JECHRIS C.

POTOT
Succession – [Sat; 3:30pm-5:30pm & 6:00pm-8:00pm]
Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo J. Hacbang vs. Atty. Basilio H. Alo

G.R. No. 191031, October 05, 2015

FACTS

Bishop Sofronio Hacbang died leaving several properties behind. Bishop has
surviving parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang and siblings: Perfecto Hacbang,
Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo. Petitioner
Dolores L. Hacbang is the grandchild of Perfecto while petitioner Bernardo Hacbang
is the son of Joaquin. The respondent Basilio Alo is the son of Dolores. Bishop
Sofronio Hacbang left one-half of his properties to his parents and devised the other
half - including the subject lot - to his sister Dolores. On 16 April 1937, a petition
for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his estate was filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. On 17 March 1975, Dolores
Hacbang Alo moved to revive the settlement proceedings because the CFI had not
yet completed adjudicating the properties. On 23 May 1975, the CFI denied the
motion for revival because the order to archive "had long become final and
executory." On 1 February 1999, petitioners Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo filed
a petition to cancel TCT No. 169342 on the ground that it was fraudulently secured.
In support of their allegations, they submitted the 5 March 1997 Investigation
Report of Land Registration Authority (LRA) Investigator Rodrigo I. Del Rosario. The
report concluded that TCT No. 117322 was of "doubtful authenticity" and was
neither derived from TCT No. 117322 nor issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City on 24 September 1971 at 2:30 PM. In his Answer dated 18 August
1999, Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and wrongdoing. He also moved
to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither heirs nor devisees of
Bishop Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot. On 7 January 2003, the
RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute the
case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already been
admitted into probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in
question. Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio
already designated his heirs: Bishop Sofronio's parents were compulsory heirs
entitled to half of his estate while the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo,
was devised the remaining half (the free portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are
neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties in interest.

The petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio's will
did not validly transfer the subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the
probate of the will is not conclusive as to the validity of its intrinsic provisions; and
(3) only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title on the properties from
the estate on the distributes. They further argued that the distribution of the estate
should be governed by intestate succession because: (1) the subject property was
not adjudicated; and (2) the settlement proceedings were archived and dismissed.

Thus, all the properties passed on to and became part of the estate of Bishop
Sofronio's parents. The petitioners concluded that they had legal interest in the
subject lot as representatives of their ascendants, the other children of Bishop
Sofronio's parents. The respondent insisted that the petitioners do not have a clear
legal right to maintain the suit because: (1) as collateral relatives, they cannot
invoke the right of representation to the estate of Bishop Sofronio; and (2) they are
not real parties in interest and have no right of action over the subject lot.

ISSUE

Whether or not Bishop Sofronio's Will did not validly transfer the subject
property to Dolores Hacbang Alo

RULING

NO, Bishop Sofronio's Will validly transferred the subject property to Dolores
Hacbang Alo. A person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in
part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator
has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair
their legitimes. Testamentary Succession has always been preferred over
intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's Will is treated and interpreted in a way
that would render all of its provisions operative.

The disposition of the property of the decedent can only be acquired by the
descendant and ascendant of the decedent not by their siblings. And the right of
the decedent to dispose all of his property either in part or in its entirely in favor of
anyone capacitated to succeed and if the testator has compulsory heirs he can still
dispose the property without impairing the rights of his/her legitimes. The Siblings
may acquire the property of the decedent if it is stated clearly in the Last Will and
Testament of the testator.

Celestino Balus vs. Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus Vda. De Calunod
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010

FACTS

Petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July
6, 1984. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as
security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte
(Bank). Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public
auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale3 was
executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within
the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25,
1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a
new title was issued in the name of the Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein
petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property
consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the
same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the
Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the
Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-39,484 was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued
possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint8 for
Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had
already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the
disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the
same to them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for the
amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail. The RTC held that the right of
petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was
recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the
parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the
CA.

On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision,

reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to
immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The
CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property
within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the
issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co ownership was
extinguished.

ISSUE

Whether or not Co-Ownership among the petitioner and the respondents over
the property continued to exist even after the transfer of title to the bank, by virtue
of the parties’ agreement prior to repurchase thereof by the respondents

RULING

NO, Co-Ownership among the petitioner and the respondents over the
property cannot continue to exist even after the transfer of title to the bank, by
virtue of the parties’ agreement prior to repurchase thereof by the respondents.
The Court ruled that the rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death,
as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In
the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his
lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no
longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently,
petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became
co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of
petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in
the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and
respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.

The properties that can be inherited by the heirs are those properties under
the name of the decedent. Since the property was mortgaged and at the same time
it was transferred already under the name of the bank, it is not already the
property of the decedent. Furthermore, co-ownership exist only if the property is
formed part of the estate of the deceased.

Nora and Elvira B. Calalang vs. Rosario Calalang- Garcia

G.R. No. 184148 June 9, 2014

FACTS

Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first
marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this
marriage, their parents acquired some property from their maternal grandmother.
Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then
gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the
respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for
free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang sold
the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. The respondent
assailed the validity of the sale on the grounds that the sale of the land was void
because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were
co-owners of the same and claimed that the sale was absolutely simulated as Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan did not have the capacity to pay for the consideration stated in
the Deed of Sale.

The petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the second
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang. The petitioners likewise denied
the allegation that the sale of the land was absolutely simulated as Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the sale. Moreover,
they alleged that the respondents did not have a valid cause of action against them
and that their cause of action, if any, was already barred by laches, estoppel and
prescription. The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by
the spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter.
Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang.
When this marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on June
7, 1942,the corresponding shares to the disputed property were acquired by the
heirs of the decedent according to the laws of succession. In particular, the trial
court allocated half of the disputed property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the
conjugal partnership and allocated the other half to the three respondents and
Pedro Calalang to be divided equally among them. The trial court then ordered all
of Pedro’s share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale.

The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro
Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. It held that
there was insufficient evidence to prove that the disputed property was indeed
jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage.
And upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the respondents did
not acquire any successional rights to the parcel of land which was exclusively
owned by Pedro Calalang.

ISSUE

Whether or not Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed
property.

RULING

YES, Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property. Pedro
Calalang occupied occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had
planted mango trees, coconut plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal
crops and built his house on the subject lot. But he applied for free patent only in
1974 and was issued a free patent while already married to Elvira B. Calalang.
Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required
by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage,
the subject property ipso jure became private property and formed part of Pedro
Calalang’s exclusive property. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are
vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." It is fundamental tenets of succession: The principle of transmission as
of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by
other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to
the legatee. Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27,
1989 that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their
pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed
property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of
Pedro Calalang.

The property can only be inherited by the heirs the moment of death of the
decedent. Since the property was sold to the buyer at his legal capacity, the rights
of the respective heirs was not prejudiced. It is the right of the owner of the
property to sell his property to any buyers he wanted even without asking the
future heirs because the heirs don’t have legal standing yet over the property. It is
fundamental principle of Succession that the heirs will have successional rights only
at the time of death of the decedent.