BY E s t e l l i t o Ra n g e l J r .

,
A u r é l i o M o r ei r a L u i z , &
H i l t o n Le ã o d e P . M . Fi l h o

W
hen designing
electrical installations in
an industry that processes
flammable products, it is
necessary to know where the classified
locations are. These locations are identi-
fied in drawings to direct the specifica-
tion of adequate electrical and electronic
equipment. This article shows why the
figures’ copy-and-paste practice does not
guarantee a cost-effective installation. It
also presents comparisons between gas
dispersion models, aiming to help pro-

all-free-download.com
fessionals perform reliable hazardous-
area-classification studies.

Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MIAS.2015.2458335

Date of publication: 12 November 2015

Area
IEEE In dustry A p plication s M ag az in e • jan |f eb 2016 • www.ieee.or g/ia s

Classification
Is Not a
Copy-and-Paste
Process
28 Performing reliable hazardous-area-classification studies

1077-2618/16©2016IEEE
Area Classification
A hazardous area is designated as any
location in which a combustible material
is or may be present in the atmosphere in
sufficient concentration to produce an
ignitable mixture. The North American
area-classification method identifies these
areas by Class, Division, and Group,
while the International Electrotechni-
cal Commission (IEC) designates
them by zone and group.
While many countries accept the
American system, there are others that
use the IEC zone system to identify
their hazardous locations [1]. The
U.S. National Electrical Code (NEC)
recognizes the zone system and allows
its use in the United States under
Article 505 [2]. In Europe, the zone
system defined in European Commit-
tee for Electrotechnical Standardiza-
in 1955, and it is used worldwide with
The objective some misconceptions [3].
In Europe, the Directive 1999/92/
of an area- EC of the European Parliament on min-
imum requirements for improving the
classification safety and health protection of workers
potentially at risk from explosive atmo-
study is to spheres [4] permits the use of any stan-
dard, provided essential health and
define and safety requirements are met. Use of
show the CENELEC standards (which are often
very close to the IEC standards and use
volumes at the concepts of zones 0, 1, and 2) gives
only a presumption of conformity. This
which the concept is somewhat destabilizing for
professionals whose preference is to refer
concentration to a given standard [5].
Depending on the method chosen,
of flammable the equipment selection and installation
gases exceeds must comply with the relevant codes.

tion (CENELEC) standards is the the lower Process Data

most commonly used, and it is mainly Among the information to be consid-
based on the IEC. explosive limit. ered are the operating temperature and
Regardless of the chosen system, the pressure, ventilation, and the vapor
objective of an area-classification study ignition temperature.
is to define and show the volumes at
which the concentration of flammable gases exceeds the Sources of Release
lower explosive limit (LEL). This will allow the selection Some of the most common sources are pump seals, valves,
of the proper explosion-protection types for all electrical flanges, and pipe fittings, where releases of flammable
and electronic equipment to be installed without compro- material are not expected during normal operation of the
mising the plant’s safety. equipment.

I E E E I ndu str y Appl ic ations Ma gazin e • jan |feb 2 016 • ww w.ieee .o rg /ias
Area classification is not intended to consider cata-
strophic failures of plant items but is applied to abnormal Area-Classification Documents
single-mode events that are predictable, e.g., accidental In industrial projects, it is necessary to develop a draft of
spillage of gasoline into sewage systems. the area-classification map during the basic design phase.
Very often, the process information at this stage is still
The Area-Classification Procedure incomplete, and, as a consequence, the documents are
The area-classification procedure can be described in issued in a preliminary version.
steps as follows: A survey related to the area-classification documents
1) establish the method that will be used (zones or divi- was carried out in the American oil, gas, and petrochemi-
sions) and the appropriate reference codes and stan- cal industries [6], and it revealed that
dards for the project ■■ 20% of designers used just a text description
2) obtain pertinent information, e.g., process-flow ■■ 20% failed to mention the gas group
diagrams, material balance sheets, material safety ■■ 25% included the recommended temperature class for
data sheets, processes data sheets, and an updated electrical and electronic equipment to be installed in
plot plan the area
3) identify and assess all continuous, primary, and sec- ■■ the reliability of these documents was assigned a rating
ondary sources and their interactions with the local of six, with ten being the highest rating.
ventilation IEC Standard 60079-10-1, Explosive Atmospheres—Part
4) define the boundaries of each zone or division and 10-1: Classification of Areas—Explosive Gas Atmospheres
plot them on appropriate drawings (that must [7], establishes that the area-classification documents,
include plot plans and elevation views). which may be issued on paper or electronically, need to
include plans and elevations showing the types
Area-Classification Method and  extents of zones, the gas groups, the auto-ignition
In 1947, the NEC introduced the concept of area classifi- temperature, and the recommended temperature class of
cation and the Division 1 and 2 probability factors. The the electrical equipment. The standard also recom-
American Petroleum Institute (API) began formal work mends  referring to the data used as the basis for the
toward an area-classification document in 1951. API RP study, such as
500, Recommended Practice for Classification of Areas for Elec- ■■ recommendations from codes and standards
29
trical Installations in Petroleum Refineries, was first published ■■ the gas dispersion data
 ■■ the ventilation parameters in relation to the releases of
flammable material, so that the availability and effec-
tiveness of ventilation can be assessed.
The area-classification map should show the zone
boundaries, gas groups, and flammable gases’ ignition
temperatures because it will help inspectors when veri-
fying the suitability of the Ex equipment. The impor-
tance of this documentation is also emphasized in other
standards such as National Fire Protection Agency
(NFPA) 70B, Recommended Practice for Electrical Equip-
ment Maintenance [8].
Unfortunately, it is very common to find area-classifica-
tion drawings that do not reflect the installation details,
and the extents of the classified areas are often direct
reproductions of the figures found in API RP 505 [9] and
API RP 500 [10].
Area of Restricted Ventilation Source of Hazard
Inside Enclosure
10 ft
What You See Is Not What You Get
As the installation designer needs to know where the gas
concentrations can reach their LEL to specify the right
electrical equipment, the definition and location of clas-
sified areas is the primary concern.
Sixty years ago, when computational resources were not
easily available, documents were issued to familiarize
designers with the safety distances that should be consid-
ered in petroleum installations, where the processes
involved flammable materials.
API RP 500 is a recommended practice for area classifi-
cation in petroleum facilities that was originally issued in
1951. The second edition, in 1957, included some refer-
ence diagrams, as shown in Figure 1 [3].
Note 1 under the original figure read “Distances given
are for average refinery installations; they must be used
with judgment, with consideration
given to all factors discussed in RP 500.”
The 2012 edition of API RP 500 [10,
Fig. 22] kept the same illustration, as
shown in Figure 2. Note  2 under the
original figure is “Distances given are for

Nonhazardous Nonhazardous typical refinery installations; they must be

25 ft

10 ft
used with judgment, with consideration
2 ft

Grade given to all factors discussed in the text.

In some instances, greater or lesser dis-
Below-Grade tances may be justified.”
Location, Such But what is a typical refinery installa-
as a Sump or 50 ft 50 ft
tion? Since the 1957 and 2012 figures are
Trench 100 ft (Note 1) 100 ft
the same, can we say that a typical 1957
refinery had the same characteristics and
Division 1 Division 2 Additional Division 2 Area Nonhazardous products as a 2015 installation, despite
IEEE In dustry A p plication s M ag az in e • jan |f eb 2016 • www.ieee.or g/ia s

—Suggested Where Large the many improvements and process

Releases of Volatile changes since then? The answer, unfortu-
Products May Occur nately, is no.
1 Additionally, it is interesting to note
Process area with restricted ventilation [3]. that the classified area extent suggested in
both diagrams was for which-
ever gas was processed in the
plant used for the example.
Source Inside Enclosure 3 m (10 ft) Therefore, just copying and
Area of Inadequate pasting that image into an
Ventilation 3 m (10 ft)
area-classification plan is no
longer acceptable. Some oil
companies realized this and
6 m (2 ft) issued internal procedures to
Grade 7.5 m (25 ft) avoid the reproduction of
generic figures in area-classi-
fication plans [11].
Below-Grade Other important details to
15 m (50 ft) 15 m (50 ft)
) note about the API RP 500
Location Such as
(Note 1) (Note 1) sample images such as Fig-
a Sump or Trench
3 m (100 ft)
30 3 m (100 ft)
30 ures 1 and 2 are as follows:
■■ The flammable prod-
ucts are not identified.
■■ The process variables
Division 1 Division 2 Additional Division 2 Area
—Suggested Where Large (pressures, volumes,
Releases of Volatile and temperatures) are
Products May Occur not known.
2 ■■ The dimensions of build-
30
Inadequately ventilated process location with heavier-than-air gas or vapor source [10]. ings are not defined.
 ■■ Division 2 was also used as a “tran- It is a matter of concern that NFPA
sition zone” between a Division 1
and a nonclassified area [12].
Changes in 497 is extensively used to classify loca-
tions in the petroleum and gas indus-
Process plants today are larger and more the product tries because, as is written in clause
complex, with a higher degree of auto- 5.7.1, it is not applicable to them but
mation. New chemical products and mix or the only to chemical process areas. It is
processes are adding many additional worth noting that clause 5.7.4 clarifies
flammable materials to an already introduction that the figures shown in NFPA 497
lengthy list of substances. Any enlarge- may be applicable in certain installa-
ments of the industrial plant or process of new tions of small chemical industries, but
changes should always consider the
effect on the existing area-classification
flammable considering that oil industry facilities
are characterized by large-volume and
plan. Changes in the product mix or the materials into high-pressure processes, it recommends
introduction of new flammable materi- using API RP 500/505 as a basis to
als into a plant can drastically change a plant can classify them.
the area classification. It is likely that the use of NFPA
In the 1990s, one of the most inter- drastically 497 in oil and gas facilities is prompt-
esting developments for text-editor ed by its Table 5.7.4, where the extent
software was the “what you see is what change the of classified locations are estimated
you get” feature. But in area classifica- depending on the pressure, volume, or
tion, the figures shown in current doc- area flow rate of process equipment. That
uments cannot be directly applied to
any project because the real plant char-
classification. table is reproduced here as Table 1.
Since such variables may have simi-
acteristics are not the same as those lar magnitudes in oil facilities, a hasty
considered for the figures. reading of Table 1 can lead to the mis-
This is the main reason why the figures in API RP conception that, knowing the pressure of the process
500/505 cannot be simply copied when performing area equipment, the area-classification extents are already
classification for a given plant. This is highlighted in the defined by the figures in NFPA 497 sections 5.9 and 5.10.
document text, as in Note 2 [10, Fig. 22]: “In some It must be highlighted that such figures as Figure 3 are
instances, greater or lesser distances may be justified.” This not intended to be copied exactly.
makes it clear that the designer is responsible for defining It is very common to apply the dimensions shown in
the distances and that the figures in the document are not to Figure 3 as the classified-area extent where the equipment

I E E E I ndu str y Appl ic ations Ma gazin e • jan |feb 2 016 • ww w.ieee .o rg /ias
be reproduced verbatim for all oil and gas projects. size is in the range of 5,000 to 25,000 gal, whatever the
As the parameters considered for elaboration of the fig- process, but this is not correct.
ures are not described in the RP 500/505 texts, the extents The subtlety is that NFPA 497 does not identify what
of the classified locations given by them tend to be arbitrary substances were considered when these figures were
and large. The interiors of vessels are well defined, but, developed, so they cannot be applied to any industrial
when the less hazardous areas—such as zone/Division 1 and plant, as expressed in 5.7.6: “...where the available
particularly zone/Division 2—are considered, it is not equipment diagrams indicate the size small (low) to
uncommon to find the entire plant as classified, instead of a moderate, and the equipment falls in the large (high)
limited area just around the process equipment. category, greater extent distances could be considered.
NFPA 497 [13] is another recommended practice, and The extent distances presented in these figures are for
its purpose is to provide the user with an understanding of combustible materials with low lower flammable limits
the parameters that define the degree and extent of hazard- (LFLs). A reduction in the extent distance could be con-
ous areas. Similarly to API RP 500/505, it is not intended sidered for combustible materials with comparatively
to immediately provide the area-classification extent by higher LFL.”
copying the figures; the extent’s definition is the user’s This reminds us that sound judgment is the key point
responsibility. in the assessment, as expressed in as highlighted in API

TABLE 1. THE RELATIVE MAGNITUDES OF TABLE 2. MASS FLOW FOR CH4 USING
PROCESS EQUIPMENT AND PIPING THAT HANDLE COX’S MODEL (g/s).
COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS [13, TABLE 5.7.4]. Pressure
Process
Equipment Units Small Moderate Large 1 MPa 2 MPa

Size gal <5,000 5,000–25,000 >25,000 Hole Area (mm2) Hole Area (mm2)

Pressure lbf/in2 <100 100–500 >500 0.25 2.5 25.0 0.25 2.5 25.0
Mass
Flow rate g/min <100 100–500 >500 flow 0.3 2.6 26.0 0.5 5.2 52.0 31
 RP 500/505 as well as NFPA 497 sec-
tion 5.8.4. We can say, in this case,
that what you see is not what you get.
Mathematical Models
Several attempts have been made to
include calculating procedures, but dis-
agreements over their accuracy have
almost always resulted in a failure to
agree on their inclusion [14].
Inexperienced persons think that
classifying locations is an easy task,
but, in fact, it is difficult to do in a
reliable way. The lack of information
with which to estimate the mass flow
rate of the leak, especially for acciden-
tal releases, leads to subjective opinions
and complicates the adoption of a
given mathematical model. Some sim-
plifications were introduced as alterna-
tives, but a consistent judgment is
required [15].
The basis for mathematical models
relies on the estimate of media flow through specially
designed openings to ensure the maximum flow rate
with minimal energy. This research is modeled by the
discipline of fluid dynamics, and statistical data are
welcome to help in the task [16]. There is concern
regarding the usage of mathematical models because
people without the knowledge to identify their limita-
tions could adopt them improperly.
IEEE In dustry A p plication s M ag az in e • jan |f eb 2016 • www.ieee.or g/ia s
The extent of hazardous areas
because there depends on the wind speed at the
vicinity of the sources of release and the
is no proven ventilation availability. For these esti-
mates, the equations are valid for well-
way to ventilated areas and with adequate
ventilation ability, i.e., outdoors with
predict the wind speed between 0.5 and 2 m/s.
Four approaches for defining the area-
consequences classification extent using mathemati-
of an cal models are described in this article:
Cox’s model, McMillan’s model, the
explosion, modified Cox model, and the IEC
60079-10-1 model.
it is not
Cox’s Model
reasonable to The model proposed by Cox for the gas
mass flow considered the Gaussian
use this EPL plume model under the simplest case: a
subsonic jet issuing from a circular ori-
underrating. fice [17]. This gives the axial jet concen-
tration C for circular holes, as in (1).
The fundamental assumptions of the
Gaussian plume model equation are
■■ level terrain
■■ constant winds with unidirectional speed
■■ homogeneous and stationary atmospheric turbulence.
c m , (1)
Cx = 5 do tA
Co x to
where

C x = axial volumetric concentration at x meters (m3/m3)

C o  = the volumetric concentration at the outlet (m3/m3)
Division 1 d o   = the outlet diameter (m)
Division 2 x   = the distance along the axis (m)
-3
t A   = the ambient atmosphere density (kg.m )
3-ft (915-mm) -3
t o    = the gas density at the outlet (kg.m ).
Source Radius
Gaussian dispersion methods depend on reliable esti-
18 in
mates of wind speed to enable the estimation of downwind
(457 m m)
mm)
Grade concentrations. While there is no theoretical limit to the
maximum wind speed that may be modeled, the equation is
unreliable if the wind speed falls below a certain limit, usu-
Below-Grade ally defined as 1 m/s. Due to the relatively low probability
Location Such as 10-ft
10 (3.05
f (3 05 m)) R
Radius
di
a Sump or Trench
of such low wind speeds outdoors, the problem of modeling
3 dispersion in near-calm conditions is seldom addressed.
To get the estimated mass flow of the release in a real
NFPA 497 Figure 5.9.1 (b): Leakage located outdoors, above
grade. The material being handled is a flammable liquid [13].
plant, three orifice areas that represented the piping acces-
sories as sources of release were considered:

TABLE 3. MASS FLOW FOR CH4— TABLE 4. NFPA 497: FIGURE 5.9.1 (B). THE MATERIAL
McMILLAN’S MODEL [g/s]. BEING HANDLED IS A FLAMMABLE LIQUID.
Pressure Small/Low Moderate Large/High
1 MPa 2 MPa Process equip- —
Hole Area (mm ) 2
Hole Area (mm2) ment size

0.25 2.5 25.0 0.25 2.5 25.0 Pressure —

Mass
32 flow 0.3 3.1 31.3 0.7 6.6 66.0 Flow rate —
 0.25 mm2 for small leakages from spiral-wound gas-
■■ The IEC 60079-10-1 Model
kets and ring-type joints This IEC 60079-10-1 standard goes beyond the area-clas-
2
■■ 2.5 mm for small leakages from compressed asbestos sification procedure, establishing also considerations on
fiber (CAF) gaskets equipment selection [7]. Its introduction says that, “in
2
■■ 25 mm for bigger leakages from CAF gaskets. areas where dangerous quantities and concentrations of
The mass flow (g/s) obtained by Cox’s model for methane flammable gas or vapor may arise, protective measures are
(CH4) with these considerations is shown in Table 2 [18]. to be applied in order to reduce the risk of explosions.”
Subclause 4.2 states that “a risk assessment may be carried
McMillan’s Model out to assess whether the consequences of ignition of an
The model proposed by McMillan for the gas mass flow explosive atmosphere requires the use of equipment of a
is given in (2) [18]. higher equipment protection level (EPL) or may justify
the use of equipment with a lower EPL than normally
G = 0.006 APo 8` M jB ,  required.” This is similar to saying that equipment
0.5
(2)
T1 approved for use only in zone 2 locations can be used in
some zone 1 locations.
where This text receives endorsement from Annex C of IEC
G = the mass released per unit time (kg/s) 60079-17, which states that it “is reasonable to install an EPL
A = the cross-sectional area of the nozzle (m²) lower than required by the classified location, if the resulting
Po = the upstream pressure (N/m²) explosion is small, and the risk to life can be disregarded”
M = the molar mass of the gas (kg/kmol) [21]. This is contradictory as the prime objective of electrical
T1 = absolute temperature of release (K). installation in hazardous locations is to avoid explosions. As is
The mass flow (g/s) obtained by McMillan’s model (2) well known, small explosions can lead to tragedies due to the
for CH4 is shown in Table 3 [19]. possibility of a domino effect, and, because there is no proven
After the mass flow calculation, the distance where way to predict the consequences of an explosion, it is not rea-
the CH 4 LEL is expected to happen was defined by sonable to use this EPL underrating. This alternative cannot
(3) [19]. be considered safe [22]. Moreover, if a device that permits an
explosion is intentionally installed in a plant, the owner can
c m , (3)
X = 2.1 # 10 G be prosecuted based on the criminal laws and legal directives
LEL2 M 1.5 T 0.5 of many countries [23].
Regarding the model introduced in this standard, a par-
where ticular concept is given, Vz , the hypothetical volume over
LEL (% vol) which the concentration of flammable gas or vapor will typ-

I E E E I ndu str y Appl ic ations Ma gazin e • jan |feb 2 016 • ww w.ieee .o rg /ias
X = distance from the source of release until the LEL ically be either 0.25 or 0.5 times the LEL, given by (5).
is reached (m)
M = molar mass (kg/kmol) f # c dV m
T = ambient temperature (K). dt min
Vz = f # Vk = , (5)
As long as the speed of the gas release is higher than C
the considered wind speed (0.5 to 2.0 m/s ), (3) is valid. If
it is lower, the gas flow will cease to be dominant, becom- where
ing more dependent on atmospheric conditions at the
location of the leak.
2.5
The Modified Cox Model 2.3
Two adjustment factors in Cox’s model were introduced
2.0
to consider the effects of the pressure and density of the 1.9
flammable gas on the classified-area extent, as shown in
(4) [20]. 1.5
(m)

5C o d o c t x m0.5 k k , (4) 1.0

x= t pr
0.2 # LEL t o o o
0.7 Cox

0.5 0.6 McMillan

where 0.2
LEL = (% vol) 0.2
C o = the concentration at outlet (% vol) 0.0
d o = the outlet diameter (m) 0.25 2.5 25
x = the distance from the source of release until (mm2)
20% LEL is reached (m) 4
3
t x = the ambient density (kg/m ) A comparison of the results under the Cox and McMillan
3
t o = the gas density at the outlet (kg/m ) models for the calculation of CH4 LEL distance from source
k t = the density adjustment factor (Y axis) considering different holes’ cross sections (X axis) at
33
o

k pr = the pressure adjustment factor.

o
1 MPa.
 f = the efficiency of the ventilation
Vk = the relationship between the calculated value
(dV/dt)min and the actual ventilation rate
within the volume under consideration in
the vicinity of the release
c m = the minimum volumetric flow rate of fresh
dV
dt min air (m3/s)
C = the number of fresh air changes per unit
time (s-1).
three release pressures were defined: 7, 35, and 100 kPa,
totaling 36 simulations [20].
The simulations did not consider wind, gravity, or phase
change. The adjustment parameters were included to consider
the influence of density and pressure on the conical subsonic
jet model. The results for all 36 cases were satisfactory.
Figure 5 shows a comparison between the modified
Cox model and the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
simulation for CH4 at 35 kPa and a 0.5-mm hole radius
at the source of release [18].

Comparisons The Modified Cox, McMillan, and Cox Models

The Cox and McMillan Models
Considering the Cox and McMillan models, the rela-
tionship between the distance from the source of release
until the CH4 LEL is achieved for 1 MPa pressure for
each simulation for different hole areas is shown on Fig-
ure 4 [18].
The Modified Cox and Computational
Fluid Dynamics Models
For this simulation, four gases were analyzed: hydrogen,
CH4, carbon monoxide, and propane. Three release holes,
with radii of 0.1, 0.5, and 2.5 mm, were defined, and
120.0
100.0
IEEE In dustry A p plication s M ag az in e • jan |f eb 2016 • www.ieee.or g/ia s
Another comparison related to the estimate of classified-
area extent is presented for CH4 using the following
parameters: release hole radius = 1 mm, temperature =
300 K, and gas concentration of interest = 20% LEL.
Figure 6 shows the radius in meters until the gas con-
centration of interest is reached under the Cox, McMillan,
and proposed modified Cox models at different pressures.
The distances defined by the McMillan model can be larg-
er than those defined by the other two.
The IEC 60079-10-1 and CFD Models
To evaluate the IEC 60079-10-1 model using Vz , a
study was conducted by the U.K. Health and Safety
Executive using the CFD software and validated against
experimental data using point measurements of gas con-
centrations [24].
Some of the study’s conclusions were as follows:
■■ The formulas for V z given in IEC 60079-10-1 are not
scientifically based and, in general, cannot be expected
to produce results that reflect reality. Furthermore, Vz is

80.0 not even a measure of the degree of ventilation as it

depends both on the ventilation and on the source of gas.
(%vol)

60.0 ■■ V z calculated using IEC 60079-10-1 has been found

to be up to three orders of magnitude larger than the
40.0
gas cloud volume Vz predicted by using a validated
20.0 CFD model.
Figure 7 shows the gas cloud volumes of CH4 free-jets
- released from a hole area of 2.5 mm2 at different pres-
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 sures calculated using three methods:
(m)
■■ the V z from IEC 60079-10-1
Model CFD
5
A comparison of the modified Cox model and CFD simula-
tion for CH4.
0.12

0.1 100% LEL

Gas Cloud Volume (m3)

20.00 50% LEL

0.08 Vz
15.00
0.06
(m)

10.00
0.04
5.00
0.02
0.00
00 50 100 150 0
(kgf/cm2) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Modified Cox McMillan Cox Pressure (barg)
6 7
A comparison of the Cox, modified Cox, and McMillan The variation of the gas cloud volume of CH4 releases versus
34
models for CH4. pressure, considering V z and CFD.
 ■■ CFD-validated soft-
ware for 50% LEL 1.5
■■ CFD-validated soft- 1.45
ware for 100% LEL 1.4
1.35
[24]. 1.3
The greatest differences 1.25
were found in the larg- 1.2
est enclosures. This 1.15
1.1
implies that use of IEC 1.05
60079-10-1 for calcu- 1
lating Vz significantly 0.95
overestimates the haz- 0.9
0.85
ard and, therefore, leads
Height (m)

0.8
to larger classified areas. 0.75
Additional concerns 0.7
in the current IEC 0.65
0.6
60079-10-1 approach 0.55
are that the definition of 0.5
classified-area extent is 0.45
not provided and there 0.4
0.35
are no warnings that the 0.3
frequency and duration 0.25
of gas releases can vary 0.2
significantly between 0.15
0.1
similar sources of release. 0.05
0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
The NFPA 497 and CFD
Models, Considering Horizontal Distance (m)
Process Temperature 8
Simulations were done Isopentane’s LEL concentration plume extent due to a leakage at 30 °C.
with isopentane at a
given pressure, consider-

I E E E I ndu str y Appl ic ations Ma gazin e • jan |feb 2 016 • ww w.ieee .o rg /ias
ing three temperatures: 30, 90, and 120 °C. In these con-
TABLE 5. A COMPARISON OF CFD SIMULATION AND
ditions, the distances in Figure 3 and Table 4 are
NFPA FIGURE 5.9.1 (b): above-LEL concentration
applicable, but the simulation results show that the dis-
of isopentane releases at different
tances for each case differ.
temperatures.
Figures 8–10 show the dimensions of the plume until
the LEL is achieved due to an isopentane’s source of release Distance (m)
at 1 m height [25]. The differences are summarized in Isopentane
Table 5. (oC) CFD (m) NFPA 497 (m)

30 4.9 3.0
The NFPA 497 and CFD models,
Considering Process Pressure 90 3.7 3.0
Simulations were done using hexane at 30 oC for two pres-
sures, 14.22 and 497.8 lbf/in2. Under NFPA 497, in both 120 3.3 3.0
situations, the Figure 3 and Table 4 distances are applicable.
As expected, however, the results show that the distances
until the LEL is reached in each case are very different [25].
In Figures 11 and 12, the dimensions of the plume until
the LEL is achieved due to a hexane’s source of release at TABLE 6. A COMPARISON OF CFD SIMULATION AND
0.5 m height are shown in meters. The maximum distances NFPA Fig. 5.9.1 (b): ABOVE-LEL CONCENTRATION
found in this simulation considering these two pressures OF HEXANE RELEASES AT DIFFERENT PRESSURES.
are summarized in Table 6.
Distance (m) Difference
Limitations of Mathematical Models
Methods for determining the release rates and the explosive Hexane Absolute Relative
atmosphere extent created by a given leak have been the (lbf/in2) NFPA 497 CFD (m) (%)
subject of much discussion. It has proved almost impossible 14.22 3.0 1.8 -1.2 -40
to settle on a method with full confidence of all relevant
interests. Experimental validation of mathematical models 497.8 3.0 5.2 +2.2 +73 35
is necessary, and some results have been achieved [26].
 One very important
1.5 parameter for modeling
1.45
1.4
the source of a gas leak
1.35 is its mass release rate.
1.3 This can be computed
1.25 using the known up-
1.2
1.15
stream temperature and
1.1 pressure. The method
1.05 used will depend on
1 whether the release is
0.95
0.9
subsonic or choked, and
0.85 it is known that choked
0.8 releases are sonic at the
Height (m)

0.75 point of release.

0.7 The use of mathe-
0.65
0.6 matical relations must
0.55 be carefully approached,
0.5 and only by those suffi-
0.45 ciently expert to identify
0.4
0.35 their limitations [27].
0.3 There is no evidence
0.25 that the calculations de-
0.2 fine hazardous areas at
0.15
0.1 least as large as necessary
0.05 when expertly used.
0 This is because they are
4
0.4
2
0.2

6
0.6
8
0.8

2.2
2
2.4
4
2.6
6
2.8
8

3.2
2
3.4
4
3.6
6
3.8
8

4.2
2
4.4
4
4.6
6
4.8
8
1.2
2
1.4
4
1.6
6
1.8
8

3
0

5
largely based on ideal
Horizontal Distance (m) releases from nozzles
9 rather than the acciden-
Isopentane’s LEL concentration plume extent due to a leakage at 90 oC. tal leaks that can occur
due to failure of such
containment elements as
IEEE In dustry A p plication s M ag az in e • jan |f eb 2016 • www.ieee.or g/ia s

1.5 glands and gaskets or, in

1.45 the case of those includ-
1.4 ed in IEC 60079-10-1,
1.35
1.3 because of the many
1.25 safety factors added. De-
1.2 spite the progress on the
1.15 CFD models, area classi-
1.1
1.05 fication is still an inex-
1 act science that relies on
0.95 risk evaluation and ex-
0.9 pert judgment.
0.85
0.8 Some considerations
Height (m)

0.75 were broadly used 50

0.7 years ago, but they were
0.65 not aligned with the area-
0.6
0.55 classification concepts
0.5 [27]. As an example, the
0.45 areas surrounding sources
0.4
0.35
of permanent ignition,
0.3 such as fired heaters, were
0.25 usually considered non-
0.2 classified ones [12]. Some
0.15
0.1
designers used this as an
0.05 advantage by positioning
0 heaters in a convenient lo-
0.4
0.2

0.6
0.8

2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8

3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8

4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
0

cation to permit the adja-

Horizontal Distance (m) cent location of another
10 piece of equipment,
36 o
Isopentane’s LEL concentration plume extent due to a leakage at 120 C. where such equipment is
difficult to obtain as both
suitable and approved for 2
the area classification, 1.9
e.g., electric starting 1.8
equipment on a diesel-en- 1.7
gine-driven pump [12].
1.6
Fortunately, the 2012 edi-
tion of API RP 500 clari- 1.5
fied this topic on 6.2.4.2: 1.4
“It may be prudent to 1.3
classify portions of these 1.2
locations. For example, 1.1
Height (m)

electrical equipment may

1
be exposed to flamma-
0.9
ble  gas during a purge
cycle of a fired heater or 0.8
furnace. The lack of classi- 0.7
fication around unpro- 0.6
tected fired vessels and 0.5
flare tips does not imply
0.4
the safe placement of fired
vessels and flare tips in 0.3
the proximity to other 0.2
sources of release because 0.1
unprotected fired vessels 0
and flare tips are them-
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8

3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
3

5.4
selves sources of ignition.”
Horizontal Distance (m)
11
Conclusions Hexane’s LEL concentration extent due to a leakage at 14.22 lbf/in . 2
The most common char-
acteristic found in area-
classification drawings is

I E E E I ndu str y Appl ic ations Ma gazin e • jan |feb 2 016 • ww w.ieee .o rg /ias
the mere reproduction 1.5
of the figures presented 1.45
1.4
in API RP 500/505 and 1.35
in NFPA 497 [25]. Al- 1.3
though these documents 1.25
express in many parts of 1.2
1.15
their texts that it is nec- 1.1
essary to consider the 1.05
real conditions of the 1
plant under study and 0.95
0.9
not only the figures, 0.85
there is a misconception
Height (m)

0.8
that they can be used in- 0.75
dependently of the plant 0.7
0.65
characteristics, like a 0.6
cookbook that could 0.55
allow people with no ex- 0.5
perience in the subject 0.45
0.4
to quickly create area- 0.35
classification drawings. 0.3
The dilemma of ap- 0.25
plying classified loca- 0.2
0.15
tions’ extent has been a 0.1
concern for a long time. 0.05
The typical-figure pro- 0
0.4
0.2

0.6
0.8

2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8

3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8

4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8

5.2
5.4
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8

cess characteristics are

0

not justified in the rec- Horizontal Distance (m)

ommended practices, 12
2 37
and many people do Hexane’s LEL concentration plume extent due to a leakage at 497.8 lbf/in .
 interpolations on them, trying to area classification, and these approaches
achieve satisfactory classifications [12]. may vary. Extreme care is therefore
It is better if standards do not have Copying necessary if a particular plant is classi-
typical figures, but rather objective re-
quirements to ensure final users that
generic fied just by mixing information from
different codes.
they will receive the necessary informa- figures is not As the area-classification plan needs
tion to specify and install the adequate to be reviewed periodically, a detailed
electrical and electronics equipment. In- the correct dossier including all considerations
stead of IEC 60079-10-1 defining the taken into account is of vital impor-
acceptance requirements for an area-clas- way to tance. The final area-classification doc-
sification plan, it directs users to other umentation should consist of at least
industrial codes to define the classified perform area the following:
areas’ extent. With this approach, the
document is not appropriately titled as a
classification. ■■ plan-view drawings
■■ detail/elevation drawings
standard; in fact, it more closely com- ■■ a list of flammable materials
plies with the IEC definition for Techni- ■■ a list of sources of release
cal Report. ■■ a comprehensive written description stating the basis
It must also be emphasized that each industry code or for classification, explaining why and how each area
company specification is based on a particular approach to was classified
■■ the locations of alert signs.
Written descriptions of classified areas are very important.
A description allows users to know the reasons for classifi-
cation and the conditions considered in the assessment,
No Unnecessary including process configuration, ventilation, safety factors,
Text mathematical models, and materials data. This will endorse
Zone, Gas Group, and
the drawings and will play a fundamental role when updat-
Temperature Class ing the area-classification plan.
An item that contributes to a safer plant and also helps
the inspection activity is the safety signalization of hazard-
Reference Drawing
Number
ous locations. The location of each alert sign can be indi-
Zone 1 IIB T4 cated in the area-classification drawings to alert workers
DWG 200-672-Area1 that perform services in industrial plants. Figure 13 shows
13 a suggestion for a distinctive sign for classified areas [28].
IEEE In dustry A p plication s M ag az in e • jan |f eb 2016 • www.ieee.or g/ia s

An effective design for a classified area’s alert sign. With a simple design that follows ISO 3864-1, Graphi-
cal Symbols—Safety Colours
and Signs [29] recommenda-
tions, it has the “Ex” inside a
1.00e - 02 yellow triangle over a red-
9.50e - 03 colored background and
9.00e - 03 shows the zone, the gas
8.50e - 03 group, and the temperature
8.00e - 03 class of permitted electrical
7.50e - 03 and electronic equipment to
7.00e - 03 be used in a particular classi-
6.50e - 03 fied area. This is important
6.00e - 03 information not only for
5.50e - 03 maintenance workers but
5.00e - 03 also for safety officers and
4.50e - 03 installation inspectors.
4.00e - 03 The referenced area-clas-
3.50e - 03 sification drawing number
3.00e - 03 is also indicated on the sign,
2.50e - 03 stating that the document
2.00e - 03 exists and also making it
1.50e - 03
easier for the user to get
1.00e - 03
additional information,
Z
such as the limits of classi-
5.00e - 04 Y fied area.
0.00e + 00 X Copying generic figures
14 is not the correct way to
38
A three-dimensional indication of the region where the flammable atmosphere reaches its LEL. perform area classification.
On the other hand, the question is not easily solved using
an equation. It is necessary to know the processes’ charac-
teristics and the limitations of the mathematical models
used [30], [31].
There are a number of methods available for measuring
and calculating ventilation rates, and any method applied to
area classification must be straightforward and give a rea-
sonable degree of accuracy [32].
Despite the progress in this subject, there is still a long
way to go, especially in dealing with flammable-mixture
analysis. The IEC 60079-10-1 standard is considered to
have an arbitrary outdoor methodology of little, if any,
value [24].
Considering that the concepts of gas dispersion are used
as the basis for modeling gas leaks and that fluid dynamics is
outside the scope of electrical engineering, area-classification
cannot be the duty of one electrical professional. The area-
classification assessment should be the result of the consensus
of a group consisting of process engineers, safety profession-
als, plant operators and the project management. Conse-
quently, standards for this subject would be better written if
issued in the international context by ISO, instead of IEC,
because the latter is an organization represented only by elec-
trotechnology professionals, who are not familiar with fluid
dynamics principles [22], [33].
The area-classification drawings are the final result of
the assessment and must express the most probable occur-
rence of explosive atmospheres, elaborated under all regis-
tered considerations found in the assessment dossier.
Figure 14 shows a three-dimensional visualization
using colors to identify the different concentrations of the
flammable atmosphere under a process leakage. The extent
can be used in the area-classification drawings to allow the
correct specification of electrical and electronics equip-
ment and also to guide the issuing of work permits for
maintenance services.
Oil and gas companies are realizing that the reproduc-
tion of the figures shown in recommended-practices docu-
ments cannot be accepted as a reliable area-classification
plan for their industrial sites [11].
References
[1] E. Rangel Jr., “Brazil moves from divisions to zones,” in Proc. 49th
IEEE PCIC Conf. Rec., New Orleans, LA, 2002, pp. 23–29.
[2] National Electrical Code (NEC), NFPA 70, 2011.
[3] Recommended Practice for Classification of Areas for Electrical Installations in
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[4] Directive 1999/92/EC, Minimum Requirements for Improving the Safety
and Health Protection of Workers Potentially at Risk from Explosive Atmo-
spheres (ATEX 137), EU, 1999.
[5] R. Tommasini, E. Pons, and F. Palamara, “Area classification for explosive
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[9] Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installa-
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[10] Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at
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[11] P resentation of the Area Classification Plan, Petrobras Standard
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Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998.
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classification using CFD,” Petrobras, Brazil, Tech. Rep. AEDC
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[21] Explosive Atmospheres—Part 17: Electrical Installations Inspection and
Maintenance, IEC Standard 60079-17, 2007.
[22] E. Rangel Jr. and C. A. Sanguedo, “International standards on explo-
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8th PCIC Europe Conf. Rec., Rome, Italy, 2011, pp. 91–94.
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[24] Health and Safety Laboratory, “Area classification for secondary releas-
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fication studies,” in Proc. 13th Brazil Automation Congr., São Paulo, Bra-
zil, 2009, pp. 87–101.
[26] R. Tommasini and E. Pons, “Classification of hazardous areas pro-
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Estellito Rangel Jr. (estellito@petrobras.com.br), Aurélio Moreira
Luiz, and Hilton Leão de P.M. Filho are with Petrobras, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. Rangel Jr. is a Senior Member of the IEEE.
This article first appeared as “Area Classification Is Not a Copy
and Paste Process” at the 2014 IEEE IAS Petroleum and Chem-
ical Industry Committee Technical Conference.
39