G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC,
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel
V. Daza III.
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was
not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent
on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code,
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios
Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen
based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration
No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino
father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California,
September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino
and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended
the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's
motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5The pertinent portions of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws
under the principle ofjus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as
his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents
brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents
also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an
alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine
citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance
to the United States.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on
May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand
eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who
obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two
thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty
four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues
involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
The Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, and declared
respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of
vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the Makati board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of
Makati.
A petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution was filed, and Petitioner
contends that the COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
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 1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was
already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and
voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on
7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner
even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-
Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano —
whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an
original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's
motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore,
cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any person allowed to
initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be
permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he
has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or
proceeding.
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the
Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties
and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or
proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation
nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of
Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came
out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the
respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner
filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If
Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter
of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right
to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of
1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition
for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present
petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also
with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the
ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for
any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in
the Charter of the City of Makati.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with
him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
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without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance —
and I reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more threatening than that of mere double
citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function
of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double
citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the
problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections
of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600
chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely
known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of
the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in
the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that
time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound
by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were
concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner
Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of common knowledge in Manila.
It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also
means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new
section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in
the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who
spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which
pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which
elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national
security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the
wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their
oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion
when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a
genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double
allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the
Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But
considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising
from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will
the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission
was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in
R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
"[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is
considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
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individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any
person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but
his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that
such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country
of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation
disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce.
There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be
an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election.
Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a
citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question.
So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of
Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he
also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at
the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a
citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of
our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts.
The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of
the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign
government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by
all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and
power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September
4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,
while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least,
he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en
banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is
solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was
made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have
been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political
election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress
to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998,
contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE
THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE
THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR
PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo
v. COMELEC it was held:
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
4
the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that election of Philippine citizenship.
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that,
when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his US Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
Philippine Government. renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of
the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to
be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the
age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon
majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no
merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said
in Aznar v.COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation
of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does
so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
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G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC
AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the
question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The
allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public
respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the
petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself
but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable
requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular
verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was
indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be
granted and the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January
20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26,
1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or
twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without
the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the
reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as
follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of a Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or
of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the
election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of
the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that —
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a
filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as
required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is
essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court
to this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals.
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he
says, it was filed ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto
with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on
January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it
as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on
February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo
warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988.
He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his
petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by
the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of
the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could
not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it,
the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No.
1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980,
respectively. To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended
for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections,
which were supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No.
1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication
as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which
became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. — The rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after
their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the
ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee.
At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record
that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on
March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila
Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became
effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in
that case that publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite such
effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may
have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in
the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for
the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however
this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment
of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the
case shall be dismissed.
6

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above prescribed are not paid,
theCommission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the
action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo
warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at
the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable,
to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so
demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than
the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the
timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the
subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more
important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address
it now in this same action.
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby
allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the
respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action.
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the
rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring the
case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will not
change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to
serve the ends of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v.
Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber
Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12
SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162. Sound practice seeks to accommodate
the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the
government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case A marked characteristic of
our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court
should act, and act with finality.
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for
stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as
"its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino
citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason
of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by private respondent
still pending before it?
We find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's
citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and
found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the
petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with
Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan
concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote,
while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been
made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged
naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and
Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is
important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof
that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This
conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had
married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with
the CID upon his return to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the
Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the
petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976.
That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of
appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19
October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following
statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the
Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do
hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the
Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not
required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted
Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must take an
oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of
affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily have
7
any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his
former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June
1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50 of
Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading
information of a material nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If
such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under
Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under Section 18
of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act
other than marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian citizenship under
Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN
EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private
respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry
made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra
has elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an
oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all
other allegiance.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR.
Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian
reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs
and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and
fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I
will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of
Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the
Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny
that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien
and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked
for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was
granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that
he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and.
even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a
foreigner.
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did
not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members
joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an
unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that
he was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses
Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine
of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was
properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked
only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one
of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that
he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified
in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill
his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot
stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also
worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present
Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
8
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of
Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted
country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The
possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not
mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does
the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He
does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after
which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
(Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a
citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution
itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio
City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the
barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident
therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and
able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should
not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and
thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the
second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not
have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to
the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines
have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief
that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently
lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner
was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as
such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as
he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in
1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes
for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were
all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was
supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two
reserving their vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
the earlier case ofGeronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic
rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.
Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without any dissent, although one
reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court
held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in
all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
9
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and
cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit
to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage,
rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not
find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit
and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he
cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country
turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election
to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines
and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered
to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this
decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31,
1989, is LIFTED.

10
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs.MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY
HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4
July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on
behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the
parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit
marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred
the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition
for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a
naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same
person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24
November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the
aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for
issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5
December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December
1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of
which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of
Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral
argument on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by
petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release
dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition
to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is
urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from
immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of
Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9urgent
motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the memorandum in
furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral
argument dated 8 December 1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988)
dated 9 December 1988,13 and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15
December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three
(3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a
citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport. 15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December
1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988.
Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift
temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in
1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the
proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10
February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a
citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd.20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his
prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and
represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry,
CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have
unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
material facts are not only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner.
A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of
due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show
proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine
citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into
the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when
required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this
Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.
Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
11
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
LEE, respondents.
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared
the rightful governor of Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number
of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office
has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds
the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution 5 granting the petition with the following disposition 6:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT
a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes 8dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29,
1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening
of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he
averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee -
should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of
Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT
the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the
completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of
Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of
the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and
the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this
resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996,
the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
12
 The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions" 15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to
warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition
and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of
Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of
petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which
are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying
Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the
ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending
the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However,
Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since
they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate
question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing
bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in
this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but
that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of
several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers
of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992,
and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-
Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he
comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable
decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having
successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation
under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime
13
opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent
Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00
p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers
met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum
dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted
for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as
defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy
furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other
words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once
created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully
couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal
to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as
is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . .
(and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious
review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for
repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is
confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on
June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June
29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his
application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization
was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained
during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there
were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was
submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of
Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily
tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not
unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-timeentry into Philippine
political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely
seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a
natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his
naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to
escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace --
and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted
no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism
vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when
the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both
the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run
and be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in
said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date
thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an
aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which
question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends
to be elected;
14
 * a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office, 31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day 32 the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to
be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.
This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from
a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the
Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates.
Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the
filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this
Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by
aliens,i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the
time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the
effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for
that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring
the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a
"registered voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he
was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended thecitizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as
another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to
require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to
govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province .
. . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually.
Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words,
the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is
actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained
as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted
again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8, 1995." 37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including
the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a
candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest
before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can
be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at
such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And
since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo
was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the
afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections
and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such
time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers,
or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical
requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo, 42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . .
(and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past
events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which
would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
15
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the
legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes. 43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a
new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail
of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital
status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing
"a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such
provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens
before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the
right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not
exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedyand a new
right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but
now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725
such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General 44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since
they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs.
Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only
upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of
C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations
and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable
that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A)
retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so
operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
thereof." 45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those
persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence.
And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as
important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative
intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t
has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident
purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute
does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some
constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive
effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The
reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that
the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the
law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible
thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression,
then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner
to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the
repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of
date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no
showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from
giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should
now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of
time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced
his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should
not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that
the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. 47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were
filed. 48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the
mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in
connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should
now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on
August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election
16
(May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become
moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?" 49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that,
when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to
the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of
the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or
abuse. 52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-
028 as affirmed in totoby Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and
executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by
this Honorable Court. 54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June
30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds
that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring
Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and
these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for
all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution: 55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections.
However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June
21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its
Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the
Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence,
in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No.
95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee
reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317
questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary
period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or
a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to
"exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority
to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317
obviously is one. 58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC, 59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that
pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the
winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463;
Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule,
however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all
and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883;
Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within
ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6)
days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired
jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not
the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just
that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court
in the aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows:
17
 The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and
none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate,
much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo
was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992
to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying
due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and
subject to the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in
both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an
(omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be
voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally
wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has
any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since
in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the
people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee --
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered
beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code
which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded
by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
affirmed en banc 63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal,
as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely
academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; 64 viz.,
"(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe
reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to
remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our
two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery.
The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there
may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such
retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of
such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material
representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel.
Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec
Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were
issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In
dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave
abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide
disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this
point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the
dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within
the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during
which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after
18
thefifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by
the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the
25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining
his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995
elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are
Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own
citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a
finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be
arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all
three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being
an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such
"public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the
last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there
be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it
differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f)
refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to
"candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of
differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that
the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have
specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of
candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on
the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath
of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do
not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be
understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all
purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up
rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the
Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here.
The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed,
so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the
naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in
the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice.
In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to
be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected
candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and
an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full
force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature
of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent
behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and
political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be
given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which
he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he
possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course,
are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a
continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we
emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to
hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political
laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way
of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will
of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (citations omitted). 67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must
exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the
19
majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who
are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before
the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of
the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical
and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the
larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in
Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches
of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to
serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of
candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his
demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite
several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal
technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines
even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility
of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would
have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the
most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning
to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every
liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis,
over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to
be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.
No costs.

20
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs.RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary,
MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General,
CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO,
Secretary of Justice, respondents.
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a
rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein1 for the
implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25, 1963, herein
petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn
— filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of
foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act
No. 220 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is
necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency this case and to
prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said
petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued
restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the
Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and
petitioner's pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties
appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the
respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident may require some
pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the
same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to
argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him
sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find
no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in
Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these
basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the
Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just
return for their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a
planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the
Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said
commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice
producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has
sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he
believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted
all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held,
however, that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one",3 or where the controverted act
is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, 4 or where
the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 7 The case at bar fails
under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is,
therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the
proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but
was authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in
the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8 that in
cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for
the restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of
our armed forces, "the President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of
war or emergency withoutwaiting for any special authority".
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by
petitioner herein - on which our view need not be expressed — we are unanimously of the
opinion - assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force — that the two Acts are
applicable to the proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such
as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines".
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association,
corporation orgovernment agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines",
although, by way of exception, it adds, that "the President of the Philippines may authorize the
importation of these commodities through any government agency that he may designate", is
the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452
explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency" from
importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452,
prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to
importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government
agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and
employee of our Government, our government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of
said laws even to importations by the Government as such, becomes more apparent when we
consider that:
21
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of
the Philippines" and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;
2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government
agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding
taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions; and
3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than
five (5) years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender
is a public official and/or employees", he shall be subject to the additional penalty specified
therein. A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or
employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the
former are those of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may
have a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The
provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof
provides a similar additional penalty for any "officer or employee of the Government" who
"violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to
apply the same to transactions made by the very government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those
prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and
domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the Government." Pursuant to
Section 1 thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other
officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the
Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus,
departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including
government-owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or
make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public use, public
buildings, or public works shall give preference to materials ... produced ... in the
Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions
hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for
the armed forces,preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The
importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside
from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security —
predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension
created by the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and
corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of
said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national
emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to
bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made
as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national
emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly
authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in
such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it
ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the administration
throughout the country under the proper dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the
occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...". (Emphasis applied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely
so much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation.
The means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional legislation.
Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be
availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1.
Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national
defense may be secured by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national
mobilization",9which does not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national
mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may by other laws
provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work
cited10 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time" 11 or when
he has placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law". 12 Since neither condition
obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory, if accepted,
would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the Executive
to that effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the
people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the
respondents, as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that
there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army — not the
civilian population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that
appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a
certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be
rejected - we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now — as respondents explicitly
admit — Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of
producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies
precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
22

It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the
Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit
importation — but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be complied
with.
IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma —
It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof by
representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should
prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be
resolved — under the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of
time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign
relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned
contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already
paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the
sell of the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the
same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior
thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted
by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute,
the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, alsoinsist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said
theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not
authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set
up and that of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative,
by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived
"of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma
does not render this case academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the
conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2)
main features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from
our local planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the
Government, and leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is
whether the proposed importation — which has not been consummated as yet — is legally
feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with
the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be
complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed
importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned
laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.
The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not
respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed
importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction
prayed for cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had
and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in
granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its
provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is,
accordingly denied. It is so ordered.
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs.HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of
National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as
Minister of Public Highways, respondents.
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles
is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of
due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
23
arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F.
Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense;
Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar
Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes
devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The
Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and
regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative
power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos,
issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major
causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or
parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device
to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic
safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation
for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos],
President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of
motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early
warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors
at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled
or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including
expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning
device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the
motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and
issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for
each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and
regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned
shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into
effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of
Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby
amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every
motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one
pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid
motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and
regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4There was issued
accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10,
1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month
period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration
requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of
Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of
Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent
Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction
No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD)
on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative
Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device
may come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD
specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that
every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially
numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each
EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official
receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders,
Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take
effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as
Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore
and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies
mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules
and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates
the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness
because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided,
onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers
instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-
called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being]
compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a
practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of
EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and
Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112
(Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained,
the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p
prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to
file an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the
petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of
this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then
on November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual
allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and
stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner
owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and
XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No.
229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation
24
Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the
constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation
of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without
legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of
this Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of
grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the
Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the
police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the
charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion
captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the
authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v.
Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968
Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the
Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took
pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times
intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the
implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its
highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined.
As noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision
as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power
with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of
the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugosoreiterated the doctrine, such
a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision
as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as
noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above
sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm
anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes
aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in
the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or
urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent.
The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an
enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and.
avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of
fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the
National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the
imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the
implementing rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay
the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale
was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American
Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject
clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption
of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and
such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning
devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly
only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable
data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt
therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * *
*. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the
installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could
mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-
on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of
such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive
Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction
to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well
known penchant for exaggeration.
25
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning
device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars
are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2)
"battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front
and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) *
* * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters,
any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway,
or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately
get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is
it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision. 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the
Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No.
229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle
owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for
motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of
this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source.
In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even
personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially
conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative
order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous,
immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices
'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *.
Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be
committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that
unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an
unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant
case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the
constitutional defects alleged against it. 32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised
on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic,
not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest,
is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that
this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice
or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the
courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense.
That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then
to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional
provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are
wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override
legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in
the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its
jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last
offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack
on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if
valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative
power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the
trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would
not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision
of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
"safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice
Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect
that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty
of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.'
Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is
authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the
hands of Congress being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by
this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter
of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
26
devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this
country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta
sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not
even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive,
and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a
more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule"
in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig
not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately
argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a
party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything
but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

27
AKBAYAN Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR,
MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE
JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO,
RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147179. March 26, 2001]
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONERS
MEHOL SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION,
FLORENTINO TUASON and RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission on
Election (COMELEC), respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated petitions [1] before us is the
exercise of a right so indubitably cherished and accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no
less than by the fundamental law - the right of suffrage.
Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million
youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent
COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.[2]
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of
the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and Peoples Participation, through a Letter
dated January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing
the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to
register before the COMELEC deadline.[3]
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant
Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay
City.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum
No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New
Voters Only, excerpts of which are hereto quoted:
Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee on electoral Reforms, Suffrage and Peoples Participation presided over by the
Hon. Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters
Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is the request by youth organizations to hold
additional two days of registration. Thus, participating students and civic leaders along with
Comelec Representatives were in agreement that is legally feasible to have a two-day
additional registration of voters to be conducted preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001
nationwide. The deadline for the continuing voters registration under R.A. 8189 is December
27, 2000.
To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for hakot system, certain restrictive
parameters were discussed. The following guidelines to serve as safeguards against fraudulent
applicants:
1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of age or less and will be
registering for the first time on May 14, 2001;
2. The applicants shall register in their places of residences; and
3. The applicants shall present valid identification documents, like school records.
Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are likewise agreed:
1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses immediately prior to the
actual registration of the applicants;
2. The Comelec field officers will be given the opportunity to verify the voters
enumerators list or conduct ocular inspection;
3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and
4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and honest conduct of the
registration and drum up interest to register among the new voters.
The rationale for the additional two-day registration is the renewed political awareness and
interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent political events in the
country among our youth.Considering that they failed to register on December 27, 2000
deadline, they approved for special registration days.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this
request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified
available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for Operations
(DEDO) for the estimated costs of additional two days of registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for consultation on the practical side
and logistical requirements of such additional registration days. The meeting will be set at 1:30
p.m. at the Office of ED.[4]
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads
and representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod
Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of
the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.[5]
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of
which reads:
Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17
and 18, 2001.
Commissioners Rufino S. B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the request while
Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the students
request. With this impasse, the Commission construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II
(YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,
docketed as G.R. No. 147066, which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELECs
Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision
effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly
situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for
registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in
the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University of the
Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179, praying that
28
this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day under the
continuing registration provision under the Election Code.
On March 13, 2001, this Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions and further
required respondents to file their Comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring at
10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court resolved to set the consolidated cases for
oral arguments on March 16, 2001.[6]
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, recommended that an additional continuing registration of voters be conducted at
the soonest possible time in order to accommodate that disenfranchised voters for purposes
of the May 14, 2001 elections.
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present petitions, is tasked to
resolve a two-pronged issue focusing on respondent COMELECs issuance of the assailed
Resolution dated February 8, 2001, which Resolution, petitioners, by and large, argue to have
undermined their constitutional right to vote on the May 14, 2001 general elections and
caused the disenfranchisement of around four (4) million Filipinos of voting age who failed to
register before the registration deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a) Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001;
b) Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters
during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000
deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a
prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised
within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to
pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and purposes,
are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the
democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of
opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other
rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our
Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect,
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT
OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO
SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE
WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE
IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned
upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in
addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996.
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process.Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should
not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the
significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly,
in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could
be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is
not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic operational considerations
bear great weight in the adjudication of the issues raised in the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing
registration, is explicit, to wit:
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a
special election. (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period
within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voters list,
provides:
SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List Any registered voter, representative of a
political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election xxx.
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its Comment:
x x x The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety
mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants,
and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of securing the
voters substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
In real-world terms, this means that if a special voters registration is conducted, then the
prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If
we do not, then no one can challenge the Voters list since we would already be well into the
100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of the principles of due process,
this would open the registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of
the voters list, and consequently, that of the entire election.
x x x It must be remembered that the period serve a vital role in protecting the integrity of the
registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any
time to evaluate the evidence on the application. We would be obliged to simply take them at
face value. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voters list
full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and
ghosts x x x.
x x x The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of
registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom
might not even be qualified to vote. x x x the very possibility that we shall be conducting
29
elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of
the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections,
regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own results. x x x
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called standby powers or
residual powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29,
Republic Act No. 6646[7] and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436,[8] thus:
SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - If it should no longer
be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts,
the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the
activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage.
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act.
Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition,
precise meaning and coverage, thus:
a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein
he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the
Election Registration Board;
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by
herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from
contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. True enough, both provisions,
although at first glance may seem to be at war in relation to the other, are in a more
circumspect perusal, necessarily capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature
in the form of amendments to a statute should be given effect, together with other parts of
the amended act. It is not to be presumed that the legislature, in making such changes, was
indulging in mere semantic exercise. There must be some purpose in making them, which
should be ascertained and given effect.[9]
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. [10] Interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of
interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of
justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile
them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should
harmonize them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same
legislature.[11]
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the
present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the
instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may
validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the letter
of Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into
play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available
period prior to election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is, to our
mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain pre-election acts are still capable of
being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the
conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELECwhich is the constitutional body tasked by no less
than the fundamental charter (Sec. 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to decide, except
those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including registration of
voterspainstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the operational impossibility [12] of conducting
a special registration, which in its on language, can no longer be accomplished within the time
left to (us) the Commission.[13]
Hence:
xxx xxx xxx.
19) In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a walk
in the park for the Comelec. Allow us to outline what the Commission has yet to
do, and the time to do it in:
20) First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by the 19th of March. The
Projects of Precincts Indicate the total number of established precincts and the
number of registered voters per precincts in a city or municipality. Without the
final Project of Precincts, we cannot even determine the proper allocation of
official ballots, election returns and other election forms and
paraphernalia. More succinctly said, without the Project of Precincts, we wont
know how many forms to print and so were liable to come up short.
21) More Importantly, without a completed Project of Precincts, it will be
impossible to complete the rest of the tasks that must be accomplished prior to
the elections.
22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be constituted on or before the
4th of March. In addition, the list of the members of the BEI including the
precinct where they are assigned and the barangay where that precinct is
located - must be furnished by the Election Officer to all the candidates and
political candidates not later than the 26th of March.
23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter Registration
Records of registered voters in particular precinct, must be inspected, verified,
and sealed beginning March 30, until April 15.
24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters List must be finalized and printed out of use
on election day; and finally
25) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of the Voters
Information Sheet must be completed on or before April 15.
26) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities, the Comelec will have
roughly a month that will act as a buffer against any number of unforeseen
occurrences that might delay the elections. This is the logic and the wisdom
behind setting the 120-day prohibitive period. After all, preparing for an
election is no easy task.
27) To hold special registrations now would, aside from being Illegal, whittle that
approximately 30-day margin away to nothing.
28) When we say registration of voters, we do not - contrary to popular opinion -
refer only to the act of going to the Election Officer and writing our names
down. Registration is, In fact, a long process that takes about three weeks to
complete not even counting how long it would take to prepare for the
registration in the first place.
30
 29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the Comelec, the other
Commissioners, prepared a time-table in order to see exactly how the
superimposition of special registration would affect the on-going preparation
for the May 14 elections.
30) We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to hold the special
registration on April 16 and 17. These are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it
takes in account the fact that we only have about 800,000 Voters Registration
Forms available, as against an estimated 4.5 million potential registrants, and it
would take about 14 days If we were to declare special registrations today to
print up the difference and to verify these accountable forms. After printing and
verification, the forms would have to be packed and shipped - roughly taking up
a further two and a half weeks. Only then can we get on with registration.
31) The first step in registration is, of course, filling the application for registration
with the Election Officer. The application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189,
is then set for hearing, with notice of that hearing being posted in the city or
municipal bulletin board for at least one week prior. Thus, if we held
registrations on the 16th and the 17th the posting requirement would be
completed by the 24th. Considering that time must be allowed for the filling of
oppositions, the earliest that the Election Registration Board can be convened
for hearing would be the May 1st and 2nd.
32) Assuming and this is a big assumption that there are nit challenges to the
applicants right to register, the Election registration Board can immediately rule
on the Applicants registration, and post notices of its action by the 2nd until the
7th of May. By the 10th, copies of the notice of the action taken by the Board
will have already been furnished to the applicants and the heads of registered
political parties.
33) Only at this point can our Election Officers once again focus on the business of
getting ready for the elections. Once the results of the special registration are
finalized, they can be encoded and a new Computerized Voters List generated -
at the earliest, by May 11, after which the new CVL would be
posted. Incidentally, it we were to follow the letter of the law strictly, a May 11
posting date for the new CVL would be improper since the R.A. 8189 provides
that the CVL be posted at least 90 days before the election.
34) Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the inspection, verification, and
sealing of the Book if Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the May
14, election date, and still not have finished our election preparations.
35) After this point, we could have to prepare the allocation of Official Ballots,
Election Returns, and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for
the new registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the contracts would be
awarded, the various forms printed, delivered, verified, and finally shipped out
to the different municipalities. All told, this process would take approximately
26 days, from the 15th of May until June 10.
36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold the elections.
xxx xxx xxx.[14]
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative
agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great
weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and
functions, in the best position to know what they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing
circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible
be done.[15] The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo
tenetur ad impossible.[16] In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible
thing. Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require
compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally[17], it must be
presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law
which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of statutes,
the interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic, common sense,
reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view that the stand-by power
of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its
being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners bare allegation that they were disenfranchised when respondent
COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of January 13, 2001
the day before the period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections commences is, to our
mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions
and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed an
application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint
before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the
Election Officer to register between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13,
2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his
application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the
registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the Firm view that petitioners
were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A.
8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or
blame. They admit in their petition[18] that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within
the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not
realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no
one come to court with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the
vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re
subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC did not
commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some
patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No. 3584 which, in respondents
own terms, resolved to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new
voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of laws.[19]
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC, in denying the request of
petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the
applicable law on the matter --Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution,
respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all
31
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, [20] inter alia, questions relating to
the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that
chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its
constitutionally-mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of
its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters registration, pertains to
the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of
grave abuse of power of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not
validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of
respondent COMELEC a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with
independence.
As to petitioners prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that this
Court cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without
transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.[21]
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of
the present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the
satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as
to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible,
possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves
the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related cases,[22] we enunciated that the
Courts function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing...(of) grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power... It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. [23]
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has issued
Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 19, 2001, to allow the
conduct of Special Registration of new voters. House Bill No. 12930 has been filed before the
Lower House, which bill seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period
provided for under said law. Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276[24] was filed before the Senate, with
the same intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special
registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.This Court views the foregoing factual
circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the executive and legislative
departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way of the conduct by the Commission
on Elections of a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and mandamus are
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

32
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,respondents.
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.
Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate
national aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and
urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free
the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the
nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and
circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition
in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to
continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception
therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the
forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on
nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration
with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among
other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and
principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now
engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for
purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this
action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not
expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized
in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one
subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as
regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not
impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power. —
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but
petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before
proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well
to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the
determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the
due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the
legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be
clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought
forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless,
just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so
we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through
which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not
define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the
limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power. —
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions
of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)
33
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom
in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their
application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance
of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the
Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection
with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can
the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process
test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the
State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of
the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the
other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have
nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative.
They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and
unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to
override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would
be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further
and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes
more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself,
which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or
citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that
they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin
to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite
number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop
into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is
enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have
multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential
as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily
life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of
capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to
members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the
community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the
various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers
around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the
daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the
clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a
small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part
of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait. —
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly
but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers
of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life
appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural
produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has
replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the
patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-
bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and
he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and
extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food
and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
34
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance,
but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware,
textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were
it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa,
his control over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath
it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that
the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is
said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business
make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits
serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of
the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination
and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings,
and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official
statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of
the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have
the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap
through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the
very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien
invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same
official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade,
remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As
observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is
practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is
the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have
been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien
dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other
things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events
since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the
Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that
the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos
"of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their control the
commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed.,
p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the
economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution,
he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of
the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political
independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private
capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national
economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced,
timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of
the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the
struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it
did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an
organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the
possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien
interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from
alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino
Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National
Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears,
alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not
only to control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to
be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger
the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough
organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on
such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles
to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or
would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the
complete subservience of national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely
unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their
mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by
the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because
a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to
agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as
a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find
the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly
out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly
suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a
fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the
interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that
alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable
practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or
other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating
35
artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have
hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much
so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save
the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated
price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had
to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic
deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among
themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that
they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to
their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by
the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land,
violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of
lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with
fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government.
As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government
and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing
feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in
the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of
population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing
goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate
the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population.
They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of
crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the
needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed
law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to
free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it
rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the
national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and
by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses
solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the
mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the
national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain
and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily
stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his
Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and
exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved
country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien
retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes
his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general
distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help
the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being
merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very
important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above,
their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the
welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which
they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise
of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State
to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and
reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike,
and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in
duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not
declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the
authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic
Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal
protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A
classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4.
One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —
36
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No.
2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the
Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a
valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise
trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted
with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9
Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example,
acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this
instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the
object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal
footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves
to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in
favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United
States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the
license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her
enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished
from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as
frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of
hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has
declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the
following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are
supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the
court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309
(Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in
the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a
deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be
sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the
relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid.
In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme
Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance
of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination
against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear
in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of
permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and
that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the
legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol,
124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210
P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies
injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar
statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs.
May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340
(Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests,
knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to
them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an
infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90
N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void,
but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the
aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the
community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California
statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship
was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because
there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them,
so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was
the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices
dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources.
In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which
imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of
age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification
and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained. —
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States
hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But
in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or
capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no
question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059
(1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the
keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local
dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of
business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall
prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their
business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's
belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other
hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business.
In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to
withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared
invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for
37
the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that
the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine,
1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because
the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said,
aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers
with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's
economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the
national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been
shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can
do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive
home the reality and significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are
without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own
people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different
psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to
suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and
whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and
formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same
inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United
States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further
enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be
affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason
for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens
as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed
are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied,
and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia
vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering
the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to
determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire
whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights
are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon
the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and
must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the
police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of
the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised
has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation
to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered. —
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men;
that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to
prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by
petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to
their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also
found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control
of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering
the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and
ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the
retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus
correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control
and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and
privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional
limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the
bill, which later was enacted into law:
38
 This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our
economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the
ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our
free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are
not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national
security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While
this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life
and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is
none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are
subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or
country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and
domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people
can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.
— the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional
restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from
economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the
Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation
that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the
precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution
expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative
power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment
introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter
because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law
which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail
trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66
and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony
of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the
exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article
XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The
nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy
laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the
same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its
duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with
the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of
public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation,
the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures,
the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the
Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been
denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would
defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not
subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of
the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is
primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with
legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due
process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not
unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law,
some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens
would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of
competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is
problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from
foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law
which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise
the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation
(I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title
and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term
"regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization"
and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But
"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have
always been included within the term regulation.
39
 Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature
may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7;
quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating
liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such
liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters
being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State,
48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of
restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be
regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there
is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating
police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of
which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p.
42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that
the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question
adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore,
the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be
included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from
"regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling
within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term
"regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under
which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other
provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of
the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have
been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition
provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of
the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval.
It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The
objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby
of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no
strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The
Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains
nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of
the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations
Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade,
and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April
18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any
other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of
all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the
law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment
by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail
or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy
a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of
the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege
of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident —
as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion
the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law
are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any
other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have
been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should
have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for
them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope
of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal
protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should
be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
40
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,vs.RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary,
MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General,
CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO,
Secretary of Justice, respondents.
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a
rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein 1 for the
implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25, 1963, herein
petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn
— filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of
foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act
No. 220 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is
necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency this case and to
prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said
petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued
restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the
Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and
petitioner's pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties
appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the
respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident may require some
pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the
same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to
argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him
sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find
no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in
Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these
basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the
Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just
return for their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a
planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the
Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said
commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice
producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has
sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he
believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted
all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held,
however, that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one",3 or where the controverted act
is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, 4 or where
the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 7 The case at bar fails
under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is,
therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the
proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but
was authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in
the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8 that in
cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for
the restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of
our armed forces, "the President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of
war or emergency withoutwaiting for any special authority".
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by
petitioner herein - on which our view need not be expressed — we are unanimously of the
opinion - assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force — that the two Acts are
applicable to the proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such
as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines".
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association,
corporation orgovernment agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines",
although, by way of exception, it adds, that "the President of the Philippines may authorize the
importation of these commodities through any government agency that he may designate", is
the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452
explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency" from
importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452,
prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to
importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government
agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and
employee of our Government, our government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of
said laws even to importations by the Government as such, becomes more apparent when we
consider that:
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of
the Philippines" and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;
2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government
agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding
taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions; and
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3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than
five (5) years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender
is a public official and/or employees", he shall be subject to the additional penalty specified
therein. A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or
employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the
former are those of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may
have a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The
provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof
provides a similar additional penalty for any "officer or employee of the Government" who
"violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to
apply the same to transactions made by the very government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those
prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and
domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the Government." Pursuant to
Section 1 thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other
officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the
Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus,
departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including
government-owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or
make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public use, public
buildings, or public works shall give preference to materials ... produced ... in the
Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions
hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for
the armed forces,preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The
importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside
from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security —
predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension
created by the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and
corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of
said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national
emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to
bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made
as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national
emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly
authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in
such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it
ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the administration
throughout the country under the proper dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the
occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...". (Emphasis applied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely
so much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation.
The means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional legislation.
Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be
availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1.
Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national
defense may be secured by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national
mobilization",9which does not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national
mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may by other laws
provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work
cited10 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time"11 or when
he has placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law". 12 Since neither condition
obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory, if accepted,
would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the Executive
to that effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the
people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the
respondents, as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that
there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army — not the
civilian population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that
appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a
certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be
rejected - we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now — as respondents explicitly
admit — Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of
producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies
precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the
Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit
importation — but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be complied
with.
IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma —
It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof by
representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should
prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be
resolved — under the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of
time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign
relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned
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contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned
paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the laws.
sell of the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense. V. The writ of preliminary injunction.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not
been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed
same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a prayed for cannot be granted.
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is,
thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted accordingly denied. It is so ordered.
by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute,
the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, alsoinsist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said
theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not
authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set
up and that of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative,
by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived
"of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma
does not render this case academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the
conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2)
main features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from
our local planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the
Government, and leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is
whether the proposed importation — which has not been consummated as yet — is legally
feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with
the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be
complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed
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