Feedback and Public Opinion i

Foreign Policy Feedback and Public Opinion

A Review of Related Literature

Sharehann T. Lucman

2004-71306

Political Science 199 TFR

Professor Athena Lydia Casambre

January 11, 2008

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion ii

I- Introduction

Studies on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) have largely been focused on understanding the

internal and external factors that influence a state's foreign policy. Few have addressed the idea

that foreign policy choices themselves may have possible repercussions on the factors that had

originally shaped them. They stop short of (thus constraining us to explore) how a foreign policy

choice may also bring about "feedback" effects to these factors.

Fortunately, recent literatures have been written on how policy choices have affected and

altered political thinking in the citizenry. Although much of these have been about social welfare

policies (e.g. Soss, 2007; Mettler 2002) rather than foreign policy per se, it is in this light, this

literature review attempts to extract their conceptualization of "policy feedback" and mirror it on

foreign policy analysis. The notion that foreign policy choices will bring about public opinion

change shall constitute a type of "policy feedback" effect.

II- The (Standard) Foreign Policy Framework

Feedback

Individual
International factors decision-
maker

Decision- Foreign
making Process policy

Domestic factors

Feedback

Figure 1. A Model of Foreign Policy (adapted from Gustavsson, 1998)

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion iii

Typically, approaches to foreign policy analyses have been modeled after the systems

theory (Easton, 1953). It is assumed that fundamental units of political input will go through a

series of processes and eventually produce a particular foreign policy (see for example, Holsti

and Rosenau, 1990; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987).

Among these models is that of Gustavsson’s (1998). As seen on Figure 1, his model is

based on the theoretical argument that "'sources'... are mediated by 'individual decision-makers'

who act within the 'decision-making process' in order to bring about a change in policy" (p. 23).

He goes on to say that these political actors work within established institutional structures, and

engage in bureaucratic “pulling and hauling” in the process of policy making (see Allison, 1971).

Meanwhile, the aforementioned “sources” are divided into two: the international factors and

the domestic factors. The international factors are concerned with, on one hand, "international

politics" that refer to "the power relations and the traditional military aspects of national security";

and on the other hand, "international economy" that refers to "cross-border economic

transactions and the institutional conditions governing such transactions" (p. 23).

Similarly, the domestic factors are comprised of both political and economic concerns. While

the political aspect is characterized by "electoral results, opinion polls and the coalitions formed

between major political actors", "statistical indicators such as GDP growth, the rate of inflation

and the level of unemployment" characterize the economic aspect (p.23).

These sources are then taken into account by individual decision makers who are then

engaged in policy-making procedures. Consequently, the end-result of the decision-making

process shall be the foreign policy choice. (p. 25)

After Gustavsson illustrates the entire causal dynamics of the foreign policy model, he then

draws our attention to two "feedback arrows" connecting the foreign policy choice back to each

of the sources. According to him, these arrows indicate "that once a change (choice) has taken

place, this might affect international and domestic factors, possibly contributing to a new round

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion iv

of foreign policy change" (pp. 24-25). Unfortunately, Gustavsson does not go into detail about

this notion of a "feedback”.

Although we are provided with a theoretical understanding of the causes of foreign policy in

the model, the other half of it- the effects of foreign policy- remained undertheorized. Hence, we

fail to see the underlying dynamics of the interaction between the sources and the foreign policy

choices.

III- The Concept of Policy Feedback

It seems as if the notion that “policies are political forces in their own right” has been taken

for granted. Policies were primarily treated as “the result of political forces (the dependent

variable), but rarely the cause of those forces (the independent variable)” (Pierson, 1993, p.

595). Recently however, systematic analyses of how policies themselves reshape mass political

attitudes have started to emerge (Barabas, 2005). In fact, although few had previously written

about it, according to Joe Soss and Suzanne Mettler (2004), the notion that "policies reshape

the political environment" has had a long legacy (p. 60). In 1935, E.E. Schattschneider already

implied that "new policies create a new politics". (as cited in Mettler and Soss, 2004).

But it was not until a decade ago that historical institutionalists were able to concretely

identify the ways by which policy choices influence political behavior. In fact according to Paul

Pierson (1993), “the emergence of a substantial and broadly persuasive literature on policy

feedback represents a considerable achievement” for the “historical institutionalist approach” (p.

596).

At its core, historical institutionalism holds that “policy legacies” and “institutional changes”

have an impact on political behavior. Institutional change in one time period will have policy

effects in the subsequent time period. Furthermore, historical institutionalists argue that public

policies being institutions themselves, “constitute important rules of the game influencing the

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion v

allocation of economic and political resources, modifying the costs and benefits associated with

alternative political strategies and consequently altering ensuing political development” (Pierson,

1993, p. 596). Hence, policies deserve to be treated as inputs in the political process capable of

reshaping social, economic and political conditions.

Using this perspective, Pierson (1993) defines the concept of policy feedback as the ways in

which policies “[reshape] social, economic and political conditions” (p.595).

More so, as an attempt to contribute to the empirical literature on policy feedback, he

provides us with a framework by which we can study the feedback process. According to him

there are six significant paths of influence whereby the feedback mechanism works.

Actors Affected by Feedback Mechanism

Government Elites Interest Groups Mass Public
Spoils

Organizing Niches
Type of Mechanism

Resource/ Administrative
Lock In
Incentive Effects Capacities
Financing

Access
Policy Learning
Visibility
Interpretative
Policy Learning Visibility
Effects
Traceability
Traceability
Figure 2. The Dimensions of Policy Feedback (Pierson, 1993)

As seen on Figure 2, policy feedback can work either as a Resource or Incentive

mechanism or as an Interpretative mechanism. With the former, “policies act as producers of

resources and incentives, thus shaping the costs and benefits associated with particular political

strategies.” With the latter on the other hand, “policies serve as sources of information and

meaning, with implications for political learning” (Mettler and Soss, 2004, p.60). Each of these

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion vi

mechanisms affects the three sets of political actors namely: government elites, interest groups

and mass publics.

1. Resource/ Incentive

a. Government Elites

Pierson (1993) cites Theda Skocpol as an authority in the study of feedback mechanism and

government elites (p.598). For Skocpol, “new policies may transform state capacities by

creating, building upon, or undercutting administrative arrangements; and they may affect the

identities, political goals, and capabilities of social groups” (Skocpol 1992, as cited in Mettler

and Soss 2004, p. 60). By using new or existing administrative arrangements to implement a

policy, policies transform or expand the capacities of the state. They change the administrative

possibilities for official initiatives in the future and affect later prospects for policy

implementation. Moreover, previous policy choices create opportunities that allow state actors to

pursue a particular agenda. For instance, in a study made by G. John Ikenberry (as cited in

Pierson, 1993) about the US energy policy during the 1970 Oil crisis, he found out that political

elites could have gained the “knowledge and managerial experience necessary to intervene

extensively in energy exploration and development” if it were not for previous energy policies

that inhibited the development of administrative capacities. By analyzing energy policies of the

1970’s, Ikenberry concluded that “the institutional legacy of the past weighed heavily on

proposals for change. In particular, the scarcity and fragmentation of bureaucratic expertise and

operational capacities provided few bases from which to build new government powers and

responsibilities (p. 604)”.

b. Interest Groups

To begin with, policies are often written out to cater to a specific set of supporters or to those

who have demanded those policies. In this light, they “provide both incentive and resources that

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion vii

may facilitate or inhibit the formation or expansion of particular groups. The incentives stem

primarily from the major social consequences of specific government actions. Public policies

often create “spoils” that provide a strong motivation for beneficiaries to mobilize in favor of

programmatic maintenance or expansion.” They also “create niches for political entrepreneurs”.

Finally, the allocation of resources to the supporters favorable decisions strengthen particular

groups by increasing their access to decision makers (Pierson, 1993, p. 594).

c. Mass Public

Meanwhile as a consequence to mass behavior Pierson suggests that previous policy

choices generate “lock in” effects. As he puts it, “policies may create incentives that encourage

the emergence of elaborate social and economic networks, greatly increasing the cost of

adopting once-possible alternatives and inhibiting exit from a current policy path. Major policy

initiatives have major social consequences. Individuals make important commitments in

response to certain types of government action. These commitments, in turn, may vastly

increase the disruption caused by new policies, effectively “locking in” previous decisions” (p.

608). This explains why Reagan’s privatizing policies failed to restructure public pensions.

According to Pierson, the problem was: “since 1939, Social Security in the United States has

operated on a pay-as-you-go basis: current benefits are paid out of current contributions; each

working generation pays for the previous generation’s retirement. Once such a system matures,

it becomes essentially locked-in.” The currently retired generation have already adapted and

committed to the public system of old-age pensions such that shifting to a private system would

merely create a “double-payment problem” wherein “current workers would have to finance both

their parents’ retirement and their own” (p. 609).

2. Interpretative

a. Policy learning

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion viii

The interpretative mechanism basically depicts policy development as a process of political

learning. Social actors interpret the rules of the game by means of “cognitive shortcuts”. “They

have to cope with overwhelming complexity and uncertainty and that they use a wide range of

cognitive shortcuts in order to make sense of the social world” (Pierson, 1993, p. 611).

Therefore, they use a variety of information shortcuts (heuristics) to make seemingly informed

political decisions.

For the policy makers, they rely on past policy experiences, draw lessons from these, then

adjust “only at the margins to accommodate those distinctive features of new situations”

(Pierson, 1993, p.615).

For the electorate, policies influence individual learning and attitudes by providing political

information. They “produce [symbolic] cues that help them develop political identities, goals, and

strategies.” The informational content of policies brings about political awareness among the

public (Pierson, 1993, p.619).

b. Visibility and Traceability

Meanwhile, Pierson (1993) highlights the power of the mass public to link policy effects with

the action of policy makers. With this in mind, he cites Douglas Arnold to provide us with the

conditions for public policies to affect mass public: “visibility” and “traceability” (p. 621).

According to Arnold, under “visibility”, “voters must experience some discernible outcome

that leads them to inquire about the cause of this outcome”. Whereas with “traceability”, “to

respond by rewarding or punishing politicians, the electorate must be able to link that outcome

to some governmental action”.

The way visibility works is that the more visible (or less “quiet”) policies are, the more likely

they are to generate “focusing events” that would capture the public eye. These focusing events

are necessary to strengthen political support for a particular agenda.

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion ix

On the other hand, traceability becomes a factor when the constituent wishes to hold policy

makers accountable to corresponding policy consequences. It is with the policy outcomes do

voters evaluate government performance.

IV- Policy Feedback and Mass Politics

In his article, Pierson (1993) acknowledges that most scholars have been attuned to

exploring the impact of policy feedback on organized interests and government elites while few

have paid attention to the processes that affect mass public. Mass publics have been usually

portrayed as background influences on the aforementioned “more proximate actors”. (p.597)

Furthermore, although Pierson was able to present the different pathways through which

policy feeds back, Joe Soss claims that Pierson's framework remains illustrative as it fell short

of presenting the empirical relationship between the social agents and the policy outcomes

(Mettler and Soss, 2004, p. 61)

Pierson merely gave us the feedback mechanisms (i.e. how specific types of policies

reshape political conditions) and not the feedback effects per se. It is the effects, Soss argues,

that is vital for the empirical study of Policy feedback for these shall serve as our “hypotheses

for investigation” (Mettler and Soss, 2004, p.61).

Hence, in a recent article, Soss pairs up with Suzanne Mettler (2004) in proposing a new

research agenda on the feedback relationship between public policies and mass behavior. As

an attempt to make up for Pierson’s shortcoming, they proposed five major types of “policy

feedback effects” on mass politics.

First, “policies define membership in a polity”. When these lay down some sort of criteria for

those who should benefit from those who should not. Policies may imply that certain individuals

are fully included within the political community while others are not. In a study conducted by the

Task Force Inequality and American Democracy participated by Mettler and Skocpol (2004),

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion x

they found out that by receiving benefits the same as other veterans through the US

Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 – commonly known as the GI Bill, beneficiaries from

less advantaged backgrounds found themselves as esteemed members of the polity. Thus, they

reacted by politically participating at surprisingly high levels.

Second, “policies forge political cohesion and group divisions” such that they “shape civic

affiliations status and the degree of unity among the citizenry”. Policies may “influence patterns

of group identity” that can result to delineating groups in the polity. They further foster these

divisions by conveying political meaning inherent in the policies that can shape the groups’

normative understandings, beliefs and expectations. An example given by the authors was that

if taxation policies cease to exist, individuals who consider themselves as “taxpayers” would

also cease to lobby their political demands by virtue of their entitlement under that collective

name (Mettler and Soss, 2004, p.61).

Third, “policies either build or undermine civic capacities”. They create the material

incentives and supply resources for political mobilization. These resources and incentives in

turn, build human capital and distribute civic capacities in the community. After WWII, veterans

took advantage of the education and training benefits granted by the GI Bill. These programs in

turn, helped stimulate their civic and political awareness (Hacker, Mettler, Pinderhughes and

Skocpol, 2004, pp. 37-40).

Fourth, “policies frame policy agendas, problems and evaluations”. By opting for particular

solutions to address social problems through particular solutions and not others, they effectively

frame issues. Such that, they influence the way citizens perceive the problem and the legitimate

role of government in relation to it. For example, a study conducted by Soss with Joseph

Schram (2007) showed that public policy was used as a strategic tool to limit public evaluation

on welfare reforms within the range of goals that were emphasized by the policy makers.

Finally, “policies structure, stimulate and stall political participation”. They affect the extent to

which individuals or groups are mobilized and the form their participation takes. Such that, they

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion xi

create new arenas for political action and shape political affiliations, “in as much as citizens view

particular groups and parties as protectors of politics that they support or oppose” (Mettler and

Soss, 2004, p. 64). For instance, those who have benefited from the GI Bill have been actively

voting all throughout their lives. In contrast, those from later generations have participated in

considerably lower levels (Hacker, Mettler, Pinderhughes and Skocpol, 2004, pp. 57).

Policy Outcome Feedback Mechanism Feedback Effect

1. Defining
membership
2. Forging political
Resource/ Incentive Effects Lock In community or
delineating groups
3. Building or
undermining civic
capacity
4. Framing policy
Visibility agendas, problems,
Interpretative Effects and evaluations
Traceability 5. Structuring,
stimulating, and
stalling participation
Figure 3. The Policy Feedback Effects on Mass Politics (Mettler and Soss, 2004)

V- Public Opinion Change as an Effect of Policy Feedback

Another scholar, Jason Barabas (2005), disputes that the policy feedback effects outlined by

Mettler and Soss had little to say about the attitudinal impact policies may have on mass

politics. “Despite calls for more research on ideological effects” he says, “the feedback literature

concentrates on participatory acts like voting” (p.3). He argues that the lack of scholarly

attention to policy opinion linkages deprives us to see the relationship between policy outputs

and public preferences (p.4). Thus, under the fourth dimension of Mettler and Soss's framework,

Barabas proposes that it is through public opinion change that we observe the capacity of

policies to shape public evaluation of governments and their actions.

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion xii

In his paper Trust fund politics: How fiscal perceptions shape public support for Social

Security and Medicare Reform, Barabas investigated on the financing mechanisms underlying

Social Security and Medicare policies and how these fed back on public support.

In the beginning he likened citizens to “satisfied customers” who want more of policies they

perceive to be beneficial. Indeed they are not experts or may even display a dearth of

knowledge on any matters. But Barabas argues that they receive and accept new policy

information through the media, through conversations with their peers or in this case through

public reports. This new supply of information serve as their cognitive shortcuts through which

they assess the trust fund programs.

In his paper he suggests that citizens learn about the trust fund status from the reports

issued by the boards overseeing Medicare and Social Security. Afterwards, citizens draw upon

these published fiscal perceptions when forming their opinions of whether Medicare or Social

Security should be reformed. His findings showed that, “perceptions of fiscal weakness increase

support for sweeping programmatic changes, while optimistic assessments of trust fund viability

lead to more support for the current system” (p. 2).

This shows us that the very policy that required oversight boards to issue fiscal reports

influenced how the public was to evaluate their trust fund programs. The policy makers of these

programs have framed mass opinion formation by publishing these financial assessments. They

have reduced the likelihood that the public would evaluate these policies on terms other than

what the assessments have said.

With Barabas' findings, we see the capacity of policies to prime particular standards for

evaluating government performance that has been mentioned under Mettler and Soss's fourth

dimension. It is this analytic framework we now translate in terms of Foreign Policy Analysis.

VI- Foreign Policy Feedback

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion xiii

To begin with, we have to establish the classification of foreign policy choices a government

can possibly implement; in order for us to figure out what type of foreign policy choice shall

reshape public opinion.

Foreign policy choices tend to move along a spectrum that has internationalism on one end,

and isolationism on the other (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999). Nairn (as cited in Rojecki, 2002, p.

4) defines internationalism as foreign policies oriented towards cooperation among fellow nation

states or the national people in some common effort. While foreign policies that are isolationist

“seek to limit or reduce the country’s international engagements to the extent that it is possible

to do so.” (Hoslti, 2003)

With that said, we move on to a study by Andrew H. Sidman. In his empirical analysis about

the influence of foreign policy considerations on presidential approval, Sidman (2005) was able

to show that in the process of formulating its opinion of the President and his administration, the

American public referred to, not only domestic, but foreign policy as well. What makes his

findings interesting was that he was able to give substantial evidence to support the idea that

public opinion can change due to subsequent consequences of past foreign policies. To

illustrate, he examined the impact of domestic and foreign policy approval on overall presidential

approval. He found out that “both types of approval are highly significant and offer to have

roughly equal effects on overall approcal” (p. 19). According to him, the electorate considers

both domestic and foreign policy in determining its assessment of the government. These policy

actions serve as points of reference when the electorate think about government performance

(particularly the president’s, in this case). Thus, through these opinion shifts we see that foreign

policy actions can actually feed back on public approval which is initially essential for the

decision maker’s political support (Gustavsson, 1998, p. 23).

Sidman’s findings almost demonstrates Soss and Mettler’s (2004) aforementioned fourth

feedback effect, wherein they suggested that “[public policies] have the power to shape public

evaluations of governments and their actions” (p. 63). More so, it substantiates Pierson’s (1993)

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion xiv

“traceability” feedback mechanism whereby he suggested that voters evaluate their

government’s performance by linking policy outcomes to governmental action (p. 621).

However, the question remains: what makes the president much more his/her approval

central to the study of foreign policy? While the purview of foreign policymaking is dependent on

the form of government, Sidman (2005) generally patterned his study after a presidential system

whereby “the President is largely the sole decision-maker, with the exception of needing the

permission of Congress to declare war and ratify treaties, and is the main beneficiary of popular

policy initiatives and the main victim of unpopular international events and involvement” (p. 7).

Policy Outcome Feedback Mechanism Feedback Effect

Framing public opinion on

Foreign Policy Traceability
government performance

From isolationism to
internationalism

or Presidential Approval

From internationalism to
isolationism
Figure 4. The Foreign Policy Feedback Effects on Public Opinion

With this question aside, we hypothesize that foreign policy choices influence public opinion.

As seen on figure 4, we posit that these foreign policy choices can be observed through shifts

either from isolationism to internationalism or from internationalism to isolationism. Meanwhile,

changes in public opinion can be determined through the public’s assessment of their president.

Thus the research question:

Does a foreign policy shift from isolationism to internationalism (or from internationalism

to isolationism) influence presidential approval over time?

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion xv

References

Allison, G. T. (1971). The essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Harper

Collins Publishers.

Barabas, J. (2005, Sep). Trust fund politics: How fiscal perceptions shape public support for

Social Security and Medicare Reform. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the

American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham,

Washington Hilton, Washington, DC. Online <APPLICATION/PDF> Retrieved 2006-10-

05 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42057_index.html

Bjereld, U. & Ekengren, A. (1999) Foreign policy dimensions: A comparison between the United

States and Sweden. International Studies Quarterly. 43: 503-518

Gustavsson, J. (1998). The politics of foreign policy change: Explaining the Swedish

reorientation on EC membership. Lund: Lund University Press

Hacker, J., Mettler, S., Pinderhughes, D., & Skocpol, T. (2004) Inequality and public policy.

Report published by the APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy.

Online <.PDF> Retrieved 2006-10-05 from

http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf

Holsti, O. (2003, Aug). A Return to isolationism and unilateralism? American public opinion, pre-

and post-September 11. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American

Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA. Online

<.PDF> Retrieved 2006-10-05 from

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64559_index.html

Holsti, O. & Rosenau, J. (1990). The structure of foreign policy attitudes among American

leaders. The Journal of Politics. 52:94-125

Hurwitz, J. & Peffley, M. (1987). The means and ends of foreign policy as determinants of

presidential support. The American Political Science Review. 81:1099-1120.

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot
 Feedback and Public Opinion xvi

Mettler, S. & Soss, J. (2004). The consequences of public policy for democratic citizenship:

Bridging policy studies and mass politics. Perspectives on Politics. 2(1): 55-73.

Mettler, S. (2002). Bringing the state back in to civic engagement: Policy feedback effects of the

GI Bill for World War II veterans. American Political Science Review. 93: 351-365

Pierson, P. (1993, July). When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change.

World Politics. 45: 595-628

Rojecki, A. (2002, Aug). Media discourse on globalization and terror. Paper presented at the

annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley

Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts. Online

<.PDF> Retrieved 2006-10-05 from

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p66230_index.html

Sidman, A. H. (2005, Apr) A Brave New World: Changes in the Effects of Economic and Foreign

Policy Considerations on Presidential Approval since September 11th. Paper presented

at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House

Hilton, Chicago, Illinois. Online <.PDF> Retrieved 2006-10-05 from

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p85950_index.html

Skocpol, T. (1992) Protecting soldiers and mothers: The political origins of social policy in the

United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Soss, J. & Schram, S. F. (2007, Feb) A public transformed? Welfare reform as policy feedback.

American Political Science Review. 101(1): 111-148

ShareyzCDR.G.04 Slapshot