FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 2812. October 18, 1906. ]

LONGINOS JAVIER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEGUNDO JAVIER, ET

AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, for Appellants.

Chicote, Miranda & Sierra, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. REALTY; POSSESSION; JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR. — Alfonso v.

Natividad, No. 2518, April 30, 1906, followed as to the right of a judicial
administrator to recover possession of real estate belonging to the estate of
the deceased.

2. ID.; ID.; GOOD FAITH; REIMBURSEMENT. — The defendants, knowing

that the land which they occupied was the property of others, were not
possessors in good faith (art. 433, Civil Code) and are not entitled to be
reimbursed for the cost of a house built thereon by them. (Art. 453, Civil
Code.)

3. ID.; OWNERSHIP; COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. — The ownership of a

house by one person, and of the land on which it stands by another, does
not create a community of property as that term is used in articles 392 et
seq. of the Civil Code.

4. ID.; TENANTS IN COMMON; CONSTRUCTION EXPENSES. — The

defendants, tenants in common with others of a tract of land, built a house
thereon. Held, That they could not compel their cotenants to share in the
expense of such construction, though they tacitly consented thereto. (Art.
397, Civil Code.)

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

This case relates to the ownership of the lot, and of the house standing
thereon, No. 521 Calle Real, Malate, Manila. The court below found that the
land belonged to the plaintiff as administrator of the estate of his father,
Manuel Javier, and that the defendant Isabel Hernandez and Manuel Ramon
Javier, her son, are the owners of the house standing on the lot. Judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the property, but
giving the defendants a reasonable opportunity to remove the house.

The evidence sustains the findings of fact to the effect that the land belongs
to the estate represented by the plaintiff. There was evidence to show that
the land was, in 1860, in the possession of Manuel Javier, the father of the
defendant Segundo Javier, and that since that time it has been occupied by
his children and that no one of these children ever made any claim to the
ownership thereof, and no one them ever occupied the property as owner.

Manuel Ramon Javier, testifying as a witness, made no claim to the

ownership of the land, and testified simply that the result of his
investigations into the question of ownership showed that there was a great
confusion in regard thereto.

The appellants claim that this action can not be maintained by the
administrator of the estate of Manuel Javier, but that it should be maintained
by all the heirs of the deceased. The right of judicial administrator to recover
the possession of real property belonging to the estate of the deceased was
recognized in the case of Alfonso v. Natividad 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 461; secs. 702,
703, and 704 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

The appellants claim in their brief that they were possessors in good faith,
and by reason thereof and of the provisions of article 451 of the Civil Code
they can not be compelled to pay rent. It is to be observed, however, that
the appellants do not come within the definition of a possessor in good faith
found in article 433 of the Civil Code cited in their brief. As said by the
appellants themselves in that brief, the two defendants, Segundo Javier and
his wife, Isabel Hernandez, always believed that the land did not belong to
them but belonged to the estate of Manuel Javier. It is to be observed,
moreover, that the judgment of the court does not allow any recovery at all
for the use or occupation of the house, and the recovery of rent for the use
of the land is limited to the time elapsed since April 24, 1904, when a
demand was made upon the defendants for the possession of the property.

It is also claimed by the appellants that, in accordance with article 453 of

the Civil Code, they are entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses of
constructing the house. These expenses are only allowed in accordance with
the article cited by the appellants to a possession in good faith, and the
appellants were not such possessors.

It is claimed finally by the appellants that the case should be decided by an

application of the principles of law meant that community of property existed
because the house was owned by the appellants and the land by the
plaintiff, the contention can not be maintained, for such a condition of affairs
does not create a community of property within the meaning of that term as
it is used in title 3, book 2 of the Civil Code. If, on the other hand, it is itself
belonged to the heirs of Manuel Javier, and that two of the defendants were
such heirs, it can be said that the decision of the court below was fully as
favorable to the appellants as it could be.

Article 397 of the Civil Code relates to improvements made upon the
common property by one of the coowners. The burden of proof was on the
appellants to show that the house was built with the consent of their
cotenants. Even if a tacit consent was shown this would not require such
cotenants to pay for the house. (8 Manresa, Commentaries on Civil Code, p.
396.)

The judgment of the court below allowed the appellants to remove the house
within a reasonable time. Whether this judgment was erroneous as far as
the appellee is concerned, we need not inquire, because he has not appealed
from the judgment.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellants.

After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the case
remanded to the court below for proper action. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaEN BANC
G.R. No. L-2812 October 18, 1906

LONGINOS JAVIER,
plaintiff-appellee,vs.
SEGUNDO JAVIER, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.
Hartigan, Rohde and Gutierrez, for appellants.Chicote, Miranda and Sierra, for appellee.

WILLARD,J .:

This case relates to the ownership of the lot, and of the house standing thereon, No.
521Calle Real, Malate, Manila. The court below found that the land belonged to
the plaintiff asadministrator of the estate of his father, Manuel Javier, and that
the defendant IsabelHernandez and Manuel Ramon Javier, her son, are the owners of
the house standing on thelot. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the
possession of the property, butgiving the defendants a reasonable opportunity to
remove the house.

The evidence sustains the findings of fact to the effect that the land belongs to the
estaterepresented by the plaintiff. There was evidence to show that the land was, in
1860, in thepossession of Manuel Javier, the father of the defendant Segundo Javier,
and that sincethat time it has been occupied by his children and that no one of these
children ever madeany claim to the ownership thereof, and no one them ever occupied
the property as owner.

Manuel Ramon Javier, testifying as a witness, made no claim to the ownership of the
land,and testified simply that the result of his investigations into the question
of ownershipshowed that there was a great confusion in regard thereto.

The appellants claim that this action can not be maintained by the administrator of
theestate of Manuel Javier, but that it should be maintained by all the heirs of the
deceased.The right of judicial administrator to recover the possession of real property
belonging to theestate of the deceased was recognized in the case of Alfonso
vs.
Natividad
1
(4 Off. Gaz.,461; secs. 702, 703, and 704 of the Code of Civil Procedure).The appellants
claim in their brief that they were possessors in good faith, and by reasonthereof and of
the provisions of article 451 of the Civil Code they can not be compelled topay rent. It is
to be observed, however, that the appellants do not come within the definitionof a
possessor in good faith found in article 433 of the Civil Code cited in their brief. As
saidby the appellants themselves in that brief, the two defendants, Segundo Javier
and his wife,Isabel Hernandez, always believed that the land did not belong to them but
belonged to the estate of Manuel Javier. It is to be observed, moreover, that the
judgment of the court doesnot allow any recovery at all for the use or occupation of the
house, and the recovery of rentfor the use of the land is limited to the time elapsed
since April 24, 1904, when a demand was made upon the defendants for the
possession of the property.

It is also claimed by the appellants that, in accordance with article 453 of the Civil
Code,they are entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses of constructing the house.
Theseexpenses are only allowed in accordance with the article cited by the appellants
to apossession in good faith, and the appellants were not such possessors.
lawphil.net
 It is claimed finally by the appellants that the case should be decided by an application
ofthe principles of law meant that community of property existed because the house
wasowned by the appellants and the land by the plaintiff, the contention can not be
maintained,for such a condition of affairs does not create a community of property within
the meaning ofthat term as it is used in title 3, book 2 of the Civil Code. If, on the other
hand, it is itselfbelonged to the heirs of Manuel Javier, and that two of the defendants
were such heirs, itcan be said that the decision of the court below was fully as favorable
to the appellants as itcould be.

Article 397 of the Civil Code relates to improvements made upon the common property
byone of the coowners. The burden of proof was on the appellants to show that the
house wasbuilt with the consent of their cotenants. Even if a tacit consent was shown
this would notrequire such cotenants to pay for the house. (8 Manresa, Commentaries
on Civil Code, p.396.)

The judgment of the court below allowed the appellants to remove the house within
areasonable time. Whether this judgment was erroneous as far as the appellee is
concerned,we need not inquire, because he has not appealed from the judgment.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
theappellants.

After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered
inaccordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the case remanded to the court below
forproper action. So ordered.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 50264. October 21, 1991.]

IGNACIO WONG, Petitioner, v. HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V and MANUEL MERCADO, Respondents.

Rodolfo B. Quiachon for Petitioner.

Jose M. Ilagan for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; MODES OF ACQUIRING THEREOF. — It should be stressed that
"possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it
is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." (Art.
531, Civil Code; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]); and that the execution of a sale
thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the
contrary . . . . If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected. (Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 Ed., p. 400).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY POSSESSED BY TWO DIFFERENT PERSONALITIES; RULE. — Should a question
arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a
title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of
its possession or ownership through proper proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTERING THE PROPERTY AND EXCLUDING THE LAWFUL POSSESSOR THEREFROM;
IMPLIES THE EXERTION OF FORCE. — The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor
therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under
the rule, entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The
foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered
without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had
prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of person
already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and
excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is
necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Ed., pp. 243-244; Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342
[1987]).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH; GENERALLY, DOES NOT LOSS ITS CHARACTER; EXCEPTION.
— It should be noted that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case
and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil Code). Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in
the title are made known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property
by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor
has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad
faith. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 226). Such interruption takes place upon service of
summons (Manotok Realty v. Judge Tecson, 164 SCRA 587 [1988] citing Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap
(13 SCRA 190 [1965]).

DECISION

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as it involves purely
question of law, seeking the annulment of the September 29, 1978 decision of the then Court of First
Instance * of Davao del Sur, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 1258 which reversed the February 20, 1978
decision of the Municipal Court of Sta. Maria, ** Davao del Sur in an action for Forcible Entry (Civil Case No.
13) ordering the dismissal of the complaint as well as the counterclaim.

The undisputed facts of this case, as found by both the trial court and the then Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur, are as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"On the basis of the admission of parties in their respective pleadings, the oral testimonies of all witnesses
for both plaintiff and defendants and the documentary evidence offered and admitted this Court finds that
plaintiff Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in litigation, particularly lot 3 (LRC) Pcs-295,
(situated at Colonga, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur) and which is particularly described and embraced in
Transfer Certificate of title No. (T-4244) T-972 from William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase which was executed in 1972 for a consideration of P3,500.00 (testimony of plaintiff, T.S.N., p. 3,
hearing of January 7, 1977). Then, in 1973, William Giger again asked an additional amount of P2,500.00
from plaintiff and so he required William Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale (Exhibit "A") on
November 5, 1973 at Davao City before Notary Public Gregorio C. Batiller (T.S.N., p. 5, hearing of January
7, 1977). In 1972, plaintiff began harvesting only the coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on the land
(Exhibits B to E) for Mr. Giger. He went periodically to the land to make copra but he never placed any
person on the land in litigation to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as he is a businessman and
storekeeper by occupation and resides at Lower Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur while the land in litigation is at
Colongan, Sta. Maria. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he is in actual possession (p. 8,
T.S.N., p. 7, hearing of January 14, 1978). He knew defendants’ laborers were in the land in suit as early as
August, 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did not do anything to stop them. Instead plaintiff was
happy that there were people and a hut on the land in suit (p. 14, T.S.N., hearing of January 14, 1978). chanrobles.co m.ph : virtual law lib rary

Before July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in litigation to find out if there were other
people residing there or claiming it besides the owner and he found none. So, in July, 1976, defendant
Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela
(Exhibit 5). After the execution of Exhibit 5, defendant Ignacio Wong asked for the delivery of the title to
him and so he has in his possession TCT No. (T-4244) T974 (Exhibit 6) in the name of William Giger. Mr.
Wong declared the land in suit for taxation purposes in his name (Exhibit 7). He tried to register the pacto
de retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the registration fee (Exhibit 8) but due to some
technicalities, the pacto de retro sale could not be registered. The defendant Wong placed laborers on the
land in suit, built a small farm house after making some clearings and fenced the boundaries. He also placed
signboards (T.S.N., pp. 14-15, hearing of September 15, 1977). On September 27, 1976, plaintiff Manuel
Mercado again went to the land in suit to make copras. That was the time the matter was brought to the
attention of the police of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur and the incident entered in the police blotter (Exhibit
11). Then on November 18, 1976, defendant Wong ordered the hooking of the coconuts from the land in
litigation and nobody disturbed him. But on November 29, 1976, defendant received a copy of plaintiffs
complaint for forcible entry with summons to answer which is the case now before the Court. During the
pendency of this instant complaint for forcible entry, spouses William Giger and Cecilia Valenzuela filed a
case for reformation of instrument with the Court of First Instance of Digos, Davao del Sur against plaintiff
Mercado (Exhibit 4). The case pertains to Exhibit "A" of plaintiff" (pp. 1-3, CA Decision, pp. 82-84, Rollo).

On the basis of the aforestated undisputed facts, the Municipal Court of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur in its
February 20, 1978 Decision found that herein petitioner (defendant Ignacio Wong) had prior, actual and
continuous physical possession of the disputed property and dismissed both the complaint and the counter-
claim.

On appeal, the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, in its September 29, 1978 Decision drew a
completely different conclusion from the same set of facts and ruled in favor of herein private respondent
(plaintiff Manuel Mercado). The decretal portion of the said decision, reads: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the plaintiff to have taken possession of the property earlier in point of time
and defendant is an intruder and must, as he is hereby ordered to return, the possession of the land in
question to the plaintiff, paying a monthly rental of P400.00 from August, 1976, till the property is returned
with costs against the defendant. Judgment is reversed." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

Petitioner filed the instant petition with the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in its March 1, 1979
Resolution *** found that the only issue is a pure question of law — the correctness of the conclusion drawn
from the undisputed facts and certified the case to this Court.

In its April 4, 1979 Resolution, the Second Division of this Court docketed the case in this Court and
considered it submitted for decision.

Petitioner alleged two (2) errors committed by respondent judge, to wit: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

A) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER IS AN INTRUDER IS WITHOUT

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR PURPOSES OF A FORCIBLE ENTRY.

B) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER MUST PAY A MONTHLY RENTAL OF
P400.00 FROM AUGUST, 1976 TILL THE PROPERTY IS RETURNED HAS NO LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS.

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner, in claiming that the private respondent has not established prior possession, argues that private
respondent’s periodic visit to the lot to gather coconuts may have been consented to and allowed or
tolerated by the owner thereof for the purposes of paying an obligation that may be due to the person
gathering said nuts and that a person who enters a property to gather coconut fruits and convert the same
to copras may only be a hired laborer who enters the premises every harvest season to comply with the
contract of labor with the true owner of the property.

The argument is untenable.

It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a
right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for
acquiring such right." (Art. 531, Civil Code; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]); and
that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless
there is stipulation to the contrary . . . . If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because
such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected. (Paras, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 Ed., p. 400).

Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed from vendor
William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro (Exhibit A), and
accordingly, the later sale a retro (Exhibit 5) in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the
property because there is an impediment — the possession exercised by private Respondent. Possession as
a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-
possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the
same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings (Art. 538, Civil
Code).

As to petitioner’s query that "Is the entry of petitioner to the property characterized by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth in order to show that private respondent has had possession so that the case is
within the jurisdiction of the inferior court?" (p. 15, Petition; p. 16, Rollo). The same is answered in the
affirmative.

The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the rule, entering upon the
premises by strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is
really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words
"by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one
person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession
therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of person already clothed
with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such
prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be
maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from
the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Ed., pp. 243-244; Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342 [1987]). chanro bles vi rtu al lawli bra ry

Anent the award of rentals in favor of private respondent, the same is in order. Petitioner’s argument that
there is no legal or factual basis for the payment of monthly rentals because bad faith on the part of
petitioner was never proved" deserves no merit.

It should be noted that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and
from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil Code).

Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause
or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode
of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. II, p. 226). Such interruption takes place upon service of summons (Manotok Realty v. Judge Tecson,
164 SCRA 587 [1988] citing Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap (13 SCRA 190 [1965]). In the latter case, this
Court held:jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

". . . Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between themselves
their rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the transaction, this legal
fiction of Yap’s good faith ceased when the complaint against him was filed, and consequently the court’s
declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and proper. A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon
service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and 1123, Civil Code)." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner received private respondent’s complaint for
forcible entry with summons on November 29, 1976 (Rollo, p. 46). His good faith therefore ceased on
November 29, 1976. Accordingly, the computation of the payment of monthly rental should start from
December, 1976, instead of August, 1976.

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the computation of the monthly rental should start from December,
1976 instead of August, 1976, the September 29, 1978 decision of respondent judge is Affirmed in all other
respects, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST WONG VS. HON. LUCAS