Aly's: Case No. 1

Aly’s Criminal Cases JD-2A
CASE NO. 1
G.R. No. 105376-77 August 5, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEXANDER MARTINEZ alias ABELARDO MARTINEZ y MONTESOR, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jesus F. Balacanta for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
On November 22, 1989, accused-appellant Alexander Martinez, alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor,
was charged with (1) violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act (Criminal Case No. 9618) and (2) violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms (Criminal Case No. 9626), before the Regional Trial Court
of Zamboanga City.
The information in Criminal Case No. 9618 charges accused-appellant and Dolores Cabatuan
Martinez with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Republic Act No. 6425), as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 1989, in the city of Zamboanga, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
being authorized by law, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell
and deliver to one EDGAR PELIN y FERNANDEZ who pose (sic) as buyer, one (1)
deck of Metamphetamine Hydrochloride popularly known as "SHABU", knowing the
same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 9)
In Criminal Case No. 9626 appellant was charged as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any justificable cause or reason, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession and under his custody and control,
one (1) .38 caliber "paltik" revolver with Serial No. 50284 and eight (8) rounds of live
.38 ammunition, without first having obtained the necessary license and/or permit
therefore, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 10)
Appellant with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on the above charges.
Thereafter, the two cases were jointly tried on the merits upon agreement of the parties.
The facts of the case as summarized in the People's brief are as follows:
The factual findings of the court a quo are not disputed by appellant . . . . This
notwithstanding, they are hereunder briefly summarized . . . .
On October 27, 1989, after receiving information that appellant was engaged in the
sale of shabu at his residence at the Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT) Compound,
Baliwasan Moret, Zamboanga City, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent
Bienvenido Salvo of the NBI Regional Office in Zamboanga City directed his "asset" or
confidential informer Edgar Pelin to purchase from appellant P200.00 worth of
prohibited drug. Pelin succeeded in purchasing from appellant a specimen which Agent
Salvo sent the next day to the NBI chemist in Cebu who, after a laboratory
examination, determined that it was indeed shabu or metamphetamine hydrochloride.
Immediately thereafter, Agent Salvo returned to Zamboanga City to map out a 'buy-
bust' operation against appellant (TSN, April 19, 1990, pp. 5-6).
On November 6, 1989, the "buy-bust" operation was set up by the NBI Regional Office
with the assistance of the Zamboanga City Police. A raid party composed of four
separate teams was formed for the 'buy-bust' operation. One of the teams (the search
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team) was headed by Agent Salvo, with Captain Isniraji Maruji of the Zamboanga City
Police and a custodian, a photographer and an administrative officer from the NBI as
members. For his part, Pelin would act as poseur-buyer in the "buy-bust" operation.
Agent Salvo likewise obtained a search warrant (Exhibit "C") for this operation (TSN,
April 18, 1990, pp. 6-10; TSN, April 19, 1990, p. 12).
The group arrived at the BAT Compound at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of said
date. Agent Salvo gave Pelin P200.00 in marked money for the purchase of the shabu.
As Pelin approached appellant's house, the rest of the party positioned themselves
about twenty to thirty meters from where the transaction took place (TSN, April 18,
1990, p. 5; TSN, April 19, 1990, pp. 9-10).
Pelin knocked at the appellant's door and was allowed entry by the latter's guard.
Inside the house, Pelin gave the marked P200.00 to appellant who in turn gave him a
'deck' of shabu (Exhibit "J") which was wrapped in aluminum foil (Exhibits "J-1" to "J-
2"). The transaction concluded, Pelin signalled to his companions by going out of
appellant's house (TSN, April 18, 1990, pp. 6-7).
The search team led by Agent Salvo then rushed forward and entered appellant's
house while the rest of the raid party secured the area. Pelin turned over the "deck"
of shabu to the NBI custodian who marked the aluminum foil wrapper with the initials
"AMM". Simultaneously, Agent Salvo presented a copy of the search warrant to
appellant and thereafter the search team conducted a search of the premises (TSN,
April 18, 1990, p. 8; TSN, April 19, 1990, p. 10; TSN, May 8, 1990, pp. 10-11).
The search team recovered drug paraphernalia from various places in appellant's
house. However, only P100.00 of the marked money was recovered by the team.
Captain Maruji and Agent Salvo also recovered a .38 caliber "paltik" revolver (Exhibit
"F") with serial number 50248 containing five live ammunition inside a pillowcase in
appellant's bedroom (TSN, April 18, 1990, p. 30, 36-39; TSN, April 19, 1990, p. 10-12).
The search team made a three-page inventory (Exhibits "D" to "D-8") of the things
seized at the appellant's house. Said inventory was signed by appellant and a copy
thereof was furnished him. Further, several photographs (Exhibits "E" to "E — 6")
where taken relative to the search (TSN, April 19, 1990, pp. 13-17).
Edgar Pelin executed an affidavit (Exhibits "A" to "A-3") wherein he recounted in detail
his participation in the "buy-bust" operation. Likewise, Agent Salvo and Captain Maruji
executed a joint affidavit (Exhibit "B") wherein they set forth the procedure they
adopted and the details on how they were able to arrest appellant and search his
house. The aforementioned affidavits were introduced and admitted in evidence and
they fully confirmed the testimony of the above-named witnesses (TSN, April 18, 1990,
p. 10-11; TSN, April 19, 1990, p. 23).
Immediately upon receipt of the "deck" of shabu, the NBI custodian submitted it to NBI
chemist Cesar Cagalawan right inside appellant's residence for examination. Chemist
Cagalawan made a preliminary investigation of the specimen known as the Marquis
Test at the NBI Regional Office in Zamboanga City and the presence
of metamphetamine was confirmed. Later, he conducted a Thin Layer Chromatography
examination at the NBI Regional Office in Cebu City which conclusively determined
that the substance sold by appellant to poseur-buyer Pelin was
indeed metamphetamine hydrocloride or shabu. He formalized the results of his
examination in Chemistry Report No. 89-DD-4411, which was offered and admitted in
evidence as Exhibits "K" to "K-3" (TSN, May 8, 1990, pp. 4-15).
(Rollo, p. 72; See People's Brief at pp. 3-8)
The defense presented accused-appellant, his wife Dolores Martinez, Angelina Martinez and
Bonifacio Leyte. Said witnesses presented a totally different version of the circumstances surrounding
the arrest of appellant and the consequent charges against him.
Appellant's version purports to show that at about 1:00 P.M. of November 6, 1989 he was at home
watching television, and slept at about 1:20 p.m. He claims to have been awakened by two persons
kicking him whom he identified as prosecution witnesses Salvo and Pelin. All told, appellant denies
having sold shabu to Pelin nor owning the .38 caliber revolver allegedly found in his room.
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At the NBI Office, appellant was allegedly forced to sign an inventory of the seized articles under the
threat of summary execution. The testimonies of the other defense witnesses, on the other hand,
generally corroborated appellant's testimony.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused Alexander Martinez
"alias" Abelardo Martinez y Montesor guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 and for Illegal Possession of Firearm defined and penalized under P.D. No.
1866 and pursuant thereto hereby sentences him as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 9618, accused is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to
pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the
costs.
xxx xxx xxx
2. In Criminal Case No. 9626, accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from
Seventeen (17) to Twenty (20) Years and to pay the costs. The accused who is a
detention prisoner is credited to the full extent of his preventive imprisonment.
xxx xxx xxx
3. In Criminal Case No. 9618, this Court, on ground of insufficiency of evidence,
hereby ACQUITS the accused Dolores Cabatuan Martinez, with costs de oficio. The
accused who is a detention prisoner is ordered released immediately unless there
exists an order in other case/s directing her continued detention.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 26-27)
In this appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
1.1 The Trial Court erred in not acquitting the Accused-Appellant for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt his guilt in Criminal Case No. 9618 (for
violation of Sec. 4, Art. 11 of Rep. Act No. 6425, "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972),
considering that:
a) The "shabu" (Exhibit "J" and submarkings) was not identified by the
prosecution's sole eyewitness to the alleged "buy-bust" operation, in the
person of Edgar Pelin who acted as 'poseur-buyer'; in other words,
there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged
"shabu" (prosecution's Exhibit "J" and submarkings) was ever
purchased by Edgar Pelin (the alleged "poseur-buyer") from the
Accused-Appellant, or that the alleged 'shabu' (Exhibit 'J' and
submarkings) is the very same dangerous drug allegedly purchased by
the poseur-buyer, precisely because Exhibit "J" and submarkings were
not identified by the poseur-buyer (Edgar Pelin);
(b) The marked money which was allegedly used in the buy-bust
operation, was EXCLUDED as evidence by the Trial Court ('Order'
dated May 15, 1990); moreover, said marked money was not identified
by the poseur-buyer himself (Edgar Pelin); hence, there could legally be
NO buy-bust operation, because the element of "marked money" (sic)
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; and
(c) Any and all items particularly the 'shabu' (Exhibit 'J' and
submarkings), the firearm (Exhibit 'F') and five live ammos (Exhibit 'F-1'
to 'F-5', which were seized by virtue of the Search Warrant (Exhibit 'C')
issued against a certain ALEXANDER MARTINEZ alias "ALEX", are
inadmissible against Accused-Appellant, who is ABELARDO
MARTINEZ y MONTESOR with the nickname "LARD"; in short, they are
two different persons, as there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that
'ALEXANDER MARTINEZ' and appellant ABELARDO MARTINEZ are
one and the same person.
1.2 The Trial Court erred in not acquitting the Accused-Appellant for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt his guilt in Criminal Case No. 9626 (for
illegal possession of firearm defined and penalized under Sec. 1 of PD No. 1866),
considering that:
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(a) The six shooter .38 caliber revolver in question, which was allegedly
found in the room of Accused-Appellant by prosecution witness Capt.
Maruji was not presented in evidence; also, the "eight (8) rounds of live
.38 caliber ammunition" (five of which were found inside the chamber
and three of which were outside the chamber of the five-shooter .38
revolver (Prosecution's Exhibit 'F') are DIFFERENT from those allegedly
found by prosecution witness Capt. Maruji, because those found by
Capt. Majuri were allegedly found in reference to a six-shooter .38
revolver (sic) (six inside the chamber and two outside); moreover, the
gray lady purse (Prosecution's Exhibit 'H-6' in which three (3) live
ammos were allegedly found, was excluded by the Trial Court ("Order"
dated May 15, 1990);
(b) The evidence presented by the prosecution is DIFFERENT from the
revolver and ammunition allegedly found by prosecution-witness Capt.
Maruji; and
(c) The alleged revolver and ammos in question were not found in the
actual possession of the Accused-Appellant, as they were allegedly
found inside the Accused-Appellant's room wherein they (revolver and
ammos) could have easily been planted.
(Rollo, pp. 36-38)
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the submission of proof
that such a sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, and the presentation
further of said prohibited drug as evidence in court (People vs. Pacleb, 217 SCRA 92 [1993]). What is
important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the shabu from appellant and that the contents
thereof were duly presented in court.
Records show that the seized shabu was duly presented in court as exhibit "J" and was competently
identified by prosecution witness Cesar Cagalawan, an NBI chemist. Pelin's testimony was likewise
consistent and compatible on its material points. He categorically pinpointed accused-appellant as the
one who handed him the tinfoil containing the shabu. When asked to testify on what had transpired on
November 6, 1989, Pelin gave the following straightforward statements:
FISCAL
Q Now, you said awhile ago that you went to the house of the accused
in order to buy a deck of Shabu. Tell the Court how were you able to
enter the house of the accused?
A I was able to get inside the house of the accused because I know the
accused already that they are selling Shabu (sic).
Q In other words, before that date November 6, 1989, you have gone to
the house of the accused already?
A Yes sir.
Q For how many times?
A I cannot remember, but I remembered October 27, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, will you please tell this Honorable Court how the transaction of
buy and sell (sic) took place.
xxx xxx xxx
A I went to the house of the accused and their guard opened the door
and I got inside and once inside, I gave the money to them and they
gave me the Shabu.
Q You said that you gave the money to them, who are you referring to?
A Abelardo Martinez. (TSN, April 18, 1990, pp. 5-7)
Pelin's statements were furthermore corroborated by the testimonies of the other witnesses for the
prosecution who were law enforcers, and, the absence of proof to the contrary are presumed to have
regularly performed their duties (People vs. Yap, 185 SCRA 222 [1990]).
As correctly stated by the Solicitor-General, Pelin testified:
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. . . that he turned over the shabu to the NBI custodian as soon as the "buy-bust"
operation ended (TSN, April 18, 1990, p. 8). For his part, NBI Chemist Cesar
Cagalawan testified that the NBI custodian submitted said drug to him inside
appellant's residence for examination (TSN, May 8, 1990, pp. 4-7). These assertions
were in turn fully corroborated by Agent Bienvenido Salvo in his direct examination
testimony (TSN, April 19, 1990, pp. 12-13). (Rollo, p. 76; See People's Brief, pp. 12-13)
Needless to say, even if the poseur-buyer was not made to identify the seized shabu, the same would
not have worked against the People's case. Proof of the transaction suffices.
The allegation of the appellant that the marked money was not properly identified by the poseur-buyer
does not deserve even a passing consideration. As long as the prohibited or regulated drug given or
delivered by the appellant was presented before the court and the appellant was clearly identified as
the offender, conviction is proper. In fact, the absence of the marked money or its non-presentation in
court would not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence (People vs. Hoble, 211 SCRA 675
[1992]; People vs. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 [1990]).
Appellant reproves the prosecution for the variance between the testimony of Captain Maruji as to the
firearm seized and that actually presented during the trial. It should be remembered, however, that
what the law punishes is the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm regardless of make, model, or
kind. That an unlicensed firearm was seized from the house of appellant is undisputed, and this is
more than adequate for appellant's conviction.
Finally, accused-appellant argues that he is not the person named in the search warrant issued in
connection with the buy-bust operation, his name being Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander
Martinez. That being the case, all things seized by virtue of the said warrant are inadmissible in
evidence.
The argument is devoid of merit.
The discrepancy regarding the name of accused-appellant and that stated in the search warrant
cannot militate against his positive identification by the poseur-buyer. It has been consistently held
that "greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses
than accused's denial concerning the commission of the crime (People vs. Serdan, 213 SCRA 329
[1992]).
And as correctly pointed out by the trial court:
The claim of the accused that his true and correct name is not Alexander Martinez but
Abelardo Martinez does not deviate from the fact of his identity being established as a
peddler of shabu. Even granting arguendo that his (accused) claim is correct that he is
not Alexander but Abelardo, that alone does not warrant dismissal or absolving the
accused of criminal liability. Sec. 7, Rule 110 of the 1985 (should read 1988) Rules on
Criminal procedure, as amended, provides:
A complaint or information must state the name and surname of the
accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is
known, or if his name cannot be discovered he must be described under
a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is unknown.
If in the course of the proceeding the true name of the accused is
disclosed by him, or appears in some other manner to the court, the true
name of the accused shall be inserted in the complaint or information
and record. (Rollo, p. 23)
Granting arguendo that the search warrant issued against accused-appellant was invalid because his
true name is Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez as stated in the search warrant, the same
cannot render the articles seized inadmissible as evidence in court. As a matter of fact the information
filed identify him as "Alexander Martinez alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, accused."
The accused-appellant was arrested as a result of a "buy-bust" operation and the ensuing search of
the premises was made as an incident to a lawful arrest (Section 12, Rule 116 Rules of Court; People
vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 [1993], People vs. Fernandez, 209 SCRA 1 [1992], People vs. Liquen, 212
SCRA 288 [1992], People vs. Li Wai Cheung, 214 SCRA 504 [1992], People vs. Eligino, 216 SCRA
370, [1992]). It is therefore clear that regardless of the alleged defect of the search warrant in
erroneously designating his first name, the seized articles may still be used as evidence against
accused-appellant, having been obtained from him and as such, fruits of a lawful search incidental to
a valid arrest.
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Furthermore, appellant was arraigned under the name of Alexander Martinez and when arraigned
under said name he entered his plea of "not guilty". Appellant should have raised the question of his
identity either at the time of arraignment or by filing a demurrer based on the court's lack of jurisdiction
over his person, inasmuch as he was then considered as Alexander Martinez alias Abelardo Martinez.
Having failed to do so, he is estopped from later raising the same question (People vs. Narvaes, 59
Phil. 738 [1934]). His identity had been sufficiently established.
Finally, as We have held in People v. Reception, (198 SCRA 670 [1991]), "the identification of a
person is not established solely through knowledge of the name of that person". It is clear from the
records that appellant was the same person who sold the prohibited drug to Pelin on two instances.
The claim therefore that his true and correct name is Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez
cannot overturn the fact of his identity being established as the peddler of shabu, a prohibited drug.
Premises considered, the Court believes and so holds that the prosecution has fully discharged its
duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In Criminal Case No. 9618, appellant was convicted for selling one (1) deck of "shabu" and was
accordingly sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay P20,000.00 fine.
In the case of People v. Simon (GR No. 93028, July 29, 1994), this Court gave retroactive application
to the provisions of R.A. 6425 which was further amended by R.A. 7659 as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds of
Instruments of the Crime. — The penalties for offensed\s under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and
9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied
if the dangerous drugs involves is in any of the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylampethamine hydrochloride;
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
Given the fact that what is involved is less than 200 grams of shabu and there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the proper imposable penalty to be imposed upon appellant is prision
correccional in its medium period without fine. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in
consonance with People v. Simon (supra), appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment from
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as maximum. The fine of P20,000.00 is deleted.
Further, the proper penalty to be imposed upon accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 9626 for
violation of P.D. 1866 should be 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum
to reclusion perpetua as maximum and not 17 years to reclusion perpetua as erroneously applied by
the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decisions, except as herein modified, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
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CASE NO. 2
G.R. NO. 201620 : March 6, 2013
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA

JAIME,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the May 17, 2011
Decision1 and March 30, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 00952.
In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code,3 viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about the 10th day of September 2000 in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having obtained and received from
one Cynthia Jaime various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00 for the
purpose of selling the same on consignment basis with express obligation to account for and remit the
entire proceeds of the sale if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of time and
despite repeated demands therefor, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to remit
proceeds of the sale of said items or to return any of the items that may have been unsold to said
Cynthia Jaime but instead has willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to his/her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia
Jaime in the aforementioned amount of P705,685.00.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence sought to prove the following facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-
law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia), were engaged in a jewelry business. Sometime in the first week of
September 2000, Senador went to see Rita at her house in Guadalupe Heights, Cebu City,
expressing her interest to see the pieces of jewelry that the latter was selling. On September 10,
2000, Rita's daughter-in-law and business partner, Cynthia, delivered to Senador several pieces of
jewelry worth seven hundred five thousand six hundred eighty five pesos (PhP
705,685).5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Cynthia and Senador, the latter undertook to sell
the jewelry thus delivered on commission basis and, thereafter, to remit the proceeds of the sale, or
return the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15) days from the delivery.6 However, as events
turned out, Senador failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold jewelry within the
given period.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita demanded from Senador the return of the unsold jewelry
or the remittance of the proceeds from the sale of jewelry entrusted to her. The demand fell on deaf
ears prompting Rita to file the instant criminal complaint against Senador.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered to Rita Keppel Bank Check No. 0003603
dated March 31, 2001 for the amount of PhP 705,685,9 as settlement of her obligations. Nonetheless,
the check was later dishonored as it was drawn against a closed account.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing evidence of the prosecution,
and instead, she relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven
and established during the trial differ. In particular, Senador asserted that the person named as the
offended party in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed the
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complaint. According to Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name
"Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further,
Cynthia Jaime was never presented as witness. Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al.11 (Uba) and United
States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (Lahoylahoy),12 Senador would insist on her acquittal on the
postulate that her constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against her has
been violated.
Despite her argument, the trial court, by Decision dated June 30, 2008, found Senador guilty as
charged and sentenced as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds RAMONCITA SENADOR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of ESTAFA under Par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the private complainants, RITA JA[I]ME and
CYNTHIA JAIME, the following: 1) Actual Damages in the amount of P695,685.00 with interest at the
legal rate from the filing of the Information until fully paid; 2) Exemplary Damages in the amount
of P100,000.00; and 3) the amount of P50,000 as Attorney's fees.
Senador questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. However, on May 17, 2011, the appellate court
rendered a Decision upholding the finding of the RTC that the prosecution satisfactorily established
the guilt of Senador beyond reasonable doubt. The CA opined that the prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the following undisputed facts, to wit: (1) Senador received the
pieces of jewelry in trust under the obligation or duty to return them; (2) Senador misappropriated or
converted the pieces of jewelry to her benefit but to the prejudice of business partners, Rita and
Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed to return the pieces of jewelry despite demand made by Rita.
Further, the CA finding that Uba13 is not applicable since Senador is charged with estafa, a crime
against property and not oral defamation, as in Uba ruled:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the June 30, 2008 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Dumaguete City,
in Criminal Case No. 16010, finding accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Senador filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated March 30, 2012.
Hence, the present petition of Senador.
The sole issue involved in the instant case is whether or not an error in the designation in the
Information of the offended party violates, as petitioner argues, the accused's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the information and the
evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal,14 more so if
the variance relates to the designation of the offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not
prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador's reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba, the
appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the person
against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous
designation of the person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was
charged with estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the
proper designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the
correct identification of the criminal act charged in the information.16 Thus, in case of an error in the
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designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court
mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the name and surname
of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation
or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him,
he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed
is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the
complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous
designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense
was sufficiently described and identified.
Lahoylahoy cited by Senador supports the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is generic
or one which is not described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then
an erroneous designation of the offended party is material and would result in the violation of the
accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
Such error, Lahoylahoy teaches, would result in the acquittal of the accused,
viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an offense shall have
been described with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person
injured shall be deemed immaterial. We are of the opinion that this provision can have no application
to a case where the name of the person injured is matter of essential description as in the case at bar;
and at any rate, supposing the allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the robbery charged in this
case would not be sufficiently identified. A complaint stating, as does the one now before us, that the
defendants "took and appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner
thereof the sum of P100" could scarcely be sustained in any jurisdiction as a sufficient description
either of the act of robbery or of the subject of the robbery. There is a saying to the effect that money
has no earmarks; and generally speaking the only way money, which has been the subject of a
robbery, can be described or identified in a complaint is by connecting it with the individual who was
robbed as its owner or possessor. And clearly, when the offense has been so identified in the
complaint, the proof must correspond upon this point with the allegation, or there can be no
conviction.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the offense was money in the total sum of PhP 100. Since money
is generic and has no earmarks that could properly identify it, the only way that it (money) could be
described and identified in a complaint is by connecting it to the offended party or the individual who
was robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus, the identity of the offended party is material and
necessary for the proper identification of the offense charged. Corollary, the erroneous designation of
the offended party would also be material, as the subject matter of the offense could no longer be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v. Kepner,18 Sayson v. People,19 and Ricarze v. Court of
Appeals20 support the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is specific or one described
with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of
the offended party is not material and would not result in the violation of the accused's constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not result
in the acquittal of the accused.
In the 1902 case of Kepner, this Court ruled that the erroneous designation of the person injured by a
criminal act is not material for the prosecution of the offense because the subject matter of the
9|Page
offense, a warrant, was sufficiently identified with such particularity as to properly identify the
particular offense charged. We held, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The allegation of the complaint that the unlawful misappropriation of the proceeds of the warrant was
to the prejudice of Aun Tan may be disregarded by virtue of section 7 of General Orders, No. 58,
which declares that when an offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient
certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed
immaterial. In any event the defect, if defect it was, was one of form which did not tend to prejudice
any substantial right of the defendant on the merits, and can not, therefore, under the provisions of
section 10 of the same order, affect the present proceeding.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction of Sayson for attempted estafa, even if there was an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured because the subject matter of the offense, a check, is
specific and sufficiently identified. We held, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been described
in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person
injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to
prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a
factual backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the
misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the
cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be
immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the
complaint with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged.
In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code,
since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes
of convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was
actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the
information." 22(Emphasis supplied.)
In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine espousing an erroneous designation of the person injured is not
material because the subject matter of the offense, a check, was sufficiently identified with such
particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged.23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses against property, if the
subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken
as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in
the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and
identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in
the designation of the offended party is immaterial.
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic
property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds of jewelry
valued in the total amount of P705,685.00." The charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and
proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement24 signed by Senador and presented during trial, which
enumerates these "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685,"
viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Quality Description
1 #1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5 grams
1 #2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams
1 #1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills 14 kt. 4.1 grams
10 | P a g e
1 #319 1 set creolla w/brills 14 kt. 13.8 grams
1 #1301 1 set creolla 2 colors w/brills 20.8 grams
1 #393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. 14 grams
1 #2155 1 yg. Bracelet w brills ruby and blue sapphire 14 kt. 28 grams
1 #1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt. (oval) 14.6 grams
1 #2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 8.8 grams
1 #206 1 set double sampaloc creolla 14 kt. 14.2 grams
1 # 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6 grams
1 # 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 kt. 2.0 grams
1 #2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 4.5 grams
1 #1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. 12.6 grams
1 #1851 1 pc. lady's ring w/ brills 14 kt. 7.8 grams
1 # 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 grams
1 #1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 kt. 4.1 grams

Thus, it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze that is applicable to the present
case, not the ruling in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The error in the designation of the offended party in the
information is immaterial and did not violate Senador's constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against her.
Lest it be overlooked, Senador offered to pay obligations through Keppel Check No. 0003603, which
was dishonored because it was drawn against an already closed account. The offer indicates her
receipt of the pieces of jewelry thus described and an implied admission that she misappropriated the
jewelries themselves or the proceeds of the sale. Rule 130, Section 27
states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In criminal cases. except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law
to be compromised. an offer of compromise by the accused may he received in evidence as implied
admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
Taken together, the C A did not err in affirming petitioner's conviction for the crime of estafa.
In light of current jurisprudence,25 the Court, however, finds the award of exemplary damages
excessive. Art. 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good. Nevertheless, "exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive
to curb socially deleterious actions."26 On this basis, the award of exemplary damages in the amount
of PhP 100,000 is reduced to PhP 30,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 17, 2011 and Resolution dated March 30, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals in C A-G.R. CJ.C No. 00952, finding Ramoncita Senador guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ESTAFA under par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages he reduced to PhP 30,000.
SO ORDERED.
11 | P a g e
CASE NO. 3
G. R. No. 122150 - March 17, 2003
GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO

U. CARANTES, Respondents.
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising
the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL
ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE
DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL
ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF
THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE
FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE
WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR
FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE
SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF
COURT WHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE
PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch
6), a complaint for damages2 for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck
driven by the respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.3 In answer
thereto, respondent contended that the criminal case arising from the same incident,
Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier
filed on January 8, 1986,4 had already been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal
Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to petitioners lack of interest;5 and
that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.6
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991,
ruling that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that
petitioner is entitled to damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to
pay plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medical
expenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00
as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorneys fees
and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal,8 the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8,
1995,9 reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioners
complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to
institute a separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal
case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for
damages, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to
an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. 10
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave11 should be
observed, i.e., a civil action for damages may be filed and proceed independently of the
criminal action even without reservation to file the same has been made;12 and that the
12 | P a g e
requirement of reservation, as provided in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically
diminished/amended/modified his substantial right.13
The petition must be denied.
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,14 is the prevailing and
governing law in this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
...
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto)
and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously
instituted.
Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that the right to bring an action
for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111,
otherwise it should be dismissed;16 and that the reservation requirement does not
impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the
general interest of orderly procedure.17
In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by
Herminio Andaya that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by
respondent Alfredo Boado. The petitioner therein initially sought for the suspension of
the civil case for damages filed against him in view of the pendency of the criminal case
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries
filed against his driver. The respondent, in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to
bring the separate civil action against the petitioner or his driver. The criminal case was
later dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal, the
Court identified the issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for
damages despite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the dismissal of the criminal
case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation
requirement is substantive in character and beyond the rule-making power of the
Court.18
The Court expounded:
. . . 1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all
civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case. In other words the right of the injured party to sue
separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto)
or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they
will de deemed instituted with the criminal action.
...
Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil
action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure.
The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code,
by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the
offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned
the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.19
While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment
of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.
13 | P a g e
x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil
actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or
simultaneous with the criminal action.
. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to
borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":
. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent
delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.20
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the
civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No.
1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be
dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the
recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST
GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES, respondents.
G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein filed a complaint for damages against
respondent for the injuries and expenses he sustained sustained after the truck driven by the
respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.
However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed
previously against the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioner’s lack of interest
and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling
that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is
entitled to damages.
Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages on the
grounds that the Hambon failed to file the civil case. Hence, it is impliedly instituted with
the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the dismissal of the civil
case.
14 | P a g e
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute
a separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the
dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages,
notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and
had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
Issue:
Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action falling under
articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the new civil code be duly dismissed for failure to make
reservation to file a separate civil action in a criminal case filed arising from the same act or
omission of the accused pursuant to Rule 111, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the failure to
make reservation being due to the fact that the criminal case was dismissed before the
prosecution started to present evidence for failure of the private complainant to appear
despite notice.
Held:
Civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.
The Court expounded that it clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed
to have been instituted with the criminal case. In other words, the right of the injured party
to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto)
or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will
be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil
action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive
rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement
is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art.
100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right
to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must
be reserved before it may be brought separately.
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil
action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-
R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil
liability that was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
15 | P a g e
CASE NO. 4
G.R. No. 179003 : January 9, 2013
ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and CAROLINA T ANJUTCO,Respondents.
G.R. No. 195816
ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JULIE O. CUA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Antonio L. Tan, Jr.
(Tan) and docketed as:cralawlibrary
(1) G.R. No. 179003 which assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated February 6, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, entitled Yoshitsugu Matsuura & Carolina Tanjutco v.
Hon. Raul Gonzales, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice and Antonio L. Tan, Jr.;
and
(2) G.R. No. 195816 which assails the CAs Decision3 dated August 17, 2010 and Resolution4 dated February
23, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, entitled Julie O. Cua v. Antonio L. Tan, Jr., Hon. Raul M. Gonzales, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice and Hon. Ernesto L. Pineda, in his capacity as
Undersecretary of the Department of Justice.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City a Complaint-
Affidavit5 charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and
Atty. Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly committed as
follows:cralawlibrary
2. On or about the period from 21 December 1996 to 09 January 1997, Mr. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA, Ms.
HIROKO MATSUURA and Mr. RUBEN JACINTO have had stolen companys properties and my personal
belongings which were kept "under lock and key". Among those stolen was my pre-signed DEED OF TRUST,
whose date and number of shares, and the item witness were all in BLANK. As a result, Criminal Case No. 98-
040 for Qualified Theft was filed against Mr. & Ms. Matsuura and Mr. Jacinto, and now pending before the
Regional Trial Court (of Makati City) Branch 132;
3. In the said "blank" Deed of Trust, the entries as to the number of shares and the date of the instrument were
then inserted, that is, 28,500 as shares and 20th day of January, and the signatures of Hiroko Matsuura and
Lani C. Camba appeared in the item WITNESS, all without my participation whatsoever, or without my consent
and authority. A copy of the "filled in" Deed of Trust is attached as Annex "A" and made part hereof;
4. Sometime on 19 June 1997, the said Deed of Trust, was made to be notarized by JULIE O. CUA, a Notary
Public for and in the City of Makati, and entered in her Notarial Register as Doc[.] No. 2; Page No. 1; Book No. 1
and Series of 1997, WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT I HAVE NEVER APPEARED, SIGNED OR TOOK [sic]
MY OATH BEFORE THE SAID NOTARY PUBLIC AND ON THE SAID DATE OF NOTARIZATION because the
document (Deed of Trust) was stolen as earlier stated, and the relation between us (Mr. and Ms. Matsuura, or
Mr. Jacinto, and the undersigned) had become hostile and irreconcilable. A copy of the notarized Deed of Trust
is attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof.
5. Both documents (Annexes "A" and "B") were/are in the possessions of Mr. Matsuura and/or his lawyer,
CAROLINA TANJUTCO, who used these false documents in the cases involving us;
6. Without prejudice to the filing of other charges in the proper venues, I am executing this affidavit for the
purpose of charging Mr. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and ATTY. CAROLINA TANJUTCO for violation of Art.
172 (2) in relation to Art. 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code with regard to Annex "A", and likewise charging
MR. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and ATTYS. CAROLINA TANJUTCO and JULIE O. CUA for violation of Art.
172 (1) in relation to Art. 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, when through their concerted actions they
FALSELY made it appeared [sic] that the undersigned had participated in notarization of the Deed of Trust
16 | P a g e
(Annex "B") on 19 June 1997, and in both instances causing prejudice and damages to the
undersigned.6?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
The respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.
Matsuura vehemently denied Tans charges. He countered that the filing of the complaint was merely a scheme
resorted to by Tan following their dispute in TF Ventures, Inc., and after he had obtained a favorable resolution
in a complaint for estafa against Tan. Matsuura further explained that the transfer of the shareholdings covered
by the subject Deed of Trust7 was a result of Tans offer to compromise the intra-corporate dispute. He insisted
that it was Tan who caused the notarization of the deed, as this was a condition for Matsuuras acceptance of
the compromise.8?r?l1
For her defense, Tanjutco argued that Tans admission of having pre-signed the subject deed only proved that
he had willingly assigned his shares in TF Ventures, Inc. to Matsuura. She also argued that Tan failed to
present any proof of her participation in the deeds falsification, and explained that she had not yet known
Matsuura at the time of the supposed notarization.9?r?l1
For her part, Cua narrated that on June 19, 1997, a group that included a person who represented himself as
Antonio Tan, Jr. approached her law office for the notarization of the subject deed. Tan presented his
community tax certificate (CTC) as indicated in the subject deed of trust, then was sworn in by Cua as a notary
public. Cua claimed to have conducted her duty in utmost good faith, with duplicate copies of the notarized deed
reported to the Clerk of Court of Makati City. She denied having any business or interest whatsoever with the
law offices of Tanjutco.10?r?l1
The Ruling of the City Prosecutor
On July 13, 1998, the OCP issued a Resolution11 dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against
Matsuura and Tanjutco. It considered the fact that Tan had voluntarily signed the subject deed, and further
noted that "whether or not the same document is notarized, the deed has the effect of a binding contract
between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown." 12?r?l1
The complaint against Cua was also dismissed. For the OCP, Tan failed to overturn the presumption of
regularity attached to the notary publics performance of her official duty. Any irregularity attending the execution
of the deed of trust required more than mere denial from Tan.13?r?l1
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for review 14 with the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice
On April 4, 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong issued a resolution 15 denying the petition.
He ruled that no evidence was presented to show that the date, the number of shares and the witnesses
signatures appearing on the subject deed were merely inserted therein by the respondents. Tans bare
averments were insufficient to show the actual participation of the respondents in the alleged falsification.
Undaunted, Tan filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution16 dated July 1, 2004. In finding probable cause to indict the respondents
for the crime of falsification, the DOJ noted that a copy of the deed of trust attached by Matsuura and Tanjutco
to Matsuuras Answer dated October 30, 1997 in an intra-corporate dispute before the SEC was not yet
notarized. Furthermore, the print and font of the deeds entries on its covered shares and date remarkably
differed from the other portions of the document. The Secretary then held:cralawlibrary
It would appear that the subject deed of trust was indeed never notarized. If the said document was purportedly
notarized on June 19, 1997, the same notarized copy should have been presented by respondent Matsuura.
After all, his Answer filed before the SEC was made with the assistance of respondent Atty. Tanjutco. There
being none, it may be concluded that the notarization of the subject deed of trust was indeed made under
doubtful circumstances.17?r?l1
The Secretary also held that Cua should have been alerted by the variance in the deeds print styles, and the
fact that the document was presented for notarization almost five months from the date of its purported
execution. The dispositive portion of the Secretarys resolution then reads:cralawlibrary
17 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 189 (Series of 2003) is
hereby SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is directed to file an information against respondents
Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco for violation of Art. 172 (2) in relation to Art. 171 (6), RPC; and
another information for violation of Art. 171 (2), RPC against respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Atty. Carolina
Tanjutco and Atty. Julie Cua.
SO ORDERED.18?r?l1
The respondents moved for reconsideration. On April 4, 2005, then DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda,
signing on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, issued a resolution 19 affirming the presence of probable cause
against Matsuura and Tanjutco, but ordering the exclusion of Cua from the filing of information. He ruled that
Cua had exercised due diligence as a notary public by requiring from the person who appeared before her a
proof of his identification. The resolutions decretal portion provides:cralawlibrary
Premises considered, the Resolution dated July 1, 2004 is hereby MODIFIED accordingly. The City Prosecutor
of Makati City is directed to move for the exclusion of respondent Julie Cua from the information for violation of
Art. 171 (2), Revised Penal Code, if any has been filed, and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina
Tanjutco is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.20?r?l1
At this point, Matsuura and Tanjutco filed with the CA the petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
89346. The DOJs review of its resolution on Cuas case continued with Tans filing of a motion for partial
reconsideration. Finding merit in the motion, the DOJ again reversed itself and issued on December 12, 2005 a
Resolution21 with dispositive portion that reads:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for partial reconsideration is GRANTED and resolution
dated April 4, 2005 is SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby directed to include Atty. Julie O.
Cua in the information for violation of Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code filed against respondents
Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco and report to this Office the action taken within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.22?r?l1
Cuas motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting her to file with the CA the petition for certiorari docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA granted both petitions questioning the Secretary of Justices resolutions.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, the CA held that given the elements of the crime, the actual participation of
respondents Matsuura and Tanjutco was not sufficiently alleged, and the element of damage was not sufficiently
shown. The dispositive portion of its Decision23 dated February 6, 2007 reads:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the DOJ dated April 4,
2005 and July 1, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the City Prosecutor, Makati City dated July 13, 1998
in I.S. No. 98-C-15857-58 affirmed by the DOJ through Secretary Datumanong on April 4, 2003 STANDS.
SO ORDERED.24?r?l1
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, the CA held that Tan also failed to discharge the burden of proving probable cause
against Cua. For the appellate court, there was nothing on record that was sufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity ascribed to both the subject deed as a public document and to Cuas discharge of her
official functions as a notary public. The dispositive portion of its Decision 25 dated August 17, 2010
reads:cralawlibrary
18 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated 12
December 2005 and 8 May 2006 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
dated 4 April 2003 affirming the findings of the City Prosecutor is hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.26?r?l1
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution27 dated February 23, 2011.
The Present Petitions
Unsatisfied, Tan separately filed with this Court two petitions for review. G.R. No. 179003 assails the CAs
disposition of Matsuura and Tanjutcos petition, while G.R. No. 195816 assails the CAs decision in the petition
filed by Cua. From these petitions are two main issues for this Courts resolution:cralawlibrary
(a) whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed before it, assuming the role of a
reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice; and
(b) whether or not the CA erred in upholding the finding of the OCP that there exists no probable cause to indict
Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua for the crime of falsification.
This Courts Ruling
We emphasize that on February 13, 2012, this Court had already issued in G.R. No. 195816 a
resolution28denying the petition, on the following bases:cralawlibrary
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision dated 17 August 2010 and Resolution dated 23 February 2011 of the Court of Appeals, Manila, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 95263, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for raising substantially factual issues and for
failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise of this Courts
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.29?r?l1
(Underscoring supplied, emphasis in the original)
Thus, the only pending incident in G.R. No. 195816 is Tans motion for reconsideration of the Courts denial of
his petition. In his motion, Tan reiterates the arguments he presented in the petition, yet argues for the first time
that the CA erred in granting Cuas motion for an additional period of thirty (30) days within which to file her
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263. This allegedly violated the provisions of A.M. 00-2-03-SC that amended
Section 4, Rule 6530 of the Rules of Court.
Tan also moved to consolidate G.R. No. 1958156 with G.R. No. 179003, which motion was allowed by the
Court.
Before ruling on the main issues, we address Tans argument that the CA erred in granting Cuas motion for
extension of time to file her petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.
In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals,31 we emphasized that the Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed
despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that the strict and rigid application of rules which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford
the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause grave injustice to the parties.32 Thus, we allowed the petition in Vallejo to proceed even if it was filed
almost four (4) months beyond the prescribed reglementary period under the rules.
Pursuant to the foregoing doctrine, in the interest of substantial justice, and given the merit that was ascribed by
the CA to Cuas petition, we sustain the appellate courts ruling on Cuas motion for extension of time to file her
petition for certiorari.
Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.
19 | P a g e
On the first main issue, the petitioner contends that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the petitions for
certiorari filed before it because criminal proceedings shall not be restrained once probable cause has been
determined and the corresponding information has been filed in courts. Citing jurisprudence, Tan argues that
the institution of a criminal action in court depends upon the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of probable cause is essentially an
executive function that is lodged with the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. However, equally
settled is the rule that courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations,
although in a mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers the courts power to determine
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its functions. Although policy considerations call
for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their
power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutors findings are supported by the
facts or by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are
exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and
controversies. Indeed, the exercise of the courts review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable
criminals are prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution.33?r?l1
We then ruled in Tan v. Ballena34 that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not
preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJs findings. In
the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or
insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the CA may take cognizance of the
case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.35?r?l1
Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA, the appellate courts exercise of
its power to review was also the proper and most prudent course to take after the Secretary had successively
issued several resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on the existence of probable
cause, even contrary to the own findings of the OCP that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by
itself, such circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear issue on the
Secretary of Justices appreciation of facts, which commanded a review by the court to determine if grave abuse
of discretion attended the discharge of his functions.
There is no probable cause for falsification against Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua.
The Court agrees with the CA that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when the latter
ruled in favor of Tan, in his complaint against the respondents. Again, while the courts generally accord respect
upon the prosecutors or the DOJs discretion in the determination of probable cause in preliminary
investigations, the courts may, as an exception, set aside the prosecutors or DOJs conclusions to prevent the
misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. 36?r?l1
We emphasize the nature, purpose and amount of evidence that is required to support a finding of probable
cause in preliminary investigations. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused.37?r?l1
While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence
with care to prevent material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of
freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged
offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. 38?r?l1
G.R. No. 179003
The Court affirms the CAs finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in
reversing the rulings of the OCP that favored Matsuura and Tanjutco.
20 | P a g e
In the Resolutions dated July 1, 2004 and April 4, 2005, the Secretary of Justice directed the filing in court of
two informations against Matsuura and Tanjutco: one information for the crime of falsification under Article 172
(2), in relation to Article 171 (6) of the RPC, and another information for a violation of Article 171 (2) of the RPC.
These penal provisions read:cralawlibrary
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:cralawlibrary
xxx
(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate.
xxx
(6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
xxx
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:cralawlibrary
xxx
(2) Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxx
In the first information, the charge was under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), for the alleged
insertions in the deed of trust on its number of covered shares, its date and the witnesses to the instruments
execution. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,39 we identified the elements of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the
RPC, to wit:cralawlibrary
(1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document;
(2) that it was made on a genuine document;
(3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and
(4) that the changes made the document speak something false.40?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
When these are committed by a private individual on a private document, the violation would fall under
paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements,
independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. 41?r?l1
Logically, affidavits and evidence presented during a preliminary investigation must at least show these
elements of the crime and the particular participation of each of the respondents in its commission. Otherwise,
there would be no basis for a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the persons being
charged are probably guilty thereof. Probable cause can only find support in facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonable mind to believe that the person being charged warrants a prosecution. Upon the Courts
review, we affirm the ruling that Tan had failed to adequately show during the preliminary investigation all the
aforementioned elements of the offense.
Petitioner Tan was not able to establish when and how the alleged unauthorized insertions in the subject
document were effected, and that Matsuura and Tanjutco should be held liable therefor. To warrant an
indictment for falsification, it is necessary to show during the preliminary investigation that the persons to be
21 | P a g e
charged are responsible for the acts that define the crime. Contrary to this, however, there were no sufficient
allegations and evidence presented on the specific acts attributed to Matsuura and Tanjutco that would show
their respective actual participation in the alleged alteration or intercalation. Tans broad statement that the deed
was falsified after it was stolen by Matsuura merits no consideration in finding probable cause, especially after
the following findings of the OCP in his Resolution dated July 13, 1998:cralawlibrary
Any alleged irregularity attending the execution of such a voluntary Deed requires more than mere denial.
Criminal Case [No. 98-040 (I.S. No. 97-20720) concerning Qualified Theft of Condominium Certificate of Title,
pre-signed checks and other personal belongings of complainant herein petitioner, has already been
recommended for dismissal by the Department of Justice on May 25, 1998, directing the withdrawal of the
information in the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 98-040. In said recommendation, the principal subject matter is
the alleged loss of condominium titles, and it appears that after the implementation of the search warrant, only
titles and the pre-signed checks were not recovered. There is no mention of a missing Deed of Trust as claimed
by complainant.42?r?l1
Tan also sought to support his falsification charge by the alleged intercalations on the covered number of shares
and date of the deed, asking the OCP and Secretary of Justice to take notice that the print, font style and size of
these entries differed from the other portions of the document. However, it is not unusual, as it is as a common
practice, for parties to prepare and print instruments or contractual agreements with specific details that are yet
to be filled up upon the deeds execution. We are bound to believe that such was the situation in Tans case, i.e.,
the document had blanks when printed but was already complete in details at the time Tan signed it to give
effect thereto, especially with the legal presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns.
Otherwise, Tan would not have voluntarily affixed his signature in the subject deed. In Allied Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,43 we ruled:cralawlibrary
Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. Hence, the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of
its contents and consequences. Said presumption acquires greater force in the case at bar where not only one
document but several documents were executed at different times and at different places by the herein
respondent guarantors and sureties.44 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
While the presumption can be disputed by sufficient evidence, Tan failed in this respect. We even find no merit
in his claim that the incomplete document was merely intended to convince Japanese friends of Matsuura to
extend credit to TF Ventures, Inc., as he failed to establish any connection between the deed of trust and the
credit sought.
It is then the Courts view that the petitioner had voluntarily executed the subject Deed of Trust, with the intention
of giving effect thereto. Even granting that there were insertions in the deed after it was signed by the petitioner,
no sufficient allegation indicates that the alleged insertions had changed the meaning of the document, or that
their details differed from those intended by the petitioner at the time that he signed it. The petitioners bare
allegation that "the change was without his consent and authority" 45 does not equate with the necessary
allegation that the insertions were false or had changed the intended meaning of the document. Again, a
violation of Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of the RPC requires, as one of its elements, that "the
alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document.46?r?l1
Neither was there sufficient evidence to support the element of damage that was purportedly suffered by Tan by
reason of the alleged falsification. As correctly observed by the OCP:cralawlibrary
By his voluntary act of signing the Deed of Trust in favor of Matsuura, it can be safely inferred that the document
speaks for itself. Whether or not the same document is notarized, the Deed has the effect of a binding contract
between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown. 47?r?l1
The Court emphasizes that the element of damage is crucial in the charge because the Secretary of Justice
directed the filing of the first information for an alleged falsification of a private document.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Secretary of Justices finding of probable cause against Matsuura and
Tanjutco was based solely on surmises and conjectures, wholly unsupported by legal and factual bases. The
CA then correctly nullified, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the resolutions that were assailed before
it. There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal
justification.48?r?l1
22 | P a g e
True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the
determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be
more than mere suspicion. And while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a
need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right
to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.
It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused.49?r?l1
The Secretary of Justices directive upon the prosecutor to file the second information against Matsuura and
Tanjutco also lacked basis. It was premised on an alleged violation of Article 171(2) of the RPC, by making it
appear that Tan participated in an act or proceeding when as he claimed, he did not in fact so participate. The
elements of this crime are as follows:cralawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public;
(2) that he takes advantage of his official position;
(3) that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.50?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
Since Matsuura and Tanjutco are both private individuals, they can be indicted for the offense only if it is shown
that they conspired with Cua, as a notary public, in the commission thereof.
Contrary to this requirement, however, the Secretary of Justice ordered in its Resolution dated April 4, 2005 the
filing of the second information against Matsuura and Tanjutco, notwithstanding the order in the same resolution
to exclude Cua in the case. Such ruling evidently amounts to a grave abuse of discretion because as correctly
held by the CA:cralawlibrary
Article 171, RPC refers to falsification committed by a public officer, employee, notary or ecclesiastical minister
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document, in this case, by causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. Herein petitioners
herein respondents Matsuura and Tanjutco, not being included in said enumeration cannot, on their own, be
held liable for aforesaid violation. They can be held liable therefor only in conspiracy with one who is a public
officer, employee, notary or ecclesiastical minister who, taking advantage of his official position, falsified a
document. On account of the exclusion of Atty. Julie Cua from said charge, herein petitioners cannot be held
liable for the charge. It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill
will or personal bias. x x x.51 (Emphasis ours)
The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of Justice to include Cua in the information, following a separate
motion for reconsideration by Tan and, we emphasize, only after CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 had already been filed,
was inconsequential to the grave abuse of discretion already committed by the Secretary of Justice in its final
disposition of the case against Matsuura and Tanjutco. The CA was tasked in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 to
determine the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions, in light of the rulings, findings and
the bases used by the Secretary. In addition, even the CA later declared in CA-G.R. SP No. 96263 that the
Secretary of Justices order to pursue the case against Cua amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 195816
We now rule on the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Courts denial of the petition docketed as G.R.
No. 195816. After review, the Court affirms its earlier denial of the petition, given Tans failure to show any
reversible error committed by the CA. As correctly held by the appellate court, no probable cause was
established to support a falsification case against Cua.
We are bound to adhere to the presumption of regularity in Cuas performance of her official duty, and to the
presumption of regularity that is attached to the subject deed of trust as a public document. As held by the OCP,
even "[t]he records of the Notarial Division of the Clerk of Court, Makati City faithfully reflects the duplicate copy
of the subject Deed of Trust made and entered on June 19, 1997 executed by Antonio L. Tan, Jr., as certified by
23 | P a g e
Atty. Corazon Cecilia Pineda."52
It needed more than a bare denial from Tan to overthrow these presumptions.
Adequate supporting evidence should have been presented to support his assertions.
Tans denial that he personally appeared before Cua on June 19, 1997 deserved no weight in the determination
of probable cause. He failed to present any plausible explanation as to why it was impossible for him to be at
the notary publics office on said date. Neither did he deny that the CTC indicated in the deeds jurat as evidence
of identity actually belonged to him. The mere circumstance that his relationship with Matsuura was already
strained at the time of the deeds notarization miserably failed to substantiate the claim that he could not have
appeared before Cua. Matsuura had precisely explained that the transfer of the shares of stock was part of an
attempt to compromise a dispute that existed between them. In addition, we have explained that the alleged
theft of the document by Matsuura was sufficiently rebutted during the preliminary investigation.
On the basis of the foregoing, the reasonable probability of the respondents participation in the commission of
the crime of falsification was not sufficiently established during the preliminary investigation. Even the failure of
Matsuura and Tanjutco to attach a notarized copy of the deed to their pleading filed with the SEC fails to support
a finding of probable cause. On the contrary, the circumstance that an unnotarized copy of the deed was
submitted to the SEC weakens the argument that the alleged falsification and wrongful notarization was
resorted to by the respondents to suit their interests. It showed that the respondents believed in the value of
the deed to their case even if it was not notarized. We then affirm the CAs ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 96263 that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, by gross misapprehension of facts, when it
ordered the filing of the information against Cua. Although Tan assails the CAs grant of the petition on such
basis, jurisprudence provides that grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction;
or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It also refers to cases in which, for various
reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of facts.53?r?l1
WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:cralawlibrary
(1) In G.R. No. 179003, the petition for review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 6,
2007 and Resolution dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 are AFFIRMED.
(2) In G.R. No. 195816, petitioner Tan's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
SO ORDERED.
24 | P a g e
CASE NO. 5
GR No. 199042, Nov 17, 2014 ]

DANILO VILLANUEVA Y ALCARAZ v. PEOPLE
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition[1] filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the Decision[2] dated 4 May 2011 and
Resolution[3] dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
C.R. No. 32582.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Information[4] reads:
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram knowing the same to [be a] dangerous drug under the
provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[5]
PROSECUTION'S VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer
(PO) 3 Jonathan Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPOl) Antonio
Asiones.[6] Their testimonies reveal that a Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Daniio Villanueva for
allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter,
PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3 Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPOl Anthony Asiones, together with
Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against
him. They invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a
plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet with
the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the National Police District Scene of
the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for examination.[7]
DEFENSE'S VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along
with three others, invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been identified as
responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at the police station.8
RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its Decision9 dated 6 April 2009, convicted
petitioner of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused DANILO VILLANUEVA y
ALCARAZ, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
9165. Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day as the minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months as the maximum and to pay the
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt
25 | P a g e
with in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH.[11]
RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan
City in Criminal Case No. 70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which the CA denied in a Resolution14 dated
18 October 2011.
Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S

CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY
OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF
THE CONFISCATED DRUG.[15]
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it took place
on the day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any warrant of arrest
was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently, inadmissible.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment[16] stating that the shabu confiscated from petitioner was
admissible in evidence against him; that the search conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot raise the
issue regarding the apprehending officers' non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first
time on appeal.
OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from

questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private person,
as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
26 | P a g e
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none of the above
that would make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never
objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He
actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.[17]
The warrantless search conducted is

not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search.[18] Records have established that both
the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right to
contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the
search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be conducted. These
searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or
consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstance.[19]
The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a moving vehicle, a
customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a seizure in plain view as
the seized item was allegedly found inside the left pocket of accused-appellant's pants. Neither was it a stop-
and-frisk situation. While this type may seemingly fall under the consented search exception, we reiterate that
"[c]onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. [20]
Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.[21] In this case,
petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket. The testimony of the police officer on the
matter is clear:
Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring out the thing which I felt.
Q: And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to bring out the contents of his pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic containing shabu.[22]
The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution:
"Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."[23] Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot be sustained.
This being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the
confiscated drug.
As a final word, we reiterate that "[wjhile this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to
uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means."[24]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution dated 18 October
2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582 are SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
*Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
27 | P a g e
CASE NO. 6
G.R. No. 198389 December 11, 2013
VIVENCIO ROALLOS y TRILLANES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision2 dated April 29, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated August 19, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32192. The CA affirmed with modification the
Decision4 dated July 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 88, finding
Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes (Roallos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual abuse
punished under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act."
The Facts
Roallos was charged in an Information5 for the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108825 before the RTC, viz:
The undersigned accuses VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES of the crime of Acts of

Lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b)[,] Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd
design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of one [AAA]6, a minor, 15 years of age, by then and
there mashing her breast and kissing her cheek, against her will which act debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said [AAA] as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Upon arraignment, Roallos pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.8 On June 24, 2002, the pre-
trial conference was deemed terminated. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.9
Roallos, a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was the Executive Director of the
Aguinaldo Vets and Associates Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAA’s mother, worked as the
secretary and treasurer of Roallos.
On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA went to BBB’s office at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
BBB, however, was then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mother’s office and
wait for the latter to return. At that time, two women were talking to Roallos inside the AVACC office.
AAA alleged that, after the two women left, Roallos went by the door of the office, looked outside to
see if anybody was around, and then locked it. He then approached AAA and asked her if there was
any pain bothering her; the latter replied that her tooth ached. Thereupon, Roallos held AAA’s hand
and intermittently pressed it. He then asked AAA if there is anything else aching in her body. AAA
said none. Roallos then placed his left hand on the table while his right hand was on AAA’s right
shoulder. At this point, AAA was seated on a chair without a backrest while Roallos was standing
behind her. Roallos then slid his hand towards AAA’s right breast and mashed it. AAA asked Roallos
why he is touching her. Roallos ignored her. He then mashed AAA’s left breast. AAA shouted "Ano
ba!," but Roallos still ignored her and, instead slid his hand towards AAA’s abdomen. AAA then
stomped her feet and pushed her chair towards Roallos. Roallos then left the office.
28 | P a g e
Thinking that her mother would soon return, AAA stayed inside the office. However, after about ten
minutes, Roallos returned to the office and approached AAA. He then asked AAA if she was hungry,
the latter told him that she would just wait for BBB to return. Roallos then offered to give money to
AAA for her to buy food, but the latter refused the offer. AAA then felt Roallos’ body pressing against
her back. Thereafter, Roallos attempted to kiss AAA. AAA was unable to escape as there was no
space in front of her; she just turned her face to avoid his kiss. He then held AAA’s right cheek, pulled
her face towards him, and kissed her left cheek. AAA then stomped her feet, still trying to free herself
from the grasp of Roallos. Roallos then left the office. This time, AAA decided to stay outside the
AVACC office and wait for her mother to return.
Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying. She asked AAA why she was crying. AAA then
relayed what Roallos did to her. BBB then confronted Roallos about the incident. Roallos, however,
denied having done anything to AAA. BBB and AAA thereafter left the office. However, BBB saw that
Roallos was following them. Fearing that Roallos would do something to harm them, BBB and AAA
immediately entered the office of the Department of National Defense (DND) in Camp Aguinaldo.
They were then advised by the employees therein to go to DND’s legal department office, where they
were advised to report the incident to the police authorities.
AAA and BBB went to the police station where a report regarding the incident was prepared. They
then referred the report to the provost marshal for proper coordination and to effect the arrest of the
accused. Thereafter, the police and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the police station for
investigation.
In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He claimed that, on the date of the incident, he
merely stayed with AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her mother; that he went out of
the office twice to meet clients of AVACC. Roallos further claimed that his arrest was illegal since the
same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise averred that he was not informed of his
rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.
On July 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision10 finding Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES is hereby found

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 and he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor
medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal maximum as maximum; to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of [P]20,000.00 by way
of moral damages; and pay the fine of [P]15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.11
Roallos’ Amended Motion for Reconsideration12 was denied by the RTC in its Order13 dated June 30,
2008.
On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated April 29, 2011 which affirmed the RTC Decision
dated July 26, 2007, albeit with the modification that the awards of moral damages and civil indemnity
were both increased to ₱50,000.00.
Roallos sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision dated April 29, 2011,14 but it was likewise denied
by the CA in its Resolution15 dated August 19, 2011.
In support of the instant petition, Roallos claims that the CA erred in affirming his conviction
considering that the Information filed against him was defective since it charged two crimes, i.e., acts
of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He further argues that he was denied due process as he was
not made to undergo a preliminary investigation. Roallos also asserts that his arrest was illegal
considering that the same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. Moreover, he alleges that the
29 | P a g e
charge against him should have been dismissed considering the unreasonable delay in the
prosecution of the case.
Further, Roallos avers that the charge against him was defective since neither AAA nor BBB signed
the Information that was filed against him and, thus, Roallos claims that the prosecutor had no
authority to file the said Information and, accordingly, the charge against him was defective.
Furthermore, Roallos alleges that the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 only applies when the victim is a child engaged in prostitution or when they indulge in
lascivious conduct due to the coercion of an adult or a syndicate. Thus, he claims that he is not liable
for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in
prostitution. In any case, he avers that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not sufficient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Issue
Essentially, the issue presented for the Court’s resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming Roallos’
conviction for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of any merit.
First, Roallos’ claim that the Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged him with the
commission of two crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the crime in the Information is clear
– Roallos was charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610.
The mention of the phrase "acts of lasciviousness" in the Information does not mean that Roallos was
charged with the felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The charge of acts of
lasciviousness against Roallos is specifically delimited to that committed in relation to Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
In any case, "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which
are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information." 16
The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed against Roallos
clearly makes out a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;]
2. The [said] act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse[; and]
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.17
(Emphasis supplied)
The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts towards
AAA, i.e., that he mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter. It likewise alleged that AAA,
at the time she was subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos, was only 15 years of age. Clearly, all the
elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are set out in the Information
that was filed against Roallos.
30 | P a g e
In this regard, the Court likewise finds that the CA and the RTC did not err in finding Roallos criminally
liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. It is undisputed that AAA was only 15
years old at the time of the incident. Further, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the committed lascivious conduct towards AAA, who is a child subjected to sexual abuse within
the purview of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
That Roallos did in fact commit lascivious conduct towards AAA is a finding of fact by the lower
courts, which this Court cannot simply disregard. In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court
are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when
the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate
the factual findings of the court below.18 The Court finds no reason to overturn the factual findings as
the lower courts in this case.
Roallos’ assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a
situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or
intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child
subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed
subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult."19
Second, Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of
arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is likewise untenable. In Miclat, Jr. v.
People,20 the Court emphasized that the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending
his arrest should he fail to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground prior to
arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case,
jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.21 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
Similarly, in Villarin v. People,22 the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary
investigation must be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary
investigation by entering his plea and actively participating in the trial without raising the lack of a
preliminary investigation. Thus:
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must
not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its
own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the
accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after
the requisite preliminary investigation."
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again.
He accepted the Ombudsman’s verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and
actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment
against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration. Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a
31 | P a g e
preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively
participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.23 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the
supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived
irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is
likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated.1âwphi1 The
right to speedy trial is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must
be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution
and defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and
balance.24 In order for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must
show two things: first, that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from
the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, that there was no more delay that is reasonably
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.25
As aptly ruled by the CA, Roallos failed to show that the proceedings below were attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The postponements sought for by the prosecution did
not, in any way, seriously prejudice Roallos. If at all, the delay in the proceedings below is only
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Lastly, that neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information filed against Roallos would not render the
charge against the latter defective; it does not signify that they did not conform to the filing of the
Information against Roallos. AAA and BBB vigorously pursued the indictment against Roallos.
Likewise, contrary to Roallos’ claim, AAA executed a complaint-affidavit for the indictment of
Roallos.26 The foregoing circumstances clearly indicate the conformity of both AAA and BBB to the
charge against Roallos.
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the
penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding
that R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, Roallos may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Roallos shall be entitled to a minimum term to be
taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by R.A. No. 7610. The penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from
eight (8) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. On the other hand, the
maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range
of which is from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. The
minimum, medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum – fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; medium – seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; and maximum – reclusion perpetua.27
Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances extant in this case, both
the RTC and the CA correctly imposed on Roallos the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor medium as the minimum term to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term. The Court likewise upholds the fine
imposed by the lower courts in the amount of ₱15,000.00.
Nevertheless, the Court hereby modifies the amount of moral damages and civil indemnity awarded
by the CA.1âwphi1 The RTC directed Roallos to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of
₱20,000.00. The CA increased the amount of moral damages awarded by the RTC to ₱50,000.00
and imposed an additional award for civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00. In line with recent
32 | P a g e
jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to reduce the award of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to
28
₱15,000.00, as well as the award of civil indemnity from ₱50,000.00 to ₱20,000.00.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all monetary awards
for damages at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until
fully paid.29
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated April 29, 2011 and the Resolution dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32192 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes is
ordered to pay ₱15,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity. He is likewise
ordered to pay interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CASE NO. 7
G.R. No. 88232. February 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, in his capacity as

Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 22, Cabagan, Isabela; ELVINO AGGABAO and VILLA
SURATOS, Respondents.
Marallag & Marallag for Alma Aggabao.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; MAY BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS;
RULING IN VERA v. PEOPLE AND PEOPLE v. MUNAR, AN EXCEPTION TO GENERAL RULE; VERA AND
MUNAR CASES DISTINGUISHED FROM CASE AT BAR. — In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings [Rule 117, Sec. 8, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
ruling in Vera v. People and People v. Munar that jurisdiction may not be raised for the first time on appeal, is
the exception rather than the general rule.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE APPLIED TO INSTANT CASE WHERE UNLIKE IN TIJAM v. SIBONGHANOY CASE
THE ELEMENT OF LACHES IS ABSENT. — Where the pivotal element of laches is absent, that the ruling in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, Vera v. People and People v. Munar does not control and instead, the general rule that
the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, must apply.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AND INFERIOR
COURTS, DEPENDS UPON GRAVITY OF BOTH THE OFFENSE AND IMPOSABLE PENALTY; UNDER THE
JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1990 CRIMES PUNISHABLE WITH DESTIERRO, VESTED IN
INFERIOR COURTS. — Since in the allocation of jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior
courts the factors considered are the gravity of both the offense and the imposable penalty, it is not
unreasonable to state that the legislature granted to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes whose
penalties are harsher than those vested in the inferior courts. And since it is already a settled rule that destierro,
by its nature, is a lighter penalty than imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v. Dingalasan, supra], it follows that even
under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro is vested not
33 | P a g e
in the Regional Trial Courts but in the inferior courts.
4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; CONCUBINE SHOULD BE TRIED WITH

ERRING HUSBAND BEFORE INFERIOR COURTS. — Considering that Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code
states that" [t]he offended party [in the crime of concubinage] cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties," it is clearly in the interest of the orderly administration of justice that the
concubine be tried with the erring husband before the inferior courts. The legislature could not have intended to
allow the absurd situation wherein the inferior court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage only as
regards the husband while the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the same crime with respect to the
concubine.
5. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION; CRIME OF CONCUBINAGE, WITHIN EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL

JURISDICTION OF INFERIOR COURTS. — The Court, holds that the crime of concubinage is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts. The Regional Trial Courts have no original jurisdiction over
the said crime.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, dismissing the
criminal information for concubinage filed against private respondents, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Upon complaint by Alma T. Aggabao, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan, Isabela filed on July 20,
1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, an information against private respondents
Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of concubinage [Annex "A" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.] allegedly
committed in September 1983. Upon being arraigned, private respondents entered a plea of not guilty [Annex
"B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 19]. The complainant was represented before the trial court by a private prosecutor.
During the trial, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued
that concubinage, under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is punishable with prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, well within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of
the Regional Trial Court. The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the imposable penalty on the concubine
[Art. 334, RPC] has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC]. The trial court
sustained private respondent’s position and granted the motion to dismiss.
Private prosecutor, together with the assistant provincial prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, filed on June 16, 1989
the instant petition assailing the order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the criminal information
against private respondents. In a resolution dated July 17, 1989, this Court denied the petition due to late
payment of docket and legal research fees and for lack of merit. The Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the Court denying the petition. Subsequently, the private prosecutor filed a
separate motion for reconsideration. In these motions, the Solicitor General and the private prosecutor
submitted additional arguments to support their position that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
crime of concubinage.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
At the outset, it must be stated that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General.
Instead, it was filed by the private prosecutor and the assistant provincial prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, with the
offended party, Alma T. Aggabao, being named co-petitioner of the People of the Philippines. The Court has
already ruled that while it is the fiscal who represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of
offenses before the trial courts, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or to the
Supreme Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines, not the fiscal [City
Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina, G.R. No. 83996, October 21, 1988, 166 SCRA 614] nor the private prosecutor,
even with the conformity of the assistant provincial prosecutor [People v. Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389, February
21, 1989]. Nevertheless, considering that the Solicitor General has intervened in this case by filing a motion for
reconsideration of the Court resolution dated July 17, 1989 denying the petition, the Court has decided to forego
technicalities and to resolve the issues raised. Moreover, since it is now apparent that the only petitioner in this
case is the People of the Philippines as represented by the Solicitor General, payment of the legal fees is not
necessary in accordance with Rule 141, Sec. 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner first contends that private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after the
prosecution has rested its case and the defense has started to present its evidence. Furthermore, petitioner
34 | P a g e
complains that "it took two (2) years and six (6) months before anyone to take (sic) notice of the jurisdictional
infirmity" [Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12]. Hence, according to petitioner, private respondents are barred from raising
the issue of jurisdiction, estoppel having already set in.
The contention is without merit. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings [Rule 117, Sec. 8, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure; U.S. v. Castanares, 18 Phil. 210
(1911)]. It is true that in Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-31218, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711 and in People v.
Munar, G.R. No. L-37642, October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA 278, cases cited by the Solicitor General and private
prosecutor in their pleadings, the Court held that jurisdiction cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
However, these cases can readily be distinguished from the case at bar by the fact that the issue of jurisdiction
was raised only on appeal. In the instant case, the private respondents made the jurisdictional challenge
pending the trial and before the trial court has rendered any judgment on the merits.
Moreover, the ruling in Vera v. People and People v. Munar that jurisdiction may not be raised for the first time
on appeal, is the exception rather than the general rule.
The doctrine in those cases was first enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29, 35-36, where the Court stated that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean v. Dean, 136 Or. 694,
86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether
the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such conduct
not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court . . . And in
Littleton v. Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 399 [See also Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No.
68544, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 211], the Court held that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an
exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case
because of the presence of laches. The Court said:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-
waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to
be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may
no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it."cralaw virtua1aw library
The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been
rendered by the trial court in this case. And as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, they did
not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be
absent, the Court holds that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, Vera v. People and People v. Munar does not
control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, must apply. Private respondents are not estopped from questioning the
35 | P a g e
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, the Court will now proceed with the main issue of whether or not the
Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage.
The crime of concubinage is penalized by Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 334. Concubinage. — Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her
in any other place shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (Emphasis supplied.)
According to Sec. 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (hereinafter referred to as the
inferior courts) shall exercise" [exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of
not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof . . ." On the other
hand, the "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body . . ." [Sec. 20. B.P. Blg. 129]
The penalty imposable on the husband who commits concubinage is prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Hence,
as regards the husband, there is no question that concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
inferior courts. The problem concerns the concubine upon whom the imposable penalty is destierro.
The Solicitor General and the private prosecutor point out that the duration of destierro, which is between six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC], is beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to impose.
Thus, they conclude that either (1) the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over the crime of concubinage [Solicitor General’s Motion for Reconsideration, p. 11; Rollo, p. 52]; or (2) the
Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have "split jurisdiction," the latter having jurisdiction over the crime
as regards the husband and the former as regards the concubine [Private Prosecutor’s Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 3; Rollo, p. 58].
These propositions are both untenable. It has already been held by the Court in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 86
Phil. 617 (1950) and People v. Santos, 87 Phil. 687 (1950) that a crime punishable with the penalty of destierro
is within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. This is so because in the scale of penalties outlined in Art. 71,
destierro comes after arresto mayor. * And since under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Republic Act No. 296], crimes
punishable with arresto mayor are within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, it follows that crimes punishable
with destierro are also within the jurisdiction of such courts. In explaining its conclusion that destierro is lighter
than arresto mayor and therefore cognizable by the inferior courts, the Court, in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,
supra at p. 619, stated the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Destierro is not a higher penalty than arresto mayor. Arresto mayor means imprisonment or complete
deprivation of liberty, whereas destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within a radius of
25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused for a specified length of time. The respective severities
of arresto mayor and destierro must not be judged by the duration of each of these penalties, but by the degree
of deprivation of liberty involved. Penologists have always considered destierro lighter than arresto mayor. Such
criterion is reflected both in the old Spanish Penal Code and in our Revised Penal Code. In the graduated scale
of article 71 the lawmaker has placed destierro below arresto mayor. There is, therefore, no basis in fact or in
law for holding that destierro is a higher penalty than arresto mayor and that an offense penalized with destierro
falls under the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The Court is well-aware of the fact that Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan and People v. Santos were decided under the
Judiciary Act of 1948 pursuant to which justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities
had original jurisdiction over "all offenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than
six months" [Sec. 87 (b)] while Courts of First Instance had original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months" [Sec. 44 (f)]. There being no mention in said
Act of crimes for which the penalty is not imprisonment, these aforecited cases were decided on the premise
that "there exists a gap in the law as to which court shall have original jurisdiction over offenses penalized with
destierro or banishment" [Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, supra, at p. 620].
36 | P a g e
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), the inferior courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2)
months [Sec. 32 (2)] while the Regional Trial Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body" [Sec. 20]. Ostensibly, Sec. 20 of B.P.
Blg. 129 would grant to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro, such as
concubinage, since destierro is not an offense punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and
two (2) months. However, the Court, after a careful reading of B.P. Blg. 129, is of the considered opinion that
there was no intention to overturn the doctrine laid down in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan and People v. Santos. It is
quite evident that among the important factors considered in the allocation of jurisdiction between the Regional
Trial Courts and the inferior courts are the gravity of both the offense and the imposable penalty. It is not,
therefore, unreasonable to state that the legislature granted to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes
whose penalties are harsher than those vested in the inferior courts. And since it is already a settled rule that
destierro, by its nature, is a lighter penalty than imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v. Dingalasan, supra], it follows that
even under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro is vested
not in the Regional Trial Courts but in the inferior courts.
More particularly in this case, the crime of concubinage has two penalties, one for the husband and another for
the concubine. The penalty for the husband, prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which
ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, is unquestionably within the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts. Considering that Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code states that" [t]he offended
party [in the crime of concubinage] cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties,"
it is clearly in the interest of the orderly administration of justice that the concubine be tried with the erring
husband before the inferior courts. The legislature could not have intended to allow the absurd situation wherein
the inferior court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage only as regards the husband while the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction over the same crime with respect to the concubine.
In fine, the Court, after a careful consideration of the pertinent laws, as well as the jurisprudence on the matter,
holds that the crime of concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts. The
Regional Trial Courts have no original jurisdiction over the said crime. Hence, the court a quo committed no
reversible error in dismissing the criminal information against private respondents. At any rate, considering that
the dismissal of the case by the court a quo on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense [Rule 117, Secs. 6 and 7, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure] and
considering further that the crime has not yet prescribed [See Art. 90, RPC], the offended wife is not precluded
from initiating the filing of another criminal information against private respondents before the proper
court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit. The reimbursement of the legal fees
paid by the private prosecutor for the filing of this petition is hereby ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 8
[G.R. No. 108208. March 11, 1994.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon City, and ALEXANDER DIONISIO Y
MANIO, Respondents. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman, intervenor-respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that "criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts." The principal issue in this case is whether the term "regular courts"
includes the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains that it does not while the respondent Judge and the
intervenor-respondent hold otherwise.
Section 46 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases
37 | P a g e
involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courts-
martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have
already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as amended, and Executive Order No.
178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, That criminal cases against PC-INP
members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper
city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge." chanrobles law library
The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched
by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was
creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo
Sadang.
On 7 August 1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an Information 2 charging Dionisio with the crime of
homicide committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 31st day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable motive, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO, by then and there shooting the latter with the use of a gun, .45 caliber
pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his neck and on his thorax, which where the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG
Y MACABEO in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 and was raffled off to Branch 104 of the RTC,
prescribed over by the respondent Judge.
On 4 September 1992, while trial was already in progress, the respondent Judge issued, motu proprio, an order
3 requiring the prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court should still proceed with the trial
of the case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" [i]n view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deloso v. Domingo (Vol. 191 SCRA, 545), quoted
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when penalty prescribed by law
for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against
the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of death (Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to
investigate it.’" chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In his Order of 24 September 1992, 4 the respondent Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 "for re-
filing with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the Regional Trial Court, has
jurisdiction over the case. The body of the order reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Which Court has jurisdiction over police officers who are charged with the crime of homicide or murder?
Accused Quezon City Patrolman Alexander Dionisio y Manio is being tried for homicide for killing T/Sgt. Romeo
Sadang y MACABEO on July 31, 1991 in Quezon City. Several witnesses were already presented by the
prosecution. Nobody raised the issue of jurisdiction. On September 4, 1992, the Court issued an order requiring
the prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court has jurisdiction over the matter in view of the
ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 945 [sic] which rules as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge
against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to
investigate it.’
38 | P a g e
As a matter of fact, even if the act or crime is not related to or connected with or arising from the performance of
official duty, it must be investigated by the Ombudsman or any of its duly deputized representative:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘The clause "any (illegal) act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed
by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should
we.’chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special classes of crimes, still can be classified as a regular
court functioning within the framework of the judicial department of the government. It is a ‘trial court and bound
by the rules governing trial courts. It is one of the "inferior courts" in Article X of the Constitution whose
jurisdiction may be questioned before the Supreme Court and whose judgments are subject to its review,
revision, affirmance or setting aside. The independence of the judiciary enshrined in the Constitution calls for
the unitary judicial system with the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchical set-up’ (Rules of Criminal
Procedures by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., 1986 Edition, p. 26).
Conformably therefore to the foregoing consideration, the regular court referred to in Section 46 of Republic Act
6975 (An Act establishing the Philippine National Police) is the Sandiganbayan. Since the penalty for homicide,
the charge against the accused, carries the penalty of reclusion temporal, said case is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to investigate it. (Art. 249, RPC).
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for refiling with the Sandiganbayan."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On 6 October 1992, the private prosecutor moved for a reconsideration 5 of the dismissal, citing the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice of 31 July 1991 6 that "crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan" because" [t]hey fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts" as provided in Section
46 of R.A. No. 6975 and" [t]he Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The respondent Judge denied the motion in the Order of 7 October 1992: 7
"The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 31, 1992 [sic]. . . . .is not binding to this Court.
This Court still holds that the regular Courts referred to in Sec. 46 of RA 6975 (An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police) includes the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive original jurisdiction to try offenses
on felonies committed by public officers in relation to their office, whether simple or complex with other crimes
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, par. c, PD 1606)
What is contemplated in the law is the regular civil court to the exclusion of non-regular courts such as military
courts which had previous jurisdiction over police officers. The police force being civilian in character should be
under the jurisdiction of the civil court. What is meant by ‘regular courts’ mentioned in Sec. 46, RA 6975 are the
‘inferior courts’ in Article X of the constitution which calls for a unitary judicial system with the Supreme Court at
the top of the hierarchical set-up (Rules in Crim. Procedure by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, page 26, 1986
edition)."cralaw virtua1aw library
On 6 January 1993, petitioner filed the instant petition. We required the respondents to comment
thereon.cralawnad
On 5 February 1993, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for leave to intervene and to file comment 8
alleging that its constitutional duty to investigate criminal cases against public officers, including PNP members,
and to prosecute cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are affected by the issue raised; and that the office of
the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had issued a joint circular on 14 October 1991 9 wherein
(a) both agencies agreed that, subject to the final determination by competent authorities, the term "regular
courts" in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 refers to "civilian courts" as distinguished from military courts, and (b)
certain guidelines were adopted to govern the investigation and prosecution of PNP members. Attached to the
motion is the Ombudsman’s Comment 10 on the petition. We granted this motion to intervene, admitted the
Comment, and required petitioner to reply thereto. 11
In their separate Comments, 12 the respondent Judge reiterates the reasons stated in the assailed orders, and
the private respondent concurs with the position and amplifies the arguments of the Ombudsman.
39 | P a g e
Petitioner filed its Reply 13 to the Comments of the respondents and the intervenor.
On 6 July 1993, we resolved to consider the separate comments of the respondents as answers, to give due
course to the petition, and to require the parties to file simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty
days from notice, which they did, with the petitioner submitting its memorandum only on 29 December 1993
after obtaining several extensions of time to do so.
In the main, petitioner insists that the dismissal of the criminal case below "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan"
was erroneous because Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 vests the exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases involving
PNP members only in the "regular courts" which excludes the Sandiganbayan since it is, constitutionally and
statutorily, a "special court" and not a regular court. To bolster this claim, petitioner points to Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1973 Constitution which described the Sandiganbayan as "a special court" and Section 4, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that" [t]he present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It further asserts that (a) if it were the intention of R.A. No. 6975 to grant to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
PNP members, then Section 46 should have explicitly stated or used the term "civil courts" considering that
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) were then integrated with and under the operational control
and administrative set-up of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and, under P.D. No. 1850, were subject to court-
martial proceedings for all crimes cognizable by the civil courts; (b) if it were the intention of R.A. No. 6975 to
include the Sandiganbayan in the term "regular courts" in Section 46, then it should not have provided therein
that "criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this
Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge" ; instead, it
should have directed such transfer to "the Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor since the Ombudsman or the
Special Prosecutor is mandated by law to entertain cases cognizable only by the Sandiganbayan" under Section
15 of R.A. No. 6770; and (c) there is an irreconcilable conflict between Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and Section
4 of P.D. No. 1606 (revising P.D. No. 1486 which created the Sandiganbayan), as amended, which vests in the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over" [o]ther offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office . . . where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional .
. . or a fine of P6,000.00" ; the latter then should be deemed impliedly repealed by the former, which is a later
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner finally contends that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, is a general law for it applies to all public officers,
while R.A. No. 6975 is a special law for it sets out a special rule of jurisdiction for PNP members. The latter
should thus prevail.
Petitioner then prays that the assailed orders of respondent Judge of 24 September 1992 and 7 October 1992
be reversed and set aside and that the respondent Judge be directed to reinstate and continue the trial of
Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman maintains the view that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the subject criminal case in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 and the Joint
Circular of 14 October 1991. It asserts that the term "regular courts" in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 includes the
Sandiganbayan and that R.A. No. 6975 has not repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606.
Amplifying its view, it opines that: (a) while the Sandiganbayan is a special court, it is a regular court within the
context of Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 because it is a "court normally functioning with continuity within the
jurisdiction vested in it," and that the term "regular courts" is used in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 to distinguish
the said courts from the courts-martial for it seeks to divest the latter of such jurisdiction and mandates its
transfer to the former pursuant to the policy of the law to establish a police force national in scope and civilian in
character; and (b) since the creation of the Sandiganbayan is mandated by the Constitution 14 to take
cognizance of crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office and P.D. No. 1606 created it
pursuant to such mandate, then the repeal of the latter, as suggested by petitioner, would diminish and dilute
the constitutional jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and would operate to amend the Constitution, which no
statute can do. Moreover, there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two laws to warrant an implied
repeal.
Finally, the Ombudsman asserts that the proviso in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 that "criminal cases against PC-
INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the
proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge" only means a referral to the proper city or
provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge for appropriate preliminary investigation and not the filing of
the criminal information with the proper court it being a fact that all city and provincial prosecutors have been
deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
40 | P a g e
As to which law is the special law, the Ombudsman maintains that it is P.D. No. 1606 because it deals
specifically with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 does not specifically
mention any particular court.
The resolution of the principal issue hinges on the interpretation of the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975 which, in turn, requires an inquiry into the legislative intent and purpose of the law.
There can be no doubt that the provisions of R.A. No. 6975 on the PNP are intended to implement Section 6,
Article XVI (General Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 6. The State shall established and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian
in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The sponsors of House Bill No. 23614, 15 which together with Senate Bill No. 463 16 eventually became R.A.
No. 6975 were unequivocal on this. Representative Antonio Cerilles, after referring to the aforementioned
mandate, declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Today is a date with history, Mr. Speaker, when this august chamber will try its best to pursue what is
mandated by the Constitution. Today, we shall insist, though legislative fiat, that the State should establish and
maintain one police force. Its civilian character on a national scope shall be paramount. Today, we should insist
that no office in any element or unit of the police force can be occupied or run by military personnel and officer.
We should also insist that the only way to professionalize our police force is to separate them from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines." 17
In this sponsorship speech, Representative Nereo Joaquin stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First and foremost among all these is, as already mentioned earlier, the fact that the bill is undoubtedly in
harmony and in conformity not only with the letter but more importantly with the spirit of the new Constitution
particularly Section 6 of Article XVI, the General Provisions. . . ." 18
Police forces have traditionally been under civilian authority. However, the dictatorial regime of then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, consistent with his own agenda to strengthen the machinery of martial law rule, exploited
to his advantage the provision of the 1973 Constitution which mandated the establishment and maintenance of
"an integrated national police force whose organization, administration, and operation shall be provided by law."
19 First, he issued a series of decrees consolidating and integrating various local police forces and placing them
under the operational control, direction, and supervision of the Philippine Constabulary (PC); 20 then on 8
August 1975, he promulgated P.D. No. 765 which "established and constituted the Integrated National Police
which shall be composed of the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as
established by Presidential Decrees Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under the Department of
National Defense." By this decree, Mr. Marcos succeeded in militarizing the police forces by making them mere
components of the PC which was then one of the four major commands of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP). He did not stop there. For, even after the farcical lifting of Martial Law in 1981 through Proclamation No.
2045, and pursuant to the infamous Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, 21 he promulgated on 4
October 1982 P.D. 1850 which provided for court-martial jurisdiction over police officers, policemen, firemen,
and jail guards. Section 1 thereof reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. —
Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National
Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by
courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known
as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who
commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried
by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court martial jurisdiction over the person of the
accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation
from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by
law.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen and jail guards."cralaw virtua1aw library
41 | P a g e
In a manner of speaking, this decree completed the militarization of the INP and consummated the aberration in
the police organization. Two years later, or on 5 September 1984, he issued P.D. No. 1952 which amended
P.D. No. 1850 by inserting a proviso to the first paragraph of Section 1 granting himself the authority "in the
interest of justice, [to] order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the
appropriate civil court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Before P.D. No. 1850, or specifically on 16 January 1981, Mr. Marcos, through P.D. No. 1822, placed under
court-martial jurisdiction, pursuant to the Articles of War, all officers, soldiers, and personnel in the active service
of the AFP or of the PC, charged with any crime or offense related to the performance of their duties.
Needless to state, the overwhelming sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution against the martial law
regime 22 and the militarization of the police forces prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and
maintenance of one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character. This civilian
character is unqualified and unconditional and is, therefore, all-embracing. The Declaration of Policy (Section 2)
of R.A. No. 6975 faithfully carried out this mandate when it declared therein that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions. Its
national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor
shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines."cralaw
virtua1aw library
That civilian character refers to its orientation and structure. Thus, during a bicameral conference committee
meeting on House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463, Senator Edgardo Angara
remarked:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SENATOR ANGARA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That’s what we’re trying to interpret nga eh. Civilian in character meaning, we’re separating the police both in
orientation and structure from the military discipline and structure, I think that’s essentially the mandate we’re
trying to implement."cralaw virtua1aw library
Civilian character necessarily includes, according to him:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SENATOR ANGARA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Civilian system of justice na." 23
It is thus evident that the mandate of Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction
over criminal cases involving PNP members and to return or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts. This
return or transfer of jurisdiction to the civil courts was explicitly provided for in the original Section 68 of House
Bill No. 23614 which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 68. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal
cases involving PNP members shall, immediately upon effectivity of this Act, be exclusively tried by the Civil
Courts: Provided, however, That in cases where a member of the PNP is unable to post bail, he may be placed
upon order by the court under the custody of his supervisor upon petition of the latter." 24
Upon motion of Representative Rodolfo Albano, accepted by the Committee and approved in plenary session,
this section was amended to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ANY PROVISION OF LAW TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING PNP
MEMBERS SHALL BE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL COURTS."25cralaw:red
In the course of the interpellation on his amendment, Mr. Albano had the occasion to emphasize the purpose of
the law and the transfer of jurisdiction to civil courts of criminal cases involving members of the
PNP:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MR. ALBANO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Considering that we are creating here a purely civilian police force, he [the PNP member] should, therefore, also
fall under our civil force, and there should be no iota of military syndrome [referring to the proviso in Sec. 68] so
to speak." 26
During the deliberation by the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense on House Bill No. 23614
42 | P a g e
and Senate Bill No. 463, more specifically on Section 68 of the former, its Chairman, Senator Ernesto Maceda,
used the term "regular courts" in lieu of civil courts. Thus:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Okay, Rey at saka iyong House, you work on the flow chart.
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong ‘Jurisdiction in criminal cases?’ What is this all about?
In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Ah, the previous one is administrative, ‘no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular courts." 27
The term regular courts was finally carried into the reconciled bill, 28 entitled "An Act Establishing the Philippine
National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other
Purposes," and incorporated in the Conference Committee Report received by the Office of the Secretary of the
Senate on 19 November 1990. Section 46 of the proposed reconciled bill is Section 68 of House Bill No. 23614,
with further modifications and amendments. The reconciled bill was approved by both Houses of Congress and
became R.A. No. 6975.
The foregoing considered, we have no doubt that the terms civil courts and regular courts were used
interchangeably or were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral Conference Committee and then by the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to
remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in
the courts within our judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as contradistinguished from courts-martial, are
the regular courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system; they pertain to the
executive department of the government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power. 29 Otherwise
stated, courts-martial are not regular courts.
Parenthetically, in Quiloña v. The General Court Martial, 30 this Court found correct and impliedly adopted as its
own a statement of the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
mandates the transfer of criminal cases against members of the PNP to the civilian courts. Thus:chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
"Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment —
The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in
line therewith, the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts." 31
Having thus ruled that the term "regular courts" in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 refers to the civil courts, we must
now determine if the Sandiganbayan is included in that term.
Regular courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such
lower courts as may be established by law. 32 Per Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code of
1987, 33 such lower courts "include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, Shari’a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
and Shari’a Circuit Courts."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486 34 pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution. 35 This was revised by P.D. No. 1606. 36 The latter was amended by P.D. No. 1860 37 and
lastly by P.D. No. 1861. 38 Under the amendments introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including
43 | P a g e
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years,
or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of
P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally
decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolution or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Petitioner’s insistence that it is not because, by the Constitution and by the statutes, the Sandiganbayan is a
special court and, therefore, not a regular court is untenable. In the first place, a comparison between the words
regular and special is inappropriate since the opposite of the latter is not the former and vice versa. Special
means "designed for a particular purpose; confined to a particular purpose, object, person, or class," 39 and is,
therefore, the antonym of general. 40 On the other hand, regular means "steady or uniform in course, practice,
or occurrence," as opposed to casual or occasional. 41 In other words, special and general are categories in the
distributive order. 42 With reference then to the courts, they principally relate to jurisdiction. Thus, there are
courts of general jurisdiction and courts of special jurisdiction. It is, of course, incorrect to say that only courts of
general jurisdiction are regular courts. Courts of special jurisdiction, which are permanent in character, are also
regular courts. The Sandiganbayan is a court with special jurisdiction because its creation as a permanent anti-
graft court is constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to certain classes of offenses.
That the Sandiganbayan is among the regular courts is further strongly indicated by Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606
which vests upon it "all the inherent powers of a court of justice" and places it on "the same level as the Court of
Appeals," and by Section 4 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which grants it appellate jurisdiction over
certain cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section
4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, as regards the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
members of the PNP. First, the argument is based on the faulty assumption that the Sandiganbayan, being a
special court, is not a regular court within the contemplation of Section 46. Second, both provisions are not
irreconcilable and the presumption against an implied repeal has not been overcome. Implied repeal may be
indulged in only if the two laws are inconsistent, or the former law must be repugnant as to be irreconcilable with
the latter law. Necessarily then, an attempt must be made to harmonize the two laws. In Valera v. Tuason, 43
this Court stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize
the provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal
another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be
irreconciliable [sic] with the latter act. (U.S. v. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208). Merely because a later enactment may
relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal
of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. (Statutory Construction,
Crawford, p. 634)."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Gordon v. Veridiano, 44 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, emphasized the task of
courts to reconcile and harmonize laws:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same
instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise
policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork
of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a
coordinate department of the government."cralaw virtua1aw library
Indeed, it has been approximately said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
44 | P a g e
"The presumption against implied repeals is classically founded upon the doctrine that the legislature is
presumed to envision the whole body of the law when it enacts new legislation, and, therefore, if a repeal of the
prior law is intended, expressly to designate the offending provisions rather than to leave the repeal to arise by
necessary implication from the later enactment. Still more basic, however, is the assumption that existing
statutory and common law, as well as ancient law, is representative of popular will. As traditional and customary
rules, the presumption is against their alteration of repeal. The presumption has been said to have special
application to important public statutes of long standing." 45
It can thus be reasonably presumed that in the enactment of R.A. No. 6975, Congress had the whole body of
the law in mind and, for consistency, coherence, and harmony, took into account the provisions of the
Constitution regarding the Sandiganbayan, the law creating it, and the amendments thereto relative to its
jurisdiction. Since under the law, the Sandiganbayan is a special anti-graft court with exclusive original
jurisdiction over (a) violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code; and (b) other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees (including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations) in relation to their office where the penalty prescribed by
law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, and since members
of the PNP are public officers or employees, 46 Congress can be logically presumed to have read into Section
46 of R.A. No. 6975 the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the Sandiganbayan. The alleged
inconsistency seen by petitioner is non-existent for, on the contrary, the two provisions can well go together with
full and unhampered effect to both and without doing violence to either, thereby giving spirit to the maxim,
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 47 As harmonized, the conclusion
is inevitable that members of the PNP, as public officers and employees, are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan with respect to (a) violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, and (b) other offenses or felonies committed by them
in relation to their office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00. All other offenses committed by them are cognizable by the appropriate
courts within the judicial system such as the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office must, however, be alleged in
the information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4(a) (2). 48 This allegation
is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information.
49
In the instant case, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 on the ground that since the penalty
prescribed for the crime charged — which is homicide — is higher than prision correccional, 50 then pursuant to
Deloso v. Domingo, 51 it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the case. In order to avoid a
misapprehension of the ruling in Deloso, which was based on P.D. No. 1606 alone, it must be stressed that we
had unequivocally ruled in Aguinaldo v. Domagas 52 that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original
jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees, under Section 4(a) (2) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that such offenses
or felonies were committed in relation to their office. We then concluded:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine
whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in
relation to their offices."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the recent case of Sanchez v. Demetriou, 53 we reiterated our ruling on the requirement that the offenses or
felonies covered by Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, have to be committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their office and likewise elucidated on the meaning of offenses
committed in relation to their office by reiterating the principle in Montilla v. Hilario 54 that an offense may be
considered as committed in relation to the office if "the offense cannot exist without the office," or that "the office
must be a constituent element of the crimes as . . . defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of
the Revised Penal Code," and the principle in People v. Montejo 55 that the offense must be intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetuated while he was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions. Further, we intimated that the fact that the offense was committed in relation to
the office must be alleged in the information.
Just recently, in Natividad v. Felix, 56 we explicitly declared that we had re-examined the Deloso case in
Aguinaldo and in Sanchez and reiterated the requisites for an offense under Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by P.D. No. 1861, to fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
45 | P a g e
In the light then of the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City would be without jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 if the information therein would show that the offense of homicide charged was
committed by the accused (private respondent) in relation to his office. The information has failed to do so. The
pleadings of the parties are of little help. We can only speculate therefrom that the crime charged might have
been committed while the private respondent was in the pursuit of his mission. Under the sub-heading in the
petition entitled "Relevant Antecedents," the petitioner merely states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. On July 31, 1991, private Respondent. . . then a member of the PNP-NCR assigned to the Central Police
District Command Station 2, based in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to
Dumalay Street in Novaliches to check on a complaint regarding a person creating trouble in the place. While in
Novaliches, private respondent shot Romeo Sadang to death."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by the private respondent
in the course of the latter’s mission. On the other hand, the private respondent asserts in his Comment that he
"shot Romeo Sadang in the performance of a lawful duty and in lawful defense of his life." 57 Petitioner ignored
this claim in its Reply to the Comment. This claim is an anticipatory defense yet to be proved and its assertion in
the Comment does not cure the deficiency, pointed out earlier, of the information. It would appear to us that with
respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the parties only took into account the prescribed penalty, relying upon Deloso
v. Domingo, for which reason they did not consider important and relevant the issue of whether the offense
charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. But as stated earlier, Deloso v.
Domingo was modified by Aguinaldo v. Domagas.
The dismissal then of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 solely on the basis of Deloso v. Domingo was erroneous.
In the light of Aguinaldo and Sanchez, and considering the absence of any allegation in the information that the
offense was committed by private respondent in relation to his office, it would even appear that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. However, it may yet be true that the crime of homicide charged therein was
committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, which fact, however, was not alleged in the
information probably because Deloso v. Domingo did not require such an allegation. In view of this eventuality
and the special circumstances of this case, and to avoid further delay, if not confusion, we shall direct the court
a quo to conduct a preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the crime charged in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-23224 was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. If it be determined in the
affirmative, then it shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and
proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a quo shall set aside the
challenged orders, proceed with the trial of the case, and render judgment thereon.
Henceforth, any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation 58 who is investigating an offense or
felony committed by a public officer or employee (including a member of the PNP) where the penalty prescribed
by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, must determine if
the crime was committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If it was, the investigating officer shall
forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman which may either (a) take over the investigation of the case
pursuant to Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31 thereof. 60 If the
investigating officer determines that the crime was not committed by the respondent in relation to his office, he
shall then file the information with the proper court.
In the light of the foregoing, further discussion on the other collateral issues raised has become
unnecessary.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a preliminary hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to
determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, and
(1) If he determines that the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office,
DIRECTING the respondent Judge to forthwith transmit the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan which
shall docket and proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it; or
(2) If he determines otherwise, DIRECTING him to set aside the challenged Orders of 24 September 1992 and
7 October 1992, to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224, and to render judgment
thereon.chanrobles law library : red
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
46 | P a g e
CASE NO. 9
G.R. No. L-30370 May 25, 1973

PEDRO ADUCAYEN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELFIN V. FLORES, as Presiding Judge of Branch XI, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, HON. DAVID C. CONCEPCION, as Municipal Judge of Makati, RIZAL, and REGAL
SALES CENTER, INC., respondents.
B. Martinez for petitioner.
J. Talavera for private respondent.
FERNAND, J.
What is immediately discernible, even at a glance the most cursory, in this petition for review on certiorari of an
order of respondent Court of First Instance Judge,1 is the marked deviation from a prevailing doctrine of this
Court uninterruptedly adhered to over all these years that a denial of procedural due process is a grave
jurisdictional defect. It came as a surprise then to have the lower court intone with all solemnity: "It is therefore
very clear that the herein plaintiff (now petitioner) has been deprived of a hearing in the lower court. Such being
the case the instant complaint for certiorari will not lie. ...2 Such a pronouncement uttered with dogmatic finality
is, to put it at its mildest, impressed with unorthodoxy. The law is anything but that. When it is further considered
that as shown in such terse and succinct two-paragraph order, petitioner was adjudged liable on, the evidence
against him being heard; ex-parte, with the judgment first sentencing him to pay P644.45 with interest then
subsequently increased in an amended decision a week later to P2,090.00, also with interest, the failure of
respondent Judge to grant the certiorari prayed for certainly defies explanation. This is one of those cases
where with the undeniable being added to the obvious, the conclusion that must emerge from a petition for
review is inescapable. We reverse.
There is no dispute as to the facts. On January 23, 1968, a complaint was filed by respondent Regal Sales
Center, Inc., with the Municipal Court of Makati, Rizal, presided by respondent Judge David C. Concepcion, for
a sum of money against one Simeon Figueras, Jr. and petitioner Pedro Aducayen. Petitioner as well as
defendant Figueras filed their answer in writing on February 27, 1968. Respondent Municipal Judge apparently
of the belief that he could set the case for pre-trial did so, scheduling it on August 22 of that year. On said date,
only counsel for defendants appeared in view of a telegram received by him that the principal defendant, the
vendee, Simeon Figueras, Jr., was still sick in the province. Petitioner was not notified of such pre-trial.3 Then
on September 9, 1968, petitioner received a copy of the decision of respondent Municipal Judge dated August
22, 1968 where it was made to appear that the evidence was adduced solely by plaintiff, respondent Regal
Sales Center, Inc. in view of the "default of defendant Pedro Aducayen, who failed to appear at the scheduled
pre-trial conference today"4 and that the cause of action having been thus sufficiently established judgment was
rendered against petitioner as defendant "to pay plaintiff the sum of P644.45 constituting the principal cause of
action herein, plus interest at 1% per month from August 3, 1967 until fully paid; .... "5 Then on September 11,
1968, petitioner received an amended decision from respondent Municipal Judge dated August 30, 1968 where
the amount for which he was held liable was increased to P2,090.00, this, on the very same evidence presented
ex-parte on August 22, 1968, there being no such scheduled pre-trial conference for August 30th.6 Nonetheless,
the opening. paragraph of the amended decision reads thus: "Considering the evidence adduced solely by
plaintiff in default of the defendant Pedro Aducayen who failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference
today, and finding the cause of action set forth therein to have been sufficiently established, judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant is hereby rendered as follows. ...."7 After which petitioner filed with respondent
Court of First Instance Judge his suit for certiorari where the due process question was squarely raised. It was
all in vain. Notwithstanding, as above shown that petitioner was not heard at all, the order dismissing his
petition, now subject of this review, was handed down on January 25, 1969. 8
The petition for certiorari was filed with this Court on April 1, 1969 and was thereafter given due course as on its
face its merit is quite discernible. After going over the answer and the respective briefs of the parties this Court,
as noted, holds that the challenged order dismissing the petition for certiorari must be set aside. So we rule.
1. It is not easy to understand how after duly noting the undeniable facts, respondent Court of First Instance
Judge could order the dismissal of the certiorari proceeding before it. He was quite categorical and quite right in
47 | P a g e
asserting that petitioner "has been deprived of a hearing in the lower court." Clearly then, there was a denial of
procedural due process, which need not have occurred had respondent Municipal Judge, ignoring what is
clearly set forth in the Rules of Court as to when a default may be ordered,9 refrained from doing so and thus
avoided the grave infirmity of petitioner as defendant not being given his day in court. As provided therein, only
when there is no written answer is a declaration of default justified. Then ex-parte evidence may be submitted
for plaintiff without offense to the due process clause. The uncontradicted facts reveal that petitioner as
defendant did not incur such omission. Respondent Court of First Instance Judge was aware that such was the
case. Yet sad to say, contrary to the authoritative doctrines of this Court, he would dismiss a petition
for certiorari when such is the appropriate remedy in case of a grave jurisdictional defect. Considering the denial
of procedural due process, petitioner was entitled to the relief sought. As expressed in the rather colorful
rhetoric that every once in a while exhibited itself in the opinions of Justice Street, 10 in the leading case
of Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca,"11 decided almost fifty-five years ago: "Where a judgment or judicial order
is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head." 12 Chief Justice Concepcion, not too long ago, did reiterate such a view in
a more restrained phraseology. 13 Thus: "Indeed, acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny
due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the
same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding." 14 Undoubtedly then, certiorari lies. This
Court has made it abundantly clear in a number of cases. 15 The order of respondent Court of First Instance
Judge then which precisely holds the opposite cannot be allowed to stand. Such seeming defiance of what this
Court has so often pronounced cannot be tolerated.
2. Nor is this all that has to be said. There is need, it does seem, to caution anew judges of inferior courts, which
according to the Constitution refer to all those outside this Tribunal, to exercise greater care in the discharge of
their judicial functions. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. Moreover, while it becomes hourly difficult to keep abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a
modicum of effort should be exerted by them not to lag too far behind. Nor is it too much to expect that they
betray awareness of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. If such were the case, then resort to us would be
less frequent. That way our time could be devoted to questions of greater significance. Not only that, there
would be on the part of party litigants less expense and greater faith in the administration of justice if there be a
belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles. Such an indictment unfortunately cannot just be dismissed as a manifestation of
chronic fault-finding. The situation thus calls for a more conscientious and diligent approach to the discharge of
judicial functions to avoid the imputation that there is on the part of a number of judges less than full and
adequate comprehension of the law.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of January 25, 1969 is reversed and set aside, the
prayer of petitioner before respondent Court of First Instance Judge, Delfin B. Flores, is granted, annulling the
order of default issued by respondent Municipal Court Judge David C. Concepcion, as well as nullifying his
decision of August 22, 1968 and his amended decision of August 30, 1968. Respondent Municipal Court Judge
Concepcion or whoever is acting in his place is ordered to set Civil Case No. 2966 in the Municipal Court of
Makati, Rizal, anew for trial with the right of petitioner Pedro Aducayen as defendant to be heard being duly
respected. With costs against respondent Regal Sales Center, Inc.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ. concur.
48 | P a g e
CASE NO. 10
G.R. No. 95370 March 10, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALEJANDRINO C. CABEBE, in his capacity as Provincial Prosecutor
of Ilocos Sur, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EFREN O. RAMOS, in his capacity as Presiding and Executive Judge, Branch 21, RTC, Vigan,
Ilocos Sur and HON. FRANCISCO R. RANCHES, in his capacity as MCT Judge of Caoayan, Sta. Catalina,
Ilocos Sur, respondents.
G.R. No. 101227 March 10, 1992
ALEJANDRINO C. CABEBE and JAIME P. FILLER, in their capacity as Provincial Prosecutor and Second
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PACITO B. VIZCARRA, in his capacity as municipal Trial Judge of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because they both involve the interpretation of Section 5 of Rule 110 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure reading as follows:
Sec. 5. — Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
However, in the Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when there is no fiscal
available, the offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of
the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority ceases upon actual intervention of the
fiscal or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
In G.R. No. 95370, the petitioners question the order of Judge Efren C. Ramos of the Regional Trial Court of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur,1 dismissing the petition against two orders of Judge Francisco R. Ranches of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Caoayan-Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur, requiring Alejandrino C. Cabebe as Provincial
Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur to personally attend the trial of seven criminal cases pending before the latter court. 2
The petitioners claim that all these cases were commenced o complaint by the offended parties or the
corresponding peace officers and without the intervention of the Provincial Prosecutor. Assistant Fiscal Ramon
D. Verzosa participated in only one of these cases but no public prosecutor was assigned to replace him when
he died because Cabebe's office was understaffed. Cabebe informed Judge Ranches of this problem and
requested him to allow the offended parties or peace officers to handle the prosecution of the cases. However,
Judge Ranches rejected this request and issued the questioned orders, which on appeal to the Regional Trial
Court of Vigan, Ilocus Sur, were substantially sustained by Judge Ramos.
Required to submit a Comment, Judge Ranches pointed out that, contrary to the allegations in the petition, not
all the seven cases were commenced by complaint, one of them having been instituted through an information
filed by State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano. Annexed to the Comment were certified true copies of the minutes of
the proceedings in the said cases to show that Fiscal Verzosa had actually participated in the prosecution of six
of these cases until his death, while Fiscal Panem attended the seventh. 3 The respondent judge also challenged
the petitioners' claim that there were not enough prosecutors to handle the said cases and implied that the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur was in fact not overworked. For his final argument, he stressed
the exception in Section 5, as affirmed in People v. Beriales,4 that the authority given to offended parties and
peace officers to handle the prosecution of cases under certain conditions shall cease upon actual intervention
of the fiscal or upon elevation of the case to the Regional trial Court. Judge Ramos raised virtually the same
justifications in his own comment.
In G.R. No. 101227, the petitioners also seek certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction,
this time against Judge Pacito B. Vizcarra of the Municipal Trial Court of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, for requiring the
attendance of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur in a criminal case pending before that
court.5 Also faulted is his order directing Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jaime P. Filler to explain why
he should not be punished for contempt for refusing to prosecute the said case.6
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The petitioner claim that a private practitioner was handling the prosecution of that case under the authority and
direction of the Provincial Prosecutor. Cabebe had earlier informed the court that no prosecutor could be
assigned to the case because nine of his ten prosecutors were assigned to the Regional Trial Court of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, and one to the Municipal Trial Court of Vigan pursuant to a directive of the Department of
Justice.7 Nevertheless, acting on the objection of defense counsel to the absence of a public prosecutor, Judge
Vizcarra deferred the trial of the case and in four separate orders required Cabebe or any of his assistants to
enter his appearance and prosecute the case.8
In the Comment he failed as required by this Court, Judge Vizcara said that the criminal case was commenced
by the filing of an information for theft by Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ulpiano Campos and not by
mere complaint. After the arraignment of the accused and the postponement of the trial for various reasons,
Filler appeared before the court and moved for time to study the case. The motion was granted and the hearing
re-set but about two weeks later Filler asked to be excused, arguing that the filing of the information by his office
did not signify its actual intervention in the case. It was for this reason that Filler was required to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt. Like Judge Ranches and Judge Ramos in the other case, Judge
Vizcarra also invoked the last sentence of Section 5 to justify his questioned orders.
The issues having been joined, the Court now proceeds to resolves them.
A study of Section 5 will show that a criminal case falling under the jurisdiction of a municipal trial court or a
municipal circuit trial court may be prosecuted by the offended party, any peace officer or any officer charged
with the enforcement of the law voilated only: 1) when there is no fiscal (or prosecutor) available; and 2) as long
as the fiscal has not intervened or the case has not been elevated to the regional trial court.
In the case at bar, it is claimed by the petitioners that there are no prosecutors available because the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur is understaffed and its distribution by the Department of Justice among
the several courts in the province precluded its handling of the seven cases in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
in Caoayan-Sta. Catalina, and the lone case before the Municipal Trial Court of Bantay.
We have examined the said directive and find that this allegation is inaccurate, to say the least. Annex F clearly
shows that Fiscal Roman Mario V. Panem has been assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Vigan and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caoayan-Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur, and Fiscal Primo T. Cabotaje, Jr. to the
Municipal Trial Court of Bantay, Ilocos Sur. It is true that, according to the directive, assignments to the
municipal trial courts and the municipal circuit trial courts are made "only upon call for assistance by police
officers, offended parties, law enforcement officers and the proper courts in the interest of justice." Such call has
been made, however, by the respondent judges.
The argument of the petitioners that the respondent judges should not be allowed to interfere with the
administration of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is not acceptable. In requiring that office to prosecute
the cases before them, the said respondent judges were merely enforcing the basic rule in Section 5 that "all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal." The questioned orders were in fact based, albeit unwittingly, on the directive of the
Department of Justice.
We also note the following allegations of Judge Vizcarra in his Comment, which have not been refuted by the
petitioners:
The petitioners stated that Provincial Prosecutor Alejandrino Cabebe and/or his assistant
prosecutors should not be required to prosecute criminal cases before the Municipal. Trial Court
of Ilocos Sur considering the insufficient number of prosecutors to serve all courts in the
province. They have never alleged much less shown to the Municipal Trial Court of Bantay,
Ilocos Sur and to the Honorable Supreme Court why they claim that there are insufficient
prosecutors to serve the courts in the province. Before September 4, 1991, Prosecutor Filler
was to assigned to any Regional Trial Court or any Municipal Trial Court of Ilocos Sur. It was
only on September 4, 1991, after these incidents which gave rise to the petition, that Prosecutor
Cabebe assigned Prosecutor Filler as an alternate or corroborating prosecutor of Branch 24 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. Nevertheless, since September 4, 1991 to the
present, Prosecutor Filler has never appeared to prosecute any criminal case before Branch 24
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. Similarly, Prosecutor Cabebe is not
assigned to any Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court of Ilocos Sur although in very few
and minor cases in which Prosecutor Cabebe is presumably personally interested he appears
in the prosecution of cases before the Municipal Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The Regional
Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur has three branches, Branch 20 presided by Honorable Florencio
50 | P a g e
Ruis who holds session only on Tuesdays and Thursdays in the morning as Judge Ruiz is
regularly assigned to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21
presided by Honorable Efren Ramos who holds session mainly in the morning and Branch 25 of
the Regional trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur presided by Honorable Herminia Pascua who holds
session at Vigan, Ilocos Sur for fifteen (15) days in one month, as she also holds session on the
other fifteen (15) days in the Regional Trial Court of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur. Prosecutor Primo
Cabotaje, Jr. the assigned prosecutor in Branch 20 therefore prosecutes cases only in the
mornings of Tuesdays and Thursdays. Prosecutor Redentor Cardenas, the prosecutor assigned
in Branch 21 usually prosecutes cases before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court only in the
mornings and rarely in the afternoons. Prosecutor Jessica Viloria who is assigned to prosecute
criminal cases in Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur prosecutes criminal
cases only in fifteen (15) days for one month and usually only in the mornings as the Court
seldom holds session in the afternoon. Aside from these, Provincial Prosecutor Cabebe,
Prosecutor Filler and Prosecutor Nonnatus Caezar Rojas could also appear in the very few
cases (about one or two times a month) of the Municipal Trial Courts of Ilocos Sur wherein the
public prosecutors have actually intervened.
Judge Ranches commented on the same matter thus, also without refutation:
The reason of petitioner Cabebe that there is a shortage of assistant fiscals that is why he is not
assigning an assistant prosecutor to handle the prosecution of criminal cases in the sala of the
undersigned respondent is not true. There is no shortage. In the municipality of Vigan alone,
which is only three (3) kilometers distance to Caoayan, there are five (5) assistant fiscals,
namely: Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Promo T. Cabotaje, Jr., Jessica G. Viloria, Jaime P.
Filler, Roman Mario Panem and Redentor Cardenas. There are only three (3) RTC branches
conducting hearings in Vigan. Branch XX presided by then Hon. Ariston L. Rubio and the
prosecuting fiscal is Primo T. Cabotaje, Jr., Branch XXV presided by Hon. Herminia Pascua
who conducts hearings only on the first fifteen (15) days of every month, her official station
being Tagudin, Ilocos Sur. The prosecuting fiscal is Jessica G. Viloria. Branch XXI now
presided by Hon. Efren O. Ramos, one of the respondents herein and the prosecuting fiscal is
Redentor Cardenas. Said Judges conduct trials only in the morning that is the reason why the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caoayan usually sets case for hearings in the afternoon.
The argument that there are no prosecutors to handle the said cases must therefore be rejected.
Coming now to the second limitation, we find that in G.R. No. 95370, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Verzosa
participated in the hearings of Criminal Cases No. 1798, 1804, 1805, 1761, and 1876, and 1871, and
Prosecutor Roman Mario Panem in the hearing of Criminal Case No. 1841, as shown by the minutes attached
to the Comment of Judge Ranches. Verzosa and Panem were not only available but actually intervened in these
seven cases, thus placing them under the general rule rather than the exception in Section 5. No. contrary
evidence has been submitted by the petitioners to belie the entries in the minutes.
In G.R. No. 101227, the record shows that Filler's appearance before Judge Vizcarra was limited to his asking
for time to study the case and his subsequent request to be excused from prosecuting it. It is necessary
therefore to determine whether the mere filing of the information by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as
was done in the prosecution for estafa before that court, should be considered an actual intervention by the
prosecutor that would disauthorize the exception in Section 5.
In his Reply to the respondents' Comments in both petitions, the solicitor General argues that:
The mere filing of the Information can not be the "actual intervention" contemplated by the
Rules. If respondent Vizcarra's interpretation were followed, there would be no instance when a
private prosecutor could intervene in a criminal case, except in private crimes where the
offended party filed the case. This is so because all Informations, except in private crimes, are
filed by the prosecutor.
Section 5 does not say it is only the private crime that may be prosecuted on complaint of the offended party. All
offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts and the municipal circuit trial courts are
allowed to be commenced by complaint by the parties named in Section 5 and without the participation of the
public prosecutor's office. Indeed, the petitioners admitted as much when they stressed and argued in G.R. No.
95370 that "the aforementioned cases were filed by the offended parties themselves, peace officers or public
officers charged with the enforcement of the law violated . . . The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had no
hand or intervention in their filing."
51 | P a g e
It is noteworthy that none of the crimes involved in these petitions is a private offense coming under Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code. Criminal Case Nos. 1761 and 1876 are complaints for estafa, Criminal Case Nos.
1798, 1804 and 1805 are for grave oral defamation and Criminal Case No. 1841 is for slight physical injuries.
The petitioners have not questioned the jurisdiction of the respondent judges over these cases and in fact have
requested that the trial thereof proceed without their participation.
The Court feels that in those cases where the prosecutors themselves have filed the criminal charges, there is
all the more reason for them to actively intervene in their prosecution. Having presumably made the necessary
investigation of these cases before filing the corresponding informations, they are in the best position to handle
their prosecution on the basis of their initial findings. If the prosecutor had not determined the prima facie guilt of
the accused, he should not have filed the information in the first place. At any rate, there is something not quite
correct in the prosecutor filling the information himself and then leaving the offended party in the lurch, as it
were, by asking him to fend for himself in prosecuting the case.
The exception provided in Section 5 must be strictly applied as the prosecution of crime is the responsibility of
officers appointed and trained for that purpose. The violation of the criminal laws is an affront to the People of
the Philippines as a whole and not merely the person directly prejudiced, who is merely the complaining
witness. This being so, it is necessary that the prosecution be handled by persons skilled in this function instead
of being entrusted to private persons or public officers with little or no preparation for this responsibility. The
exception should be allowed only when the conditions therefor as set forth in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure have been clearly established.
We find that the respondent judges were correct in requiring the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur
to participate in the prosecution of the criminal cases pending before their respective courts. However, it is not
necessary for the Provincial Prosecutor himself to personally handle the prosecution of the criminal cases, and
in requiring him to do so, Judge Ranches committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court notes that although
Judge Ramos sustained Judge Ranches's order for the participation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
the trial of the criminal cases, he nevertheless did not require petitioner Cabebe to personally prosecute this.
Judge Ramos was correct in allowing Cabebe to merely assign any of his assistants to attend the said hearings.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 95370 and G.R. No. 101227 are both DENIED except the Provincial
Prosecutor Aljendrino Cabebe shall not be required to personally undertake the prosecution of the cases
involved in G.R. No. 95370. Subject to this modification, the challenged orders of the respondent judges are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 11
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice),
JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON,
REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in their official capacities
as members of the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan,
Laguna, who stands accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict has already been rendered by many
outraged persons who would immediately impose on him an angry sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments
against him, he is under our Constitution presumed innocent as long as the contrary has not been proved. Like
any other person accused of an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the Bill of Rights.
52 | P a g e
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash
the informations for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons. We shall treat it as we would
any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and impartial judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against
several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the
killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to
appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning
of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio
Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the
killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in
Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as
his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August 13, 1993, by
Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases
Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was
forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven
informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr.,
George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the
accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases
might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the
petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon
ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to
respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an
aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds now
raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion.
Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because: 1) he was
denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the
competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not
acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two
persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo
Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we required a Reply from the petitioner within a
non-extendible period of five days.1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The Court may consider his non-
53 | P a g e
compliance an implied admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his petition,
which is a ground for its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural lapse and proceed to
discuss his petition on the basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he was not
accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion,
manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or countermand all these
statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned, We are not going to submit any counter-
affidavit.
ACSP Zuño to Atty. Brion:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit because we

believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all these statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?
3
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come up soon.
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuño, told Atty. Brion that he could
still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuño furnished the petitioner's counsel, this time Atty.
Salvador Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan, and told him he could submit
counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The following exchange ensued:
ACSP Zuño:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of witness Aurelio
Centeno y Roxas and the sworn statement of SPO3 Vivencio Malabanan y
Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission of counter-
affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuño:
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned, this case
is submitted for resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion,
was not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn
to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits dated August
54 | P a g e
15, 1993. Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August
13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire
proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy
Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his representation by this lawyer as
unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed
or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the
evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation 5, so may he waive the
right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
case or constitute a ground for quashing the information.6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused,
order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case
at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her
factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the proceedings conducted by the
Department of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it is the
Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases involving public
officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and
prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we held only two years ago in the case
of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in. respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed
the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended
information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that
such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the Court
held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or omissions on the
part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be
pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of
any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusiveauthority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the
non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any
adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute
the information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the Department of Justice, in connection with
the charge of sedition, 10 and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth
cases,11 may conduct the investigation,
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an
arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.
55 | P a g e
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is
not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an
intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by
PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court declared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and
answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not
illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an
invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the
country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a military
camp, the same can be easily taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be,
but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez was
to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of
arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went
without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are
applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was
pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuño
himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two
state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing
of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that
the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno
and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993,
or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed"
when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be
sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
56 | P a g e
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused
raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted
his person to the jurisdiction of that court.14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a
warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637
for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first
warrant served as the initial justification for his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding
warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him
the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4
of the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not
be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall,
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been arrested by virtue of a
John Doe warrant. In their return, the respondents declared that a new warrant specifically naming her had been
issued, thus validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the Court said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant of arrest
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding the
particular description of the person to be arrested. While the first warrant was unquestionably
void, being a general warrant, release of the petitioner for that reason will be a futile act as it will
be followed by her immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and valid warrant, returning her to
the same prison she will just have left. This Court will not participate in such a meaningless
charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court, 17 more recently in the Umil case. 18
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the
two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as
there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the
highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its
character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an
constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty
which is in the highest degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of
the application of the death penalty by the Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
57 | P a g e
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except
only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal
Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with
the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply
helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl
was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the
other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her
instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against
each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of
Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were
committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the
informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo
Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he
nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient
evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such
discretion. 20
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by
the President of the Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom
the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will justify
judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such
exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.22 Moreover, before resorting to this relief, the
party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case must first avail itself of other
adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion.23
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed against Alqueza and
Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner and his co-accused should also be dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or employees at the
time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it
just the same for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
58 | P a g e
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in

relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under
paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is
not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario,24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our
opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to
be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the
office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for
instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised
Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator. being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as alleged
in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof, not
from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the
crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office
as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can
stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the
crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall
under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a
result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of a senator as their counsel
was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from representing
them because they were accused of an offense committed in relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held
that even if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate
connection between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition
of an offense "committed in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of
murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended
information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not
have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent
Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of
Basilan City. (Emphasis supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape with
homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that
there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an
ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
59 | P a g e
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the facts and the
applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge,
who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed therewith
without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits of the criminal cases being
tried below. These will have to be decided by the respondent judge in accordance with the evidence that is still
being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The Court will
caution against such irrelevant public speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not
officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them with
deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 12
G.R. No. 100455 September 17, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUISITO EROLES Y VERANGA alias "Ka Randy", ALEJANDRO ROMERO alias "Ka Noel", FELICIANO
PATRIARCA alias "Ka Darwin", PEDRO EROLES alias "Ka Rommel", Peter Doe and John Doe, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
Two soldiers were killed in the morning of March 23, 1989, at a restaurant in Quezon Province. 1 Their weapons
were presumably stolen. That same day, Luisito Eroles was picked up by the police for questioning. No other
suspects were apprehended although the crime was reportedly committed by several persons.
On July 31, 1989, an information for robbery with double homicide was filed against Eroles and five other
persons. The information read in full as follows:
The undersigned accuses Luisito Eroles y Veranga alias "Ka Randy", (prisoner), Alejandro
Romero alias "Ka Noel", (at large), Feliciano Patriarca alias "Ka Darwin" (at large), Pedro Eroles
alias "Ka Rommel", (at large), Peter Doe and John Doe, the last two-mentioned accused being
still at large and whose true names are still unknown, of the crime of robbery with double
homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of March, 1989, at Barangay Lapu-lapu,

Poblacion, Municipality of Unisan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
firearms of undetermined caliber, with intent to gain and to rob, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with force and
violence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away one M-14 rifle, valued at P10,000.00; with Serial, No. 860752,
issued to and in the possession of CAA Rogelio Nieva, CAFGU, and a property
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, to its damage and
prejudice in the said amount of P10,000.00; and that on the same occasion and
by reason thereof, the above-named accused, armed with firearms, conspiring
60 | P a g e
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
C2C Fernando Villanueva, PC and CAA Rogelio Nieva, CAFGU, respectively,
which directly caused their death.
Of the six accused, Eroles alone was arraigned because the others remained at large. 2 He pleaded not guilty.
After trial, he was convicted by Judge Ludovico C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City in a decision
rendered on May 27, 1991.3 Eroles was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Villanueva civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00.
The trial court found, on the basis principally of the testimonies of Pat. Danilo Medina and C1C Geronimo
Carreon, that the accused, in the company of the other accused, shot and killed C2C Fernando Villanueva and
thereafter took the victims' weapon and fled. It discounted his alibi as an inherently weak defense, which
additionally, he had failed to sustain.
In this appeal, Eroles faults his conviction on the grounds that the testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses are
contradictory and inherently incredible. He claims that the robbery was not established. Moreover, the
prosecution should rely on its own strength and not on the weakness of the defense.
It is necessary first to correct the designation in the information of the offense as "Robbery with Double
Homicide." As we have emphasized, in two recent cases:
. . . it is the nature of the crime of robbery with homicide that the homicides, irrespective of their
number, committed on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery, are merged in the
composite crime of "robbery with homicide." It is error, therefore, to treat the death of the victims
as "double or multiple homicide," for in this special complex crime, the number of persons killed
is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.4
xxx xxx xxx
The designation of the crime an robbery with multiple homicide is incorrect. Assuming that a
complex crime was committed, it should be categorized as robbery with homicide regardless of
the number of persons killed by reason or on occasion of the robbery. 5
It must also be pointed out that the crime of robbery with homicide is a crime against property. 6 The principal
offense is robbery, not homicide. Hence, it must be shown that the homicide was committed on the occasion of
or in connection with the robbery as originally planned, and not independently thereof. This cannot be
presumed. Unless the robbery itself is established, the crime committed is simple homicide or murder as the
case may be.7
The fact of the killing of Rogelio Nieva and Fernando Villanueva is not disputed. The autopsy reports showed
that the former died of two gunshot wounds and the latter of four as a result of the attack against them at the
restaurant.8What is in issue is the identity of the killer or killers. More to the point, was it Eroles who killed them?
The decision of the trial court seems to have found Eroles guilty of killing only Villanueva because it decreed the
payment of indemnity only to his heirs. No similar indemnity was ordered for the heirs of Nieva.
In finding that Eroles was the killer of Villanueva, the trial court obviously relied on the testimony of Carreon,
who said that when they heard the gunshots coming from the restaurant, he and Medina immediately proceeded
thereto.9 There they came upon Eroles firing at Villanueva and thereafter taking the victim's rifle before
fleeing. 10
The trial court apparently disregarded the testimony of the other supposed eyewitness, Medina. Medina testified
that when they arrived at the scene of the crime, Villanueva was already lying dead outside the restaurant and
Nieva had also succumbed inside. 11 He said it was at Carreon that Eroles fired two shots. 12
The appellee dismisses this inconsistency as a minor discrepancy, but the Court does not think so. It goes to
the very issue of who shot and killed Villanueva and must therefore be carefully considered in assessing the
criminal responsibility of the accused. Where two alleged eyewitnesses contradict themselves on such a vital
question, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be disregarded. Significantly, both Carreon
and Medina were prosecution witnesses.
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The other crime allegedly committed by Eroles was robbery. The allegation was that the accused stole and
carried away an M-14 rifle "with Serial No. 860752 issued to and in the possession of CAA Rogelio Nieva" at the
time he was killed. This too must be proved with clear and convincing evidence.
The memorandum receipt signed by Nieva proves only that he had been issued the rifle described
therein. 13 The fact that the soldiers were killed does not raise the presumption that a robbery was also
committed. The circumstance that they were soldiers does not raise the presumption that they were carrying
firearms at the time of the attack. Even if it did and a robbery could also be presumed, there is no proof that it
was Eroles who robbed them of the gun mentioned in the information.
Carreon testified that he saw Elores fire at Villanueva and thereafter take his victim's gun before fleeing. Medina
said nothing of the sort. His statement was that Villanueva and Nieva were already dead when they arrived at
the restaurant and the supposed assailants were already fleeing.
The trial court itself seemed confused about the firearm that was taken. The decision said that Eroles got
Villanueva's M-14 rifle and, later in the same paragraph, noted that Nieva's M-14 was also missing. It added that
the rifle taken by Eroles was covered by a memorandum receipt signed on March 15, 1989, by Nieva (not
Villanueva). So whose rifle was stolen by Eroles? If anything is clear about these findings, it is that the object of
the robbery is uncertain. That uncertainty casts doubt on the evidence of the prosecution that a robbery was
committed with the killings.
It would have been the better strategy for the prosecution to present the testimony of Celestina Capuno, the
owner of the restaurant who had earlier signed a sworn statement regarding the incident in question. 14 She was
the best eyewitness because she was in the restaurant even before Carreon and Medina arrived. She could
have testified on how Nieva and Villanueva were killed, and by whom, and whether any robbery occurred at all.
For some reason, however, she did not testify for the prosecution.
The Court agrees that the appellant's alibi is not worthy of credence. His testimony that he traveled through
several barangays to be at Barangay Kabulihan, to attend a burial, 15 is not believable. He never went to an
interment although there was indeed one in the said barangay on March 23, 1989. 16 Moreover, he did not
establish that from Barangay Kabulihan he could not have possibly gone to Barangay Lapulapu and be there at
the time the two soldiers were killed.
But despite all these improbabilities, the weakness of Eroles's alibi is not enough to overcome the presumption
of innocence in his favor. The evidence of the prosecution is simply too flimsy to show that it was Eroles who
shot Villanueva to death and stole the gun he was carrying. The two alleged eyewitnesses, both testifying for
the prosecution, contradicted themselves on the actual killing of Villanueva. There is also no convincing proof of
the firearm that was stolen or, indeed, that a firearm had been stolen at all.
The defense is weak, to be sure, but the prosecution is even weaker. It cannot sustain the appellant's conviction
against the presumption of his innocence as decreed by no lees than the Constitution itself.
The Court notes the defense suggestion that when the police team organized to pursue the killers "chanced
upon" Eroles, they arrested him because of his supposed NPA connections. He was a convenient "fall guy" they
could easily frame. True or not, these observations jibe with the significant fact that Eroles had not sought to
hide or flee after the commission of the crime. He alone of the six persons who allegedly attacked the two
soldiers did not go into hiding. He alone did not elude trial and conviction.
The Court is not convinced to the point of moral certainty that Luisito Eroles is the person who killed Villanueva
(and much less Nieva) and that a robbery was committed on the occasion or by reason of such killing. As there
is not enough evidence to support the conclusion that he is guilty of the crime charged, he is entitled to be
exonerated on the ground of reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City in Criminal Case No. 89-600 is
REVERSED, and appellant Luisito Eroles is hereby ACQUITTED, with no pronouncement as to costs. He is
ordered released immediately.
SO ORDERED.
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CASE NO. 13
G.R. No. 116945 February 9, 1996
ROMULO DELA ROSA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN MAGTOTO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Does the dismissal of a criminal action for violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial constitute a bar to
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense? May the offended party, on his own and independently of the
Solicitor General, appeal a trial court's order dismissing a criminal case? These are the main issues resolved in
this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals2promulgated on August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31665 which reversed the Orders dated
November 17, 1992 and May 24, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54 3 in Criminal Cases Nos.
91-99715 to 91-99723.
Private respondent filed his Comment on November 14, 1994 while petitioner sent his Reply on November 29,
1994. By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division transferred this case to the Third. After due
deliberation and consultation on the foregoing submissions, the Court tasked the undersigned ponente with the
writing of this Decision.
The Facts
The facts are not disputed.
On October 22, 1991, nine (9) separate informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 91-99715 to 91-99723) were filed
against petitioner, charging the latter with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 54, upon complaint of private respondent.
At the scheduled arraignment set on May 18, 1992, petitioner failed to appear, prompting the trial court to issue
a warrant for his arrest. The next day, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order of arrest and for the continuance
of his bail bond, stating that his failure to appear was due to illness. The motion was granted by the trial court.
During the arraignment on June 10, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. The trial
court set hearings on the following dates: August 4, 10, 18, 25 and September 2, 9, 16, 23, 1992.
The hearings set for August 4, 10, and 18, 1992 were all cancelled at the instance of petitioner, who claimed
that he had not yet secured the services of his counsel de parte.
On August 25, 1992, private respondent presented his first witness, Romy Antonio of the Philippine Bank of
Communications. On motion of petitioner, the cross-examination of the said witness was deferred to September
2, 1992.
The trials scheduled on September 2 and 9, 1993 were likewise cancelled upon written motion of petitioner, who
claimed that his counsel had prior commitments.
On September 10, 1992, private respondent moved for the postponement of the trial set for September 16,
1992, on the ground that Antonio was not available due to work-related matters. The trial court granted the
motion without any objection from petitioner.
The cross-examination of witness Antonio was completed on September 23, 1992. Two additional trial dates
(October 21 and November 17, 1992) were set by the trial court.
63 | P a g e
On October 19, 1992, private respondent moved for the postponement of the hearing set for October 21, 1992
due to a previous out-of-town commitment. The same was granted by the trial court without any objections from
petitioner.
On November 17, 1992, counsel for private respondent, in open court, moved for the postponement of the trial
set on that date on the ground that private respondent had doubts "as to his inability to bring out the details of
the transaction" (Records, p. 73). Petitioner objected to the postponement and invoked his constitutional right to
a speedy trial. Consequently, the trial court dismissed all the nine cases against petitioner in its questioned
order dated November 17, 1992, on the following grounds4 :
Considering that according to the private prosecutor and without objection or qualification on the part of
the public prosecutor, the prosecution is not ready to present the complainant who is the second and
maybe the last witness for the prosecution, on the ground that the private complainant is having serious
doubts as to the details of the cases and is not ready to testify; considering the manifestation of counsel
for the accused invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial; considering that the cases had
been filed before this Court on October 22, 1991 or more than a year ago and during this period the
complainant should have taken steps to gather all details and refresh his memory as to all other matters
pertaining to these cases, considering that as stated by the private prosecutor himself that the cases
involve a large amount, and the complainant is not here today; the motion of counsel for the accused is
hereby granted, (and) all these cases are dismissed. . . .
Private respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on May 24, 1993.
Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a Decision setting aside the
two orders of the trial court and reinstating the cases5 , as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 17, 1992 and May
24, 1993 of the RTC-Manila, Branch 54, are SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 91-99715 to 91-99723
are REINSTATED and DEMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings.
Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed this special civil action.
The Issues: Speedy Trial and Double Jeopardy
Petitioner contends that since. the dismissal of the cases against him by the trial court was based on his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, the reinstatement and remand of the same would place him in double
jeopardy.
In Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan6 , we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the delay, are considered.
Records show that the delay in the trial of the case was mainly due to petitioner's fault. As found by the
respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
. . . . His arraignment set for May 18, 1992 was canceled due to his non-appearance. From the time he
was arraigned on June 10, 1992, to the first trial date on August 4, 1992, he failed to secure the
services of a lawyer, which led to the postponement of the hearing scheduled for that day and the trials
set for August 10 and 18, 1992. It is unusual for private respondent dela Rosa to fail to have a lawyer on
the trial dates set by the lower court. He had enough time to secure the services of a counsel de parte,
or counsel of his choice to represent him. If indeed private respondent dela Rosa was wary of his right
to a speedy trial, he should not have moved for the postponement of the scheduled trials on September
2 and 9, 1992, and objected to the cancellation of the trials set for September 16 and October 21, 1992.
....
64 | P a g e
Indeed, the several postponements sought and obtained by petitioner, in effect, amounted to a waiver or
abandonment of his right to a speedy trial7 . Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him.8
On the other hand, private respondent's reasons for the postponement of the trials set on September 16, 1992,
October 21, 1992 and November 17, 1992 cannot be said to be vexatious, capricious and oppressive as to
result in the denial of petitioner's right to a speedy trial.
In asking for the postponement of the trial set on November 17, 1992, private respondent reasoned out that ". . .
there are details which we feel are important for our case, and there are numerous transactions here involving
the accused and the private complainant (herein private respondent). We wish to ask for a postponement to
give our witness more time to refresh his memory, . . . "9 . It will be noted that the amount involved in these nine
criminal cases amounted to more or less P13 million. The postponement of this trial date would not in any way
have prejudiced the accused considering that accused himself as stated earlier is guilty of delay. The more
prudent thing would have been for the trial court to reset the case to another date to give the prosecution
another opportunity to present its case 10 . The trial court's dismissal of the case on the ground that the petitioner
is entitled to a speedy trial is capricious and unwarranted under the circumstances obtaining in this case.
Neither does double jeopardy apply in the instant case. The requisites that must occur for legal jeopardy to
attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused 11 . The fourth requisite is lacking. The dismissal of the cases was
upon the motion of petitioner as shown by the following:
COURT: You insist (sic) the right to speedy trial.
ATTY. LOPEZ: Yes, I do insist.
COURT: So make a (sic) oral motion.
ATTY. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor.
Your Honor please, in todays (sic) hearing, the complainant (sic) is not around and he is
scheduled to testify, Your Honor. The accused is present, Your Honor, together with his counsel
and we are ready for trial, but, Your Honor, in as much as the private prosecutor is not ready,
on the ground that his client, who is the private complainant, has problems or have (sic) doubt
about the details of this case before, Your Honor, then, we respectfully plea (sic) that the case
be dismissed, invoking the constitutional right of the accused for speedy and an
expensive (sic) public trial, Your Honor. 12 (Emphasis supplied).
Solicitor General's Intervention

Not Necessary
Petitioner further alleges that private respondent as a private offended party in a criminal case cannot file a
special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal without the intervention of
the Solicitor General.
In the case of People vs. Santiago 13 , this Court said:
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent
the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such
appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In
such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
65 | P a g e
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in (the) name of said complainant. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court was therefore proper since it was
brought in his own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. That the said proceedings benefited
the People is not a reversible error. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of discretion. There being no violation
of the double jeopardy doctrine, the prosecution of the case may still resume in the trial court, as decided by the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated August
31, 1994 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
66 | P a g e

Aly's: Case No. 1

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Aly’s Criminal Cases JD-2A

RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The petition is without merit.

1 #1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5 grams

1 #2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams

1 #1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills 14 kt. 4.1 grams

1 #1301 1 set creolla 2 colors w/brills 20.8 grams

1 #393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. 14 grams

1 #1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt. (oval) 14.6 grams

1 #2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 8.8 grams

1 #206 1 set double sampaloc creolla 14 kt. 14.2 grams

1 # 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6 grams

1 # 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 kt. 2.0 grams

1 #2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 4.5 grams

1 #1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. 12.6 grams

1 #1851 1 pc. lady's ring w/ brills 14 kt. 7.8 grams

1 # 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 grams

1 #1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 kt. 4.1 grams

GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO

The Factual Antecedents

The respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.

The Ruling of the City Prosecutor

The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice

The Ruling of the CA

The CA granted both petitions questioning the Secretary of Justices resolutions.

Tans motion for reconsideration was denied.

The Present Petitions

This Courts Ruling

(Underscoring supplied, emphasis in the original)

Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.

G.R. No. 179003

pesos shall be imposed upon:cralawlibrary

(1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document;

(2) that it was made on a genuine document;

(1) that the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public;

(2) that he takes advantage of his official position;

G.R. No. 195816

WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:cralawlibrary

GR No. 199042, Nov 17, 2014 ]

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

RULING OF THE RTC

The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:

On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S

We find the instant appeal meritorious.

Accused-appellant is estopped from

The warrantless search conducted is

The evidence obtained is not admissible.

*Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

The undersigned accuses VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES of the crime of Acts of

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES is hereby found

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of any merit.

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;]

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.17

₱15,000.00, as well as the award of civil indemnity from ₱50,000.00 to ₱20,000.00.

G.R. No. 88232. February 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, in his capacity as

Marallag & Marallag for Alma Aggabao.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for Private Respondents.

4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; CONCUBINE SHOULD BE TRIED WITH