[G.R. No. L-62287. January 31, 1984.] Romero v. WCC, et al, 77 SCRA 480 (1977) and Gonzales v.
77 SCRA 480 (1977) and Gonzales v. WCC, Et Al., 81 SCRA 709
FELICIDAD F. GONZAGA, ​Petitioner​, v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Respondents.​
Esmero, Juan, Lagunsad, (CLAO) for ​Petitioner​.
The Solicitor General for ​Respondents​.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAW; WOMEN’S
COMPENSATION ACT; PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY; APPLICABILITY TO
ILLNESS OR INJURY CONTRACTED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE NEW
LABOR CODE; CASE AT BAR. — To forestall further confusion, it is high time to stress
that in employees’ compensation cases, the time of inception of the illness or injury is
crucial. An illness or injury which has its inception prior to January 1, 1975 shall be
governed by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Najera v. ECC, 122
SCRA 697; Segismundo v. GSIS, 121 SCRA 304; Delegente v. ECC, 118 SCRA 137;
Evangelista v. ECC, 111 SCRA 94; Corales v. ECC, 88 SCRA 547). As early as 1979, in the
Corales v. ECC, Et Al., supra and in a long line of subsequent cases this Court
consistently ruled that "the governing law in prosecution of cause of action which has
accrued prior to effectivity of a new law shall be the law enforced at the time of accrual of
the said action" (Ceniza v. ECC, supra, Barrameda v. ECC, 106 SCRA 621; Cenabre v.
ECC, 97 SCRA 338; Balatero v. ECC, Et. Al. 95 SCRA 608; Delos Angeles v. ECC, Et Al.,
94 SCRA 308; villones v. ECC, Et Al., 92 SCRA 320.) It follows then that inasmuch as
herein petitioner’s claim accrued in 1973, prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code,
the presumption of compensability, presumption of work-connection or
work-aggravation, award of attorney’s fees and payment of administrative fee must be
observed and applied (Cañeja v. ECC, Et Al., 96 SCRA 896; Landicho v. WCC, ET AL., 89
SCRA 150; Santos v. WCC, 75 SCRA 364)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPENSABILITY OF HYPERTENSION CONCLUSIVE
WHERE EMPLOYMENT INCREASED THE RISK OF CONTRACTING THE SAME;
CASE AT BAR. — The Employees’ Compensation Commission was correct when it
concluded that the petitioner’s illness or hypertension is compensable in the case at bar,
the presumption of compensability should have been applied even at the outset by the
GSIS; hence, the latter was clearly in error when it ruled that the "evidence you have
submitted have not shown that the said ailments are the direct results of your
occupation or employment . . ." (p. 14, rec.). However, the presumption of
compensability is rendered conclusive by a consideration of the petitioner’s employment
as a barrio school teacher and working conditions which increased the risk of
contracting her illness.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE UPON FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE
EMPLOYER TO REBUT THE SAME; CASE AT BAR. — it is the duty of the employer to
overcome with substantial evidence the presumption of compensability unequivocally
established by Section 44 of the workmen’s Compensation Act. This being so, the
presumption of compensability becomes conclusive upon failure on the part of the
employer to establish the contrary by substantial evidence (Panangui v. ECC, 121 SCRA
65; Villasan v. Republic, 104 SCRA 102). In the instant case, no evidence was produced
to rebut said presumption.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 THEREOF, EXPLAINED; AWARD OF
PERMANENT DISABILITY, ALTHOUGH PARTIAL, IS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF
"ACTUAL AND PERMANENT LOSS OF A MEMBER OF THE BODY" ; CASE AT BAR.
— In allowing compensation during temporary disability, the law aims to compensate
the laborer for what he may have earned during the treatment of his injury. On the other
hand, in granting permanent disability, the law aims to compensate the injured laborer
for the actual and permanent loss of a member of the body (Central Azucarera Don
Pedro v. De Leon, Et Al., L-10036, December 28, 1957; Cañete v. Insular Lumber Co.,
Inc. No. 42175, July 10, 1935, 33 O.G. 2544). In awarding permanent disability to
petitioner, although this was limited to partial disability, the respondent then impliedly
admitted "the actual and permanent loss of a member of the body" of herein petitioner
which could be read to be specifically enumerated in paragraph (a) of Section 15 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act which provides: "the total and permanent loss of the sight
of both eyes shall be considered total and permanent disability." This should not be
construed literally but instead should be considered in the sense that both eyes are
rendered functionally useless for they are incapable of the usual work they have been
accustomed to. Where the disability is merely functional, whether physical or psychic,
there is disability under the Act (Marcelino v. 7-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 47
SCRA 350 [1972]). Under the Act, there is no difference between "loss of a member" and
the "loss of the use thereof" (Yu Dee Kim v. Zamora, G.R. No. L-6731, June 16, 1953). In
(1978), this Court declared that "disability is used either in the medical or physical sense,
as evidenced by obvious loss of member or by medical testimony that the claimant
simply cannot make the necessary muscular movements and exertions; it is used to
mean de facto inability to earn wages, as evidenced by proof that claimant has not in fact
earned anything."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF PETITIONER’S HYPERTENSION
ALONE FOR HER TO BE COVERED THEREBY. — Section 15 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act is not exclusive for in the said provision it is stated that "the
enumeration above made shall not be considered as exclusive." Hence, notwithstanding
that "ametropia is not considered secondary to hypertension", the latter alone is still
sufficient for petitioner to be covered by Section 15 by virtue of said qualifying provision.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
BENEFITS PROPER IN VIEW OF PETITIONER’S RETIREMENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
Petitioner could not in all honesty be deemed entitled to merely partial disability benefit;
because she has been forced out of work and has been rendered incapable of further
pursuing her usual job which is teaching. It was not only her "ability to perform her
usual task" which was impaired, and her "efficiency and competence for work as well as
earning capacity" which was reduced; but ultimately, herein petitioner had to let go of
her job as a teacher. She was forced to retire because her illness rendered her incapable
of teaching (Landicho v. WCC, Et Al., supra; Marcelino v. 7-Up Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, supra). Furthermore, the fact of an employee’s disability is placed beyond
question with the approval of the employee’s optional retirement for such is authorized
only when the employee is "physically incapable to render sound and efficient service"
under C.A. 186, as amended by Republic Act 4968 in conjunction with Memorandum
Circular No. 133 of the Office of the President on October 19, 1967 (Faicol v. WCC and
Republic of the Philippines, 93 SCRA 811; Roma v. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools,
80 SCRA 170; Romero v. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools, 77 SCRA 842).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL THEREOF RENDERS INUTILE THE
SOCIAL JUSTICE PRECEPT. — This Court feels that to deny permanent total disability
benefits to herein petitioner, a teacher who for 24 years of dedicated service, was forced
to retire due to illness contracted in the course of her employment, would render inutile
and meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed by the Constitution (Abadiano v.
GSIS, 111 SCRA 509 [1982]; Cenabre v. ECC, 97 SCRA 338).
DECISION
MAKASIAR, ​J.​:
This is a petition for review on ​certiorari to modify and/or set aside the decision of
respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) dated July 1, 1982 (Annex
"D", Decision, pp. 22-25, rec.) in ECC Case No. 1425, affirming the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) [the respondent GSIS was dropped as a
party in this case as per resolution of the Supreme Court dated February 17, 1983]
denying permanent total disability benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, to claimant
Felicidad F. Gonzaga, who is assisted by the Citizens Legal Assistance Office.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
Petitioner Felicidad F. Gonzaga was a public school teacher since 1952. In June, 1973,
after 21 years of teaching, the petitioner, who was then assigned to a remote barrio
school in Northern Samar, contracted dimness of vision, later on diagnosed as
ametropia (ametropia is an error of refraction). The images are not brought to a proper
focus in the retina producing hyperometropia [farsightedness], myopia
[nearsightedness] or astigmatism in which a variable degree of refraction exists in
different mendians of the eyeball. [This was the definition provided by the Medical
Services Center in its Summary of Findings, p. 30; rec.]), attributed to hypertension,
sufficient enough to interfere with the normal discharge of her duties as elementary
grade school teacher. On January 31, 1976, she was forced to retire from her work, at the
age of 49, as a direct consequence of her hypertension and ametropia.
On January 19, 1978, after receipt of the favorable report by the Division Superintendent
of Schools stating that petitioner "contracted dimness of vision in the course of her
employment, directly caused by, the result of and/or aggravated by the nature of her
work, rendering her physically disabled and to stop working and finally causing her to
retire" (Annex "B", p. 15, rec.), the GSIS denied the petitioner’s claim for disability
benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, and the pertinent portion of said decision
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, your ailments are
found not to be in the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We
believe that your ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not
work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have submitted have not shown that the
said ailments are the direct results of your occupation or employment as a Teacher of
San Jose Central School, Northern Samar" (​Emphasis supplied​, p. 41, rec.)
On October 5, 1978, the ECC reversed the aforementioned GSIS’ decision after fully
appreciating the employment and working conditions of petitioner, and held:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x tests and examination conducted on appellant, found appellant’s case to be meritorious
". . . the crucial issue to be resolved is whether or not her ailments of hypertension and
ametropia are work-connected, at least, under the theory of increased risk. We believe it
is.
"Hypertension, one of the ailments of appellant herein, is a pathological change in the
arteries involving elevated blood pressure. Stress . . . has always been considered as one
of the risk factors that could induce the elevation of the blood pressure of an individual. .
. . . stress is ‘any stimulus on the external environment that the organism or employee is
subjected to over and above what he was ordinarily required to do’ (​Emphasis supplied​).
School teachers branded as ‘factotums of society’ are prone to such stress. The Supreme
Court stated ‘school teachers . . . are underpaid but overworked’ (Arzadon v. WCC,
L-42404, December 8, 1976). Similarly, ‘heart disease, hypertension and tuberculosis
may be aggravated by one’s work as a school teacher which involved emotional strain’
(Legason v. WCC, L-43089, January 31, 1977)
"x x x
". . .. In fact, appellant was exposed comparatively to more hazards than the ordinary
classroom teacher as more often than not, she was the only teacher in her place of
assignment. She had to singlehandedly attend to a considerable number of students and
numerous community activities.
"x x x (Annex "C", ECC decision dated October 5, 1978, pp. 18-19, 20-21, rec.).
The ECC further ordered that the case be remanded to the GSIS "for proper computation
and payment of the benefits provided for by P.D. 626, as amended, to the appellant"
(ECC decision, p. 21, rec.)
The GSIS, in compliance with the order of herein respondent, awarded permanent
partial disability benefits for five (5) months and paid her the amount of P952.40 (p. 43,
rec.).
On January 28, 1979, the petitioner requested for a re-evaluation of her award, claiming
that it was only her hypertension which was considered while ametropia which she
claimed was secondary to her hypertension, was not evaluated (p. 42, rec.).
After defining what ametropia is, the Medical Service Center concluded that ametropia is
not at all secondary to the claimant’s hypertension and such being the case, there is no
medical basis for granting additional benefits to claimant (p. 30, rec.).
On January 30, 1979, the petitioner then requested for additional benefits, arguing that
under P.D. 626, as amended, the maximum compensation for her case is P12,000.00.
Acting on the petitioner’s request for further compensation benefits, the GSIS subjected
the petitioner to electrocardiogram. On October 18, 1979, the GSIS declared that
inasmuch as her hypertension is "moderate in degree" her case "falls under permanent
partial disability only and as such it is given a non-scheduled disability benefits of five
(5) months with no more forthcoming benefits" (Annex "E", p. 26, rec.).
On July 1, 1982, on appeal, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS ruling
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x of earning capacity. The Act observes the wage-loss factor as basis of the granting of
"We have thoroughly reviewed the evidences submitted in this case and we found that
the respondent system’s decision is in harmony with the law. Appellant’s disability
benefits is based on moderate hypertension and the respondent system, after evaluating
the merits, found it to command a maximum benefit equivalent to only five (5) months.
We have perused over the record carefully and noted nothing at all to indicate that the
respondent system’s evaluation was tainted with error or abuse of discretion. Finding
nothing irregular, we are not inclined to disturb their findings. The Employees’
Compensation Commission under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, confers the
Government Service Insurance System, the ECC’s administering agency for the
government sector the power to determine the degree of disability in cases of
work-connected injuries or illnesses resulting in permanent partial disability not
embraced in the schedule of disability set forth in Article 193 paragraph (b) of PD 626,
as amended. This authority is embodied in paragraph (f) of the above law which declares
that: ‘In cases of injuries or illnesses resulting in permanent partial disability not listed
in the preceding schedule, the benefits shall be an income benefit equivalent to the
percentage of the permanent loss of the capacity to work.’ As earlier intimated, we
directed the respondent GSIS in our Decision dated October 5, 1978, to undertake a
‘proper computation and payment of the benefits provided for by PD 626, as amended,
to the appellant.’ This order of ours was properly complied with by the respondent
System which, after a meticulous scrutiny of the medical records submitted and related
for only five months permanent partial disability benefits. Needless to state, appellant’s
cause of action being permanent but partial disability in nature, it is not eligible for the
maximum benefit of P12,000.00.
"x x x" (Annex "D", ECC Decision dated July 1, 1982, pp. 23-25, rec.)
On October 27, 1982, the petitioner, with the assistance of her counsel, filed the instant
petition. The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to
permanent total disability benefits in the amount of P12,000.00 under P.D. 626, as
amended.cralawnad
1. To forestall further confusion, it is high time to stress that in employees’
compensation cases, the time of inception of the illness or injury is crucial. An injury or
illness which has its inception prior to January 1, 1975 shall be governed by the
provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Najera v. ECC, 122 SCRA 697 [1983];
Segismundo v. GSIS, 121 SCRA 304 [1983]; Delegente v. ECC, 118 SCRA 67 [1982];
Ceniza v. ECC, 118 SCRA 137 [1982]; Evangelista v. ECC, 111 SCRA 94 [1982]; Corales v.
ECC, 88 SCRA 547 [1979]).
As early as 1979, in the Corales v. ECC, Et. Al. case and in a long line of cases which
followed thereafter, this Court consistently ruled that "the governing law in prosecution
of cause of action which has accrued prior to effectivity of a new law shall be the law
enforced at the time of accrual of the said action" (Ceniza v. ECC, supra; Barrameda v.
ECC, 106 SCRA 621 [1981]; Cenabre v. ECC, 97 SCRA 338 [1980]; Balatero v. ECC, Et
Al., 95 SCRA 608 [1980]; Delos Angeles v. ECC, Et Al., 94 SCRA 308 [1979]; Villones v.
ECC, Et Al., 92 SCRA 320 [1979]).
2. It follows then that inasmuch as herein petitioner’s claim accrued in 1973,
prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code, the presumption of compensability,
presumption of work-connection or work-aggravation, award of attorney’s fees and
payment of administrative fees must be observed and applied (Cañeja v. ECC, Et Al., 96
SCRA 896 [1980]; Landicho v. WCC, Et Al., 89 SCRA 150 [1979]; Santos v. WCC, 75
SCRA 364 [1977]).
The Employees’ Compensation Commission was correct when it concluded that the
petitioner’s illness or hypertension is compensable. In the case at bar, the presumption
of compensability should have been applied even at the outset by the GSIS; hence, the
latter was clearly in error when it ruled that the "evidence you have submitted have not
shown that the said ailments are the direct results of your occupation or employment . .
." (p. 41, rec.). However, the presumption of compensability is rendered conclusive by a
consideration of the petitioner’s employment as a barrio school teacher and working
conditions which increased the risk of contracting her illness. Moreover, no evidence
was produced to rebut said presumption.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
It is the duty of the employer to overcome with substantial evidence the presumption of
compensability unequivocably established by Section 44 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. This being so, the presumption of compensability becomes
conclusive upon failure on the part of the employer to establish the contrary by
substantial evidence (Panangui v. ECC, 121 SCRA 65 [1983]; Villasin v. Republic, 104
SCRA 102 [1981]).
3. It is not sufficient that an injury or illness is compensable. It is further
required by the Workmen’s Compensation Act that the compensable injury or illness
resulted in a disability recognized by the Act. Disability refers to the loss or impairment
disability benefits (Corales v. ECC, 88 SCRA 547 [1979]).
Disability, as a basis for compensation, is the combination of partial or total physical
incapacity and of inability to work, or inability to work with the same ease and
competence as before the injury, or the loss, total or partial, of earning power from the
injury (Corpus Juris, Section 535, p. 813 cited in Lavilla v. Secretary of Labor, 122 SCRA
657 [1983]; Corales v. ECC, supra; Gonzales v. WCC, 81 SCRA 703 [1978]; Romero v.
WCC, Et Al., 77 SCRA 480 [1977]).
When petitioner contracted her illness or hypertension and ametropia, she was forced to
resign from teaching. Her illness rendered her incapable of further performing or
pursuing the work which she had loyally performed for 24 long and arduous years. She is
then deemed to be entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act classifies various disabilities as follows: a) according
to the extent — total or partial, and b) according to duration — temporary or permanent
[Landicho v. WCC, Et Al., 89 SCRA 150 (1979)].
Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same
kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for, or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality and attainment could do
(Landicho v. WCC, et al, supra; Marcelino v. 7-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Et Al.,
47 SCRA 343 [1972]). It does not mean an absolute helplessness but rather an incapacity
to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent (Landicho v. WCC, Et Al.,
supra). Total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or
totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that she cannot
pursue her usual work and earn therefrom [Tenasas v. WCC, 80 SCRA 464 (1977)]. It is
not the injury which is compensated but the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one’s earning capacity (Herrera v. Republic and WCC, 85 SCRA 713
[1978]; Natividad v. WCC and Republic, 85 SCRA 115 [1978]).chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
And in Lavilla v. Secretary of Labor (supra), a very recent case decided by this Court,
hypertension was considered as a total disability although in this particular case, the
disability was a temporary one. Here, the petitioner is likewise a teacher who had
permanent dizziness due to hypertension which, coupled with her long-standing throat
irritation, prevented her from her usual work of teaching.
In allowing compensation during temporary disability, the law aims to compensate the
laborer for what he may have earned during the treatment of his injury. On the other
hand, in granting permanent disability, the law aims to compensate the injured laborer
for the actual and permanent loss of a member of the body (Central Azucarera Don
Pedro v. De Leon, Et Al., L-10036, December 28, 1957; Cañete v. Insular Lumber Co.,
Inc. No. 42175, July 10, 1935, 33 O.G. 2544). In awarding permanent disability to
petitioner, although this was limited to partial disability, the respondent then impliedly
admitted "the actual and permanent loss of a member of the body" of herein petitioner
which could be read to be specifically enumerated in paragraph (a) of Section 15 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act which provides: "the total and permanent loss of the sight
of both eyes shall be considered total and permanent disability." This should not be
construed literally but instead should be considered in the sense that both eyes are
rendered functionally useless for they are incapable of the usual work they have been
accustomed to. Where the disability is merely functional, whether physical or psychic,
there is disability under the Act (Marcelino v. 7-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 47
SCRA 350 [1972]). Under the Act, there is no difference between "loss of a member" and
the "loss of the use thereof" (Yu Dee Kim v. Zamora, G.R. No. L-6731, June 16, 1953). In
Romero v. WCC, et al, 77 SCRA 480 (1977) and Gonzales v. WCC, Et Al., 81 SCRA 709
(1978), this Court declared that "disability is used either in the medical or physical sense,
as evidenced by obvious loss of member or by medical testimony that the claimant
simply cannot make the necessary muscular movements and exertions; it is used to
mean de facto inability to earn wages, as evidenced by proof that claimant has not in fact
earned anything." cralawnad
Section 15 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is not exclusive for in the said provision
it is stated that "the enumeration above made shall not be considered as exclusive."
Hence, notwithstanding that "ametropia is not considered secondary to hypertension",
the latter alone is still sufficient for petitioner to be covered by Section 15 by virtue of
said qualifying provision.
Petitioner could not in all honesty be deemed entitled to merely partial disability benefit;
because she has been forced out of work and has been rendered incapable of further
pursuing her usual job which is teaching. It was not only her "ability to perform her
usual task" which was impaired, and her "efficiency and competence for work as well as
earning capacity" which was reduced; but ultimately, herein petitioner had to let go of
her job as a teacher. She was forced to retire because her illness rendered her incapable
of teaching (Landicho v. WCC, Et Al., supra; Marcelino v. 7-Up Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, supra).
4. Furthermore, the fact of an employee’s disability is placed beyond question
with the approval of the employee’s optional retirement for such is authorized only when
the employee is "physically incapable to render sound and efficient service" under C.A.
186, as amended by Republic Act 4968 in conjunction with Memorandum Circular No.
133 of the Office of the President on October 19, 1967 (Faicol v. WCC and Republic of the
Philippines, 93 SCRA 811 [1979]; Roma v. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools, 80 SCRA
170 [1977]; Romero v. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools, 77 SCRA 842 [1977]).
When an employee is forced to ask for retirement ahead of schedule, not because of old
age, but primarily of his weakened bodily condition due to illness contracted in the
course of her employment, she should be given compensation for her inability to work
during the remaining days before her scheduled retirement, aside from the benefits
received by her (Villaflor v. Republic of the Philippines, 98 SCRA 383 [1980], Almaiz v.
WCC, 85 SCRA 144 [1978]; Bello v. WCC, 80 SCRA 153 [1977]; Marcelino v. 7-Up
Bottling Co. of the Philippines, supra).
The contention then of the respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission that "the
retirement of petitioner does not necessarily prove that she is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits since the approval of her application for retirement was made for the
reason mainly that she was already physically incapable to render further efficient
service", is without merit.
5. Finally, this Court feels that to deny permanent total disability benefits to
herein petitioner, a teacher who for 24 years of dedicated service, was forced to retire
due to illness contracted in the course of her employment, would render inutile and
meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed by the Constitution (Abadiano v. GSIS,
111 SCRA 509 [1982]; Cenabre v. ECC, 97 SCRA 338 [1980]).
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED JULY 1, 1982 OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE BUREAU OF
PUBLIC SCHOOLS IS HEREBY ORDERED.
1. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS
AS MAXIMUM PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER THE
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT;
2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER’S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL
EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS; AND
3. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, ​JJ.​, concur.
G.R. No. L-57473 August 15, 1988
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, ​petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SAN MIGUEL
BREWERY SALES FORCE UNION (PTGWO) ​respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices for petitioner.
Isidro D. Amoroso for private respondent.
NARVASA, ​J.:
On May 1, 1974, the Labor Code 1​ brought into being a new employees' compensation
program. 2​
1) that is tax-exempt; ​3
2) designed to ensure promptitude, in cases of work-connected disability or
death, in the award to employees and their dependents of adequate income benefit and
medical or related benefits; 4​
3) funded by monthly contributions of all covered employers; 5​
4) compulsory on all employers and their employees not over 60 years of age;​6
5) the benefits of which are exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive
damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents; 7​​ and
6) having its own adjudicative machinery with original and exclusive jurisdiction to
settle any dispute with respect to coverage, entitlement to benefits, collection and
payment of contributions and penalties thereon, or any other matter related thereto,
independent of other tribunals except the Supreme Court. 8​
As might be expected, provisions were incorporated in the Code to govern the transition
from the old to the new program. It was required, for instance, that all actions or claims
accruing prior to the effectivity of the Code as well as those cases already pending before
the Workmen's Compensation Units and before the Workmen's Compensation
Commission as of March 31, 1975 — were to be determined in accordance with the laws,
rules and procedure in force at the time of their accrual and prior to the effectivity of the
Code. 9​ Such actions, accruing before the effectivity of the Code, and during a specified
period subsequent thereto ending on December 31, 1974, had to be filed with the
appropriate regional offices of the Department of Labor not later than March 31, 1975,
otherwise they would be forever barred. 10 ​ And the effectivity of all workmen's
compensation insurance policies and indemnity bonds for self-insured employers
executed under the old law was declared to continue only until their stipulated
termination dates but in no case beyond December 31, 1974.​11
Now, prior to the inauguration of this new compensation program, it had been the
practice of the petitioner firm, San Miguel Corporation, to grant to its salesmen and
helpers suffering work-connected sickness or disability, their basic salary and other
benefits consisting of average commission one sack of rice per month, free
hospitalization, and cost of living allowance. The aggregate value of these benefits was,
of course, higher than the corresponding benefits under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. This practice was discontinued by petitioner on effectivity of the new compensation
scheme. It registered itself and its employees with the Social Security System, 12 ​ will now proceed to do.
commenced to pay to the State Insurance Fund the required monthly premium
contributions, i.e., an amount equal to one percent (1%) of each employee's salary credit,
13
and otherwise started to comply with all the obligations imposed on all employers by
the new law.
Desiring to obviate the adverse effects of the reduction in benefits caused by the change
from the old to the new compensation system, the union representing the petitioner's
salesmen and helpers within Metro Manila, the respondent San Miguel Sales Forces
Union (PTGWO), filed a complaint with the Bureau of Labor Relations on January 3,
1978, praying that the petitioner be compelled to pay in proper cases the difference in
monetary benefits between what it had theretofore been granting and that payable under
the Labor Code. 14​
Shortly thereafter, the Union filed a second complaint, 15 ​ this time with the Labor
Arbiters' Office, accusing the petitioner of non-compliance with the requirements of PD
851, non-payment of premium pay for work done during rest days and holidays, and
underpayment of wages under PD 928. It also prayed for the inclusion in the bargaining
unit of the salesmen and helpers in the sales offices located in Valenzuela, Bulacan and
Muntinlupa, Rizal.
Conciliation proceedings were had but failed to bring about an amicable settlement of
the controversy. The parties then agreed to consolidate the cases and submit the same
for compulsory arbitration. 16
​ injury during the program's effectivity, given the cut-off date set by the law 27
The decision of the Labor Arbiter, rendered on July 14, 1978, 17
​ sustained the Union on
all issues. As regards the particular matter of compensation, ​the judgment held the
petitioner to be "under legal obligation to pay the union members who have suffered
industrial accident illnesses, the difference between what they receive from the State
Insurance fund and their monthly salary as this has been its practice and policy before
the effectivity of the Code​. " 18
​ new compensation program implementd. Clearly, on such accruing claims no recovery of
The petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission 19 ​ which, on
January 7, 1981, upheld the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled that ​petitioner's
employees are "entitled to the same computation of work-connected disability benefits
as was the practice before the effectivity of the Labor Code, thereby making .. (it) liable
for the deficiency in what the State Insurance Fund pays." 20
​ and once a claim is made under such a new indemnification scheme, it is the Fund which
The petitioner has instituted in this Court a special civil action of certiorari and
declaratory relief, 21
​ imputing grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC and praying on that
account for nullification and setting aside of its decision. The sole issue raised by
petitioner concerns the validity of the NLRC ruling just quoted that petitioner continues
to be bound up to the present by the same obligation regarding work-connected
disability benefits that it had assumed before the enactment of the Labor Code. The issue
in other words is whether or not the Labor Code put an end to the petitioner's
voluntarily assumed obligation, prior to the Code's enactment, of paying work-connected
disability benefits to its employees of a value higher than that granted by said Code.
At the time of the initiation (in January, 1978) of the proceedings before the ​Bureau of
Labor Relations by respondent Union, for the purpose of defining and in effect
expanding the benefits otherwise due to its members under the new compensation
program of the Labor Code, that Bureau and the Labor Arbiters and the National Labor
Relations Commission itself, for that matter had no jurisdiction of the subject matter
thereof. That particular subject matter had already been placed within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Social Security System, 22
​ subject to appeal to the Employees'
Compensation Commission. This is clearly stated by Article 180 of the Labor Code which
reads as follows:​23
ART. 180. Settlement of claims. — The System shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any dispute from this Title with respect to coverage, ​entitlement to
benefits collection and payment of contributions and penalties thereon, ​or any other
matter related thereto​, subject to appeal to the Commission, which shall decide
appealed cases within twenty (20) working days from the submission of the evidence.
This, too, is the message of Policy Instructions No. 1 of the Minister of Labor, dated April
23, 1976, that employee compensation cases in private employment are under the
original jurisdiction of the SSS.
Now, it is evident that what was sought to be litigated by the union before the Bureau of
Labor Relations and later before the Labor Arbiter, was the matter of its members'
entitlement to benefits for work-connected disability — whether limited to those
specified by the Labor Code or inclusive of the difference between the latter and that
theretofore being paid by the petitioner. In any case, it certainly was an issue
unavoidably comprehended within the catch-all phrase, "​any other matter related
thereto​," contained in the afore-quoted Section 180 of the Code. It was, therefore,
undoubtedly an issue exclusively cognizable by the SSS, and consequently, one beyond
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and that of the Labor Arbiters as well
— from which Article 217 of the Code in fact expressly except "claims for employees'
compensation," among others.
Resolution of the case on this jurisdictional issue would not, however, end the
controversy. To do that, it is necessary to decide the appeal on the merits. This the Court
Two reasons have been given by the respondent Commission for ruling as it did 24​
​ ​viz:
1) the employees have already acquired a vested right to the compensation
package theretofore extended by their employer for work-connected disabilities or
death; consequently, the right can not be withdrawn or diminished without violating
Article 100 of the Labor Code; and
2) the exclusory proviso in Article 173 of the Code does not exempt the
employer from continuing to comply with payment of compensation arising from prior
unilateral grant and practice. These reasons are not persuasive.
The right to compensation or benefit for the loss or impairment of an employee's earning
capacity due to work-related illness or injury is premised on the occurrence of the illness
or injury. It accrues upon, and not before, the happening of these contingencies.​25 Since
as has already been stated, claims for indemnity under the Labor Code are to be
adjudicated "in accordance with the law and rules at the time their causes of action
accrued, 26
​ the benefits due to an employee suffering from a compensable disability must
be computed in accordance with the method existing at the time of the illness or the
injury. It is thus obvious that an employee acquires no vested right to a program of
compensation benefits simply because it was operative at the time he became employed
and had been subsequently discontinued. That he must have incurred the illness or
​ is the only
fact which operates to vest the right to be indemnified according to either the phased-out
scheme or the new one. 28​
Compensation in accordance with the employer's schedule of benefits in effect prior to
the effectivity of the Labor Code is in this case being sought for disabilities which
admittedly would be suffered long after said Labor Code had come into effect and the
compensation from the employer can be had on the basis of the old indemnity scheme
which in simple fact would no longer be in existence at the time of birth or generation of
the employees' causes of action. What would then already be in force would be an
entirely different program imposing upon the employer nothing more than the liability
to remit monthly premiums to the State Insurance Fund. In the event of illness or injury,
becomes liable to compensate the employee for the disability, and its liability is
"exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer," regardless of whether
these liabilities are "provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Republic Act Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered one
hundred eighty-six, as amended, Republic Act Numbered six hundred ten, as amended,
Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four, as amended .. (or) other laws
whose benefits are administered by the system .. ." 29
​
The exclusionary provision aforecited clearly admits of no exception under which
payment of the additional indemnity sought in this case may be justified. It is in fact
apparent therefrom, and from the rules set forth in the Code regarding the institution of
claims and the continued effectivity of the abolished systems until the cut-off date
therein prescribed, that the new scheme was intended to replace the old, whether the
latter had been established by law or by a voluntary employer policy or practice. The
clear intent of the law is that the employer should be relieved of the obligation of directly
paying his employees compensation for work-connected illness or injury on the theory
that this is part of the cost of production or business activity; and that no longer would
there be need for adversarial proceedings between an employer and his employee in
which there were specific legal presumptions operating in favor of the employee and
statutorily specified defenses available to an employer. 30 ​ To repeat, the new
compensation program now imposes on the employer nothing more than the obligation
to remit monthly premiums to the State Insurance Fund, and it is the latter on which is
laid the burden of compensating the employee for any disability. 31 ​ Once the employer
pays his share to the fund, all obligation on his part to his employees is ended. 32​ ​ The
petitioner asserts, and the respondents do not deny, that it has in fact remitted and
continues to date to remit millions of pesos to the State Insurance Fund as mandatory
premiums or contributions to defray the cost of compensation and disability benefits not
only for its employees but others as well. The employer would be unwarrantedly reverted
to the old setting were it to be compelled both to remit its contributions to the Fund
under the prevailing set-up and to answer for the difference between what it used to pay
and what is due to the employee from the Fund. It is manifestly unfair to require the
employer in effect to maintain two systems of compensation, one governed by the Labor
Code, and the other, by the old Workmen's Compensation Act. This would entail a return
to the adversarial type of proceeding involving particular presumptions and specific
statutory defenses under an act which has ​already been repealed​, and resolution of
issues for which the adjudicative machinery previously set up no longer exists. This is a
situation certainly not intended by the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated January 7, 1981 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
a new one entered dismissing the private respondent's complaint. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 58176. March 23, 1984.]
RUTH JIMENEZ, ​Petitioner,​ v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Respondents.​
Isidro Pasana for ​Petitioner​.
The Solicitor General for ​Respondents.​
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION; COMPENSABILITY OF ILLNESS; CANCER OF THE
LUNGS, A BORDERLINE CASE REQUIRING STUDY OF CIRCUMSTANCES OF CASE.
— Admittedly, cancer of the lungs (bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of those borderline
cases where a study of the circumstances of the case is mandated to fully appreciate
whether the nature of the work of the deceased increased the possibility of contracting
such an ailment. WE have ruled in the case of Dator v. Employees Compensation
Commission (111 SCRA 634, L-57416, January 30, 1982) that" (U)ntil now, the cause of
cancer is not known." Indeed, the respondent has provided an opening through which
petitioner can pursue and did pursue the possibility that the deceased’s ailment could
have been caused by the working conditions while employed with the Philippine
Constabulary. Respondents maintain that the deceased was a smoker and the logical
conclusion is that the cause of the fatal lung cancer could only be smoking which cannot
in any way be justified as work-connected. However, medical authorities support the
conclusion that up to now, the etiology or cause of cancer of the lungs is still largely
unknown.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCLUSION OF COMMISSION NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH MEDICAL AUTHORITIES AND FACTS ON RECORD. — The sweeping
conclusion of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission to the effect that
the cause of the bronchogenic carcinoma of the deceased was due to his being a smoker
and not in any manner connected with his work as a soldier, is not in accordance with
medical authorities nor with the facts on record. No certitude can arise from a position
of uncertainty. WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have given
credence to the stand of the petitioner that her husband developed bronchogenic
carcinoma while working as a soldier with the Philippine Constabulary. The records
show that when the deceased enlisted with the Philippine Constabulary in 1969, he was
found to be physically and mentally healthy. A soldier’s life is a hard one. As a soldier
assigned to field duty, exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep
and rest is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals while handling ammunition
and firearms cannot be discounted. WE take note also of the fact that he became the
security of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan, and he always accompanied the
doctor wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.). Such assignment invariably involved
irregular working hours, exposure to different working conditions, and body fatigue, not
to mention psychological stress and other similar factors which influenced the evolution
of his ailment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THEORY OF INCREASED RISK. — The theory of
increased risk is applicable in the case at bar. In the case of Cristobal v. ECC (103 SCRA,
336-337) where the Court held that "to establish compensability under the said theory,
the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof
required is merely substantial evidence, which means ‘such relevant evidence to support
a decision’ (Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union,
Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be
pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish direct
causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of the deceased.
Such a strict requirement which even medical experts cannot support considering the
uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the principle of the liberality in the
matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives
meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in
Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that ‘all doubts in the implementation of
the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; STRICT RULES ON EVIDENCE NOT APPLICABLE; STATE
POLICY OF LIBERALITY TOWARDS LABOR MUST BE MAINTAINED. — In San
Valentin v. ECC (118 SCRA 160), the Court held that "In compensation cases, strict rules
on evidence are not applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all that is required or
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working condition." This is in
line with the avowed policy of the State as mandated by the Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 9)
and restated in the New Labor Code (Art. 4) to give maximum aid and protection to
labor.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, ​J.​:
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) dated August 20, 1981 (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.) in ECC
Case No. 1587, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), denying petitioner’s claim for death benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
The undisputed facts are as follows:​chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner is the widow of the late Alfredo Jimenez, who joined the government service
in June, 1969 as a constable in the Philippine Constabulary (p. 2, rec.)
After rendering service for one year, he was promoted to the rank of constable second
class. On December 16, 1974, he was again promoted to the rank of sergeant (p. 26, rec.)
Sometime in April, 1976, he and his wife boarded a bus from Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to
Anulung, Cagayan. While on their way, Sgt. Jimenez, who was seated on the left side of
the bus, fell down from the bus because of the sudden stop of the vehicle. As a result, he
was confined at the Cagayan Provincial Hospital for about one (1) week, and thereafter,
released (comment of respondent ECC, pp. 25-36, rec.). He was again confined for
further treatment from November 7, 1978 to May 16, 1979 at the AFP Medical Center in
Quezon City.
While on duty with the 111th PC Company, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, he was assigned as
security to one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC
Regional Board, June 6, 1980). In compliance with his duty, he always accompanied the
doctor wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.)
On November 7, 1978, the deceased was again confined at the Cagayan Provincial
Hospital and then transferred to the AFP V. Luna Medical Center at Quezon City for
further treatment. He complained of off-and-on back pains, associated with occasional
cough and also the swelling of the right forearm. The doctors found a mass growth on his
right forearm, which grew to the size of 3 by 2 inches, hard and associated with pain,
which the doctors diagnosed as "aortic aneurysm, medrastinal tumor" (p. 27, rec.)
His condition improved somewhat after treatment and he was released on May 16, 1979.
He was advised to have complete rest and to continue medication. He was then given
light duty inside the barracks of their company.
Unfortunately, his ailment continued and became more serious.
On May 12, 1980, he died in his house at Anulung, Cagayan, at about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening. He was barely 35 years old at the time of his death.
The cause of death, as found by the doctors, is "bronchogenic carcinoma" which is a
malignant tumor of the lungs.
On June 6, 1980, an administrative hearing was conducted before the PC Regional
Board. It was their official findings that the subject enlisted man "died in line of duty" ;
that the deceased was a PC member of the 111th PC Company at Tuguegarao, Cagayan;
that he died due to "bronchogenic CA" ; and that he "died not as a result of his
misconduct and did not violate any provisions of the Articles of War" (ECC rec.,
Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980).
The Board recommended "that all benefits due to or become due subject EP be paid and
settled to his legal heirs" (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6,
1980). Thus, as per records of the GSIS, petitioner was paid benefits due to her deceased
husband under Republic Act No. 610 (Comment of respondent ECC, p. 27,
rec.)​cralawnad
Nevertheless, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under PD No. 626, as amended
with the respondent GSIS. Said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that her
husband’s death is not compensable "for the reason that the injury/sickness that caused
his death is not due to the circumstances of the employment or in the performance of the
duties and responsibilities of said employment" (Letter of denial by the GSIS dated July
14, 1980, ECC rec.)
The said decision was affirmed by respondent Employees Compensation Commission in
its decision dated August 21, 1981, stating among others:​chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x up to now, the etiology or cause of cancer of the lungs is still largely unknown as
"After an exhausted (sic) study of the evidences (sic) on record and the applicable law on
the case, we conclude that the law has been properly applied by the respondent System. .
..
"Bronchogenic carcinoma, medical authorities disclose, is the most common form of
malignancy in males reaching a peak between the fifth and seventh decades and
accounting for one in four male cancer deaths. The sex incidence is at least 5 to 1, male
to female. Extensive statistical analysis by medical authorities have confirmed the
relationship between lung cancer and cigarette smoking. Other factors that may have
potential roles are exposure to ionizing radiation, exposure to chromates, metallic iron
and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, beryllium and asbestos (Harrison’s Principles of
Internal Medicine by Wintrobe, Et Al., 7th Edition, p. 1322).
"Although Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, was envisioned to give relief to
workingmen, who sustain an injury or contract an ailment in the course of employment
and that to best attain its lofty objective, a liberal interpretation of the law should
pervade in its implementation, this precept, however, may not be invoked as not even a
slight causal link between the development of the ailment and the decedent’s (sic) duties
and working conditions as a PC sergeant could be deduced from the records of this case.
The respondent System’s ruling that appellant’s claim does not fall within the
beneficiant provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, and therefore the
same should be denied, is in full harmony with the law and the facts obtaining herein.
. . ." (Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.)
On September 28, 1981, ​Petitioner,​ assisted by counsel, filed the instant petition, the
only pertinent issue being whether or not her husband’s death from bronchogenic
carcinoma is compensable under the law.
The petitioner contends that her husband’s death is compensable and that respondent
Commission erred in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted circumstance
that when the deceased entered into the Philippine Constabulary, he was found to be
physically and mentally healthy. She farther contends that as a soldier, her husband’s
work has always been in the field where exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue
and lack of sleep and rest was the rule rather than the exception. The nature of work of a
soldier being to protect life and property of citizens, he was subject to call at any time of
day or night. Furthermore, he was even assigned as security to one Emilio Cordero and
always accompanied the latter wherever he went. Exposed to these circumstances for
several years, the deceased’s physical constitution began to deteriorate, which eventually
resulted to his death from bronchogenic carcinoma (Petition, pp. 2-9, rec.)
On the other hand, respondent Commission maintains that while the deceased soldier
may have been exposed to elements of dust and dirt and condition of lack of rest and
continued fatigue by virtue of his duties to protect the life and property of the citizens,
such conditions have no causal relation to his contraction of bronchogenic carcinoma. It
is also the opinion of the respondent that since there is evidence of the deceased to be a
smoker, "the late Sgt. Jimenez may have indulged heavily in smoking and drinking, not
merely ‘occasionally’. And it has been demonstrated medically that the more cigarettes a
person smokes, the greater the risk of developing lung cancer" (Memorandum, p. 62,
rec.). In short, the respondent alleges that the deceased was responsible to a large degree
for his having contracted bronchogenic carcinoma that led to his demise.​cralawnad
WE find the petitioner’s claim meritorious.
Primary carcinoma of the lung is the most common fatal cancer and its frequency is
increasing (The Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647). Admittedly, cancer of the lungs
(bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of those borderline cases where a study of the
circumstances of the case is mandated to fully appreciate whether the nature of the work
of the deceased increased the possibility of contracting such an ailment. In the case of
Laron v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission (73 SCRA 90), WE held, citing
Schmidt’s Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine, 165 Sup. 143; Beerman v. Public Service
Coordinated Transport, 191 A 297, 299; Words and Phrases, 6 Permanent Edition 61,
"The English word ‘cancer’ means ‘crab’, in the medical sense, it refers to a malignant,
usually fatal, tumor or growth." Findings of fact by the respondent points out that
bronchogenic carcinoma is a malignant tumor of the lungs. WE have ruled in the case of
Dator v. Employees Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 634, L-57416, January 30,
1982) that" (U)ntil now, the cause of cancer is not known." Indeed, the respondent has
provided an opening through which petitioner can pursue and did pursue the possibility
that the deceased’s ailment could have been caused by the working conditions while
employed with the Philippine Constabulary.
Respondents maintain that the deceased was a smoker and the logical conclusion is that
the cause of the fatal lung cancer could only be smoking which cannot in any way be
justified as work-connected. However, medical authorities support the conclusion that
provided for in the following:
"Although the etiology of cancer in humans cannot yet be explained at the molecular
level, it is clear that genetic composition of the host is important in cancer induction.
Related immunologic factors may predispose the host to a putative carcinogen. There is
some evidence that viruses may play a role in the neoplastic process. In addition, both
environmental and therapeutic agents have been identified of carcinogens" (Harrison,
Principles of Internal Medicine, 9th Edition, 1980, p. 1584).
"Considerable attention has been directed to the potential role of air pollution exposure
to ionizing radiation and numerous occupational hazards, including exposure to
chromates, metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, beryllium and asbestos"
(Harrison, Ibid, p. 1259).
"The lungs are the site of origin of primary benign and malignant tumors and receive
metastases from many other organs and tissues. Specific causes have not been
established but a strong dose-related statistical association exists between cigarette
smoking and squamous cell and undifferentiated small (oat) cell bronchogenic
carcinomas. There is suggestive evidence that prolonged exposure to air pollution
promotes lung neoplasms" (The Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647).
"What emerges from such concepts is the belief that cancers in man do not appear
suddenly ‘out of the blue’. . . . Moreover, there need not be a single etiology or
pathogenesis. Many influences may be at work during the evolution of the lesion and
many pathways may be involved. Indeed, the term cancer may embrace a multiplicity of
diseases of diverse origins" (Robbins, Pathologic Basis of Disease, 2nd Edition, 1979, p.
185, ​Emphasis supplied​).
WE cannot deny the fact that the causes of the illness of the deceased are still unknown
and may embrace such diverse origins which even the medical sciences cannot tell with
reasonable certainty. Indeed, scientists attending the World Genetic Congress in New
Delhi, India, have warned that about 25,000 chemicals used around the world could
potentially cause cancer, and Lawrence Fishbein of the U.S. National Center for
Toxilogical Research pointed out that humans were daily exposed to literally hundreds
of chemical agents via air, food, medication, both in their industrial home and
environments (Evening Post, December 16, 1983, p. 3, cols. 2-3).
The theory of increased risk is applicable in the instant case. WE had the occasion to
interpret the theory of increased risk in the case of Cristobal v. Employees
Compensation Commission (103 SCRA, 336-337, L-49280, February 26, 1981):​c
"To establish compensability under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of
work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence,
which means ‘such relevant evidence to support a decision’ (Ang Tibay v. The Court of
Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and
convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of
evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on
evidence which would establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer
and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical
experts cannot support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would
negate the principle of the liberality in the matter of evidence, Apparently, what the law
merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This
kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that ‘all
doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.’
". . . As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured
by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude
in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts
inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of
compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code (the
constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the
liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. . . ." (​Emphasis supplied​)
The sweeping conclusion of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission to
the effect that the cause of the bronchogenic carcinoma of the deceased was due to his
being a smoker and not in any manner connected with his work as a soldier, is not in
accordance with medical authorities nor with the facts on record. No certitude can arise
from a position of uncertainty.
WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have given credence to the
stand of the petitioner that her husband developed bronchogenic carcinoma while
working as a soldier with the Philippine Constabulary. The records show that when the
deceased enlisted with the Philippine Constabulary in 1969, he was found to be
physically and mentally healthy. A soldier’s life is a hard one. As a soldier assigned to
field duty, exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest is a
common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals while handling ammunition and firearms
cannot be discounted. WE take note also of the fact that he became the security of one
Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan, and he always accompanied the doctor
wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.). Such assignment invariably involved irregular
working hours, exposure to different working conditions, and body fatigue, not to
mention psychological stress and other similar factors which influenced the evolution of
his ailment.

WE held in the case of San Valentin v. Employees Compensation Commission (118 SCRA
160) that:

"x x x

"In compensation cases. strict rules of evidence are not applicable. A reasonable
work-connection is all that is required or that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions."

In the case of Dator v. Employees Compensation Commission

(L-57416, January 30, 1982), WE held the death of Wenifreda Dator, a librarian for 15
years, caused by bronchogenic carcinoma compensable. Being a librarian, "she was
exposed to duty books and other deleterious substances in the library under unsanitary
conditions" (Ibid., 632). WE do not see any reason to depart from the ruling in the said
case, considering that a soldier’s duties and environment are more hazardous.

This is in line with the avowed policy of the State as mandated by the Constitution
(Article II, Section 9) and restated in the new Labor Code (Article 4), to give maximum
aid and protection to labor.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED.

1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND

(P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;

2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER’s MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL

EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; AND

3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO

HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR BURIAL EXPENSES.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, ​JJ.​, concur.