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Manoeuvre warfare: a new military paradigm for business decision making

Article  in  Management Decision · March 2003

DOI: 10.1108/00251740310457614

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Manoeuvre warfare: a new military paradigm for
business decision making
Keywords
Decision making,
Business planning
Abstract
Emphasises the dangers of
complacency in business thinking
and of the risks associated with
strategic decisions that are
repetitive and predictable.
Introduces a military decision
making model termed manoeuvre
warfare and its history, successes,
and applications within a business
context. Recounts some well-
known military and business
decision making blunders and
warns of the strategic implications
of falling into the same flawed
decision-making traps. Concludes
with arguments supporting
aggressive strategies that exploit
the elements of speed, surprise,
and flexibility.
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
# MCB UP Limited
[ISSN 0025-1747]
[DOI 10.1108/00251740310457614]
[ 168 ]
Richard J. Pech
Graduate School of Management, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
Geoffrey Durden
Graduate School of Management, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
Introduction
If everyone is thinking the same, no one is
thinking! (General George S. Patton)
History has demonstrated repeatedly that in
warfare, predictable, off-the-shelf strategies
result in long drawn out battles of attrition
and exhaustion ± with all of the attendant
costs, wastage, and pain. In contrast,
strategies characterised by speed,
innovation, disruption, and the unexpected,
often appear to bring less costly and more
rapid results. D’Aveni (1994) has used the
term hypercompetition to describe the
increasing intensity and pace of competition
in the modern business landscape. It is
appropriate then to refer to some aspects of
the business landscape as a war zone,
particularly at the decision making level.
Numerous parallels can be drawn between
military and business decision processes.
This article describes a war-fighting
paradigm termed manoeuvre warfare, which,
if applied within a business context, can:
increase a firm’s repertoire of competitive
actions;
improve the effectiveness of retaliatory
strategies against other firms’ competitive
actions;
help to anticipate and to some extent drive
the competitive dynamics of the business
landscape; and
increase the firm’s probability for rapid
growth and greater longevity.
Intelligence, economy of effort, the elements
of surprise and deception, and rapid
movement are the underpinning drivers
behind manoeuvre warfare. It will be argued
that this paradigm shift in military thinking,
if adopted in the business arena, has the
potential to defeat business opponents,
regardless of their strength or ``firepower’’,
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which refers to their size and position of
historical market dominance.
Background
Lind (1985) describes manoeuvre warfare
(also sometimes referred to as air-land battle)
as a concept which best explains Hannibal’s
defeat of the Romans at Cannae in 216 BC,
German infiltration tactics in the offensive of
1918, the Second World War Blitzkrieg,
Patton’s successful race across Europe, and
General Sharon’s attack across the Suez
Canal in 1973. In 1974, a retired Air Force
Colonel, John Boyd, made a study of air-to-air
combat during the Korean War. American
aviators achieved a 10 : 1 kill ratio over their
North Korean and Chinese opponents, even
though the American F-86 was considered by
many to be inferior to the Russian MiG-15.
According to Lind (1985), Boyd determined
that the F-86 was superior in two respects.
Firstly, the F-86’s bubble canopy gave its pilot
good outward vision, while the MiG’s faired
canopy made it difficult to see out. Secondly,
the F-86 had high-powered and highly
effective hydraulic controls that the MiG
lacked. The result was a much faster MiG but
a more manoeuvrable F-86. The American
pilots were able to adjust their actions
quickly and with each alteration the MiG’s
response became more disorientated until
the MiG pilot either panicked or,
inadvertently, provided the F-86 pilot with a
clear firing opportunity.
Boyd observed that, as well as having a
more manoeuvrable aircraft, the F-86 pilot
followed a process where he observed where
he was relative to his enemy, he oriented
himself on the basis of his observation, he
then made a decision to act, and then put that
decision into effect. The pilot would then
observe and re-orient relative to his enemy,
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Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
decide on his next action, and then act again.
The F-86 pilot would continue this cycle until
his opponent became disorientated and lost
control. This has been termed the Boyd Cycle
or OODA Loop (observe, orient, decide, act).
Lind (1985) claims that Boyd’s study of
ground combat identified a similar pattern:
where one side would present the other with
a sudden, unexpected change, or a series of
such changes to which the other side could
not adjust, resulting in defeat, usually at
small cost to the victor. Boyd found that the
loser had often been physically stronger than
the winner, but the loser had suffered panic
and/or paralysis similar to that experienced
by the North Korean and Chinese pilots.
Wehrmacht victories by Rommel, Guderian
and von Manstein, in retrospect, are credited
by Lind and his adherents (cited in Hooker,
1993) with such tactics. British generals, such
as Slim and O’Connor and Soviet
commanders, such as Rokossovsky, also
applied this principle now termed
manoeuvre warfare (Morris, 1993).
Morris (1993) describes manoeuvre warfare
as a method of seeking a decision in battle
with the greatest economy of effort. The focus
is on the enemy, not ground, and speed of
action and reaction must be faster than that
of the enemy. Manoeuvre warfare
concentrates on the enemy’s weaknesses, it
creates multiple threats to throw the enemy
off balance, and it constantly creates and
shifts through new options more quickly
than the enemy can respond. The battle is
dictated by action as opposed to following
carefully laid plans. According to the
philosophy underpinning manoeuvre
warfare, velocity and sustained momentum
can create enough force to move a larger and
seemingly immobile mass. Similarly,
strategies based on speed can throw larger
opponents into a state of confusion and
disarray by forcing them to move at a pace to
which they are unaccustomed and at a time
for which they are ill prepared.
Manoeuvre theory implies a philosophical
shift from the previously held doctrine of
attritional or positional[1] warfare where
strength was pitted against strength. The
essence of the new doctrine is to generate
havoc and confusion amongst the enemy to
destroy their cohesion and will to fight. Pech
(2000) argues that the ultimate aim of this
doctrinal reorientation is to create a state of
preparedness for future conflicts as opposed
to training with the old mindsets and
techniques developed and carefully refined
during previous campaigns[2].
The increasing pace of change
Lissack and Roos (2001, p. 57) point out that
decision making processes and models are
often based on four false assumptions:
1 the world is stable enough that changes
that may occur are foreseeable;
2 prediction is possible;
3 boundaries are clearly defined; and
4 outcomes are more important than
processes.
As a consequence of the above assumptions,
decision makers often fail to create,
develop, or exploit opportunities. We act as
though we are in control of events, when
clearly often we are not. De Kluyver (2000)
argues that the pace of change is more
likely to accelerate than decelerate. He
continues by explaining that the drivers of
this change include the relentless pace at
which competition is becoming global, the
technology revolution, and deregulation.
Janszen (2000) reinforces the message of
unpredictability by suggesting that
economic systems are non-linear, like the
weather, and therefore prediction of the
behaviour of such systems is always
hazardous. Lissack and Roos (2001, pp. 57-8)
complete the portrait of a turbulent
business landscape by arguing that:
. . . managers perceive that continuity is but a
fragile, temporary, and illusive notion, the
assumption of predictability does not hold
anymore . . .. Prediction at best, is possible in
the very short term: the dartboard works
better in the long term. Boundaries are
always shifting: composition of work teams,
temporary organizations, the company, the
industry, and the competitive environment
are rarely predictable.
Using Boyd’s terms, some competitors are
cycling through their decisions more quickly
than the traditional and slower moving
firms, resulting in various states of
disorientation. Some decision makers blame
the turbulence of the business landscape for
their failures, but perhaps they were simply
outsmarted by strategists with a better view
of events, greater manoeuvrability, and who
were able to cycle through their decision
processes more rapidly.
Parallels between military and
business failure
Psychologist Norman Dixon (1976) studied
military disasters to identify common
patterns in decision making in an attempt to
explain why and how these tragedies
occurred. Dixon concluded that decision
making incompetence was the reason for the
[ 169 ]
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
[ 170 ]
majority of the failures that he studied.
Pech (2002) has identified parallels between
Dixon’s examples of military decision
making incompetence and a number of
business disasters.
Fundamental conservatism and clinging to
outworn traditions
Dixon cites a number of military examples
including the British preoccupation with
drill and parades during the Boer War. While
the Boers focused on guerrilla tactics and
non-conventional warfare, British troops
focused on solid line formations, mechanical
precision, and a rigid dependence on order.
Dixon (p. 52) complains that the British
demonstrated a lack of positive transfer from
the lessons learnt in the Crimean War.
Instead, they were consumed with
appearance and form, spending only two
months of the year in training while the
remainder was occupied with parading. He
argues that they seemed obsessed with
maintaining tradition rather than
responding to the need for change.
An example of a business strategy, which
mirrors this pattern, could be that of IBM’s
apparent reluctance to enter the desktop
computer market. In 1983, the industry’s
monitor, Dataquest, claimed there were more
than 800 firms turning out desktop
computers, while IBM was still only ``dipping
its toes into the pool’’. Again, in 1986, IBM
appeared to miscalculate the need for change
when it thought it could continue with the
Intel 286 chip rather than moving to the 386.
Sobel (1999) explains that IBM was afraid that
the 386 would make its PC compete with the
company’s expensive mid-range computers,
thereby cannibalising sales. Did IBM really
believe that such a decision would impact on
competitor and buyer behaviour by stopping
them from pursuing greater processing
power? Compaq, which had no such
conflicting attachments, moved to the 386 and
immediately increased its sales, largely at
IBM’s expense. Apple, an entrepreneurial
company that seriously challenged IBM’s
sales, also fell into the trap of believing that
its approach of retaining its own operating
system was the right decision. While on the
one hand, Apple demonstrated flexible
thinking and great foresight, it was doggedly
determined to cling to its newly created
``tradition’’ of individualism, while IBM,
finally demonstrating innovative thinking,
opened its architecture to the clones and
thereby created an industry standard, which
both Apple and Commodore resisted to their
own detriment.
A tendency to reject or ignore information
that is unpalatable or that conflicts with
preconceptions
The Bay of Pigs fiasco where overwhelming
evidence to the contrary failed to stop the
military from implementing poorly
conceived plans, provides an example of the
tendency to ignore unpalatable information.
Based on a number of false assumptions, the
USA government launched an attack on
Castro’s army. Dixon (1976, p. 398) explains
that nothing went according to plan. No one
believed the CIA’s cover story, the ships
carrying reserve ammunition failed to
arrive, by the second day the invading army
were surrounded by Castro’s ``weak’’ army of
20,000 well-equipped Cuban troops, and by
the third day the invading army were either
dead or behind bars. Seven months later the
USA recovered what was left of their
invasion force for a ransom price to Castro of
$53 million.
Dixon (p. 30) argues that people are
reluctant to revise plans after having
gradually and perhaps painfully accumulated
information in support of a decision. His
evidence supports the view that the greater
the impact of the new (and contrary)
information, the more strenuously it will be
resisted. Sobel (1999) discusses the collapse of
Henry Kaiser’s foray into the automobile
industry in the 1940s. In 1949, Kaiser, the
founder of the hugely successful business
entities of Kaiser Steel, Kaiser Aluminium,
and Kaiser Ventures, was advised to declare
insolvency, largely because of his short-lived
automobile enterprise. Brushing this
suggestion aside, he instead introduced new
model cars. Ignoring sound advice from
automobile industry experts, he shocked
everyone by expanding further with the
purchase of Willys-Overland. This expansion
was funded out of other Kaiser companies.
His refusal to accept advice and listen to
people with more industry experience than
he had himself formed the catalyst for the
demise of the entire Kaiser empire.
A tendency to underestimate the enemy
and overestimate one’s own capability
Examples of this tendency include the
Vietnam War for the USA and the war in
Afghanistan for the former Soviet Union,
where underestimating the capability of
``untrained’’ and ``poorly equipped’’ troops
cost these countries dearly. Miller (1990),
discussing the decline of once-successful
business companies has termed this malady
the Icarus Paradox, where outstanding
firms become overconfident and their
executives become careless and possibly
obsessed with a particular focus or strategy,
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
leading to excesses and extremes that can
result in, amongst other things,
underestimation of the competition and an
overvaluing of one’s own abilities. Miller (p.
158) relates the example of GM’s chairman,
Roger Smith, who, believing that the small-
car market was an aberration of the oil
crisis, stated in 1982 that if the price of gas
were to drop to ``a nickel a gallon’’, the
Japanese penetration of the USA market
would disappear. He completely failed to see
that the Japanese successes were based as
much on quality, performance, and style, as
they were on fuel consumption.
An obstinate persistence in a given task
despite strong evidence against it
One of the best examples taken from history
describes Hitler’s persistence in capturing
Stalingrad when he must have known that
the Russian armies had improved greatly in
leadership, training, and material since
previous major battles. Hitler’s Chief of Staff,
General Kurt Zeitzler, pleaded with him day
after day to permit a withdrawal of troops,
but Hitler, having no concept of fluid defence
tactics, was not able to admit that the Sixth
Army was being sacrificed to an unsound
plan. This mistake marked the beginning of
the end for Hitler’s dreams of world
domination.
Argenti’s (1976) analysis of the collapse of
Rolls-Royce in 1971 provides a clear business
example of obstinate persistence in the face
of looming failure. Rolls-Royce symbolised
British quality and workmanship and, in the
1960s, the company’s jet engines powered
more than half of the civil aircraft in the
western world. It appears that Rolls-Royce
placed all of their eggs in one basket in 1967
by launching the development of the RB-211
aero engine for wide-bodied airliners.
Despite alarming financial projections for
1970-1971, the chairman of the company
stated in June of 1970 that the board was
``satisfied’’ that the company had sufficient
working capital and later, at the AGM in
July, he claimed that the company was ``in
good shape’’ and on the verge of ``reaping the
benefits’’ from the RB-211 project. In
February of the following year, to the shock
and dismay of the engineering world, the
receivers were called in. While tests showed
that the engine was finally approaching
performance expectations, the company,
predominantly managed by engineers, had
ignored financial indicators that pointed to a
looming disaster due to the RB-211’s massive
developmental cost blowouts.
Failure to exploit ground gained and a
tendency to pull punches rather than push
home an attack
The Roman armies often used the ``golden
bridges’’ principle where they offered a
cornered enemy army one line of dignified
retreat in order to save their own troops from
the damage inflicted when engaging an army
fighting for its life. It has been claimed that
Hitler offered the British a ``golden bridge’’
when they evacuated their troops from
Dunkirk. While some argue that he may have
desired a peace treaty with the British,
conflicting evidence suggests that he was
fooled by GoÈring’s claims that the Luftwaffe
could destroy the retreating armies so that
the tank crews could be rested (Jacobsen and
Rohwer, 1966). Whatever the explanation,
Hitler failed to destroy the retreating troops,
allowing them time to recover, regroup, and
rearm for a later assault on his armies.
Sobel (1999) gives the example of American
Tobacco who refused to add filters to their
cigarettes, believing them to be ``affectations’’
and perhaps ``effeminate’’. In 1961 American
Tobacco’s Pall Mall1 brand was the USA’s
highest selling brand, their refusal to add a
filter, in the face of growing market as well as
anti-smoking pressure group demands, cost
the company dearly. Sobel states that, in 1977,
American Brands1 (formerly American
Tobacco) top brand, Pall Mall1 , had slipped
to fifth place in industry sales. The top two
brands were filters and the next two were
mentholated brands. American Brands fell
apart in 1994, selling its domestic tobacco
business to Brown & Williamson. American
Tobacco, once on top, decided not to take any
risks with success, failing to take notice of
changes in the market, and in so doing, were
the authors of their own demise.
Inadequate reconnaissance
Again the military examples of the Bay of
Pigs and Vietnam spring to mind. Miller
(1990) discusses the poor managerial
performance of Sears CEO, Ed Brennan, who
was asked to name the biggest problem he
would face in the coming year, a year when
speciality stores such as K-Mart and
Wal-Mart were inflicting enormous damage
on Sears’s sales. Brennan replied:
I don’t see any huge problems. I feel very good
about how we’re positioned strategically
(p. 163).
According to Miller, Brennan had no
strategic plan and did not appear to be
interested in gathering the information
necessary to develop one, perhaps because he
really believed that Sears was under no
threat. As Bowman and Helfat (2001) point
out, strategic planning does have a positive
[ 171 ]
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
[ 172 ]
impact on performance, something that
appears to have eluded Brennan.
Reconnaissance is required to ensure that
the strategic plans reflect the reality of the
business landscape (Shay and Rothaermel,
1999). Brennan appears to have been in
complete ignorance of his competitors’
activities, basing his views on Sears’s strong
historical position rather than its actual
weakening position.
A predilection for frontal assaults, often
against the enemy’s strongest point
Perhaps the most recent example of the
frontal assault may be the attack on
David Koresh and his followers at Waco,
Texas. In New Zealand an entrepreneurial
new airline upstart, Kiwi Air, in a head-to-
head strategy, tried to take on the incumbent
Air New Zealand in the lucrative trans-
Tasman market between New Zealand and
Australia. Thinking that it could win on
price, Kiwi introduced low-cost fares that
undercut Air New Zealand by a considerable
margin. Air New Zealand’s response was to
launch its own cut-price subsidiary Freedom
Air. Being smaller and less able to absorb
losses and taking on Air New Zealand at one
of its strongest points, along with the
unplanned and unforeseen groundings
caused by the sudden eruption of a major
volcano, Kiwi Air was soon relegated to
history.
A belief in brute force rather than the
clever ruse
The trenches of the First World War bear
witness to the truth (and futility) of the
mislaid faith in mass and blood versus an
alternative strategy based on velocity and
brains. In many ways, the Cola Wars prior to
1961 (when Coca-Cola introduced Sprite1 and
started a proliferation of new brands and
competitive behaviour) could be viewed as
attrition warfare, with each side ``pounding’’
the other with similar strategies and tactics
rather than one side attempting the
unexpected and continuing to surprise their
competitor until forcing a decisive victory.
Although analysts may argue that both
Coca-Cola and Pepsi’s marketing campaigns
were amongst the most innovative,
sophisticated, and aggressive of all major
advertisers (Yoffie in Ghemawat, 1999), they,
in fact, reflected altering intensities of
firepower rather than a variety of tactics to
throw the other off balance. Perhaps Pepsi
demonstrated innovation by entering the
bottled water market in 1994, as it took
Coca-Cola another five years to announce
that it too was entering this lucrative market.
The newer energy drink wars between Red
Bull1 and V1 focus on the ownership of the
word ``vitalise’’ with large sums of money
being poured into litigators’ coffers as they
slug it out, seemingly using brute force
rather than the clever ruse.
Failure to make use of surprise and
deception
Hadley (in Hooker, 1993, p. 364) discusses the
use of deception to occupy the enemy’s
thinking. He cites an example from the
Second World War where a British pilot, at
great risk, flew over one of Germany’s largest
airports and dropped a helium-filled soccer
ball coated in a thick layer of luminous paint.
As the object slowly drifted toward the
runway everyone cowered in shelters,
believing this to be some new form of deadly
weapon. On striking the runway the ball once
again rose majestically into the sky, drawing
all attention as the ground troops fearfully
attempted to understand this new weapon.
Scientists from all over Germany were
hastily called to come and analyse this new
threat. In total, the analysis tied up a
specially requisitioned train to transport the
ball to a remote research facility, and it tied
up numerous troops and scientists over a
number of weeks until they were able to
render a report. When it was finally revealed
that the ``weapon’’ was a helium-filled soccer
ball, the scientists were immediately
criticised for their lack of imagination and
inability to assess the inherent dangers posed
by such a weapon. They were sent back to
continue their investigations until they could
come up with a better assessment. It was
inconceivable to the Germans that the
British would risk the life of a pilot and his
aeroplane in order to drop a painted soccer
ball. While everyone was tied up assessing
the threat posed by this new ``weapon’’, they
were unable to do anything else of a more
useful nature to contribute to the German
war effort.
Oliver (1999) relates a number of USA
business examples where incumbent market
leaders are surprised daily by new
competitors from firms or countries they
have barely heard of. Oliver describes how
distributors with long supplier relationships
are stunned to learn that the companies they
represent are leapfrogging them and going
direct to end-users. Businesses from entirely
different industries and traditions are
catching technology-oriented firms
completely off guard by invading their
markets. Some of these examples do not
necessarily demonstrate radical product
innovations; they do however illustrate the
efficacy of surprise and speed as deliberate
strategies for rapid market penetration.
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
Some of Oliver’s examples include: Canon,
a ``camera’’ company, leveraging its
``reproduction’’ know-how and invading new
territory with the introduction of a new
product line into the global photocopier
market, and AutoNation, a new player, who
changed the ``rules of engagement’’ in the
auto-dealer market with a national chain that
sells cars from all makers in all price ranges.
Meanwhile, Ford and GM have each started
``in-house’’ dealer networks and are even
selling direct to consumers via their
websites. Southwest Airlines defied
traditional competitors in the stagnating
passenger airline business in the USA by
introducing a whole new business model that
has seen them grow steadily and profitably
for some 25 years. Similarly, FedEx’s
radically new ideas about overnight package
delivery caught both the Post Office and UPS
off guard. Wal-Mart, a leader in
``megastores’’, is currently invading the
traditional grocery and small convenience
store market with a new line of small stores.
These examples reinforce Hamel and
Prahalad’s (1993) and Hamel’s (1996)
argument that there is an overwhelming
focus on current resources and present
competitors but how often is the question
asked: ``Which companies could pose a threat
in the future?’’ Oliver’s examples of firms
that appear to have sprung strategic
surprises on their competitors, demonstrate
that these firms have used their capabilities
to move beyond the confines of their
traditional roles and markets. Christensen
(1997) points out that disruptive technologies
can be particularly easy to overlook and can
be particularly dangerous, however, it is
argued that strategies exploiting the
elements of surprise and speed may be just as
dangerous (if not more so). It appears then
that the abilities to surprise, anticipate, and
manoeuvre are all crucial factors in the
strategic arsenal of those seeking to realize
and sustain competitive advantage.
A new paradigm for business
decision making
Dixon’s analysis of military decision making
incompetence describes a mindset that can
be likened to the ``attrition’’ philosophy of
war fighting. It is suggested that the
implementation of a ``manoeuvre’’
philosophy of war fighting may prevent the
recurrence of such failures in both a military
and business context. Table I shows the shift
in military doctrines from one that has been
loosely defined as attrition to one of
manoeuvre.
Mobility in business can be equated with
flexibility, rapid decision making, and an
action orientation such as described by Boyd.
While some businesses prefer to stand their
ground and rely on their ``mass’’ to crush
competitors, smaller firms and newcomers
have demonstrated that a combination of
speed and surprise can cause enough
momentum to dislodge older and more
established firms from their
traditional markets.
Many of the examples of business failure
could be categorised as being the result of an
``attrition’’ mentality. Decisions were often
made rigidly and by one person or a small
group of people with a narrow and
ill-informed perspective. Decisions were
made from an authoritarian and centralised
position, with faith in weight and mass
. . . equating to a perception of greater size
and, therefore, a false sense of superior
capability, and with little consideration of
market/consumer acceptance or
competitors’ (and potential competitors’)
retaliatory strategies. The decision makers
often demonstrated complete but perhaps
misguided faith in their firm’s ``firepower’’.
Antal (Hooker, 1993) explains that from an
``attrition’’ perspective, ``firepower’’ is aimed
at destroying the enemy, but with
overwhelming ``mass’’ as the means (p. 66).
The examples of the Cola and energy drink
wars demonstrate the application of ``mass’’
and ``firepower’’, as opposed to clever
thinking, surprise, and speed in order to
defeat their competitors. Kiwi Air made a
frontal assault against Air New Zealand’s
strongest point, its international travel
capability, rather than firstly attempting to
establish Kiwi Air’s reputation with some of
the less competitive domestic routes. Almost
three decades ago, Cohn and Lindberg (1974)
suggested that smaller firms should avoid
meeting giants head-on, that they should be
flexible and move fast, in other words these
authors advocate the deployment of
movement over firepower (Mf). In this
context, ’``fire’’ could be interpreted as a
metaphor for marketing muscle, or current
market penetration, market acceptance, etc.
There is no reason why Cohn and Lindberg’s
advice should be ignored by larger
businesses.
``Orientation’’ as referred to in Table I
could be likened to Kaiser’s infatuation with
automobiles rather than focusing on the
things that really mattered, such as market
demands (consumers wanted an
eight-cylinder engine, which Kaiser failed to
produce), controlling costs, and managing
the productivity of his workforce.
[ 173 ]
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
[ 174 ]
Table I
The shift in military thinking from attrition to manoeuvre
C on cept Attrition
S tra te gy D irect
O rie ntatio n Terrain
T argets Strengths
P lanning C entralised
H istoric al
S tru cture R igid
O rders D etailed
P rescrib ed
U nd erstanding Ex plic it
C on trol C entralised
D om inant
T actic s Fire pow er
Fm *
Attrition
E m p hasis D isciplin e
M ass
W eight
B loo d
N ote : * Fm e m pha sizes firepow er over m ob ility, M f em p hasizes m obility ove r fire. M f w ill still utilize fire but this
w ill o nly be rega rd ed as one of m any optio ns rather than relying upo n fire a s the m a in effort
S ource : Adap ted fro m Antal (in H oo ke r, 1993 )
The stereotypical view of the military still
holds that commanders are martinets
autocratically making decisions and barking
orders at their subordinates. Manoeuvre
theory recognises that the battlefield is too
chaotic to control centrally and that the
commander must, therefore, direct
operations through guidance rather than
active control. Lind (in Hooker, 1993) argues
that mission tactics emphasize clarity of
direction but leave the subordinate with
maximum decision making latitude in order
to determine how to achieve the desired
result. Mission tactics allow honest mistakes
(p. 12). Similarly, a business manager must
lead by giving subordinates clear guidance
rather than vague sentiments or conversely,
orders of such an exacting nature that the
subordinate has no decision making freedom.
Akio Morita of Sony Corporation is quoted as
saying:
The best way to train a person is to give him
authority ... . We tell our young people: Don’t
be afraid to make a mistake, but don’t make
the same mistake twice. If you think it is good
for the company, do it (Mintzberg and Quinn,
1991, p. 851).
These arguments suggest the possibility of
taking the war-fighting doctrine of
manoeuvre theory and applying a similar
paradigm shift to the conception and
deployment of twenty-first century business
decision making. Upbin (2000) almost
cynically explains how McDonald’s, Texas
Instruments, Fannie Mae, Motorola, and
M a noe uvre
Ind irec t
Ene m y
W eak nesses
De cen tra lise d
Anticipatory
Fle xible
M ission bas ed
Discretio nary
Im p lic it
De cen tra lise d
Gu iding
M o vem e nt
M f*
Agility
Trust
Velo city
Surprise
Bra in s
Electronic Arts have all hired military
strategists to help them with their business
strategies. But the point he fails to make is
that the emphasis is no longer on the direct,
massed attrition warfare model of the past,
but on the application of intelligence and
rapid manoeuvre. Hooker (1993, p. 79) argues
that manoeuvre theory preaches the futility
of formulaic rules more strongly than any
comparable theory of war. His view is that
manoeuvre theory stresses an intellectual
approach focusing on how to think, not what
to do. From the business perspective,
De Kluyver (2000) asserts that sweeping
change and competitive turbulence have
forced strategic orthodoxies to be questioned
with increasing frequency. Military and
business thinkers appear to be in agreement
with regard to the following:
linear, formulaic planning that leads to
predictable behaviour is not an option in a
turbulent environment; and
strategic pre-emption is available to
anyone (within reason) who chooses to be
a player.
Why is it that so many firms have been
reluctant to include a manoeuvre paradigm
amongst their strategic options? Besides the
inability of many decision makers to think
outside the square or what is regarded as
custom and practice, Hadley (in Hooker, 1993)
explains that many people mistakenly
believe that examples of brilliant manoeuvre,
the Trojan horse for example, are perceived
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
as acts of ``deceit’’ rather than acts of
``deception’’. Deceit as a strategy is
unacceptable to many people, and as a
consequence, deception is often overlooked
as a potential strategy for defeating a
competitor. A search of the literature quickly
identifies a dearth of material on strategies of
deception, and yet, what is wrong with the
example described by Hadley of the British
pilot dropping the helium-filled soccer ball?
As Hadley rightly concludes, decision
makers should ask themselves daily: ``What
Trojan horse can I employ to gain success or
victory so cheaply?’’ (Hooker, 1993, p. 366).
Lessons
Research by Chen and Hambrick (1995) found
that smaller firms competing with larger
firms differed from their larger counterparts
in terms of competitor behaviours. They
found that smaller firms attempted to retain
initiative by engaging in more competitive
attacks than their larger, more complacent
competitors. The smaller firms implemented
their competitive actions more quickly. The
larger firms suffered from structural
complexity, bureaucracy, and unwieldy
information processing and decision-making
systems. A commonly used example is the
rapid rise of the upstart Apple Computer
Company that challenged the giant IBM,
growing from a garage in 1977 to a company
with sales of $2 billion by 1985. There is no
reason why larger firms should tolerate size
or tradition as excuses for poor performance.
Size is a trait that can give a false sense of
strength and security, while tradition freezes
the mind by confounding it with 20/20
historical insight and unyielding future
shortsightedness. A great deal has been
written on the lethargy inherent in larger
organisations but how can such a malady be
avoided? Lind (1985, p. 7) argues that
manoeuvre warfare means you will not only
accept confusion and disorder and operate
successfully within it, but through
decentralisation, you will also generate
confusion and disorder.
As an example, Bellamy (Holmes, 2001)
discusses the strategies of the Mongol armies
who were highly mobile and manoeuvred by
avoiding cities and returning to them later.
They moved so fast that their victims vastly
overrated their numbers, leading to
terrifying tales of vast Mongol hordes.
According to Bellamy (p. 541), they were in
fact usually numerically inferior to their
opponents.
Lind cites the tactics of the German
Blitzkrieg, which, to the traditionalist way of
thinking, were inherently disorderly. Higher
headquarters could neither direct nor predict
the exact path of the advance. But the
multitude of German reconnaissance thrusts
generated massive confusion among the
French in 1940. Each was reported as a new
attack. The Germans seemed to be
everywhere; and the French, who had better
tanks and superior troop numbers but whose
system demanded certainty before making
any decisions, were paralysed.
These examples should strike fear into the
hearts of traditional decision makers as they
elicit a number of lessons:
businesses must ceaselessly guard against
another Blitzkrieg-style surprise attack;
``proud’’ traditions and embedded
practices can become liabilities;
novel ideas should not be disregarded on
the basis of the perceived credibility or
past history of their originators;
the measuring instrument used for
estimating capability may be obsolete
when confronted with a new paradigm in
competitive behaviour;
perceptions of one’s own strength may be
based on false assumptions;
one’s high self-prescribed code of conduct
may not be equally adhered to by less
scrupulous competitors; and
velocity and surprise are better tactical
methods than reliance on former
successes, size, and strength.
In 1990, Hewlett-Packard showed symptoms
of complacency and was slipping from being
an industry leader to simply being another
unprofitable technology giant, such as IBM
or Digital Equipment Corp at that time.
David Packard, one of the original founders
and nearing 80 years of age, came out of
retirement to find an organisation that had
become completely centralised in its decision
making, was rigidly bureaucratic, and which
was operating by consensus management
through a total dependence on committees.
Hewlett and Packard together took charge of
their company. They reduced the number of
managers, restructured the company into
two semi-autonomous divisions, and
abolished the committee system to speed up
decision making, which was also
decentralised. The result was an aggressive
and market-responsive company that, once
again, led the industry in innovations and
pricing standards (Pitta, 1993). The
innovations and changes made at
Hewlett-Packard during this period may
perhaps have been one of the major catalysts
for IBM’s announced loss of $2.8 billion in
1991, its first annual loss in IBM’s 80-year
history.
[ 175 ]
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
[ 176 ]
Figure 1 shows the failings of the military
and business decision-making processes
where the decision makers distort
information through a filter composed of
attitudes, beliefs, and values of a
conservative and tradition-bound nature.
Information that conflicts with
preconceptions is rejected and/or ignored,
and no attempt is made to seek out
information that may counter the established
view. As a result, the threat posed by
competitors and potential competitors is
underestimated and personal capability is
overestimated. A history of previous
successes, a heavily filtered decision-making
process, and a degree of stubbornness
together result in a formulaic (and, therefore,
highly predictable) approach, often using
brute strength as the delivery mechanism.
There is no evidence of positive transfer from
recent experiences due to an overt reluctance
to learn and change.
Objective information is a crucial
determinant for the success of existing as
well as new ventures. In order for manoeuvre
warfare to succeed, a commander requires
accurate and timely information. Similarly,
business intelligence plays a crucial role in
the business decision-making process
Figure 1
Factors that lead to decision-making failure
(Shaker and Gembicki, 1999). The examples
of business failure in this discussion have
illustrated weaknesses in the decision
making process, which can often be
attributed to neglect, arrogance, or a narrow
focus resulting in ignorance of what is
happening at the industry periphery where
potential competitors move stealthily,
seeking an opportunity to ``pounce’’ upon
their unsuspecting ``prey’’.
Simply storing information is not enough
according to Bollinger and Smith (2001), who
make a distinction between information and
knowledge. They argue that information is
processed data and can reside within
computers, whereas knowledge is defined as
an understanding, awareness, or familiarity
acquired through study, investigation,
observation, or experience over a course of
time (p. 9). Bollinger and Smith are convinced
that the management of knowledge, which
they believe reflects and develops an
organisation’s wisdom, will help an
organisation become more competitive by
using new knowledge to reduce costs, increase
speed, and meet customer needs. Continual
development and use of the knowledge
management system will also result in a
growing collective wisdom. The authors argue
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
that organisational knowledge is a strategic an accurate and active
asset, provided that the culture is supportive knowledge-management (collection,
of the embedding, sharing, and updating of
storage, interpretation, and
knowledge in the quest for improvement. The dissemination) system; and
examples of failure, both military and the ability to thrust and manoeuvre
business, have illustrated the dangers of rapidly relative to an opponent or
ignoring or rejecting knowledge and shown potential opponent.
how these choices have influenced decision-
Manoeuvre can be likened to the flow of
making failures. Floyd and Lane (2000) warn
water, which Sun-tzu described as avoiding
that organisations need to be sensitive to the
heights (strengths) and flowing to the
risk of strategic role conflict when
lowlands and depressions (weak points).
implementing major changes, with particular
Apple Computers avoided IBM’s strengths in
care being taken to manage the magnitude of
the mainframe market by exploiting the
change and the development of trust
computing giant’s weakness in the desktop
throughout every level of the organisation.
market. Later, IBM applied a more powerful
Antal (Hooker, 1993) explains that under
counter manoeuvre against Apple by opening
conditions of manoeuvre warfare, the
its architecture to the clones, marginalizing
commander must trust his or her
the ``individualists’’. Apple and Commodore
subordinates to execute their missions
were alienated from the growing market and
according to the commander’s intent. The
its demands for an industry standard, and, as
dynamics of the battlefield mean that the
a result, became increasingly isolated and
commander cannot see everything at once or
unattractive to consumers. Such is the ebb
be everywhere at once. Subordinates are
and flow of competition. The victor is often
therefore trained to think and execute in the
the one who can sustain the element of
absence of the commander. Subordinates’
surprise beyond first strike. Infiltration
understanding of the commander’s intent
tactics, probing for a competitor’s
must be implicit rather than explicit. Antal
weaknesses, reporting back, and decisive
argues that success in battle often falls to the
exploitation of those weaknesses will
side that can quickly and consistently take
increase the tempo of the ``attack’’, creating a
advantage of the enemy’s mistakes. He
paralysis similar to that demonstrated by
continues by explaining that this is not
Sears CEO, Ed Brennan, when he failed to act
necessarily the result of faster moving units
in the face of competitors’ moves against
or vehicles; it comes from faster, more
Sears’ interests.
focused thinking (p. 70). Antal claims that
In his description of Boyd’s study of
exploitation of faster and more focused
air-to-air combat in the Korean War, Lind
thinking in order to defeat an opponent
(1985) explained the importance of the F-86’s
requires a commander to:
bubble canopy, providing clear forward and
reduce the level at which decisions are
peripheral vision. This can be likened to a
made and allow trained subordinate
firm’s need for 360-degree vision/knowledge,
leaders maximum freedom of action
so that the business is concerned not only
guided by the commander’s intent;
with what lies directly ahead, but also with
train cohesive units capable of
what is approaching from the rear or the
independent action;
side. Boyd’s study also identified the
develop a streamlined information
importance of effective hydraulic controls in
gathering and information processing
the F-86. In metaphorical terms, this suggests
system (knowledge management) that
that a business must be able to change
promptly reports information internally,
direction or alter its line of focus quickly and
laterally, and to higher levels in the
effectively without stalling (crashing in the
organisation; and
process). These criteria suggest a change in
instil the understanding that decisions
the management focus away from control and
will be made without the availability of
technology and towards knowledge
perfect information.
management and responsiveness.
These instructions provide simple guidelines In the early years of the Apple/IBM
for the military and business decision conflict, IBM focused on its technology to the
makers alike. Success is often dictated by a detriment of market responsiveness. Kaiser
competitor’s speed of response; therefore, the Motors produced expensive cars
efficacy of decision-making processes is a demonstrating a lack of responsiveness to
crucial factor in an organisation’s strategic what the market wanted or was willing to
arsenal. An organisation, therefore, requires: pay. GM’s Chairman, Roger Smith, failed to
competent people; see what was closing in on him in the early
a culture based on trust; 1980s ± he appeared to lack the knowledge
[ 177 ]
Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
[ 178 ]
and the vision to understand that the
automobile market had undergone
fundamental changes. Rolls-Royce were
obsessed with the development of the RB-211
aero engine, but better management of their
collective knowledge and improved
responsiveness may have saved them from
receivership. Pall Mall1 , the leading tobacco
brand name in the early 1960s, would not or
could not see the limitations of their own
tradition-bound and conservative values.
Refusing to add a filter to their cigarettes,
they were overtaken by more responsive
brands. Brennan from Sears could see ``no
huge problems’’ while competitors were
cutting unmercifully (and noticeably) into
his market share. Kiwi Air was intent on
becoming an international airline, and in the
process failed to predict or anticipate what
effect their competitor’s retaliatory
strategies would have on this dream. And
while the incumbent giants battle for market
share, playing by their existing rules, new
entrants stealthily accumulate the
knowledge they need to strike, exploiting a
new set of rules and moving at a pace that
unravels existing market cohesion so quickly
and fiercely that the ``surprised’’ incumbents
are unable to respond.
Conclusion
The business landscape will continue to be
characterised by uncertainty and
unpredictability. It has been argued that
reliance upon linear planning, ``firepower’’
(which can be interpreted to include such
functions as marketing muscle, brand
recognition, and historical successes) and
strategies of attrition (price wars, copycat
techniques, doing nothing) guarantee little in
the race for growth, profits, and market
share. Some planners make the mistake of
imposing a linear ``battlefield’’ mentality,
characterised by order and predictability,
upon their planning processes. So-called
anomalies, blips, crises, reforms, and
surprises are weak but often-used excuses to
explain subsequently declining profits and
failing ventures.
Manoeuvre theory has been advanced as a
strategic approach that is more in keeping
with the turbulent quantum dynamics of the
twenty-first century business landscape. It
will not provide a formulaic prescription for
business success; instead it questions
tradition and demands alternatives to that
which is predictable, orderly, systematic, and
customary. Manoeuvre theory accepts
confusion and disorder, orchestrating
strategic offensives and retaliations from a
moving platform that rejects the illusive
``fundamentals’’ of tradition and previous
successes. In this regard, the rejection of
strategic orthodoxy will create a degree of
distrust amongst traditionalists. They will
argue that the elegance of their plans and the
insights of their analyses will continue to
deliver success. This may be true until
someone changes the rules of engagement, at
which point, it will be recognised that the
``fire’’ upon which they have come to rely is
really only a supportive mechanism for
decisive manoeuvre (of which they have
become incapable). As the examples of
decision-making failure have demonstrated,
sole reliance on firepower, as provided by a
firm’s historical performance, risks
presenting competitors with a weakness that
they can and will exploit.
The views expressed in this article have
evolved out of a number of disciplines
including military strategy, business
strategy, and psychology. Such
cross-disciplinary work has a great deal to
offer decision makers in all fields where
competition is a major force shaping their
decision landscape (or mindscape). It would
be particularly useful to encourage further
cooperative research between the disciplines
of psychology, computing, and strategy to
facilitate the design of powerful
industry-specific ``what-if?’’ scenario
software. Such software would allow
decision-makers to compete and experiment
with real or imagined competitors using
various strategies and scenarios. Carl von
Clausewitz, the Prussian general and theorist
of war, argued that if an opponent was put in
a situation where he had three options he
would probably take a fourth, suggesting that
attempts at prediction of an opponent’s
behaviour is difficult at the best of times.
Such mindscape strategising should extend
beyond the usual competitive forces and
market analyses, and include the option of
looking into a competitor’s state of mind.
Such decision exercises would encourage the
development of decisive mindsets where
anticipation of competitive behaviours are
the norm rather than the exception.
Notes
1 The terms attritional and positional are not
official descriptive terms. Argument
concerning the correct terminology and
categorisation for warfare, which is not
regarded as being manoeuvreist in nature is
ongoing.
2 For a comprehensive review of the theory of
manoeuvre warfare, see Hooker (1993).
 Richard J. Pech and
Geoffrey Durden
Manoeuvre warfare: a new
military paradigm for business
decision making
Management Decision
41/2 [2003] 168-179
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