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Sharehann T. Lucman
2004-71306
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Feedback and Public Opinion ii
I- Introduction
Studies on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) have largely been focused on understanding the
internal and external factors that influence a state's foreign policy. Few have addressed the idea
that foreign policy choices themselves may have possible repercussions on the factors that had
originally shaped them. They stop short of (thus constraining us to explore) how a foreign policy
Fortunately, recent literatures have been written on how policy choices have affected and
altered political thinking in the citizenry. Although much of these have been about social welfare
policies (e.g. Soss, 2007; Mettler 2002) rather than foreign policy per se, it is in this light, this
literature review attempts to extract their conceptualization of "policy feedback" and mirror it on
foreign policy analysis. The notion that foreign policy choices will bring about public opinion
Feedback
Individual
International factors decision-
maker
Decision- Foreign
making Process policy
Domestic factors
Feedback
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Typically, approaches to foreign policy analyses have been modeled after the systems
theory (Easton, 1953). It is assumed that fundamental units of political input will go through a
series of processes and eventually produce a particular foreign policy (see for example, Holsti
Among these models is that of Gustavsson’s (1998). As seen on Figure 1, his model is
based on the theoretical argument that "'sources'... are mediated by 'individual decision-makers'
who act within the 'decision-making process' in order to bring about a change in policy" (p. 23).
He goes on to say that these political actors work within established institutional structures, and
engage in bureaucratic “pulling and hauling” in the process of policy making (see Allison, 1971).
Meanwhile, the aforementioned “sources” are divided into two: the international factors and
the domestic factors. The international factors are concerned with, on one hand, "international
politics" that refer to "the power relations and the traditional military aspects of national security";
and on the other hand, "international economy" that refers to "cross-border economic
transactions and the institutional conditions governing such transactions" (p. 23).
Similarly, the domestic factors are comprised of both political and economic concerns. While
the political aspect is characterized by "electoral results, opinion polls and the coalitions formed
between major political actors", "statistical indicators such as GDP growth, the rate of inflation
These sources are then taken into account by individual decision makers who are then
After Gustavsson illustrates the entire causal dynamics of the foreign policy model, he then
draws our attention to two "feedback arrows" connecting the foreign policy choice back to each
of the sources. According to him, these arrows indicate "that once a change (choice) has taken
place, this might affect international and domestic factors, possibly contributing to a new round
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Feedback and Public Opinion iv
of foreign policy change" (pp. 24-25). Unfortunately, Gustavsson does not go into detail about
Although we are provided with a theoretical understanding of the causes of foreign policy in
the model, the other half of it- the effects of foreign policy- remained undertheorized. Hence, we
fail to see the underlying dynamics of the interaction between the sources and the foreign policy
choices.
It seems as if the notion that “policies are political forces in their own right” has been taken
for granted. Policies were primarily treated as “the result of political forces (the dependent
variable), but rarely the cause of those forces (the independent variable)” (Pierson, 1993, p.
595). Recently however, systematic analyses of how policies themselves reshape mass political
attitudes have started to emerge (Barabas, 2005). In fact, although few had previously written
about it, according to Joe Soss and Suzanne Mettler (2004), the notion that "policies reshape
the political environment" has had a long legacy (p. 60). In 1935, E.E. Schattschneider already
implied that "new policies create a new politics". (as cited in Mettler and Soss, 2004).
But it was not until a decade ago that historical institutionalists were able to concretely
identify the ways by which policy choices influence political behavior. In fact according to Paul
Pierson (1993), “the emergence of a substantial and broadly persuasive literature on policy
feedback represents a considerable achievement” for the “historical institutionalist approach” (p.
596).
At its core, historical institutionalism holds that “policy legacies” and “institutional changes”
have an impact on political behavior. Institutional change in one time period will have policy
effects in the subsequent time period. Furthermore, historical institutionalists argue that public
policies being institutions themselves, “constitute important rules of the game influencing the
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allocation of economic and political resources, modifying the costs and benefits associated with
alternative political strategies and consequently altering ensuing political development” (Pierson,
1993, p. 596). Hence, policies deserve to be treated as inputs in the political process capable of
Using this perspective, Pierson (1993) defines the concept of policy feedback as the ways in
provides us with a framework by which we can study the feedback process. According to him
there are six significant paths of influence whereby the feedback mechanism works.
Organizing Niches
Type of Mechanism
Resource/ Administrative
Lock In
Incentive Effects Capacities
Financing
Access
Policy Learning
Visibility
Interpretative
Policy Learning Visibility
Effects
Traceability
Traceability
Figure 2. The Dimensions of Policy Feedback (Pierson, 1993)
resources and incentives, thus shaping the costs and benefits associated with particular political
strategies.” With the latter on the other hand, “policies serve as sources of information and
meaning, with implications for political learning” (Mettler and Soss, 2004, p.60). Each of these
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Feedback and Public Opinion vi
mechanisms affects the three sets of political actors namely: government elites, interest groups
1. Resource/ Incentive
a. Government Elites
Pierson (1993) cites Theda Skocpol as an authority in the study of feedback mechanism and
government elites (p.598). For Skocpol, “new policies may transform state capacities by
creating, building upon, or undercutting administrative arrangements; and they may affect the
identities, political goals, and capabilities of social groups” (Skocpol 1992, as cited in Mettler
and Soss 2004, p. 60). By using new or existing administrative arrangements to implement a
policy, policies transform or expand the capacities of the state. They change the administrative
possibilities for official initiatives in the future and affect later prospects for policy
implementation. Moreover, previous policy choices create opportunities that allow state actors to
pursue a particular agenda. For instance, in a study made by G. John Ikenberry (as cited in
Pierson, 1993) about the US energy policy during the 1970 Oil crisis, he found out that political
elites could have gained the “knowledge and managerial experience necessary to intervene
extensively in energy exploration and development” if it were not for previous energy policies
that inhibited the development of administrative capacities. By analyzing energy policies of the
1970’s, Ikenberry concluded that “the institutional legacy of the past weighed heavily on
proposals for change. In particular, the scarcity and fragmentation of bureaucratic expertise and
operational capacities provided few bases from which to build new government powers and
b. Interest Groups
To begin with, policies are often written out to cater to a specific set of supporters or to those
who have demanded those policies. In this light, they “provide both incentive and resources that
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may facilitate or inhibit the formation or expansion of particular groups. The incentives stem
primarily from the major social consequences of specific government actions. Public policies
often create “spoils” that provide a strong motivation for beneficiaries to mobilize in favor of
programmatic maintenance or expansion.” They also “create niches for political entrepreneurs”.
Finally, the allocation of resources to the supporters favorable decisions strengthen particular
c. Mass Public
choices generate “lock in” effects. As he puts it, “policies may create incentives that encourage
the emergence of elaborate social and economic networks, greatly increasing the cost of
adopting once-possible alternatives and inhibiting exit from a current policy path. Major policy
response to certain types of government action. These commitments, in turn, may vastly
increase the disruption caused by new policies, effectively “locking in” previous decisions” (p.
608). This explains why Reagan’s privatizing policies failed to restructure public pensions.
According to Pierson, the problem was: “since 1939, Social Security in the United States has
operated on a pay-as-you-go basis: current benefits are paid out of current contributions; each
working generation pays for the previous generation’s retirement. Once such a system matures,
it becomes essentially locked-in.” The currently retired generation have already adapted and
committed to the public system of old-age pensions such that shifting to a private system would
merely create a “double-payment problem” wherein “current workers would have to finance both
2. Interpretative
a. Policy learning
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learning. Social actors interpret the rules of the game by means of “cognitive shortcuts”. “They
have to cope with overwhelming complexity and uncertainty and that they use a wide range of
cognitive shortcuts in order to make sense of the social world” (Pierson, 1993, p. 611).
Therefore, they use a variety of information shortcuts (heuristics) to make seemingly informed
political decisions.
For the policy makers, they rely on past policy experiences, draw lessons from these, then
adjust “only at the margins to accommodate those distinctive features of new situations”
For the electorate, policies influence individual learning and attitudes by providing political
information. They “produce [symbolic] cues that help them develop political identities, goals, and
strategies.” The informational content of policies brings about political awareness among the
Meanwhile, Pierson (1993) highlights the power of the mass public to link policy effects with
the action of policy makers. With this in mind, he cites Douglas Arnold to provide us with the
conditions for public policies to affect mass public: “visibility” and “traceability” (p. 621).
According to Arnold, under “visibility”, “voters must experience some discernible outcome
that leads them to inquire about the cause of this outcome”. Whereas with “traceability”, “to
respond by rewarding or punishing politicians, the electorate must be able to link that outcome
The way visibility works is that the more visible (or less “quiet”) policies are, the more likely
they are to generate “focusing events” that would capture the public eye. These focusing events
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On the other hand, traceability becomes a factor when the constituent wishes to hold policy
In his article, Pierson (1993) acknowledges that most scholars have been attuned to
exploring the impact of policy feedback on organized interests and government elites while few
have paid attention to the processes that affect mass public. Mass publics have been usually
Furthermore, although Pierson was able to present the different pathways through which
policy feeds back, Joe Soss claims that Pierson's framework remains illustrative as it fell short
of presenting the empirical relationship between the social agents and the policy outcomes
Pierson merely gave us the feedback mechanisms (i.e. how specific types of policies
reshape political conditions) and not the feedback effects per se. It is the effects, Soss argues,
that is vital for the empirical study of Policy feedback for these shall serve as our “hypotheses
Hence, in a recent article, Soss pairs up with Suzanne Mettler (2004) in proposing a new
research agenda on the feedback relationship between public policies and mass behavior. As
an attempt to make up for Pierson’s shortcoming, they proposed five major types of “policy
First, “policies define membership in a polity”. When these lay down some sort of criteria for
those who should benefit from those who should not. Policies may imply that certain individuals
are fully included within the political community while others are not. In a study conducted by the
Task Force Inequality and American Democracy participated by Mettler and Skocpol (2004),
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Feedback and Public Opinion x
they found out that by receiving benefits the same as other veterans through the US
Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 – commonly known as the GI Bill, beneficiaries from
less advantaged backgrounds found themselves as esteemed members of the polity. Thus, they
Second, “policies forge political cohesion and group divisions” such that they “shape civic
affiliations status and the degree of unity among the citizenry”. Policies may “influence patterns
of group identity” that can result to delineating groups in the polity. They further foster these
divisions by conveying political meaning inherent in the policies that can shape the groups’
normative understandings, beliefs and expectations. An example given by the authors was that
if taxation policies cease to exist, individuals who consider themselves as “taxpayers” would
also cease to lobby their political demands by virtue of their entitlement under that collective
Third, “policies either build or undermine civic capacities”. They create the material
incentives and supply resources for political mobilization. These resources and incentives in
turn, build human capital and distribute civic capacities in the community. After WWII, veterans
took advantage of the education and training benefits granted by the GI Bill. These programs in
turn, helped stimulate their civic and political awareness (Hacker, Mettler, Pinderhughes and
Fourth, “policies frame policy agendas, problems and evaluations”. By opting for particular
solutions to address social problems through particular solutions and not others, they effectively
frame issues. Such that, they influence the way citizens perceive the problem and the legitimate
role of government in relation to it. For example, a study conducted by Soss with Joseph
Schram (2007) showed that public policy was used as a strategic tool to limit public evaluation
on welfare reforms within the range of goals that were emphasized by the policy makers.
Finally, “policies structure, stimulate and stall political participation”. They affect the extent to
which individuals or groups are mobilized and the form their participation takes. Such that, they
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create new arenas for political action and shape political affiliations, “in as much as citizens view
particular groups and parties as protectors of politics that they support or oppose” (Mettler and
Soss, 2004, p. 64). For instance, those who have benefited from the GI Bill have been actively
voting all throughout their lives. In contrast, those from later generations have participated in
considerably lower levels (Hacker, Mettler, Pinderhughes and Skocpol, 2004, pp. 57).
Another scholar, Jason Barabas (2005), disputes that the policy feedback effects outlined by
Mettler and Soss had little to say about the attitudinal impact policies may have on mass
politics. “Despite calls for more research on ideological effects” he says, “the feedback literature
concentrates on participatory acts like voting” (p.3). He argues that the lack of scholarly
attention to policy opinion linkages deprives us to see the relationship between policy outputs
and public preferences (p.4). Thus, under the fourth dimension of Mettler and Soss's framework,
Barabas proposes that it is through public opinion change that we observe the capacity of
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In his paper Trust fund politics: How fiscal perceptions shape public support for Social
Security and Medicare Reform, Barabas investigated on the financing mechanisms underlying
Social Security and Medicare policies and how these fed back on public support.
In the beginning he likened citizens to “satisfied customers” who want more of policies they
perceive to be beneficial. Indeed they are not experts or may even display a dearth of
knowledge on any matters. But Barabas argues that they receive and accept new policy
information through the media, through conversations with their peers or in this case through
public reports. This new supply of information serve as their cognitive shortcuts through which
In his paper he suggests that citizens learn about the trust fund status from the reports
issued by the boards overseeing Medicare and Social Security. Afterwards, citizens draw upon
these published fiscal perceptions when forming their opinions of whether Medicare or Social
Security should be reformed. His findings showed that, “perceptions of fiscal weakness increase
support for sweeping programmatic changes, while optimistic assessments of trust fund viability
This shows us that the very policy that required oversight boards to issue fiscal reports
influenced how the public was to evaluate their trust fund programs. The policy makers of these
programs have framed mass opinion formation by publishing these financial assessments. They
have reduced the likelihood that the public would evaluate these policies on terms other than
With Barabas' findings, we see the capacity of policies to prime particular standards for
evaluating government performance that has been mentioned under Mettler and Soss's fourth
dimension. It is this analytic framework we now translate in terms of Foreign Policy Analysis.
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To begin with, we have to establish the classification of foreign policy choices a government
can possibly implement; in order for us to figure out what type of foreign policy choice shall
Foreign policy choices tend to move along a spectrum that has internationalism on one end,
and isolationism on the other (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999). Nairn (as cited in Rojecki, 2002, p.
4) defines internationalism as foreign policies oriented towards cooperation among fellow nation
states or the national people in some common effort. While foreign policies that are isolationist
“seek to limit or reduce the country’s international engagements to the extent that it is possible
With that said, we move on to a study by Andrew H. Sidman. In his empirical analysis about
the influence of foreign policy considerations on presidential approval, Sidman (2005) was able
to show that in the process of formulating its opinion of the President and his administration, the
American public referred to, not only domestic, but foreign policy as well. What makes his
findings interesting was that he was able to give substantial evidence to support the idea that
public opinion can change due to subsequent consequences of past foreign policies. To
illustrate, he examined the impact of domestic and foreign policy approval on overall presidential
approval. He found out that “both types of approval are highly significant and offer to have
roughly equal effects on overall approcal” (p. 19). According to him, the electorate considers
both domestic and foreign policy in determining its assessment of the government. These policy
actions serve as points of reference when the electorate think about government performance
(particularly the president’s, in this case). Thus, through these opinion shifts we see that foreign
policy actions can actually feed back on public approval which is initially essential for the
Sidman’s findings almost demonstrates Soss and Mettler’s (2004) aforementioned fourth
feedback effect, wherein they suggested that “[public policies] have the power to shape public
evaluations of governments and their actions” (p. 63). More so, it substantiates Pierson’s (1993)
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However, the question remains: what makes the president much more his/her approval
central to the study of foreign policy? While the purview of foreign policymaking is dependent on
the form of government, Sidman (2005) generally patterned his study after a presidential system
whereby “the President is largely the sole decision-maker, with the exception of needing the
permission of Congress to declare war and ratify treaties, and is the main beneficiary of popular
policy initiatives and the main victim of unpopular international events and involvement” (p. 7).
From isolationism to
internationalism
or Presidential Approval
From internationalism to
isolationism
Figure 4. The Foreign Policy Feedback Effects on Public Opinion
With this question aside, we hypothesize that foreign policy choices influence public opinion.
As seen on figure 4, we posit that these foreign policy choices can be observed through shifts
changes in public opinion can be determined through the public’s assessment of their president.
Does a foreign policy shift from isolationism to internationalism (or from internationalism
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References
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