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history of physics and psychology. Ameri-
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ness? Whose beauty? American Psycholo-
gist, 50, 391.
Russell, R. L., & Gaubatz, M. D. (1995). Con-
tested affinities: Reaction to Gergen's (1994)
and Smith's (1994) postmodernisms. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 50, 389-390.
Smith, M. B. (1994). Selfhood at risk:
Postmodern perils and the perils of
postmodernism. American Psychologist, 49,
405-411.
Smith, M. B. (in press). Self psychology & la
Vico: A tutorial in narrativism. American Jour-
nal of Psychology.
White, D. R., & Wang, A. Y. (1995). Univer-
salism, humanism, and postmodernism.
American Psychologist, 50, 392-393.
Postmodern Psychology:
Resonance and Reflection
Kenneth J. Gergen
Department of Psychology,
Swarthmore College
I find the reactions to my exchange (Gergen,
May 1994) with Smith (May 1994) illumi-
nating, gratifying, and inviting of further re-
flection. They are illuminating in the ways in
which they have broadened and enriched the
initial dialogue. In their analysis of architec-
ture, Russell and Gaubatz (1995, this issue)
beautifully illustrate the potential of "elite"
theoretics literally to alter the cultural land-
scape. White and Wang (1995, this issue)
offer a powerful critique of the tendency to
universalize a culturally specific discourse,
including as well the potential threat such
tendencies pose to the ecosystem. Mente
(1995, this issue) adds an important voice to
the proceedings in his positive account of
situated knowledge. And Denner (1995, this
issue) further twists the lines of argument in
such a way that new questions can be asked.
In effect, by multiplying the voices engaged
in the colloquy we have added significantly
to the range and depth of understanding. The
discussion expands, its laminations and nu-
394
essential to explore further the practical (in-
cern is enriched. This discursive option stands
in contrast to foundationalist attempts—
both in the realm of scientific metatheory
and in the philosophy of ethics—to replace
variability with univocality and dialogue with
monologue.
At the same time I find these offerings
highly gratifying. I am not saying this sim-
ply because many of the arguments are con-
genial to the position I attempted to articu-
late in my initial publication (Gergen, 1994a).
Rather, what I find particularly appealing is
the character of the interchange—the very
form in which the arguments are frequently
cast. In my view, the traditional attempt to
legislate uni vocal standards for intelligibility
in psychology has invited a range of unfor-
tunate practices. These include the fragmen-
tation of the discipline into small, self-pro-
tective and self-congratulatory enclaves, each
compelled by the nonsituated truth of their
assumptions and driven to derision of all
that is at variance. And, most relevant to the
present exchange, it includes the traditional
penchant for binary-based (true-false) argu-
mentation, in which the primary goal is the
annihilation of the opposition. In contrast,
in the present offerings I discern a slightly
softer, more subtle form of argumentation.
Whereas Russell and Gaubatz (1995) ini-
tially add to the postmodern corpus, they
also critically reflect on possible limitations.
White and Wang (1995) are clear in their
preferences but conclude by lauding a dia-
logue that may revitalize psychology. Mente
(1995) concludes his discussion not by at-
tacking Smith but by asking questions—
inviting replies. And although Denner (1995)
does trade in innuendo and distortion, he is
also multivocal, taking several positions over
the course of the discussion. Is it possible
that such discussion is the practical realiza-
tion of the postmodern emphasis on plural-
ist truths and goods and the realization of
meaning through dialogue? I would like to
think so.
Finally, I am moved to further reflec-
tion by these entries. Russell and Gaubatz
(1995) introduce the positive possibilities
of universalism, and indeed their argument
could have been buttressed by a consider-
ation of the movement toward universal hu-
man rights. Although I deny the universal-
ity of the standards of comparison I used
(Gergen, 1994a) in my arguments, I do feel it
cluding moral and political) consequences of
universalist as opposed to particularistic dis-
courses. White and Wang (1995) see "plenty
of room for both modern and postmodern
approaches to psychology" (p. 392). Al-
though I agree with this view in the abstract,
we must think further about the conditions
of coexistence. It seems to me that
postmodern thought leaves a space for em-
piricist discourse and practice, but empiri-
cism in itself operates much like fundamen-
talist religion: If one fails to embrace its
tenets, the state of grace is denied. Under
these conditions, how are viable forms of
communicative practice to be established?
Here I both sympathize with and eschew
Denner's view (1995) that because tradi-
tional practices have no foundations they
can simply continue untroubled by ulterior
"beasts." To be sure, the tradition is scarcely
obliged to capitulate to forms of argumenta-
tion or critique falling outside its paradig-
matic borders. However, to the extent that
the discipline fails to share intelligibilities
with ulterior enclaves, it becomes progres-
sively isolated. And how are we as psy-
chologists to regard a discipline that suc-
ceeds primarily in speaking to itself? I am
not, then, attempting to offer foundations
for moral or political choice—as Denner in-
vites. Rather, as elaborated in Gergen (1994b)
the attempt is to move from undecidable
matters of principle to livable practices.
REFERENCES
Denner, B. (1995). Stalked by the postmodern
beast. American Psychologist, 50, 390-391.
Gergen, K. J. (1994a). Exploring the postmodern:
Perils or potentials? American Psychologist,
49, 412-416.
Gergen, K. J. (1994b). Realities and relation-
ships. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Mente, D. (1995). Whose truth? Whose good-
ness? Whose beauty? American Psycholo-
gist, 50, 391.
Russell, R. L., & Gaubatz, M. D. (1995). Con-
tested affinities: Reactions to Gergen's (1994)
and Smith's (1994) postmodernisms. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 50, 389-390.
Smith, M. (1994). Selfhood at risk.
Postmodern perils and the perils of
postmodernism. American Psychologist,
49, 405-411.
White, D. R., & Wang, A. Y. (1995). Universal-
ism, humanism, and postmodernism. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 50, 392-393.
May 1995 • American Psychologist