THE POST OFFICE GROUP LITIGATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) Appeal No. A1/2019/1387

ON APPEAL FROM
THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION

B E T W E E N:-
ALAN BATES & OTHERS
Claimants / Respondents
– and –

POST OFFICE LIMITED

Defendant / Applicant

RESPONDENTS’ STATEMENT OF OBJECTION

The Post Office’s Skeleton Argument is referred to as “PO Skeleton” and Judgment No.3 as
“the Judgment”, with paragraphs as “J§”. References to the bundle are [Vol/Tab/Page].

Contents

A. OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................................... 1

B. GROUNDS OF APPEAL................................................................................................. 3
B.1 Issue (1): ‘Relational Contract’ and implied duty of good faith ........................... 3
B.2 Issue (2): Implied terms ........................................................................................ 4
B.3 Issue (3): Discretions and powers subject to implied requirements ..................... 6
B.4 Issue (16): Termination on notice ......................................................................... 6
B.5 Issue (15): Termination for breach under the NTC .............................................. 6
B.6 Issues (17) & (18): “True agreement” on termination .......................................... 7
B.7 Issue (14): Suspension of SPMs under express terms .......................................... 7
B.8 Issues (5) & (6): Onerous and unusual terms ....................................................... 7
B.9 Issues (7), (19) & (20): UCTA ............................................................................. 8
B.10 Issues (12) & (13): SPMs as agents and the Branch Trading Statement ............. 9
B.11 Issue (13): Burden of proof .................................................................................. 9
B.12 Issue (8): Liability for alleged losses .................................................................. 10

C. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 10

Date: 12 July 2019

Respondents’ Statement of Objection OVERVIEW

A. OVERVIEW

1. The Post Office (“PO”) applies for permission to appeal against the Order of Mr Justice
Fraser dated 15 March 2019 (the “Order”) [CB/5], made following Judgment No. 3 [CB/6].
The Respondents respectfully submit that the proposed appeal has no realistic prospects of
success under CPR r.52.6(1)(a)); there is no other compelling reason why it should be heard
under CPR r.52.6(1)(b)). The Respondents therefore invite this Court to refuse permission.

2. PO’s Amended Grounds of Appeal still overlap with points rejected by this Court in PO’s
previous recusal application. They challenge the decision on 16 of the 23 Common Issues,
on 26 Grounds, without regard to the actual basis, in law and fact, of the points appealed.
Furthermore, PO overreaches in its criticisms of the Judge and overstates the wider
significance of the Judgment, given on the particular facts and contracts in issue.

3. First, the Judgment does not contain “a number of novel and wide-reaching propositions of
law”, as PO contends at PO Skeleton, §3 [CB/3/20]. Rather, the Judge applied orthodox
principles of law, on a careful review of the authorities and made (at the lowest) plainly
available findings as to the nature of the relationship, on these particular contracts.

4. The correct application of the law, on particular facts, is not vitiated by diverging from the
general view of the editors of Chitty on Contracts, to which the Judge in any event had
regard; he explained, respectfully, where its summary of the law is incorrect: J§706 to §711
[CB/6/360-362]. This affords no ground of appeal.

5. Second, for the most part, the proposed appeal seeks to re-litigate the same arguments made
by PO at trial – effectively by way of a re-hearing, despite the fact that the Judge cannot
realistically be said to have fallen into error. This does not afford a ground of appeal either.

6. Third, as to PO again seeking to put a gloss upon aspects of the Judgment, so as to suggest
legally novel findings and far-reaching consequences, the Judge said that this “…leads to a
great concern that the majority of the claims by the Post Office of what Judgment No. 3
does, and does not, find or hold are taken either wholly out of context, mis-stated, or
otherwise not correctly summarised”: Form N460 Reasons, §8 [CB/7/479.3].

7. Contrary to what PO submits or implies in its Skeleton, at §4(a) to (k) [CB/3/20-22]:-

a. Automatic implication: The Judge did not fall into error (as PO contends) by holding
that “any commercial contract classified as ‘relational’ automatically includes a broad
implied good faith term”: he identified the nature of the relationship, which justified
both the implication of a good faith term and his conclusion that the contracts are

1
Respondents’ Statement of Objection OVERVIEW

relational. By confining relational contracts to those with such an implied term, he

reached a correct conclusion – a clearer and more helpful one – disavowing any general
duty of good faith in commercial contracts: esp. J§721 and J§727 [CB/6/365-367].

b. Duration and agency: The Judge did not disregard the objective intention as to the
duration of the contract. He did not find that a commercial contract may be ‘relational’
“even if it provides, in detail, for an agent-principal relationship”. In fact, he identified
that the agency appointment was confined to a single clause (and it made no such
detailed provision), as PO recognised in its submissions: J§791 to J§793 [CB/6/380].

c. 17 separate terms: The Judge did not primarily find that “17 separate implied terms”
were indeed separate implied terms of these contracts (Grounds of Appeal, §3
[CB/2/12]). His primary finding was that they were incidents of the implied obligation
of good faith in these relational contracts: J§743 to §746 [CB/6/370-371].

d. Termination: The Judge did not find that a clause providing that a relational contract
may be determined on “…not less than three months’ notice” did not create a right to
terminate on three months’ notice. He correctly construed the term to require a minimum
of 3 months’ notice: J§893 [CB/6/398]. The implied duty obliges PO to consider the
appropriate period in good faith: J§894 to §895 [CB/6/398]. That finding was made as
to the proper construction of the SPMC and NTC, not all ‘relational’ contracts.

e. True agreement: The Judge was correct that the approach in Autoclenz could apply
to the contracts in issue. If anything, he construed that approach narrowly. It is
uncontroversial that “the express terms of the contract” will not prevent the Court from
identifying the “true agreement” between the parties. But this was not determinative.

f. Suspension: This point is hostage to PO’s approach to the implication of the good faith
term. Furthermore, implied qualifications on rights to suspend are entirely orthodox.

g. Material breach: The Judge had to construe ‘material’ breach to discern its meaning
within these contracts and he correctly identified his proper foundation for doing so, in
the cases identified in Lewison. He construed it correctly, in these contracts.

h. UCTA (not employment): The Judge was right to distinguish the situation in
Commerzbank, as he did at J§1075. UCTA applies to contracts with third parties, not
employees and it is PO that insists that SPMs are in business on their own account.

i. UCTA (reasonable expectations): The Judge did not find as PO contends, that the
requirement in section 3 UCTA for a contract to entitle one party to render contractual
performance substantially different “…includes any case in which the provisions in

2
Respondents’ Statement of Objection GROUNDS OF APPEAL

question have a substantial effect on that party’s performance (without any reference
needing to be made to reasonable expectations)”. He expressly directed himself as to
the latter requirement at J§1077 to §1080 [CB/6/447-449].

j. UCTA (performance): The Judge did not find that a party is “performing” his/her
contractual obligations if he/she terminates the contract or suspends performance.
Rather, applying Paragon Finance v. Nash [AB/9], he found that the suspension and
termination clauses had “…an effect (indeed a substantial effect) on the contractual
performance reasonably expected”: J§1084 [CB/6/449-450]. He found remunerating
SPMs to be the performance reasonably expected of PO: J§1082 [CB/6/449]. That
obligation was the primary consideration from PO’s side. The contrary cannot sensibly
be argued.

k. Agency: The Judge did not find that “[e]xpress appointment of an agent does not import
common law agency principles into the relationship”: he correctly applied trite
principles (e.g. declaration of agency not conclusive) and made his findings about this
particular relationship: PO Skeleton, §4(k) [CB/3/22], c.f. J§799ff [CB/6/382].

8. In the light of the foregoing, a fair, accurate and complete understanding of the Judge’s
findings of fact and law, and the process of reasoning by which he reached his conclusions
on the Common Issues, does not support the plea for permission made by PO.

B. GROUNDS OF APPEAL

B.1 Issue (1): ‘Relational Contract’ and implied duty of good faith

9. The Judge did not fall into error in implying a duty of good faith, fair dealing, transparency,
cooperation, and trust and confidence (PO Skeleton, §4(a) [CB/3/21]). Rather:-

a. He accepted, as the authorities show, that there is no general duty of good faith in all
commercial contracts, but that “…such a duty could be implied into some contracts
where in accordance with the presumed intention of the parties”: J§721 [CB/6/365]

b. His finding that the SPMC and NTC are relational contracts was dependent on: (i) the
factual context: J§728, §729 to §734 and §737 [CB/6/367-369] and (ii) the terms of
these contracts: J§721 [CB/6/365]. There was no inconsistency with Globe Motors1 or
other orthodox principles.

1
Globe Motors v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering [2016] 1 CLC 712, per Beatson LJ
at paras 67-68 [AB/42/20-21]; PO Skeleton, at §11 [CB/3/24]

3
Respondents’ Statement of Objection GROUNDS OF APPEAL

c. The extravagant submission that this finding will undermine contractual certainty has
no foundation. The Court stated that it was of no wider application and was made with
regard to the “very specific characteristics” that were necessary: J§727 [CB/6/367].

10. It was not an error of law to classify the NTC and SPMC as ‘relational’: PO Skeleton, §4(b)
[CB/3/21]. As the Judge rightly directed himself, the question is “heavily dependent” upon
context and terms of the contract, which must be long-term: J§725(2) [CB/6/366]. This is
far from apparent from PO’s criticisms of the Judge.

11. PO is wrong to suggest that the absence of notice provisions is a requirement for
classification as a ‘relational contract’: J§732 [CB/6/368]). As at trial, PO again wrongly
conflates the expected term of the relationship with the express termination provisions.

12. The Judge ascertained only relevant factors: J§721, §728 [CB/6/365-8].

13. The re-heated submission that a good faith term could not be implied given other “powerful
implied terms” (PO Skeleton, §25 [CB/3/28]) was rightly rejected as a technical pleading
point (if a point at all). The Judge addressed those terms: J§740 to §741 [CB/6/370].

14. The suggestion that a duty of good faith, fair dealing, transparency, cooperation, and trust
and confidence requires only honesty was rejected as inconsistent with the authorities: J§705
to §710 [CB/6/358-362]; c.f. re Chitty, J§711 [CB/6/362].

15. The Judge did not imply a “broad and onerous” term. Rather, he found it required the parties
to “refrain from conduct which in the relevant context would be regarded as commercially
unacceptable by reasonable and honest people”, recognised as not a demanding standard.
His approach was properly founded in the authorities: J§706 [CB/6/360-361].

B.2 Issue (2): Implied terms

16. PO’s pleaded case was that the SPM contracts were subject to two broad implied terms: the
Stirling v Maitland and ‘Necessary Cooperation’ terms: GDCC, at §105 [CB/12/654], and
see GReply §58 (esp. §58.5) [CB/13/715].

17. Both parties admitted that the express terms failed to specify all the necessary terms between
the parties – the parties crossing that Rubicon together – and it was therefore necessary to
imply terms. PO’s admitted implied terms were themselves wide-ranging. However, they
were also extremely high level and unhelpful (without more precision) for the purpose of
determining the Group Litigation before the Court. PO repeatedly refused to clarify the
incidents of its admitted terms: Respondents’ Opening Submissions at §177 to §196 (not
included in appeal bundles lodged by PO).

4
Respondents’ Statement of Objection GROUNDS OF APPEAL

18. The dispute was not therefore whether the Court should imply terms at all, only whether the
terms to be implied were limited to the general terms admitted by PO, or other/more specific
terms or incidents of the same. The Judge did not find PO’s generalised terms to be implied.
Despite this, PO still contends that the Court should only have found its generalised admitted
implied terms to have been terms of the contracts and nothing more.

19. Before the Judge, PO refused to be drawn on the incidents of its general implied terms, as
noted above. Despite this, PO now positively avers such incidents on appeal: those at PO
Skeleton at §69 and §54 (c) go distinctly beyond its case below, that at §47(a) was not argued
at all, and that at §110 was postulated, but was not PO’s positive case (PO Closing, §343).

20. PO’s approach is in any event at odds with the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Ukraine
v LDTC [2018] EWCA Civ 2026, per Gloster LJ at §207 (from which permission to appeal
has been refused), to which PO does not refer. Although in various contexts different courts
are willing to imply a duty of cooperation or term prohibiting one party from preventing the
performance of another, there is in fact no general rule that such term will be implied. PO
likewise ignores its own case that the requirement of necessity was met otherwise than by
its (far more) generalised terms.

21. Ultimately, all roads led to Rome: the Judge reached his view both by his analysis of
relational contracts and on previous free-standing contractual orthodoxy.2 There is no error.

22. Incidents: PO’s case as to the incidents of the implied good faith term is without merit:

a. it wrongly conflates the Judge’s assessment of what were incidents of that term with the
approach to implying further terms on the ground of necessity: this is circular, illogical
and at odds with the agreed purposes of the trial;

b. contrary to PO’s case, the Judge considered each separately: J§743 [CB/6/743]); and

c. the Judge was not limited to finding only incidents that required a “guilty mental state
and/or guilty knowledge” (PO Skeleton, §40 [CB/3/32]): they are incidents, examples
or consequences of the operation of an implied duty of good faith, fair dealing,
transparency, cooperation, and trust and confidence: J§700 and §743 [CB/6/357] and
[CB/6/370].

23. Necessity: For the same reasons and more, PO’s appeal on the seven further incidents of the
good faith term also found to be implied on the grounds of necessity is also without merit:

2
J§693 [CB/6/355], §743 [CB/6/370] and §770 [CB/6/376]

5
Respondents’ Statement of Objection GROUNDS OF APPEAL

a. these cannot be fairly described as ‘absolute and unlimited’ obligations: each is specific
and was found necessary to give business efficacy to the contracts on the proper judicial
assessment as to their terms and business context;

b. the Judge correctly applied the requirements set out in Marks & Spencer;

c. it is hopeless for PO to contend that it was not open to the Court to find it was necessary
to imply these terms, despite PO admitting the necessity to imply far more generalised
terms governing their subject matter; and

d. in effect, PO’s appeal wrongly seeks a re-hearing before this Court, on points it lost.

B.3 Issue (3): Discretions and powers subject to implied requirements

24. PO’s approach is artificial and without merit. The duty of good faith term prescribes how
discretions and powers were to be exercised – as do many well long-established implied
terms. The duty prevents discretions being exercised otherwise than in good faith.

25. PO’s appeal on this point is, in substance, hopeless given the well-established principle that
in the absence of very clear language to the contrary, a contractual discretion must be
exercised in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously (BT v Telefonica O2 UK [2014]
Bus LR 765, per Lord Sumption at §37 [AB/33/17]).

B.4 Issue (16): Termination on notice

26. As above, the Judge found the termination provisions to require a minimum of three months’
notice. That was correct. It was open to the Court to give effect to the express words “not
less than” as requiring consideration of the appropriate period of notice: J§894 [CB/6/398].

27. PO’s preference for an alternative construction is not proper foundation for an appeal to this
Court. The meaning of other termination clauses in different contracts and commercial
contexts do not vitiate the Judge’s decision. Ilkerler Otomotiv is not authority for a general
“rule” of the kind suggested: different implied terms pleaded in that case were found to be
inconsistent with the contract: Ilkerler, at §27 and §30 [AB/45/6].

28. That the NTC conferred a right to SPMs takes the challenge made to the finding that the
right was to be exercised in accordance with good faith nowhere.

B.5 Issue (15): Termination for breach under the NTC

29. The finding that NTC Part 2, paras 16.2.1 and 16.2.2 permit termination for repudiatory
breach (PO Skeleton, §88 [CB/3/45]) was made on orthodox principles and with regard to

6
Respondents’ Statement of Objection GROUNDS OF APPEAL

the prescribed contractual list of breaches, which in the case of “material” breaches the
Court correctly held would not include minor ones: J§907 [CB/6/401].

30. PO’s Grounds do not identify an error of law, and Fortman Holdings Ltd. v Modem
Holdings [2001] EWCA Civ 1235, on the meaning of “material” in a different clause,
contract and commercial context does not assist: see Fortman at §21 [AB/7/7]. A fairer
view is in the passage in Lewison to which the Judge refers.

B.6 Issues (17) & (18): “True agreement” on termination

31. PO’s criticisms of the Judge’s observations (J§925 [CB/6/405-406]) are misplaced (see
§7(e) above). Common Issues (17) and (18) did not arise, and the Judge’s determination is
only material if he was wrong on anterior points: J§926 [CB/6/406]; J§1122(17) and (18)
[CB/6/460].

B.7 Issue (14): Suspension of SPMs under express terms

32. The question posed was “in what circumstances and/or on what basis was Post Office
entitled to suspend” SPMs under provisions that contained stipulated grounds. The Judge
took into account PO’s need to preserve its cash and stock and the integrity of its business:
J§871 [CB/6/394]. His finding that the NTC and SPMC terms were subject to a common
requirement that they be exercised for PO’s legitimate interests, was made in the context of
the contracts as a whole, on the alternative basis of necessary implication, or as an implied
restriction on a contractual discretion: J§873 to §874 [CB/6/395]

33. PO has no realistic prospect of challenging this as an ‘error of law’. Mid Essex Hospital
Services NHS Trust v. Compass Group [2013] EWCA Civ 200 [AB/28] is not authority for
the general proposition contended for by PO: it did not concern powers to suspend, but
implication of a term to prevent arbitrary exercise of a power to award service failure points
where the basis for doing so was contractually prescribed.

34. PO says regard was to be had to PO’s interests ‘alone’. That it still favours this alternative
construction is not a ground upon which to appeal.

B.8 Issues (5) & (6): Onerous and unusual terms

35. The Judge correctly directed himself that a clause may not be incorporated into a contract if
the written term is of an unusual and stringent, or particularly onerous, nature, unless it has
fairly been brought to that person's attention: J§960 to §979 [CB/6/418-424].

36. No error of law was made in applying that principle, still less was it “obviously wrong”:

7
Respondents’ Statement of Objection GROUNDS OF APPEAL

a. NTC Part 22, paras. 4.1, 13.1 purport to impose full liability upon SPMs for unlimited
losses for matters that might be entirely out of their control, regardless of any fault
whatsoever. It is hopeless to suggest that the Judge erred in finding this to be onerous
and unusual in this contract and commercial context.

b. The finding that powers to withhold payment and require branch access during
suspension (SPMC Section 19, clauses 5 and 6 [CB/33/1627], NTC Part 2, paras. 15.2
and 15.3 [CB/34/1676]) were onerous and unusual is criticised on the basis of purported
errors in the Court’s discussion of the issue. None of these, even if correct, is an error
of principle, still less grounds to suggest the decision was obviously wrong.

c. The Judge’s reasoning that the NTC summary termination clause (NTC Part 2, par. 16.2
[CB/34/1676]) would be onerous and unusual were it not to be construed as requiring
material breach was open to him, and correct.

d. It was also open to the Judge to find that an unlimited right to terminate on three months’
notice in the SPMC (SPMC Section 1, Clause 10 [CB/33/1545]) would be onerous and
unusual. PO’s speculation as to how promptly it was likely to be used is irrelevant.

e. There is no basis to impugn the finding made that the clauses denying compensation in
the event of suspension or termination were onerous and unusual as contrary to
principle, still less ‘obviously wrong’. PO’s favoured construction adds nothing.

f. That PO contends that the Judge ought to have found, on the facts, that such terms would
have been incorporated by conduct in Mr Bates’ case is not a ground of appeal. It was
open to him not to on the facts, and obviously so.

B.9 Issues (7), (19) & (20): UCTA

37. It was open to the Judge to find that the SPMC and NTC are PO’s written standard terms of
business – not least because they obviously were − given (i) PO’s insistence that these are
business to business contracts and its business includes running a large number of branches;
and (ii) the nature of its business model and its statutory obligation to maintain a network of
such branches: PO Skeleton, §125(a) and (b) [CB/3/56]. The employment cases ironically
relied upon by PO were rightly distinguished: J§1072 to §1074 [CB/6/445-446].

38. The Judge did not disregard that s.3(2)(b) UCTA refers to claims by a party to be entitled,
by reference to a contract term, to render performance substantially different from that
reasonably expected of him, nor how each relevant clause would entitle PO to do so with
respect to its own performance: J§1082-4 [CB/6/449]. The assessment of reasonableness is
fact-sensitive and the proposed appeal against that assessment is without merit.

8
Respondents’ Statement of Objection GROUNDS OF APPEAL

B.10 Issues (12) & (13): SPMs as agents and the Branch Trading Statement

39. The Judge correctly applied the law in determining the extent and effect of the agency of
SPMs to PO. In particular: (i) on the highest authority, later (i.e. post-contractual) words
and conduct may have a bearing on the extent and content of the agency (PO Skeleton, §145
[CB/3/62]);3 (ii) the Judge rightly directed himself that the label of ‘agency’ is not itself
determinative;4 (iii) the Judge applied uncontroversial principles as to an agent’s duty to
account and settled account (Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency: J§790 [CB/6/379-380]).

40. PO overstates the effect of the passage in Chitty (PO Skeleton, §146 and 148 [CB/3/62-63]):
the latter part of the full passage makes clear that grant of authority is conceptually distinct
from the contract: J§796 [CB/6/381]. The Judge identified the correct limits to the grant of
authority to SPMs and their duties: J§797 to §818 [CB/6/381-385].

41. PO is wrong to say that contractual requirements as to how (purported) accounts were to be
submitted “does not modify the usual common law consequences” and the distinction drawn,
between method and consequences, is artificial and wrong: PO Skeleton, §148 [CB/4/63].

42. As explained at J§806 to §810 [CB/6/382-383] and J§816 to §817 [CB/6/385]: (i) the
contractual requirement to submit a Branch Trading Statement (“BTS”), by design, forced
SPMs to “accept” an ‘account’ (as PO conceded at trial: J§432 [CB/6/278]); (ii) there was
no mechanism for disputing items on Horizon, so the ‘account’ might include disputed items
and the BTS could not be regarded as an agreed or settled ‘account’ rendered by the agent.

43. Finally, the Judge did not hold that the principle of making presumptions of fact against an
agent who deliberately rendered a false account should be “disapplied” when items in the
BTS were disputed: Grounds of Appeal, §24 [CB/2/17]. The principle did not arise, given
the above: J§819 to §820 [CB/3/385-386] and §827 to §828 [CB/3/387].

B.11 Issue (13): Burden of proof

44. PO Skeleton at §154 [CB/3/65] misstates the decision: the Court held that SPMs did not
bear the burden of proving that a BTS account they submitted to PO was incorrect: J§853
[CB/6/392] (on the agreed wording of Common Issue (13)). This followed from the finding
that the BTS was not a settled or agreed account, above: J§815 to §819 [CB/6/385-386].

3
Garnac Grain Company v HMF Faure & Fairclough [1968] AC 1130, 1137 [AB/1]
J§787 [CB/6/379]; Form N460 Reasons, §31 to 32 [CB/7/479.8]
4
J§786 [CB/6/379] citing Acer Investment Management Ltd v Mansion Group Ltd
[2014] EWHC 3011 [AB/31]; Form N460 Reasons, §31 [CB/7/479.8].

9
Respondents’ Statement of Objection CONCLUSION

The new gloss as to how and when shortfalls ‘typically’ become apparent does not assist
and the appeal on this point remains without merit: PO Skeleton, §155 and §156 [CB/3/65].

B.12 Issue (8): Liability for alleged losses

45. SPMC section 12, clause 12 was construed on its plain words, which impose liability for
“all losses caused through [the SPM’s] own negligence, carelessness or error” (J§646
[CB/6/345]), and by testing the commercial implications of rival constructions, on orthodox
principles. PO lost, having accepted “[i]n the ordinary way, if you allege there is a loss you
need to show it. He who asserts must prove” (J§648 [CB/6/345]). PO’s awkward case on a
blanket presumption for ‘Horizon-generated’ shortfalls was rightly rejected: J§652
[CB/6/346]; J§671 to §675 [CB/6/350-352] and N460 Reasons, §34 to §36 [CB/7/479.9].

46. The complaint that the Court took into account post-contractual matters is hopeless: PO
Skeleton, §162 [CB/3/67]. PO lost on this in Judgment No. 4, §112 and Written Reasons of
the Court of Appeal dated 10 May 2019, §28 (not in the Appeal bundles filed by PO).

47. PO’s point on losses caused by Assistants is no more than its case below, made on the flawed
premise that the words permit only one meaning: PO Skeleton, §168 [CB/3/68].

C. CONCLUSION

48. The appeal has no reasonable prospect of success and there is no other compelling reason
for permission to be granted (CPR r.52.6(1)(b)). Neither of PO’s reasons has any merit: the
effect on 11,000 branches is not a compelling reason (PO Skeleton, §8(a) [CB/3/23]); and
the “far-reaching effects on the English law of contract” are obviously overstated (PO
Skeleton, §8(b) [CB/3/23]), given that the decision arises on these very particular facts.

PATRICK GREEN QC
KATHLEEN DONNELLY
HENRY WARWICK
OGNJEN MILETIC
12 July 2019 REANNE MACKENZIE

10
THE POST OFFICE GROUP LITIGATION
Appeal No. A1/2019/1387
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM
THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
B E T W E E N:-
ALAN BATES & OTHERS
Claimants / Respondents
– and –

POST OFFICE LIMITED

Defendant / Applicant

RESPONDENTS’ STATEMENT OF OBJECTION

PATRICK GREEN QC
KATHLEEN DONNELLY
HENRY WARWICK
OGNJEN MILETIC
REANNE MACKENZIE

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