Republic of the Philippines appointment, and the Associate Justices shall have
Congress of the Philippines precedence according to the date of their respective
Metro Manila
Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of
July, two thousand three.
Republic Act No. 9282 March 30 2004
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF
A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND
ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
CERTAIN SECTIONS OR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippine Congress Assembled:
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Court; Justices; Qualifications; Salary; Tenure.
- There is hereby created a Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which
shall be of the same level as the Court of Appeals, possessing
all the inherent powers of a Court of Justice, and shall consist
of a Presiding Justice and five (5) Associate Justices. The
incumbent Presiding Judge and Associate Judges shall
continue in office and bear the new titles of Presiding Justice
and Associate Justices. The Presiding Justice and the most
Senior Associate Justice shall serve as chairmen of the two
(2) Divisions. The additional three (3) Justices and
succeeding members of the Court shall be appointed by the
President upon nomination by the Judicial and Bar Council.
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his
appointments, or when the appointments of two (2) or more of
them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which
their appointments were issued by the President. They shall
have the same qualifications, rank, category, salary,
emoluments and other privileges, be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same
retirements and other benefits as those provided for under
existing laws for the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices
of the Court of Appeals.
"Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are increased,
such increases in salaries shall be deemed correspondingly
extended to and enjoyed by the Presiding Justice and
Associate Justices of the CTA.
"The Presiding Justice and Associate Justices shall hold office
during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy (70),
or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office,
unless sooner removed for the same causes and in the same
manner provided by law for members of the judiciary of
equivalent rank."
Section 2. Section 2 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 2. Sitting En Banc or Division; Quorum; Proceedings. -
The CTA may sit en banc or in two (2) Divisions, each Division
consisting of three (3) Justices.
"Four (4) Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en
banc and two (2) Justices for sessions of a Division: Provided,
That when the required quorum cannot be constituted due to
any vacancy, disqualification, inhibition, disability, or any other
lawful cause, the Presiding Justice shall designate any Justice
of other Divisions of the Court to sit temporarily therein.
 "The affirmative votes of four (4) members of the Court en
banc or two (2) members of a Division, as the case may be,
shall be necessary for the rendition of a decision or
resolution."
Section 3. Section 3 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 3. Clerk of Court; Division Clerks of Court;
Appointment; Qualification; Compensation. - The CTA shall
have a Clerk of Court and three (3) Division Clerks of Court
who shall be appointed by the Supreme Court. No person
shall be appointed Clerk of Court or Division Clerk of Court
unless he is duly authorized to practice law in the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court shall exercise
the same powers and perform the same duties in regard to all
matters within the Court's jurisdiction, as are exercised and
performed by the Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court
of the Court of Appeals, in so far as the same may be
applicable or analogous; and in the exercise of those powers
and the performance of those duties they shall be under the
direction of the Court. The Clerk of Court and the Division
Clerks of Court shall have the same rank, privileges, salary,
emoluments, retirement and other benefits as those provided
for the Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court of the Court
of Appeals, respectively.'
Section 4. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 4. Other Subordinate Employees. - The Supreme Court
shall appoint all officials and employees of the CTA, in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Supreme Court
shall fix their salaries and prescribe their duties."
Section 5. Section 5 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 5. Disqualifications. - No Justice or other officer or
employee of the CTA shall intervene, directly or indirectly, in
the management or control of any private enterprise which in
any way may be affected by the functions of the Court.
Justices of the Court shall be disqualified from sitting in any
case on the same grounds provided under Rule one hundred
thirty-seven of the Rules of Court for the disqualification of
judicial officers. No person who has once served in the Court
in a permanent capacity, either as Presiding Justice or as
Associate Justice thereof, shall be qualified to practice as
counsel before the Court for a period of one (1) year from his
retirement or resignation."
Section 6. Section 6 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 6. Place of Office. - The CTA shall have its principal
office in Metro Manila and shall hold hearings at such time and
place as it may, by order in writing, designate."
Section 7. Section 7 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
"a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided:
"1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue or other
laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
"2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or
other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, where the National Internal
Revenue Code provides a specific period of
action, in which case the inaction shall be
deemed a denial;
"3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the
Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction;
"4. Decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs in cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other money
charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected, fines, forfeitures or other
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the Customs Law or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs;
"5. Decisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property
originally decided by the provincial or city
board of assessment appeals;
"6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on
customs cases elevated to him automatically
for review from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs which are adverse
to the Government under Section 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code;
"7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, in the case of nonagricultural
product, commodity or article, and the
Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties
under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of
the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under Republic Act No. 8800,
where either party may appeal the decision to
impose or not to impose said duties.
"b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses
as herein provided:
"1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
criminal offenses arising from violations of
the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff
and Customs Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the
principal amount o taxes and fees, exclusive
of charges and penalties, claimed is less than
One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where
there is no specified amount claimed shall be
tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction
of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision
of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all
times be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in the same proceeding by
the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing
of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filling of such civil action separately from the
criminal action will be recognized.
"2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal "2. Exclusive appellate
offenses: jurisdiction in tax collection
cases:
"a. Over appeals from the judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional "a. Over appeals
Trial Courts in tax cases originally from the judgments,
decided by them, in their respected resolutions or orders
territorial jurisdiction. of the Regional Trial
Courts in tax
"b. Over petitions for review of the collection cases
judgments, resolutions or orders of originally decided by
the Regional Trial Courts in the them, in their
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction respective territorial
over tax cases originally decided by jurisdiction.
the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal "b. Over petitions for
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective review of the
jurisdiction. judgments,
resolutions or orders
"c. Jurisdiction over tax collection of the Regional Trial
cases as herein provided: Courts in the
Exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction
"1. Exclusive original
jurisdiction in tax collection over tax collection
cases originally
cases involving final and
decided by the
executory assessments for
Metropolitan Trial
taxes, fees, charges and
Courts, Municipal
penalties: Provided,
however, That collection Trial Courts and
cases where the principal Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, in their
amount of taxes and fees,
respective
exclusive of charges and
jurisdiction."
penalties, claimed is less
than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be Section 8. Section 10 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
tried by the proper Municipal follows:
Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court and Regional "SEC. 10. Power to Administer Oaths; Issue Subpoena;
Trial Court. Punish for Contempt. - The Court shall have the power to
 administer oaths, receive evidence, summon witnesses by
subpoena duces tecum, subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as applied in judicial
proceedings of a similar nature. The Court shall, in
accordance with Rule seventy-one of the Rules of Court, have
the power to punish for contempt for the same causes, under
the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein."
Section 9. Section 11 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 11. Who May Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of
Appeal. - Any party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or
inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the
Secretary of Trade and Industry or the Secretary of Agriculture
or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals or the Regional
Trial Courts may file an appeal with the CTA within thirty (30)
days after the receipt of such decision or ruling or after the
expiration of the period fixed by law for action as referred to in
Section 7(a)(2) herein.
"Appeal shall be made by filing a petition for review under a
procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CTA within thirty (30)
days from the receipt of the decision or ruling or in the case of
inaction as herein provided, from the expiration of the period
fixed by law to act thereon. A Division of the CTA shall hear
the appeal: Provided, however, That with respect to decisions
or rulings of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction appeal shall be made by filing a petition for review
under a procedure analogous to that provided for under rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CTA, which
shall hear the case en banc.
"All other cases involving rulings, orders or decisions filed with
the CTA as provided for in Section 7 shall be raffled to its
Divisions. A party adversely affected by a ruling, order or
decision of a Division of the CTA may file a motion for
reconsideration of new trial before the same Division of the
CTA within fifteens (15) days from notice thereof: Provide,
however, That in criminal cases, the general rule applicable in
regular Courts on matters of prosecution and appeal shall
likewise apply.
"No appeal taken to the CTA from the decision of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of
Customs or the Regional Trial Court, provincial, city or
municipal treasurer or the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary
of Trade and Industry and Secretary of Agriculture, as the
case may be shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint,
and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction
of his tax liability as provided by existing law: Provided,
however, That when in the opinion of the Court the collection
by the aforementioned government agencies may jeopardize
the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court
any stage of the proceeding may suspend the said collection
and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed
or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount
with the Court.
"In criminal and collection cases covered respectively by
Section 7(b) and (c) of this Act, the Government may directly
file the said cases with the CTA covering amounts within its
exclusive and original jurisdiction."
Section 10. Section 13 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 13. Decision, Maximum Period for Termination of
Cases. - Cases brought before the Court shall be decided in
accordance with Section 15, paragraph (1), Article VIII
(Judicial Department) of the 1987 Constitution. Decisions of
the Court shall be in writing, stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which they are based, and signed by the
Justices concurring therein. The Court shall provide for the
 publication of its decision in the Official Gazette in such form
and manner as may best be adopted for public information
and use.
"The Justices of the Court shall each certify on their
applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by
them for payment, or upon the payrolls under which their
salaries are paid, that all proceedings, petitions and motions
which have been submitted to the Court for determination or
decision for a period required by the law or the Constitution,
as the case may be, have been determined or decided by the
Court on or before the date of making the certificate, and no
leave shall be granted and no salary shall be paid without
such certificate."
Section 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows:
"SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. - No
civil proceeding involving matter arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the
Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as
herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been
previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.
"A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the
CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a
petition for review with the CTA en banc."
"SEC. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected
by a decision or ruling of the CTA en banc may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari
pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."
Section 13. Distraint of Personal Property and/or Levy on Real
Property. - Upon the issuance of any ruling, order or decision by the
CTA favorable to the national government, the CTA shall issue an
order authorizing the Bureau of Internal Revenue, through the
Commissioner to seize and distraint any goods, chattels, or effects,
and the personal property, including stocks and other securities,
debts, credits, bank accounts, and interests in and rights to personal
property and/or levy the real property of such persons in sufficient
quantity to satisfy the tax or charge together with any increment
thereto incident to delinquency. This remedy shall not be exclusive
and shall not preclude the Court from availing of other means under
the Rules of Court.
Section 14. Retention of Personnel; Security of Tenure; Upgrading of
Positions and Salaries. - All existing permanent personnel of the CTA
shall not be adversely affected by this Act. They shall continue in office
and shall not be removed or separated from the service except for
cause as provided for by existing laws. Further, the present positions
and salaries of personnel shall be upgraded to the level of their
counterparts in the Court of Appeals.
Section 15. Transitory Provisions. - In consonance with the above
provision, the incumbent Presiding Judge and Associate Judges shall
comprise a Division pending the constitution of the entire Court.
Section 16. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations
Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 17. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders, executive
issuances or letter of instructions, or any part thereof, inconsistent with
or contrary to the provisions of this Act are hereby deemed repealed,
amended or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Separability Clause. - If for any reason, any section or
provision of this Act shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid, the
other parts thereof not affected thereby shall remain valid.
Section 19. Effectivity Clause - This Act shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following its publication in at least (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
 Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
 Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Tenth Congress
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of
July, two thousand seven.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 8249 February 5, 1997
AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications;
Tenure; Removal and Compensation. - A special court, of the
same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the
inherent powers of a court ofjustice, to be known as the
Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding
justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed
by the President."
Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended
to read as follows:
"SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. -
The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro
Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and
determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That
cases originating from the principal geographical regions of
the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall
be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when
the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses,
or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in
which instance a case originating from one geographical
region may be heard in another geographical region:
Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice
shall authorize any divisions of the court to hold sessions at
any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the
interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may
require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities
of the courts or other government offices where any of the
divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts
or offices shall be subject to the orders of the
Sandiganbayan."
Section 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is
hereby deleted.
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended
to read as follows:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
 "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan
and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department
heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city
department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade'27'and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall
be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto,
arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not
be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office
of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in govemment-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from
the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however,
That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately
but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be,
for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal
action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned."
Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended
to read as follows:
'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. -
All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case
or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the
Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts
and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly
raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.
"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision
may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or
notice of the final order on judgment, and such motion for
reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from
submission thereon.
"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided
by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in
the Rules of Court.
"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.
"Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable
by said courts under this decree as well as those rendered by
them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be
appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the
manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court.
"In case, however, the imposed penalty by the
Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper
 exercise of their respective jurisdictions, is death, review by
the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not
accused files an appeal."

Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the

initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current
fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such
sums as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases

pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof

Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any

provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION - CASE DIGEST -
or portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION GR 139465, 17
Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and October 2000
circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. FACTS:

On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
circulation.
Country".

Approved: On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,

representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
(Sgd.) ERNESTO M. MACEDA (Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA, JR. signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of
President of the Senate Speaker of the House of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
Representatives States of America.

The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in

Approved: February 5, 1997 the ratification of the said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in
the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition
President of the Philippines request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer
of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of
 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States, 2 counts),
 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts),
 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),
 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and
 (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33
counts).
 On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249
designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez
(on 1 July 1999 requested copies of the official extradition request
from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers
submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on
the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. The Secretary denied the request.
On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a
petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
l for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez
the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford
him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request,
and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively);
l certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July
1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court;
l and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to
the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed
the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez
copies of the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
IN SUMMARY:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs a request from the United States for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the
procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a
foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that
he be given ample time to comment on said request. The petitioners
denied the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal
duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
HELD:
NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in the Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is
applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation
where there is a conflict between a rule of the international law and
the constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the
provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable,
the municipal law must be upheld. The fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over the municipal law in the municipal
sphere. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with
the constitution.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and
present danger of loss of property or employment but of liberty itself,
which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land.
The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition
request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily
comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which
is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only
in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not
even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are
protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the
organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in
keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised.

Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the

extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by
LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO
represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY
P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF
WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF
SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE
OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF
LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF
SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG,
CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS,
CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF
TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF
VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY
OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM,petitioners-in-intervention.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the
subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act
on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act
No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment
was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad
rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the
11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve
the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007.
The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws 10) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve
of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection
clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the
Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection
clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because
RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more
than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not
in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes
to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a
city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any
statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved
bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in
the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still
be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws
administered by the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct
the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood
Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing
because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League
with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing
issues affecting city government administration and securing, through
proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-
intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because
their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws
are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing
because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient
interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the
release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what
the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress.
This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has a locally generated average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One
hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and
if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100)
square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had
cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became
law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100
million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
acted upon during the 11thCongress. This Resolution reached the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in
the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and
December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x
shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities
from the income requirement of P100 million prescribed in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from
March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to
sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the
effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001
or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in
December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007.
Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-
retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA
9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied
retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All
Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and
not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern
exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of
the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution
is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units
must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found
solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation
from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to
increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for
the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from
that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100
million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from
this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to
respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were
pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood
Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt
respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid,
such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local
Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable
distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being
equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city
with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land
area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria,
prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local
government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not
follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue
Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of
Congress – if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous.
Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the
law, within the law's four corners.19 If the language of the law is plain,
clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its
express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of
statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. 20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased
income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose
cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must
meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go
beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local
Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent
municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on
the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write
this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included
such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the
cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must
appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the
conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from
such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code.
Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such
criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city
through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption
found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations
except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide
for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations
may be created or established by special charters in the
interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation,
organization, or regulation" of private corporations in a general law
applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create
a private corporation through a special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills
Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills
filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations
conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became
worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These
hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills
enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All
unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officioupon
adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to
be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-
filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had
to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just
like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval.
Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished
Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate
upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first
time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on
Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business
shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being
considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until
it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end
of a session shall be resumed at the commencement
of the next session as if no adjournment has taken
place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all
Unfinished Business are deemed
terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved
cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12 th and
13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA
9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not
qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent
Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income
requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for
possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for
the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be
assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However,
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the
Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption
must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. The exemption provision merely states,
"Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall
be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under
Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the
exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from
the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid
classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption
will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had
cityhood bills pending in the 11thCongress when RA 9009 was
enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and
those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income
requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on
substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing
conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court
has ruled:
 The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits
a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the
same class.24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or
determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower
annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood
bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood
bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the
law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not
informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a
condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income
requirement. Had they been informed, many municipalities would
have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities,
even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent
municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less
than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA
9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates
the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to
existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower
Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk
dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower
than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower,
the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a
regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may
except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling
or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes
licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those
entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act
and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which
exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses
within certain areas, but excepting existing
establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such
laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business
or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the
public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to
those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as
against all those who enter the industry after that date.
The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any
relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the
provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at
any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the
absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up
possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The
classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the
appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives
the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date
− the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress -
as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after
the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all
similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and

declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405,
9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

SO ORDERED.