heightening public consciousness on
the solemnity of judicial proceedings and in impressing upon the
judge the exacting obligations of his office. The robe is part of
judges’ appearance and is as important as a gavel. The Supreme
Court added that “while circumstances, such as the medical
condition claimed by respondent judge, may exempt one from
complying with AC No. 25, he must first secure the Court’s
permission for such exemption. He cannot simply excuse himself,
like respondent judge, from complying with the requirement.
4. Related Provision in the Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 3.04 - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to
lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants
are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
2015 Bar, Q. XI: Atty. Belinda appeared as counsel for accused
Popoy in a case being heard before Judge Tadhana. After Popoy
was arraigned, Atty. Belinda moved for a resetting of the pre-
trial conference. This visibly irked Judge Tadhana and so before
Atty. Belinda could finish her statement, Judge Tadhana cut her
off by saying that if she was not prepared to handle the case,
then he could easily assign a counsel de oficio for Popoy. Judge
Tadhana also uttered that Atty. Belinda was wasting the
precious time of the court. Atty. Belinda tried to explain that she
was capable of handling the case but before she could finish her
explanation, Judge Tadhana again cut her off and accused her of
always making excuses for her incompetence. Judge Tadhana
even declared that he did not care if Atty. Belinda filed a
thousand administrative cases against him.
According to Atty. Belinda, Judge Tadhana had also humiliated
her like that in the past for the flimsiest of reasons. Even Atty.
Belinda's clients were not spared from Judge Tadhana's wrath as
he often scolded witnesses who failed to respond immediately
to questions asked of them on the witness stand.
[216]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Atty. Belinda filed an administrative case against Judge Tadhana.
Do the acts of Judge Tadhana as described above constitute a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct? Explain.
A: Judge Tadhana has violated Sec. 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct of the Philippine Judiciary which provides that:
Sec. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.
The SC has held as follows:
The duty to maintain respect for the dignity of the court applies to
members of the bar and bench alike. A judge should be courteous
both in his conduct and in his language especially to those
appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the
public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical.
He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and
remember always that courtesy begets courtesy. Above all, he
must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no reason
for reproach.(Ruiz v. Bringas, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1266, April 6,
2000)
1990 Bar, Q. V(1): What would your comment be about a judge
who. whenever he promulgates a decision, invites
representatives of the print and broadcast media to his sala for
the purpose of having the promulgation televised, and that in
the process, he gives interviews although he does not discuss his
personal views on the merits of the case? Explain your answer.
A: The judge's conduct is improper. Canon II, Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should not seek
publicity for personal vainglory. A judge should conduct
proceedings in court with fitting dignity and decorum and in such
a manner as to reflect the Importance and seriousness of the
inquiry to ascertain the truth. Allowing television coverage of the
promulgation of the decision would detract the dignity of the
court proceedings, degrade the court and create misconception in
the public mind. His giving interviews, even if he does not discuss
his personal views on the merits of the case, has no other purpose
than to seek publicity for personal vainglory, which is prohibited.
1990 Bar, Q. V(2): How far should the judge allow publicity of
the proceedings and decisions of his court? Explain your answer.

A: A judge may allow publicity by letting his actuations as a Judge
and his decisions speak; for themselves, without any comment on
his part. What makes publicity improper is the employment of
traditional dignity of court proceedings and of the judge himself.
Good, efficient, speedy and correct administration of justice on
his part has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention, and the publicity thereby generated is a normal by-
product of efficient discharge of his duties, which IS proper.
2004 Bar, Q. III: Upon opening session of his court, the Presiding
Judge noticed the presence of television cameras set up at
strategic places in his courtroom and the posting of media
practitioners all over his sala with their video cameras. The
Judge forthwith issued an order directing the exclusion from the
courtroom of all television paraphernalia and further instructing
the reporters inside the hall not to operate their “video cams”
during the proceedings. The defense lawyers objected to the
court’s order, claiming that it was violative of their client’s
constitutional right to a public trial.
A. In issuing the questioned order, did the Judge act in
violation of the rights of the accused to a public trial?
Discuss briefly.
B. Did the Judge act in derogation of press freedom when he
directed the exclusion of the television paraphernalia from
the courtroom and when he prohibited the news reporters
in the courtroom from operating their “video cams" during
the proceedings? Reason briefly.
A:
A. The judge did not violate the right of the accused to a public
trial. A trial is public “when anyone interested in observing
the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so” (Garcia v. Domingo, 1973). There is to
be no ban on attendance. In the question given, the judge
did not bar attendance, only the use of television
paraphernalia and “video cams”.
B. No. Press freedom was never transgressed. The serious risks
posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and
radio broadcast, especially when emotions are running high
on the issues stirred by the case, should be taken into
consideration before addressing the issue of press freedom.
The right of the accused to a fair trial, not by trial by
publicity takes precedence over press freedom as invoked by
the TV reporters in this case (Sec. Perez v. Estrada, 2001).
Alternative: The judge did not act in derogation of press freedom.
In an En Banc Resolution dated October 23, 1991, “Re Live TV and
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino’s
Libel Case", the Supreme Court ruled that:
“Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant’s right to due
process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice,
and considering further that the freedom of the press and the
right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by
less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed.
Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be
restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial
officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted dining the trial proper.”
Sec. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the
diligent discharge of judicial duties.
1. Conduct Compatible with Diligent Discharge of Judicial
Duties
 Canon 6, Sec. 7 covers all other questionable or doubtful
conduct of a judge
 Ultimately, the judge must serve the people by rendering
justice where justice is due.
Definitions
In this Code, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the
following meanings shall be attributed to the words used:
“Court staff” includes the personal staff of the judge including law
clerks.
“Judge” means any person exercising judicial power, however
designated.
“Judge’s family” includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-
law, daughter-inlaw, and any other relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a companion
or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, supersedes the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
heretofore applied in the Philippines to the extent that the
provisions or concepts therein are embodied in this Code:
Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence of
[217]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
specific provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and the Code of Judicial Conduct shall be applicable in a
suppletory character.
This New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary shall
take effect on the first day of June 2004, following its publication
not later than 15 May 2004 in two newspapers of large circulation
in the Philippines to ensure its widest publicity.
Promulgated this 27th day of April 2004. The Code took effect on
June 1, 2004.
Other Notes
1. Evidence Required
Lachica v. Flordeliza, (1996). The quantum of evidence required
to hold a judge administratively liable is only substantial evidence.
2. Accountability as a Lawyer
NBI v. Judge Reyes, (2000). The judge who was charged with
bribery was dismissed from the service and was also disbarred.
3. Preventive Suspension of Judges
OCA v. Judge Floro. A judge may be preventively suspended by
the SC indefinitely or “until such time that a final decision is
reached in the administrative case against him or her.”
Re: Payment of Backwages and Other Economic Benefits of
Judge Iturralde, (2005). Unlike ordinary service officials and
employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense
warranting preventive suspension are not automatically
reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90) day period, as
mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge
until a final decision is reached in the administrative case
especially where there is a strong of likelihood of his guilt or
complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is
intended to shield the public from any further damage or
wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of
office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’
image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and
conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the
privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a
judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast
government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as

the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression.
4. The Requisite Exhaustion of Judicial Remedies Before
Resort to Administrative Charges Against the Judge
Hilado v. Judge Reyes, (2006). Resort to and exhaustion of judicial
remedies are prerequisites for the taking of, among other
measures, an administrative complaint against the person of the
judge concerned.
Flores v. Hon. Abesamis. The law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a
Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary
remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as
normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or
substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a
motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary
in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for
inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative,
or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies
are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where
such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof”.
Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
influence from external forces or factors, they should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in
the performance of their duties and functions
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
RESOLUTION
Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004 and on the proposed
Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 submitted by the Sub-
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Committee for the Study, Drafting and Formulation of the Rules (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
Governing the Appointment of Notaries Public and the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
Performance and Exercise of Their Official Functions, of the defined by these Rules; and
Committees on Revision of the Rules of Court and on Legal (c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the
Education and Bar Matters, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the contents of the instrument or document.
proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, with modifications,
thus: Sec. 3. Commission – “Commission” refers to the grant of
authority to perform notarial acts and to the written evidence of
Rule I: Implementation the authority.
Sec. 1. Title – These Rules shall be known as the 2004 Rules on Sec. 4. Copy Certification – “Copy Certification” refers to a
Notarial Practice. notarial act in which a notary public:
Sec. 2. Purposes – These Rules shall be applied and construed to (a) is presented with an instrument or document that is neither
advance the following purposes: a vital record, a public record, nor publicly recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or
(a) To promote, serve, and protect public interest; document;
(b) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules governing (c) compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
notaries public; and (d) determines that the copy is accurate and complete.
(c) To foster ethical conduct among notaries public.
Sec. 5. Notarial Register – “Notarial Register” refers to a
Sec. 3. Interpretation – Unless the context of these Rules permanently bound book with numbered pages containing a
otherwise indicates, words in the singular include the plural, and chronological record of notarial acts performed by a notary public.
words in the plural include the singular.
Sec. 6. Jurat – “Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual on a
Rule II: Definitions single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
Sec. 1. Acknowledgment – “Acknowledgment” refers to an act in
instrument or document;
which an individual on a single occasion:
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
defined by these Rules;
integrally complete instrument or document;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or
notary; and
identified by the notary public through competent evidence
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to
of identity as defined by these Rules; and
such instrument or document.
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the
instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for
the purposes stated in the instrument or document, 1996 Bar, Q. XI: Distinguish between: A jurat and
declares that he has executed the instrument or document Acknowledgment. Give an example of each.
as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a
particular representative capacity, that he has the authority Jurat Acknowledgement
to sign in that capacity. The form prescribed for The form executed by the
sworn statements or notary public stating that
Sec. 2. Affirmation or Oath – The term “Affirmation” or “Oath” affidavits where no rights of certain document
refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: titles are transferred before a transferring rights or
notary public property have been executed
(a) appears in person before the notary public; by the persons known to him
to be the same person, and
that it was their free act, and
[218]

voluntary deed
An example is an affidavit An example is the
subscribed before a notary acknowledgment in a deed of
public or public official lease of land.
authorized for the purpose.
Sec. 7. Notarial Act and Notarization – “Notarial Act” and
“Notarization” refer to any act that a notary public is empowered
to perform under these Rules.
Sec. 8. Notarial Certificate – “Notarial Certificate” refers to the
part of, or attachment to, a notarized instrument or document
that is completed by the notary public, bears the notary's
signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary
public in a particular notarization as provided for by these Rules.
Sec. 9. Notary Public and Notary – “Notary Public” and “Notary”
refer to any person commissioned to perform official acts under
these Rules.
Sec. 10. Principal – “Principal” refers to a person appearing before
the notary public whose act is the subject of notarization.
Sec. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business – The term “regular
place of work or business” refers to a stationary office in the city
or province wherein the notary public renders legal and notarial
services.
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity – The phrase
“competent evidence of identity” refers to the identification of an
individual based on:
(a) At least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual; or .
(b) The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to
the instrument, document or transaction who is personally
known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary
public documentary identification.
2013 Bar, Q. I: Under the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, what
may used to satisfy the requirement of "competent evidence of
identity"?
(a) Passport, Senior Citizen card, HMO card.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(b) Police clearance, credit card, Professional Regulatory
Commission ID. 2012 Bar, Q. (22): Which of these does not constitute competent
(c) Voter’s ID, NBI clearance, Driver’s license. evidence of identity?
(d) Ombudsman’s clearance, private office ID, PhilHealth card.
(e) All of the above. (a) Passport;
(b) SSS card;
A: (c). Notarial Act, Sec. 12 (c) Community Tax Certificate;
(d) Senior Citizen Card.
2011 Bar, Q. 2: The acknowledgment appearing in a deed of sale
reads: “Before me personally appeared this 30 August 2010 2012 Bar, Q. 45: What is the effect when the parties to a
Milagros A. Ramirez, who proved her identity to me through document acknowledged before a notary public did not present
witnesses: 1. Rosauro S. Balana, Passport UU123456; 1-5-2010/ competent evidence of identity?
Baguio City; and 2. Elvira N. Buela, Passport VV200345; 1-17-
2009/ Manila. “Both witnesses, of legal ages, under oath declare (a) Voidable;
that: Milagros A. Ramirez is personally known to them; she is the (b) Valid;
same seller in the foregoing deed of sale; she does not have any (c) Invalid Notarization;
current identification document nor can she obtain one within a (d) Unenforceable.
reasonable time; and they are not privy to or are interested in
the deed he signed.” What is the status of such a notarial
2011 Bar, Q. 32: Myra asked Atty. Elma to notarize her deed of
acknowledgment?
sale. When Elma asked for Myra's competent evidence of
identity, she explained that she does not have any current
(a) Questionable since the notary public is not shown to
identification document nor could she get one soon. Instead, she
personally know the principal party.
presented her friend, Alex, who showed Atty. Elma his driver’s
(b) Ineffective since it included parties not privy to the deed.
license and confirmed her Myra’s identity. Is Alex’s identification
(c) Invalid since the evidence of identity is non-compliant with
of Myra valid?
the notarial rules.
(d) Valid since it is a manner of establishing the identity of the
(a) Yes, provided Alex states in the deed of sale that he knew
person executing the document.
Myra personally.
(b) No, Myra needs to produce a valid identification document
2007 Bar, Q. VII(a): What evidence of identity does the 2004 of herself.
Rules on Notarial Practice require before a notary public can (c) No, since Alex is not himself a party to the document.
officially affix his notarial seal on and sign a document presented (d) Yes, since Alex had a valid identification document.
by an individual whom the notary public does not personally
know?
Sec. 13. Official Seal or Seal – “Official seal” or “Seal” refers to a
device for affixing a mark, image or impression on all papers
A: The required evidence of identity required before a notary
officially signed by the notary public conforming the requisites
public can officially affix his notarial seal on and sign a document
prescribed by these Rules.
presented by an individual whom the notary public does not
personally know areas follows:
Sec. 14. Signature Witnessing – The term “signature witnessing”
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single occasion:
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual, or (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to instrument or document;
the instrument, document or transaction who is personally (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as
known to the notary public and who personally knows the
defined by these Rules; and
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary notary public.
public documentary identification.”
[219]

Sec. 15. Court – “Court” refers to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
Sec. 16. Petitioner – “Petitioner” refers to a person who applies
for a notarial commission.
Sec. 17. Office of the Court Administrator – “Office of the Court
Administrator” refers to the Office of the Court Administrator of
the Supreme Court.
Sec. 18. Executive Judge – “Executive Judge” refers to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of a city or province
who issues a notarial commission.
Sec. 19. Vendor – “Vendor” under these Rules refers to a seller of
a notarial seal and shall include a wholesaler or retailer.
Sec. 20. Manufacturer – “Manufacturer” under these Rules refers
to one who produces a notarial seal and shall include an engraver
and seal maker.
Rule III: Commissioning of Notary Public
Sec. 1. Qualifications – A notarial commission may be issued by
an Executive Judge to any qualified person who submits a petition
in accordance with these Rules.
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:
(1) Must be a citizen of the Philippines;
(2) Must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
(3) Must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year
and maintains a regular place of work or business in the city
or province where the commission is to be issued;
(4) Must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing
with clearances from the Office of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and
(5) Must not have been convicted in the first instance of any
crime involving moral turpitude.
2012 Bar, Q. 46: The petition for appointment as a notary public
should be filed with:
(a) The Office of the Court Administrator;
(b) The Clerk of Court;
(c) The MeTC Executive Judge;
(d) The RTC Executive Judge.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2012 Bar, Q. 44: Atty. Tony is a 25 year old Filipino lawyer. He
has been a resident in Paranaque City for about ten (10) years
and holds office in his residence. He filed a petition for
appointment as Notary Public in Paranaque and has clearance
from the IBP and the Bar Confidant. However, it appears that
while still a college student, he was convicted by a Laguna Court
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
During the summary hearing of his petition, the offended party
therein strongly objected on that ground. Can Atty. Tony be
appointed?
(a) No, because he has a previous criminal record.
(b) No, because of the opposition.
(c) Yes, the offense of Reckless Imprudence does not involve
moral turpitude.
(d) Yes, since the Reckless Imprudence case did not happen in
the jurisdiction where Atty. Tony is applying.
1996 Bar, Q. III(2)(a): Is a lawyer always a notary public?
A: A lawyer is not always a notary public.
Under Rule III, Sec. 1 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, in
order to be a notary public, he has to be issued a commission by
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court where he has
applied for such commission.
1996 Bar, Q. III(2)(b): Is a notary public always a lawyer? Explain.
A: Yes, A notary public needs is always a lawyer. Under Rule III,
Sec. 1(4) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, to be eligible for
commissioning as notary public, the petitioner must be a member
of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the
Office of the bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Alternative: A notary public need not be a lawyer. Sec. 233 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that persons who have
completed and passed the study of law in a reputable school or
university, or who have passed the examinations for office of
justice of the peace or clerk or deputy clerk of court for a period
of not less than two years, may also be appointed notaries public.
In municipalities and municipal districts where there are no
lawyers or persons having the qualifications above specified, or
having them, refused to hold such office, the judges may appoint
other persons temporarily to exercise the office of notary "public
who have the qualifications of fitness and morality.
[220]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 2. Form of the Petition and Supporting Documents – Every
petition for a notarial commission shall be in writing, verified, and
shall include the following:
(a) A statement containing the petitioner's personal
qualifications, including the petitioner's date of birth,
residence, telephone number, professional tax receipt, roll
of attorney's number and IBP membership number;
(b) Certification of good moral character of the petitioner by at
least two (2) executive officers of the local chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines where he is applying for
commission;
(c) Proof of payment for the filing of the petition as required by
these Rules; and
(d) Three (3) passport-size color photographs with light
background taken within thirty (30) days of the application.
The photograph should not be retouched. The petitioner
shall sign his name at the bottom part of the photographs.
Sec. 3. Application Fee – Every petitioner for a notarial
commission shall pay the application fee as prescribed in the
Rules of Court.
Sec. 4. Summary Hearing on the Petition – The Executive Judge
shall conduct a summary hearing on the petition and shall grant
the same if:
(a) The petition is sufficient in form and substance;
(b) The petitioner proves the allegations contained in the
petition; and
(c) The petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the
Executive Judge that he has read and fully understood these
Rules.
The Executive Judge shall forthwith issue a commission and a
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal in favor of
the petitioner.
Sec. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing –
(a) The notice of summary hearing shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the city or province
where the hearing shall be conducted and posted in a
conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and
of the Clerk of Court. The cost of the publication shall be
borne by the petitioner. The notice may include more than
one petitioner.
(b) The notice shall be substantially in the following form:

NOTICE OF HEARING
Notice is hereby given that a summary hearing on the petition for
notarial commission of (name of petitioner) shall be held on
(date) at (place) at (time). Any person who has any cause or
reason to object to the grant of the petition may file a verified
written opposition thereto, received by the undersigned before
the date of the summary hearing.
_____________________
Executive Judge
Sec. 6. Opposition to Petition – Any person who has any cause or
reason to object to the grant of the petition may file a verified
written opposition thereto. The opposition must be received by
the Executive Judge before the date of the summary hearing.
Sec. 7. Form of Notarial Commission – The commissioning of a
notary public shall be in a formal order signed by the Executive
Judge substantially in the following form:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________
This is to certify that (name of notary public) of (regular place of
work or business) in (city or province) was on this (date) day of
(month) two thousand and (year) commissioned by the
undersigned as a notary public, within and for the said
jurisdiction, for a term ending the thirty-first day of December
(year) .
________________________
Executive Judge
Sec. 8. Period Of Validity of Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal – The Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal shall be valid for a period of three (3)
months from date of issue, unless extended by the Executive
Judge.
A mark, image or impression of the seal that may be purchased by
the notary public pursuant to the Certificate shall be presented to
the Executive Judge for approval prior to use.
Sec. 9. Form of Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a
Notarial Seal – The Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a
Notarial Seal shall substantially be in the following form:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF_____________
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION
TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL
This is to authorize (name of notary public) of (city or province)
who was commissioned by the undersigned as a notary public,
within and for the said jurisdiction, for a term ending, the thirty-
first of December (year) to purchase a notarial seal..
Issued this (day) of (month) (year).
________________________
Executive Judge
Sec. 10. Official Seal of Notary Public – Every person
commissioned as notary public shall have only one official seal of
office in accordance with these Rules.
Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary
public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2)
years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
2011 Bar, Q. 9: When will Atty. Antonio's notarial commission
expire if he applied for and was given such commission on 12
November 2010?
(a) 31 December 2012
(b) 31 December 2011
(c) 11 November 2011
(d) 11 November 2012
Sec. 12. Register of Notaries Public – The Executive Judge shall
keep and maintain a Register of Notaries Public in his jurisdiction
which shall contain, among others, the dates of issuance or
revocation or suspension of notarial commissions, and the
resignation or death of notaries public. The Executive Judge shall
furnish the Office of the Court Administrator information and data
recorded in the register of notaries public. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall keep a permanent, complete and updated
database of such records.
Sec. 13. Renewal of Commission – A notary public may file a
written application with the Executive Judge for the renewal of his
commission within forty-five (45) days before the expiration
thereof. A mark, image or impression of the seal of the notary
public shall be attached to the application.
Failure to file said application will result in the deletion of the
name of the notary public in the register of notaries public.
[221]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
The notary public thus removed from the Register of Notaries
Public may only be reinstated therein after he is issued a new
commission in accordance with these Rules.
Sec. 14. Action on Application for Renewal of Commission – The
Executive Judge shall, upon payment of the application fee
mentioned in Section 3 above of this Rule, act on an application
for the renewal of a commission within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof. If the application is denied, the Executive Judge
shall state the reasons therefor.
1. Only Those Qualified May Notarize
Nunga v. Viray, (1999). Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be
prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the
administrative offices in general.
2. Performing a Notarial Without a Commission is a Violation
of the Lawyer’s Oath
Nunga v. Viray, (1999). It is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to
obey the laws for performing a notarial with a commission,
specifically disobedience to the notarial law.
2015 Bar, Q. XX: Cecilio is one of the 12 heirs of his father
Vicente, who owned an agricultural land located in Bohol. Cecilio
filed a complaint charging Judge Love Koto with abuse of
discretion and authority for preparing and notarizing a
document entitled "Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous
Deed of Sale" executed by Cecilio's mother Divina and brother
Jose. Jose signed the Deed on his own behalf and purportedly
also on behalf of his brothers and sisters, including Cecilio.
Cecilio though alleged that in his Special Power of Attorney, he
merely granted Jose the authority to mortgage said agricultural
land but not to partition, much less to sell the same. Judge Koto
contended that in a municipality where a notary public is
unavailable, a municipal judge is allowed to notarize documents
or deeds as ex officio notary public. He claimed that he acted in
good faith and only wanted to help. Did Judge Koto violate any
rules? Discuss.
A: MTC judges are notaries public ex officio; however, they may
notarize only such documents as are related to their functions.
The exception to this is that, in remote municipalities where there
is no notary public available, an MTC judge may notarize a private

document provided that he shall state in his certification the
absence of a notary public in the municipality, and that the
notarial fees should be paid to the Municipal Treasurer.
Assuming, nevertheless, that the exception applies in this case,
Judge Koto should not have notarized the “Extra-Judicial Partition
with Simultaneous Deed of Sale” submitted to him for
notarization. This is because not all of the parties concerned
signed and appeared before him. In the particular case of Cecilio,
his brother Jose signed for him purportedly on the basis of a
Special Power of Attorney. Judge Koto should have asked for the
production of the Special Power of Attorney and determined
whether or not Cecilio indeed authorized Jose to sign the deed of
partition and sale on his behalf.
2011 Bar, Q. 8: Raul sought Ely's disbarment for notarizing a
deed of sale knowing that four of the sellers were dead. Ely
admitted that he notarized the deed of sale but only after his
client assured him that the signatures of the others were
authentic. Later, Raul moved to have the complaint against him
dismissed on the ground that it was filed because of a
misunderstanding which had already been clarified. This
prompted the IBP to recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Can the dismissal be allowed?
(a) No, unless the complainant executes an affidavit of
desistance.
(b) Yes, since no compelling reason remained to continue with
it.
(c) Yes, but recall Ely's notarial commission since the charge
against him seems meritorious.
(d) No, given Ely’s admission that he notarized the document
when some signatories were absent.
Rule IV: Powers and Limitations of Notaries Public
Sec. 1. Powers –
(a) A notary public is empowered to perform the following
notarial acts:
(1) Acknowledgments;
(2) Oaths and affirmations;
(3) Jurats;
(4) Signature witnessings;
(5) Copy certifications; and
(6) Any other act authorized by these Rules.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a
signature by thumb or other mark on an instrument or
document presented for notarization if:
(1) The thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the
notary public and of two (2) disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
(2) Both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the
thumb or other mark;
(3) The notary public writes below the thumb or other mark:
"Thumb or Other Mark affixed by (name of signatory by
mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of
witnesses) and undersigned notary public"; and
(4) The notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other
mark through an acknowledgment, jurat, or signature
witnessing.
(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person
who is physically unable to sign or make a mark on an
instrument or document if:
(1) The notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or
make a mark to sign on his behalf;
(2) The signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence
of two disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the
instrument or document;
(3) Both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) The notary public writes below his signature: “Signature
affixed by notary in presence of (names and addresses of
person and two [2] witnesses)”; and
(5) The notary public notarizes his signature by
acknowledgment or jurat.
1995 Bar, Q. IV(1): What are the powers and duties of a notary
public?
A: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Sec. 1
Alternative: Every notary public shall have power to administer all
oaths and affirmations provided for by law, in all matters
incidents to his notarial office, and in the execution of affidavits,
depositions, and other documents requiring an oath; to receive
the proof or acknowledgment of all writings relating to commerce
or navigation, such as bills of exchange, bottomries, mortgages,
and hypothecactions of ships, vessels, or boats, charter parties or
affreightments, letters of attorney, deeds, mortgages, transfers
and assignments of land or buildings, or an interest therein, and
such other writings as are commonly proved or acknowledged
before notaries; to act as a magistrate in the writing of affidavits
or depositions, and to make declarations and certify the truth
[222]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
thereof under his seal of office, concerning all matters done by
him by virtue of his office. (Sec. 241, Notarial Law)
The duties of a notary public are the following:
(1) To keep a notarial register;
(2) To make the proper entry or entries in the notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by the law;
(3) To send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of court
within the first 10 days of the month next following;
(4) To affix to acknowledgments, the date of expiration of his
commission, as required by law;
(5) To forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper
clerk of court;
(6) To make report, within a reasonable time, to the proper
judge concerning the performance of his duties, as may be
required by such judge;
(7) To make the proper notation regarding residence
certificates. (Sec. 247, Revised Administrative Code)
2012 Bar, Q. 42: A party to a contract does not know how to
write. Neither can he affix his thumbmark because both hands
were amputated. How will that person execute the contract?
(a) Ask the party to affix a mark using the toe of his foot in the
presence of the notary public and two (2) disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument.
(b) Ask the party to hold the pen with his teeth and affix a +
mark to be followed by the signature of one friend.
(c) The party may ask the notary public to sign in his behalf.
(d) None of the above.
2010 Bar, Q. II: Enumerate the instances when a Notary Public
may authenticate documents without requiring the physical
presence of the signatories.
A:
(1) If the signatory is old or sick or otherwise unable to appear,
his presence may be dispensed with if one credible witness
not privy to the instrument and who is known to the notary
public, certifies under oath or affirmation the identity of the
signatory.
(2) If two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the
instrument, not known to the notary public but can present
their own competent evidence of identity, certify under oath
or affirmation to the identity of the signatory.
(3) In case of copy certification and issuance of certified true
copies.

Sec. 2. Prohibitions –
(a) A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his
regular place of work or business; provided, however, that
on certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act
may be performed at the request of the parties in the
following sites located within his territorial jurisdiction:
(1) Public offices, convention halls, and similar places where
oaths of office may be administered;
(2) Public function areas in hotels and similar places for the
signing of instruments or documents requiring notarization;
(3) Hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an
instrument or document is confined for treatment; and
(4) Any place where a party to an instrument or document
requiring notarization is under detention.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules.
2016 Bar, Q. XVII: Jojo, a resident of Cavite, agreed to purchase
the lot owned by Tristan, a resident of Bulacan. Atty. Agaton,
Jojo's lawyer who is also a notary public, prepared the Deed of
Sale and Jojo signed the document in Cavite. Atty. Agaton then
went to Bulacan to get the signature of Tristan. Thereafter, Atty.
Agaton went back to his office in Cavite where he notarized the
Deed of Sale.
Is the notarization legal and valid? Explain.
A: The notarization is not legal and valid.
Rule IV, Sec. 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
that a person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document is not
personally in the notary’s presence at the time of notarization.
Tristan was not in Atty. Agustin’s presence when the latter
notarized the deed of sale in his office in Cavite; moreover, Tristan
signed in Bulacan which is outside Atty. Agustin’s territorial
jurisdiction.
2009 Bar, Q. VI: Atty. Sabungero obtained a notarial
commission. One Sunday, while he was at the cockpit, a person
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
approached him with an affidavit that needed to be notarized.
Atty. Sabungero immediately pulled out from his pocket his
small notarial seal, and notarized the document. Was the
affidavit validly notarized? Explain.
A: Sec. 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
that a Notary Public shall not perform a notarial act outside his
regular place of work, except in few exceptional occasions or
situations, at the request of the parties. Notarizing in a cockpit is
not one of such exceptions. The prohibition is aimed to eliminate
the practice of ambulatory notarization. However, assuming that
the cockpit is within his notarial jurisdiction, the notarization may
be valid but the notary public should be disciplined.
1995 Bar, Q. IV(2): What is the extent of the jurisdiction of a
notary public?
A: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Sec. 2
Sec. 3. Disqualifications – A notary public is disqualified from
performing a notarial act if he:
(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be
notarized;
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission,
fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law;
or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or
relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within
the fourth civil degree.
2011 Bar, Q. 11: Which of the following will subject Atty.
Lyndon, a Manila notary public, to sanctions under the notarial
rules?
(a) Notarizing a verification and certification against forum
shopping in Manila Hotel at the request of his Senator-
client.
(b) Refusing to notarize an extra-judicial settlement deed after
noting that Ambo, a friend, was delisted as heir when he
was in fact one.
(c) Performing signature witnessing involving his brother-in-
law and recording it in his register.
(d) Notarizing a deed of sale for someone he knew without
requiring any proof of identity.
[223]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2009 Bar, Q. I(e): A notary public is disqualified from performing
a notarial act when the party to the document is a relative by
affinity within the 4th civil degree.
A: True. 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Sec. 3(c)
Sec. 4. Refusal to Notarize – A notary public shall not perform any
notarial act described in these Rules for any person requesting
such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by
these Rules if:
(a) The notary knows or has good reason to believe that the
notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;
(b) The signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the
mind of the notary public reasonable doubt as to the
former's knowledge of the consequences of the transaction
requiring a notarial act; and
(c) In the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or
her own free will.
In re: De Lara, (1914). A notary public’s appointment was revoked
for notarizing the following document:
Know all men by these presents: That we, Cirilo San Pedro and
Petronila Trias, both of lawful age and residents of the city of
Manila, P. I., solemnly state and declare:
(1) That the said Cirilo San Pedro states and promises that he
will legally marry the said Petronila Trias within 30 days
following the death of his wife, to whom he is at present
married.
(2) That the said Petronila Trias also states and promises that
she will make no contract of espousal of a marriage with any
other man than said Cirilo San Pedro while she remains
single, she agreeing to await and fulfill that which she has
agreed to in the present instrument.
(3) Both parties are obligated to comply with the provisions of
this instrument, and the party refusing to do so shall pay as
damages the sum of P500.
In witness whereof we sign the present agreement and bind
ourselves to respect all the paragraphs thereof, this 21st day of
February, 1912.
(Signed)
C. SN. PEDRO.
1989 Bar, Q. VI: The agreement between the estranged husband
and wife provided for, among others, the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, and

support for the children. In the same agreement, the couple
waived the right to prosecute each other for bigamy, adultery,
concubinage and whatever acts of infidelity. There was also a
condonation provision. The agreement was prepared and
notarized by a lawyer who was the best man at the wedding.
What are the liabilities, if any, of this lawyer? Explain your
answer.
A: The document executed by the spouses is immoral and
contrary to law. The lawyer who drafted and notarized all said
documents committed malpractice and can be disbarred or
suspended. Although the principal duty of the notary public is to
ascertain the identity of the parties and the voluntariness of the
declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard
against any illegal or immoral agreement.
Sec. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate – A notary public shall not:
(a) Execute a certificate containing information known or
believed by the notary to be false.
(b) Affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that
is incomplete.
Sec. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents – A notary public
shall not notarize:
(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or .
(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial
certification.
1. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof
(Rule 132, Sec. 19(b) and 23). Rule 132, Sec. 19, ROC:
Rule 132, Sec. 19. Classes of Documents – For the purpose of
their presentation evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to the entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
2. Maligsa v. Cabanting, (1997). Notaries must observe utmost
care in the performance of their duties.
Rule V: Fees of Notary Public
Sec. 1. Imposition and Waiver of Fees – For performing a notarial
act, a notary public may charge the maximum fee as prescribed by
the Supreme Court unless he waives the fee in whole or in part.
. notarial fees does not affect the validity of the notarization
Sec. 2. Travel Fees and Expenses – A notary public may charge
travel fees and expenses separate and apart from the notarial
fees prescribed in the preceding section when traveling to
perform a notarial act if the notary public and the person
requesting the notarial act agree prior to the travel.
Sec. 3. Prohibited Fees – No fee or compensation of any kind,
except those expressly prescribed and allowed herein, shall be
collected or received for any notarial service.
Sec. 4. Payment or Refund of Fees – A notary public shall not
require payment of any fees specified herein prior to the
performance of a notarial act unless otherwise agreed upon.
Any travel fees and expenses paid to a notary public prior to the
performance of a notarial act are not subject to refund if the
notary public had already traveled but failed to complete in whole
or in part the notarial act for reasons beyond his control and
without negligence on his part.
Sec. 5. Notice of Fees – A notary public who charges a fee for
notarial services shall issue a receipt registered with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and keep a journal of notarial fees. He shall
enter in the journal all fees charged for services rendered.
A notary public shall post in a conspicuous place in his office a
complete schedule of chargeable notarial fees.
2013 Bar, Q. IV: Ms. Seller and Mr. Buyer presented to a
commissioned notary public a deed of sale for notarization. The
notary public explained to them the transaction the deed
embodies and asked them if they were freely entering the
transaction. After the document was signed by all the parties,
the notary public collected the notarial fee but did not issue any
BIR-registered receipt.
The notarization of the deed is __________.
[224]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(a) neither unlawful nor improper because he explained the
basis for the computation of the notarial fee
(b) unlawful because he did not issue a BIR-registered receipt
and did not post in his office the complete schedule of
chargeable notarial fees
(c) proper because he is not required to issue receipts for
notarial fees
(d) improper because he did not ask Ms. Seller and Mr. Buyer if
they needed a receipt
(e) proper because any irregularity in the payment of the
made
A: (e). Ocampo v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164968,
July 3, 2009
Rule VI: Notarial Register
Sec. 1. Form of Notarial Register –
(a) A notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for
lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological
official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a
permanently bound book with numbered pages.
The register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the Solicitor
General to any notary public upon request and upon payment of
the cost thereof. The register shall be duly paged, and on the first
page, the Solicitor General shall certify the number of pages of
which the book consists.
For purposes of this provision, a Memorandum of Agreement or
Understanding may be entered into by the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the Court Administrator.
(b) A notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at
any given time.
2012 Bar, Q. 41: A notary public is required to record
chronologically the notarial acts that he performs in the:
(a) Notarial Book;
(b) Roll of Documents Notarized;
(c) Notarial Register;
(d) Notarial Loose Leafs Sheets.
Sec. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register –

(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial
register at the time of notarization the following:
(1) The entry number and page number;
(2) The date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) The type of notarial act;
(4) The title or description of the instrument, document or
proceeding;
(5) The name and address of each principal;
(6) The competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the notary;
(7) The name and address of each credible witness swearing to
or affirming the person's identity;
(8) The fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) The address where the notarization was performed if not in
the notary's regular place of work or business; and
(10) Any other circumstance the notary public may deem of
significance or relevance.
(b) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the
reasons and circumstances for not completing a notarial act.
(c) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the
circumstances of any request to inspect or copy an entry in
the notarial register, including the requester's name,
address, signature, thumb mark or other recognized
identifier, and evidence of identity. The reasons for refusal
to allow inspection or copying of a journal entry shall also be
recorded.
(d) When the instrument or document is a contract, the notary
public shall keep an original copy thereof as part of his
records and enter in said records a brief description of the
substance thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive
number, beginning with number one in each calendar year.
He shall also retain a duplicate original copy for the Clerk of
Court.
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state
on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries
(f) In case of a protest of any draft, bill of exchange or
promissory note, the notary public shall make a full and true
record of all proceedings in relation thereto and shall note
therein whether the demand for the sum of money was
made, by whom, when, and where; whether he presented
such draft, bill or note; whether notices were given, to
whom and in what manner; where the same was made,
when and to whom and where directed; and of every other
fact touching the same.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(g) At the end of each week, the notary public shall certify in his
notarial register the number of instruments or documents
executed, sworn to, acknowledged, or protested before him;
or if none, this certificate shall show this fact.
(h) A certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate
original copy of any instrument acknowledged before the
notary public shall, within the first ten (10) days of the
month following, be forwarded to the Clerk of Court and
shall be under the responsibility of such officer. If there is no
entry to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a
statement to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein
required.
Sec. 3. Signatures and Thumbmarks – At the time of notarization,
the notary's notarial register shall be signed or a thumb or other
mark affixed by each:
(a) Principal;
(b) Credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity of a
principal; and
(c) Witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to a
signing by the notary public on behalf of a person physically
unable to sign.
Sec. 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal –
(a) In the notary's presence, any person may inspect an entry in
the notarial register, during regular business hours,
provided;
(1) The person's identity is personally known to the notary
public or proven through competent evidence of identity as
defined in these Rules;
(2) The person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or
other recognized identifier, in the notarial register in a
separate, dated entry;
(3) The person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or
document, and name of the principal in the notarial act or
acts sought; and
(4) The person is shown only the entry or entries specified by
him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement
officer in the course of an official investigation or by virtue
of a court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that
a person has a criminal intent or wrongful motive in
requesting information from the notarial register, the notary
shall deny access to any entry or entries therein.
[225]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 5. Loss, Destruction or Damage of Notarial Register –
(a) In case the notarial register is stolen, lost, destroyed,
damaged, or otherwise rendered unusable or illegible as a
record of notarial acts, the notary public shall, within ten
(10) days after informing the appropriate law enforcement
agency in the case of theft or vandalism, notify the Executive
Judge by any means providing a proper receipt or
acknowledgment, including registered mail and also provide
a copy or number of any pertinent police report.
(b) Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial commission, or
death of the notary public, the notarial register and notarial
records shall immediately be delivered to the office of the
Executive Judge.
Sec. 6. Issuance of Certified True Copies – The notary public shall
supply a certified true copy of the notarial record, or any part
thereof, to any person applying for such copy upon payment of
the legal fees.
1. When a Lawyer is NOT Authorized to Supply a Certified
True Copy
Domingo v. Evangelista, (2003). It is a grave misconduct for a
lawyer, who was not the notary public before whom the
documents were acknowledged and who is neither the custodian
of the original copies of the documents, to supply a certified true
copy of the documents. The lawyer who supplied the certified
true copies was only the partner and son of the deceased notary
public, and not the notary public himself.
2012 Bar, Q. 43: The reports of a Notary Public are submitted to
the:
(a) Executive Judge;
(b) Court Administrator;
(c) Notarial Archives;
(d) Clerk of Court.
Rule VII: Signature and Seal of Notary Public
Sec. 1. Official Signature – In notarizing a paper instrument or
document, a notary public shall:
(a) Sign by hand on the notarial certificate only the name
indicated and as appearing on the notary's commission;
(b) Not sign using a facsimile stamp or printing device; and
(c) Affix his official signature only at the time the notarial act is
performed.

Sec. 2. Official Seal –
(a) Every person commissioned as notary public shall have a
seal of office, to be procured at his own expense, which shall
not be possessed or owned by any other person. It shall be
of metal, circular in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall
have the name of the city or province and the word
“Philippines” and his own name on the margin and the roll
of attorney's number on the face thereof, with the words
"notary public" across the center. A mark, image or
impression of such seal shall be made directly on the paper
or parchment on which the writing appears.
(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the time the notarial
act is performed and shall be clearly impressed by the
notary public on every page of the instrument or document
notarized.
(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and
secure and shall be accessible only to the notary public or
the person duly authorized by him.
(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a notary public is
stolen, lost, damaged or other otherwise rendered
unserviceable in affixing a legible image, the notary public,
after informing the appropriate law enforcement agency,
shall notify the Executive Judge in writing, providing proper
receipt or acknowledgment, including registered mail, and in
the event of a crime committed, provide a copy or entry
number of the appropriate police record. Upon receipt of
such notice, if found in order by the Executive Judge, the
latter shall order the notary public to cause notice of such
loss or damage to be published, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in
the city or province where the notary public is
commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall issue to
the notary public a new Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal.
(e) Within five (5) days after the death or resignation of the
notary public, or the revocation or expiration of a notarial
commission, the official seal shall be surrendered to the
Executive Judge and shall be destroyed or defaced in public
during office hours. In the event that the missing, lost or
damaged seal is later found or surrendered, it shall be
delivered by the notary public to the Executive Judge to be
disposed of in accordance with this section. Failure to effect
such surrender shall constitute contempt of court. In the
event of death of the notary public, the person in possession
of the official seal shall have the duty to surrender it to the
Executive Judge.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Sec. 3. Seal Image – The notary public shall affix a single, clear,
legible, permanent, and photographically reproducible mark,
image or impression of the official seal beside his signature on the
notarial certificate of a paper instrument or document.
Sec. 4. Obtaining and Providing Seal –
(a) A vendor or manufacturer of notarial seals may not sell said
product without a written authorization from the Executive
Judge.
(b) Upon written application and after payment of the
application fee, the Executive Judge may issue an
authorization to sell to a vendor or manufacturer of notarial
seals after verification and investigation of the latter's
qualifications. The Executive Judge shall charge an
authorization fee in the amount of PhP 4,000 for the vendor
and PhP 8,000 for the manufacturer. If a manufacturer is
also a vendor, he shall only pay the manufacturer's
authorization fee.
(c) The authorization shall be in effect for a period of four (4)
years from the date of its issuance and may be renewed by
the Executive Judge for a similar period upon payment of
the authorization fee mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.
(d) A vendor or manufacturer shall not sell a seal to a buyer
except upon submission of a certified copy of the
commission and the Certificate of Authorization to Purchase
a Notarial Seal issued by the Executive Judge. A notary
public obtaining a new seal as a result of change of name
shall present to the vendor or manufacturer a certified copy
of the Confirmation of the Change of Name issued by the
Executive Judge.
(e) Only one seal may be sold by a vendor or manufacturer for
each Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal.
(f) After the sale, the vendor or manufacturer shall affix a mark,
image or impression of the seal to the Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and submit the
completed Certificate to the Executive Judge. Copies of the
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and
the buyer's commission shall be kept in the files of the
vendor or manufacturer for four (4) years after the sale.
(g) A notary public obtaining a new seal as a result of change of
name shall present to the vendor a certified copy of the
order confirming the change of name issued by the
Executive Judge.
Rule VIII: Notarial Certificates
[226]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 1. Form of Notarial Certificate – The notarial form used for
any notarial instrument or document shall conform to all the
requisites prescribed herein, the Rules of Court and all other
provisions of issuances by the Supreme Court and in applicable
laws.
Sec. 2. Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial Certificate
– The notarial certificate shall include the following:
(a) The name of the notary public as exactly indicated in the
commission;
(b) The serial number of the commission of the notary public;
(c) The words "Notary Public" and the province or city where
the notary public is commissioned, the expiration date of
the commission, the office address of the notary public; and
(d) The roll of attorney's number, the professional tax receipt
number and the place and date of issuance thereof, and the
IBP membership number.
Rule IX: Certificate of Authority of Notaries Public
Sec. 1. Certificate of Authority for a Notarial Act – A certificate of
authority evidencing the authenticity of the official seal and
signature of a notary public shall be issued by the Executive Judge
upon request in substantially the following form:
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY FOR A NOTARIAL ACT
I, (name, title, jurisdiction of the Executive Judge), certify that
(name of notary public), the person named in the seal and
signature on the attached document, is a Notary Public in and for
the (City/Municipality/Province) of the Republic of the Philippines
and authorized to act as such at the time of the document's
notarization..
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed below my signature and seal
of this office this (date) day of (month) (year)..
_________________
(official signature)
(seal of Executive Judge)
Rule X: Change of Status of Notary Public
Sec. 1. Change of Name and Address – Within ten (10) days after
the change of name of the notary public by court order or by
marriage, or after ceasing to maintain the regular place of work or
business, the notary public shall submit a signed and dated notice
of such fact to the Executive Judge.

The notary public shall not notarize until:
(a) He receives from the Executive Judge a confirmation of the
new name of the notary public and/or change of regular
place of work or business; and
(b) A new seal bearing the new name has been obtained.
The foregoing notwithstanding, until the aforementioned steps
have been completed, the notary public may continue to use the
former name or regular place of work or business in performing
notarial acts for three (3) months from the date of the change,
which may be extended once for valid and just cause by the
Executive Judge for another period not exceeding three (3)
months.
Sec. 2. Resignation – A notary public may resign his commission
by personally submitting a written, dated and signed formal
notice to the Executive Judge together with his notarial seal,
notarial register and records. Effective from the date indicated in
the notice, he shall immediately cease to perform notarial acts. In
the event of his incapacity to personally appear, the submission of
the notice may be performed by his duly authorized
representative.
Sec. 3. Publication of Resignation – The Executive Judge shall
immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous
place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of
Court the names of notaries public who have resigned their
notarial commissions and the effective dates of their resignation.
Rule XI: Revocation of Commission and Disciplinary Sanctions
Sec. 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions –
(a) The Executive Judge shall revoke a notarial commission for
any ground on which an application for a commission may
be denied.
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission
of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon,
any notary public who:
(1) Fails to keep a notarial register;
(2) Fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register concerning his notarial acts;
(3) Fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge
within the first ten (10) days of the month following;
(4) Fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of
his commission;
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
(5) Fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to the
Executive Judge;
(6) Fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to the
Executive Judge concerning the performance of his duties,
as may be required by the judge;
(7) Fails to require the presence of a principal at the time of the
notarial act;
(8) Fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal
knowledge or competent evidence;
(9) Executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5,
Rule IV;
(10) Knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act
prohibited or mandated by these Rules; and
(11) Commits any other dereliction or act which in the judgment
of the Executive Judge constitutes good cause for revocation
of commission or imposition of administrative sanction.
(c) Upon verified complaint by an interested, affected or
aggrieved person, the notary public shall be required to file
a verified answer to the complaint. If the answer of the
notary public is not satisfactory, the Executive Judge shall
conduct a summary hearing. If the allegations of the
complaint are not proven, the complaint shall be dismissed.
If the charges are duly established, the Executive Judge shall
impose the appropriate administrative sanctions. In either
case, the aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court for review. Pending the appeal, an order
imposing disciplinary sanctions shall be immediately
executory, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.
(d) The Executive Judge may motu proprio initiate
administrative proceedings against a notary public, subject
to the procedures prescribed in paragraph (c) above and
impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the
grounds mentioned in the preceding paragraphs (a) and (b).
2011 Bar, Q. 22: In what documented act will a notary public’s
failure to affix the expiration date of his commission warrant
administrative sanction?
(a) In the jurat of a secretary's certificate.
(b) In the will acknowledged before him.
(c) In the signature witnessing he performed.
(d) In the document copy he certified.
1995 Bar, Q. IV(3): Who can revoke his notarial commission?
A: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule XI, Sec. 1
[227]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Sec. 2. Supervision and Monitoring of Notaries Public – The
Executive Judge shall at all times exercise supervision over
notaries public and shall closely monitor their activities.
Sec. 3. Publication of Revocations and Administrative Sanctions
– The Executive Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court
to post in a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge
and of the Clerk of Court the names of notaries public who have
been administratively sanctioned or whose notarial commissions
have been revoked.
Sec. 4. Death of Notary Public – If a notary public dies before
fulfilling the obligations in Section 4(e), Rule VI and Section 2(e),
Rule VII, the Executive Judge, upon being notified of such death,
shall forthwith cause compliance with the provisions of these
sections
Rule XII: Special Provisions
Sec. 1. Punishable Acts – The Executive Judge shall cause the
prosecution of any person who:
(a) Knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public;
(b) Knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal,
notarial register, or official records of a notary public; and
(c) Knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary
public to commit official misconduct.
Sec. 2. Reports to the Supreme Court – The Executive Judge
concerned shall submit semestral reports to the Supreme Court
on discipline and prosecution of notaries public.
Rule XIII: Repealing and Effectivity Provisions
Sec. 1. Repeal – All rules and parts of rules, including issuances of
the Supreme Court inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed or
accordingly modified.
Sec. 2. Effective Date – These Rules shall take effect on the first
day of August 2004, and shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines which provides sufficiently
wide circulation.
Promulgated this 6th day of July, 2004.
Legal Forms and Practical Exercise
Bar Questions (1987-2016)
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Book No.___
Jurat IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this Series of 2004
28th day of September, 1994, Calauag, Quezon.
1994 Bar, Q. XVI: A Jurat in an affidavit attesting to the loss of Affidavits
Alberto A. Villanueva
your driver’s license.
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1994 2001 Bar, Q. XIX: Draft an affidavit of a party to bar proceedings
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in the City of Manila, this in the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of your barangay.
28th day of September, 1994 by Jose de la Cruz with Community
Reg. No. 112
Tax Certificate No. A-12345 issued at Manila on January 5. 1994. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
Page No. 43
Book No. 2 QUEZON CITY ) S.S.
PEDRO DE GUZMAN
Series of 1994
Notary Public AFFIDAVIT
Until December 31. 1994
2004 Bar, Q. IX(B): Prepare an acknowledgment of a deed of sale I, _________________________,Filipino, of legal age, with
Reg. No. 98; of a registered parcel of land, consisting of four (4) pages address at __________________ after having been duly sworn in
Page No. 45; inclusive of the page where the acknowledgment appears. accordance with law, depose and state that:
Book No. 2; Supply fictitious names of the parties, the notary public and
Series of 1994 details of the parties' community tax certificates. (1) I am a resident of No. 30 _____ Street, Barangay X, Quezon
City;
REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES ) (2) I am a respondent in the complaint for collection filed by Mr.
2005 Bar, Q. I(1): Which of the following need not be verified?
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S. Z before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay X, Quezon
(a) Petition for Certiorari; City;
ACKNOWLEDGMENT (3) Mr. Z is a resident of No. 23 _____ Street,Barangay Q,
(b) Interpleader;
(c) Petition for Habeas Corpus; Makati City;
IN THE CITY OF MANILA, Philippines, this 26th day of September, (4) Mr. Z and I do not live within the same barangay or City;
(d) Answer with compulsory counterclaim;
2004, personally appeared before me Mr. Juan dela Cruz, with (5) I have not agreed to the submission of the complaint of Mr.
(e) All pleadings under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Community Tax Certificate No. 123456 issued at Manila on Z against me for amicable settlement with the
January 31, 2004, and Miss Evangeline Adan, with Community Tax LupongTagapamayapa of Barangay X, Quezon City;
Acknowledgement Certificate No. 78910 issued at Baguio City on February 5, 2004, (6) This affidavit is being executed for the purpose of barring
both of whom are known to me and to me known to be the same the proceedings in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the
1996 Bar, Q. XVI(4): An acknowledgment of a deed of sale persons who executed the foregoing instrument, and they complaint filed against me by Mr. Z.
involving two parcels of land. acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntary act
and deed. Further, affiant further sayeth naught.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
PROVINCE OF QUEZON ) S.S. I further certify that the foregoing instrument is a deed of IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this _____
MUNICIPALITY OF CALAUAG ) absolute sale of a parcel of registered land located in the District day of _____, 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines.
of Singalong, Manila, and consists of four (4) pages, including this
BEFORE ME, this 28th day September, 1994 in the Municipality of page on which this Acknowledgment is written, and signed on Affiant
Calauag, Province of Quezon, Philippines, personally appeared each and every page by the said parties and their instrumental
Juanito Perez with Community Tax Certificate No. 1-9234 issued witnesses. (Jurat)
at Calauag, Quezon, on January 6, 1994, and with Tax
Identification No. 7865, known to me to be the same person who IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed and affixed my
notarial seal at the date and on the place first above mentioned. 2007 Bar, Q. IX: Prepare an affidavit of merits to be attached to a
executed the foregoing instrument, and he acknowledged to me
Petition for Relief.
that the same is his free act and deed.
JORGE BATUNGBACAL
Notary Public REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
This instrument relates to the sale of two parcels of land located
Until December 31, 2004 CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
in Calauag, Quezon, and consists of four pages including the page
on which this acknowledgment is written, each and every page on
Doc. No.___ AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT
which, on the left margin, having been signed by Juanito Perez
and his witnesses, and sealed with my notarial seal. Page No.___
[228]

I, Mr. B, of legal age, single, and a resident of Quezon City, after
being duly sworn, depose and state that:
(1) I am the defendant in the case entitled “A versus B,
docketed as Case No. 1234 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 56, for collection of a sum of money;
(2) On July 7, 2007, while on our way to the court to attend the
hearing of said case, a truck bumped the taxicab in which my
counsel and I were riding, causing serious physical injuries to
both of us, which necessitated our hospitalization for two
months;
(3) Upon our failure to appear in court on that date, the
Honorable Regional Trial Court proceeded with the trial and
thereafter rendered judgment ordering me to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P500,000.00 with interest from
January 10, 2006, plus costs. The said decision was served
on my counsel only on September 15, 2007.
(4) If I am given a chance to present evidence, I can show that
the amount being collected from me by the plaintiff has
been fully paid as shown by the receipt, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex 1 of this Affidavit;
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Manila, September 20, 2007.
B My commission expires December 31, 1987
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this 21st day of
September 2007, by the affiant Mr. B who exhibited to me his
Passport No. 345678 issued at Manila, on January 12, 2007.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.
CD
NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 2007
Commission No.
(address)
Attorney’s Roll No. _____
IBP Membership No. _____
PTR O.R. No. _____, Manila,
Doc No. _____;
Page No. _____;
Book No. _____;
Series of 2007.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2006 Bar, Q. XVI: Draft an Affidavit of Desistance in a criminal (2) That after verifying the facts, I realized that said FF was not
case for acts of lasciviousness. (Exclude the jurat) altogether reckless in driving said vehicle;
(3) That in order to settle the case amicably and since the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) owner of the car DD had offered to pay all the medical
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S. expenses I incurred and the losses suffered in the total
amount of P10.000.00 which I hereby acknowledge, I am
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE withdrawing my complaint in both civil and criminal cases
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Civil Case
I, _____, of legal age, single and a resident of _____ after having No. 497 and Criminal Case No. 5 179);
been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and (4) That by virtue thereof. I am waiving all my rights to file any
state: civil and criminal cases against FFand DD.
(1) That I am the complainant in Criminal Case No. _____ of the Quezon City, November 29, 1987.
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch _____, for Acts of
Lasciviousness; JUAN DELA CRUZ
(2) That, after listening to the explanation of the accused, I am
convinced that he acted unintentionally and without Republic of the Philippines
malicious intent; Quezon City
(3) That I am no longer interested in the prosecution of the said
case, and I am hereby desisting from the same. SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 29th day of
November 1987 in Quezon City, by affiant Juan de la Cruz, who
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. exhibited to me his Residence Certificate No. 5789, issued at
Quezon City, on July 1, 1987, and TAN 7987.
Manila, September 24, 2006.
PC
Affiant Notary Public
(jurat)
Doc. No.___;
Book No.___;
1987 Bar, Q. XV: Your client was the victim of a hit and run car
Page No.___;
owned by DD and driven by FF. After you had taken the steps to
Series of 1987
file the required court actions against DD and the driver, your
client was convinced by the car owner to accept a sum of money
by way of settlement, since the amount offered was fair and 1991 Bar, Q. XVI: Prepare an Affidavit of Good Faith in a Chattel
reasonably covered all the expenses incurred. Prepare the Mortgage with A as mortgagor. B as mortgagee, and Mabel Riza
document of Release and Waiver that in your opinion will best as the notary public.
protect the interest of your client, the victim and will likewise be
legally sufficient and acceptable to the car owner and his driver. AFFIDAVIT OF GOOD FAITH
RELEASE AND WAIVER REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
City of Manila ) S.S.
I, JUAN DE LA CRUZ, Filipino citizen, of legal age and resident of 7
Kitanlad, Quezon City, after having been duly sworn in accordance We, A as mortgager and B as mortgagee severally swear under
with law hereby states: oath the foregoing chattel mortgage was executed by us for
securing a good and valid obligations and not for the purpose of
(1) That as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred committing fraud.
on November 1, 1987 in Quezon City, when I was hit by a car
driven by FF and owned by DD, I filed a criminal and civil A, Mortgagor
complaint against both FF and DD in the Regional Trial Court B, Mortgagee
of Quezon City;
[229]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of September (Description of property)
1991 in the City of Manila affiants having exhibited me their -and-
Residence Certificate Nos. _____and Tax Account Nos. _____. That by virtue of these presents, I, Z, have agreed to lease the
B.D., Filipino, of legal age, single, with residence at _____ and aforesaid property to O, Filipino citizen, of legal age, residing at
MABEL RIZA hereafter called the LESSEE. 201 Palmera St., Mandaluyong City, hereinafter known as the
Notary Public LESSEE.
My Commission expires December 31, 1991. WITNESSETH:
That the conditions of the lease are:
Doc. No. ___; THAT, for and in consideration of the rentals to be paid, the
Page No. ___; LESSOR has hereby leased to the LESSEE and the LESSEE hereby (1) That the duration of the lease is from January 1. 1996 to
Book No. ___; accepts the same in lease, the following described property: December 30, 1996.
Series of 1991. (2) That the LESSEE shall pay a monthly rental of P 10,000
(description of apartment) payable on or before the 5th of each month.
(3) That upon failure of the LESSEE to pay the rentals for three
Certification
subject to the following terms and conditions: (3) consecutive months, the contract is deemed
automatically terminated:
1994 Bar, Q. XVI(2): A certification that a copy of a decision is a (1) Period of the Lease
true copy. (2) Rentals to be Paid – IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set out signatures on
(3) (Other terms and conditions) this 28th day of September 1996 in the City of Manila.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed these Signed in the Presence of:
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION presents, at _____, this _____ day of _____, 1998.
BRANCH 22 QUEZON CITY REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
A.B., Lessor CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
CERTIFICATION
C.D., Lessee On this 29th day of September 1996 in the City of Manila
I, Editha S. Llanes, Clerk of Court, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, personally appeared before me Z and O exhibiting to me their
Quezon City, do hereby certify that the copy of the decision WITNESSES respective Community Tax Certificates No. 43210 and 21451
hereto attached is a true copy of the original decision in Civil Case issued at Manila on January 15, 1996 and February 2, 1996 and
No. 3452 rendered by this court. (Acknowledgment) TIN 45127-31 and 18279-10 to me known and known to me to be
same persons who executed the foregoing lease agreement and
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL, this 28th day of September, 1994. acknowledged to me that it is their free act and voluntary deed.
1996 Bar, Q. XI(2): Z, who owns a house at 34 San Rafael Street,
San Juan, Metro Manila, leased the premises to O, who resides
Editha S. Llanes X
at 206 Palmera Street, Mandaluyong City, beginning 1 January
Clerk of Court NOTARY PUBLIC
1996 to 30 December 1998, at P 10,000.00 a month, payable on
or before the 5th of each month. Upon failure of the lessee to My commission expires Dec. 31. 1996
Contracts and Deeds pay for 3 consecutive months, the contract will be deemed
automatically terminated. Doc. No. 2:
A. Contract of Lease Page No. 4:
Draft the contract of lease. Book No. 5:
Series of 1996.
1998 Bar, Q. IX: Prepare a Contract of Lease of an apartment unit
DEED OF LEASE
CONTRACT OF LEASE 1988 Bar, Q. XI: Prepare a contract of lease of an apartment unit
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: for P5,000.00 a month between Mr. Jesus Santos as lessor and
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: Mrs. Olivia Palpallatoc as lessee, for a period of twenty-four (24)
That I, Z, Filipino citizen, residing at No. 37 Retiro, Quezon City, months. Supply the other facts required in a contract of lease.
hereinafter known as LESSOR is the owner of a house located at Include an acknowledgment.
This contract of lease, entered into by and between:
345 San Rafael Street, San Juan, Metro Manila more or less
described as follows: CONTRACT OF LEASE
A.B., Filipino, of legal age, single, with residence at _____ and
hereafter called the LESSOR
[230]

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This agreement made on this 30th day of September 1987
between JESUS SANTOS, hereinafter known as LESSOR, Filipino
citizen residing at No. 40 Limon Street, Quezon City and Mrs.
Olivia Palpallatoc, Filipino citizen married to Juan Palpallatoc
residents of No. 40 Kitanlad, Quezon City, hereinafter known as
LESSEES hereby agree by the presents:
(1) That the LESSOR is registered owner of an apartment
located at No. 10 Kitanlad, Quezon City, covered by TCT No.
14789, Registry of Deeds, Quezon City;
(2) That for the consideration of the rental of P5,000.00 a
month for a period of 24 months from the date of the
execution of this contract, the LESSOR hereby lease unto the
LESSEES the aforesaid described apartment;
(3) That the LESSEES bind themselves to pay the said monthly
rental within the first 10 days of each month;
(4) That the LESSEES shall use the said apartment for residential
purposes only.
IN WITNESS HEREOF, we have set our signatures on this 30th day
of September 1987 in Quezon City.
JESUS SANTOS, Lessor
OLIVIA PALPALLATOC, Lessee
JUAN PALPALLATOC, Lessee
Witnesses:
PEDRO SISON
JUAN REYES
In this 1st day of October 1987 personally appeared before me
JESUS SANTOS, OLIVIA PALPALLATOC and JUAN PALPALLATOC, to
me known as the same persons who executed the foregoing
contract of lease and acknowledged to me that the same is their
free act and voluntary deed. JESUS SANTOS exhibited to us his
Residence Certificate No. 123 issued at Quezon City on January
10, 1988 and TAN 512356-18. OLIVIA PALPALLATOC Residence
Certificate No. 78766 issued at Quezon City on January 11, 1988
and TAN 571179.
JUAN CRUZ
Notary Public
My Commission Expires on December 31, 1988
DCR. No. 5;
Page No. 7;
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Book No. 1;
Series of 1988
1987 Bar, Q. XIV: Prepare a contract of lease covering an
apartment located in 001 Atis St., Makati The lessee agrees to
pay a monthly rental of P5,000.00. The entire period of the lease
shall be 12 months, renewable upon mutual agreement of the
parties. Furnish the terms and conditions that in your opinion
will protect the lessor who is your client.
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This agreement made and entered into at Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, this 27th day of November 1987 by and between Jose
Uy of legal age, married to Petra Uy, and a resident of Makati,
hereinafter called the landlord, and Jess Cruz, of legal age, single,
and a resident of Makati, hereinafter called the tenant evidences
that the parties have agreed as follows:
(1) In consideration of the rent and the tenant’s covenants
hereinafter reserved and contained, the lessor hereby
demises and leases to the tenant an apartment located at
001 Atis St., Makati, belonging to the landlord, covered by
TCT No. 100, Register of Deeds of Makati.
To hold the Tenant for the term of 12 months.
Yielding and praying therefor during the said term, rent at the
rate of P5,000.00 Pesos to be made on the first 10 days of each
month of which the first shall be made on the first day of January
1988.
(2) The tenant hereby covenants with the landlord as follows:
(a) To pay the rent as aforesaid without the necessity of express
demand therefor, at the residence of the landlord;
(b) To keep the leased premises in good and habitable
condition, making the necessary repairs and painting inside
and outside the house;
(c) Not to make alterations and improvements on the premises
without the written consent of the landlord, and, in case of
such authorized alterations and improvements on the
premises, any and all such improvements shall become the
property of the landlord at the expiration of this lease.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto set out signatures on
this 29th day of November 1987 at Makati.
[231]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
JOSE UY, landlord
JESS UY, tenant
Witness:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
On this 29th day of November 1987 personally appeared before
me Jose Uy, landlord, and Jess Cruz, tenant, to me known and
known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
contract of lease and acknowledged to me that the same is their
free act and voluntary deed.
They exhibited to me the Residence Certificate No. _____ issued
at Manila on January 10, 1987and his Residence Certificate No.
789 issued at Makati on June 1 1, 1987, and Tax Account No. 678,
respectively.
XYZ
Notary Public
My commission expires December31, 1988
Doc. No. ___
Book No. ___
Page No. ___
Series of 1987.
2007 Bar, Q. VIII: Prepare a clause stipulating a right of first
refusal to be embodied in a contract of lease, in case of sale of
the property leased.
A: It is hereby agreed that if the Lessor should decide to sell the
leased premises during the period of this lease, he shall first offer
the same in writing to the Lessee who shall have the right to
accept the offer within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of
the same. Should the Lessee fail or refuse fail to accept, the Lessor
may offer to sell the property to any other person, provided that
he cannot offer the same at a lower price without first extending
the same right of first refusal to the Lessee.
B. Chattel Mortgage
1999 Bar, Q. XV: C.D. borrowed Twenty Thousand (P20, 000.00)
Pesos from E.P. to guarantee payment of his obligation on or
before December 10. 1999. C.D. agreed to constitute a chattel
mortgage on his car, a Toyota Corolla Model 1990. Prepare the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage (Omit Acknowledgment and affidavit
of good faith).

Deed of Chattel Mortgage
This MORTGAGE, made and entered into this 26th day of
September 1999 in the City of Manila, by and between C.D., (the
Mortgagor) of legal age, single and residing at No. 1, X Street,
Manila and E.P. (the Mortgagee) likewise of legal age, single and
residing at No. 2, Y Street, Manila, witnesseth:
(1) That the Mortgagor hereby conveys by way of mortgage to
the Mortgagee all his rights, title and interest in that
personal property which is a car, a Toyota Corolla Model
1990, which is exclusively owned by the Mortgagor and in
his possession;
(2) That this mortgage is given as security for the payment to
the Mortgagee on or before December 10, 1999 by the
Mortgagor of his loan to the Mortgagee in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00);
(3) That the conditions of this obligation are such that if the
Mortgagor, his heirs, administrators, executors and assigns
shall pay the aforesaid loan to the Mortgagee, then this
obligation shall be null and void; otherwise, it shall remain in
full force and effect. Executed and signed on the date and
place first above written.
C.D., Mortgagor
E.P., Mortgagee
WITNESSES:
1997 Bar, Q. XIX: Document a chattel mortgage covering a motor
vehicle.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, A, of legal age, married and resident of the City of Manila,
for and in consideration of the loan of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50.000.00), Philippine Currency, granted to me by B. likewise of
legal age. married and resident of the City of Manila, to be paid
one year after date with 6% interest per annum from date hereof,
have transferred and conveyed by way of chattel mortgage unto
said B, his heirs, successors and assigns, free from all liens and
encumbrances, that certain motor vehicle at present in my
possession in my aforementioned address, more particularly
described as follows:
(Description of motor vehicle)
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
of which I am the true and absolute owner by title thereto being
evidenced by Registration Certificate of Motor Vehicle issued in
my name by the Land Transportation Office, Quezon City on
January 10, 1996.
This chattel mortgage has been executed in order to secure the
full and faithful payment of the aforementioned obligation in
accordance with the terms and conditions of this instrument, then
this contract shall become null and void: otherwise, it shall
continue to be in full force and effect and may be foreclosed in
accordance with law.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand on this
instrument, in the City of Manila, this 28th day of September
1997.
A, Mortgagor
B, Mortgagee
Signed in the presence of: D, E
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
AFFIDAVITOF GOOD FAITH
We, severally swear that A, Mortgagor and B, Mortgagee have
executed the foregoing Chattel Mortgage Contract in order to
guaranty as good and valid obligations and the same is not
intended for the purpose of defrauding our creditors.
A, Mortgagor
B, Mortgagee
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
BEFORE ME, A Notary Public in and for the City of Manila,
personally appeared A, Mortgagor, with Community Tax
Certificate No. 12345 Issued in Manila on February 17. 1997 and
B, mortgagee, with Community Tax Certificate No. 56789 issued in
Manila on March 10, 1997, all known to me to be the same
persons who subscribed to the truth of the foregoing affidavit of
good faith and A acknowledged to me further that he executed
the foregoing Chattel Mortgage Contract as his free and voluntary
act and deed.
[232]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
my notarial seal on this instrument in the City of Manila,
Philippines, this 28th day of September 1997.
NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires on December 31, 1997
Doc. No. 1
Page No. 2
Book No. 3
Series of 1997.
C. Contract of Sale
1991 Bar, Q. XIII: CD, married to HR, sold their parcel of land
located in Ayala Heights, Quezon City to DX for the amount of
P500, 000.00. The land is more particularly described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 45678 in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. The parties agreed that all expenses for taxes, registration,
transfer and association dues are for the account of DX. Prepare
the contract of sale. Use a fictitious name for the notary public.
(Do not specify the metes and bonds of the property; just state
the TCT no. and the location).
DEED OF SALE OF REAL ESTATE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
CD, married to HR, Filipino citizens and residents of Ayala Heights.
Quezon City, hereinafter known as the VENDORS and DX, Married
to Y, Filipino citizen’s residents of No. 12 San Andres, Manila,
herein after known as the VENDEES have entered into this
contract of sale as follows:
(1) That the VENDORS are the owners in fee simple title of a
parcel of residential land containing an area of 1,000 square
45678 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
(2) That for and in consideration of the sum of P500.000 duly
acknowledge and received by these presents, the
VEN¬DORS hereby sell, cede and convey by way of absolute
sale to the herein VENDEES, the aforesaid described
property;
(3) That it is further agreed that all expenses for taxes,
registration, transfer and association dues are for the
account of DX;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have hereunto set our signatures this
29th day of September 1991 in Quezon City.
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
DX, Vendee (1) That the VENDORS are the absolute owners of a residential
lot in Ayala Alabang, with an area of 1,500 square meters
CD, Vendor, with marital consent HR covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. 1434477, Registry
of Deeds of Rizal;
Witnesses (2) That for and in consideration of the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) per square meter or a total of
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT P2,500,000.00 receipt of which we hereby acknowledged by
these presents, we hereby sell, transfer and convey to the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) VENDEE ANASTASIA the aforesaid described parcel of land
Quezon City ) S .S. together with all improvements thereon;
(3) That the VENDORS undertake to pay all taxes, registration
On this 29th day of September 1991 personally appeared before and transfer fees while the VENDEE shall pay the village
me CD, HR, AND DX known to me to be the same persons who association dues.
executed the foregoing deed and acknowledged that it is their
free act and voluntary deed and exhibiting to me their Residence IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto sign this deed of absolute
Certificates and Tax Account Numbers as follows: sale at Ayala Alabang, Province of Rizal on this 24th day of
September 1989.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have-hereunto set my signature and seal
on the day above stated. ANASTASIA, Vendee
GABRIEL, Vendor
JUAN SANTOS With my marital consent: BONITA
Notary Public
My Commission expires December 31, 1991 Witnesses
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
2005 Bar, Q. XIII(a): Gerry Cruz is the owner of a 1,000-square
meter lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12345
located in Sampaloc, Metro Manila. Gerry decided to sell the
property but did not have the time to look for a buyer. He then
designated his brother, Jon, to look for a buyer and negotiate
the sale. Jon met Angelo Santos who expressed his interest to
buy the lot. Angelo agreed to pay P1 Million for the property on
September 26, 2005.
Draft the Deed of Sale of Real Property.
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This instrument, executed by and between:
GERRY CRUZ, of legal age, single, and a resident
of_______________, herein represented by his Attorney-in- Fact,
JON CRUZ, of legal age and a resident of _____________ and
_____________ hereafter referred to as the VENDOR,
-and-

Doc. No.___;
Page No.___;
Book No.___;
Series of 1991.
1989 Bar, Q. XIII: Gabriel, married to Bonita, wants to sell a
residential lot in Ayala Alabang to Anastacia, a widow. The
property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1434477
and consists of 1,500 square meters, more or less. The agreed
purchase price is Five Thousand Pesos (P5, 000.00) per square
meter. The parties also agreed on other matters such as
payment of taxes, registration and transfer fees, and village
association dues. Prepare the appropriate contract together
with the notarial page. Do not use your name as notary public.
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, GABRIEL, married to Bonita, Filipino citizen, of legal age,
and resident of 261 R. Hidalgo St., Quezon City, herein after
known as VENDOR and ANASTASIA, widow, Filipino citizen, of
legal age and resident of 262 R. Hidalgo St., Quezon City,
hereinafter known as VENDEE, hereby execute this document,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) ANGELO SANTOS, Filipino, of legal age, single, a resident of
PROVINCE OF RIZAL ) S.S. _____________ and hereafter referred to as the VENDEE,
ALABANG, MUNTINLUPA )
WITNESSETH:
On this 24th day of September 1989 in Alabang, Province of Rizal
personally appeared before me, to me known, and known to me THAT, for and in consideration of the sum of One Million Pesos
to be the same persons who executed the foregoing Deed of Sale (P1,000,000.00), in hand paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR and
Gabriel and his spouse Bonita with Residence Certificate Nos. receipt of which is herein acknowledged by the latter, the
12345 and 6789 respectively issued at Pasig, Rizal on January 5, VENDOR has sold, transferred and conveyed, and by these
1989 and Tax Account No. A47896 and Anastasia with Residence presents does hereby sell, transfer and convey, unto the VENDEE,
Certificate No. 76543, issued at Quezon City on January 5, 1989 that certain parcel of land with an area of 1,000 square meters,
and Tax Account No. 7475. more or less, located in Sampaloc, Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12345 of the Register of Deeds of Manila,
Witness may hand and seal on the date aforementioned. and which is more particularly described as follows:
JUAN CRUZ (technical description)
Notary Public
My commission expires December 31, 1989. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed these
I.B.P. No. 12345 presents at Manila, this 26th day of September, 2005.
P.T.R. No. 12345
Gerry Cruz
Doc. No. 1 Vendor
Page No. 15
Book No. I Angelo Santos
Series of 1989 Vendee

[233]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
By: That, for an in consideration of the love and affection which I bear Until December 31, 2010
JON CRUZ Attorney-in-Fact for the donee, I, Mr. A.B., Filipino, of legal age, single and a (address & tel. no.)
resident of No. 7, West Aguila St, Green Cross Subdivision, Quezon (Attys. Roll No., date)
WITNESSES: City, Manila, have donated, as I hereby donate, to the Donee, (IBP O.R. No., date/place issued)
Miss C.D., of legal age, single and a resident of No. 11, West (PTR O.R. No. date/place issued)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT Agiuila St., Green Cross Subdivision, Quezon City, that certain
parcel of land and the improvements thereon located at No. 9, Doc No. ___;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) West Aguila St. , Green Cross Subdivision, Quezon City, covered by Page No. ___;
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12345 of the Registry of Deeds of Book No. ___;
Quezon City, and which is more particularly described as follows: Series of 2008.
IN THE CITY OF MANILA, Philippines, personally appeared before
me, Mr. JON CRUZ, with Community Tax Certificate No. (technical description) Power of Attorney
____________ issued at ____________ on ______________,
2005, in his capacity as Attorney-in-Fact of Mr. GERRY CRUZ, with And I, the above-named donee, do hereby accept this donation
2010 Bar, Q. X: Allison hired Atty. X as his counsel in his
Community Tax Certificate No. ____________issued at with deep gratitude to the donor.
complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. Upon receipt on
____________ on______________, 2005, both of whom are
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed these March 20, 2009 of the Notice of Pre-Trial which was scheduled
personally known to me to be the same persons who executed
on May 24, 2009, Allison noted at that time he would still be in a
the foregoing instrument, and they acknowledged to me that the presents, at Quezon City, Philippines, this 25th day of September,
2008. two-week conference in St. Petersburg. He thus asked Atty. X to
same is their free and voluntary act and deed, and the free and
represent him during the pre-trial.
voluntary act and deed of the principal whom Mr. JON CRUZ
represents. A.B., Donor
Prepare the necessary document that Atty. X should submit to
C.D., Donee
the court to enable him to represent Allison during Pre-Trial.
I further certify that the foregoing instrument is a deed of sale of
a parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila, and consists of____ WITNESSES:
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
pages, including this page, and is signed on each and every page
by the said parties and their instrumental witnesses. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
) S.S.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL. CITY OF QUEZON )
THAT, I, ALLISON, of legal age and a resident of _____ have
named, appointed and constituted Atty. X of legal age and
NOTARY PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT
resident of _____to be my true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for me
My Commission expires on December 31, 2005
and in my name place and stead, to do or perform any or all of the
(Address) In the City of Quezon, Philippines, this 25th day of September,
2008, before me, a Notary Public in and for the said city, following acts and deeds, to wit:
Commission No._______, Manila
Attorney’s Roll No. IBP Membership No. personally appeared Mr. A.B., with Driver’s License No. _____
To represent me at the pre-trial of the case entitled ALLISON v.
PTR O.R. No. ________, Manila,2005 issued at Quezon City, on _____, and Miss C.D., with Passport No.
_____, issued at Manila, on _____, both of whom are personally _____, Civil Case No. _____of the Regional Trial court of Manila,
on _____ 2010 or any postponement thereof, with full authority
Doc. No. ___ known to me and to me known to be the same persons who
executed the foregoing instrument, and they acknowledged to me to consider and decide on those matters covered by Section 2,
Page No. ___
Rule 18 of the 1997 rules of Civil Procedure.
Book No. ___ that the same is their free and voluntary act and deed.
Series of 2005.
I further certify that the foregoing instrument is a deed of HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said Attorney-In-Fact
full power and authority whatsoever necessary, proper or
donation of a parcel of land with the improvements thereon
D. Deed of Donation convenient as I might or could lawfully do if personally present,
located at No. 9 West Aguila St., Green Cross Subdivision, Quezon
and hereby CONFIRMING AND RATIFYING all that my Attorney-in-
City, and consists of pages, including this page, and signed on
2008 Bar, Q. XI: Draft a complete deed of donation of a piece of each and every page by the said parties and their instrumental Fact shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these
land in accordance with the form prescribed by the Civil Code. witnesses. presents.

DEED OF DONATION WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL. (Place and Date)

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: ALLISON

NOTARY PUBLIC
(Sgd.)
[234]

ACCEPTED:
ATTY. X
(Acknowledgement)
2009 Bar, Q. XIX: Romeo Hacendero wants to authorize Juanito
Ahente to sell, on cash basis, for a price not lower than
P500,000.00, a parcel of land, situated in Munoz, Nueva Ecija,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 123456, in the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. Prepare a Special Power of
Attorney granting such authority.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA )S.S.
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT I, ROMEO HACENDERO, of legal age and a resident of _____
have named JAUNITO ABENTE, of legal age and a resident of
_____, to be my true and lawful Attorney- in-Fact, for me and in
my name, place and stead, to do or perform the following acts
and deeds, to wit:
To sell for the price of not lower than P500,000.00, that parcel of
land situated in Munoz, Nueva Ecija, of which I am the absolute
owner, my title thereto being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 123456 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and to
sign the corresponding deed of sale.
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said Attorney-in-Fact full
power or authority as may be proper or necessary as fully to all
extent as I could do if personally present, and hereby confirming
all that my said Attorney-in-Fact shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue of these presents.
Manila, September, 2009.
ROMEO HACENDERO
Principal
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
In the City of Manila, this day of September ___, 2009 personally
appeared before me Mr. Romeo Hacendero with Driver’s License
No. _____ issued at _____ on _____, known to me to be the same
person who executed the foregoing instrument, and he
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
acknowledged to me that he executed the same of his own free
and voluntary act and deed.
I further certify that the foregoing instrument is a Special Power
of Attorney over a parcel of land situated in Munoz, Nueva Ecija.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.
NOTARY PUBLIC
(Attorney’s Roll No.)
(Commission No.)
(IBP Membership No.)
(PTRO.R. No.)
(Email Address)
Doc. No. ___
Page No.___
Book No.___
Series of 2009.
2005 Bar, Q. XIII: Gerry Cruz is the owner of a 1,000-square
meter lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12345
located in Sampaloc. Metro Manila. Gerry decided to sell the
property but did not have the time to look for a buyer. He then
designated his brother. Jon, to look for a buyer and negotiate
the sale. Jon met Angelo Santos who expressed his interest to
buy the lot. Angelo agreed to pay PI Million for the property on
September 26. 2005.
(a) Draft the Special Power of Attorney to be executed by
Gerry Cruz, as principal, in favor of his brother Jon, as
agent, authorizing the latter to sell the property in favor of
Angelo Santos.
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT I, GERRY CRUZ, of legal age, single and a resident of _____,
Manila, have named, appointed _____ and constituted, and by
these presents do hereby name, constitute and appoint, my
brother JON CRUZ, whose specimen signature appears below, as
my true and lawful Attorney-in- Fact, for me and in my name,
place and stead, and for my benefit, to do or perform any or all of
the following acts and deeds, to wit:
To sell to Angelo Santos at the price of One Million Pesos (PI,
000,000.00), my parcel of land with an area of one thousand
(1,000) square meters, located in Sampaloc, Manila, covered by
[235]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12345 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila, and which is more particularly described as follows:
(technical description)
and to execute and sign the corresponding deed of sale.
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said Attorney-in- Fact
full power and authority whatsoever necessary, proper and
convenient as fully to all intents and purposes as I might or could
do if personally present, and hereby confirming and ratifying all
that my said Attorney-in-Fact shall lawfully do or cause to be done
by virtue of these presents.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed these presents, at the City of
Manila, this 25th day of September, 2005.
GERRY CRUZ
Principal
SPECIMEN SIGNATURE:
JON CRUZ
Attorney-in-Fact
WITNESSES:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
IN THE CITY OF MANILA, Philippines, this ___ day of ______, 2005,
personally appeared before me Mr. GERRY CRUZ, with
Community Tax Certificate No. _____ issued at _____ on ______,
2005, personally known to me to be the same person who
executed the foregoing instrument, and he acknowledged to me
that the same is his free and voluntary act and deed.
I further certify that the foregoing instrument is a Special Power
of Attorney to sell a parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila,
and consists of ___ pages, including this page, and signed on each
and every page by the said GERRY CRUZ and his instrumental
witnesses.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 200_
(address)
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Commission No. ___, Manila acknowledged to me that it is his free act and voluntary deed. He PLAINTIFF, by undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Court
Attorney’s Roll No. exhibited to me his Residence Certificate No. 79112, issued at respectfully alleges that:
IBP Membership Roll No. Caloocan City on January 4, 1992, and TIN No. 79512.
PTR O.R. No. Manila, (1) Plaintiff is a banking corporation organized and existing
_____, 2005 Notary Public under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at 777
Until Dec. 31, 1992 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, while defendant is of legal age
Doc. No. and a resident of 888 Kamias St., Quezon City, where he may
Page No. Doc. No.___; be served with summons;
Book No. Page No.___; (2) On September 28, 1996, defendant borrowed from the
Series of 2005. Book No.___; plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00, subject to interest at
Series of 1992 the rate of 14% per annum, payable on the fifth anniversary
of the loan, and secured by a real estate mortgage over a
1992 Bar, Q. XIV: Roy Alvarez filed a complaint for damages
Pleadings in Criminal Actions parcel of land located in Cavite City, as evidenced by an
against Erwin Bracia, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-31046 of the
agreement executed on the same date, a copy of which is
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Said case is scheduled for
hereto attached as Annex “A” hereof;
pre-trial on October 5, 1992. Since Roy Alvarez cannot attend A. Complaint (3) Defendant failed to pay the said loan and interests thereon
the pre-trial, he authorized his lawyer. Atty. Florentino, to
on the due date thereof, and continues to fail to pay the
represent him therein with full power and authority.
2003 Bar, Q. XV(a): Seven years ago today, the Paramount Bank, same until the present, despite demands of the plaintiff;
doing business in 777 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, granted Juan (4) Due to defendant’s unjustified failure to comply with
Prepare the corresponding special power of attorney.
Reyes, a resident of 888 Kamias, Quezon City, a P1,000,000.00 plaintiff’s plainly just and valid claim, plaintiff was compelled
loan, with 14% interest per annum, secured by a real estate to initiate this action and to retain the services of the
POWER OF ATTORNEY
mortgage over a property located in Cavite City. The full amount, undersigned counsel and to incur expenses in the amount of
plus the interest due, was payable on the fifth anniversary of the P100,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
loan. The above stipulations were contained in a well-
documented and duly executed agreement. Despite demands, WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing,
(1) That I, ROY ALVAREZ, Filipino citizen, of legal age and
Juan Reyes refused to settle the loan obligation. The bank opted judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff
residing at 179 Rizal, Caloocan City have filed a complaint for
for the filing of a simple complaint for a sum of money. the amount of P1,000,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of
damages against Erwin Bracia, Civil Case No. 17896, Regional
14% per annum from September 28, 1996 until fully paid, plus the
Trial Court of Caloocan City;
You are the prosecutor; prepare the appropriate Information for amount of P100,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees.
(2) That said case was scheduled for pre-trial on October 5,
the crime committed.
1992 at 9:00 a.m.;
Plaintiff prays for such other and further reliefs as may be just or
(3) That in view of the fact that I cannot attend said pre-trial
Prepare the complaint, indicating the court which has proper equitable under the premises.
because I am making a business trip to Japan,I have
jurisdiction and venue.
authorized by these presents my counsel, Atty. Alberto
Makati City, September 28, 2003.
Florentino to represent me and giving him full powers to
REPUBLIC OFTHEPHILIPPINES
enter into pre-trial and stipulate facts in accordance with
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION (Sgd.)
law;
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Counsel for the Plaintiff
MAKATI CITY (Address)
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my signature this, 26 th
PTR O.R. No.___, Makati City, Jan. 3, 2003
day of September 1992 at Caloocan City, Metro Manila
PARAMOUNT BANK, IBP O.R. No. ___, Makati City, Jan. 20, 2003
Plaintiff, Attorney’s Roll No., (date)
ROY ALVAREZ
-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
Witnesses:
JUAN REYES, I, A.B., do hereby certify that I am the President of the Paramount
Republic of the Philippines )
Defendant. Bank, plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that I have been duly
Caloocan City ) S.S.
x----------------------------x authorized by the Board of Directors of the said bank to execute
this Certification against Forum Shopping, as evidenced by the
On this 26th day of September 1992 in Caloocan City, Roy Alvarez
COMPLAINT Secretary’s Certificate of Board Resolution hereto attached as
personally appeared before me, and known to me to be the same
Annex “B” hereof; that the plaintiff has not filed any other case in
person who executed the foregoing instrument and
[236]

any other court or administrative tribunal involving the same
cause of action; that I am not aware of any pending case involving
the same cause; and that should I hereafter acquire knowledge of
such other action, I will notify this Honorable Court thereof within
five (5) days from acquiring such knowledge.
Makati City, September 28, 2003.
A.B.
SUBSCRIBED & SWORN to before me this 28th day of September,
2003 the affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate
No. _____ issued at on January 31, 2003.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 2003
Doc. No. ___;
Page No. ___;
Book No. ___;
Series of 2003.
B. Information
2010 Bar, Q. XVIII(A): Draft the accusatory' portion of an
Information for RAPE of a 13-year old child committed by her
maternal uncle in broad daylight at the back of a church.
The undersigned public prosecutor accuses A.B. of the crime of
Qualified Rape pursuant to Republic Act No. 8353 otherwise
known as the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997” committed as follows:
That on or about 8:00 o’ clock in the morning of September
25,2010, in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused A.B. an uncle, a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree, of the victim C.D., a
minor 13 years of age, did then and there grab the said victim
while she was praying inside the Quiapo Church, and dragged her
behind a side altar of the church, and through the use of threats
and violence, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of her.
Contrary to law.
2006 Bar, Q. XVIII: Draft an Information charging Obet Buena
with arson filed with the Regional Trial Court. Branch 10, Manila.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 10
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
-versus- CRIMINAL CASE No.___________
OBET BUENA,
Accused.
X------------------------------------------------X
INFORMATION
The undersigned Public Prosecutor hereby accused OBET BUENA
of the crime of ARSON, committed as follows:
That, on or about September 1,2006, at about 10:00 p.m. at
nighttime purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the
offense, at St., District of Quiapo, City of Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of arson as a
consequence, by throwing a lighted torch and a can of gasoline at
a Barangay Hall in the said street, causing as a result the complete
burning and destruction of the same to the damage and prejudice
of the City of Manila, in the amount of P5,000,0,00.00.
Contrary to law.
Manila, September ___, 2006.
Public Prosecutor
Certification
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation of the above-
entitled case was conducted under my direction, and that there is
prima facie evidence that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Public Prosecutor
2004 Bar, Q. IX(A): Prepare a draft of a criminal information
charging a person with a crime of homicide, complete with
caption and title and required certification re preliminary
investigation. Do not use real names but supply all facts needed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONALCAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
[237]
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
CITY OF MANDALUYONG
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versus- CRIM CASE NO. Homicide
JUDE ESPINA,
Accused
x-------------------------------------------------------x
INFORMATION
THE UNDERSIGNED Assistant City Prosecutor accuses JUDE ESPINA
of the crime of HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of April 2004, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed
weapon, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one JOSEPH TOLEDO y
PABLICO, thereby inflicting upon him a fatal wound which directly
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
City of Mandaluyong, 26 September 2004.
Asst. City Prosecutor
IBP No. 7654321 dated May 28, 2004
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have conducted a preliminary
investigation of the case; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence; that
based on the evidence on record, there is reasonable ground to
believe that the crime has been committed; and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
Asst. City Prosecutor
Witnesses:
Maria Olivia P. Toledo (address) and others –
BAIL RECOMMENDED: P40.000.00
2003 Bar, Q. XV(b): Six-year old Maria informed her mother
Divina that on 02 June 2003, her fater entered her bedroom and
inserted his middle finger into her vagina. Maria later
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
underwent a medical examination. The medical findings CITY PROSECUTOR
revealed that she had fresh slight lacerations. A
Bail Recommended: None Public Prosecutor
You are the prosecutor; prepare the appropriate Information for
the crime committed. 2000 Bar, Q. XVIII: Prepare an Information for rape of a 17-year SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ___ day of _____,
old girl committed by the common-law spouse of her mother 2000, affiant exhibiting to me her Community Tax Certificate No.
Prepare the complaint, indicating the court which has proper warranting the imposition of the death penalty. _____ issued _____ at on _____, 2000.
jurisdiction and venue.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Doc. No. ___
REPUBLIC OFTHEPHILIPPINES NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION Page No. ___
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Book No. ___
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT MANILA Series of 2000.
MANILA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1999 Bar, Q. XVI: In the February 15, 1999 issue of the Manila
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, News, a daily newspaper published in Manila, the following was
Plaintiff, published: “Congressman’s querida caught peddling shabu." She
-versus- Crim Case No. ____For: Rape was identified as one who lives at 156 Rizal Avenue in Manila. It
-versus- CRIM. CASE No. For: Rape turned out that the woman referred to as CD residing at said
X address was really a congressman’s girlfriend. However, it was
x---------------------------------x not really CD who was caught peddling shabu but another who
__________, looked like her. CD brought a Complaint in the Office of the City
Accused. INFORMATION Prosecutor of Manila against the editor and publisher of the
x-------------------------------x Manila News. The Prosecutor found there was a case against the
The undersigned Public Prosecutor for the City of Manila, hereby editor and publisher of the newspaper. Prepare the Information.
INFORMATION accuses X of the crime of Rape committed as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
The undersigned City Prosecutor hereby accuses _____ of the That, on or about 10:00 p.m., of July 4, 2000, at his house in _____ REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
crime of Rape committed as follows: Tondo, Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable National Capital Judicial Region
Court, the said accused, by means of repeated blows to the Branch Manila
That on or about June 2, 2003, at about ___ p.m., in ____ and stomach which rendered the victim unconscious, did then and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge People of the Philippines,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, through of Y, who was then a minor child, 14 years of age, and daughter of Plaintiff.
force and intimidation, inserted the middle finger of his right hand Z, the common law spouse of the accused.
in the genital organ of Divina _____, who is his own daughter and -versus-
is only six (6) years of age. Contrary to law.
Mr. Editor and Mr. Publisher,
CONTRARY TO LAW. Manila, September 23, 2000. Accused,
x------------------------------------x
Manila, September 28, 2003. A
Public Prosecutor INFORMATION
CITY PROSECUTOR
City of Manila CERTIFICATION The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses Mr. Editor and Mr.
Publisher of the crime of LIBEL defined under Article 353 of the
CERTIFICATION This is to certify that a preliminary investigation has been Revised Penal Code and penalized under Article 355 of the same
conducted in the above-entitled case, and that on the basis of the Code, committed as follows:
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation was conducted in evidence presented there is reasonable ground to believe that the
the above-entitled case, and there is prima facie evidence that the offense charged has been committed and the accused is probably That on or about February 15, 1999 in the City of Manila and
crime of Qualified Rape has been committed and that the accused guilty thereof. within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
is probably guilty thereof. Mr. Editor and the accused Mr. Publisher, the editor and
Manila, September 23, 2000. publisher, respectively, of the Manila News, a daily newspaper
[238]

published in Manila, caused to be publicly and maliciously
published in the February 15, 1999 issue of the Manila News,
“Congressman’s querida caught peddling shabu" identifying said
querida as the one who lives at 156 Rizal Avenue. That the said
aforesaid publication publicly and maliciously imputed upon the
private complainant CD, a congressman’s girlfriend who is living at
156 Rizal Avenue, the crime of peddling shabu, when in truth and
in fact CD was never “caught peddling shabu,” which publication
tended to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt upon CD.
Contrary to law.
Manila, Philippines September 27, 1999
(Sgd.) Public Prosecutor
WITNESSES: Mr. A and Mr. B.
Bail recommended: P25.000.00
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that a preliminary investigation has been
conducted in accordance with law, that the complainant and her
witnesses have been examined and that on the basis of the sworn
statements and other evidence submitted, there is reasonable
ground to believe that the crime has been committed and the
accused are probably guilty thereof, that the accused were
informed of the complaint and the evidence submitted against
them, and that they were given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence.
(Sgd.) Public Prosecutor
(jurat)
1998 Bar, Q. I: Boy, armed with a knife had sex with Nella, a
sixteen- year-old lass, through force and intimidation on May 1,
1998 in Bauan, Batangas. May the Provincial Prosecutor of
Batangas file an information for rape against Boy instead of a
criminal complaint to be signed by Nelia?
If so, prepare the information complete with caption.
If not, prepare the criminal complaint likewise with complete
caption to be signed by Nella. In both cases, exclude the
certification.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A: R.A. No. 8353, which reclassified rape as a crime against Plaintiff,
persons, became effective on October 22, 1997. Hence, the
Provincial Fiscal may file an information for rape against Boy. -versus- CRIMINAL CASE No. 100321
For Highway Robbery
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PEDRO SANTOS and JUAN MAGNO,
FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION Defendants
BATANGAS CITY X--------------------------------------X
BRANCH________
INFORMATION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff, The undersigned accuses PEDRO SANTOS and JUAN DELA CRUZ, of
the crime of Highway Robbery committed as follows:
-versus- CRIM. CASE No. FOR: RAPE
That on or about September 1,1995, in Quiapo, Manila, and
BOY, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused
Accused. confederating and confabulating with each other did then and
x-----------------------------------x there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain, and
the use of force, violence and intimidation to wit: while inside a
INFORMATION public utility jeepney plying the Quiapo- Cubao route, accused
Pedro Santos, 16 years old, pointed a gun at Maria Sison, and
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor hereby accuses the above taking advantage of the situation, accused Juan Magno, 14 years
named accused of the crime of rape under Article 265-A par. 1 of old, who acted with discernment, snatched, steal and carry away
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, therefrom, without her consent, the necklace of said witness
committed as follows: valued at P2,000,Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the witness in the said sum.
"That on or about May 1, 1998 In the municipality of Bauan,
province of Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Contrary to law.
Court, the above named accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and maliciously, through force and intimidation with a Manila, Philippines, September 24. 1995
knife, have sexual congress with the offended party Nelia, a minor
16 years of age, succeeding in penetrating her genital organ, INOCENCIO CRUZ
thereby causing her actual and moral damages in the amount of Assistant City Prosecutor
at least P100,000
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation was conducted by
CONTRARY TO LAW. me, according to law; that there is reasonable ground to believe
that a crime was committed and the accused is probably guilty
(Sgd.) Provincial Prosecutor thereof.
1995 Bar, Q. XIII: Prepare an Information charging two accused INOCENCIO C. CRUZ
one of whom is 14 and the other is 16, with violation of P.D. 532 Assistant City Prosecutor
(Highway Robbery) for having snatched from the complaining
witness a gold necklace worth 2.000.00. 1994 Bar, Q. XIX: Prepare an information for murder against
three accused with two aggravating circumstances.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
CITY OF MANILA BRANCH 9 4TH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 52
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
[239]

People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff,
-versus- Crim. Case No. 6785
For: Murder
Diosdado Avila. Agapito Luna and Aurelio Pena,
Accused.
x-------------------------------------------------------x
INFORMATION
The undersigned Public Prosecutor hereby accuses Diosdado
Avila, Agapito Luna and Aurelio Pena of the crime of MURDER,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of July. 1994 in Brgy. San Miguel.
Puerto Princesa City. Palawan, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with each other, and armed with deadly weapons,
to wit: two large fan knives and a bolo, did then and there, with
malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to take the life of
Raymundo Dadores, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and treacherously attack and wound the latter in
different parts of the body, inflicting upon him two stab wounds
on the left side of the breast and a large hack wound on the neck,
defendant Pena having stabbed Dadores while the latter was
being held by the arms by defendants Avila and Luna, and
defendant Luna then hacking Dadores on the neck as the latter
was falling to the ground, and as a result of his said wounds,
Dadores Immediately died.
Contrary to law.
Puerto Princesa, September 28, 1994
Rene A.
Francisco Public Prosecutor
WITNESSES: Wilma R.Dadores; EdmundoC.Reyes
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation has been
conducted in this case under my direction, having examined the
witnesses under oath, and that a prima facie case exists and the
accused are probably guilty thereof.
Rene A. Francisco Public Prosecutor
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Bail Recommended: SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 2nd day of May
1993 in the City of Manila. Philippines.
1993 Bar, Q. VIII: Prepare a hypothetical criminal information for
Homicide with complete caption. JOSE PEREZ
City Fiscal
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION List of Witnesses
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Branch II Manila Bail Recommended: P20.000.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1991 Bar, Q. XIV: A complaint for knowingly rendering an unjust
Plaintiff, Judgment was filed against Judge X before the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office. Z, the investigating prosecutor, found a
-versus- Criminal Case No.7 prima facie case against X. Prepare the information. Omit the
For: Homicide caption.
DANILO PARAS, Undersigned Fiscal charges Judge X of the Regional Trial Court of
Defendant Manila of the crime knowingly rendering unjust Judgment
x--------------------------x punishable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code
committed as follows:
INFORMATION
That on or about August 1.1991, Judge X, Regional Trial Court of
The undersigned fiscal charges Danilo Paras of the crime of Manila dismissed a charge of rape of a 12 year old girl filed against
homicide committed as follows: That on or about August 10, 1993 Juan on the basis of an affidavit of desistance of the victim,
in the City of Manila, the said accused did then and there willfully, knowing fully well that in the crime statutory rape consent of the
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, fire his 45 caliber victim is invalid.
gun upon Ricardo Santos inflicting on him mortal wounds which
immediately caused the death of the said Ricardo Santos. Contrary to law.
Contrary to law. JUAN CRUZ
Assistant Fiscal
Domingo Velez
Assistant Fiscal CERTIFICATION
CERTIFICATION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation on this case has
been conducted by me in accordance with law; that I have
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation in this case had examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there Is a
been conducted by me in accordance with law; that I have reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
examined the complainants and their witnesses; that there is and the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was
reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged had been informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against
committed; that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the him and was given an opportunity to submit controverting
accused was informed of the offense charged and was given the evidence, and that the filing of this information is with prior
opportunity to submit controverting evidence; and that the filing authority and approval of the City Fiscal.
of this information is with the prior authority and approval of the
City Fiscal. Manila. September 1, 1991.
DOMINGO VELEZ JUAN CRUZ
Assistant Fiscal Assistant Fiscal
[240]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of September committed; and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed
1991 in the City of Manila. the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence of the complaint against him and was given an opportunity to
submitted against him and was given the opportunity to submit submit controverting evidence and the filing of this information
PEDRO SISON controverting evidence; and that the filing of this information is was with the prior authority of the Fiscal. Manila, January 18,
City Fiscal with the prior authority and approval of the City Fiscal. 1988.

List of Witnesses DOMINGO PEREZ PTC

Bail Recommended P50.000. Assistant Fiscal
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th day of January
Bail recommended P10,000.00. 1988 in the City of Manila.
1989 Bar, Q. XIII: Prepare an information charging the accused
with bigamy. Assume all necessary details. Do not use your
1988 Bar, Q. XIV(a): Using the alphabet for names, draft a LBC
name.
criminal information for the crime of theft. Supply the necessary Assistant Fiscal
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES facts.
List of Witness:
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION Bail Recommended:
BRANCH I, MANILA
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES MANILA, BRANCH 7 2009 Bar, Q. XX: From the affidavits and the death certificate
Plaintiff, submitted during the preliminary investigation, the following
Crim. Case No. 1 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES facts are established: At 6:00 o’clock in the evening of
-versus- For Bigamy Plaintiff, September 13, 2009, at the comer of Dapitan and Dos Castillas
Sts., Sampaloc, Manila, Edgar Bastonero, alias Bugoy, and Carlos
JUAN CRUZ -versus- Tirador, alias Pogi, accosted Johnny Escolar, a student, and
Accused. demanded the latter’s cellular phone and wrist watch. Because
X------------------------------X X, Y, Z Johnny resisted, Bastonero pulled out a knife and stabbed
Defendant. Johnny several times in the chest, causing instantaneous death.
INFORMATION x-----------------------x Bastonero and Tirador then ran away. The affidavits were
executed by William Tan- and Henry Uy, classmates of Johnny,
Undersigned Fiscal accuses JUAN CRUZ of the Crime of Bigamy INFORMATION who witnessed the entire incident. The death certificate was
committed as follows: issued by Dr. Jose Cabra who conducted the autopsy on Johnny.
Undersigned accuses XYZ of the crime of theft committedas
That on or about August 10, 1989, in the City of Manila, follows: As Assistant City Prosecutor in Manila, prepare the appropriate
Philippines, the said accused, being then legally married to Petra criminal information to be filed in court.
de Jesus and without such marriage having been legally dissolved That on or about September 1, 1988, in the City of Manila, the
said marriage still existing and valid, did there and willfully, herein accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
unlawfully and felicitously contract a second marriage with gain and without the knowledge and consent of ABC, the owner NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
Elizabeth Sison in the City of Manila. took a gold necklace studded with diamonds valued as P50,000.00 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT MANILA
to the prejudice of said contrary to law.
Contrary to law. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PTC Plaintiff,
DOMINGO PEREZ Assistant City Fiscal
Fiscal Manila -versus- CRIM CASE NO.
For: Robbery with Homicide
CERTIFICATE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION CERTIFICATION
EDGAR BASTONERO alias “BUGOY” and
I hereby certify that preliminary investigation in this case had I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation has been CARLOS TIRADOR alias “POGI”,
been conducted by me in accordance with law; that I have conducted by me in accordance with law; that I have examined Accused.
examined the complainant and her witnesses; that there is the complaint and her witnesses; that there is a reasonable x-----------------------------x
reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged had been ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that said
[241]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
INFORMATION For: ESTAFA
C. Petition for Bail
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila hereby JOSE MALINLANG,
accuses Edgar Bastonero alias “Bugoy” and Carlos Tirador alias Accused,
2010 Bar, Q. XVII(C): Draft a Petition for Bail.
“Pogi”, of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed as x-----------------------------------x
follows: (Caption)
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
PETITION FOR BAIL
That on or about 6:00 p.m. of September 13, 2009 at the corner of
Dapitan and Dos Castillas Streets, Sampaloc, Manila, Philippines, The Clerk of Court
Defendant Juan de la Cruz, through counsel, respectfully alleges:
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Regional Trial Court
conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding each Branch 1, Manila
(1) That the defendant is in custody for the alleged commission
other, with the use of superior force, and with intent to gain, did of a capital offense.
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means Sir:
(2) That no bail has been recommended for his temporary
of violence, take and take away from one JOHNNY EXCOLAR, a release on the assumption that the evidence of guilt is
student, one cellular phone and a wrist watch belonging to the Kindly enter the appearance of the undersigned as Private
strong.
said JOHNNY ESCOLAR, of the total value of One Hundred Prosecutor in the above-entitled case, under the supervision and
(3) That the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is
Thousand Pesos(P100,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of control of the Public Prosecutor, with the conformity of the
with the prosecution, and unless that fact is satisfactorily
the said owner, and on the same occasion and for the purpose of complainant Joyce Mapagbigay, as shown below.
shown, the defendant may be bailed at the court’s
enabling them to take away the articles above mentioned, the discretion;
herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and Henceforth, kindly furnish the undersigned with copies of all
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, and pleadings and orders at his address given below.
WHEREFORE, upon due notice and hearing, it is respectfully
taking advantage of their superior number and strength, prayed that the defendant be admitted to bail in such amount as
treacherously attack, assault, and repeatedly stab the said Manila, September 22, 2002.
this Honorable Court may fix.
JOHNNY ESCOLAR in the chest with a knife, thereby inflicting
multiple chest wounds on the said person which directly caused PEDRO CRUZ
(Place and Date)
his death. Counsel for the Complainant
(address)
MCL
Contrary to law. (PTR & IBP OR Nos.)
Counsel for the Defendant

Manila, Philippines, 2009 CONFORME:

(notice of hearing)
Assistant City Prosecutor JOYCE MAPAGBIGAY
D. Entry of Appearance Complainant
CERTIFICATION
2002 Bar, Q. XVII: Jose Malinlang is accused of estafa upon Copies Furnished by personal delivery:
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation was conducted by complaint of Joyce Mapagbigay. The case is pending before the
me, in which the accused were given an opportunity to present Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Manila, where it is docketed as The City Prosecutor
their evidence, and on the basis of the affidavits presented, there Criminal Case No. 5430. Joyce engages your services as a private Manila
is prima facie reason to believe that a crime has been committed prosecutor. File your formal entry of appearance. For purposes
and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. of this pleading, your name is Pedro Cruz. Atty.
Counsel for the Accused
Assistant City Prosecutor REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (address)
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Witnesses: NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION Legal Forms in Civil Cases
BRANCH 1, MANILA
William Tan, Address
A. Complaint
Henry Tan, Address PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Dr. Jose Cabra, Address Plaintiff,
2009 Bar, Q. IX: Alexander Sison, resident of 111 Libertad St.,
Bail Recommended: P100,000.00 for each accused. -versus- CRIM. CASE No. 5430 Sampaloc, Manila, engages your services as lawyer. He tells you

[242]

that a certain Mr. Juan Jamero of 222 Juan Luna St., Tondo,
Manila, owes him P1, 000, 000.00; that the debt is long overdue;
and that, despite repeated demands, Jamero has failed to
comply with his obligation. He also shows you a promissory
note, executed on January 3, 2008, wherein Jamero promises to
pay the amount of P1,000,000.00, with 12% interest per annum,
within one (1) year from date of note. Sison agrees to pay you
attorney’s fees in the amount of P75, 000.00 and a fee of P3,
000.00 for every appearance in court.
As Sison’s lawyer, prepare the complaint that you will file in
court against Juan Jamiro.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT MANILA
ALEXANDER SISON
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. _____
JUAN JAMIRO,
Defendant.
x------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, through undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges:
(1) That plaintiff is of legal age and a resident of 111 Libertad
St., Sampaloc, Manila, while defendant is of legal age and a
resident of 222 Juan Luna St., Tondo, Manila, where he may
be served with summons;
(2) That on January 3, 2008, the defendant borrowed from the
plaintiff the amount of P1, 000, 000.00, evidenced by a
Promissory Note executed by the defendant on the same
date, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “A” and
made an integral part hereof, promising to pay the plaintiff
the said amount of P1, 000, 000.00 with interest thereon at
the rate of 12% per annum within a period of one year from
the date thereof;
(3) That the period of one year expired on January 2, 2009, but
the defendant has not paid the said loan or any portion
thereof despite repeated demands;
(4) That due to the defendant’s failure to pay plaintiff’s plainly
just and valid claim, the plaintiff was compelled to institute
this suet and to engage the services of counsel, to whom he
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
has agreed to pay the amount of P75, 000.00 at attorney’s sold a 1989 Lancer to B, who resided at 24 Lontok Street, Quezon
fees, plus P3, 000.00 for every appearance in court. City. A promissory note was executed by B promising to pay on
(5) That barangay mediation was previously sought but no or before December30, 1995, the amount of P250, 000.00 with
agreement was arrived at and the plaintiff was given a interest of 36% per annum, aside from attorney's fees in the sum
certification to file his claim in court, a copy of which is of P20, 000.00 in the event of litigation. After one year, B failed
hereto attached as Annex “B” hereof. to pay any amount prompting to demand full payment of
vehicle. B refused, contending that the payment was due In
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully that, after due hearing, judgment December 1995. S wants you to file a complaint against B with
be rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the instructions to recover the unpaid vehicle.
amount of P1, 000, 000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum from January 2, 2009 until fully paid, plus the Prepare the appropriate pleading.
amount of P75, 000.00 per court appearance, as attorney’s fees.
Republic of the Philippines
Plaintiff prays for such other and further relief as may be just or NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
equitable under the premises. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Makati City
Manila, September 28, 2009.
S,
ATTY. _____ Plaintiff.
Counsel for the Plaintiff
(address) -versus- Civil Case No. 1
Attorney’s Roll No. ___ For Sum of Money
Date ___
PTR No., ___, Place/ Date of issue B,
IBP O.R. No. ___ Defendant.
Date/ Place issued ___ X--------------------------------------X
MCLE Cert. No. ___
Email address: ___ COMPLAINT
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING COMES NOW, the plaintiff, through the undersigned counsel and
to this Honorable court respectfully alleges:
I, ALEXANDER SISON, after being duly sworn, hereby depose and
state: (1) That plaintiff S, of legal age. Filipino citizen, residing at 211
Madison Street, Greeenhills, Metro Manila and B,
(1) That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; defendant, of legal age, Filipino citizen residing at 24 Lontoc
(2) That I have not initiated any case involving the same issues Street. Quezon City, where he may be served with
before any other court or administrative body; summons;
(3) That I am not aware of the pendency of any case involving (2) That on October 5, 1994, defendant purchased a 1989
the same issues or proceedings in any other court or Lancer car from the plaintiff in the amount of P250.000.00
administrative body, and payable on or before December 30, 1995 with an interest of
(4) That if I should hereafter learn about the pendency of 36% per annum; and that in the event of litigation,
another case involving the same issues in another court, defendant shall pay P20.000.00 as attorney’s fees. A copy of
tribunal or administrative body, I will notify this Honorable said promissory note is hereto attached.
Court within five (5) days from thereon. (3) That after one year had expired, defendant failed to pay said
promissory note;
ALEXANDER SISON (4) That despite demands both written and oral, defendant
Affiant failed to pay the value of said promissory note forcing
plaintiff to file this case engaging the services of counsel in
1996 Bar, Q. XII(1): On October 5, 1994, S, with address at 211 the amount P20.000.00.
Madison Street, Greenhills, Metro Manila, a dealer of used cars,
[243]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due trial, (3) That defendant failed to pay the monthly rentals for 6 only be in the appropriate court in Cebu City. Prepare the
defendant be ordered to pay the amount of P250.000.00 plus 36% months, and despite written and oral demands to vacate, requested promissory note.
interest until the amount is fully paid and P20,000.00 as defendant failed to pay said rentals for 6 months in the
attorney’s fees. amount of P90.000.00; Bryan failed to pay the promissory note referred to in letter a
(4) That due to the refusal of defendant to pay the rentals, above. Jocot decided to file a complaint against Bryan to enforce
Makati City, September 1, 1996. plaintiff was constrained to file the present action engaging the note and hired the services of George, a young lawyer, for
the services of counsel, in the amount of P 10,000.00. that purpose. You are George, prepare the complaint.
J
Counsel for Plaintiff WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due trial I, Bryan, Filipino citizen, of legal age and resident of Manila
PTR OR. No. 6321, January 7. 1996 defendant be ordered to pay the amount of P90.000.00 with legal promise to pay JOCOT or order the sum of P50.000.00 in five
IBP OR No. 1265, January 7, 1996 interest and to vacate the premises. equal installments commencing on October 1, 1991, payable not
later than the 20th day of each month, with compounded interest
Makati City, September, 24 1996. at ten percent (10%) per annum; that in the event of a suit to
1996 Bar, Q. XII(2): Rey Carreon, who resided at 26 Real Street,
enforce the promissory note, I promise to pay P5.000 as
Makati City, owns a market stall at Shoppersville, Greenhills,
Juan De La Cruz attorney’s fees; and that said action shall be filed in an
Mandaluyong City. He leased it to Siony Beltran from 1 March
Counsel for Plaintiff appropriate court in Cebu City.
1993 to 1 March 1995 at a monthly rental of P15,000.00. Siony
PTRO.R. NO. 7755, January 10, 1996
failed to pay for 6 months. Despite demands, Siony refused to
IBP OR No. 7007, January 10, 1996 Cebu City, September 1, 1991.
pay. Rey wants to recover the premises.
VERIFICATION BRYAN
Draft the requisite complaint, containing all the pertinent facts
as outlined above.
I, REY CARREON, am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case, have REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
cause the above complaint to be filed and the allegations thereof REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Republic of the Philippines
are true and correct. CEBU CITY
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
MAKATI CITY
REY CARREON JOCOT,
CITY COURT, Br. No. 1
Plaintiff,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 29th day of
REY CARREON
September 1996 at the City of Manila, affiant exhibited to me his -versus- Civil Case No. 2
Plaintiff,
Community Tax Certificate No. 01234 issued at Manila on January FOR SUM OFMONEY
17. 1996 BRYAN
-versus- For: Ejectment
Defendant.
Rosalie R. Lamigo x-----------------------x
SIONY BELTRAN
Notary Public
Defendant.
My commission expires on Dec. 31, 1996 COMPLAINT
X----------------------------------------X
COMES NOW the plaintiff through the undersigned counsel and to
COMPLAINT
Doc. No. 1; this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges,
Page No. 2;
COMES NOW, the plaintiff in the above entitled case, through the
Book No. 4; (1) That plaintiff, JOCOT is a Filipino citizen, married and
undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully
Series of 1996. resident of Cebu City and defendant BRYAN, is a Filipino
alleges:
citizen and resident of No. 2 Osmeña Street. Cebu City
1991 Bar, Q. XV: Jocot asks you to prepare a negotiable where he may be served with summons;
(1) That the plaintiff, of legal age. residing at 26 Real Street,
promissory note wherein the promissory, Bryan, binds himself to (2) That on September 1, 1991, defendant executed a
Makati City, that defendant is of legal age, residing at No. 2
pay a loan of P50.000.00 in five (5) equal monthly Installments promissory note in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
Wilson. Makati where he may be served with summons;
commencing on October 1991; payable not later than the 20th P50.000 to be paid within a period of five months from
(2) That the plaintiff is the owner of a market stall at
day of each month, with interest at ten percent (10%) per October 1, 1991. A copy of said promissory note is hereto
Shoppersville. Greenhills. Mandaluyong City, which was
annum. He wants you to include an acceleration clause, and attached as Annex of this complaint:
leased to defendant on March 1, 1993 to March 1995 at a
stipulations regarding attorney’s fees of P5,000.00 in the event (3) That the period of five months had already expired and
monthly rental of PI5,000,00;
of suit to enforce the note and on venue of action which shall defendant failed to pay said promissory note;

[244]

(4) That despite repeated demands both oral and written,
defendant still failed and refused to pay said promissory
note;
(5) That the plaintiff was constrained to file this suit to enforce
said promissory note engaging the services of counsel in the
amount of P5.000;
(6) That the amount due from defendant in accordance with
said promissory note is P50.000 plus compounded Interest
of 10% per annum plus attorney's fee in the amount of
P5.000;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due trial,
defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff P50.000 plus
compounded interest of 10% per annum and P5.000 attorney’s
fees.
GEORGE
Counsel for Plaintiff
PLT No. 5798
IBP OR No. 6790
1990 Bar, Q. IX(1): Prepare a complaint for the collection of a
sum of money in behalf of your client Jose Santos against Pedro
Luz for the amount of P50, 000.00 based on a promissory note.
Omit caption and title, and do not sign or use your name as
counsel. Use a fictitious name.
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the plaintiff JOSE SANTOS through the undersigned
counsel in the above-entitled case and to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges:
(1) That JOSE SANTOS is a Filipino citizen of legal age and
married residing at No. 3 Sta. Cruz St. Manila and that
PEDRO LUZ. the defendant is a Filipino citizen of legal age
and residing at No. 10 Arlegui Street. Manila where he may
be served with summons;
(2) That on August 1. 1990 PEDRO LUZ executed a promissory
note in favor of herein plaintiff* in the amount of
P50.000.00 payable within 30 days from the date of the
promissory note which reads as follows;
“Manila. Philippines 1 August 1990
I promise to pay PEDRO LUZ the sum of P50.000.00 or order
within 30 days from this date.
JOSE SANTOS"
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(Copy of said promissory note is attached hereto and made an you have defaulted in the payment of the said rentals for six
integral part hereof as Annex “A") months already, from January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007.
(3) That the 30-day period had elapsed and despite demands In view thereof, my client is hereby terminating your lease, and
orally and in writing by the plaintiff, defendant refused and demand is hereby made upon you to vacate the leased premises
failed to pay the amount stated in the promissory note. and pay your rentals in arrears within five (5) days from your
(4) That due to the unjust and unlawful refusal of defendant to receipt hereof.
comply with the demands, plaintiff was compelled to file the
instant action engaging the services of counsel in the Yours truly,
amount of PI0,000.00. Atty. X
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due trial judgment (b) Assume Jun Miranda did not heed your demand letter.
be rendered against defendant to pay the sum of P50.000.00 plus Draft a complaint for ejectment. (Omit verification and
interest and attorney’s fees and such other reliefs, this Honorable affidavit of non-forum shopping).
Court may deem Just.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Manila, August 30. 1990 NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
PETER YAN QUEZON CITY
Counsel for the Plaintiff
P.T.R. No. 5983 dated January 5, 1990 JUN MIRANDA,
IBP O.R No. 79890. January 5, 1990 Plaintiff,
562 Escolta, Manila
-versus- CIVIL CASE No. For: Unlawful Detainer
B. Complaint for Ejectment
IAN ALBA,
Defendant.
2008 Bar, Q. X: Ian Alba owns a house and lot at No. 9 West x------------------------x
Aguila, Green Cross Subdivision, Quezon City, which he leased to
Jun Miranda for a term of two years starting May 1, 2006, at a COMPLAINT
monthly rental of P50,000. Jun defaulted in the payments of his
rentals for six (6) months, from January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007. PLAINTIFF, through undersigned counsel, respectfully alleges that:
(a) Prepare a demand letter as lawyer of Ian Alba addressed to (1) Plaintiff is of legal age and a resident of No. 7, West Aguila
Jun Miranda preparatory to filing an ejectment case. St., Green Cross Subdivision, Quezon City, while defendant is
of legal age and a resident of No. 9, West Aguila St., Green
July 10, 2007
Cross Subdivision, Quezon City, where he may be served
with summons;
Mr. Ian Alba (2) Plaintiff is the owner of a house and lot located at No. 9,
No. 9, West Aguila St. West Aguila St., Green Cross Subdivision, Quezon City;
Green Cross Subdivision (3) On May 1, 2006, defendant leased the said house and lot
Quezon City from the plaintiff for a period of two (2) years starting on the
said date, at a monthly rental of P50,000,00 a month,
Dear Sir: payable within the first five (5) days of each month;
(4) By virtue of the said lease, possession n of the said house
This is with reference to your lease of the house and lot of my and lot was delivered to the defendant starting May 1, 2006;
client, Mr. Jun Miranda, located at your above stated address. (5) However, defendant defaulted in the payment of the
monthly rentals for six (6) months, from January 1, 2007 to
You leased the said property for a period of two years starting
June 30, 2007;
from May 1, 2006, at a monthly rental of P50,000.00. However,
[245]

(6) Due to the default of the defendant in the payment of his
rent, the plaintiff, through undersigned counsel, sent him a
letter dated July 10,2007, terminating his lease and
demanding that he vacate the leased premises and pay his
rentals in arrears within five (5) days from receipt of the said
letter; a copy of the said letter is hereto attached as Annex
“A” hereof;
(7) Defendant received the said letter on July 15, 2007, as
shown by his signature at the bottom of Annex “A” hereof,
but he failed and refused, and until the present continues to
fail and refuse, without justifiable cause, to vacate the
premises and pay his rentals in arrears;
(8) Due to the refusal and/or failure of the defendant to comply
with plaintiffs plainly just and valid claim, plaintiff was
compelled to file this complaint, and to engage the services
of legal counsel for a fee of P50,000.00, for which defendant
should be held liable.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering the defendant to vacate the house and lot located
at No. 9, West Aguila St., Green Cross Subdivision, Quezon
City, and surrender possession thereof peacefully to the
plaintiff;
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff rentals in arrears
at the rate of P50,000.00 a month from January 1, 2007 until
the time that he actually vacates the leased premises;
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P50,000,00 as attorney’s fees; and,
(d) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other and further reliefs as may be just and
equitable under the premises.
Atty. X
Counsel for the Plaintiff
(Address)
(Attorney Roll No.)
IBP O. R. No. (date & place of issue)
PTR O.R. No. (date & place of issue)
2000 Bar, Q. XVII: Your client comes to you complaining that a
lessee of his building has refused to vacate the leased premises
despite the expiration of the contract of lease which was not
renewed, and despite demands to vacate. He asks you to initiate
legal action. Prepare the necessary complaint.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff, and to pay the
MANILA plaintiff the amount of P50.000.00 as and for attorney’s fees, plus
costs of suit.
A,
Plaintiff. Plaintiff prays for such other and further reliefs as may be just and
equitable under the premises.
-versus- CIVIL CASE NO.
For: Unlawful Detainer Manila, September 23, 2000.
B. ATTY. X
Defendant, Counsel for the Plaintiff
x----------------------x Address
IBP OR No. ___, Manila January 5, 2000
COMPLAINT PTR No. ___, Manila January 5, 2000
A, through the undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Court VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
respectfully alleges:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
(1) Plaintiff is of legal age, single, and a resident of _____, CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
Manila, while defendant is of legal age, single and a resident
of _____, Manila, where he may be served with summons; A, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby
(2) Plaintiff is the owner of a commercial building in _____, deposes and states:
Manila, which the defendant has leased for a period of five
(5J years commencing from August 1. 1995 at a monthly (1) That he is plaintiff in the above-entitled case and has caused
rental of P 1,000,000.00, pursuant to a written contract of the foregoing complaint to be prepared;
lease, a photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex “A" (2) That he hereby certifies that he has not heretofore
and made an integral part hereof. commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
(3) The said contract of lease expired on July 31, 2000, and has issues before any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
not been renewed. agency, that to the best of his knowledge, there is no such
(4) Despite the expiration of the said contract of lease, B. has pending action or claim, and that if he should hereafter
unlawfully failed and refused to vacate the same despite learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
demands of the plaintiff. A photocopy of the last demand, or is pending, he shall report such fact within five (5) days
dated August 5, 2000 and received by the defendant on the therefrom to this Honorable Court.
same date, or more than five (5) days prior to the filing of his
complaint is hereto attached as Annex “B" and made Manila, September 23, 2000.
integral part hereof.
(5) Due to the defendant's adamant refusal to vacate the leased A
premises, plaintiff has been compelled to initiate the suit Affiant
and to incur expenses in the amount of P50.000.00 aside
from costs of suit. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ___ day of _____,
(6) Prior to the filing of this complaint, this dispute was brought 2000, the affiant exhibiting to me her/his Community Tax
to the lupon tagamayapa of Barangay _____, where the Certificate No. issued at _____ on _____.
leased premises is located, but no settlement was arrived at,
as evidenced by the Certification to File Action issued by the Doc. No.
Barangay Chairman, a copy of which is hereto attached as Page No.
Annex “C" hereof. Book No.
Series of 2000.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing.
Judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, and all persons 1997 Bar, Q. XX: Prepare a complaint for ejectment.
acting under him. to vacate the aforementioned leased premises
[246]

Republic of the Philippines
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila
National Capital Region
Manila
A Manila, Philippines. September 28, 1997.
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL CASE NO.G.R. NO. 1000 B
For Unlawful Detainer
Defendant,
x-----------------------x
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, through counsel, alleges:
(1) Plaintiff, is of legal age, resident of the City of Manila, that
Defendant is likewise of legal age, residing at No. 2 CDE
apartment, F St., Quezon City, and may be served of
summons at said address;
(2) That plaintiff is the owner of an apartment building located
at F St. Manila, and described as follows:
"a ten-door apartment approximately 500 sq. meters, bounded on
the left by JKL Building and bounded on the right by MNO
Building."
(3) That on January 10, 1996, plaintiff entered into a contract
with defendant whereby the former leased to the latter the
above-described property for the period of one (1) year,
starting on February 1, 1996, for the monthly rental
ofP5,000.00;
(4) That by virtue of said contract, defendant took the property
in question on February 1, 1996, and he is still in possession
of the same up to the present time;
(5) That the period stipulated in the contract has already
expired but defendant refused and still refuses to vacate the
property, in spite of repeated demands to vacate, the last of
which was served on him on September 6, 1997.
(6) That as a consequence of defendant’s refusal to vacate
plaintiffs property, the latter has suffered, by way of
damages; of at least P35.000 pesos as unpaid rentals above
all legal claims;
(7) That the plaintiff and the defendant do not live in the same
municipality, neither do the barangay in which they reside
adjoin one another, hence there is no need to refer the
matter for barangay conciliation.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment in his favor ordering 55 Matalino St., Quezon City
defendant to vacate the premises and to return the possession
thereof to plaintiff plus costs, and other remedies which are just SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me at Quezon City,
and proper under the premises. Philippines, this 24th day of September 1995, affiant exhibiting to
me his community tax certificate no. 12345. issued at Quezon
City, on March 12. 1995.
OPQ JOSE SANTOS
Counsel for Plaintiff Notary public Until December 31. 1995.
RST Bldg., Manila P.T.R. No. 3012 Quezon City. January 10,1995.
PTR. No. 14345
IBP OR. NO. 0321 Doc. No. 23;
Page No. 24;
VERIFICATION Book No. II;
Series of 1995.
A, herein plaintiff, upon first being duly sworn in accordance with
law, hereby depose and say that he has caused the filing of the 1994 Bar, Q. XVIII: Prepare a complaint for ejectment.
above complaint and that the allegations therein are true and
correct. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
A 6TH JUDICIAL REGION
Plaintiff BRANCH 18
ROXAS CITY
Certification of No-Forum Shopping
Josefina D. Alejandro,
1995 Bar, Q. XIV: You are the owner of a wall which separates Plaintiff,
your property from that of your neighbor. You make an opening
on the wall to allow light to enter your property and enjoy the -versus- Civil Case No. 765
view through the estate of your neighbor. For: Ejectment
Prepare a notarial prohibition to be sent to your neighbor to Roberto T. Reyes,
forbid him from doing any act which would prevent light from Defendant,
entering your property through the opening and obstruct your x------------------------x
view in order to acquire a negative easement of light and view.
COMPLAINT
To: TOMAS REYES
57 Matalino St. COMES NOW the plaintiff, by the undersigned counsel, and unto
Quezon City this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
Greetings! (1) That the plaintiff is of age and a resident of 182 C. Garcia St.,
Roxas City; while the defendant is also of age, with residence
You are hereby notified that I have made an opening on my wall and postal address at 58 Sta. Rosa St., Roxas City, where he
which separates my property from your property located at 55 may be served with summons;
Matalino St., Quezon City, to allow light to enter my property and (2) That the plaintiff is the absolute owner and lessor of that
to enjoy the view through your estate. In this connection, you are certain building located at 58 Sta. Rosa St., Roxas City, and
hereby enjoined from building or constructing anything on your now leased and occupied by the defendant;
said estate that would prevent the light from entering through the (3) That the defendant leases and occupies the said building
said opening or obstruct my view therefrom. under the express obligation of paying a rent of 15.000 a
month, payable in advance within the first five (5) days of
EDUARDO A. LOPEZ each month;
[247]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(4) That the defendant has not paid the rents for the said compelled to file this complaint engaging the services of
building for the month of July and August of the current Lorenzo U. Dy counsel in the amount of PI0,000.
year; Notary Public Until December 31. 1994
(5) That the plaintiff has several times demanded of the PTR No. 47696 Roxas City WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered
defendant to vacate the above premises and to pay his back ordering the defendant to vacate the premises to pay the unpaid
rents, now amounting to 30,000.00, the last demand for 1993 Bar, Q. VII: Prepare a hypothetical complaint for Unlawful monthly rentals in the amount of
payment having been made on him personally and in writing Detainer with complete caption. P50.000 and further rentals until the said defendant fully vacates
on September 15, 1994 or more than five days before the the premises and to pay the costs of the suit.
filing of this Complaint; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(6) That this case has been referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa. NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION Plaintiff prays for such other remedy as this Honorable Court may
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT deem just and equitable.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing, Branch I Manila
judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and ordering the Manila. Philippines. September 26. 1993.
defendant and all persons acting under him: Pedro Sison
Plaintiff, JUAN PEREZ
(a) To vacate the leased premises and surrender the same to Counsel of the Plaintiff
the plaintiff; -versus- Civil Case No. 5: No. 1 Perez Street, Manila
(b) to pay the plaintiff the sum of 30,000.00, representing the For Unlawful Detainer PTR No.
arrears of rent now overdue, with legal interest from the IBP O.R. No.
filing of this Complaint until fully paid; Juan Cruz,
(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of 15.000.00 a month from Defendant VERIFICATION
September, 1994, until he vacates the premises; and x---------------------------x
(d) to pay the costs of this suit. I, Pedro Sison, am the plaintiff who caused the above complaint to
COMPLAINT be filed and the allegations therein are true and correct.
Roxas City, this 28th day of September,1994.
Comes now the plaintiff through the undersigned counsel and to PEDRO SISON
Edward S. Lim the Honorable Court alleges;
Attorney for the Plaintiff Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of September
Buyco Bldg., Mckinley St. Roxas City (1) Plaintiff Pedro Sison, is married, Filipino citizen and residing 1993 in the City of Manila. Affiant has exhibited to me his Res.
PTR No. 472, January 30, 1994 Roxas City at No. 450 Palacio, Manila while defendant is a Filipino Cert. No. 89357 issued at Manila on Feb. 2. 1993.
IBP No. 921, January 7, 1994 Roxas City citizen, married and residing at No. 396 Mercedes Street,
Manila where he may be served with summons; JUAN PEREZ
VERIFICATION (2) That plaintiff is the owner of a land over which an apartment Notary Public My Commission expires Dec. 31. 1993
had been constructed, located at 436 Rizal Avenue, Manila;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) (3) That by virtue of a contract of lease, plaintiff leased unto the Doc. No. 1;
PROVINCE OF ROXAS ) S.S. defendant the aforesaid apartment for a consideration of Page No. 2;
ROXAS CITY ) P5.000 (Five Thousand Pesos) a month as rental to be paid Book No. 3;
within the first ten days of each month starting January 1. Series of 1993.
Josefina D. Alejandro, after being sworn in accordance with law, 1993
deposes and says: That she is the plaintiff in the above-entitled (4) That defendant failed to pay the agreed rental for several 1988 Bar, Q. XII(a): Prepare a complaint for ejectment under the
case; that she has caused the preparation of the above Complaint months starting from April 1993 up to the present; facts stated in the question immediately preceding (Question
and has read and knows the contents thereof; that the allegations (5) That on May 2. 1993, plaintiff sent a letter of demand to No. XI) for failure to pay three consecutive monthly rentals
therein are true of her own knowledge. vacate the apartment which was received by the defendant Supply the other necessary facts.
as shown in the registry return receipt hereto attached;
Josefina D. Alejandro (6) That despite said letter of demand which was repeated by COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT
oral demands defendant failed and still refused to pay the
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me, in the City of Roxas, this agreed amount of rentals and to vacate the apartment; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
28th day of September, 1994 by Josefina D. Alejandro with (7) That by reason of the failure of the defendant to vacate the Metropolitan Trial Court
Community Tax Certificate No. A-2345 issued at Roxas City on premises and to pay the unpaid rentals, plaintiff was Quezon City
January 4, 1994. Branch 1
[248]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
mental stress, suffering mental and moral damagesin an
Jesus Santos, JESUS SANTOS, after having been duly sworn in accordance with amount to be assessed by the Honorable Court;
Plaintiff, law hereby deposes: (5) That the defendant in order to defend himself from the
unfounded suit had to engage the services of counsel in the
-versus- Civil Case No. 10 That he is the plaintiff in the above entitled case for ejectment amount of P20.000.00.
For Ejectment and that all the allegations therein are true and correct.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the complaint be
OLIVIA PALPALLATOC and Quezon City, October 1, 1987. dismissed and defendant be allowed to intro-duce evidence on his
JUAN PALPALLATOC, counterclaim or menial and moral damages and to collect such
Defendants. JOSE REYES amount including attorney’s fees.
x--------------------------------x
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 1st day of October Manila, Philippines, October 1, 1990.
COMPLAINT 1987 in Quezon City, affiant having exhibited to me his Residence
Certificate No. 1423 issued in Quezon City on January 10, 1987. PERICLES SANTO
COMES NOW, the plaintiff through the undersigned counsel and Counsel for the Defendant
to either Honorable Court, respectfully alleges: BEN ROSARIO PTR OR No. 7778
Notary Public Until December 31, 1988 IBP OR No. 9784
(1) The Plaintiff is a Filipino citizen resident of 40 Luis St. While 562 Escolta, Manila
the defendants are spouses, Filipino citizens and residing at Doc. No. 5;
No. 10, Kitanlad St., Quezon City where they may be served Page No. 6; VERIFICATION
with summons; Book No. II;
(2) That on September 30, 1988 a contract of lease entered into Series of 1988 PEDRO LUZ. of legal age, after having been duly sworn, deposes
between the plaintiff leased unto the defendants a certain and says: That he is the defendant in the above¬ entitled case;
apartment for a monthly rental of P5,000.00 a month. A C. Answer with Counterclaim that he caused the preparation of the above answer; that he has
copy of said contract is hereto attached as Annex “A”; read the allegations thereof and the same are true and correct of
(3) That defendants have failed to pay the monthly rental from his own knowledge; and that the signature in the promissory note
1990 Bar, Q. IX(2): Prepare an answer as counsel for Pedro Luz
January to March 1987 in the total amount of P15,000.00; attached to the complaint and purporting to be his signature is
denying the validity and due execution of the promissory note not his signature and such signature is a forgery, he not having
(4) That despite written and oral demands, the last demand
and, if at all, alleging payment. Again omit caption and title, and executed said alleged promissory note.
having made on April 1, 1987, defendants failed and refused
use fictitious name.
to pay said rentals in arrears thereby notifying them to
vacate the apartment; WITNESS my hand this 1st day of October, 1990.
ANSWER
(5) That due to the unjustified refusal of the defendants to pay
the rental for over 3 months, the plaintiff was compelled to PEDRO LUZ
COMES NOW the defendant in the above entitled case through
file the instant suit engaging the services of counselfor the
undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully
amount of P5,000.00. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October,
alleges: 1990 at Manila, affiant exhibiting to me his Residence Certificate
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered No. 123456 issued in Manila on January 15. 1990.
(1) That he admits paragraph 1 of the complaint;
ordering the defendants to vacate the apartment and to pay the
(2) That he denies the allegations in paragraphs 2 & 3 of the
unpaid rentals starting from January 1988 until they have actually Notary Public
complaint as he never signed any promissory note in favor Until Dec. 31,1990
vacated the premises and to pay the attorney’s fees in the
of the plaintiff. IBP No. 54689issued on June 15, 1990 at Pasig
amount of P5,000.00 and costs of this suit.
(3) That he has no sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to PTR No. 98590 issued on January 20, 1990 at Manila.
the truth of the allegations in paragraph 4 of the complaint
Quezon City, September 30, 1988.
and therefore denies them. Doc. No. 25;
JOSE REYES Page No. 6;
AS COUNTERCLAIM Book No. I;
Counsel for Plaintiff
PTR No. 7755 Series of 1990
(4) That due to the filing of the entirely baseless and unjustified
January 10, 1988
complaint without any valid cause of action, defendant's
reputation was destroyed causing him sleepless nights and D. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping
VERIFICATION

[249]

Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
2010 Bar, Q. I(A): Prepare the following: Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping.
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
X, after being duly sworn, hereby deposes and states:
That he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that he has
caused the foregoing Complaint to be prepared; that he has read
the same and that the allegations of fact therein contained are
true of his personal knowledge or based on authentic documents;
That (a) he has not heretofore commenced any action of filed an
claim involving the same issued in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency, and to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; and (b) if he should thereafter
learn that the same of similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
this Honorable Court.
2005 Bar, Q. XVI: Draft a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
I, A.B., plaintiff in the above-entitled case, do hereby certify under
oath that:
(1) I have not heretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues before any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency;
(2) To the best of my knowledge, there is no such other action
or claim is pending before any other court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency; and,
(3) If I should thereafter learn that such other action has been
filed or is pending, I will report such fact to this Honorable
Court within five (5) days after learning the same.
Manila, _____, 2005.
A.B.
(Jurat)
2004 Bar, Q. X(A): A. Prepare a draft of the verification and non-
forum shopping certification that should be appended to a
complaint. Omit the signature, place, date and the jurat.
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING Plaintiff,
I, Pedro Reyes, of legal age and a resident of Manila, Philippines, -versus- Civil Case No. C-1774
after having been duly sworn, hereby depose and state:
PEDRO O. SANTOS,
That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that I have Defendant.
caused the foregoing Complaint to be prepared; that I have read X--------------------------X
the same, and the allegations therein contained are true of my
own personal knowledge or based on authentic documents. ORDER
That I further certify that I have not heretofore commenced any Issues being joined in this case, the Pre-Trial Conference under
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Circular No.
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and to the best of my 1-89 of the Supreme Court, is set for October 30. 1995, at 8:30
knowledge, no such action or claim is pending therein, and if I a.m.
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, I will report that fact within five (5) Counsels are instructed to notify their respective clients.
days therefrom to this Honorable Court.
Counsels are also reminded of the mandatory filing of Pre-Trial
1994 Bar, Q. XVI(3): Verification in a petition for certiorari. Briefs at least 3 days before the Pre-Trial date.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) SO ORDERED.
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.
Given this 24th day of September,1995 at the City of
Ricardo de Leon, after being sworn in accordance with law.
deposes and says: That he is the petitioner in the above-entitled Manila. Metro Manila.
petition: that he has caused the preparation of the above Petition
for Certiorari and has read and knows the contents thereof; that JAIME DG. RAMOS
Judge
the allegations therein are true of his own knowledge.
Ricardo de Leon Copy furnished:
Affiant
(1) Falible Law Offices Suite 303,Pacia Complex Binondo, Manila
(2) Arrieta, Samano and Valencia Rm. 777. Marilag
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, in Quezon City, this 28th
Condominium Mandaluyong City. Metro Manila
day of September, 1994 by Ricardo de Leon with Community Tax
Certificate No. A-9876 issued at Quezon City on January 7, 1994.
F. Petition for Letters Rogatory
Pedro de Guzman
Notary Public Until December 31, 1994 2010 Bar, Q. I(B): Prepare the following: Petition for Letters
Rogatory
E. Notice of Pre-Trial Conference
(caption)
1995 Bar, Q. XV: Draft a notice of pre-trial conference. PETITION FOR LETTERS ROGATORY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF, through counsel, respectfully alleges:
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (1) That the above action is pending in this court and, for the
BRANCH 7, CITY OF MANILA purpose of completing the evidence and presenting to the
court all the facts whereby a just decision can be arrived at,
JUAN DE LA CRUZ, it is necessary that the testimony of Mr. A.B., who is
[250]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
presently residing in 123 North Avenue, Vancouver, British Note: The foregoing form is the ordinary procedure but in that
Columbia, Canada, be taken; PEDRO E. SISON, incident of fire in Quezon City Hall the reconstitution was through
(2) That the said witness will be unable to go to the Philippines REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City a special administrative process to facilitate the reconstitution of
to testify in this case due to his ailment as certified to by his Respondent. thousands of titles
doctor’s sworn certificate hereto attached as Annex “A” x--------------------------x
hereof; H. Notice of Appeal
(3) That it is in the interest of justice that the testimony of the PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
aforementioned witness be taken and made part of the TITLE
evidence in this case. 2005 Bar, Q. XV: Draft a Notice of Appeal.
COMES NOW, the petitioner through undersigned counsel and to
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this court orders the this Honorable court respectfully alleges: NOTICE OF APPEAL
issuance by the clerk of this court of letters rogatory to the proper
Notice is hereby given that the defendant is hereby appealing
judicial tribunal of Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, (1) That petitioner is of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and
requesting the examination of Mr. A.B. on the written residing at 107 Malaya, Quezon City; that respondent Pedro from the judgment of this Honorable Regional Trial Court dated
_____, 2005, a copy of which was served on the defendant only
interrogatories filed herewith. Sison is the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Quezon City
Hall where he may be served with summons and other court on _____, to the Court of Appeals, on questions of fact and law.
Manila, September 6, 2010. processes; Manila, _____, 2005.
(2) That petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land
Atty. WY located at Malaya Street, Quezon City and covered by Atty. X
Counsel for the Defendant
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7984. Registry of Deeds of
Notice of Hearing Quezon City, free of any encumbrance; (Address, Attorney’s Roll no., top Membership no., PTR O.R. No.)
(3) That on June 11, 1992 the office of the Register of Deeds of
Atty. M. Quezon City was burned and all the Torrens titles in said Copy Furnished:
Counsel for the defendant office including T.C.T. No. 7984 were burned;
Atty. Y
(Address) (4) That said T.C.T. was never mortgaged or sold to anyone;
Counsel for the Plaintiff
Sir: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Register of Deeds (Address)
of Quezon City issue a reconstituted Original Title based on the
Kindly take notice that the foregoing petition will be submitted to owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title hereto attached in the name I. Preliminary Injunction
the Honorable Court on September 27, 2010, for its consideration of herein petitioner.
and resolution 2001 Bar, Q. XX: Draft a short complaint with prayer for
Quezon City, September 26. 1992. preliminary Injunction to be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Atty. WY Manila.
PEDRO CRUZ
G. Petition for Reconstitution of TCT Counsel for Petitioner REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
P.T.R. No. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
I.B.P. O.R. NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
1992 Bar, Q. XIII: Prepare a petition for reconstitution of the
original copy of TCT No. 9213645 in the name of Lina Ochoa BRANCH ___, CITY OF MANILA
SUBSCRIBES AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of
which was burned when the Office of the Registry of Deeds of September by JUAN PEREZ, exhibiting to me his Residence
Quezon City was razed to the ground on June 11, 1992. A,
Certificate No. 12346 issued at Quezon City on 4 January 1992. Plaintiff,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES JUAN CRUZ
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION -versus- Civil Case No. ___
Notary Public until December 31, 1992
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 1, QUEZON CITY B,
Doc. No. ___ Defendant,
Page No. ___ x---------------------x
JUAN V. PEREZ, Book No. ___
Petitioner,
Series of 1992 COMPLAINT
-versus-
[251]

Plaintiff, through counsel, alleges that:
(1) Plaintiff is of legal age and a resident of No. ___, C.M. Recto
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila while defendant is of legal age and
a resident of No. ___, Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila, where
he may be served with summons.
(2) Plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land situated at Rizal
Avenue, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
28699 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, and more
particularly described in said certificate of title as follows:
(Technical Description)
(3) Defendant is the owner of a lot, also at Rizal Avenue, Manila,
adjoining the aforementioned lot of Plaintiff;
(4) On or about 02 January 2001, defendant started
construction of a building in his lot, but the said construction
has encroached into the lot of the plaintiff by about three
(3) meters along the whole extension of the boundary line
between the two lots;
(5) The said construction by the defendant continues at present
despite protests and objections of the plaintiff, and
defendant has refused to vacate the plaintiff’s property,
notwithstanding the demands of the plaintiff;
(6) The continuance of the construction during the pendency of
the present litigation will not only cause injustice and great
and irreparable injury to the plaintiff, but and will also
complicate aggravate, and multiply the issues of this case;
(7) Plaintiff is willing to post a bond in such amount as may be
fixed by this Honorable Court, for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant and all
persons under him from continuing with his construction
inside the plaintiff is lot during the pendency of this case;
(8) Since plaintiff and defendant are residents of different
barangays, prior resort to the Lupong Tagapamavapa is not
required.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered:
(1) Upon the filing of a bond by the plaintiff in such amount as
this Honorable Court may fix, a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued enjoining the defendant and all persons under him
from doing further work in the construction of his building
within the plaintiff is property during the pendency of this
case.
(2) After trial, making the injunction above- mentioned
permanent, and ordering the defendant to remove all the
posts and other construction within the plaintiff is lot, and
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
upon the defendant failure to do so, authorizing plaintiff to REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
order said removal at defendant’s expense. NATIONAL CAPITALREGION
(3) Ordering defendant to pay the costs of the suit. BRANCH 91, QUEZON CITY
Plaintiff prays for other measures of relief that are just and BAYAD-AGAD INSURANCE CO.,
equitable under the premises. Plaintiff,
Place, Date. -versus- Civil Case No. 10023
For: Interpleader
Atty. X
Counsel for the Plaintiff NORA IMPIS and
(Address) LENNY IMPIS,
(IBP/PTR OR Nos. Place & Date of Issue) Defendants.
X-------------------------------------X
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
COMPLAINT
A, after being duly sworn, hereby depose and states:
PLAINTIFF, through counsel, alleges:
(1) That he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that he has
caused the foregoing complaint to be prepared; that he has (1) That plaintiff. BAYAD-AGAD INSURANCE CO. is an insurance
read the same and all the allegations of fact therein company, duly authorized and existing under the laws of the
contained are true and correct of his personal knowledge. Republic of the Philippines, with principal office at B_A.I.
(2) That he hereby certifies that (a) he has not heretofore Bldg., Quezon Ave., Quezon City and defendants NORA
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same IMPIS and LENNY IMPIS, both of legal age, Filipino, and
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, (b) to residents of 35 Masikap St. Quezon City, and 25 Matalino St.
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is Quezon City, respectively;
pending therein, and (c) if he should thereafter learn that (2) That on June 15, 1993, Resty Impis took a life insurance
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is policy for P2 Million from the plaintiff and that the primary
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days beneficiary designated is simply “wife";
therefrom to this Honorable Court. (3) That said Resty Impis died intestate on July 1, 1995;
(4) That both defendants, claiming to be the wife of Resty Impis,
Place, Date. filed their respective claims with the insurance company;
(5) That plaintiff is ready, willing and able to pay the proceeds
(Sgd.) A of such insurance policy; however, it has no means of
knowing definitely to whom as to the two defendants,
(Jurat) payment should be made;
(6) That defendants should Interplead and litigate their
J. Interpleader conflicting claims to the insurance proceeds.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment issue:
1995 Bar, Q. XII: In a life insurance company for P2 Million issued
by Bayad-Agad Insurance Company (BAYAD-AGAD) to insured
(1) Ordering defendants to interplead and litigate their
Resty Impis, the primary beneficiary designated is simply “wife". conflicting claims between them.
After Resty Impis died, Nora Impis and Lenny Impis, each
(2) Ordering the payment of the life insurance proceeds to this
claiming to be the wife of Resty, filed their respective claims for Court, and considering said payment as made to whomever
the insurance proceeds. BAYAD-AGAD is at a loss as to whom to of the defendants is entitled to the same.
pay and decides to bring the matter to court. (3) Ordering costs and other fees to the defendants.
Draft the necessary pleading as counsel for BAYAD-AGAD.
Quezon City, September 24, 1995.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
[252]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
Mercado and Associates ATTESTATION CLAUSE BRANCH I, MANILA
Counsel for Plaintiff
Magnum Towers, Ortigas Centre We, the undersigned attesting witnesses, whose residence SP. Proceedings No. 1
Pasig, Metro Manila addresses are stated after our names, do hereby certify that the
PTR OR No. 17243 Pasig. M.M. January 10. 1995 testator Alexander Magno has on this date published to us the PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
IBP OR No. 0676 Pasig, M.M., March 21, 1995 foregoing instrument, consisting of four (4) pages, including this PAQUITO PAMINTUAN, ALMA PAMINTUAN PETITIONER
page, numbered correlatively in letters at the top of each page, as
his Last Will and Testament, and he signed the same at the end COMES NOW, the petitioner through undersigned counsel in the
Legal Forms in Special Proceedings
and on every page thereof, and we, in turn, at his request, signed above entitled petition and to this Honorable Court respectfully
the same and every page thereof in the presence of the said alleges:
A. Affidavit of Self-Adjudication testator and of each other.
(1) That petitioner is a Filipino citizen residing at No. 4 Taft
2006 Bar, Q. XVII: Draft an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the We further certify that this Attestation Clause is in English, a Avenue, Manila and the widow of the deceased PAQUITO
estate of a deceased person (Exclude the jurat) language known to us. PAMINTUAN;
(2) That on December 1, 1987, PAQUITO PAMIN¬TUAN died in
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) Signatures: the Philippine General Hospital, Manila where he last
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S. resided;
JOSE MERCADO _____ (3) That on September 30, 1987 he executed a holographic will
AFFIDAVIT OF SELF-ADJUDICATION GREGORIO LUNA _____ in his own handwriting in English known to him. A copy of
PERFECTO SOLIS _____ said holographic will is hereto attached as Annex “A”, as his
I, _____, of legal age, single and a resident of Manila after having last will and testament;
been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and 1988 Bar, Q. XIII(a): Don Paquito Pamintuan, with a wife (Alma) (4) That said will soon can be attested to as the handwritingof
state: and a son (Casimiro), asks you to draft a holographic will for him the testator by Juan Cruz, who was his private secretary for
so that in his own handwriting he can copy it and thus avoid a period of 17 years;
(1) That _____, a resident of _____, died on September 1, 2006, payment of attorney’s fees. (5) That the deceased left only two properties namely a lot and
without a last will and testament; house located at Taft Avenue and an apartment located at
(2) That I am the sole heir of the said deceased, being his only Make a draft of a holographic will. Supply the necessary facts Remedios Street, Manila;
child by his wife who has predeceased him; but use the alphabet for other necessary names. (6) That he left as his only heirs the herein petitioner as his
(3) That the said deceased left real and personal properties widow and his son Casimiro both of whom are residing at
consisting of his house and lot located at Manila, and HOLOGRAPHIC WILL No. 4, Taft Avenue, Manila;
covered by TCT No. _____ of the Register of Deeds of (7) That the deceased left no debts.
Manila, and personal belongings found in the said house; Manila, Philippines September 30, 1987
(4) That the said deceased left no debts; WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due notice and
(5) That, wherefore, I hereby adjudicate all of the above- I hereby execute this holographic will in my handwriting and in publication this Honorable Court fix the date for the probate of
described properties of the deceased to myself as his sole the English language which I know how to read and write said holographic will and that letters of administration be issued
heir. bequeathing my lot and house located at No. 4 Taft Avenue, in favor of the herein petitioner and thereafter adjudicate the
Manila to my son CASIMIRO PAMINTUAN; my apartment located properties of the deceased in accordancewith the said
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. at 4 Remedios Street, Manila to my wife, ALMA PAMINTUAN. holographic will.

Manila, September, ___, 2006. (Sgd.) PAQUITO PAMINTUAN Manila, January 7, 1988

Affiant JUAN CRUZ

C. Petition for Probate Counsel for the Petitioner
(jurat) PTR No. 7890
1988 Bar, Q. XIII(b): Draft a petition for the probate of Don IBP OR No. 17987
Paquito Pamintuan’s will. January 5, 1988
B. Attestation Clause of Notarial Will
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VERIFICATION
2004 Bar, Q. X(B): Prepare a complete draft of an attestation NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
clause of a notarial will. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

[253]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
I, ALMA PAMINTUAN, after having been duly sworn to in Hall, Quezon City, where he may be served with summons Petitioner
accordance with law hereby state that I am the petitioner in the and other court processes;
above entitled petition, that the allegations wherein is true and (2) That on August 30, 1992 Major R Solar of the PNP, Quezon SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of
correct. City while holding office was arrested by superior police September 1992 at Quezon City, affiant having exhibited to me
authorities for alleged participation in a robbery with her Residence Certificate No. 52789, issued at Quezon City on
PONCIANO CRUZ homicide in Quezon City; January 4. 1992.
Notary Public until December 31, 1988 (3) That since then Major R Solar was detained at the Police
Sub-Station 5, Quezon City, without any formal charge filed P. SOLIVEN
Doc. No 5; against him; Notary Public Until December 31, 1992
Page No. 7; (4) That Major R Solar had not participated in the alleged
Book No. 2; robbery with homicide hence his arrest and detention is Doc. No. ___
Series of 1988 without any lawful cause; Page No. ___
(5) That Major R Solaris restrained of his liberty without due Book No. ___
process of law. Series of 1992
D. Habeas Corpus
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed E. Habeas Data
1992 Bar, Q. XII: Prepare a petition for habeas corpus on behalf that this Honorable Court:
of Major Solar who has been arrested by superior police
authorities and detained at the Police Sub-Station 5 of Quezon (1) order respondent and/or his agents to appear before this 2010 Bar, Q. XVIII(B): Draft a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
City since August 30, 1992 for participation in a robbery with of Habeas Data.
Honorable Court and produce Major R Solar and forthwith
homicide case. explain why he should not be released from detention
Republic of the Philippines
immediately;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (2) declare his arrest and detention as invalid and un- (Court)
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION constitutional.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS DATA, JUAN
BRANCH I, QUEZON CITY Petitioner further prays for such other relief and remedy as this DE LA CRUZ,
Petitioner,
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable.
IN THE MATTER OF THE
APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS Quezon City, Philippines. -versus- SP. Proc. No. ____
IN BEHALF OF MAJOR R SOLAR
September 26, 1992. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
MARY SOLAR, and THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPINE NATIONAL
Petitioner, CRUZ Law Office POLICE,
by: J. CRUZ Respondents.
-versus - x--------------------------x
PTR No.
IBP receipt no.
JOSE CRUZ, Superintendent, PETITION
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, VERIFICATION
Respondent. PETITIONER, through undersigned counsel, respectfully alleges;
x--------------------------------------------x Mary Solar after having been duly sworn in accordance with law
hereby states: (1) That petitioner is of legal age and a resident of Balanga,
PETITION Bataan, while respondents are likewise of legal age and may
That she is the petitioner in the above-entitled case; be served with summons at their offices at Camp Emilio
Comes now the petitioner, by her undersigned counsel and to this Aguinaldo and Camp Crame, respectively, EDSA, Quezon
Honorable Court respectfully states: That she has caused the filing of the petition and the contents City;
thereof are true and correct. (2) That, on or about March 1, 2010, allegedly on the basis of
(1) That petitioner of legal age, Filipino citizen, is the wife of intelligence reports, elements of the Armed Forces of the
Major R SOLAR residing at 177 Mayon, Quezon City; that Quezon City, 23. September, 1992. Philippine National Police, without any warrant of arrest,
respondent is the incumbent Superintendent of the apprehended the petitioner and 42 others while they were
Philippine National Police, Quezon City with office at City peacefully attending a seminar on rural health at Morong,
MARY SOLAR
Bataan.
[254]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
(3) That, ever since that date, March 1, 2010, until the present, 2002 Bar, Q. XVI: Prepare a motion for extension of time to file 2009 Bar, Q. X: Given the same facts in No. IX above, assume
the petitioner is under detention by the military and the an answer to a complaint in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, that summons had been served on Jamero, but no responsive
police on the basis of the alleged intelligence reports. Manila. For purposes of this pleading, your name is Pedro Cruz. pleading was filed within the reglamentary period.
(4) That the petitioner had repeatedly asked the respondents to Supply the other hypothetical data. Omit proof of service and
show him the alleged intelligence reports so that he can notice of hearing. Prepare a motion to declare Jamero in default.
defend himself, but until the present, the respondents have
failed and/or refused to comply with the said request of the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
petitioner. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
(5) That, to the best of the knowledge of the petitioner, the said NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
intelligence reports are in the abovementioned offices of the BRANCH 3, MANILA BRANCH___, MANILA
respondents.
JUAN DE LA CRUZ, ALEXANDER SISON
WHEREFORE, is it respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, a Plaintiff, Plaintiff,
writ of Habeas Data be issued ordering the respondents to
disclose and/or furnish copies thereof to the petitioner, the -versus- Civil Case No. 12345 -versus- Civil Case No. ___
alleged intelligence reports which are the basis of his continued
unlawful detention. PEDRO DE GUZMAN, JUAN JAMIRO,
Defendant. Defendant.
Place and date. x---------------------------x x------------------------------x

Counsel for the Petitioner. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER MOTION TO DECALRE IN DEFAULT

(Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping) PLAINTIFF, through undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Court PLAINTIFF, through undersigned counsel, through this Honorable
respectfully alleges: Court respectfully alleges:
F. Arbitration Clause
(1) That defendant was served with summons and a copy of the (1) That on September ___, 2009, defendant was served with
complaint on September 19, 2002 and, consequently, has summons and a copy of the Complaint;
2007 Bar, Q. X: Prepare an arbitration clause to be included in a only up to October 4, 2002 within which to file an Answer; (2) That the reglamentary period for the defendant to file an
contract. (2) That the undersigned counsel has started to prepare the Answer or motion to dismiss expired on _____, without the
Answer but unfortunately, due to pressure of work in defendant filing any such answer or motion.
A: Any dispute that may arise between the parties hereto attending to other equally important cases; he will need (3) That defendant may now be declared in default.
concerning the interpretation of this contract and/or on the additional time, of 15 days from October 4, 2002, to
rights, duties or liabilities of any party arising hereunder, shall be complete and file the same; WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the defendant be
exclusively referred to arbitration by a committee of three (3) (3) That, his motion is being Filed solely for the foregoing declared in default and the plaintiff be allowed to present his
arbitrators. Each party shall nominate one arbitrator and the two reason and not for purposes of delay. evidence ex-parte.
so nominated shall choose the third arbitrator. If they cannot
agree on the third arbitrator within sixty (60) days from the date WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that defendant be given an Manila, _____, 2009.
that the last of them was nominated, the Executive Judge of the extension of time, of 15 days from October 4, 2002 within which
Regional Trial Court of Manila shall be asked to appoint such third to file an Answer to the Complaint ATTY. _____
arbitrator. Any decision of the Arbitration Committee shall be Counsel for the Plaintiff
final, enforceable and binding on the parties. Manila, September 21, 2002. (address)
Attorney’s Roll No. ___
Motions PEDRO CRUZ Date _____
(Counsel for the Defendant) PTR No. _____, Place/ Date of issue
I. Motions in Civil Cases (address) IBP O.R. No. _____
(PTR & IBP OR Nos.) Date/ Place issued _____
MCLE Cert. No. _____
A. Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer
B. Motion to Declare Defendant in Default Email address: _____

NOTICE OF HEARING

[255]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, on this 29th day of while the defendant is a resident of Caloocan City. Hence, venue
Mr. Juan Jamero September 1996 in Manila, affiant exhibited to me his CTC No. has been improperly laid.
222 Juan Luna St., Tondo 43210 issued at Manila on Feb. 1, 1996.
Manila WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the complaint be
CD dismissed.
Sir: Notary Public
My commission expires on Dec. 31, 1996 Quezon City, September 23, 2002.
Notice is hereby given that on _____, at 8:30 a.m., the foregoing
motion will be submitted to the Honorable Court for its Doc. No. ___; PEDRO CRUZ
consideration and resolution. Page No. ___; Counsel for the Defendant
Book No. ___; (address)
ATTY. _____ Series of 1996 (PTR & IBPOR Nos.)
Counsel for Plaintiff
D. Motion to Dismiss Atty. ____ (By personal service)
Counsel for the Plaintiff
C. Motion to Lift Order of Default and For New Trial
(address)
2002 Bar, Q. XVIII: Prepare a motion to dismiss an action for a
1996 Bar, Q. XII(3): For failure to file an answer within the sum of money in the RTC, Branch 1, Quezon City on the ground Sir:
reglementary period, defendant L was declared in default. of improper venue. Supply the other hypothetical facts and use
Plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and thereafter, Judge G Pedro Cruz as your name. Please be notified that on October 11, 2002, at 8:30 a.m. or as
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff. soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, the undersigned
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES counsel will submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court
As counsel for defendant L, draft the appropriate motion to REGIONAL TRIAL COURT for its consideration and resolution.
restore L’s standing in court. NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 1, QUEZON CITY
PEDRO CRUZ
MOTION TO LIFT ORDER OF DEFAULT AND FOR NEW TRIAL Counsel for the Defendant
JUAN DE LA CRUZ,
COMES NOW, L, defendant in the above-entitled case through the Plaintiff,
1988 Bar, Q. XII(b): Prepare a motion to dismiss the complaint
undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully
-versus- Civil Case No. ___ referred to in (a) hereof on two legal grounds.
alleges:
For: Sum of Money
REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES
(1) That the summons issued by this court was served in an
PEDRO PATERNO, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
address which was not the correct address of the defendant
Defendant. NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
as he is now living in another city which is No. 5 San Andres,
x-----------------------------x BRANCH 1, QUEZON CITY
Manila:
(2) That the defendant was not duly informed about said
MOTION TO DISMISS JESUS SANTOS,
complaint against him, hence, he was not able to file the
Plaintiff,
answer;
(3) That if properly served with the summons he will file his DEFENDANT, through undersigned counsel, to this Honorable
Court respectfully moves for the dismissal of the complaint in the -versus- Civil Case No. ___
answer and has a good and valid defense.
above-entitled case on the ground that VENUE HAS BEEN For: Ejectment
WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully prays the order of default IMPROPERLY LAID.
OLIVIA PALPALLATOC and
issued by this Honorable Court be lifted and he be allowed to file
ARGUMENT JUAN PALPALLATOC,
his answer and a new trial be held.
Defendants.
The Rules of Court provide that a complaint in a civil case x-------------------------------x
AB
Counsel for Plaintiff cognizable by the Regional Trial Court should be filed in the RTC of
the place where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the MOTION TO DISMISS
PTR No. 579, February 1. 1996
IBP No. 261, February 1. 1996 option of the plaintiff. The complaint in the above-entitled case
expressly alleges that the plaintiff is a resident of Makati City

[256]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
COMES NOW, the defendants through undersigned counsel in the 1994 Bar, Q. XX: Prepare a motion for consolidation of two cases
above entitled case to this Honorable Court respectfully move to filed in different divisions of the Court of Appeals. Atty. Jorge Villareal
dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: Counsel for the Appellee
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES S-304, ITC Building 337 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue
(1) That the claim or demand for rentals from January to March COURT OF APPEALS Makati, Metro Manila
1988 have been paid; FOURTH DIVISION
(2) That the complaint does not state a sufficient cause of MANILA F. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
action.
Juan de la Cruz,
1989 Bar, Q. XIV: You are the lawyer of the plaintiff in a
ARGUMENTS Plaintiff-Appellee,
collection case. The defendant, in his answer, admitted the
material allegations of your complaint.
(1) That the rentals for the months of January to March 1987, -versus- C.A.-G.R. C.V. No. 675
have been tendered to the plaintiff as shown in the checks
Prepare a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Omit Caption
sent to him by registered mail but plaintiff refused them on Pedro Ramos,
and Title. Assume all necessary details. Do not use your name.
the pretext that he was raising the amount of rentals to Defendant-Appellant.
P10,000 a month. x---------------------------x
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
(2) That the complaint states no sufficient cause of action since
the demand have been deemed to be satisfied. MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION
COMES NOW the plaintiff through the undersigned counsel in the
above entitled case and to this Honorable Court respectfully
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the complaint be Defendant-Appellant Pedro Ramos, through the undersigned
alleges:
dismissed with costs against the plaintiff. counsel, to the Honorable Court respectfully states:
(1) That on September 1, 1989, plaintiff filed a complaint for
Quezon City, October 10, 1988. (1) That this case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
sum of money in the amount of P50,000.00 against the
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 2345 for recovery of
defendant;
ESTEBAN CRUZ possession of a parcel of land.
(2) That in his answer, defendant admitted the obligation, but
Counsel for Defendants (2) That herein defendant-appellant is the appellee, and the
that he was asking for an extension of time to pay his
PTR No. 7999 plaintiff-appellee is the appellant in a pending appeal before
obligation and instead the herein complaint was filed;
IBP OR No. 7999 the Fifth Division of this Honorable Court entitled Pedro
(3) That said answer admits the material allegations of the
Ramos vs. Jose Santos. CA GR CV No. 567 which is an appeal
complaint and has not tendered any issue;
NOTICE OF HEARING from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in an
(4) That in view thereof, a judgment on the pleadings can be
action for quieting of title over the same property subject
rendered.
Atty. Jose Perez matter of this case.
Samanillo Building (3) That the same question of ownership is involved in these
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court
Escolta, Manila two cases.
render judgment on the pleadings.
(4) That in order to avoid different decisions from two divisions
Please be notified that the foregoing motion to dismiss will be set of this Honorable Court, this case should be consolidated
Manila, Philippines, September 24, 1989.
for hearing on October 7, 1988at 9:00 A.M. or as soon as counsel with CAGR CV No. 567, which bears the lowercase number.
may be heard.
MANUEL PEREZ
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be
Counsel for Plaintiff
ESTEBAN CRUZ consolidated with CA GR CV No. 567.
32 Melvar, Manila
Counsel for Defendants
PTR No. 7999 Manila, Philippines, September 28, 1994.
NOTICE OF HEARING
IBP OR No. 7999
Arthur A. Ocampo
To: Atty. Pedro Cruz
Copy served to: Counsel for Appellant
261 R. Hidalgo, Manila
Atty. Jose Perez 54 Juan Luna St., Manila
Counsel of Plaintiff IBP No. 987 Issued on Jan. 3,1994 at Manila
Please be notified that the foregoing motion is set for hearing on
PTR No. 456 Issued on Jan. 5, 1994 at Manila
Friday, September 29, 1981 at 8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as
E. Motion for Consolidation of Cases counsel may be heard.
Copy furnished:

[257]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
MANUEL PEREZ P15.000.00 for her sustenance during the pendency of the For: Violation of City Ordinance No. 5
instant case.
Copy furnished: ELEONOR LEE,
Atty. Pedro Cruz WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Defendant.
261 R. Hidalgo, Manila Court that the defendant be ordered to give the plaintiff a x------------------------------------x
monthly support pendente lite of P15,000.00 to be paid at
plaintiff’s residence on or before the 10th day of each month. MOTION TO QUASH
G. Motion for Support Pendente Lite
Place, Date. COMES NOW the Accused through undersigned counsel in the
2001 Bar, Q. XVIII: Draft a motion for support pendente lite to be above-entitled case and to this Honorable Court, respectfully
filed in your client's pending case in the Regional Trial Court of Atty. Z moves to quash the Information filed by the Fiscal of Manila on
Pasay City. Counsel for Plaintiff the ground that:
(IBP/PTR OR Nos. Place & Date of Issue)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OF THE CASE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (Notice of Hearing)
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION ARGUMENT
BRANCH ___, PASAY CITY Atty. A
Counsel for the Plaintiff City Ordinance No. 5 imposes a maximum penalty of 6 months
WIFE, (Address) imprisonment and P1, 000 fine which is within the exclusive
Plaintiff, jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.
Sir:
-versus- Civil Case No. 00-00000 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the information be
Please take note that on______________ ,2001at a.m., the quashed and the Accused be released immediately from
HUSBAND, undersigned counsel will submit the foregoing motion to the detention.
Defendant. Honorable Court for its consideration and resolution.
x----------------------x Manila, Philippines, October 1, 1990.
Atty. Z
MOTION FOR SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE JUAN TAMAD
II. Motions in Criminal Cases Counsel for the Accused
Plaintiff through counsel, respectfully states that: PTO No. 77756
IBP No. 57789
(1) On 01 June 2001, plaintiff filed the complaint in the above A. Motion to Quash 562 Escolta St., Manila
entitled case praying, among others, that defendant be
ordered to give plaintiff a monthly support. 1990 Bar, Q. X: The prosecutor charged Eleonor Lee with NOTICE OF HEARING
(2) As alleged in the complaint, defendant and plaintiff are violating a city ordinance before the RTC of Manila, Br. 47.
husband and wife, having been legally married on 08 Eleonor Lee’s lawyer, Atty. Mayko Liwanag seeks to quash the The Clerk of Court
December 1996 at the Our Lady of Sorrows Church, Pasay information on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over Regional Trial Court of Manila
City. A certified true copy of their marriage contract is the offense charged. Branch 47
hereto attached as Annex "A", hereof.
(3) As also alleged in the complaint, defendant has abandoned Prepare a motion to quash. Please set the foregoing Motion to Quash for hearing on Friday,
the conjugal home on 24 January 1998 without justifiable October 5,1990 at 9;00A.M. or as soon as counsel may be heard.
cause or reason, and since then defendant has failed to give REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
any support to the plaintiff. NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION JUAN TAMAD
(4) The plaintiff is without any source of income as shown by REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
her affidavit attached hereto as Annex "B" hereof, whereas BRANCH 47, MANILA Copy Furnished:
the defendant is a medical doctor actively engaged in the
practice of his profession with an average monthly income PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, City Prosecutor
of P80,000.00 more or less. Plaintiff. City Hall, Manila
(5) Considering the present prices of essential commodities,
plaintiff needs a monthly allowance and support of -versus- Criminal Case No. ___

[258]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
1988 Bar, Q. XIV(b): Fiscal Bartolo filed an information for the PEDRO SISON MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT
crime of theft of a Rolex Watch valued at P50,000.00 against Counsel of Accused
Jose Pobre, an 11 year old orphan, with no known address, with PTR No.___ COMES NOW the defendant through undersigned counsel and to
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. You are the counsel for IBP No.___ this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
Jose Pobre. Draft a motion to quash the information.
NOTICE OF HEARING (1) That the above entitled case was set for trial on December
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 17, 1987 at 8:30 A.M.;
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION Fiscal J. Bartolo (2) That the undersigned counsel had to attend a business
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT Office of the City Fiscal meeting on December 17, 1987 which was previously set;
BRANCH I, MANILA Manila (3) That his presence in said meeting is indispensable, hence,
will not be able to attend the trial on said date,
MOTION TO QUASH Please be notified that the foregoing motion to quash is set on (4) That this request for postponement of the hearing is not for
Friday, Sept. 9,1988 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereof as counsel the purpose of delaying the trial of the case.
COMES NOW the accused Jose Pobre through undersigned may be heard.
counsel and to this Honorable Court in the above entitled case WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the hearing on
respectfully moves to quash the information for the crime of theft PEDRO SISON December 17, 1987 be postponed to another day at the
on the grounds that: convenience of this Honorable Court.
Copy furnished:
(1) IT CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH, IF TRUE, WOULD Fiscal Bartolo Manila, December 4, 1987.
CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION. Office of the City Fiscal
(2) THAT THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OF THE CASE. Manila XYZ
ARGUMENT Counsel for the Defendant
III. Other Motions
The information alleges that the accused Jose Pobre is eleven NOTICE OF HEARING
years old with no known address. Under Article 12, paragraph 3 of
A. Motion for Postponement Atty. Conrado Juez
the Revised Penal Code, a person over nine years of age and
under fifteen unless he acted with discernment is exempt from Counsel for the Plaintiff
criminal liability. 1987 Bar, Q. XII: You represent the defendant in a civil case 37 Calamba, Quezon City
pending in Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 299. It is now
Moreover, there is no allegation that the accused acted with December 8, 1987 and the case is set for trial for December 17, a Please be notified that the foregoing motion for postponement is
discernment. Even granting that he had acted with discernment, Thursday; but because of a previously set business meeting in set for hearing and for the consideration of the Honorable Court
such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article which your presence is indispensable, you want to postpone the on December 10, 1967 at 8:30 A.M.
80 of the Revised Penal Code. court hearing set for December 17. Prepare a complete motion
for postponement. XYZ
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code provides among others that a
minor unless sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Copy served on
a grave or less grave felony. The court shall suspend the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
proceedings and shall commit such minor or to the custody or NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION Atty. Conrado Juez
case of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution BRANCH 299, MANILA 37 Calamba, Quezon City
established under the law for the care or education of orphaned,
homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the case and PEDRO CRUZ, B. Motion for Inhibition/Disqualification
custody of any other responsible person in any other place Plaintiff,
subject to the visitation of the Director of Social Welfare.
-versus- Civil Case No. 10 2001 Bar, Q. XVII: Draft a motion to disqualify the Judge from
For: Sum of Money hearing your client's case
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the instant information
be dismissed and the accused be immediately be released for
JUAN PEREZ, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
detention.
Defendant. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
x------------------x NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
Manila, September 2,1988.
BRANCH ___, MANILA

[259]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)
A REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Plaintiff, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION Copies Furnished by Personal Delivery:
BRANCH ___, MANILA
-versus- Civil Case No. 00-00000 Atty. Y
A.B., (address)
B. Plaintiff,
Defendant. Mr. A.B.
x---------------------x -versus- Civil Case No. ___ (address)

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION/INHIBITION C.D., Legal Forms in Commercial Law

Defendant.
Defendant, by undersigned counsel, respectfully moves and prays x--------------------------x
Negotiable Promissory Note
that the Honorable Presiding Judge of this Court be disqualified
and/or inhibit himself from presiding over this case, on the MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL
ground that Atty. T, counsel of the Plaintiff herein, is his first 1994 Bar, Q. XVII: Prepare a negotiable promissory note.
cousin, a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity, which COMES NOW the undersigned counsel for the plaintiff and to this
is a mandatory ground for disqualification/inhibition pursuant to Honorable Court respectfully alleges: City of Manila, September 28,1994
Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
(1) That he has recently suffered a mild stroke, and his present 6,000.00
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable physical and condition renders it difficult for him to carry out
Presiding Judge disqualify or inhibit himself from presiding over his employment effectively. Thirty (30) days after date, I. Arturo M. Padilla, hereby promise to
these proceedings. (2) That he has tried to get the conformity of his client but the pay to the order of Milagros Concepcion, the sum of six thousand
latter refuses to give the same. WHEREFORE, it is (6,000.00) Pesos (Philippine Currency).
Place, Date. respectfully prayed that the undersigned counsel be granted
leave to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiff. (Sgd.) Arturo M. Padilla
Atty. Z
Counsel for Defendant Manila, _____, 2005. Board Resolutions
(IBP/PTR OR Nos. Place A Date of Issue)
X
1987 Bar, Q. XIII(a): Prepare the necessary resolutions to be
(Notice of Hearing) Counsel for the Plaintiff
adopted by a company’s stockholders, to effect: an increase in
(address)
the number of directors, from five to seven. Supply such other
Atty. A Attorney’s Roll No. ___,
data that in your opinion would be necessary to include in such
Counsel for the Plaintiff IBP Membership No. ___,
resolutions.
(Address) PTR O.R. No. ___)
XYZ CORPORATION
Sir: NOTICE OF HEARING
Resolution No. 2
Please take note that on _____,2001 at a.m., the undersigned To: A.B.
Series of 1987
counsel will submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court
for its consideration and resolution. Atty. Y
WHEREAS, in a meeting called for the purpose, wherein all
Counsel for the Defendant
stockholders were duly notified in accordance with law, the
Atty. Z meeting of stockholders representing 90% of the
Counsel for Defendant Gentlemen:
subscribed and paid capital stock was held on November, 1987 in
principal office of the XYZ Corporation.
Notice is hereby given that on _____, 2005, at 8:30 a.m. or as
C. Motion To Withdraw as Counsel
soon thereafter as the matter may beheard, the undersigned
WHEREAS, during said meeting presided by AC President of the
counsel will submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court
2005 Bar, Q. XIII(c): Draft a withdrawal of counsel without said corporation by a vote of stockholders representing more than
for its consideration and resolution.
conformity of client. 2/3 of the subscribed and paid up capital stock voted to amend
the Articles of Incorporation by increasing the number of board of
X
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES directors from five to seven.
[260]
 Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises (based on Pineda and Funa)
Vanguardia, A.M. (updated 3 May 2018)

WHEREAS, the stockholders have resolved to submit the said

amendments for approval of the Security and Exchange
Commission;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto attest to the approval of

said Resolution.

JPC
Secretary of the Corporation

Attested:

PV
President

AMENDED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF THE XYZ

CORPORATION

WHEREAS, in a meeting of the stockholders of the corporation

called for the purpose on November 2, 1987 in the provincial
office of the XYZ Corporation in Manila by a vote representing
more than 2/3 of the subscribed and paid- up capital stock of said
corporation, Article 5 of the Articles of Incorporation is hereby
amended to read:

“5. That the number of Board of Directors shall be seven (7)…

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I JPC, Secretary of the Corporation attest

to the approval of said resolution.

JP
Secretary of the Corporation

Attested:

PV
President

[261]