Garcia vs.

Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Case:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was
married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately

without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick
contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the
suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able
to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
Reaction:

For me, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article

26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson
appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although,
appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence
regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was
admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he
objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.

Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was

validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to
marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent
also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing
his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
 Niñal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
Case:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage, the petitioners were born. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months after or on
December 11, 1986, Pepito married respondent Norma Bayadog without any
marriage license.

In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license.

On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
“annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

The RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before
his death.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
Reaction:

My reaction is that the 5-year common law cohabitation period, which

is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is
unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first

spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be

said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5
years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months
had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual

severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband
and wife”.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
 Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

Case:

Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration

of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that
she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived
in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their
child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M.
Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage.

One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and

promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited
the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
Reaction:

For me, if the court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it
was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After
respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.

Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing

that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. It cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between

an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the
rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
 Amadora vs. CA
160 SCRA 274

Case:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward

to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the
presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. As it
turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited
experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally
hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.

Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action
for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their
respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the
plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
Reaction:

The Court has came to a conclusion that the provision in question (Art.
2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.

Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school is

academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old
academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones
directly involved with the students.

Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools
of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and
directly instructed the apprentices.

Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also
liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing
discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact
that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t
required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
 Balogbog vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

Case:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio

Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961,
respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,
predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and
Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against
petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of
Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They

alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their
parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private
respondents, ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until
the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private
respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay
attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html
Reaction:

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In this
case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private
respondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or
destroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of
Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue
that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage
of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit. Although a
marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.

Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that

Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one
of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when
Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were
recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of
Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid.

EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG

LAW 2A
July 27, 2019
Reference: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html