EJECTMENT-OWNERSHIP ISSUE

Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. — When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession. (4a)

All, or both Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of possession as co-owners. Neither party
can exclude the other from possession. Although the property remains unpartitioned, the respondents in fact possess specific
areas. Teodoro Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area, which is that which was possessed by Petra. Teodoro Teodoro
cannot be dispossessed of such area, not only by virtue of Petra's bequeathal in his favor but also because of his own right of
possession that comes from his co-ownership of the property. As the RTC concluded, petitioners, as heirs substituting Teodoro.
(Teodoro vs Espino, G.R. No. 189248 February 5, 2014)

Section 17. Judgment. — If after trial court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for:
1 the restitution of the premises,
2 the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
3 attorney's fees and costs.

If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs
as justice requires. (6a)

Section 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. — The judgment rendered in
an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting
title to the land or building.
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted
by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)

As such, the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction ,was not limited to the errors assigned in the petitioner’s appeal
memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. (Macaslang vs Zamora, G.R. No. 156375 May 30,
2011)

Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made immediately executory to
avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in such a case may have such judgment stayed only by (a)
perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.9The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will
not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed
within the period for the perfection of the appeal.10 (Alconera vs Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069 January 20, 2014)

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension
of ejectment proceedings. “The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did
not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a
ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved.” (Suarez vs Emboy, G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014)

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de
Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared:
“x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the
plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and
less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and
expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should
a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order
to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been
forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the
prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises
involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the
courts.” (Suarez vs Emboy, G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014)

IMPLIED TRUST/RESULTING TRUST/CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS

Jose Juan Tong v. Go Tiat Kun – G.R. 196023 (April 21, 2014)

Held:
The appellate court’s conclusion that an express trust was created because there was a direct and positive act by Juan Tong to
create a trust must inevitably yield to the clear and positive evidence on record which showed that what was truly created was an
implied resulting trust. As what has been fully established, in view of the mutual trust and confidence existing between said parties
who are family members, the only reason why Lot 998 was registered in the name of Luis, Sr. was to facilitate the purchase of
the said property to be used in the family’s lumber business since Luis, Sr. is the only Filipino Citizen in the Juan Tong family at
that time. As the registered owner of Lot 998, it is only natural that tax declarations and the corresponding tax payment receipts
be in the name of Luis, Sr. so as to effect payment thereof.

The principle of a resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines
the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature
or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title
but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, a constructive trust, unlike an
express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. Constructive trusts are created by the construction of
equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one
who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and
good conscience, to hold.

Guided by the foregoing definitions, the Court is in conformity with the finding of the trial court that an implied resulting
trust was created as provided under the first sentence of Article 1448 which is sometimes referred to as a purchase money
resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting
valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. Here, the
petitioners have shown that the two elements are present in the instant case. Luis, Sr. was merely a trustee of Juan Tong and
the petitioners in relation to the subject property, and it was Juan Tong who provided the money for the purchase of Lot 998 but
the corresponding transfer certificate of title was placed in the name of Luis, Sr.

The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one
reposes on another especially between families, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal
document.

Contrary to the claim of the respondents, it is not error for the trial court to rely on parol evidence, i.e., the oral testimonies
of witnesses Simeon Juan Tong and Jose Juan Tong, to arrive at the conclusion that an implied resulting trust exists. What
is crucial is the intention to create a trust.

"Intention—although only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of the transaction or from the facts and
circumstances accompanying the transaction, particularly the source of the consideration—is always an element of a resulting
trust and may be inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties rather than from direct expression of conduct. Certainly,
intent as an indispensable element is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by evidence, even circumstantial, of
statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes. Because an implied trust is neither dependent upon an express
agreement nor required to be evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parol evidence
to prove their existence. Parol evidence that is required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be
trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations."

Lastly, the respondents’ assertion that the petitioners’ action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel is erroneous.
As a rule, implied resulting trusts do not prescribe except when the trustee repudiates the trust. Further, the action to
reconvey does not prescribe so long as the property stands in the name of the trustee. To allow prescription would be
tantamount to allowing a trustee to acquire title against his principal and true owner. It should be noted that the title of Lot 998
was still registered in the name of Luis Sr. even when he predeceased Juan Tong. Considering that the implied trust has been
repudiated through such death, Lot 998 cannot be included in his estate except only insofar as his undivided share thereof is
concerned. It is well-settled that title to property does not vest ownership but it is a mere proof that such property has been
registered. And, the fact that the petitioners are in possession of all the tax receipts and tax declarations of Lot 998 all the more
amplify their claim of ownership over Lot 998-A. Although these tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. Such realty tax
payments constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Therefore, the action for reconveyance of Lot 998-
A, which forms part of Lot 998, is imprescriptible and the petitioners are not estopped from claiming ownership thereof.

Moreso, when the petitioners received a letter from VGCC, and discovered about the breach of the trust agreement committed
by the heirs of Luis, Sr., they immediately instituted an action to protect their rights, as well as upon learning that respondent Go
Tiat Kun executed a Deed of Sale of Undivided Interest over Lot 998-A in favor of her children. Clearly, no delay may be
attributed to them. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that the parties are
connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay.

Emilia O’Laco v. Valentin Co Cho Chit and CA – G.R. 58010 (March 31, 1993)

Held:
But the more crucial issue before us is whether there is a trust relation between the parties in contemplation of law.

We find that there is. By definition, trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts are those
which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention
to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of
the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into being
by operation of law.
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable
title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title
but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created
by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to
intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he
ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.

Specific examples of resulting trusts may be found in the Civil Code, particularly Arts. 1448, 1449, 1451, 1452 and 1453,
while constructive trusts are illustrated in Arts. 1450, 1454, 1455 and 1456.

Unlike express trusts concerning immovables or any interest therein which cannot be proved by parol evidence, implied trusts
may be established by oral evidence. However, in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the
proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. It
cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.

After a thorough review of the evidence on record, We hold that a resulting trust was indeed intended by the parties under Art.
1448 of the New Civil Code which states —

"ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is
paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is
the beneficiary . . .”

xxxx

Having established a resulting trust between the parties, the next question is whether prescription has set in.

As differentiated from constructive trusts, where the settled rule is that prescription may supervene, in resulting trust, the
rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust. Once the resulting trust is
repudiated, however, it is converted into a constructive trust and is subject to prescription.
A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui
trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing.

In Tale v. Court of Appeals 43 the Court categorically ruled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years, and not otherwise, thereby modifying previous decisions holding
that the prescriptive period was four (4) years.

xxx

But immediately after Emilia sold the Oroquieta property which is obviously a disavowal of the resulting trust, respondent-spouses
instituted the present suit for breach of trust. Correspondingly, laches cannot lie against them.

After all, so long as the trustee recognizes the trust, the beneficiary may rely upon the recognition, and ordinarily will not be
in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights. There is no running of the prescriptive period if the trustee
expressly recognizes the resulting trust.