1st CUDIA v.

CA confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused

Facts:
Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga allegedly for
possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Angeles
City, where he was detained. The City Prosecutor of Angeles
City filed an information against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. The Information states that he
committed the crime in Angeles City. The case was raffled to
RTC Branch 60, Angeles City. Cudia pleaded not guilty to the
charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the
attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the
information, petitioner had committed the offense in
Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an
existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City
RTCs as to who would handle cases involving crimes committed
outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the
case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes
committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was
assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In
consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such
as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by
silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint
or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the
complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could
not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of
the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority
to file the information, the dismissal of the first information
would not be a bar to petitioners subsequent prosecution.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a
defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the
prosecution.

However, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an

information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. The case was likewise
raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted
the prosecutor in the first criminal case to file a Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, it appearing that the
apprehension of the accused was made in Mabalacat,
Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Pampanga. The trial court granted the motion.

Cudia then filed a Motion to Quash the second criminal case on

the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had
been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been
dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to
be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
The trial court denied the motion to quash. CA affirmed that
there was no double jeopardy on the ground that the petitioner
could not have been convicted under the first information as
the same was defective.

Issue:

Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she

was acquitted in the criminal charges against her

Held:

It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City

had no authority to file the first information, the offense having
been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is
beyond his jurisdiction.

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City

Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses
committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An
information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or
presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized
by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of

authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in
question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out
by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information
before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all
objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings
are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express
provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform
decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information
signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites,
 2nd Estodillo, et al vs. Judge Baluma
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837; March 23, 2004

PRINCIPLE
The information need not be under oath, the reason therefore
being principally that the prosecuting officer filing it is charged
with the special duty in regard thereto and is acting under the
special responsibility of his oath of office.

FACTS
In a verified complaint dated December 26, 2002, Jovelyn
Estudillo (Jovelyn) assisted by her mother, Visitacion L.
Estodillo, charges Judge Teofilo D. Baluma with Gross and
Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleges that her administrative complaint arose
from the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11627 for Other Acts
of Child Abuse by respondent Judge.
The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, Judge James Stewart E.
Himalaloan found that there was sufficient ground to hold the
herein accused for trial for the offense. The record of the case
was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
where, after a review by Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
Macario I. Delusa, he failed an Information.
Respondent dismissed the Information on the ground that the
information had not been subscribed by the prosecutor. Hence,
herein respondent found that the information is defective.
The prosecution through Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Revival alleging that there was no
necessity for the Information to be under oath since he merely
concurred with the resolution of the investigating judge and
that he "has properly subscribed and signed the Information
with the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor".

Issue: Whether or Not Judge is correct in dismissing the

subject information on the ground that it was not under oath

Ruling: NO, respondent Judge Baluma erred in dismissing the

subject Information.

Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:

Sec. 4. Information defined. – An information is an

accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.

There is no requirement that the information be sworn to.

Otherwise, the rules would have so provided as it does in a
complaint which is defined as a "sworn written statement
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended
party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with
the enforcement of the law violated".13 In a case, we ruled that
the information need not be under oath, the reason therefore
being principally that the prosecuting officer filing it is charged
with the special duty in regard thereto and is acting under the
special responsibility of his oath of office. Clearly, respondent
had confused an information from a complaint.

A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was

subscribed or signed by Prosecutor Macario I. Delusa. It is thus
clear that respondent erred in dismissing the subject
Information on the ground that it was not under oath.
 3rd People vs. Ilarde
125 SCRA 11 ,
G.R. No. L-58595
October 10, 1983
Facts: This is a case for adultery originated in the City of
Iloilo. Efraim Santibañez caught his wife in an act of adultery.
The next thing he did was to execute an affidavit-complaint,
which he filed in the office of the City Prosecutor if Iloilo City.
In his affidavit he said “That I am formally charging my wife,
Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana (Private
Respondents) of the crime of adultery and would request that
this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against
them”.
not considered the complaint contemplated by Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code because it was a mere narration of how
the crime of rape was committed against her. However, in the
affidavit-complaint submitted by Efraim Santibañez, the latter
not only narrated the facts and circumstances constituting the
crime of adultery, but he also explicitly and categorically
charged private respondents with the said offense.
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.

While the case was pending before the fiscal for preliminary
investigation, Efraim Santibañez died in the United States.
Notwithstanding, Fiscal Galvez prepared the information and
filed the same with the Court of First Instance of IloIlo.
Private respondents filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
offense charged, as the offended party had not filed the
required complaint pursuant to the provisions of Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court to the effect that “the crimes of adultery and concubinage
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse.”

Respondent judge granted the motion and dismissed the case.

The city fiscal moved for a reconsideration, but the same was
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been compliance with the
requirement of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
reiterated in Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, that “the
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party.”
HELD: Yes. We are aware that in a long line of
decisions,3 this Court has maintained strict adherence to the
requirement imposed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.

It must be borne in mind, however, that this legal requirement

was imposed “out of consideration for the aggrieved party who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial.”4 Thus, the law leaves it
to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress
for the affront committed by the erring spouse. And this, to Our
mind, should be the overriding consideration in determining the
issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed by
said Article 344 has been complied with. For needless to state,
this Court should be guided by the spirit, rather than the letter,
of the law.

In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Efraim

Santibañez, to bring his wife and her alleged paramour to
justice is only too evident. Such determination of purpose on
his part is amply demonstrated in the dispatch by which he filed
his complaint with the police; the strong and unequivocal
statement contained in the affidavit filed with the Fiscal’s Office
that “I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and
Atty. Bob Javellana of the crime of adultery and would request
that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against
them”;his filing of a complaint for legal separation against
Cecile Santibañez with the local Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court; and finally, in disinheriting his wife in his Last
Will and Testament dated January 10, 1981.

In quashing the information, respondent judge relied upon Our

decision in People vs. Santos5 to the effect that a “salaysay” or
sworn statement of the offended party, which prompted the
fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation and then to file an
information in court, was not the complaint required by Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code.
The ruling in Santos is not applicable to the case at bar. In that
case, the “salaysay” executed by complainant Bansuelo was
 4th PEOPLE VS. YPARAGUIRRE Y SEPE
G.R. NO. 124391 (July 5, 2000)
Principle: An offer to compromise does not require that
a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be
received in evidence against the offeror. What is required
is that after committing the crime, the accused or his
representative makes an offer to compromise and such
offer is proved.
Facts:
• Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with
the crime of rape.
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic]
psychiatrist.
x x x."
• Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was
confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation
and treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to
talk and revealed that she was raped by appellant.
•Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime
charged. He claimed that on the night of the alleged rape
he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was
at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and worked straight
until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until
after 8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.

• The prosecution established that Rosita Bacaling was a

•The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and
housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him
in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in
to indemnify Rosita P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay
Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking porridge for the
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees,
spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the
other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived from
work and found the two children asleep. He approached Issue:(1) Whether the must first be a complaint filed
Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to contain before there is an offer to compromise for there to be an
medicine for her skin disease. Rosita was afflicted with implied admission of guilt.
rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly
contracted from one of the children.
Ruling:(1) No. An offer to compromise does not require
that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can
• Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) be received in evidence against the offeror. What is
tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all required is that after committing the crime, the accused or
the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell his representative makes an offer to compromise and such
down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging offer is proved.
her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant
pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at
The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist
her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill
prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not physically
her.
impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the
crime. The public market was merely a ten-minute walk
• Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He from their rented room and during work breaks, appellant
kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.
then entered her. Rosita cried out in pain but appellant
continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant
pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach. She lost
consciousness.

A few minutes later, Rosita woke up and saw blood in her

private parts. She wiped the blood and changed her
clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her
should she report the incident to her parents. Appellant
then left the house.

• Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She

continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before
leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio
YYY. Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock. She
could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary
daily functions such as dressing herself. In short, Rosita
became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal Health
Officer by her mother for examination.

• On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr.

Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her
unresponsive and unable to talk. She conducted a physical
examination and also found that:

-- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00

[position]; hymen not intact;

Internal examination -- admits one finger;

 5th Gonzales v. Arcilla are not applicable in this case since, as above discussed, the
G.R. No. 27923 (Nov. 18, 1991) alleged slanderous utterances subject of the assailed
information do not impute any crime which cannot be
Facts: On 17 February 1966, an information for slander prosecuted de oficio.
against accused Marcela N. Gonzales was filed before the City
Court of Davao by Assistant City Fiscal Alfredo Celi. The
information reads:

"That on or about December 19, 1965, in the City of Davao,

Philippine, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused with intent to cast dishonor,
discredit and contempt upon one Filipinas Ordoñez, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and in the heat of anger uttered
publicly in the presence and within the hearing of several
persons the following defamatory words, to wit: ‘MANG-
AAGAW NG ASAWA NG MAY ASAWA! TIBIHON! PUTANG INA
MO! WALANG HIYA! PATAY GUTOM’, which when translated to
English runs (sic) as follows: "Seducer of wives of other
husbands or adulteress. Consumptive. Your mother is a
prostitute. You do not have a sense of shame. You are a
glutton’, to the dishonor, discredit and contempt of said
Filipinas Ordoñez."

Gonzales moved to to quash the information asserting that the

City Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that
the Officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
She claims therein that the alleged defamation imputes the
crime of adultery and thus cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The
motion to quash was denied by respondent Judge Arcilla. On
appeal, the CFI ruled in favor of Gonzales.

Issue: Whether the criminal action for Gonzales’ alleged

defamation can be brought de officio

Ruling: Yes.

Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in writing.

In both, there is a public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person,
or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

The first portion of utterance, "Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may

asawa!”, does not necessarily mean an adulteress. At most, it
may imply that the person to whom it is addressed is a "flirt, a
temptress, or one who indulges in enticing other husbands;"
hence, it is more of an imputation of a vice, condition or act
not constituting a crime.

Tibihon! Putang Ina Mo! Walang Hiya! Patay Gutom!" are

imputations which did not give color and importance to the
first portion; they were uttered merely to expose all the
possible vices, defects, real or imaginary, status, or condition
of the offended party. None of these, however, imputed any
crime.

Accordingly, the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised

Penal Code which provides that:

"No criminal action for defamation which consist in the

imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint
expressly filed by the offended party."

which has specific reference to the crimes against chastity, and

the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court which provides:

"The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be

prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse. . . ."
 6th THE UNITED STATES vs. BASILIO TICSON place at their invitation or with their consent, it being presumed
25 Phil 67 that he did so against their will, for, to gain entry, he had to
August 14, 1913 cut the fastenings that held the door of the house.
Defendant convicted of forcible entry.
Ponente: TORRES, J.:

Doctrine: Under the rules of procedure, a person can only be

convicted of the crime charged and prosecuted.

FACTS: Appeal by the defendant from the judgment of

December 15, 1911, by the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge,
sentencing him to the penalty of two months and one day of
arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty
in case of insolvency, and the costs.

The proper preliminary investigation was made and the

provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Surigao, charging Basilio Ticson with the crime of forcible
entry of a dwelling. This case being thus initiated, the court,
upon the evidence adduced, rendered the judgment
aforementioned.

It was proved at trial that the defendant, Basilio Ticson, early

in the morning of October 6, 1911, entered the house of Braulio
Calang, situated in the barrio of Sison, of the pueblo of Surigao,
by taking advantage of an occasion when the latter was away
from home and his wife, Epifania Cupo, and brother-in-law,
Sinforoso Dinulus, were asleep; that the latter, at the
husband's request, had, since the previous evening, remained
in the house to sleep there in order to accompany the offended
party who was alone; that the defendant cut the fastenings
which held the door closed, entered the room where the said
Epifania was asleep, raised the skirt she was wearing,
undoubtedly with the purpose of lying with her; that thereupon
the woman awoke, immediately resisted the assault and called
for help, for which reason the defendant left the house, through
the same door by which he had entered, pursued by the
offended party and her companion, Dinulus, who had been
awakened by the noise; that both the latter recognized the
defendant, for there was bright moonlight and they had known
him previously, as he had visited at the house the night before;
and that for these reasons the offended party recognized the
defendant, although he was running, and even threw a piece
of wood at him when he passed by the house near one of the
windows.

On the fourth day after the assault, when the husband returned
home and was informed of what had occurred, he immediately
reported the matter to the justice of the peace, Eusebio
Tiongko. This official testified that at the preliminary
investigation the defendant confessed his guilt, and, in the
presence of the justice, begged the offended spouses' pardon,
but that the woman refused, saying that he might attempt to
repeat the act.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is correct to charge only the crime of

forcible entry.

RULING:

The criminal purpose of the defendant was to lie with the

offended party, a married woman, even though he had to use
violence, yet, on account of her resistance, the crime did not
exceed an attempt; but, in view of the fact that in the
information he was only charged with the crime of forcible
entry of a dwelling, for which he was afterwards tried and
convicted, we must abide by that denomination of the crime.

So, on this theory, since the defendant, in entering the house

of the offended parties, had to cut the fastenings which held its
door closed, he undeniably committed the crime of forcible
entry, with violence and against the will of the inmates of the
dwelling, inasmuch as it was not proved that he entered the
 7th PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONNIE
QUITLONG
Facts:
Jonathan Capito (a 19 yr. old Medical Technology student
in Baguio) and others while on their way home bought fish
balls. When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso
bill, he saw that he had only been handed back thirty five
pesos. Confronted by Calpito, the fish ball vendor did not
admit that he had short-changed the former. Commotions
between group of Capito and group of Fish ball vendors
happened. Capito was stabbed and later died. Police officers
caught the accused on the act of stabbing Capito. Emelio
Senoto, Salvador Quitlong, and Ronnie Quitlong was charge
for murder. But in the original charge it was not alleged that
there was conspiracy.
principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the
latter's death. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio
Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at the precise
time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of executing his
criminal intent. Simultaneity, however, would not itself
demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action
and purpose that could be a basis for collective
responsibility of two or more individuals; indeed, from all
indications, the incident would appear to have occurred
at the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and
Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to be mere
accomplices conformably with Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of
the crime of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not conspiracy can be considered even if it was

not alleged in the original complaint.

Held:

Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the

trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an
accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has
been apprised when the charge is made conformably with
prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. No. An
information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
his accusation is not violated, must state

the name of the accused;

the designation given to the offense by the statute;

a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as

constituting the offense;

the name of the offended party; the approximate time and

date of the commission of the offense; and

the place where the offense has been committed.

In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged,

the information must set forth the facts and circumstances
that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the
accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more accused persons is that of
conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital
of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during
trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an
allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would
impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another
or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person,
regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation,
equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of
the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly
be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the
felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one
being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must
know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of
his co-accused as well. Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a
 8th PEOPLE vs. DANIEL MAURICIO
G.R. No. 126026. February 6, 2001
Facts:
Accused Mauricio Loyola appeals from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape as charged in the information and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
On April 9, 1994, Stecy Gatilogo, a sixteen boarded a bus from
Pangantucan, Bukidnon bound for Wao, Lanao del Sur . It was
in the bus that she saw and became acquainted with accused
Mauricio Loyola, the bus conductor, who seemed to take special
interest in her. He saw to it that he could sit by her side after
issuing bus tickets to the other passengers, and striking a
conversation with her.
The bus was not able to reach Wao that day because at a place
called Balating, a part of Wao, the road became too slippery for
the bus to continue.
Stecy was prevailed upon to stay in the bus. The bus turned
around and traveled back to the nearest town.
At about ten o'clock, already tired and wanting to sleep,
occupied one seat near the center of the bus. She noticed
accused also lying near the bus door. The driver was asleep at
the front-most part of the bus.
Accused was not able to present any proof to show that he and
the complainant were indeed lovers, that he had courted her
and that she had accepted him. Besides, even if indeed accused
and complainant were sweethearts, this fact does not
necessarily negate rape. "A sweetheart cannot be forced to
have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand
sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence
upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust."
Accused-appellant's can not claim that there was no force or
intimidation employed by him. In People v. Fraga it was held
that
"The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a
reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or
does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would
be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none
at all does not amount to consent to the sexual assault. It is
not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death
or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is
enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if she
yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she
did not do so. Indeed, the law does not impose upon a rape
victim the burden of proving resistance."
In this case, accused covered Stecy's mouth and threatened
that he would kill her if she cried for help. She was abused in
a place where she was unfamiliar. The nausea and fear
prevented Stecy from putting up a resistance. However, lack of
physical resistance can not be considered consent.

At about midnight, Stecy was startled when she felt that
someone had touched her breast. When the person told her not
to shout, Stecy recognized accused by his voice. Stecy begun
to cry and became frightened when accused threatened to kill
her if she would cry for help. She found herself unable to rise
because her arm had stuck into a small gap between the seat
and seat armrest during her sleep.
Finally As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage is an
admission of guilt.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused-
appellant Mauricio Loyola y Botaya guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

Stecy's resistance was futile. Accused succeeded in having

sexual intercourse with her.

On April 13, 1994 Stecy's aunt, Maribel Abaniel reported the

incident to her brother Federico, a policeman. Maribel and her
grandmother with other relatives brought Stecy to the police
station. She was examined by a doctor who issued a Medical
Certificate testifing that Stecy had a broken hymen but no
laceration on her vaginal wall.

Accused Mauricio claimed that he and Stecy were lovers and

that what happened in the midnight of April 11, 1994, was
consensual. Mauricio disclosed that they had met four times
before April 11, 1994, and during those times, he courted her.
When they met again on that day, Stecy accepted his love.
After the incident, accused offered to marry Stecy but the latter
spurned the offer, declaring that "I am not willing to marry him
because he is not my sweetheart."

Issues:

Is sweetheart defense a valid alibi.

What are the test is whether there is force or intimidation

employed?

Ruling:

The "sweetheart defense" has been rarely upheld as a defense

without convincing proof. Indeed, accused-appellant bears the
burden of proving that he and complainant had an affair that
naturally led to a sexual relationship.

"No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she

had been raped unless that was the truth. Even in these
modern times, this principle still holds true."
 9th PEOPLE vs. ROGELIO MORENO
G.R. No. 140033
January 25, 2002
Facts:
Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellant Rogelio Moreno
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death.
That on or about the 8th day of January 1999 accused, armed
with a bladed weapon, with intent to gain and by means of
violence and intimidation take and divest Marites and on the
occasion of the said robbery accused have carnal knowledge of
the complainant Marites against her will and consent.
ROGELIO entered a plea of not guilty.
CA finds accused Rogelio Moreno, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of having committed the special complex crime of
robbery with rape and considering the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and absent any
mitigating circumstance, the Court imposes the penalty of
death upon said accused.
ROGELIO banks on the alleged absence of resistance and
struggle by MARITES as evidenced by the absence of injuries
on her person. He likewise argues that it was improper to
charge him with robbery with rape, since the taking of the
victim's property was a mere afterthought and an independent
act from the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
ROGELIO alleges that when he was arrested, he was not
informed of his right to remain silent, and when he was forced
by the policemen to undress and admit the crime, he was not
assisted by an independent and competent counsel.
ROGELIO maintains that the trial court erred in appreciating
against him the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity
because the place where the rape took place was not covered
with darkness, and there is no evidence that nighttime was
deliberately sought after by him to carry out a criminal intent.
Issues:
The special complex crime of robbery with rape defined in
Article 293 in relation to paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, employs the clause "when
the robbery shall have been accompanied with rape." In other
words, to be liable for such crime, the offender must have the
intent to take the personal property of another under
circumstances that makes the taking one of robbery, and such
intent must precede the rape.
If the original plan was to commit rape, but the accused after
committing the rape also committed robbery when the
opportunity presented itself, the robbery should be viewed as
a separate and distinct crime. A painstaking assessment of the
evidence in this case convinces us that ROGELIO committed
two separate offenses of rape and theft, and not the special
complex crime of robbery with rape.
The constitutive element of violence or intimidation against
persons in robbery was not present at the time of the snatching
of the shoulder bag of MARITES. The force or intimidation
exerted by ROGELIO against the victim was for a reason foreign
to the fact of the taking of the bag. It was for the purpose of
accomplishing his lustful desire. Hence, it cannot be
considered for the purpose of classifying the crime as robbery.
Accused-appellant may thus be held liable for simple theft only,
in addition to the crime of rape.
3. However, the trial court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. For
nocturnity to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that it
facilitated the commission of the crime and that it was
purposely sought for by the offender.
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance.
In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was offered to prove
that ROGELIO deliberately sought the cover of darkness to
accomplish his criminal design. In fact, the victim testified that
there were streetlights and lights from the ABC Commercial
Complex.
As modified, ROGELIO MORENO is hereby declared guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two separate crimes of rape and
of theft.

1. IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

FOR THE CRIME CHARGE HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

2. IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WAS VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS
ARRESTED AND BROUGHT TO THE POLICE STATION FOR
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF
AN INDEPENDENT AND COMPETENT COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE.

3. IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

NOCTURNITY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

Ruling:

1. We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that

ROGELIO succeeded in having carnal knowledge of MARITES
with the use of force and intimidation. When he first put his
arms around her, he had a fan-knife in his possession directed
towards her neck. As he was on top of her, his hand was on
her throat and he threatened to stab and kill her should she
create a noise.

MARITES might have failed to resist ROGELIO's advances, but

such failure was a manifestation of involuntary submission, not
of consent

2. We cannot, however, sustain ROGELIO's conviction of

robbery with rape.
10th PEOPLE vs. NERIO SUELA y HEMBRA, EDGAR SUELA above-cited new rule and current jurisprudence, we cannot
y HEMBRA and EDGARDO BATOCAN appreciate the aggravating circumstance of disguise against
G.R. Nos. 133570-71 appellants. The special complex crime of robbery with homicide
January 15, 2002 carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. There being
no appreciable aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty
to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
FACTS:
Furthermore, in People v. Catubig, we held that while a non-
On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, alleged but proven aggravating circumstance cannot be used
while at his townhouse residence, private complainant John to increase the penalty, nonetheless it can be the source of civil
Doe, his adopted son Rosas and his friend Gabilo were watching awards. Hence, we retain the trial court's civil grants in this
television. Suddenly, three persons, allegedly the respondents regard.
herein, sporting ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing
handguns and a knife, barged into the house. Respondents
threatened, through the use of said instruments, private
complainant and his companions to give the location of their
money and valuables, which they eventually took. Respondents
then dragged Gabilo downstairs and stabbed him which caused
the latter’s death.

After five (5) months of no leads, a caller which was later

identified as appellant Edgar Suela provided an information as
to the perpetrators of the crime. When arrested he told the
authorities that he, his brother Nerio Suela and one Edgardo
Batocan were the persons behind the taking of personal
properties of private complainant John Doe as well as the killing
of Gabilo. The said respondents executed an extra-judicial
confession of the commission of the crime but Batocan later
contended that the said confession was effected through force
and intimidation disregarding his constitutional rights.

The RTC ruled that appellants had been assisted by competent

and independent counsel during the execution of their
extrajudicial confessions. With the presence of one
aggravating circumstance (disguise) with no mitigating
circumstance to offset it, the trial court found appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and simple
robbery and sentenced them to death.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of disguise can

be appreciated.

Ruling:

No, the court cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance

of disguise to increase the penalty to death.

The current Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even

generic aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the
Information. Thus, Section 9 of new Rule 110 states:

"Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for
the court to pronounce judgment.

In People v. Mauricio, the Court elucidated:

"The use of the word 'must' indicates that the requirement is

mandatory, therefore failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110,
means that generic aggravating circumstances, although
proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused
if such circumstances are not stated in the information. It is a
cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given
retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused."
In the present case, the aggravating circumstance
of disguise which was appreciated by the lower court was not
alleged in the Informations against appellants. Following the
 11th FELICISIMO ROCABERTE
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ANDRES S.
SANTOS, Judge, RTC, Tagbilaran, Bohol
G.R. No. 72994
January 23, 1991
FACTS:
The case at bar treats of the sufficiency of the averment in the
information of the time of the commission of the felony of theft
ascribed to petitioner Felicisimo Rocaberte and two (2) others.
The information, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, City
of Tagbilaran,1 Judge Andres S. Santos, presiding, reads as
follows:2
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal hereby accused
Felicisimo Rocaberte, Florencio Ranario and Flaviana Ranario of
the crime of Theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the Period from 1977 to December 28,
1983 at the off offshore of West Canayaon, municipal of
Garcia-Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines . . ., the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping
each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the
owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away properties in the total amount of
THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FORTY-FOUR PESOS (P371,944.00), Philippine Currency,
belonging to and owned by the Philippine Sinter Corporation,
to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforestated
amount.
The accused, thru counsel de officio, Atty. Lilio L. Amora,
moved to quash the information,3 alleging that the statement
of the time of commission of the felony charged, "from 1977 to
December 1983, . . . a period of seven years," or "about 2,551
days," was fatally defective: there was "so great a gap as to
defy approximation in the commission of one and the same
offense" (citing Peo. v. Reyes, 108 SCRA 203); "the variance is
certainly unfair to the accused for it violates their constitutional
right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge
against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend
themselves . . ." (invoking Peo. v. Openia, 98 Phil. 698).
The motion was denied4 as was, too, the defendants' motion
for reconsideration.5 In the motion for reconsideration, the
accused drew attention to Section 4, Rule 117 "of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information filed against herein petitioner
is defective
HELD:
YES. The rules of criminal procedure declare that —
. . . A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the defendant; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
and — as regards the time of the commission of the offense,
particularly — that:7
. . . It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise time at which the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act
may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed as the
information or complaint will permit.
In the case at bar, there was a variance of several years
between the time stated in the information, 1947, and the
proof of its actual commission adduced at the trial, 1952, the
dismissal of the case by the Trial Court was sustained by this
Court, since to allow amendment of the indictment to conform
to the evidence would be violative of defendant's constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.9
Again, the statement of the time of the commission of the
offense which is so general as to span a number of years, i.e.,
"between October, 1910 to August, 1912," has been held to be
fatally defective because it deprives the accused an opportunity
to prepare his defense.10
A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of
the crime charged is not, however, a ground for a motion to
quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a
motion for quashal on that account will be denied since the
defect is one that can be cured by amendment; instead, the
court shall order the amendment to be made by stating the
time with particularity.11
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time
of the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is
a motion for a bill of particulars, provided for in Section 6, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court of 1964.12
Bill of particulars. — Defendant may, at the time of or before
arraignment, move for or demand a more definite statement
or a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to
plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects
complained of and the details desired.
From all that has been said, the conclusion should be clear. The
information against petitioner Rocaberte is indeed seriously
defective. It places on him and his co-accused the unfair and
unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a
span of more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be
made to bear. The public prosecutor must make more definite
and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft
attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he cannot,
the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case must be
dismissed.
 12th People vs. Lizada
G.R. No. 14346
January 24, 2003
Facts:
Accused Lizada was charged of 4 counts of qualified rape
under four separate information for raping his
stepdaughther, Analia Orillosa. Analia’s mother and the
accused lived as common law wife and husband, after the
former separated with Analia’s father. Her mother tried
different jobs to make both ends. While her mother was
away for work, Analia alleged that the accused raped her
for several times. Accused, then, denied the accusations.
The Trial Court decided on the case and found accused
appelant guilty of the crime of qualified rape punishable
with death. Accused-appellant assigned errors made by the
trial court before the Suoreme Cout. He contends that the
decision of the trial court is null and void as it failed to
comply with the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He avers that the
court made no findings of facts in its decision. The trial
court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses
of the prosecution and those of accused-appellant and his
witnesses, and forthwith set forth the decretal portion of
said decision. The trial court even failed to state in said
decision the factual and legal basis for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death on him.
and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the
issues, and of the applicable laws.
The trial court failed to specifically state the facts proven
by the prosecution based on their evidence, the issues
raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and
legal issues, as well as the legal and factual bases for
convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged.
The trial court rendered judgment against accused-
appellant with the court declaration in the decretal portion
of its decision that it did so based on the evidence of the
prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker
the evidence of the prosecution. It failed to explain in its
decision why it believed and gave probative weight to the
evidence of the prosecution. Reading the decision of the
trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial court ignored
the evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not
even bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its
imposition of the supreme penalty of death on accused-
appellant for each count of rape. The trial court merely cited
seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. The decision of the trial court is a good example of
what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, should not be.

Issue:

Whether the decision of the trial court is null and void

Ruling:

Yes. The decision is null and void. Article VIII, paragraph

14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
This requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule
120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which reads:

"SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment

must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall
contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which
the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal

qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused, and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the commission
thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability
or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
action has been reserved or waived."14

The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and

the person reading the decision on how it was reached by
the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties
 13th Gabionsa vs CA and People
Facts: Petitioner was accused in an information for violating
Sec. 22, pars. (a) and (d), in relation to Sec. 28, par. (e), of
RA 1161(Social Security Law). The said information alleged
that that "in and about or during the period from January
1991 to May 1993" petitioner, President of the Manila City
Bus Corporation, a compulsorily-covered employer under RA
1161, willfully and unlawfully failed, neglected and refused to
remit to the Social Security System (SSS) contributions for
SSS, Medicare and Employee Compensation (EC) amounting
to P1,652,330.10 and the 3% penalty imposed thereon in the
amount of P541,417.87.3
On December 7, 1993, petitioner was arraigned. After four
years, the public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of Court
to Amend Information, to change the material dates stated in
the Information from "January 1991 to May 1993" to January
1991 to May 1992." Petitioner opposed the motion contending
that the proposed amendment was substantial in nature, hence
to allow the same would be a violation of his right to be
informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him,
and would negate or prejudice defenses that were otherwise
available to him. The RTC granted the motion and allowed
amendment of the Information, ruling that the amendment
pertained only to matters of form. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner brought the issue before the Court of Appeals. CA
upheld the amendment and dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not an information can be amended to
change the material dates of the commission of the offense
after the arraignment of the accused
Ruling: The proper procedure for the amendment of an
Information is governed by Sec. 14, Rule 110, of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure -
Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court at any
time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the
trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the accused x x x x
The court held that after the accused enters a plea,
amendments to the Information may be allowed, as to matters
of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of
the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint or Information is
when a defense under the Complaint or Information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused
might have, would be inapplicable to the Complaint or the
Information as amended.
Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as:
(a) it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke
prescription;(b) it does not affect or alter the nature of the
offense originally charged (c) it does not involve a change in
the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused
to undergo any material change or modification in his
defense;(d) it does not expose the accused to a charge which
would call for a higher penalty; and, (5) it does not cause
surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the
new averment.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment
is one of form and not of substance. The allegation of time
when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time
is a material ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary
to state in the Information the precise time the offense was
committed unless time is a material factor. It is sufficient that
the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as near
to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the
Complaint or Information will permit.14
Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his
rights is untenable. We fail to see how his original defenses
would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment, nor the
prosecution's theory in anyway altered by the same. Petitioner
failed to adduce any evidence in support of his allegation that
the amendment would adversely affect his rights. Petitioner
invokes Wong v. Yatco,15 People v. Opemia16 and People v.
Reyes17 in support of his cause. However, we hold that the ratio
decidendi of the three (3) cases does not apply in the present
case.
In Wong the prosecution amended the Information of a
violation of Commonwealth Act No. 104 to change the dates of
the violation from "May 3, 1954 to October 11, 1954" to
"between January 2, 1955 and March 17, 1955." The Court
disallowed the amendment because in 1954, the law punishing
the act had not been published yet, therefore there was no
crime in legal contemplation, The Court said that since an
amended Information retroacted to the time of the original one,
the proper course would have been not to amend the previous
Information but to file another one. This crucial fact is not
involved here.
In Opemia the Court held, "the period of almost five years
between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that
one may be led to believe that another theft different from that
committed by the defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by
them in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it
violates their constitutional rights to be informed before the
trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of
the opportunity to defend, themselves."
In Reyes, this Court held that "the disparity of time between
the years 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy approximation
in the commission of one and the same offense."
The last two (2) cases involved changes in dates which were
so far removed from each other that substituting one for the
other would clearly work to the detriment of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges
against him. This is not so in the present case. For one, a
comparison of the amended Information (January 1991 to May
1992) and the original one (January 1991 to May 1993) shows
that the period stated in the former is even shorter than and is
included within the latter. Also, the averment "in or about and
during the period" gives a sufficient approximation of the date
of the commission of the offense. Therefore, the first
Information had adequately informed petitioner of the period
of time when the crime was committed. No surprise, ergo, no
violation of rights, could spring from merely replacing the
original period, more so with one that is shorter and included
within the same.
Moreover, the imposable penalty will not increase as a result of
the amendment. A reading of Sec. 28, par. (e), RA 1611, shows
that it penalizes, among others, the failure or refusal of a
compulsorily-covered employer from remitting compulsory
contributions to the SSS. Neither time nor duration of the
offense charged is a material ingredient of the offense. In fact,
the penalty imposed for this violation is constant at six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, regardless of the
number of infractions.
 14th PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLY
MANALILI y BOLISAY and DANILO REYES y
MAMNILA
G.R. No. 121671. August 14, 1998
FACTS: Willy Manalili y Bolisay and Danilo
Reyes y Mamnila were charged with attempted robbery
with homicide on July 27, 1990.
Info 1: attempted robbery
Info 2: multiple frustrated murder (Alfredo Tango y
Tabinga, Sonny Quintua and Nestor Agustin y Correo)
Info 3: homicide with illegal possession of firearms
(+Michael Guiang, William Simmapan and Fernando Arado)
Both accused entered a plea of not guilty to each of the
offenses charged.
Prosecution: hold-up with homicide Reyes and Manalili
Defense: Alibi (REYES – at Manalili’s house, asked him to
accompany him to see Reyes’ GF) Manalili corroborated
Reyes. . They denied that they robbed or held up the bus
and shot and killed the passengers. They alibied that they
were in San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija in the evening
of February 1, 1990. it was only on February 2, 1990 in the
morning when they left Nueva Ecija to go to Alicia, Isabela,
to see the girlfriend of Danilo Reyes
RTC – Reyes & Manalili GUILTY of crime of attempted
robbery with homicide and hereby sentences each of them
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 50,000 each victim
 How the holdup was done was not also
controverted by the defense. There is nothing
incredible about the story that would inspire
disbelief.
 The Court found no reason why these witnesses
would falsely accuse the accused. ‘The Court has
consistently held that where conditions of visibility
are favorable and the witness does not appear to
be biased against the man on the dock, his or her
assertions as to the identity of the malefactor
should be normally accepted.
The counsel for the accused erroneously filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Court of Appeals which correctly
transmitted the records of this case to the Supreme Court,
inasmuch as reclusion perpetua was imposed by the trial
court.6
CA: The counsel for the accused erroneously filed a Notice
of Appeal with the Court of Appeals which correctly
transmitted the records of this case to the Supreme Court,
inasmuch as reclusion perpetua was imposed by the trial
court.6
ISSUE: WON the trial court correctly adjudged appellants
guilty of the “complex crime of attempted robbery with
homicide under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code.”
SC: The trial court erred in convicting appellants of the
special complex crime of attempted robbery with homicide.
Under the three Informations filed in this case, appellants
should be convicted of attempted robbery and double
murder, but acquitted of frustrated murder.
. As the trial court itself observed, “the prosecution filed
three separate informations, one for attempted
robbery, the other for multiple frustrated murder and
the third [for] qualified illegal possession of firearms
used in multiple murder.”27 There was no information
charging the special complex crime of attempted
robbery with multiple homicide. Thus, to hold
appellants liable for this offense, notwithstanding the
absence of the proper information, is to violate the explicit
guarantee of the Constitution, which provides:28
Article III, Section 14, par. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
“(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.” (Italics
supplied.)
“The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it
is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of
an offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be violative of this constitutional
right.”29 Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a
crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily
included in the information filed against him.
Same scenario in People vs. Legaspi:
- Their conviction can only be limited to the
crime alleged or necessarily included in
the allegations in the separate
informations. What controls is the
description of the offense as alleged in the
information.31 While the trial court can hold a
joint trial of two or more criminal cases and
can render a consolidated decision, it cannot
convict the accused of a complex crime
constitutive of the various crimes alleged
in the two informations. Thus, the accused
were deprived of their constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them.”
It is true that the Information for attempted robbery
contained the allegation that one of the robbers was
killed during such attempt. This, however, does not
warrant a conviction for the special complex crime.
Hence, although there is enough evidence on record to
sustain a conviction for attempted robbery with homicide,
we are constrained to convict the accused only for
the crimes charged and duly proven against them.
Under the first Information, the appellants can be held
guilty only of the crime of attempted robbery. The accused
commenced their planned robbery with direct overt acts by
announcing a holdup, firing a warning shot in the air and
ordering the passengers to raise their hands and bow their
heads. They failed to carry out all acts of execution which
should have consummated the crime of robbery, due to the
resistance of a passenger who exchanged fire with them,
and not because of their own voluntary desistance.33

Although a prosecution witness testified that one of the

malefactors took money from a woman passenger, the said
victim never took the witness stand. In any event,
appellants cannot be held liable for consummated
robbery, for the said Information merely charged
them with attempted robbery. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the information and that
proved, Section 4 of Rule 120 mandates that the
accused may be convicted only “of the offense
charged included in that which is proved.”

FINAL JUDGMENT:

1.In Crim. Case No. 21-1156 (the first case), appellants are
found GUILTY as principals of attempted robbery and are
hereby SENTENCED to four months of arresto mayor.

2. .In Crim. Case No. 21-1157 (the second case),

appellants are found GUILTY as principals of the double
murder of Alfredo Tango and Sonny Quintua and are each
SENTENCED to two terms of reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, they are each ORDERED to pay, jointly and
severally, the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs
of Alfredo Tango and another P50,000 also as civil
indemnity to the heirs of Sonny Quintua. They are
ACQUITTED of any responsibility for the death of Nestor
Agustin, for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

3.In Crim. Case No. 21-1158 (the third case), appellants

are likewise ACQUITTED of any criminal liability, for failure
of the prosecution to prove any crime. Costs against
appellants.
15th PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLENN DE LOS be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate
SANTOS informations should have, therefore, been filed.
G.R. No. 131588
March 27, 2001
FALLO:

FACTS:
Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on
his Isuzu Elf truck. On their way, they decided to pass by a
restaurant where Glenn had 3 bottles of beer. On their way
to Cagayan de Oro City from Bukidnon, Glenn’s truck, hit,
bumped, seriously wounded and claimed the lives of several
members of the PNP who were undergoing an endurance
run on a highway wearing black shirts and shorts and green
combat shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on the spot, 12
were seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10
sustained minor injuries. At the time of the occurrence, the
place of the incident was very dark as there was no moon.
Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.
The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crime of
multiple murders, multiple frustrated murders and multiple
attempted murders, with the use of motor vehicle as the
qualifying circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is hereby SET ASIDE, and
another one is rendered holding herein accused-appellant
GLENN DE LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
(1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and
sentencing him, for each count, to the penalty of two (2)
months of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of
death indemnity for each group of heirs of the trainees
killed are reduced to P50,000; and the awards in favor of
the other victims are deleted. Costs against accused-
appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not GLENN should be held guilty of the complex

crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide
with serious physical injuries and less serious physical
injuries.

HELD: YES.

Considering that the incident was not a product of a

malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of
reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicides with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the

single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is
applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the
definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions
punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit
{dolo) or fault (culpa).26 In Reodica v. Court of
Appeals,27 we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or
negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v.
Court of Appeals,28 the accused was convicted, in
conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the
complex crime of "homicide with serious physical injuries
and damage to property through reckless imprudence," and
was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead
of the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also,
in Soriao v. Court of Appeals,29 the accused was convicted
of the complex crime of "multiple homicide with damage to
property through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor
boat to capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight
passengers.

The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other

victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been
intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light
felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should
 16th TEEHANKEE vs. MADAYAG
G.R. No. 103102
March 6, 1992
FACTS: This case was about the murder of Maureen
Hultman. She was shot but did not die immediately. So the
crime charged was frustrated murder. But while the case
was pending. Hultman died. Therefore, the fiscal filed a new
information for consummated murder
ISSUE: Is amendment of information different from
substitution of information?
RULING: The first provides for the rules for amendment of
the information or complaint, while the second refers to the
substitution of the information or complaint
17th PEOPLE v CASEY and FELIX
GR No. L-30746
(February 24, 1981)
NATURE:
Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal
Court imposing upon Casey and Felix the capital
punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez.
FACTS:
- On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito filed
an Information for Murder against accused-appellant
Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging:
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the
municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named
accused, being then armed with a knife, together with one
Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with
a firearm and who was (sic) still at large, and the two of
them conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the
said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting
upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his
death.
- In June, 1968, upon arraignment, Casey pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged in the said complaint.
- September, 1968, accused ' appellant Ricardo Felix alias
"Carding Tuwad" was arrested. Accordingly, an Amended
Information was filed by the same fiscal to include Ricardo
Felix as an accused, stating:
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the
municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused Joseph Casey alias "Burl" being then armed with a
knife, together with the accused Ricardo Felix alias "Carding
Tuwad" who was then armed with a firearm, and the two of
them conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the
said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting
upon the latter fatal wounds which directly
- The court a quo rendered the aforementioned judgment
of conviction. It found that two aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the crime, namely: employing
or taking advantage of superior strength and evident
premeditation, one of which qualified the killing to murder.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant
Casey on the amended information without
arraignment
2. WON the Court a quo erred in holding that appellants
acted with evident premeditation and abuse o of
superior strength, and in qualifying the crime
committed as aggravated murder
3. WON whether or not there is conspiracy between the
two accused in the commission of the crime
4. WON the Court erred in discounting Casey’s defense
that he acted in legitimate self-defense
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning
- The lack of arraignment under the amended information
is objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly
on the ground that there is a violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the charge against him. There can
be a violation of such right, however, only when the
amendment pertains to matters of substance. In the case
at bar, the alterations introduced in the information refer to
the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same
charge of murder. They do not change the nature of the
crime against accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy,
evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength are similarly alleged in both informations.
No extenuating circumstance is likewise alleged in both.
Thus the amendment of the information as far as accused-
appellant Casey is concerned is one of form and not of
substance as it is not prejudicial to his rights.
- The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment of an information has been said to be whether
a defense under the information as it originally stood would
be available after the amendment is made, and whether
any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows
that an amendment to an information introduced after the
accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not
expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher
penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment had each been held to be one of form
and not of substance — not prejudicial to the accused and,
therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
2. YES 4. YES

Reasoning Reasoning

- Indeed, accused-appellant Joseph Casey gave an - claim is uncorroborated and contrary to the testimony of
extrajudicial sworn statement that he met accused- the eyewitness, Mercedes Palomo.
appellant Ricardo Felix and another person named Rudy in
Cubao, Quezon City on that fateful day. However, there is
- The fact that the victim sustained four stab wounds while
no showing that this meeting was purposely arranged to
the accused complained merely of abrasions on his back
plan the killing of the victim. In fact, the following questions
indicates the falsity of the claim.
and answers in the said sworn statement show that there
was no preconceived design to kill the victim.
Dispositive the judgment of the trial court under
automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-
- There is evident premeditation when the killing had been
appellants Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix are found guilty
carefully planned by the offender or when he had previously
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without
prepared the means which he had considered adequate to
any attending circumstances and should be sentenced to
carry it out, when he had prepared beforehand the means
reclusion temporal in its medium period. But applying the
suitable for carrying it into execution, when he has had
Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the accused is
sufficient time to consider and accept the final
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of
consequences, and when there had been a concerted plan.
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years and four
16
It has also been held that to appreciate the
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused
circumstances of evident premeditation, it is necessary to
are likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the
establish the following; (1) the time when the offender
deceased Alfredo Valdez in the amount of TWELVE
determined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly
THOUSAND PESOS jointly and severally, and to pay the
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination;
costs.
and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and execution to snow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to
hearken to its warning.

- From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in said

sworn statement, it can be gleaned that the killing was not
a preconceived plan. It was not preceded by any reflection
or deep thought. It was just a spontaneous decision
reached when the victim started to run away upon being
approached by accused-appellant Ricardo Felix.

- There are indeed two accused-appellants in this case

charged with the murder of not one victim but superiority
in number does not necessarily mean superiority in
strength. It is necessary to show that the aggressors
"cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from
their superiority in strength."

3. YES

Reasoning

- Although there is no direct showing that the accused had

conspired together, but their acts and the attendant
circumstances disclose that common motive that would
make accused Ricardo Felix as a co-principal with the actual
slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he performed overt
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

- Ricardo Felix's overt acts consist in instigating the pursuit

of the deceased, in firing a shot at him and in giving Joseph
Casey encouragement by his armed presence while the
latter inflicted the fatal wounds on the deceased. From the
extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant Joseph
Casey, it can also be inferred that Ricardo Felix was the
moving factor of the evil act perpetrated by the former
against the victim. While it was Joseph Casey who inflicted
the mortal wounds that caused the death of the victim, he
did so out of his perverted sense of friendship or
companionship with Ricardo Felix.
 18th THE HON. BENJAMIN A. G. VEGA, Presiding ISSUE:
Judge, Branch IV, City Court of Olongapo, and the
CITY FISCAL OF OLONGAPO
(1) Did the City Court of Olongapo acquire jurisdiction
vs.
over the case in view of the absence of necessary
THE HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding
complaint for acts of lasciviousness?
Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance of
Zambales Stationed at Olongapo City and LEOPOLDO
LAZO RULING:

G.R. No. L-40842 September 30, 1982
FACTS:
Felicitas Vargas filed a complaint for Attempted Rape
against Leopoldo Lazo. After the preliminary investigation,
Judge Villanueva found that "only the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness has been proven to have been committed.
He ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the
accused, and further ordered that "the records of this case
be transmitted to the Clerk of Court, for raffle and
assignment to some other branches for trial on the merits
and/or further proceedings.
The case was assigned to Judge Vega. Judge Vega issued
an order directing that "the records of the case be
forwarded to the City Fiscal for appropriate action in order
that the Court can proceed for trial on the merits. Assistant
City Fiscal Purita H. Cortes filed an information with the
court charging Leopoldo Lazo with the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness. Upon arraignment, Leopoldo Lazo pleaded
"Not Guilty."
Assistant City Fiscal Purita H. Cortes filed a motion to admit
an Amended Information to include an allegation that the
offense was committed with the aggravating circumstances
of "dwelling" and "night time." The accused opposed the
admission of the amended information upon the ground
that he had already entered a plea and the amendment is
prejudicial to his rights, but the court admitted the
amended information. The accused filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the order, but his motion was denied.
Thereafter, trial on the merits proceeded. After the
prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case,
the accused Leopoldo Lazo filed a motion to dismiss the
case upon the ground that the City Court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the case in view of the absence of the
necessary complaint for Acts of Lasciviousnes duly signed
by the complainant or her parents, grandparents or
guardian.
YES. The filing of the complaint for Attempted Rape by the
offended party as required by Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. Although the complaint, which was made the basis
for the preliminary investigation was for Attempted Rape,
and the information and amended information,
subsequently filed after the said preliminary investigation,
were for Acts of Lasciviousness, it is not necessary to
procure the filing of a complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness
because Attempted Rape includes deshonestos or Acts of
Lasciviousness. When the charge is consummated,
frustrated or attempted rape, the defendant may be
convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness.
Under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an
information may be amended even after arraignment at the
sound discretion of the court and when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the accused
While the information against Leopoldo Lazo, in the instant
case, was amended after the accused had been arraigned,
the amendment of the information to include the allegation
that the crime was committed with the aggravating
circumstances of "dwelling" and "night time" is an
amendment as to a matter of form, and, hence, may be
allowed. The additional allegations that the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of
"dwelling" and "night time" do not have the effect of
charging another offense different or distinct from the
charge contained in the original information. The new
allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in case of conviction. The additional
allegations do not also alter the prosecution's theory of the
case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the
form of defense he has or will assume.

The presiding judge denied the motion to dismiss. The

accused moved for the reconsideration of the order, but his
motion was denied Whereupon, the accused Leopoldo Lazo
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction, with the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, to annul and set aside the
proceedings therein for lack of jurisdiction.

After a hearing, judgment was rendered, granting the writ

prayed for, and all proceeding conducted in Criminal Case
No. 8-73 were nullified and set aside, upon the ground that
the City Court of Olongapo had not acquired jurisdiction
over the case since there was no valid complaint for Acts of
Lasciviousness filed.

Hence, the present recourse.

 19th PEOPLE vs. ZULUETA
G.R. No. L-4017 (August 30, 1951)
FACTS:
On October 15, 1949 an information was filed in said
criminal case charging Jose C. Zulueta with the crime of
malversation of public property. Copy of the information is
appended hereto (App. A.). The substance of the accusation
is that the accused, as Acting Chairman of the Surplus
Property Commission, wilfully or thru abandonment
permitted Beatriz Poblete to take and convert 3,000 kegs
of nails of the aforesaid Commission. It is alleged that he
secured the approval of sale to her of said nails at very low
prices by "astutely" prevailing upon Commissioner Angel
Llanes to approve it on the pretext of urgency to expedite
the liquidation of surplus properties. As an alternative
charge the information states that at least through
abandonment the accused permitted Beatriz Poblete to
carry the hardware away. Arraigned on November 24,
1949, the accused pleaded "not guilty."
In this connection it must be recalled that under the rules
of criminal procedure there is further limitation to formal
amendments, namely, that the amendment "can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant." Surely the
preparation made by herein accused to face to meet the
new situation. For undoubtedly the allegations of
conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe
to the accused Zulueta all the facts, knowledge, admission
and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in
furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendments thereby
widen the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of
newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of
the opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to
sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the
controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only
guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial. Needless to
emphasize, as in criminal cases the liberty, even the life, of
the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he
be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible
surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too
many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting
unprepared adversaries.

On January 14, 1950, the prosecution submitted an

amended information (App. B), which practically
reproducing the original accusation, contained the
additional assertion — among others — that in permitting
the misappropriation the accused Jose C. Zulueta acted in
conspiracy with Commissioner Llanes, who had
subsequently been booked for malversation of the identical
public property (nails) in Criminal Case no. 11727 of the
same court.

The accused objected to the admission of the amended

information contending that it introduced allegations about
acts and omission constituting another offense, and that
the amendments were substantial and prejudicial to his
right.

ISSUE:

WHETHER the amendment was purely a matter of form.

RULING: NO.

The amended pleading, with its deletions, transportation

and rephrasing, practically added a full page to the original
seven-page information. Seeing the prosecution's
insistence in its admission, to the extent of appealing to this
Court even at the risk of delaying the proceedings, one
would naturally suppose that its moves are dictated by the
necessities — neither formal nor unsubstantial — of the
case for the People.

Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive

that whereas in the first the accused is charged with
misappropriation, of public property because: (1) he
deceived Angel Llanes into approving the bargain sale of
nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment
he permitted that woman to obtain information a third
ground responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived
and conspired with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-
away transaction.

Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in

effect contradicts the original theory of the information: if
the accused conspired with Llanes, he did not deceive the
latter, and did not by mere negligence permit the sale
 20th DANILO BUHAT v. COURT OF APPEALS and the accordance with the findings of fact set forth in the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

G.R. No. 119601 (December 17, 1996)

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

FACTS:

Danilo Buhat was charged with Homicide in an information

which alleged that petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a
knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu
while the said two unknown assailants held his arms, "using
superior strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which were
x x x the direct x x x cause of his death."

Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution

moved for the deferment of the arraignment on the ground
that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu,
moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City
Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned
information for homicide.

Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial,

opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was arraigned and,
since petitioner pleaded "not guilty", trial ensued.

The City Prosecutor of Roxas City was ordered "to amend

the information by upgrading the offense charged to
MURDER.”

ISSUE:

Whether the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide

to the more serious offense of murder is such a substantial
amendment or a formal amendment.

HELD:

It is FORMAL because the allegation of superior

strength is already there. In other words, from the very
start it was really meant to be murder.

“The real nature of the criminal charge is

determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of
the law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal aspects
of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as
alleged in the body of the information.”

Petitioner in this case maintains that, having

already pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide, the
amendment of the crime charged in the information from
homicide to murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial
to his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that the
original information did allege that petitioner stabbed his
victim "using superior strength". And this particular
allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how
such a killing is technically designated in the information
filed by the public prosecutor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit. The City Prosecutor of Roxas City is HEREBY
ORDERED to file the correct Amended Information fully in
21st GALVEZ v. CA
 22nd PEOPLE v GOROSPE (2) Damage took place in Bulacan, where the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank.
GR No. 74053-54
- Therefore, jurisdiction may be entertained by either the
Bulacan or the Pampanga court.
(January 20, 1988)

BP 22 violation
FACTS:

- In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also

- Manuel Parulan is a wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corp
(SMC). He issued two checks in favor of SMC (P86,071.20
and P11,918.80) that were dishonored for insufficiency of
funds.
- The checks were received at the SMC Bulacan branch,
then forwarded to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando,
Pampanga.
- SMC Finance Officer deposited the check in BPI San
Fernando, Pampanga branch.
- (Parulan’s bank is Planters Development Bank in Bulacan)
appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the
offense is committed by the very fact of its performance;
and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the
fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or
drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case,
therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. The
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of
the issuance of the check. However, it is likewise true that
knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check
of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential
ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing
eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or
another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

- SMC filed for violation of BP22 (1st check) and for estafa - Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in
under par. 2d (2nd check) with the RTC of Pampanga. the Information, which are controlling. The Information
filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was
- After hearing the facts and evidence, Judge Grospe of the committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore,
Pampanga RTC dismissed the case because he said that the within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
two essential elements, deceit and damage, of the offenses
charged occurred and took place in Bulacan. DECEIT took
place when Parulan gave the checks to SMC in Bulacan, with
the false assurance that it had sufficient funds. DAMAGE
occurred at the moment the checks issued by the accused
were dishonored by the Planters Development Bank, the
drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan which received them
from the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for clearing
purpose.

ISSUE:

1. WON any of the essential elements of the offenses

charged occurred or took place within the jurisdiction of
RTC Pampanga.

HELD:

1. YES

- A person charged with a transitory crime may be validly

tried in any municipality or province where the offense was
in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in
which some acts material and essential to the crime and
requisite to its consummation occur in one province and
some in another, the Court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first
Court taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the others.

ESTAFA under par 2d

- Elements:

(1) Deceit took place in Pampanga, where it was uttered

and delivered. The rule is that the issuance as well as the
delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a
holder, which means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof, who in this
case is the Financial Officer of SMC
23rd HE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JOSE
C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND
SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISABELITA
ESGUERRA-ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993
or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything. While "Fencing", is the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft

FACTS: In 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in

We are not unaware of a number of instances when the
the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of
Court would allow a change of venue in criminal cases
precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were
"whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and
taken. An information was instituted against the
there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial
perpetrators in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case
Subsequently, another information for violation of
would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the
miscarriage of justice." Here, however, we do not see the
"Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial
attendance of such compelling circumstances, nor are we
Court of Quezon City against herein respondent spouses
prepared to state that the lower court gravely abused its
Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, from
discretion in its questioned orders.
whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in
Antipolo, Rizal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED, and the orders
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash filed by the
appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED
accused render its judgment as follows:

Xxx the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of

the Municipality or Province wherein the offense was
committed, or anyone of the essential ingredients thereof
took place.

Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal,

outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and
considering that all criminal prosecutions must be instituted
and tried in the Municipality or Province where the offense
took place, this Court, necessarily, does not have
jurisdiction over the instant case.

Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby QUASHED,

without prejudice to the filing of the corresponding action
against the accused in the Court having proper jurisdiction.

The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was

denied in the court's order of 21 March 1986. Hence, the
instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the crime of "fencing" is a continuing offense

that could allow the filing of an information therefor in the
place where the robbery or theft is committed and not
necessarily where the property, unlawfully taken is found
to have later been acquired?

RULING: NO. The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly

two distinct offenses. In People vs. Ledesma, the court
held that a "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting
of a series of facts arising from a single criminal resolution
or intent not susceptible of division. According to Cuello
Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of
right violated, commits diverse acts each of which, although
of a delictual character merely constitutes a partial
execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence of
delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." For it to exist
there should be plurality of acts performed separately
during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed
upon or violated; unity of criminal intent or purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the same penal
provision are united in one and the same intent leading to
the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to

another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against
 24th PEOPLE V. ZAFRA

G.R. NO. 110079 (October 19, 1994)

FACTS: On November 21, 1991 at 10:30 in the evening,

appellant Francisco Zafra, with appellants Feliciano
Braganza Cresencio Velasco and three (3) other
unidentified male companions on board, was driving a
passenger jeep (owned by Efren Cardinal) along Turbina,
Calamba going in the direction of Batangas.

Upon reaching the bridge in Turbina, Calamba, appellant

Zafra was stopped by SPO1 Reynaldo Siman and PO3 Mario
Villa of the Calamba Police as the passenger jeep had no
lights and was being driven in an erratic manner . When
asked by the police about his destination, Zafra replied that
he was going to Batangas. Then, as the police approached
to search the vehicle which was unlighted, the three (3)
unidentified companions of Zafra ran away. The passenger
jeep and the appellants were then taken into custody.

Appellants were investigated on the same evening by SPO3

Rolando Alcalde during which they revealed having killed
the driver of the jeepney and threw his body in Barangay
Real, Calamba. As a result, on November 24, 1991, SPO4
Feliciano Masongsong, SPO2 Elly Villa, SPO1 Rodolfo Hizon
and other civilian agents accompanied the appellants to
Barangay Real where they found the body of Candido
Diongco, the jeepney driver, on a grassy portion near the
end of the South Expressway.

Zafra, Braganza, Velasco together with three (3)

unidentified men were charged with the crime of
carnapping.

Only Zafra, Braganza, and Velasco were arraigned and

tried, the other accused having remained at large. The trial
court found the accused guilty.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Fourth Judicial District

stationed in Calamba, Laguna has jurisdiction over the case
even the killing took place in Alabang, Muntinlupa.

RULING: Yes.

Accused-appellants contend that the Regional Trial Court of

the Fourth Judicial District stationed in Calamba, Laguna
has no jurisdiction over the case as the killing took place in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The contention clearly runs counter
to Paragraph (b). Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
which reads:

(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an

aircraft, or in any other public or private vehicle while in the
course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and
tried in the court of any municipality or province through
which such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during
such trip.

As accused-appellants were apprehended in Calamba while

they were in the carnapped jeepney, the information was
validly filed in Calamba.
 25th CALME V. CA jurisdiction is vested "in the proper court of the first port of
entry or of any municipality or territory through which the
vessel passed during such voyage . . ." This is the applicable
G.R. NO. 78447 August 17, 1989
provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we
do not qualify the same. We fully concur with the finding of
FACTS: Petitioner Wenefredo Calme and four other persons the Court of Appeals, thus:
were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly
throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland
To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400,
passenger ship owned and operated by William Lines, Inc.,
which according to him is the spirit behind the present Sec.
while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City
15(c), Rule 110. The said Act specifically provides, among
on the night of 12 May 1991. Petitioner impugned the
other things, that for crimes committed within the
Oroquieta RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged
navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a
through a motion to quash which, however, was denied by
ship or water craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may
RTC, Oroquieta City. Petitioner Calme’s petition for
be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province
certiorari and prohibition was denied due course and
in which the vessel shall come after the commission of the
dismissed by the CA.
crime.

ISSUE: Whether Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the

Petitioner’s reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision
offense charged against petitioner.
of said Act vesting jurisdiction in the province where the
vessel shall come after the commission of the crime is not
RULING: Yes. carried in the present Rule.

Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took
place while the vessel was in transit, the general rule laid
down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision in
determining the proper venue and jurisdiction and not Sec.
15(c) (now Section 14) thereof since the exact location
where the alleged crime occurred was known.
The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to
rely on Act 400 in determining its true meaning, regardless
of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it.
In fact, it does not seem that the provision of Act 400 was
carried into the present rule, as it is now worded.

Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor

because, according to the Marine Protest filed by the
vessel’s captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles
off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt.
Magallanes) received the report that "a passenger jumped
overboard."

Petitioner’s contention is unmeritorious. The exact location

where the alleged offense was committed was not duly
established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the
vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the
captain was informed of the incident, which does not
necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the
same area. In any case, where the crime was actually
committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it
occurred while the vessel was in transit. "In transit" simply
means "on the way or passage; while passing from one
person or place to another. In the course of transportation."
Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of
Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 100 which provides that"
(w)here an offense is committed on board a vessel in the
course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted
and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry of any
municipality or territory through which the vessel passed
during such voyage subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law."

Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110

governs, Oroquieta City would still be excluded as a proper
venue because the reckoning point for determining the
venue under the aforementioned paragraph is the first port
of entry or the municipalities/territories through which the
ship passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act
No. 400.

We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec.

15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court in that under
the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any
province into which the ship or water craft upon which the
crime or offense was committed shall come after the
commission thereof, while the present rule provides that
 26th CHARMINA B. BANAL vs. TOMAS V. TADEO
GR Nos. 78911-25 (December 11, 1987)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the
orders of the respondent Regional Trial Court, which
rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as
private prosecutor in a criminal case where respondent
Rosario Claudio is accused for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and which denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the order another for
mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as
private prosecutor in the aforestated criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate information for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing
Checks law were filed against respondent Claudio before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order
rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as
private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide
for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a
crime against property but public order."
While an act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see
that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own
act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether
or not the same be punishable by law. In other words,
criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same
felonious
act or omission results in damage or injury to another and
is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or
injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil
action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be
criminally liable, it
is enough that the act or omission complained of is punish
able, regardless of whether or not it also causes material
damage to another. Article 20 of the New Civil Code
provides:
“Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.”
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so p
rovides, indemnification of the offended party may be had
on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered
as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.

The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for

reconsideration.

Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for

reconsideration.

But the respondent court denied petitioner's motion for

reconsideration.

Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the

respondent Court.

Issue:

Whether or not a private prosecutor may intervene in the

prosecution for violation of BP 22 which does not provide
for civil liability.

Held:

Yes. A private prosecutor may intervene in a BP 22 case

because there is a civil liability in BP 22.

Under Art. 100 of the RPC:

“every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly

liable.”

Thus, a person committing a felony offends namely

the society in which he lives in or the political entity called

the State whose law he had violated;and

the individual member of that society whose person, right,

honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured
or damaged by the same punishable actor omission.
 27th JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR. vs. The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member,
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) beneficiary or contributor of the AFP-RSBS, and that even
if it were so, it would not sustain a direct and material
damage by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the
G.R. Nos. 140576-99 (December 13, 2004)
AGFOI to intervene would open the floodgates to any
person similarly situated to intervene in the proceedings
Facts: and, thus, frustrate the speedy, efficient and inexpensive
disposition of the cases.
Luwalhati R. Antonio, then member of the House of
Representatives, representing the First District of the The Court agrees with the contention of the petitioner that
Province of South Cotabato, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the AGFOI are not the offended parties envisaged in Section
the office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
that anomalous real estate transactions involving the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable
payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the government
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
had been entertained into between certain parties. She
Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal
then requested the Ombudsman to investigate the
action personally or by counsel, who will act as private
petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then
prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the
President of the AFP-RSBS, together with twenty-seven
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of
(27) other persons for conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-
justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove
RSBS funds and defrauding the
to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
government millions of pesos in capital gains and
parties and further delay the final disposition of the case.
documentary stamp taxes.
The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied
institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
Several informations was filed for violation of Section 3 (e) actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose
and Corrupt Practices Act and Falsification of Public of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
Documents, defined and penalized under paragraph 4, deter him and others from committing the same or similar
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate
him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The law firm of Albano and Associates filed a Notice
of Appearance as private prosecutors in all the
aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and
Flag Officers Inc. (AGFOI). The petitioner opposed the
appearance of the law firm contending that charges brought
against him were purely public crimes which did not involve
damage or injury to any private party; thus no, no civil
liability had risen and under the rules of court an offended
party may be allowed to intervene through a special
prosecutor only in those cases where there is civil liability
arising from the criminal offense charged. the law office on
the other hand averred in their comment that since the one
they are representing are our members and investors of the
AFP-RSBS, their interest will be prejudiced on the matter.

The Sandiganbayan sided with the law firm and let them
appear, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the member of the AGFOI are to be

considered as offended party under Section 16, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court.

Held:

No. The members are not to be considered as offended

party.

Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, which reads:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal

action.— Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability
is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense.