SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
titute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch
18, RTC, Bulacan
FACTS: Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who
became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New
York, U.S.A and lived there with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16;
and Josephine, 14.
Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all
the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
"wheresoever situated". In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael
G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will
and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Four
days later, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament
containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they
were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed
separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the
County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to
probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner
herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the
two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked
that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased
couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. She
contends she is the sole heir of her daughter. RTC of Bulacan decided in the
petitioner’s favor.
Repondent judhe held that the motion holding that to allow the probate of two
wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and
established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He
pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first
submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings"
Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986,
citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party
that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically
the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their
respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy
determination of the proceedings"
ISSUE: Whether evidence sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New
York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings
HELD:
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens,
will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect
in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have
been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution
of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his
domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has
been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal
is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on
the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules
on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be
interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for
the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach.
Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." In the case at
bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills
contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint
probate.
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in
the delay in the administration of justice.
But, essentially, the rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of
a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2)
means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated
as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first
time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which
require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the
executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of
the time and place for proving the wills.
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA
vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON
FACTS: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard)
were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years.
They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979,
Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard,
who was also designated as executor. The will was admitted to probate
before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named
James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his
appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of
the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.
Thereafter, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent)
with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then CFI of Rizal
Proceeding No. 9625. As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1)
Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili
Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati
property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance
of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00.
Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the
Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha
or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law
Offices, as ancillary administrator.
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial
court in its Order.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also
filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the
Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated
to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground
that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee
the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the
annulment of the RTC Orders. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause
and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite
the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA
ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the
decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed
Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found
that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with
Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s
adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner
contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition
before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate
succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests
of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive
their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was
annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside. no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the
applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud
HELD:
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of
Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder,
states:
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that
the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and
Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the
project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced
respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati
property.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of
his duties as an official of the court.

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court

shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be
disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate
upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants
of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action

appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the
resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a
circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow
the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders
without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as
ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption
that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession.
Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally