SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 93454. September 13, 1991.]

DR. HECTOR S. RUIZ, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS, Iba, Zambales, RODOLFO V. SIOJO, ANGEL AL. CALUNTAD, Respondents.

Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Office for Petitioner.

Caluntad-Alfaro, Dabu & Associates for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; LITIGATIONS SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THEIR

MERITS AND NOT ON TECHNICALITIES. — It is well settled that litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits, and not on technicalities, and that every party litigant must
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from
unacceptable plea of technicalities. This Court, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, may disregard
technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on evidence (Tesorero v. Mathay,
185 SCRA 124 [May 8, 1990]).

2. ID.; ID.; GROUNDS TO ANNUL A FINAL JUDGMENT. — Certain requirements must be

established before a judgment can be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a) the judgment is void
for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) it has been obtained by fraud (Mercado
v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719 [July 24, 1990]).

3. ID.; ID.; FRAUD AS A GROUND; CONSTRUED. — An action to annul a final judgment on the
ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. It is regarded as
extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting all of
his case to the court (Asian Security and Insurance Co., Inc.. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233
[November 15, 1982]).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT WHEN PARTIES ARE DULY NOTIFIED; CASE AT BAR. — A perusal of
the records reveals that none of these grounds exists to warrant the annulment of the decision of
the trial court. Petitioner’s receipt of the summons is shown by the return submitted by the sheriff
dated June 24, 1983. He was represented by Atty. H.A. Jambora who, on July 8, 1983, filed an
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer which, however, was not filed despite the
extension granted by the lower court. Nevertheless, Atty. H.A. Jambora was consistently furnished
copy of court orders as well as the decision rendered by the court a quo as shown by the registry
receipts on record. It has been settled that when a party appears by counsel in an action in court,
all notices required to be given must be served to the counsel and not to the client, for the rule is
that notice to the counsel is notice to the client (Lincoln Gerard, Inc. v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 701 [July
23, 1990]). He cannot, therefore allege that he was not aware of the case and that he was not
given a chance to present his case in court.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
Restraining Order seeking to annul the Resolutions * of respondent Court of Appeals dated
February 28, 1990, which dismissed herein petitioner’s petition for annulment of decision, and May
8, 1990, which denied his motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

On August 23, 1988, Petitioner Dr. Hector S. Ruiz filed before the Court of Appeals a complaint for
Annulment of Decision, Documents, Surrender of Owner’s Duplicate of Title, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against respondent Siojo docketed as CA-G.R. No. 15411. In said complaint,
Ruiz alleged that:chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. He is the registered owner of Magalawa Island embraced and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 25102 of the Province of Zambales, located in the Municipality of Palauig, containing an
area of 425,904 sq. meters;

2. In the early part of March 1979, he constituted respondent Siojo as his exclusive agent for a
period of one year to sell the aforementioned property for P3.5 M with a 5% commission of the
price; should he be able to sell the property for more than the said amount, he shall be entitled to
the excess thereof On or about March 29, 1979, respondent Siojo handed the amount of
P200,000.00 for which petitioner’s wife signed a receipt prepared by the Respondent.

3. After the lapse of one year, without Siojo selling the property, Ruiz entered into an agreement
with one Mr. Francisco Joaquin to organize a corporation to develop the Magalawa Island property
into a tourist beach resort. However, after the lapse of another year without the corporation being
organized, Ruiz demanded from Mr. Joaquin the return of the owner’s duplicate copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25102. The latter’s refusal to return said document prompted Ruiz
to file a replevin suit against Mr. Joaquin before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3109-0, in which a judgment on the pleadings was rendered in favor of
Ruiz (Rollo, pp. 110-112). Said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
01727-R in its decision dated February 28,1988. Mr. Joaquin’s petition for review on certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July 1, 1985 in G.R. 70350.

4. On or about February 23, 1983, Ruiz executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of herein
respondent Siojo to hamper Mr. Joaquin in holding TCT No. 25102, to protect the P200,000.00
advance payment by way of earnest money and for humanitarian reason that Mr. Siojo may show
the French Embassy that he is a propertied businessman to allow his daughter to become a nun in
France.

5. On March 1983, respondents Siojo and Caluntad approached and convinced petitioner Ruiz of
the necessity of filing a replevin suit by respondent Siojo against petitioner Ruiz to foreclose any
right which Mr. Joaquin may have over the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
37590 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch XCV). However, he was not informed
of the status of the case and by means of malicious, fraudulent and illegal manipulations, a
judgment was rendered in their favor, and through misrepresentations, succeeded in getting TCT
No. 25102 to the damage and prejudice of Ruiz in the amount of P1 M.

6. On May 28, 1985, Ruiz sold the property to Mr. Christian M. Prohn for P7.2 M; although the
latter was aware of the status of Ruiz’s title to the property.

7. Siojo, upon learning of the sale, pleaded for the return of the P300,000.00 to which Ruiz
agreed.

8. A Deed of Reconveyance was executed by Siojo in favor of Ruiz which was acknowledged before
Notary Public Jose Padolinas on September 27, 1985 as Document No. 445, Page No. 90, Book No.
487 Series of 1985.

9. In view of the contract of sale in favor of Mr. Prohn, Ruiz was assured by respondent Caluntad
that the decision of the Supreme Court as to appeal of Mr. Joaquin was forthcoming.
10. That unknown to Ruiz, Respondents, by conniving with one another, succeeded in getting TCT
No. 25102. It was only upon his inquiry at the Supreme Court that he learned that the title to the
property has been delivered to the Respondent.

11. Due to respondent Siojo’s refusal to return the TCT No. 25102, Ruiz filed the replevin case
before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales but later, he moved for its dismissal upon realizing the
need to nullify the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No.
37590.

Respondent Siojo filed his Answer with Counterclaim in CA-G.R. No. 15411 on September 26, 1988
(Rollo, pp. 59-83) while that of respondent Caluntad was filed on October 2, 1988 (Ibid., pp. 84-
107).chanrobles vi rt ualawlib ra ry chan roble s.com:c han robles. com.ph

On petitioner’s motion, the respondent Court of Appeals gave petitioner until August 22, 1989 to
file his amended petition (Ibid., p. 142). On September 21, 1989, petitioner’s amended petition
was admitted, the same having been filed within the period granted by the Court. Respondents
were required to answer the amended petition (Ibid., p. 163). Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the September 21, 1989 Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals on October
12, 1989 pointing out that the petition was filed out of time and that Ruiz was directed to implead
the trial court that rendered the decision sought to be annulled but he also impleaded Atty.
Jambora which is in violation to Rule 10 of the Rules of Court (Ibid., pp. 282-285). On October 20,
1989, respondent Court of Appeals required petitioner to comment on respondent Siojo’s Motion
for Reconsideration (Ibid., p. 286). Ruiz filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to Comment
wherein he stated that respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration is pro-forma, hence on the basis of
the time-honored principle of law — res ipsa loquitur — submitted the incident for resolution (Ibid.,
p. 168).

On February 28, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals issued the questioned resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"WHEREFORE, for late filing of the amended petition; and for petitioner’s failure, among other
things, to file his opposition or comment on respondents’ motion for reconsideration dated October
12, 1989 despite being required to do so, among other things, Our resolution of September 21,
1989 is hereby set aside, the amended petition filed on August 23, 1989 is denied admission, and
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

(Ibid., p. 171).

Ruiz filed his motion for reconsideration of March 26, 1990 (Ibid., p. 172) which was denied by the
respondent Court of Appeals on May 8, 1990.

Hence, this petition which was given due course on January 16, 1991. On the same day, the notice
of death of the petitioner, filed by his counsel, Atty. Eduardo Balaoing, with the information that
the petitioner is survived by his widow Lourdes E. Ruiz and children Alman, Paul, Joan and Joseph,
all surnamed Ruiz, with residence and postal address at 88 Jose Abad Santos St., Heroes Hill,
Quezon City, with prayer that copies of court processes be sent to them to give them reasonable
time to hire the services of another counsel, was noted and granted (Ibid., p. 353).

Petitioner Ruiz submits that the respondent court seriously erred when it dismissed CA-G.R. No.
15411 on mere technical grounds. He admits that the amended petition was f led one day late but
such delay is not sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the petition. He stressed that the amended
petition was admitted by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated September 21, 1989,
which also directed the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch XCV) to
elevate the complete records of Civil Case No. 37590 (Petitioner’s Memorandum p. 420).

He asserts that a closer scrutiny of his Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to Comment dated
November 20, 1989 would show that his counsel filed his comment when he made the following
statement: chanroble s virtualawl ibra ry c hanro bles. com:chan rob les.com. ph

"However, it may be amiss to state that the petitioners motion for Leave of Court to admit
Amended Petition well explained the necessity of amending the aforesaid petition, which motion
for reconsideration of respondent’s failed (to) refute; the latter’s motion for reconsideration is
utmost (sic) pro-forma; hence, on the basis of the time-honored principle of law — RES IPSO
LOQUITOR — petitioner, most respectfully submit the incident for resolution." cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry

Accordingly, Ruiz insisted that considering the well established principle that pleadings should be
liberally construed, the respondent court should have considered the aforequoted statement as his
comment (Ibid., pp. 423-444).

Ruiz further contends that the inclusion of Atty. Jambora as a party-respondent was neither aimed
to delay the early disposition of the case nor did it alter the cause of action. His inclusion was done
solely for the purpose of presenting a complete case that would settle the case in a single
proceeding (Ibid., p. 427).

On the other hand, respondent Siojo submits that the petitioner is guilty of gross negligence when
he failed to implead the trial judge that rendered the decision sought to be annulled and m filing
his petition beyond the period granted by the court despite the warning that no further extension
will be granted (Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, p. 386). Furthermore, even the instant petition
was filed out of time. The May 8, 1990 resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals was received
by the petitioner on May 18, 1990, from which date he had 15 days or until June 2, 1990 to appeal
to this Court. He was granted a 30-day extension or until July 3, 1990 to file this petition.
However, records show that this petition was filed on July 12, 1990 which is clearly beyond the
period allowed by the Court (Ibid., p. 390).

It is well settled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits, and not
on technicalities, and that every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his case, free from unacceptable plea of technicalities. This Court,
in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, may disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its
merits based on evidence (Tesorero v. Mathay, 185 SCRA 124 [May 8, 1990]).

A careful perusal of the records however shows that even if the issue of technicalities is
disregarded, and the case be decided on the merits, still no sufficient grounds can be found to
grant the petition.

In his petition filed before the respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 15411, Ruiz
sought to annul the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch XCV) in
Civil Case No. 37590 which was allegedly obtained through deceit and malicious manipulation and
that he was never notified of any proceeding concerning the case. But certain requirements must
be established before a judgment can be the subject of an action for annulment. A judgment can
be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of
due process of law; or (b) it has been obtained by fraud (Mercado v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719 [July
24, 1990]). An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. It is regarded as extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a
party from having a trial or from presenting all of his case to the court (Asian Security and
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233 [November 15, 1982]).

A perusal of the records reveals that none of these grounds exists to warrant the annulment of the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s receipt of the summons is shown by the return submitted by
the sheriff dated June 24, 1983 (Original Records, p. 15). He was represented by Atty. H.A.
Jambora who, on July 8, 1983, filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer
(Ibid., pp. 17-18) which, however, was not filed despite the extension granted by the lower court.
Nevertheless, Atty. H.A. Jambora was consistently furnished copy of court orders as well as the
decision rendered by the court a quo as shown by the registry receipts on record. It has been
settled that when a party appears by counsel in an action in court, all notices required to be given
must be served to the counsel and not to the client, for the rule is that notice to the counsel is
notice to the client (Lincoln Gerard, Inc. v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 701 [July 23, 1990]). He cannot,
therefore allege that he was not aware of the case and that he was not given a chance to present
his case in court.

Upon the other hand, there is no allegation of fraud whether intrinsic or extrinsic. cha nrob les.co m:cralaw: red

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 75810. September 9, 1991.]

KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-

KATIPUNAN), Petitioner, v. HON. CRESENCIANO B.
TRAJANO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations, and VIRON GARMENTS MFG., CO.,
INC., Respondents.

Esteban M. Mendoza for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE AND ITS

IMPLEMENTING RULE; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; ORDER
BARRING HOLDING THEREOF A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHERE THE PROSCRIPTIONS TO CERTIFICATION ELECTION
ENUMERATED UNDER THE LAW ARE INEXISTENT AND/OR
TOOK PLACE AFTER INITIATION OF CERTIFICATION ELECTION
CASE. — The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February
27, 1981 — when NAFLU was proclaimed the exclusive
bargaining representative of all VIRON employees — to April
11, 1985 — when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification
election or a period of more than four (4) years, no collective
bargaining agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock
ever arose from negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON
resulting in conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid
strike notice. The respondents advert to a strike declared by
NAFLU on October 26, 1986 for refusal of VIRON to bargain
and for violation of terms and conditions of employment, which
was settled by the parties’ agreement, and to another strike
staged on December 6, 1986 in connection with a claim of
violation of said agreement, a dispute which has since been
certified for compulsory arbitration by the Secretary of Labor &
Employment. Obviously, however, these activities took place
after the initiation of the certification election case by KAMPIL,
and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as
precluding the holding of the certification election thus prayed
for.

RESOLUTION

NARVASA, J.:

The propriety of holding a certification election is the issue in

the special civil action of certiorari at bar.

By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations

dated February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor
Unions (NAFLU) was declared the exclusive bargaining
representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron
Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON). chanrobles lawlib rary : re dnad

More than four years thereafter, or on April 11, 1985, another

union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL-
Katipunan) filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition
for certification election among the employees of VIRON. The
petition allegedly counted with the support of more than thirty
percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.

NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be expected. The Med-

Arbiter however ordered, on June 14, 1985, that a certification
election be held at VIRON as prayed for, after ascertaining that
KAMPIL had complied with all the requirements of law and that
since the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining
representative in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had
been executed between it and VIRON.

NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the petition for

certification election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in
process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in
fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it to
file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances constituted
a bar to the petition for election in accordance with Section 3,
Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, 1 reading as follows: chanrobles virtua l lawlib ra ry

"SEC. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective

bargaining agreement submitted in accordance with Article 231
of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at
any time. However, no certification election may be held within
one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final
certification election result. Neither may a representation
question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for
certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an
incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.

If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered

in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for
certification election or a motion for intervention can only be
entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of
such agreement." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Finding merit in a NAFLU’s appeal, the Director of Labor

Relations rendered a Resolution on April 30, 1986 setting aside
the Med-Arbiter’s Order of June 14, 1985 and dismissing
KAMPIL’s petition for certification election. This disposition is
justified in the Resolution as follows.

". . . While it may be true that the one year period (mentioned
in Section 3 above quoted) has long run its course since
intervenor NAFLU was certified on February 27, 1981, it could
not be said, however, that NAFLU slept on its right to bargain
collectively with the employer. If a closer look was made on
the history of labor-management relations in the company, it
could be readily seen that the delay in the negotiations for and
conclusion of a collective agreement — the object of the one-
year period could be attributed first, on the exhaustion of all
legal remedies in the representation question twice initiated in
the company before the filing of the present petition and
second, to management who had been resisting the
representations of NAFLU in collective bargaining.

The one-year period therefore, should not be applied literally to

the present dispute, especially considering that intervenor had
to undergo a strike to bring management to the negotiation
table. . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

KAMPIL moved for reconsideration, and when this was denied,

instituted in this Court the present certiorari action.

It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding

of a certification election "within one year from the date of
issuance of declaration of a final certification election result" —
in this case, from February 27, 1981, the date of the
Resolution declaring NAFLU the exclusive bargaining
representative of rank-and-file workers of VIRON — can have
no application to the case at bar. That one-year period —
known as the "certification year" during which the certified
union is required to negotiate with the employer, and
certification election is prohibited 2 — has long since expired.

Thus the question for resolution is whether or not KAMPIL’s

petition for certification election is barred because, before its
filing, a bargaining deadlock between VIRON and NAFLU, as
the incumbent bargaining agent, had been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid
notice of strike or lockout, in accordance with Section 3, Rule
V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules above quoted.

Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the

petition for election in this case, there was no such "bargaining
deadlock . . . (which) had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike
or lockout." To be sure, there are in the record assertions by
NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation
table had been unsuccessful because of the latter’s
recalcitrance, and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; 3
but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally
coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain
collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor
practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate
strike in protest against VIRON’s refusal to bargain collectively
and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by
NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain collectively had been
delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing
it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no
adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent
initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON. chanrob les.co m:cra law:red

The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981

— when NAFLU was proclaimed the exclusive bargaining
representative of all VIRON employees — to April 11, 1985 —
when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification election or a
period of more than four (4) years, no collective bargaining
agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock ever arose
from negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in
conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice.

The respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU on

 October 26, 1986 for refusal of VIRON to bargain and for
violation of terms and conditions of employment, which was
settled by the parties’ agreement, and to another strike staged
on December 6, 1986 in connection with a claim of violation of
said agreement, a dispute which has since been certified for
compulsory arbitration by the Secretary of Labor &
Employment. 4 Obviously, however, these activities took place
after the initiation of the certification election case by KAMPIL,
and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as
precluding the holding of the certification election thus prayed
for.

WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions

to certification election set out in the law exists in the case at
bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to
have ruled otherwise, the contested Resolution of the
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated
April 30, 1986 in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-004-
85) is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against
private Respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. As amended by Sec. 3, Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa

Bilang 130.

2. SEE Sec 1, Rule 3, Rules and Regulations Implementing PD

1391.

3. Comment filed by public respondent himself dated Sept. 14,

1987 (Rollo, pp. 60, 63) in view of the refusal of the Solicitor
General to do so (Rollo, pp. 34-44).

4. Rollo, p. 63.

SO ORDERED.